

HEARING ON AMERICANS MISSING OR PRISONER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE DEPARTMENT OF DE- FENSE ACCOUNTING PROCESS

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO LEARN THE FATE OF AMERICA'S
MISSING SERVICEMEN

JUNE 24 AND 25, 1992

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

60-095-

WASHINGTON : 1992

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-039938-6

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HEARING ON AMERICANS MISSING OR PRISONER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACCOUNTING PROCESS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1992

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry, (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the POW/MIA Senate Select Committee will come to order.

I would like to do a couple of housekeeping items, if I may, before I make my opening comments and turn to colleagues for their openings. I want to apologize up front for the fact that my opening may be a little bit longer than normal. But I think it is very important to set the framework and to understand exactly how the committee is coming at this hearing today, indeed, coming at the hearings of the next months.

The first housekeeping matter I want to deal with is that yesterday I talked with Ambassador Toon in Moscow, and we are still following up on aspects of the reports concerning American POW's that were made by President Yeltsin. At this time, there is no archival information that supports the statements that were made. There is still a question with respect to some of the individuals from whom information has come. And he has assured me that our staff, the commission staff in Moscow, is following up on that even as we are here now. And he was having an important meeting with the head of the military intelligence yesterday afternoon. I do not know the results of that. So that is being pursued even as we speak.

Originally, we were to have had a meeting with President Yeltsin this Friday. We are not going to be able to do that for a couple of reasons, not the least of which is that the President is now unable to meet at that particular time. So we will hold that in abeyance.

Second, we have been in touch with Vietnam through their representation in New York, and they have assured us that as to any names or any individuals who might become the subject of discussion here in the course of our releasing new lists and bringing to

gether new information, that they will move immediately to search out any information with respect to those people, that they welcome whatever new information we might have in terms of names, and they will do their best, or so they say, to try to help us resolve any questions that might exist.

Third, I read with some interest today about a characterization of deep divisions within the committee with respect to its direction. I do not buy that, and I just want to make the record very clear that whatever problems have existed in the last couple of days have existed over the issue of leaks, and some people may have had their own priorities with respect to issuing information that has not yet been fully examined, analyzed, and vetted by this committee. We will not tolerate leaks, and we have taken action with respect to that.

There is no disagreement between Senator Smith and myself whatsoever as to the direction of this Committee or what we will do with respect to information. Senator Smith and I have said since the inception of this committee that we will seek full declassification of all material relevant to this issue and that it will take a major showing of national security concern in order to prevent us from seeking that declassification of material now 20 years or more old. We have been in touch with various parties and we have gotten much of that. And we appreciate the cooperation.

I might add that the Defense Department, the State Department, and the National Security Council have provided to this committee documents that have never before been viewed with respect to this issue.

Both Senator Smith and I believe that we could still do better. Both of us believe that there are procedures in place that could be simplified, and both of us believe that the agencies of our Government could frankly be more forthcoming. So I concur heartily with Senator Smith's expression of frustration with respect to that issue. We are going to take a vote next week on a suggestion of our subcommittee of Senator Grassley and Senator Robb, who have been tasked to put together a declassification approach. We will be seeking the full declassification of materials. But I want to make it absolutely clear to all that we are going to vet this.

I also want to make it clear that as chairman, I object to those within the committee or elsewhere who might undertake on their own volition to set the agenda or the schedule and decide that they will release information to the press when it has not necessarily been fully analyzed or vetted. Why? Why do I do that? Not because I want this committee to withhold anything. I cannot make it more clear that we want all information out. But we have a responsibility to families, families who have been jerked around and tugged and pulled on an emotional roller coaster for 20 years. I am not going to allow the Committee to raise hopes falsely or to become a cause of that kind of unfair emotional roller coaster. We will do our work responsibly and we will do it cautiously and we will do it intelligently.

Now, let me also say that we received a letter from the White House this past week from Boyden Gray which does not satisfy the committee with respect to our ability to get a waiver of executive privilege with respect to POW/MIA materials. Dr. Kissinger has

given us a letter granting us access to his archival material. But he has done that subject to the White House's control of executive privilege over that material. We have asked for access to that material, and it is my hope that the White House will quickly decide that they do not want to apply executive privilege as to material that is 20 years old or more.

We fully understand as to current national security material. We are not seeking copies of current national security material, although it may be that we need Senatorial access to some of it.

Now, having said that, let me talk about what we are setting out to do beginning today. We had one set of hearings last November, and they were to set the stage: What is this issue all about? Who is concerned about this issue? What are the concerns that people have expressed? We heard from veterans groups; we heard from families; we heard from activists; we heard from people on all sides of the issue, all of whom have carried for years a responsibility of one kind or another in order to get answers on this issue.

We promised we would do careful analysis. We have tried to do that. For 6 months, we have quietly been pouring over lists, getting information, trying to understand ourselves what the story is here so that we could lay out to our fellow Americans the truth. I want to emphasize, and I have said it before, we are not interested in any ideological slant on the truth. We are not interested in some particular party's view of the truth. We are not interested in a shade of the truth. We are interested in the truth. Painful as it may be, upsetting as it might be, disturbing, we want the truth no matter what it does to somebody's 20 years of endeavors on this issue. I am convinced that nothing will do more to satisfy Americans that Government can produce something than for this committee to come through with that.

In that effort, we are going to start to sort some of it out in public. We do not have all the answers today. I want to emphasize that. A 1-day or 2-day hearing on this issue will leave questions outstanding. We know that. What we are beginning is the open inquiry that Americans have asked for so that people can say with certainty there is not a conspiracy to cover up or to continue to cover up.

On April 13, 1973, less than 2 weeks after the return of the last American prisoners as part of Operation Homecoming, Dr. Roger Shields, who was then the head of the Defense Department task force on POW/MIA's said, quote, we have no indication at this moment that there are any Americans alive in Indochina. That statement, in fact, is perhaps the beginning point of much of the controversy.

Information uncovered by the investigators of this Committee indicate that this statement which was so disheartening to families and so difficult to accept at that time has fed controversy for two decades, and we have found that it was wrong. There was evidence. And it is this statement that really has helped to feed this issue, and it may have been the critical moment, if you will, of the beginning of the controversy that has raged for 20 years or more.

In point of fact, during and after Operation Homecoming our Government—and our Government, in fact, did a better job than it has even advertised for itself—but it did at the highest levels press

Vietnam to explain why Americans that we had recorded as captive were not on the returning POW lists. We wanted to know what had happened to them and why, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, the DIA, had a list at that time that included 80 names. So we are left asking what was this, if it was not evidence that Americans could have been left alive?

Some might answer that was simply 80 questions, Senator, we were not certain. But in fact, this committee finds, having looked at those files that it was evidence. It was exactly that, evidence that an American might be alive. Sufficient, I might add, for some people to make a judgment that they believed and had reason to believe that someone was alive. That will be seen as we go through these hearings.

In addition, after careful review of current and archival DOD documents, our committee has compiled a list not of 80, but of 244 Americans who did not return at Operation Homecoming but who were or should have been recorded prior to Operation Homecoming as in captivity. One hundred and eleven of those people are accounted for as having died in captivity by virtue of the debriefings of those prisoners who did return during Operation Homecoming, leaving you with a potential universe, according to our analysis of DOD's and DIA's documents, and I emphasize we are dealing within that universe—there may be names outside of that and that has yet to be determined in the course of these hearings—but within that universe that leaves us with 133 people at the end of Operation Homecoming about whom we should have been asking questions.

Now, let me emphasize we cannot prove that all of these people were alive at that moment. We are owed an explanation, however, as to what we did to try to find out about whether or not they were, and as to why there are discrepancies in these lists and what the differences are. But it is accurate to state that we had sufficient reason to believe that even if they had died in captivity previously and we did not know it, they should have been listed as people about whom we were concerned as prisoners of war and missing in action.

There is evidence that some people were absolutely left behind in that status at that time. And it is sufficient to contradict official statements made then and repeated for almost 2 decades. It is enough to require us now to demand to know why we said what we said back then and if and why we may have failed to aggressively pursue the information that we had.

For 19 years the POW/MIA issue has been tearing the country apart in many different ways. Isolated facts mixed with rumor and hope and theory and all too often with fraud have driven conceptions and confused the public and left families agonized over whom and what to believe. For years people have asked, is the official story accurate that there was no evidence that anyone was alive after 1973, or are the stories about hundreds of prisoners being moved around from camp to camp true? What is the reality? Does it lie somewhere in between the two?

Well, as I said a moment ago, we do not have the final answers to that today. I have my own suspicions at this point, but as chairman of the Committee I am pledged to try to provide the answers,

not to provide you with our suspicions. And that is what the entire Committee is going to try to do as openly as we can. But we intend today for the first time in all of the inquiries that have taken place over the course of the years to try to narrow the universe of possibility based not on theory, not on speculation, not on ideology, but on fact.

Here in this document is the entire list of names, all of the people who are within that potential universe who might have been POW/MIA. Most of them are accounted for by virtue of remains that have come back, by virtue of first-hand reports of their having been killed in action, by virtue of their having come back in Operation Homecoming or having come back to their families alive as a consequence of their service. But we anticipate challenging and testing and exposing what we can in order to get to the real universe.

Let me say a word about that. Sometimes you read a story about hundreds of people in tiger cages. Sometimes you hear people talk about thousands of people who might still be there. The question has to come down to reality now. What is the potential for thousands? If you do not have thousands of names of servicepeople who are missing in any category and who are unaccounted for then we owe it to America to say so and to bring these theories down to a level of reality. And that is the purpose of these hearings.

This morning and for the next 2 days we will hear and we will question those who have had the very important responsibility of accounting for Americans lost or taken prisoner during the war. In preparation, we ask them to break that process down step by step, going back more than 25 years. We literally reconstructed their database and we have asked them to answer questions under oath about how and why people were categorized as prisoners of war, as missing in action, as presumed dead, and who made those decisions, who kept the lists, and on what basis individuals were moved from one category to another. In so doing, we learned a great deal about the sources of confusion and even deception in the POW/MIA accounting process, the fragmentation of responsibility, the secrecy, the constantly changing terminology, and the failure to pull together and follow through on important pieces of information.

We learned, for example, that there were not one but at least two official lists of POW/MIA's that were kept—a casualty list kept by the military services and an intelligence list kept by DIA—and that these lists did not and still do not always agree. We learned that terms used by DOD and DIA to categorize POW's and MIA's changed over time, adding to the confusion. We learned that for years during the war the location of loss for those involved in covert operations in Cambodia and Laos was intentionally falsified, meaning that erroneous information was provided to families and inserted into files. We will make public a recently declassified memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff reversing that policy, and we regret that there is no one within the Joint Chiefs now who has a historical memory of this process to be able to share with us the steps taken to erase the confusion and suspicion that caused.

We have also, as I said, identified the universe of originally 244, brought down to 133 by virtue of the POW interviews of Americans where current and archival records indicate that they either were

or should have been listed as prisoners but who did not return in operation homecoming. Now, our purpose in doing all of this has been to construct a foundation of facts, and I emphasize facts. It may be that one or two of our interpretations are incorrect.

That is the purpose of this hearing, to sort out these lists, because I will tell you, if after 6 months we have had trouble absolutely sorting it out and there are different lists and terminology, you can well understand why the American people simply do not understand what is going on here. And that is what we are going to get at. So we hope to build the foundation upon which subsequent hearings on the Paris peace accords, on Laos and on live sighting reports may be held.

INFORMATION ON LISTS

PRIVATE SECTOR LISTS

Abstract of information in documents obtained by the Select Committee from the archival files of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The documents contain names of wartime POWs and MIAs obtained by the Agency from the private sector. Some lists contain DIA analysis of those names.

DIA ARCHIVAL FILES

Photocopy of a letter to the Department of Defense, November 12, 1969, from Rev. Paul D. Lindstrom, "Remember The Pueblo," with an attached list of names of individuals he asserted were POWs in Vietnam.

Photocopy of an Unclassified Memorandum For Record, November 13, 1969, Subject: Rev. Lindstrom's List, providing a breakdown of the names of 107 individuals on a list provided by Rev. Lindstrom. List was determined to contain 10 names which could not be identified, names associated with known POWs and MIAs from Vietnam and Laos, names of 81 MIA from the Korean War and the names of two U.S. military detainees lost over North Korea on August 17, 1969.

Photocopy of a For Official Use Only Memorandum For Record dated November 28, 1969, providing an analysis of the current casualty status and prior information about those 59 names on the "Dellinger PW List," 54 of whom were carried by both DIA and the Services as POWs, the remaining 5 being carried as MIA by the Services but POW by DIA. Investigator's comment: The five individuals carried at the time as MIA all returned alive as POWs during Operation Homecoming.

Photocopy of a For Official Use Only Memorandum For The Record dated December 2, 1969, Subject: Prisoner of War List Released by Mr. David Dellinger. Attached to the Memorandum is a handwritten list of the 59 individuals with annotations about the DIA and Service casualty status and DIA computer database holdings describing when the individual had previously written mail, when releasees had provided information about the individual being in captivity and North Vietnam press releases about the individual's captivity.

Photocopy of four pages of unclassified typewritten material, undated, titled Names of U.S. PWs Released Thru U.S. Mobilization Committee. The pages contain the 60 names and related military service, rank, service number and city or State association with a column heading "First List 26 Nov. 1969."

Photocopy of For Official Use Only material including a photocopy of press release dated January 15 (1970) announcing the formation of a Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam. The release describes the Committee's activities as a conduit for mail between U.S. POWs in North Vietnam and their families, describes 5 POW releases during 1965-1969, a list of 156 U.S. POWs in North Vietnam, a list of 5 servicemen "confirmed as being dead by the North Vietnamese; and 3 individuals neither confirmed alive nor dead. Investigator's Comment: Three of the individuals reported dead were identified in the January 27, 1973 as having died in captivity and their remains have been returned to the U.S. The remains of remaining two individuals have been recovered, both having died while in an MIA status and neither is carried as having survived into captivity.

Photocopy of For Official Use Only Memorandum For The Record, DIAAP-7C, dated January 22, 1970, Subject: PW Letters on the Schneider List Announced by Cora Weiss, providing the PW status of those individuals with mail brought from Hanoi by Mr. Schneider of the American Friends Society, total mail received to

date, and total number of letter writers. Attached is a listing of those confirmed POW in North Vietnam but who had not sent mail.

Unclassified photocopy of press release dated March 24, 1970, New York, from the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIAFAM), describing a package of American POW mail en route to POW families in the United States. The release states the mail is from 80 servicemen, 34 of whom had not been heard from before, and their names and the addresses of all mail recipients is attached. The press release also describes COLIAFAM's activities since December 1969 relating to their function as a conduit for POW mail from U.S. POWs in North Vietnam to their family members in the U.S.

Photocopy of For Official Use Only Memorandum prepared by DIAAP-7C, dated March 24, 1970, Subject: Analysis of the Total of 218 U.S. PWs said to be Confirmed by the Committee of Liaison. The Memorandum describes four mail shipments between November 26, 1969-March 11, 1970 and comments on the Committee's confirmed POW list.

Photocopy of For Official Use Only DIA Memorandum for IPWIC Members, C-3122/AP-7, dated March 12, 1970, prepared by (name redacted), Cdr. USN, DIA Member, Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee, providing an analysis of the 31 new POW names released by Cora Weiss on March 11, 1970. The Memorandum notes that all but one of the 31 individuals are new letter writers, 2 were then listed as MIA by both DIA and the Services and DIA carried 2 others in a POW status.

Photocopy of Unclassified and Undated Memorandum For The Record, DIAAP-7C, Subject: Analysis of the Total of 218 U.S. PWs said to be Confirmed by the Committee of Liaison, describing the development of the confirmed list of POWs starting with the David Dellinger list of 59 on November 26, 1969 and through the 31 new names from Cora Weiss' list.

Photocopy of an unclassified document dated March 20, 1970, titled Rubin List. No April or May and providing a list of servicemen by branch of service, dates relating to mail during the period February 17, to May 18, 1970, for specific individuals, including some hand done notations. Attached to the document is a general letter from Cora Weiss dated September 14, 1980, generally too faint to be legible and with the handwritten notation 143 list.

Photocopy of an unclassified list, undated, providing the name, rank service and casualty status of 27 individuals and titled List Released To Swedish Prime Minister Palme in March 1970.

Unclassified Memorandum For The Record, DIAAP-7C, undated, Subject: Analysis of COLIAFAM's 256 "Confirmed" U.S. PWs in North Vietnam. The Memorandum describes various "lists" released, the source of the identification of letter writers, information from Cora Weiss passed through Mr. Sieverts at the State Department and Col. Haggard at OASD/ISA and others sources of information about live POWs writing letters and/or on various "lists."

Photocopy of an unclassified list titled 81 Names Passed Through The Committee of Liaison, April 7, 1970, providing the names, rank and service for 81 servicemen, annotations of those individual carried by the Air Force as an MIA but 3 of whom were carried by DIA as a PW and 73 of the individuals identified as never having written according to DIA records. Investigator's Comment: The three individuals carried by DIA as a POW returned alive from captivity during Operation Homecoming.

Unclassified Photocopy of Memorandum For Record dated April 30, 1970, name of preparer redacted, attached to a Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) memorandum to DIA dated April 14, 1970, name of preparer redacted. Attached to the OSD Memorandum are 9 pages of typewritten material. Each page contains a left hand column of names and a right hand column of names and addresses. There are handwritten notations on the photocopied document which include the following: 4 have the notation MIA, 18 have the notation (Sch.), 9 have the notation (14 H.P.) and some names have from 0 to 2 checks. The OSD Memorandum states: "Ross Perot gave us this list obtained from Rev. Fernandez in Vientiane. It was not certain that Fernandez is aware the list was obtained." The Memorandum For Record contains information, possibly explaining the check marks in relationship to the appearance of an individuals name on a March 24, 1970 list, an March 11, 1970 list, and a January 14, 1970 "Schneider" list. There is further an annotation "4. Contains all the 14 Happy Families" which is not further identified but may correlate to specific identities associated with the annotation (14 H.P.). Investigator's Comment: The document may list American POWs in North Vietnam sending mail to specific addresses in the United States. The name of "Rev. Fernandez" may be Rev. Richard Fernandez, a Committee member of COLIAFAM as of March 1970.

Unclassified photocopy of a document titled "The Rubin List June 1970," listing the names and addresses of 140 mail recipients with hand done notations showing dates. Investigator's comment: Other material may relate to the military service of POW correspondents and several notations CP which is not otherwise identified.

Unclassified photocopy of an American Friends Service Committee, Inc., letter dated July 27, 1970, to Mrs. Bruce A. Nystrom and describing a list of 885 American POWs in North Vietnam and North Vietnam's unwillingness to accept mail for anyone they have not included on their list of POWs.

Photocopy of a For Official Use Only List of 379 individuals, dated September 21, 1970, with the notation Sheer List Arrived JFK Airport September 16, 1970, List Received DIA on September 18, 1970. The document contains the names of the mail senders, the addresses and handwritten date annotations and name corrections. Investigator's Comment: The date annotations may pertain to the dates POWs wrote the letters. One handwritten notation reads Sheer ltr dtd 18 Sep 70.

Unclassified photocopy of an undated list with 16 names, the DIA case file identifier for 15 of the names and their casualty status under the heading "List Provided To Cora Weiss On November 6, 1970." Investigator's Comment: The one name without a DIA identifier may correlate to an individual not in DIA's database at that time. The individual, Randolph Ford, is currently carried as having died in captivity and his remains have been recovered.

Unclassified photocopy of an undated document providing the names and service of 6 U.S. personnel the North Vietnamese provided to Cora Weiss on November 6, 1970 and 11 provided to Cora Weiss by the North Vietnamese on November 20, 1970. Investigator's comment: The 17 names above were all included in the list of 23 servicemen later provided in January 1973 by the North Vietnamese as having died in captivity.

For Official Use Only Memorandum providing DIA analysis of the 11 names reported by Cora Weiss as deceased servicemen, listing those 7 carried by DIA as a POW (the services carried 5 as PWs) and 4 were being carried as MIAs.

Unclassified photocopy of an undated two page list with 96 names, the DIA case file identifier 92 of the names and their casualty status under the heading "List Provided To Cora Weiss On November 20, 1970." Investigator's comment: The four names without a DIA identifier may correlate to individuals not in DIA's data base at that time. Of four individuals (Brendon Foley, Randolph Ford, Fred Franke, Donald R. Hubbs), Brendon Foley was found to have died in Laos based on a presumptive finding of death, Randolph Ford died in captivity and his remains have been recovered, Fred Franke returned alive as a POW from North Vietnam and Donald Hubbs was found to have died without the recovery of remains in an over-water incident.

For Official Use Only List of 379 typewritten names and 12 handwritten names, dated October 1, 1970, with the notation Use for Stavits (326) List Arrived JFK Airport, November 23, 1970. The document contains the names of the mail senders, the addresses and handwritten date annotations and name corrections. Investigator's Comment: The date annotations may pertain to the dates POWs wrote the letters. The typewritten list of names appears to be a duplicate of a similar list dated September 21, 1970, but which has a new list of dates of letters and new letter writers.

Unclassified document, undated, providing the DIA case file identifier, name, service and date of loss. The document is titled 339 List and includes the names of 20 individuals "claimed dead-NVN."

Unclassified photocopy of a document titled The Palme List December 10, 1970, and providing DIA's analysis the list from Sweden on December 10, 1970, and including 210 names. The document also contains handwritten entries providing DIA with information on the casualty status, loss location and related information.

Unclassified document, undated, listing the names and dates of 15 pilots who died from air loss related wounds and 5 pilots who died from "serious disease" titled Causes of the Death of 20 U.S. Pilots Captured in North Vietnam (addendum to copy of "Kennedy List" received by ICRC in June 1971) and referring to the "Kennedy List" of December 22, 1970 (368 names).

Unclassified Memorandum from (redacted) thru CDR Trowbridge, December 22, 1971, with information from Lt. Col. Haggard regarding 1,001 letters from Cora (Weiss) from 332 writers and DIA's analysis of the scope of the current letter writers.

Memorandum for Capt. Robert E. Adams, June 21, 1972, Subject: reported "Master List" of U.S. PWs in North Vietnam (U), prepared by Charles F. Trowbridge, Jr., Cdr., USN, Chief, Evasion & Escape Branch, Production Support and Resources Division. The memorandum provides DIA analysis of a reported "Nippon Dempa" Japanese News Agency list of "390 U.S. PWs" and includes data concern-

ing North Vietnam's "368 list" of December 1970 (339 POWs and 20 releases and 20 died. It also includes a description of U.S. losses over North Vietnam during December 1970-May 1972. Conclusion is that 22 names on the 390 list not previously mentioned. The 368 list contained 339 acknowledged as PWs by the DRV, 9 releases and 20 whom the DRV claimed were dead. Attached is list of individuals listed as PW by either DIA (1), the services (5) or both (14) and lost over NRN during December 1970 and May 1972.

Unclassified photocopy of a list of 24 individuals under the heading List Provided To Walter Sohler (Representing Senator Edward Kennedy) At Paris on June 22, 1972. The document includes the individual's DIA case file identifier, rank, service and previous casualty status.

Unclassified photocopy of a list of 20 individuals under the heading "Causes of the Death of 20 U.S. Pilots Captured in North Vietnam." Identified as an addendum to copy of "Kennedy List" (December 22, 1970 with 368 names) received by the ICRC in June 1971. Lists "15 pilots died from previous wounds when shot down" and "5 pilots died from serious diseases."

Unclassified photocopy of a list titled 10 Individuals Announced By Senator Kennedy August 24, 1972 and providing the date of loss during June-July 1972, name, service and rank, and the annotation that all were carried as MIA by DIA and the services.

DIA ARCHIVAL LISTS

Archival lists of POWs and MIAs produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency and provide the Senate Select Committee during June-September 1992.

DIA LISTS

Unclassified photocopy of a list of 14 POWs who appeared at a June 29, 1972, press conference in Ha Noi and the names of 2 others who were mentioned but did not appear. Six PWs were acknowledged in captivity for the first time.

Unclassified photocopy of list of 23 individuals under the heading Names Provided by the North Vietnamese in January 1973 U.S. Personnel Who Died In Captivity. The list provides the individual's name, service and date of death.

Unclassified photocopy of a list of 41 individuals under the heading Names of Those U.S. Personnel Who Died In Captivity Provided By the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in January 1973. The list includes the names, service, date of death of 37 individuals, 3 unidentified bodies and 1 individual listed as U.S. who is identified as Australian.

Unclassified sketch, undated, titled Grave Pilot Sketch Map, 22 DIC's Buried In Ha Bac Cemetery, Bac Ninh Province, NVN, with grave locations reflecting the names of 1 Thai and 21 Americans.

For Official Use Only analysis prepared by DIA (DI-6C) during the period January 29 to February 2, 1973. The document provides DIA and Military Service comparisons for all military and civilian POWs and MIAs then carried in that status and compared to information on lists provided by the DRV/PRG on January 27, 1973, and the Pathet Laos on February 1, 1973. Investigator's Comment: A separate detailed description of the chronology of the changes in DIA/DOD casualty totals during this period is attached in a document prepared by this investigator and titled Analysis Input Notes.

U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team, Memorandum For: Chiefs of Other Delegations, Subject: Request for Information about Persons Missing in Action, April 17, 1973, prepared by LTC Lawrence Robson, Acting Chief. Lists 104 U.S. and foreign nationals, identified as List Number One.

Defense Intelligence Agency Data Base Printout, June 1973, forwarded by CDO (U-111), August 27, 1992. Provides the DIA ID number, name, casualty status, date of incident, loss coordinates, country, aircraft type, service, serial number and loss rank for individuals in the PMSEA ADP data base.

Unclassified photocopy of a document providing statistical data relating to U.S. POWs and MIAs, undated, providing the varying length of captivity by service for 591 returnees; a breakdown of Homecoming returnees by date of incident of loss during 1964-1973; annual breakdown by year of escape, year of capture of Returnees, reported dead by year of capture and pre-Homecoming releases by year of capture; service breakdown for 566 Homecoming military releasees, PRG/DRV died list of 63 individuals, and "unaccounted for" (POW and MIA) after Homecoming (does not include reported dead) for 132 individuals including 67 military unaccounted for POWs; officer and enlisted breakdown for releasees, died, escapes and pre-Homecoming returnees.

Unclassified photocopy of document dated 75/10/03 with 1,537 names also including their DIA case file identifier, military service, DIA unique casualty status, date of incident and country of loss. The document is broken down into four geographical regions of North Vietnam (462 records including 22 remains returned), South Vietnam (760 records including 16 remains returned), Laos (293 records including 0 remains returned) and Cambodia (32 records including 0 remains returned). There is a further breakdown by service within country of loss and alphabetically within service.

Unclassified photocopy of a Memorandum from DIA to Mr. Frank A. Sieverts, Department of State, December 12, 1975, commenting on one Australian reported on the PRG died list as an American and providing a description of 3 misidentified Americans on the PRG died list and noting that if the PRG recovered 3 individuals and buried them, they are other than the 3 individuals names.

Defense Intelligence Agency Data Base Printout, January 13, 1976, forwarded by CDO to the SSC. Provides the DIA ID number, name, casualty status, date of incident, service, rank, race, country of loss, loss coordinates, aircraft/vehicle type, time of incident, for individuals in the PMSEA ADP data base on the date of the printout.

Photocopy of a For Official Use Only list dated 76/01/23 list of 98 names and providing the DIA case file identifier, name, service and casualty status. There is a handwritten notation "Individuals carried in PW category by the Comptroller and State in late January 1973 (after the lists were passed in Paris) 30 were on dead list (starred names). Investigator's Comment: DIA's handwritten notation is not correct. DIA's 1976 listing contains Arlo Gay, an American civilian arrested in Vietnam on April 19, 1975; it includes Commander Harley Hall who was declared MIA on January 27, 1973, did not appear on U.S. POW/MIA records until a week later and was not declared POW until February 1973; it does not include Norman Schmidt, lost over North Vietnam in 1966, who was reported during the war by Cora Weiss as having died in captivity, was still in a POW status as of January 27, 1973 and whose remains were returned in 1974. The remaining names on the list are the same as that list of 97 names provided the SSC by DIA in January 1992 and described as the official list of POWs as of Operation Homecoming. However, DIA archival records dated February 1, 1973 do not list 97 individuals on a POW list as of late January 1973; DIA listed 80 (68 military, 12 civilians) while the services only carried 51 as unaccounted for POWs as of that date.

Defense Intelligence Agency Data Base Printout, April 24, 1974, forwarded by CDO to the SSC. Provides the DIA Prisoners of War and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia (PMSEA) Automated File Printout showing ID number, name, casualty status, date of incident, loss coordinates, country, aircraft type, service, service number and loss rank for individuals in the PMSEA ADP data base on the date of the printout; in both alphabetical and chronological order.

Defense Intelligence Agency Data Base Printout, June 1976, forwarded by CDO to the SSC. Provides the DIA (DIR-4H) PW/MIA Automated File Printout showing ID number, name, casualty status, date of incident, service, rank, race, country of loss, loss coordinates, aircraft/vehicle type, time of incident, and category for individuals in the PMSEA ADP data base on the date of the printout, in both alphabetical and chronological order.

Defense Intelligence Agency Data Base Printout, Combined List of Personnel PW/MIA, September 30, 1971, forwarded by CDO to the SSC. Provides the DIA ID number, name, date of incident, loss coordinates, country, aircraft type, DIA casualty status, service, serial number, and rank at loss.

Defense Intelligence Agency Data Base Printout, April 21, 1972, forwarded by CDO to the SSC. Provides the DIA ID number, name, date of incident, loss coordinates, country, aircraft type, casualty status, service and service number for individuals in the PMSEA ADP data base.

Defense Intelligence Agency Data Base Printout, December 1, 1972, forwarded by CDO (U-1111, August 27, 1992). Provides the DIA ID number, name, casualty status, date of incident, loss coordinates, country, aircraft type, service, serial number and loss rank for individuals in the PMSEA ADP data base.

MASTER LIST

Lists obtained by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs since January 1992 of Americans unaccounted for during the Southeast Asian conflict. Includes supplemental information on numbers of Unaccounted For Americans presented during Congressional testimony or from other documents.

Updated: June 1992.

Number of lists: 139.

1969

Supplemental Information

Title: American Prisoners of War in Vietnam. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, November 13 and 14, 1969, p. 13. Statement of Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. There are 1,339 U.S. servicemen who are missing or captured in Southeast Asia. More than 900 American servicemen are listed as missing in action. Over 200 servicemen have been missing or captured for almost 4 years.

Title: Ibid., p. 29. Total missing in action and believed captured—American servicemen in Southeast Asia—November 12, 1969. Total—1339. Nine hundred and twenty-six missing in action (323 South Vietnam, 443 North Vietnam, 160 Laos). Four hundred and thirteen believed captured (70 South Vietnam, 341 North Vietnam, 2 Laos). We have confirmation of only 413 of them that we know to be prisoners.

Title: Ibid., p. 103. The United States Army, as of 10 November 1969, carries 49 personnel as confirmed captured and a total of 323 as missing in action. Since July 1967, 38 Army personnel have been returned from captivity to U.S. control.

1970

Supplemental Information

Title: American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1970. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session, April 23, May 1, 6, 1970, p. 69. Statement of Hon. G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). One thousand three hundred and ninety-nine personnel missing or captured.

Title: Ibid., p. 91. In his foreign policy report to the Congress, February 18, 1970, the President (stated): Over 1,400 Americans are now listed as missing or captured.

Title: Ibid., p. 120-127. List of 335 names officially confirmed by Hanoi to be prisoners held in North Vietnam—April 30, 1970.

1971

Title: Swedish list, undated, 14 pages, in French, providing the identity of various individuals by name, rank, service number, and reference to being present in prison in North Vietnam or never captured in North Vietnam. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Enclosure 11, letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and over Laos. Includes as Enclosure 12, U.S. Navy memorandum dated January 26, 1971, providing background information on those U.S. Navy personnel described on the Swedish List as never captured in North Vietnam.

Supplemental Information

Title: American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, March 23, 24, 25, 30, 31; April 1, 6, 20, 1971, p. III. Today approximately 460 men are known to be prisoners and an additional 1,184 are listed as missing in Southeast Asia.

Title: Ibid., p. 326. Statement of Hon. G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, p. 316. Over 1,600 men missing or captured. P. 317. In December 1970, Hanoi released a list of 368 names, 9 men once captured and since released, 339 identified as prisoners and 29 identified as having died. Only one of these is a prisoner in South Vietnam. No one in Laos has been allowed to write.

Title: Ibid., p. 395. Mrs. Weiss said that by April 6, 1970, the names of 335 prisoners-of-war were known. That four more were added to the list in November (1971) when the DRV released a "final and official" list of 339 names. The list reappeared in new guise and was presented to Senators Fulbright and Kennedy. This time it

included the 334 names from the original Weiss-list, plus the four added in November, plus 20 the North Vietnamese now say are dead.

Title: Ibid., Special Analysis, The Prisoner of War Problem, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, p. 1. As of December 5, the Department of Defense unofficial carried 1,150 total missing (South Vietnam 520, North Vietnam 403, Laos 227). Four hundred and sixty believed captured (South Vietnam 79, North Vietnam 378, Laos 3). Total 1,610.

Title: Ibid., Appendix II, p. 481. On March 5, 1971, the White House released the following recapitulation of U.S. POW's and men missing in action in Southeast Asia: Total 1,145 missing, 460 captured, total 1,605. North Vietnam: 402 missing, 378 captured, 780 total; South Vietnam 482 missing, 79 captured, total 561. Laos 261 missing, 3 captured, total 264.

Title: Ibid., Appendix III: Material Submitted for the Record by Charles W. Havens, from the American Bar Association Journal, January 1, 1971, p. 488. American Prisoner of War and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia as of February 28, 1971. Total 1,604, captured 460, missing 1,145 (Army total 444, Navy 250, Marine Corps 116, Air Force 795). Total missing and captured by year lost: 1964 (7), 1965 (125), 1966 (239), 1967 (409), 1968 (397), 1969 (211), 1970 (96), 1971 (58). Enemy acknowledged capture of 370 (349 in North Vietnam, 20 in South Vietnam, 1 in Laos). As of February 1971, received mail from 385 separate writers.

Title: American Prisoner of War in Southeast Asia, 1971. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, Part 2, June 29, August 3, September 28, 1971, p. 87. Statement of Mrs. Iris Powers, Special Assistant to General Westmoreland on POW/MIA matters. Total captured and missing personnel by service in Southeast Asia as of September 3, 1971. Total captured and missing: 1,599 (1,184 missing, 46 captured).

1972

Title: By name listing of 61 American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia who have returned to United States control as of March 2, 1972, including those released, recovered and escaped and by captor force (North Vietnam, Pathet Laos and Viet Cong). Source: Unknown. Preparer: Unknown.

Title: List dated January 17, 1972, of 80 U.S. Army personnel dropped from the rolls (deserters) who were accountable to units in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos on the date they were dropped from the rolls, prepared by the U.S. Army enlisted records and evaluation center. Preparer: USAEREC. Source: U.S. Army total personnel command. Preparer: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), as enclosure 2 to OASD letter dated February 18-19, 1992 responding to a Select Committee letter of December 10, 1991.

Supplemental Information

Title: American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1972. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, Part 3, February 3, March 16, 1972, p. 21. Over 1,600 U.S. military personnel are listed as missing or captured in Southeast Asia and over 40 U.S. civilians are in the same status. According to Defense Department, 383 listed captured in North Vietnam, 92 in South Vietnam and 5 in Laos. Two U.S. pilots known captured in China. North Vietnam has identified 346 U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam.

Title: Ibid., Statement by Mr. Nutter (DOD/ISA). One thousand six hundred and eighteen American Prisoners of War and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia as of March 11, 1972, (1,129 missing, 489 captured). Missing or captured January 1, 1972-March 17, 1972: Total 11 (1 South Vietnam, 6 North Vietnam, 4 Laos. Five of the 6 from North Vietnam captured).

Title: Ibid. Hon. Clement J. Zablocki on February 2, 1972. Defense Department reports 1,617 total missing/captured as of January 1972, 476 of whom the U.S. believes to be POW. (Three hundred and twenty six captured/identified as of January 1969, 10 released and 2 escaped since January 1969, 162 captured and identified prior to or after January 1969.)

1973

Title: Nine lists provided to U.S. Representatives at the time of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, preparer: Vietnam. Source: Enclosure 16 to S-004/DOD POW-MIA CDO.

List of U.S. Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with 492 names and dates of capture between August 5, 1964 and December 28, 1972, Ministry of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam and attached to it a list of one American civilian, two Thai and one South Vietnamese Air Force 2nd Lieutenant.

List of U.S. Military Personnel Captured in South Vietnam listing 93 individuals, Provisional Revolutionary Government.

List of Civilian Personnel of the United States and Other Foreign Countries Captured in South Vietnam, listing 32 individuals (27 Americans), Provisional Revolutionary Government.

List of U.S. Military Personnel Captured in South Vietnam Who Have Been Released, listing 24 individuals, Provisional Revolutionary Government.

List of U.S. Civilians Captured in South Vietnam, Who Have Been Released, listing five individuals, Provisional Revolutionary Government.

List of Foreign Military and Civilian Personnel Captured in South Vietnam, Who Have Been Released, listing 21 individuals, PRG.

List of U.S. Military Personnel Captured in South Vietnam, Who Have Died, listing 34 individuals, PRG.

List of U.S. Civilians Captured in South Vietnam, Who Have Died, listing seven individuals, PRG.

List of Foreign Civilians Captured in South Vietnam, Who Have Died, listing 6 individuals, PRG.

Title: Photocopy of typewritten document marked Ministry of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, U.S. pilots captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with hand written annotation "Obtained from JCRC on January 23, 1973. These are lists as handed over by the PRG and DRV." Document cover has an attached listing of 400 named individuals: Preparer: Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Source: Tracy Ustry files.

Title: Photocopy of computer list in alphabetic order listing 1,321 names "... of U.S. military personnel who are unaccounted for in Southeast Asia ... prepared from casualty reports received as of May 5, 1973 ... " Preparer: Unknown. Source: Tracy Ustry files.

Title: Photocopy of computer list in alphabetic order, received October 10, 1984, undated but probably dated 1973, listing 725 names titled "U.S. Returnees/Escapes, SEA." Preparer: Unknown. Source: Tracy Ustry files.

Title: Photocopy of computer list in alphabetic order providing 108 names and titled "Missing Category 1 POW/MIAs whose name did not appear on 1973 Kissinger List of Discrepancy Cases," including analytical type comments regarding the fate of the individuals, undated. Preparer: Unknown, possibly DIA. Source: Tracy Ustry files.

Title: United States Army Vietnam/Military Assistance Command Vietnam Support Command roster dated February 25, 1973, verified by the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point. Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN, listing 924 deserters from units in Vietnam, 890 of whom were verified by the Deserter Information Point as last known to be in Vietnam. Preparer: USARV. Source: National Archives, Suitland Reference Branch.

Title: Military personnel casualties in Southeast Asia, alphabetic name listing within country, individuals whose bodies have not been recovered, dated January 24, 1992, listing by name 2,235 military personnel and including 76 individuals BNR in Cambodia, 4 individuals BNR in China, 514 individuals BNR in Laos, 0 individuals BNR in Thailand, 565 individuals BNR in North Vietnam and 1,076 individuals BNR in South Vietnam. Document exhibit 13, January 30, 1992, DIOR. Source: Preparer: DIOR.

Title: DIA response to document requested (Document Nr. 4), provided as Enclosure 15 to S-004/DOD POW-MIA CDO, in response to Select Committee request to "Provide a complete copy of any other discrepancy list which has existed from 1962 to the present." DIA's response: "Attached is a listing of 97 Americans officially listed by their respective services as 'Prisoners of War' following the completion of 'Operation Homecoming' in April 1973. Preparer: DIA. Source: DIA.

Title: Tab A, listing by date of incident of 3,128 Americans unaccounted for at the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, January 27, 1973, enclosure to DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991. Preparer/Source: DIA.

Title: Tab B, listing by date of incident of 12 Americans missing between January 27, 1973 and April 2, 1973, and body not recovered by U.S. Forces and subsequently identified, enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991. Preparer/Source: DIA.

Title: Tab C, listing by date of incident of 591 American POWs returned during Operation Homecoming, February 12, 1973 to April 1, 1973, enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991. Preparer/Source: DIA.

Title: Tab D, listing by date of incident of 2,547 Americans still unaccounted for at the completion of Operation Homecoming, April 2, 1973, enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991. Preparer/Source: DIA.

Title: Tab E, listing by date of incident of 36 Americans missing between March 30, 1973 and May 15, 1973, and body not recovered by U.S. Forces and subsequently identified, enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991. Preparer/Source: DIA.

Title: Tab G, listing dated September 30, 1977 of 84 U.S. military who returned to military control from captivity prior to January 27, 1973. Preparer: Comptroller, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Source: Directorate of Information Operations & Reports (DIOR), Washington Headquarters Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Title: Tabs H, listing by September 30, 1977 of 122 U.S. military personnel initially reported missing who had returned to U.S. military control prior to January 27, 1973. Preparer/Source: DIOR, WHS, OSD.

Title: Tab C, listing of 882 U.S. military personnel unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as of June 30, 1975 (includes those classified as POW and MIA as of January 27, 1973 and still in such a category). Preparer/Source: DIOR, WHS, OSD.

Title: Tab O-R, listing of 566 U.S. military personnel who returned to military control during Operation Homecoming. Includes 52 previously reported as Missing in Action, 512 previously reported as Prisoner, 1 not reported due to classification as a deserter and 1 previously reported as Killed in Action and body recovered. Preparer/Source: DIOR, WHS, OSD.

Title: Tab W, listing of 2 individuals initially reported by the U.S. Air Force in December 1967 as U.S. military who died in hostile action who were reported in August 1973 to be U.S. civilians and were dropped from all U.S. military casualty accountability.

Title: DIOR 1973 weekly statistical reports providing by name changes to died, unaccounted for and returned to military control categories since January 27, 1973 with infrequent breakdown of unaccounted for by military service/country of loss through the end of CY 1973. Total unaccounted for on January 27, 1973, the date of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, is 1,929 (1,220 Missing in Action, 118 missing nonhostile and 591 POW). Total unaccounted for on June 2, 1973, date of first report following the return of POWs, is 1,283 (1,216 missing hostile/nonhostile and 67 POWs). Adjustment due to the return of 566 U.S. military POWs, one of whom was not listed as a casualty due to deserter categorization and one POW returned alive who had been believed killed in action with recovery of body, and changes in casualty status with 122 reported having died in captivity, 22 previously reported as a POW and 102 previously reported as missing. Total unaccounted for on September 29, 1973 is 1,233 (1,167 missing and 66 POW). Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Listing of 97 Americans who, according to DIA in 1992, were still officially listed by the Military Services as POWs in 1973 and did not return alive during Operation Homecoming. Preparer/Source: Enclosure 15 to S-004/DOD POW-MIA CDO.

Supplemental Information

Title: Hearings on H.R. 16520 before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, October 10, 1974, p. 25. Mr. Mills provided the following information from Defense Department: As of January 1973 and the exchange of POW lists, 1,929 were carried

as POW/MIA, 566 POWs returned, 1,363 remained as POW/MIA, 4 more losses in Cambodia, 23 of 80 remaining in POW category after return of live POWs changed to died based on information from returning POWs, 1,285 remaining POW/MIA (57 of whom are in a POW category).

Title: Hearings on H.R. 16520 before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, November 19, 1974, p. 41. Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic Affairs stated the following: As of January 1973, the military services carried 593 servicemen as Prisoners of War, the other side listed 540, 513 as prisoners and 27 of whom had died in captivity, leaving 53 for whom there was no accounting by the other side.

Title: Ibid., p. 43. Twenty-three Americans listed by the DRV as having died in captivity have been returned since Operation Homecoming. Of these, 15 had been listed as POW, 7 as MIA and one deceased, remains not recovered.

Title: Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, 1973. Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, First Session, December 5, 1973, p. 7. Statement of Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Matters. It will soon be a year... since the last POWs were released. P. 12. More than 1,300 Americans listed as missing. P. 18. In addition to more than 1,300 U.S. military personnel who remain unaccounted for in Indochina, some 20 international journalists missing and possibly captured, nearly all of them in Cambodia. One civilian, Homer L. Elm, captured October 6, 1973 in South Vietnam.

Title: Ibid., p. 15. Statement by Dr. Roger E. Shields, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Director of POW/MIA Affairs. The other side listed 594 U.S. and third country nationals for repatriation. Three more individuals were also reported and returned in the ensuing days. In addition, 3 U.S., two military and one civilian, were released by China for a grand total of 600 Americans and foreign civilian prisoners released. Also included on the lists were the names of 70 persons said to have died in captivity.

Title: Ibid., p. 42. But more than 50 men who had been identified by our Government as having been taken prisoner were not among those returned. P. 43. National League of Families, October 2, 1973. On January 27, 1973, 1,925 members of the Armed Forces and 52 civilians were listed as MIA or POW in Southeast Asia. P. 44. Of the MIA, only 47 men out of a total of 1,334 MIA were to be repatriated and 10 others identified as MIA were included on the list of those who died in captivity. In Laos, 317 servicemen MIA or POW but only 6 captured in Laos were released.

Title: Unit History, 500th MI Group, Calendar Year 1975, including Group's involvement in the CINCPAC formulated Joint Debriefing and Casualty Reporting Center, Clark AFB, Philippines, and describing the organization and activities for the Phase II debriefing of 593 returnees (566 military/28 civilian) arriving in the Philippines of whom 555 military returnees were debriefed, 11 military returnees not debriefed on orders of "higher headquarters" and 23 U.S. civilians and 5 foreign nationals (2 Thai, 2 German, 1 Canadian) were debriefed by the U.S. Embassy, Manila. Source/Provider: 1992 FOIA Response, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command, FOIA/Privacy Office, Ft. Meade, MD.

1974

Title: DIOR 1974 weekly statistical reports providing by name changes to died, unaccounted for and returned to military control categories since January 27, 1973. Total unaccounted for on September 28, 1974 is 960 (923 missing hostile/nonhostile and 37 POWs). Preparer/Source: DIOR, WHS, OSD.

Title: U.S. Navy Missing In Action and Prisoners of War, October 1, 1974, nine pages of alphabetical listing with hand notations of date of presumptive finding of death or date presumed killed in action after October 1978, next of kin and other personal information and five pages of separate U.S. Navy Missing. Preparer: U.S. Navy. Source: Enclosure 9, Letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and/or over Laos.

Supplemental Information

Title: Hearings on H.R. 16520 before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, October 10, 1974, p. 25. Mr. Mills provided the following information from Defense Department: As of September 28, 1974, 960 POW/MIA, 37 of whom were POWs.

Title: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session on Accounting for U.S. Prisoners of War and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, January 28, 1974, p. 1. Senator Fulbright, opening statement. Six-hundred American prisoners were released, 1,200 other Americans still listed as missing in action.

Title: Ibid. Statement of Scott Albright, Executive Director, National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia. In the wake of the Paris Agreement, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong gave us the names of 580 American POWs—566 military men and 24 civilians—who were to be repatriated, a list of 60 Americans—55 military men and 5 civilians. One thousand, nine hundred and twenty five military men and 55 civilians were reported missing in Indochina and carried on the U.S. Government's "official list." Five hundred and ninety-four prisoners, 3 more were reported and released, 3 U.S. (2 military/1 civilian) were released by China. The lists included 70 said to have died in captivity. Over 1,800 others listed as missing and captured.

Title: Ibid., p. 69. Response of Mr. Sieverts, Department of State, to Additional Questions of Senator Case. The Administration did not conclude that "North Vietnam would responsibly account for the release of all American prisoners."

1975

Title: DIOR 1975 statistical reports providing by name changes to died, unaccounted for and returned to military control categories since January 27, 1973 with infrequent breakdown of unaccounted for by military service/country of loss. Reports initially weekly, then monthly starting April 1975. Total unaccounted for on September 30, 1975 is 856 (820 missing hostile/nonhostile and 36 POWs). Report for February 1, 1975 lists, without by name identification, a total of 1,592 declared deaths (body not recovered). This total includes those declared dead both prior and subsequent to January 27, 1973. Preparer/Source: DIOR, WHS, DIOR.

Supplemental Information

Title: Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, Part I, September 23 and 30, October 9 and 23, 1975, p. 31. Statement of Dr. Roger Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. During Operation Homecoming, almost 600 individuals held POW came back, about 1,850 carried as either POW or MIA did not return. We had about 1,200 declared dead, KIA, remains never recovered, for a total of about 2,500 individuals. We have, at this time, approximately 860—almost 900—we still carry as POW or MIA.

P. 32. All 860 are carried on the payroll. We had nothing hard until we received what we were told was a comprehensive list when the cease-fire agreement was signed in Paris. We brought home almost 600. We left some that we knew had been captured at one time . . . So there were a number of men that we knew had been captured who were not repatriated.

P. 51. There have been 509 status changes since January 27, 1973, 142 of which are termed reports of death. Three hundred and sixty seven were what we call presumptive findings.

P. 71. DOD says there are 758 military missing hostile and 69 missing nonhostile. Still carry 36 POWs for a total of 863. State has 30 missing civilians and 10 captured civilians. This makes a total of 903.

1976

Title: DIOR 1976 quarterly statistical reports providing by name changes to died, unaccounted for and returned to military control categories since January 27, 1973 with breakdown of unaccounted for by military service/country of loss. Total unaccounted for on September 30, 1976 is 774 (740 missing hostile/nonhostile and 34 POWs, and a total of 1,710 dead (body not recovered)). This total includes those declared dead both prior and subsequent to January 27, 1973. Preparer/Source: DIOR, WHS, OSD.

Supplemental Information

Title: Americans Missing in Southeast Asia—Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations. Prepared for the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia of the U.S. House of Representatives, December 1976, p. 3. Two thousand five hundred and forty-six Americans did not return from the war in Southeast Asia, including 41 civilians (25 missing or unaccounted for and 26 unrecovered dead or presumed dead). Thirty-three Americans are still listed as POW, 6 improperly classified as POWs at the time of their loss and there is no evidence that the other 16 were actually taken prisoner.

Title: Americans Missing in Southeast Asia—Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations. Prepared for the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia of the U.S. House of Representatives, December 1976, p. 2-3. Partly as a result of Committee efforts, the Chinese returned the ashes of 2 deceased Americans and provided some information on 22 other Americans missing from the Korean war and the war in Vietnam. The Vietnamese announced the names of 12 American pilots claimed to have been killed during the war. Two thousand five hundred and forty-six Americans did not return from the war in Southeast Asia. Forty-one are presumed dead. That of the 2,505 servicemen, there are 1,113 killed in action whose bodies have not been recovered, 631 who have been presumed dead, 728 still listed as missing and 33 still listed as prisoners of war. That of the 33 still listed as POW, at least 11 were actually POW's who have not been accounted for by their captors, 6 were improperly classified as POW's at the time of their loss and there is no evidence that the other 16 were actually taken prisoner. That the widespread practice of classifying an individual as MIA at the time of loss, based mainly on not recovering the individual, led to many questionable classifications as MIA. That the report of five Navy fliers declared KIA and later discovered to be POW's influenced some Navy commanding officers to excessive caution in classifying individuals as MIA.

Title: Ibid., p. 6-7. That a total accounting for all 2,546 Americans who did not return from Southeast Asia is not now and never will be, possible. That approximately 64 of those cases still listed as missing, and 845 of the KIA (BNR) cases may not be resolved by former enemy forces. Those losses occurred under nonhostile conditions, generally in areas in which no enemy forces were known to be operating. That more than 400 remains of the declared dead are nonrecoverable due to circumstances, i.e. loss at sea, disintegration of an aircraft, etc. That the North Vietnamese have information on a large but undetermined number of aviators shot down over North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, as well as information on some Americans killed, or once held, in other areas of Indochina. That the PRG had information on the remains of 40 POW's who died in captivity. That the Pathet Laos may have information on at least unaccounted for American prisoners as well as information on others. That the Cambodians may have information on a few Americans lost in areas they now control. That the governments of Indochina may be capable of returning the remains of more than 150 Americans, including any located through crash site investigations. That it is highly unlikely that the Indochina governments will permit non-indigenous teams of any kind to conduct field investigations.

Title: Vietnam: 1976. A report by Senator George Stanley McGovern to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 1976, p. 3. The Paris Agreement provided no deadline for an accounting for missing in action personnel. The Four-Party Joint Military Team was established as provided in the protocol, and the United States began in April 1973 to provide to the DRV and the PRG lists of all missing personnel, including the best available information on where and how each individual was lost. Beginning in August 1973, these computer lists were supplemented by folders providing additional details on each case where there was persuasive evidence that their the DRV or the PRG would have knowledge of the loss. Folders concerning a total of 107 personnel were passed on between August 1973, and February, 1975. In March, 1974, the remains of 23 American airmen who died in captivity in North Vietnam were returned. In February 1976 two aides to Senator Kennedy traveled to Vietnam and returned with the remains of the two Marines killed during the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975.

P. 4. The United States lists 2,518 American servicemen and 43 civilians who did not return from Southeast Asia. Of these, 1,119 were killed in action or died in captivity, and their remains have not been recovered. An additional 565 have been presumed dead. Eight hundred and thirty-four personnel and 27 civilians are still listed as missing in action.

Title: Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, Final Report, Together with the Additional and Separate Views of the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, United States House of Representatives, December 13, 1976, p. 21. Of the 2.6 million Americans, military and civilian, who served in the war in Indochina, 2,546 did not return to the United States. These Americans were killed or became missing during a 12-year period in five different countries.

P. 22. Americans missing or those who have been declared dead-body not recovered, as of November 1976, based on official record of the Department of State and Department of Defense.

North Vietnam—247 MIA, 15 POW, 213 PFOD, 294 KIA-BNR.

South Vietnam—227 MIA, 14 POW, 300 PFOD, 586 KIA (BNR), 13 civilians missing, 12 presumed dead.

Laos—233 MIA, 2 POW, 109 KIA (BNR), 5 missing, 4 presumed dead.

Cambodia—19 MIA, 2 POW, 7 PFOD, 47 KIA (BNR), 7 missing.

China—2 MIA, 2 PFOD.

Subtotal—723 MIA, 33 POW, 631 PFOD, 1,113 KIA (BNR), 25 missing civilians, 16 presumed dead civilians.

Grand total—2,505 Servicemen MIA, POW, PFOD, KIA (BNR), 41 civilians missing or presumed dead.

P. 135. Table 1, U.S. servicemen listed as Missing in Action or POW in Southeast Asia (1961-1971) by year.

P. 135. Fifty two servicemen were repatriated whom the military services had previously listed as MIA, 36 of these 52 had been lost in late 1972 and early 1973.

P. 142. List of individuals provided by the U.S. Delegation to the Four Power Joint Military Team. April 17, 1973, 104 persons; May 8, 1973, 1,444 persons; May 14, 1973, 1,114; June 13, 1974, 2,558; April 1, 1975, 2,401.

P. 143. Dates between August 6, 1973 and February 6, 1975 when 52 folders regarding 69 individuals were passed to the DRV and 30 folders with information on 38 individuals were given to the PRG. The DRV returned two folders, saying they'd been lost in Laos. The North-Vietnamese permitted return of 23 remains of Americans, a 24th was not repatriated because the individual had died in his aircraft, not in captivity.

P. 196. Twenty-six civilians are currently listed as missing or unaccounted for; another 16 are presumed to have died or were declared dead.

P. 241. That a total accounting for the 2,546 Americans who did not return from Southeast Asia is not now, and never will be, possible. Sixty-four of those cases still listed as missing and 345 of the KIA (BNR) may not be resolved by former enemy forces which occurred under nonhostile conditions, generally in areas in which no enemy forces were known to be operating. More than 400 remains of the declared dead are nonrecoverable.

Title: Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, Part 4, April 7, May 12, 26 and June 2, 1976, p. 22-23. Statement of Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. Eight hundred and sixteen Americans are still carried as missing in action or prisoners of war.

P. 234. Documentation submitted by DOD. Current missing by year of loss and service as of March 31, 1976. 1964 (3), 1965 (29), 1966 (113), 1967 (133), 1968 (170), 1969 (120), 1970 (61), 1971 (49), 1972 (123), 1973 (12), 1974 (0), 1975 (3). Total 340 Army, 81 Navy, 58 Marines, 437 Air Force, total 816. Attached are comparative figures described the detailed benefits and entitlements to the wife of an MIA not available to the widow of a KIA.

Title: Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, Part 3, February 4, 18, and 25, March 3, 17, 25, and 31, 1976, p. 5. Five hundred and sixty-six military, 25 U.S. civilians returned, including 2 military and 1 civilian from China. Fifty-two returned alive who were carried as MIA, 36 of whom were lost late in 1972 and early 1973.

P. 58. Data processing lists were provided to the other three delegations, beginning with the list of 104 on April 17, 1973. The list turned over in June 1974 consolidated the two lists provided in May 1973 and also totaled 2,558. There were 2,401 names on the April 1975 list, a decrease which resulted from the deletion of bodies recovered and over water crashes, far distances out at sea.

P. 60. In November 1975, the Department of State provided to a senior Cambodian official at the UN in New York a complete listing of all American servicemen and civilians currently carried unaccounted for in Cambodia. With respect to Laos, none of these folders had been turned over with the exception of the five this committee turned over in December 1975. Spectre 17, of which 13 of the crew are still unaccounted for, was given to the Laos.

P. 61. Mr. MacDonald. Seven hundred and ninety-eight military currently carried in active MIA status, 36 are still POW, total 834. One thousand one hundred and nineteen killed in action bodies not recovered or ones determined to have died while in missing status. The total number of Americans who did not return from Indochina is 2,518.

1977

Title: DIOR 1977 quarterly statistical reports providing by name changes to died, unaccounted for and returned to military control categories since January 27, 1973 with infrequent breakdown of unaccounted for by military service/country of loss. Report for September 30, 1977 lists, without by-name identification, a total of 1,788 dead (body not recovered). This total includes those declared dead both prior and subsequent to January 27, 1973. Total unaccounted for is 702 (682 missing hostile/nonhostile and 30 POW. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Tabs I-J, L; Listing of 65 U.S. military personnel reported as captured or missing as of or after January 27, 1973, who were reported after January 27, 1973 to have died in captivity. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Tabs K, M, Mc; Listing of 605 U.S. military personnel previously reported as missing (hostile and nonhostile) as of January 27, 1973 who were reported after January 27, 1973 and as of September 30, 1977 to have died while missing. Of these, 550 individuals initially reported as Missing In Action were reported after January 27, 1973 to have died while missing, nonhostile. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Tabs S, U; Listing of 91 U.S. military reported to have died in hostile action or nonhostile causes after January 27, 1973, including some who died of wounds caused prior to January 27, 1973. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Tab T; Listing of 7 U.S. military who were reported missing in action after January 27, 1973, and as of September 30, 1977. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Tab V; Listing of 1 U.S. military reported captured on January 27, 1973, reported in March 1973 as captured, and still in a POW status as of September 30, 1977. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Supplemental Information

Title: Americans Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, A Status Report, Markup of H. Con. Res. 331, March 31; July 27; October 5, 27, 1977; and February 2, 1978, p. 60-61. On August 16 (1977) the Administration announced that the Pentagon would resume status review of the 712 servicemen still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia.

Title: Ibid., p. 70. There has been a return of remains of only 59 men out of 2,500 missing.

Title: Ibid., p. 114. Mr. Gilman. Men in categories one and two, a total of 1,339 men.

Mr. Sieverts: We are, after all, concerned not about 1,300 men, but about 2,500 or, as your resolution suggests 2,800.

Mr. Gilman: DOD says 1,339.

Mr. Sieverts: We left 16 folders with the Vietnamese on the second trip, the recent mission, covering 30 individuals.

Title: Ibid., p. 131, Appendix 3. Department of Defense Presentation on Americans Missing in Action in Southeast Asia by Lt. Col. C.M. Matthews, U.S. Army. During Operation Homecoming we repatriated almost 600 Americans who had been prisoners of war, but more than 2,500 other Americans did not return. There are still 2,546 Americans, including 41 civilians, listed as dead with bodies not recovered or as missing or prisoner. Although 758 military personnel are on the books as "prisoners of war" or "missing," the distinction between the terms is probably academic. We have no evidence to indicate that any American servicemen are being held as prisoners in Southeast Asia.

Title: U.S. MIA's in Southeast Asia. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Senate, First Session, on Report of the

Presidential Commission on U.S. Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, April 1, 1977, p. 18.

Mr. Woodcock: There is a total of 2,546, which covers every American, military and civilian, missing since 1962, under any circumstances.

Title: Americans Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, A Status Report, Markup of H. Con. Res. 331, March 31; July 27; October 5, 27, 1977; and February 2, 1978, p. 84-85. Excerpt from Testimony of Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director, CIA, before the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, March 17, 1976, regarding the results of extensive analysis of the POW/MIA data base.

Cambodia: Personnel who returned during Operation Homecoming said everyone they'd seen was either a returnee or died in captivity. Army deserter living in Cambodia in May 1973 had been with VC for several years but joined the Khmer Rouge in October 1973. Several captured in Cambodia prior to April 1975 have never been accounted for, two U.S. civilians not accounted for after fall of Phnom Penh.

Laos: Returnees during Operation Homecoming had no firsthand information on any Americans captured in Laos other than the nine released by the DRV in Ha Noi. U.S. personnel known to have been captured in Laos have not all been accounted for. An American civilian and Australian civilian disappeared in Laos in September 1974 and last sighted alive in late February 1975. An American pilot release during September-November 1974 had no knowledge of other Americans in captivity in Laos.

North Vietnam: All men known to the returned to have been in the prison system had been accounted for. Some seen on the ground not in the prison system are on the list for which we have asked the DRV to account.

South Vietnam: All persons known by returnees during Operation Homecoming were accounted for. There are still a number of Americans in Saigon. There have been reports that a few of them are in jail. These cases of Americans in Saigon are being handled separately from the PW/MIA cases since the names and circumstances are well known. There are cases of men known to have been captured in South Vietnam for whom there has been no accounting. We have no new substantial information on any of these cases. There were reports of an American, possibly an individual captured in Quang Nam Province in 1965 and held with some of the returnees, operation with the enemy in northern South Vietnam as late as August 1973.

1978

Title: Photocopy of computer list of 2,468 Casualties Incurred by U.S. Military Personnel as of September 11, 1978, including BNR as of September 11, 1978, by State home of record. Preparer: Unknown, possibly JCRC. Source: Tracy Usry files.

Supplemental Information

Title: Americans Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, Part 2, August 9 and September 13, 1978, p. 59.

Mr. Guyer: We had 1,300 dead but not found. Now that figure has never been challenged, 1,300 dead but not found. But then there was a variable number, from 1,000 down to 400 MIA-POWs.

Mr. Montgomery: 2,500 not brought back all together.

Mr. Montgomery: 2,500 remains not recovered. . . . The Department of Defense confirmed to me that there were 2,465 who were killed in action or presumed dead and whose remains were not recovered. This included the 282 who are still carried as MIA as of September 30, 1978.

P. 60, Mr. Montgomery: So actually we might have used the figure . . . 1,300 who were still classified as MIA at the time with those carried as POWs. One thousand two hundred were actually classified killed in action initially, so that gives you 2,500 remains we had not recovered. . . . In this war, of the total 55,000 killed, we have recovered all but 4 percent.

1979

Title: Photocopy of computer list in alphabetic order titled "US Military and Dependents, Captured, Missing Detained or (illegible) remained in SEAsia, accounted

for or (illegible) from January 1, 1961 through current date (791011). Preparer: DIA PW/MIA Branch. Source: Tracy Usry files. (Two copies.)

Title: DIA PW/MIA Automated File (PMSEA), dated September 7, 1979, prepared by DIA/DB-4H, All Personnel PW/MIA, Southeast Asia—Alphabetical with 3,679 names of individuals of interest to DIA and chronologically by date of incident from 521129 through 790915 for 3,679 individuals. Preparer: DIA. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), letter dated February 28, 1992, responding to request at Attachment A, No. 6, accompanying the January 27, 1992 subpoena of Charles Trowbridge.

1980

Title: Photocopy of computer printout, untitled, providing an alphabetical listing, dated 800725, appearing to represent U.S. POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia, available in two versions, one 76 pages in length and one 78 pages in length. Prepared by: DIA PW/MIA Branch. Source: Tracy Usry files.

Title: All US Personnel, SEA 1961 to Present, alphabetical listing dated 800226, appearing to represent U.S. POWs, and MIAs in Southeast Asia, 75 pages. Prepared by: DIA PW/MIA Branch. Source: Tracy Usry files.

Supplemental Information

Title: POW/MIA's Oversight, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Part 2, December 2, 1980, p. 11. Statement of Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. There are still approximately 2,500 Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. At the completion of Operation Homecoming in 1973, these individuals were classified as prisoners of war, missing in action and killed in action—body not recovered. The status of most of these 2,500 Americans has since been changed by the military services to that of presumed dead. Notwithstanding, there is no distinction between these terms as far as DIA is concerned.

Title: POW/MIA's Oversight, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, June 27, 1980, p. 3. Seventy three sets of American remains returned to various Congressional delegations since 1975. Still over 2,500 Americans missing in Indochina. Over half of these are men who were either known or strongly suspected to be prisoners of the Vietnamese or Laotians. One hundred and thirty eight Americans whose names and voices used for propaganda purposes, as many as 750 more were probably in their custody.

P. 4. Statement by Lt. Gen. Eugene T. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Approximately 2,500 Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. At completion of Operation Homecoming, 113 POWs, 1,237 MIA and 1,178 KIA-BNR. The distinction between the terms is treated only administratively by DIA. Whether a man is listed as dead or alive, we continue to seek an accounting for him.

P. 5. Since Operation Homecoming, 72 of our dead have been returned, the remains of 40 others named by the Vietnamese as having died in captivity have yet to be returned. There are 556 men unaccounted for in Laos.

1981

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during 27-30 May 1981 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Supplemental Information

Title: Prisoners of War/Missing in Action: Oversight, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, Part 1, June 25, 1982, p. 8. Statement by Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. There are still approximately 2,500 Americans who are listed as prisoner, missing or killed body not recovered, that remain unaccounted for. The exact figure is 2,497 and the status of all but 12 of these Americans has been changed by the military services to that of presumed dead.

1982

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese via SRV Embassy in Bangkok on July 1, 1982. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during visit to Hawaii August 8-12, 1982. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during December 6-9, 1982 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Supplementary Information

Title: To Express the Sense of Congress Concerning Americans Missing in Action in Laos, Hearing and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, on H. Con. Res. 425, December 3 and 14, 1982, p. 2. Statement of Hon. Thomas M. Foglietta, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania. Currently, there are 2,494 Americans listed by the Department of Defense as missing and unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Five hundred and fifty eight of these Americans are presumed to be located in Laos.

Title: American POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, September 30, 1992, p. 8. There are still 2,500 Americans still missing. The PRG died in captivity list from the South had a list of 39 men and 1 woman who had died in captivity, the remains of those people had never been returned.

Title: Ibid., p. 18. Ms. Griffiths response to Mr. Solarz. Of the 2,500 MIA's and POW's, there is a list of 113 that were on the U.S. Government record as unreturned POW's; That might have decreased through return of remains to approximately 100 listed as POW unreturned.

1983

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese via SRV Embassy in Bangkok on February 16, 1983. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese via SRV Embassy in Bangkok on April 6, 1983. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during June 1-3, 1983 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Supplementary Information

Title: MIA/POW's in Southeast Asia: A Continuing National Priority, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, July 14, 1983, p. 6. Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian Affairs. Some 2,500 Americans are missing and unaccounted for as a result of the war in Indochina; some 1,800 in Vietnam, nearly 600 in Laos and almost 100 in Kampuchea.

Title: Ibid., p. 12. Prepared statement of Hon. Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. Nearly 2,500 men missing in Indochina.

1984

Title: Photocopy of computer alphabetical listing of 2,483 names titled "U.S. Personnel Unaccounted For, SEA. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Tracy Ury files.

Title: U.S. Casualties in South East Asia, dated split 840822 and 840823, By State and Alphabetical Within State. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Tracy Ury files.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during February 1, 1984 repatriation of remains. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during August 15-18, 1984 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during October 24-27, 1984 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Supplementary Information

Title: Prisoner of War/Missing in Action in Southeast Asia: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session, August 8, 1984, p. 12. Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Almost 2,500 of our men still missing.

Title: Ibid., p. 16. One thousand eight hundred and twenty six Americans are still missing in Vietnam alone; government-to-government negotiations have thus far resulted in only 95 remains repatriated by the SRV and subsequently identified as Americans. (The Chinese turned over two additional remains and the Laos one which have been identified as American and were the result of negotiated efforts.)

Title: Ibid., p. 28, 29. Almost 2,500 Americans are still missing in Southeast Asia.

Title: Ibid., p. 54. Mr. Applegate. There are 2,483 veterans that have not been accounted for.

1985

Title: Photocopy of DIA letter with attachment listing "2,483 American servicemen and civilians who remain unaccounted for as a result of the Vietnam war." Preparer: DIA. Source: Tracy Ury files.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during February 6-9, 1985 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during April 17-20, 1985 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during July 3-6, 1985 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese via SRV Embassy in Bangkok on July 17, 1985. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during September 25-28, 1985 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during November 13-15, 1985 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

1986

Title: Microfiche copies of Casualty Files for 674 U.S. Army Personnel never categorized-POW/MIA or reported to have been killed in action (body not recovered) and their remains not yet recovered, information current to 1986. Source/Preparer: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) letter of February 12, 1992 in response to Senate Select Committee request of December 10, 1991 (Interrogatories 6, 7, 22 and Document Request 2).

Title: DIA POW/MIA Automated File (FMSEA), dated March 6, 1986, Alphabetical and chronologically by date of incident. Preparer: DIA, Secret NOFORN. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), letter dated February 28, 1992, responding to request at Attachment A, No. 6, accompanying the January 27, 1992 subpoena of Charles Trowbridge.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during February 27-28, 1986 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during June 11-14, 1986 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during August 13-16, 1986 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Vietnamese during October 29-November 1, 1986 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

1987

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Laos during November 11-13, 1987 consultative meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese via SRV Embassy in Bangkok on August 4, 1987. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during August 25-28, 1987 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during October 28-31, 1987 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Laos during November 11-13, 1987 consultative meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Laos during November 11-13, 1987 consultative meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: List of 80 individuals (also known as Vessey I discrepancy cases) passed to the Vietnamese in August 1987, provided as Enclosure 14, to S-004/DOD POW/MIA CDO. Preparer/Source: DIA.

1988

Title: Photocopy of computer generated list of 2,411 individuals in alphabetic order titled "All Unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia, January 11, 1988. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Tracy Ury files.

Title: DIA POW/MIA Automated File (PMSEA), dated July 13, 1986, Alphabetical and chronologically by date of incident, Secret NOFORN. Preparer: DIA. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), letter dated February 28, 1992, responding to request at Attachment A, No. 6, accompanying the January 27, 1992 subpoena of Charles Trowbridge.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during January 22-25, 1988 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during March 12-15, 1988 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Laos during May 3-11, 1988 recovery operation. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during June 1-3, 1988 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during July 25-28, 1988 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Laos during August 22-23, 1988 consultative meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during September 12-14, 1988 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Laos during October 24-28, 1988 visit to Hawaii. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during December 19-21, 1988 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

1989

Title: List of 32 individuals (also known as Vessey II discrepancy cases) passed to the Vietnamese in October 1989, provided as Enclosure 14, to S-004/DOD POW/MIA CDO.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during January 26-28, 1989 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during March 23-24, 1989 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during May 16-17, 1989 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during August 28-30, 1989 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during November 27-29, 1989 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

1990

Title: U.S. Personnel, Southeast Asia (and Selected Foreign Nationals) Alpha and Chronological Reports, dated February 1, 1990. Alphabetical list of 3,754 U.S. citizens and foreign nationals of interest to DIA's POW/MIA office together with a chronology of their date of capture, detention and/or disappearance during the period from 1952 to present. Includes wartime prisoners/missing and those persons detained/disappeared after January 27, 1973 to the present time. Preparer/Source: DIA/POW-MIA.

Title: Navy Southeast Asia Unaccounted for, dated May 1990, with alphabetical list of all unaccounted for Navy personnel. Preparer: U.S. Navy. Source: Enclosure 5, Letter of February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and/or over Laos.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during January 17-19, 1990 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during February 1-2, 1990 consultative meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during July 10-12, 1990 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during November 7-9, 1990 consultative meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Supplemental Information

Title: H.J. Res. 279, H.R. 1730 and H.R. 3401 (VRACU Congressional Medal of Honor and MIAs/MIAs), Hearing before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, January 30, 1990, p. 64. The Hon. John G. Rowland (Connecticut). All but one of 2,316 unaccounted for POW's and MIA's from the Vietnam era, have had their official status changed from MIA-POW to MIA, Killed in Action, regardless of individual circumstances and regardless of anything else surrounding their disappearance.

Title: POW/MIA's In Indochina and Korea. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, June 28, 1990, p. 7. Statement of Hon. Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Two thousand three hundred and two Americans still missing and unaccounted for in Southeast Asia were lost in Vietnam. Over 80 percent of the 535 individuals unaccounted for in the territory of Laos were lost in areas controlled by Vietnam during the war. A similar percentage of those missing in Cambodia were also lost in areas controlled by the Vietnamese during the war.

Title: Ibid. P. 20. Statement by Dr. Carl W. Ford. Today there are 2,302 Americans who are missing or unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Vietnam—1,678; Laos—535; Cambodia—83; China (coastal waters)—6. P. 24. Since August 1987 the Vietnamese have turned over to us 240 remains. Of this number, only 98 have thus far been identified as Americans. P. 25. Two thousand three hundred and two Americans still missing.

Title: Ibid. P. 52. Statement by the National League of Families. Status of the POW/MIA Issue: June 28, 1990. Two thousand three hundred and two Americans still prisoner, missing or unaccounted for. Vietnam (North—596; South—1,081) 1,677; Laos—537; Cambodia—82; China (territorial waters)—6. Twenty eight remains returned during 1974-1975, 47 remains returned during 1976-78, 1 set of remains returned during 1979-80, 205 sets of remains returned during 1981-1989.

Title: Ibid. P. 89. Answers for the Record Provided by the Department of Defense. Twenty one of the 70 compelling discrepancy cases General Vessey has urged the Vietnamese to resolve have been resolved, 17 by remains identification and four by evidence the remains are not recoverable. P. 93. Total unaccounted for 2,302 including 471 over water, 433 ground incidents, 1,399 involving aircraft. South Vietnam—1,081; North Vietnam—597; Cambodia—83; Laos—535; China—6.

1991

Title: Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Alphabetical Name Listing Within Service; Special Listing—Casualties Where The Body Was Never Recovered, dated December 13, 1991, providing the names of 2,239 U.S. military personnel who were found to have died during the war in Southeast Asia and whose bodies have not yet been recovered. Source/Preparer: Directorate of Information Operations & Reports, Washington Headquarters Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Title: Tab F, Listing by date of incident of 2,267 Americans (2,225 military and 42 civilians), still unaccounted for as of December 11, 1991, enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991 (included as Enclosure F, listing attached at Enclosure G). Also included is a response to a question from Senator Kerry to Bob Sheetz listing 16 Americans known to have been captured in Laos and currently listed by DIA as having returned during Operation Homecoming, died in captivity or have escaped. Source/Preparer: DIA/POW-MIA.

Title: Tab G, Listing by date of return, of 316 Americans who have been accounted for as of December 11, 1991 based on recovery of remains, enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in

response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991 (included as Enclosure F, listing attached at Enclosure G). Source/Preparer: DIA/POW-MIA.

Title: Tab H, Listing of 244 American civilians who became missing in Southeast Asia and who have been accounted for or are still unaccounted for, an enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991. Source/Preparer: DIA/POW-MIA.

Title: Tab I, Listing of 42 American civilians who are still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, an enclosure to the DIA/POW-MIA CDO letter dated January 15, 1992 to the Senate Select Committee in response to the Committee's letter dated December 9, 1991. Source/Preparer: DIA/POW-MIA.

Title: U.S. Personnel, Southeast Asia (and Selected Foreign Nationals), Alpha and Chronological Reports, April 1991, listing 3,752 Americans and foreign nationals. Preparer: DIA/POW-MIA. Source: Letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and over Laos.

Title: Alpha Roster, Biographic Report (sorted alphabetically by name), 161 pages, dated 910821. Preparer: Joint Casualty Resolution Center. Source: Letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and over Laos.

Title: REFNO Roster, Biographic Report (sorted by REFNO), 250 pages, dated 910821. Preparer: Joint Casualty Resolution Center. Source: Letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and over Laos.

Title: Navy Southeast Asia Unaccounted For, dated September 1991 appearing to provide an alphabetical list of all unaccounted for Navy. Preparer: U.S. Navy. Source: Enclosure 6, Letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and over Laos.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during March 19-23, 1991 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during May 9-11, 1991 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Cambodians during August 22-23, 1991 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Cambodians during September 19-20, 1991 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Vietnamese during October 31-November 1, 1991 technical meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to the Laos during December 16, 1991 consultative meeting and outlining primary/secondary areas of investigative focus during 1992. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: Loss incident cases passed to Laos during May 5, 1991 consultative meeting. Source/Preparer: JCRC.

Title: List, dated September 10, 1991, of 15 U.S. Army personnel with records in the Army Personnel Center Deserter Information Point, a list of 6 personnel for whom there were no records of them in the Deserter Information Point and attached list of 21 individuals "last seen while on authorized absence in Southeast Asia." Source: U.S. Army Total Personnel Command. Preparer: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), as Enclosure 2 to OASD letter dated February 18, 1992, February 19, 1992, responding to Select Committee letter of December 10, 1991.

Title: Listing of approximately 1,900 U.S. Navy personnel placed in a deserter status after January 1, 1962, worldwide, through the end of 1991, and who are still carried in that status, with approximately 105 individuals in that status from the

era of the Southeast Asian conflict, with no indication of their specific point of desertion or if that desertion took place in Southeast Asia. Provided alphabetical and by date of desertion. Preparer: U.S. Navy Deserter Information Point. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), response to Document Request 17 in Select Committee request dated December 10, 1991, provided as Enclosures 1-2, OASD letter dated February 24, 1992.

Title: Listing of 215 U.S. Marine Corps personnel placed in a deserter status during the Vietnam era and who are still carried in that status, with no indication of their specific point of desertion or if that desertion took place in Southeast Asia. Provided alphabetical and by date of desertion. Preparer: U.S. Marine Corps. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), response to Document Request 17 in Select Committee request dated December 10, 1991, provided as Enclosure 3, OASD letter dated February 24, 1992.

Supplementary Information

Title: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) memorandum, November 14, 1991, outlining the following breakdown for existing POW/MIA totals: Total—2,273; KIA/BNR—1,101; POW/MIA—2,272. Includes breakdown by military service/casualty category. Describes components of "Vessey List" and last known alive categorization. Breakdown of official remains repatriations during 1974-1991 with statement that 161 returned remains exhibited "some evidence of above ground storage (curated, warehouses)." 1992

Title: List identified as master list of individuals in alphabetical order lost in Laos with date of incident based on information provided to JCRC by the service casualty branches. Of the total 608 names provided, 37 are identified as resolved cases. Fifteen individuals lost over Laos were last reported to be in Vietnam, 14 of whom are resolved. Of the three lost over Vietnam and last reported in Laos, one has been resolved. Preparer/Source: JCRC.

Title: Casualty Statistical Book dated 1973-1977, provided January 30, 1992, Exhibit 3. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Alphabetic Name Listing Within Service, provided January 30, 1992. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: List of casualties by date of casualty (Part I) and List by date of transaction (Part II), provided January 30, 1992, Exhibit 12. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Captured U.S. Military Personnel Returned At Operation Homecoming—1973 Plus Earlier Returnees and Escapees—Vietnam War Era, undated, provided as response to Document Request Nr. 7 as Appendix A to Enclosure 17 to S-004/DOD POW-MIA CDO.

Title: U.S. Personnel Southeast Asia, Chronological Order, Includes Selected Foreign Nationals, January 7, 1992, listing 3,752 individuals. Preparer: DIA. Source: Response to Documents Requested 10 and 11, as Enclosure 18 to S-004/DOC POW-MIA CDO.

Title: Department of the Air Force list in alphabetical order of all United States Air Force Personnel missing, captured as a POW, KIA-BNR and PFOD in Laos, including a date reported missing and date declared dead. Preparer/Source: Air Force Military Personnel Center, January 9, 1992, responding to Congressional request for this information dated December 20, 1991. Also attached is a list of USAF personnel involved in casualty affairs from 1961 to present and their current location.

Title: Attachment 1, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia. All Personnel Ever Reported as Captured (excluding individual in Attachment 5), listing 764 U.S. military. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 2, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Captured/Interned, Returned to Military Control, listing 651 individuals. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 3, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Died While Captured/Interned, listing of 111 U.S. Military, dated January 31, 1992. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 5, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Current Captured, one individual, dated January 31, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 6, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Captured/Interned—Returned to Military Control, Special Listing—By Date of Casualty, listing 651 U.S. military, dated February 1, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 7, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Special Listing—Country Changes, listing six individuals whose initial country of loss was changed, dated February 1, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 8, Summary of Southeast Asia Casualty Statistics as of February 1, 1992. Totals: DOD killed 38,497; died of wounds 5,221; died while missing 3,534; died while captured/interned 111; current captured 1; nonhostile died of other causes 7,453; nonhostile died of illness/injuries 1,990; nonhostile died while missing 1,854; Total—58,161. Captured/interned, returned to military control by branch of service: 134 Army, 145 Navy, 333 Air Force, 39 Marines, 0 Coast Guard, Total DOD—651. Preparer/Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 1, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, listing 651 U.S. military alphabetically by service who were captured and returned to military control, dated February 3, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 2, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Died While Captured/Interned, Names Listed Alphabetically Within and By Military Service, and listing 111 U.S. Military by-name (45 Army, 23 Air Force, 7 Marines and 36 Navy). Dated February 3, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 3, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Died While Captured/Interned, By date of casualty determination, and listing 111 U.S. Military by-name during the period from July 1961–February 1980, dated February 3, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 4, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Died While Captured/Interned, By Date of Transaction, providing the transaction date when DOD entered the individual as having died and listing 111 U.S. Military by-name. Dated February 3, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 1, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Currently BNR, Listing By Country, identifying 765 individuals previously reported to DOD as captured and including 27 in Cambodia, 2 in China, 18 in Laos, 519 in North Vietnam and 199 in South Vietnam, dated February 4, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Attachment 2, Military Personnel Casualties in Southeast Asia, Died While Captured/Interned, Hostile, Special Listing by Country of Loss, listing 111 individuals by-name and including 4 in Cambodia, 4 in Laos, 49 in North Vietnam and 54 in South Vietnam, dated February 4, 1992. Source: DIOR.

Title: Photocopied list of U.S. Citizens Unaccounted for By Date of Loss, listing 603 individuals between 610113–981003, not further identified, dated January 14, 1992, with notation, "Response to #1, December 20, letter." Source: Unknown.

Title: Photocopied list of U.S. Citizens Unaccounted for in Laos, alphabetical, listing 522 individuals, not further identified, dated January 15, 1992. Source: Unknown.

Title: Photocopied list of U.S. Citizens Lost or Captured In Or Over Laos, January 1, 1961–present, in alphabetical order, with notation Enclosure #2, listing 603 individuals, dated January 15, 1992. Source: Unknown.

Title: Navy Southeast Asia All Unaccounted For, undated but reportedly current, appearing to provide an alphabetical list of all unaccounted for Navy. Preparer: U.S. Navy. Source: Enclosure 7, Letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and over Laos.

Title: Laos—Remains Not Recovered, undated but reportedly current, appearing to provide an alphabetical list of all unaccounted for Navy. Preparer: U.S. Navy. Source: Enclosure 8, Letter, February 20, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command-Control-Communications and Intelligence, DOD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office, providing the Department of the Navy's response to the Select Committee's request of December 20, 1991 for information on all U.S. citizens lost in and over Laos.

Title: Microfiche copies of 41 Casualty Files, 381 Master Personnel Records and 82 Supplemental Missing Report files pertaining to 819 U.S. Air Force Personnel ever categorized POW/MIA or reported to have been killed in action (body not recovered) and their remains not yet recovered, information current to 1986. Source/Preparer: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications

and Intelligence) letter of February 12, 1992 in response to Senate Select Committee request of December 10, 1991 (Interrogatories 6, 7, 22 and Document Request 2).

Title: Microfiche copies of the Casualty Files of 819 U.S. Air Force Personnel ever categorized POW/MIA or reported to have been killed in action (body not recovered) and their remains not yet recovered, with separate alphabetical listing of names. Source/Preparer: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) letter of February 29, 1992 in response to Senate Select Committee request of December 10, 1991 (Interrogatories 6, 7, 22 and Document Request 2).

Title: List of 283 Marine casualties whose POW/MIA status was changed to KIA/BNR based on a Presumptive Finding of Death in accordance with the Missing Persons Act. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), response to Interrogatories 6, 7, 20, 21 and 22 in Select Committee request dated December 10, 1991, provided as Enclosure 1, OASD letter dated February 24, 1992.

Title: List of 34 Marine casualties whose POW/MIA status was changed to KIA/BNR based on a Presumptive Finding of Death in accordance with the Missing Persons Act and whose status was later changed to KIA following return and positive identification of their remains at CILHI. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), response to Interrogatories 6, 7, 20, 21 and 22 in Select Committee request dated December 10, 1991, provided as Enclosure 2, OASD letter dated February 24, 1992.

Title: List of 34 Marines who were captured and later returned to United States military control with their status changed from POW to Returnee. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), response to Interrogatories 6, 7, 20, 21 and 22 in Select Committee request dated December 10, 1991, provided as Enclosure 3, OASD letter dated February 24, 1992.

Title: Microfiche copies of Casualty Files and separate list of 674 U.S. Army casualties who were ever categorized as POW/MIA or declared KIA and who were either not repatriated and/or whose remains have never been recovered. Changed to KIA/BNR based on a Presumptive Finding of Death in accordance with the Missing Persons Act. Preparer: Unknown. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), response to Interrogatories 6, 7 and 22 in Select Committee request dated December 10, 1991, and Document Request 2, provided as enclosures to OASD letter dated February 12, 1992.

Title: List dated January 30, 1992 of 268 remains officially repatriated from Vietnam since Operation Homecoming (149 Air Force, 83 Navy, 21 Army, 13 Marine Corps, 2 foreign national civilians), list of 44 remains officially repatriated from Laos since Operation Homecoming (28 Air Force, 15 Army, 1 Navy), list of 3 remains received unofficially from Laos since Operation Homecoming (1 Navy, 2 Air Force), list of 2 remains officially repatriated from China since Operation Homecoming (2 Navy) and provided as Enclosure 1 to letter February 18–February 19, 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) in response to Select Committee letter of December 10, 1991. Preparer/Source: CILHI.

Title: Listing of United States Air Force personnel initially categorized as MIA or POW, and the current list of 819 Air Force personnel, alphabetically and by country of loss, who are "unaccounted for," 99 MIAs who were killed in action outright, 32 MIAs who died as the result of nonhostile action, 333 Air Force returnees chronologically by specific date of return (332 repatriates; 1 escapee) and chronological listing of the dates of recovery of 206 USAF personnel identified remains (13 prior to Operation Homecoming, 193 during or after Operation Homecoming, and including 18 remains of individuals who died in captivity and 6 killed outright). Preparer: U.S. Air Force. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Enclosure 1 to letter of March 4, 1992 responding to Senate Select Committee interrogatories 6, 7, and Document Requests 7, 8.

Title: Listing of 193 United States Air Force personnel remains returned to U.S. custody prior to, during and after Operation Homecoming, alphabetically and chronologically by remains returned date. Preparer: U.S. Air Force. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Enclosure 3 to letter of March 4, 1992 responding to Senate Select Committee Document Requests 7, 8.

Title: Listing of 20 United States Marine Corps personnel POW/MIA in Laos, 2 of whose remains have been returned and identified, alphabetically. Preparer: U.S. Marine Corps. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Enclosure 2 to letter of January 31, 1992 responding to Senate Select Committee letters of December 20, 1991.

Supplementary Information

Title: Summarization of authority to place individual in POW/MIA status, 1962 to present, together with the application of the Missing Persons Act and casualty status review procedure by the U.S. Air Force for all Air Force for all persons in an MIA/POW status who were not accounted for in Southeast Asia. Preparer: U.S. Air Force. Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Enclosure 2 to letter of March 4, 1992 responding to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories 20, 21 and 22.

To set the stage for the testimony we will receive, I am going to run quickly through two things. Again, I apologize to my colleagues for the length, but I think it is the only way to make sense of where we are going today. First, I want to mention how DOD and DIA reached their current number of more than 2,200 still unaccounted for, and second, I want to give you a breakdown of the list of 244.

We have a chart, a couple of charts up here, that are harder to read from the distance, but one chart indicates that DIA began a systematic accounting of POW/MIA's in 1965. In October of that year, the list of prisoners, possible prisoners and MIA's, was 430. There was no running list during the war of those now referred to as KIA-BNR, killed in action, body not recovered.

The totals rose during the war until on January 27, 1973, the day the peace agreement was signed, DOD listed 591 POW's, 1,220 MIA's, and 118 as missing but in nonhostile circumstances, for a total of 1,929. DIA, which included civilians in its count, had a higher total of 1,986.

From that point, the numbers declined. The prisoners came home and told officials what they knew about other actual or suspected prisoners. Several hundred changes in status were approved from missing to presumed dead as a result of the prisoner accounts or at the request of next of kin. The total number of POW/MIA's dropped below 1,000 on both the DOD and DIA lists.

But in 1975 DOD began recording a new number, the so-called KIA-BNR's, killed in action, body not recovered. This category included almost 1,600 Americans. Near the end of the decade the category was folded into yet another new term, total unaccounted for. Thus, the universe of possibility, at least in the public mind, expanded to about 2,500, not because of new facts, but because of new policy. Now obviously, this larger number includes those formerly listed as POW's or MIA's, but it also includes those listed as killed in action, body not recovered. The overall total as of today is 2,236 on the DOD list and 2,266 on the DIA list.

Now, one of the principal questions that we are going to need to discuss today is what this number, 2,266 or 2,236, what does it really mean? Does it really mean that that many servicemen are truly unaccounted for in the sense that we do not know if they are alive or dead, or does it mean something else?

It is clear given the history that the probability of survival is greater on the list for some than it is for others. Some are individuals who survived their incidents and were taken captive. Many

others were reported dead immediately after their incident. I want to emphasize that our Committee does not accept at face value all of the decisions about casualty status the DOD has made.

One American, for example, who had been listed as having been killed in action showed up alive at Operation Homecoming. In addition, our investigators have found a small number of cases, and they may find more, where there is reason to challenge determinations of dead, body not recovered.

One of the issues that we are going to have to discuss during these hearings is whether there is sufficient cause to revisit that entire category. I understand General Christmas is revisiting it now, and that there will be a review of those who are in the category of KIA/BNR, or whether that process simply revives false hopes, which we do not want to do.

Now, what we have identified and what I want now to discuss is the 244 cases where we have determined that DOD or DIA had a specific reason to believe that the individual had been taken prisoner at some point, perhaps as far back as at the beginning of the war.

But the point is, that based on the information we had available to us according to our own files, that person should have been recorded at that time as a potential prisoner of war. The list includes others who are not listed in that way, but whom archival records reveal might have been taken into captivity and, clearly, this is the area of greatest question and concern to the Committee.

Of the 244, as I have said, 111 are on the DOD list of military believed to have died in captivity, although exactly when and where, in many cases we do not know. We cannot rule out the possibility that some could have survived past April 1973, and we want to hear from our witnesses regarding that possibility. In fact, it is not just a possibility, but there is evidence the Committee has that that in fact happened.

A further breakdown of the listing shows 2 of the 244 were deserters, and 16 were civilians who are believed to have died in captivity. Fifteen were listed by DIA as prisoners at the time of the Paris accords, but for reasons unexplained in their files, their status was changed to missing in action soon after Operation Homecoming.

Twenty were listed by DIA as MIA's, but their status was changed to died in captivity shortly after the Paris accords. Twenty one are MIA's contained on a list of known or probable POW's that the U.S. gave to the North Vietnamese in April 1973, immediately after Operation Homecoming. So again, by our own handing over to the North Vietnamese of a list of people after Homecoming of people we said had been prisoners, we operate on evidence that they had people which is contrary to the publicly stated policy.

Fifty one are military personnel reported as in captivity, or possibly in captivity and they were reported so by returning American prisoners after Operation Homecoming. We are releasing today the Air Force documents summarizing their accounts. Six of the 244 are military personnel reportedly captured alive through reliable intelligence. One is Robert Garwood, who returned alive in 1979, and one, Colonel Charles Shelton, still listed officially as a POW.

During the next 2 days, we will hear from the people who put these lists together and set the criteria, and made the judgments and issued the policy directives that lie behind them. We will begin with wartime decisions and policies and go right through to the present. Some of this is tedious, I recognize that.

Every Member of the Committee recognizes it, but we are not here to provide television entertainment. We are here to build a factual basis which can put this issue to rest, and the only way to do it is to go through step by step what happened to these names so that we maintain a realistic universe.

We understand the shortcomings of bureaucracy. The chaos of the war, the passage of time, and the past obsession with secrecy may make it very difficult to erase entirely the confusion that still surrounds this whole process, but we believe that we can narrow the range of possibility in a way that is more real and more accurate than has ever been done before.

Already, the information that we have put out is information that, notwithstanding 20 years and 13 investigations, has never been made public. In closing I want to add a couple of points which deal generally with the work of this Committee and why we are here today. These hearings are only going to begin to tell the story. They are a starting point.

No Member of this Committee yet knows what the full story will be, or how complete it will turn out to be, and while these hearings are held, our investigations are continuing along two tracks. The first track is historical, to piece together the past record through the evaluation and review of depositions and files, and documents.

The second track is anchored firmly in the present and that is to follow up on the freshest, most recent, most credible evidence that an American might still be alive in Southeast Asia, or elsewhere. Second and related to the first, we are continuing to press other governments and our own to cooperate fully in our investigation. Whatever we eventually learn about Americans in Russia, President Yeltsin's declaration of full cooperation is the standard by which we should judge ourselves and everyone else.

We are not interested in assigning blame for past mistakes. We are not interested in nurturing anger. We want healing and we want the truth, and we want, as President Yeltsin put it, full access to every document in every archive about every American, and we want immediate follow-up of credible live sighting reports. We will be satisfied with nothing less.

Finally, I apologize in advance for the fact that much of the discussion during these 2 days will be about numbers and lists. We will throw around acronyms and we will talk apparently coolly about status changes. We will talk about presumptions of death and bodies not recovered and it may all sound a little bit cold, and a little bit callous, and far removed from the reality of why we are here.

I wish it could be otherwise. I think I speak for all Members of the Committee when I say that we, none of us, have forgotten why we are here. We have not forgotten that behind every name on these lists there is a family, there is a memory, there is a strong feeling of duty and a sense of commitment and we recognize the

pain of the 20 years, and the pain that exists today as we talk about people's loved ones.

These are the brothers we looked up to, the sons that were raised, and buddies that we fought with, and that is why we are here. Now, I am aware that some people have chosen to question the political motives of this Committee or otherwise. I just hope people will not do that. This is a tough issue. There is nothing easy about digging into it. We are going to do our work as solidly as we conceivably know how and we are promising the American people that we are going to get it done, and we just ask for patience as we proceed through a very difficult task.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KERRY

On April 13, 1978, less than 2 weeks after the return of the last American prisoners as part of Operation Homecoming, Dr. Roger Shields, head of the Defense Department (DOD) Task Force on POW/MIAs, said that "we have no indication at this time that there are any Americans alive in Indochina."

Information uncovered by the investigators of this Committee indicate that this statement, so disheartening to families and so difficult to accept that it has fed controversy for 2 decades, was wrong.

During and after Operation Homecoming, our government, at the highest levels, pressed Vietnam to explain why the Americans we had recorded as captive were not on the returning POW lists; we wanted to know what had happened to them and why. The Defense Intelligence Agency's (DLA) list at the time included 80 names. What was this, if not evidence that Americans could have been left alive?

In addition, after careful review of current and archival DOD documents, our Committee has compiled a list not of 80 but of 244 Americans who did not return at Operation Homecoming, but who were or should have been recorded in captivity at the end of Operation Homecoming and the debriefing of returnees.

I want to emphasize that neither this list nor our other information proves beyond doubt that all 244 Americans were left behind. In fact, we know from returning prisoner reports and other information that many of these 244 did die in captivity. But taken altogether, the information available to the Committee does constitute evidence that some Americans remained alive in Indochina after Operation Homecoming. This is enough in my mind to contradict official statements made then and repeated for almost 2 decades. It is enough to require from us a demand to know why our government said what it said, and if and why it failed aggressively to pursue the information that it had.

For 19 years, the POW/MIA issue has been tearing our country apart. Isolated facts mixed with rumor and hope and theory and—all too often—fraud have driven perceptions and confused the public and left families agonizing over whom and what to believe. Is the official story accurate—no evidence that anyone was alive after 1973? Or are the stories about hundreds of prisoners being moved around from camp to camp true? What is the reality?

We do not have final answers today. But we intend, for the first time, to narrow the universe of possibility, based not on theory or speculation, but fact; not by accepting the official story, but by challenging it, testing it, and exposing what we believe to be some very serious flaws of priority and process.

This morning, and for the next 2 days, we will be hearing from, and questioning those, who had the very grave responsibility of accounting for Americans lost or taken prisoner during the war. In preparation, we asked them, to break that process down, step by step, going back more than 25 years. We literally reconstructed their database, and asked them to answer questions, under oath, about how and why people were categorized as prisoners of war, as missing in action, as presumed dead; about who made those decisions; who kept the lists; and on what basis individuals were moved from one category to another.

In so doing, we learned a great deal about the sources of confusion and even deception in the POW/MIA accounting process—the fragmentation of responsibility, the secrecy, the constantly changing terminology and the failure to correlate and follow up on important pieces of information.

We learned, for example, that there were not one, but at least two, official lists of POW/MIAs—a casualty list kept by the military services and an intelligence list kept by DLA; and that these lists did not—and still do not—always agree.

We learned that terms used by DOD and DIA to categorize POW/MIAs changed over time, adding to the confusion.

We learned that, for years during the war, the location of loss for those involved in covert operations in Cambodia and Laos was intentionally falsified, meaning that erroneous information was provided to families and inserted into files. We will make public a recently declassified memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff reversing that policy. And we regret that the JCS does not have anyone available today who might have the institutional memory required to explain the history of the policy and the steps taken to erase the confusion and suspicion that it caused.

We have also, as I have said, identified 244 Americans whose current and archival records indicate that they either were or should have been listed as prisoners, but who did not return in Operation Homecoming.

Our purpose in doing all this has been to construct a foundation of facts upon which we may build further during these hearings and in subsequent hearings on the Paris Peace Accords, on Laos, on live-sighting reports and on exactly what our intelligence information has shown.

To set the stage for the testimony we will receive today, I want to run quickly through two things.

First, how the DOD and DIA reached their current number of more than 2,200 still unaccounted for, and second, a breakdown of the list of 244 Americans that I just referred to as recorded in captivity.

As the first chart indicates, the DIA began a systematic accounting of POW/MIAs in 1965. In October of that year, the list of prisoners, possible prisoners and MIAs numbered 430. We know of no running list during the war of those now referred to as KIA/BNR, killed in action or otherwise died, body not recovered.

The totals rose during the war until on January 27, 1973, the day the peace agreement was signed. DOD listed 591 POWs, 1,220 MIAs and 118 as missing but in non-hostile circumstances, for a total of 1,929. DIA, which included civilians in its count, had a higher total of 1,986.

From that point, the numbers declined. The prisoners came home and told officials what they knew about other actual or suspected prisoners. Several hundred changes in status were approved from "missing" to "presumed dead" as a result of the prisoner accounts, or at the request of next of kin. The total number of POW/MIAs dropped below 1,000 on both the DOD and DIA lists.

But in 1975, DOD began recording a new number, the so-called KIA/BNRs, believed dead, but bodies not recovered. This category included almost 1,600 Americans. Near the end of the decade, the category was folded into yet another new term, "total unaccounted for." Thus, the universe of possibility, at least in the public mind, expanded to about 2,500—not because of new facts, but because of new policy.

Obviously, this larger number includes those formerly listed as POWs or MIAs, but it also includes those listed as KIA/BNRs. The overall total, as of today, is 2,236 on the DOD list and 2,266 on DIA's.

Now, one of the principal questions we're going to discuss today is what this number—2,266 or 2,236—really means. Does it really mean that many servicemen are truly unaccounted for, in the sense that we do not know if they are alive or dead?

It is clear, given the history, that the probability of survival for some on the lists is far greater than it is for others. Some are individuals who survived their incidents and were taken captive. Many others were reported dead immediately after their incident.

I want to emphasize that our Committee does not accept at face value all of the decisions about casualty status that DOD has made. One American, for example, who had been listed as having been "killed in action" showed up alive at Operation Homecoming. In addition, our investigators have found a small number of cases, and they may find more, where there is reason to challenge determinations of "dead, body not recovered". One of the issues we will be discussing during these hearings is whether there is sufficient cause to revisit this entire category of KIA/BNR, or whether all this would ultimately do is to raise false hopes once again.

What we have identified, and what I want now to discuss, is the 244 cases where we have determined that DOD or DIA had specific reason to believe the individual had been taken prisoner at some point, perhaps as far back as near the start of the war, but where that individual did not return at Operation Homecoming. This list, in the form shown in our second chart, has never been pulled together before. It includes many of those listed as prisoners of war at the time of Operation Homecoming. It includes others who were not so listed, but whom archival records reveal

may have been taken into captivity. Clearly, this is the area of greatest question and concern.

Of the 244, 111 are on the DOD list of military men believed to have died in captivity although exactly when and where, in many cases, we do not know. We cannot rule out the possibility that some could have survived past April, 1973. And we want to hear from our witnesses regarding that possibility.

Two of the 244 were deserters and 16 were civilians who are believed to have died in captivity.

Fifteen were listed by DIA as prisoners at the time of the Paris Accords but, for reasons unexplained in their files, their status was changed to "missing in action" soon after Operation Homecoming.

Twenty were listed by DIA as MIAs, but their status was changed to "died in captivity" shortly after the Paris Accords.

Twenty-one are MIAs contained on a list of known or probable POWs that the U.S. gave to the North Vietnamese in April, 1973—immediately after Operation Homecoming.

Fifty-one are military personnel reported as in captivity, or possibly in captivity, by returning American prisoners during Operation Homecoming. I should note that this number may come down as we scrutinize the reports more closely. We are releasing today the Air Force document summarizing the returning prisoner accounts.

Six of the 244 are military personnel reported captured alive through reliable intelligence.

One is Robert Garwood, who returned alive in 1979. And one, Colonel Charles Shelton, is still listed officially as a POW.

During the next 2 days, we will hear from the people who put the official lists together and who set the criteria and made the judgments and issued the policy directives that lie behind them. We will begin with wartime decisions and policies and go right through to the present. We understand that the shortcomings of bureaucracy, the chaos of war, the passage of time and the past obsession with secrecy may make it impossible to erase entirely the confusion that still surrounds this whole process, but we believe we can narrow the range of possibility in a way that is more real and more accurate than has ever been done before.

In closing, I want to add three points, the first two of which deal generally with the work of this Committee and the third with specifically why we are here today.

First, these hearings will only begin to tell the story we will be telling over the next 6 months. They are a starting point. No Member of this Committee yet knows what the full story will be—or how complete it will turn out to be. Even while these hearings are held, our investigations are continuing along two tracks. The first track is historical—to piece together the past record through the evaluation and review of depositions and files and documents. The second track is anchored firmly in the present: following up on the freshest, most recent, most credible evidence that Americans may still be alive—in Southeast Asia, or elsewhere.

Second, and related to the first, we are continuing to press other governments, and our own, to cooperate fully in our investigation. Whatever we eventually learn about Americans in Russia, President Yeltsin's declaration of full cooperation is the standard by which we will judge all the others. We're not interested in assigning blame for past mistakes. We're not interested in nurturing anger. We want healing. We want the truth. We want, as President Yeltsin put it, full access to every document in every archive about every American; and we want immediate followup on credible live-sighting reports. We will be satisfied with nothing less.

Finally, I want to apologize in advance for the fact that much of the discussion during these 2 days will be about numbers and lists. We will throw around acronyms and talk coolly about "status changes". We will talk about presumptions of death and bodies not recovered. It may all sound cold and callous and far removed from the reality of why we are here.

I think I speak for all Members when I say that we have not forgotten why we are here. We have not forgotten that behind each name on each list there is a life. These people we now refer to as POWs and MIAs and BNRs were once little kids who grew up in towns across America, pledging allegiance, playing ball, calling home on Father's Day and Mother's Day, remembered last at a bus station or train station or airport or in photographs and letters from the front. They are the brothers we looked up to, the sons we raised, the spouses we loved, the fathers we barely remember, the buddies with whom we shared our hopes and fears, our neighbors, our countrymen and our friends.

They are why we are here, still, after so many years.

They are why we take this job as seriously as we do, and why we have determined to proceed in a way that is as non-political and non-ideological as possible.

I am aware that others have chosen to characterize this Committee and its hearings in different terms. Those who do so only betray their own lack of seriousness and are either ignorant of, or perhaps all too aware of, our determination, as best we can, to find the truth.

Because we have such a long list of witnesses and a great deal of ground to cover, I will leave it there—and move we proceed.

Senator Smith.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues and audience will probably be very pleased to know that I do not have an opening statement and I will be very brief. I apologize for being a few minutes late, Mr. Chairman. I did not hear the beginning of your remarks, but I just want to comment on the issue of leaks from the committee. Of course, when these types of things happen it is an embarrassment to the committee, and frankly, to the members.

You start off by being angry and you get frustrated, and after a point you almost get to the point where you get resigned to this in this city, because reporters have big ears and are able to apparently gain access, which does reflect on all members of the staff. I just want to move on from that to say and reiterate what Senator Kerry has already said, essentially that we intend to get the information.

This committee intends to get the information that the executive branch of the Government has on this issue, the whole issue, including the numbers which are the subject of this week's hearing. However, I must say that over the past, you might say, 45 years, if you want to go all the way back to World War II, which we technically do in the jurisdiction of this committee, and with some of the recent revelations of Mr. Yeltsin, basically are involved in World War II issues as well, although the main focus is Vietnam.

Over the past 45 years, we have seen not only zealous, but jealous guarding of information by the executive branch of the Government on this issue, and it would be one heck of a lot easier if, in fact, the executive branch would cooperate with the legislative branch and get the truth out to the American people totally, unequivocally—totally and unequivocally cooperative. That is what we have asked for.

That is what the American people want. That is why 75 percent of them do not believe that the truth has been told, because frankly, we would not have an investigation today on any of this if the information had been put out and given to the American people. So I expect total cooperation. I am prepared as one member of this committee to do whatever it takes to get that information. Hopefully, it will be willingly.

The cooperation thus far has been good. There has been a vast improvement after Secretary of Defense Cheney spoke to this committee early in the very beginning stages of it, but it has not been total and it has not been easy getting all of the information. We have been rebuffed for various reasons which I will not get into at this time, but we have been rebuffed on information.

So in addition, it seems as if whenever anybody comes forth with information in this past few days, Boris Yeltsin, the process seems to be to throw a grenade at the messenger. Never mind the message. Well, sometimes when you throw a grenade it can get picked up and thrown back and some of the comments that have been made, whether you agree with Mr. Yeltsin or not—one comment was made, attributed to a prominent official in the DOD, that Mr. Yeltsin was drunk when he said what he said, which is an outrageous comment.

Second, every effort has been made, and some of the people speaking out on this issue both in the press as well as within the Government, have tried to indicate that he misspoke. Why do we not just check his message and then we will make that determination as far as what the messenger said. Let us check out his message before we shoot down the messenger.

So the way to deal with this, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, is to declassify this information, which the chairman and I agree needs to be done. We intend to have a vote of the committee next week to do that, to declassify all this information. It is the official position, apparently, it seems to be that none of the information is valid.

It does not show the existence of live POW's. That seems to be the position of the Government, so if it does not, what are you afraid of? Put it out on the street. Let the American people see it, let them judge for themselves whether or not they are, quote, unquote, evidence or not.

Let me just finally comment on the subject today, just one footnote. Senator Kerrey has gone through in great detail what we are talking about in numbers. I must say, for the past several months, this committee has simply tried to find out what the universe is. That is, how many people are missing. We have seen I do not know how many lists.

I cannot even count how many lists we have seen from how many different sources. We think we may have a universe number, we are not sure and we are talking for the most part about Vietnam. Now when we talk about people who are listed as MIA's and POW's, what they may have been, or whatever position they are in, we are not talking about Laos. Laos is a black hole. We do not have any idea, with the exception of about 13 individuals, what happened to the people in Laos.

So when we classify people in Laos as dead, then we have to have substantiation for that, and we do not know what happened to them. I really do not know how you can make that judgment, so one of the things that we need to look into is the 591 men who were lost in Laos, about 30 or 40, or maybe 50 of which have been returned as remains and eight, I believe, were returned by the Vietnamese at the end of the war.

So I want to keep in mind as one member that I want to look into that area of Laos and get some explanations there. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Smith. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman. I want to be included in the record for that request.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. Senator Kerrey?
 Senator KERREY. I have no opening statement.
 The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid?
 Senator REID. I have no opening statement.
 The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR
 FROM IOWA

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, it has become apparent that it is open season on leaks from this committee. It has gotten to the point that instead of getting briefed by my staff, all I simply have to do is pick up the morning paper and read a lot of what this committee does. So a lot of people in this town as well as the country at large must really have big question marks about what it all means.

The public and even our colleagues in the Senate, indeed all those not intimately involved with this issue, find it difficult to understand the dynamics of the issue and hence, the dynamics of this committee. This is certainly not a proper way to air a debate. I would like to take a stab, if I could, at defining it and then offering a suggestion.

As the chairman himself recently said, there are a lot of people involved who have investments in particular viewpoints, statements, or conclusions on this POW/MIA issue. Perhaps a lot of reputations and perhaps even a lot of careers might be at stake, and that is not even to mention the most important point, that this issue involves the fate of thousands of loved ones throughout the country.

When you sum all this up, what you have got is a deeply rooted emotional polarized situation. The very notion that a committee could come together in this environment would necessarily lead to a microcosm of the broader polarized environment, and that is indeed what this committee is. Someone described it as a tent, as I read in this morning's paper. Whatever it is, it certainly is no melting pot, and expecting calm and order on this issue is like expecting cats and dogs to live in perfect harmony.

Having said all that, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would also like to point out that in my view, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this committee have done next to the impossible in terms of keeping this committee together, to keep it focused, and conducting its oversight. This round of hearings is merely scratching the surface. It is an attempt to create a baseline.

Meanwhile, we have uncovered numerous documents which are beginning to tell a rather uncomfortable story in my view. Those documents must and will be declassified. The task force staff has identified hundreds of thousands of documents to be declassified. The sooner they are declassified, the better. In my view, part of the frustration being felt by Senator Smith is that the documents that we are collecting do not tell the same rosy story that we keep hearing from the Administration.

When a report comes out in public the Administration is quick to debunk it and then claims there is no evidence that we left men behind. Well, that simply is not true. We do have evidence that we

left men behind, but it has not been subjected to rigorous scrutiny because we are still early in this process.

Until these documents become declassified and tell the story themselves without the debunkers, without the conspirators, and the spin doctors, it is incumbent upon us, those of us on this committee and, of course, the media as well, to counter the misrepresentations that there is no evidence.

Unfortunately, we were given a glimpse of that evidence in yesterday's Wall Street Journal. Evidence exists, and the next time that someone in the Administration says that there is no evidence that we left people behind, it is clear that he or she is not reading the same documents that the members of this Committee and our respective staffs are reading.

So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is that we make it very clear and as often as is necessary that statements to the effect that there is no evidence, that these statements simply are not credible. I am reminded, Mr. Chairman, as you spoke about the openness of Mr. Yeltsin and his statement last week, that our government ought to do exactly the same thing and act the same way and be totally open.

The years and years that have gone into individual efforts to see a lot of these documents that have not been given to this committee and some, having now been given to this committee, the amount of stonewalling that went on, what a contrast to have a former communist open up documents of their government to members of our government, and we have problems with our own government stonewalling.

It may not be treasonous in the sense of violating the Constitution's definition of treason or statutory definitions of treason, but it is surely treasonous to the spirit of open government and the checks and balances of our government that people in our administrative branch of government over several administrations have not wanted to make our system of government work the way it was intended by our Constitution's writers.

I hope that the evidence of this committee and the work of this committee will surely be judged not just by what we do on resolving the POW issue, but what we do setting a standard for future administrations on future issues to keep legitimate information from the American people.

If we do not crack that nut, Mr. Chairman, regardless of how good our work is on the POW issue, I think we have fallen short of our responsibilities beyond our resolution of creation to the American people as whole, and the end of openness in our government. Mr. Chairman, I am done with my statement, but I do have a question in regard to your numbers and also following upon what Senator Smith asked about Laos.

Did the numbers that you give us include the numbers in Laos?

The CHAIRMAN. It is accurate, they do. The numbers according to DOD, again we are working off the DOD lists, et cetera, but they listed 13, I believe it was, as POW's, 9 of whom were returned in the course of Operation Homecoming, and then there is an accounting process for the rest. The MIA's on the rest of the 590 or so—there is no accounting of them. So they are within that universe of 2,236. That is accurate.

Senator GRASSLEY. I will accept what you said.
[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

Mr. Chairman, it's apparently become open season on leaks from this committee. It's gotten to the point where, instead of getting briefed by my staff, I simply pick up the morning paper. So a lot of people out there must have big question marks about what it all means. The public, and even our colleagues in the Senate, indeed all those not intimately involved in this issue, find it difficult to understand the dynamics of the issue, and hence the dynamics of this committee. This is certainly not the proper way to air a debate. Nonetheless, I'd like to take a stab at defining it, and then offering a suggestion.

As the chairman himself recently said, there are a lot of people involved who have investments in particular viewpoints, statements or conclusions on this issue. Perhaps, a lot of reputations and careers are at stake. And that's not even to mention the most important point—that this issue involves the fate of thousands of loved ones throughout this country. When you sum all that up, what you've got is a deeply-rooted, emotional, polarized situation. The very notion that a committee could come together in that environment would necessarily lead to a microcosm of the broader, polarized environment. And that is, indeed, what this committee is. Someone described it as a tent, as I read in this morning's papers. Whatever it is, it certainly is no melting pot. And expecting calm and order on this issue is like expecting cats and dogs to live in perfect harmony.

Having said all that, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to point out that, in my view, the chairman and vice chairman of this committee have done next to the impossible in terms of keeping this committee together, keeping it focused, and conducting its oversight. This round of hearings that begin today are merely scratching the surface. It's an attempt to create a baseline. Meanwhile we have uncovered numerous documents which are beginning to tell a rather uncomfortable story, in my view. Those documents must and will be declassified. The task force staff has identified hundreds of thousands of documents to be declassified. The sooner they are declassified, the better. In my view, part of the frustration being felt by Senator Smith is that the documents we are collecting do not tell the same rosy story we keep hearing from the Administration. When a report comes out in public, the Administration is quick to debunk it, and then claims there's no evidence we left men behind. Well, that simply is not true. We do have evidence we left men behind. But it hasn't been subjected to rigorous scrutiny because we're still early in this process. Until these documents become declassified, and tell the story themselves, without all the debunkers, the conspiratorialists and the spin doctors, it's incumbent upon us—we on this committee—and the media as well, to counter the misrepresentation that there is no evidence. Unfortunately, we were given a glimpse of that evidence in yesterday's Wall Street Journal. Evidence exists. And the next time someone in the Administration says there is no evidence we left people behind, it's clear he or she is not reading the same documents we have.

So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is that we make it very clear, and as often as is necessary, that statements to the effect that there is "no evidence" is simply not credible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I detailed all of these lists to be made public so that anybody who wants to struggle through and try to recreate this database obviously can do so. We are going to follow through on what I said. We are releasing some 70 documents today, most of these lists. We will be releasing other documents that we have that support the contention of knowledge about people being alive at that time.

I might add that the committee has other documents supporting what we have stated today. These are not blind statements, but they are not yet declassified. As soon as we can get all these documents declassified, then people will be able to make their own judgments and obviously the purpose of this effort is to allow people to make their own judgments. Senator Kassebaum?

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the patience of my colleagues and everybody, and again I apologize for the longer opening statement, but I do think it was important to give you a sense of the basis of today's hearing or I am not sure where people would know where we are going.

One final announcement. With respect to Mr. Perot's testimony, Mr. Perot has agreed to do a formal deposition with the Committee on July 1, and that will take place. He has agreed to do that. I just want to correct any misinterpretation that appeared, again, in stories.

The committee did not threaten, nor did it vote, any subpoena. Mr. Perot has cooperated with the committee and has been invaluable to us on a number of occasions. He did not, obviously, want to come in a public way for the reasons that he stated. We are proceeding as we have with other witnesses, which is to do the deposition. The committee has waived no right with respect to subsequent public testimony should that be what we decide.

Senator KERREY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Kerrey.

Senator KERREY. Has Mr. Perot asked any restrictions be placed on the deposition, those doing the deposing?

The CHAIRMAN. The only restraint we have accepted is the notion that it will be with respect to POW/MIA issues. In other words, we are not going to be asking political questions, or his stand on positions, but anything with respect to POW/MIA is fair game within this deposition. We waived nothing as to POW/MIA.

I would like to proceed, if we can, with the first panel. We have several panels today. The first panel is an overview of wartime casualty accounting procedures from 1967 through the present—through 1973. There will be some overlap, obviously, into the present.

We are pleased to have Mr. Robert Sungeis, who is the Chief of the Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports of the Office of Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs from 1971 until 1992, Colonel Michael Spinello, Director of Casualty Affairs and Operations, U.S. Army, Brigadier General Michael McGinty, Commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Captain Peggy Debien.

Captain DEBIEN. Debien.

The CHAIRMAN. Director of Personnel, Family and Community Support Division, United States Navy, and Colonel Quebecodaux, United States Marine Corps Casualty Office. We appreciate you being here.

Stand and raise your right hand, please and be sworn. If you would raise your right hand, do you swear each and individually to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SUNGENIS. I do.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I do.

Colonel SPINELLO. I do.

General MCGINTY. I do.

Captain DEBIEN. I do.

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trowbridge and Mr. Sungenis, I gather you both will have opening statements, and then we will proceed to questions. Would you pull the microphone over to you, Mr. Trowbridge, if you are going to begin.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES TROWBRIDGE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SPECIAL OFFICE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS, (1971-1992)

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'm pleased to appear before you today to discuss the role of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the POW/MIA issue and in particular provide to you historical background on DIA's wartime activities.

I came to DIA in December of 1971, and became involved in the POW/MIA issue almost immediately. At that time, I was aware that prior to my arrival in DIA, with the build-up of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, the intelligence community already had increased emphasis on collecting information relating to our POW's and MIA's.

Hanoi's June 1966 announcement that our captured airmen would be tried for war crimes drastically focused intelligence community attention on this issue. In Vietnam and Laos, both military and civilian organizations were sensitized to exploit all sources for any information they might have on missing Americans.

Worldwide intelligence-gathering efforts were expanded to include collection of all media coverage and photographs of POW's. Communist radio broadcasts were also carefully monitored for information. During these years, DIA's role in the issue expanded and the agency assumed the chairmanship of the Interagency POW/MIA Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee.

Through this committee and the POW/MIA Intelligence Task Force which was formed in December of 1971, DIA worked closely with each of the military services and with the other members of the intelligence community. These committees, which were comprised of representatives from the intelligence sections of each of the military services as well as appropriate representatives from State and CIA monitored and focused the worldwide POW/MIA intelligence efforts and expedited communication with the policy-makers.

I want to emphasize that the entire intelligence community was involved in the collection and analysis of information which could be related to our men. During these interagency working meetings, which were usually held weekly, information was exchanged on specific cases to ensure that each of the services had access to all collected and correlated information and that any information that the services had would be commonly shared.

During the war, DIA's efforts were focused almost exclusively on trying to determine who was being held prisoner and where they were likely being held. While DIA was obviously interested in any information on a missing man, crash and grave related information was more the responsibility of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, whose mission was to pursue the long-term task of recovering U.S. personnel after search and rescue operations had been suspended. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center was the forerunner

of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center which has more recently become the Joint Task Force—Full Accounting.

All types of information were used to determine the likelihood of captivity. Some information from sensitive intelligence sources was often quite reliable. Open source information and information from visitors were also of value. Unfortunately, for many years the North Vietnamese steadfastly refused to name any of the prisoners they held.

Some POW's were identified through various broadcast media, while others were photographed often by communist bloc media outlets which permitted DIA to verify their status. In some cases, it was not until after they were permitted to write to their loved ones or families that they were certain that they were alive.

I might also note that during the course of the war a few men escaped or were released from camps in the south. Through them, we were able to learn about others still in captivity. In the case of North Vietnam, several early releasees provided us with hundreds of names of POW's.

Much has been made over a perceived difference in DIA's analytical assessment versus the status in which the services carried a man. Right here, I want to make it absolutely clear for the record that DIA did not and does not determine the legal status of a serviceman. That is the sole responsibility of each of the military service secretaries.

During the war, there were a few cases where, based on information DIA received or upon the circumstances of loss, DIA thought it possible that a man was a POW, yet the services carried him as missing in action. The status the service assigned was always their legal status. Ours was more a working hypothesis for analytical purposes.

In other instances, the services believed that based on a loss incident, or maybe other information, the man should be listed as POW. On occasions, we did not concur that the available information indicated that the man was likely a prisoner. These differences were usually resolved by subsequent receipt of information which either confirmed or cast doubt on the possibility of POW status.

Over the past 9 months, this committee has reviewed hundreds and hundreds of POW/MIA case files maintained by DIA. As you are aware, these analytical working files are comprised of information gleaned from a wide variety of sources. Some of the data is fairly detailed and of substance, while in other cases it is rather vague and fragmentary. DIA cannot create data out of thin air. We can only work with what we are able to collect.

Going back to the war years within DIA, our office was the focal point for POW/MIA information. This information was analyzed in an effort to correlate it to a missing U.S. serviceman or civilian.

For instance, if a human source—say, a captured North Vietnamese soldier—told his U.S. interrogators that in 1966 he saw the downing of an F-105 and the capture of a pilot in a specific location, the report would be sent to Washington for analysis. As part of DIA's analysis we would review such losses in that area for the general time cited by the source.

In so doing, we might find that that report would correlate to several incidents. Duplicates of the source's debrief report would

then be put in each man's file in the hope that subsequent information would then become available which would aid in positive identification of the POW. Sometimes we did get additional data, sometimes not.

It must be understood that intelligence analysis is not an exact science where conclusions can be faultlessly reached based on perfect knowledge. We have to make the best judgment we can based on the information we have, and that is what we did.

I would like to elaborate on my previous comment. When you take into account the POW's who were returned, we are left with slightly less than 100 men who are officially listed by the services as POW's. While many of these official POW status determinations were based on imperfect knowledge of the circumstances of loss, including in some cases varying indication that the man had survived and fallen into enemy hands, in no instance did we have current intelligence to indicate that these men were currently held in captivity.

In some cases, we had very good information that the individuals had been held in captivity but had died there. In many other cases, there was no information beyond the original loss data. There were also a few cases where the services listed men as prisoners of war based on data which they later learned was erroneous in that it correlated to a different man. Much of this we learned through debriefing all of the returnees, who also told us of men who had died before entering the prison system.

Further, there are also instances such as those well-publicized cases in Laos, for example, where in the mid-Sixties two men were known to have been held in captivity by the Pathet Laos in caves near the command headquarters in Sam Neua Province but who did not come home in 1973. In these cases, however, we also possess convincing evidence that both of these men had died several years earlier.

There were obviously many questions stemming from the lack of full knowledge. Many of these questions remain unanswered to this day. That is why DIA has joined hands with the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting. DIA provides detailed intelligence support packages to the JTF prior to each round of research activities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In these packages we try to highlight positive steps that can be taken to gather missing information through interview, archival records, and other field investigative means.

DIA realizes that the answers to these vexing and troublesome questions lie within the borders of the nations of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As an agency, DIA intends to keep doing its part until these answers are obtained.

I hope these opening remarks will be of value to the committee, and I will be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trowbridge follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES TROWBRIDGE, JR.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the role of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the POW-MIA issue, and particularly provide you with historical background on DIA's wartime activities.

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During these years DIA's role in the issue expanded and the Agency assumed the chairmanship of the Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee. Through this committee and the POW/MIA Intelligence Task force which was formed in December 1971, DIA worked closely with each of the military services and with the other members of the Intelligence Community. These committees, which were comprised of representatives from the intelligence sections of each of the military services, as well as appropriate representatives from State and CIA, monitored and focused the worldwide POW/MIA intelligence efforts and expedited communication with policy makers.

I want to emphasize that the entire Intelligence Community was involved in the collection and analysis of information which could be related to our men. During these interagency working meetings, which were usually held weekly, information was exchanged on specific cases to ensure that each of the services had access to all collected and correlated information, and that any information the services had would be commonly shared.

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Much has been made over a perceived difference in DIA's analytic assessment versus the status in which the services carried a man. Right here I want to make it absolutely clear for the record that DIA did not, and does not, determine the legal status of a serviceman. That is the sole responsibility of each of the Military Service Secretaries. During the war there were a few cases where, based on information DIA received, or upon the circumstances of loss, DIA thought it possible that the man was a POW, yet the service carried him as MIA. The status the service assigned was always the legal status; ours was more of a working hypothesis for analytical purposes. In other instances the services believed that based on the loss incident, or maybe other information, the man should be listed as a POW. On occasion we did not concur that the available information indicated the man was likely a prisoner. These differences were usually resolved by subsequent receipt of additional information which either confirmed or cast doubt on the possible POW status.

Over the past 9 months this committee has reviewed hundreds and hundreds of POW/MIA case files maintained by DIA. As you are aware, these analytical working files are comprised of information gleaned from a wide variety of sources. Some of the data is fairly detailed and substantive, while in other cases it is rather vague and fragmentary. DIA cannot create data out of thin air; we can only work with what we are able to collect.

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serviceman or civilian. For instance, if a human source—say a captured North Vietnamese soldier—told his U.S. interrogators that in 1966 he saw the downing of an F-105 and the capture of a pilot at a specific location, the report would be sent to Washington for analysis. As part of DIA's analysis we would review known losses in that area for the general time cited by the source. In so doing we might find that the report could relate to half a dozen different incidents. Duplicates of the source debrief report would then be put in each man's file in the hope that subsequent information would become available which would aid in positive identification of the POW. Sometimes we did get additional data, sometimes not. It must be understood that intelligence analysis is not an exact science where conclusions can be faultlessly reached based on perfect knowledge. We have to make the best judgment we can based on the information we have. And that is what we did.

At the time of the 1973 signing of the Agreement to End the War, the Vietnamese provided the U.S. Government with lists of Americans who were to be released, as well as names of men who had died in captivity. These lists were followed later by a list of Americans who had been captured in Laos, but were held in Vietnam, who would also be released. Generally, the information received matched fairly closely with that held by the Intelligence Community.

I'd like to elaborate on my previous comment. When you take into account the POWs who returned, we were left with slightly less than 100 men who were officially listed by the Services as POWs. While many of these official POW status determinations were based on imperfect knowledge of the circumstances of loss—including in some cases varying indications that the man had survived and fallen into enemy hands—in no instance did we have current intelligence to indicate that these men were currently held in captivity. In some cases we had very good information that individuals had been held in captivity but had died there. In many other cases there was no information beyond the original loss data. There were also a few cases where the services listed men as POWs based upon data which they later learned was erroneous in that it correlated to a different man. Much of this we learned through debriefing all the returnees, who also told us of men who had died before entering the prison system. Further, there are also instances, such as those well publicized cases in Laos, for example, where in the mid-1960s 2 men were known to be held captive by the Pathet Laos in caves near the command headquarters in Sam Neua Province, but who did not come home in 1973. In these cases, however, we also possessed convincing information that both men had died several years earlier.

There were obviously many questions stemming from lack of full knowledge; many of these questions remain unanswered to this day. That is why DIA has joined hands with the JTF-Full Accounting. DIA provides detailed intelligence support packages to the JTF prior to each round of research activities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In these packages, we try to highlight positive steps that can be taken to gather missing information through interview, archival records, and other field investigative means. DIA realizes that the answers to these vexing and troublesome questions lie within the borders of the nations of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As an agency, DIA intends to keep doing its part until these answers are obtained.

I hope these opening remarks will be of value to the committee. I would be happy to take your questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Trowbridge. Mr. Sungenis.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT SUNGENIS, CHIEF, DIRECTORATE OF INFORMATION, OPERATIONS AND REPORTS (DIOR), OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD), (1973-1992)

MR. SUNGENIS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee—

THE CHAIRMAN. Would you pull the mike closer to you, please? You almost want to talk right on it, into it.

MR. SUNGENIS. My name is Joseph Robert Sungenis. I am the Director of Information, Operations, and Reports in the Washington Headquarters Services. The Washington Headquarters Services is a field activity of the Department of Defense. Its mission is to provide administrative and operational—

THE CHAIRMAN. I need to ask you to get the mike closer. Pull it underneath the book, or to the side. Thank you.

MR. SUNGENIS. Its mission is to provide administrative and operational support to specified activities in the national capital region.

I first became involved in casualty reporting in September 1974, when I was assigned to the organization responsible for the collection and dissemination of information on all aspects of the Southeast Asia conflict.

In the fall of 1976, I moved to another part of the organization and was no longer involved in Southeast Asia statistical operations.

In October 1977, as a result of a reorganization Washington Headquarters Services was established, and I was selected for my current position. Subsequent to that reorganization, the Southeast Asia casualty responsibility was transferred to one of my operating divisions.

In September 1973, the Department of Defense began collecting reports of U.S. casualties in Southeast Asia from the military services. The information was to be retroactive to January 1, 1961, and information on individuals was not required.

Almost 10 years later, on March 20, 1973, the authority for the combat area casualty file on individual servicemen was issued. The purpose of the file was to consolidate guidance and procedures for reporting U.S. casualties in combat areas into one issuance, add uniform procedures and formats for reporting automated weekly detailed data on casualties, and designate a single point of contact for maintaining the official DOD combat area casualties database.

The Southeast Asia casualty database contains selected personnel data on U.S. military personnel who became casualties in the Vietnam conflict. Currently, the file contains 55,939 individuals whose remains have been recovered, and 2,226 individuals whose bodies have not been recovered. The total is 58,165.

The responsibility for the file was transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration on July 3, 1980. At that time, the Archives became the official custodian and agreed to process all inquiries and requests for information contained therein. My office agreed to act as the liaison between the military departments and the Archives for the purpose of updating the file if subsequent changes occurred.

It should be noted that at the time the casualty file was created a hard copy of the DD Form 1300 report of casualty was on hand for every individual listed in the file. However, at the time the official file was transferred to the Archives, the back-up materials, such as the hard copy DD Forms 1300 and other supporting documentation, were discarded.

In 1982, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was dedicated in Washington, DC. The names for the memorial were provided by the National Archives. After the memorial was erected, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, which is the private group responsible for establishing and dedicating the memorial, requested that my office participate with them in validating and updating the names on the memorial. We have continued to work with the National Parks Service in that capacity to this day.

All of the data collection systems in this directorate are sponsored by a policy organization in OSD. In regard to Vietnam conflict statistics, my office and its predecessor prior to the creation of the Washington Headquarters Services was responsible for the

compilation and consolidation of reports on U.S. casualties in combat areas as reported by the casualty officers of the military services in consonance with Department of Defense Instruction 7730.22.

To the best of my knowledge, at no time did this office engage or participate in any policy determination or jurisdictional matter concerning the reporting criteria used by the respective military services. We compiled and published the data submitted by DD Form 1300. Any changes made to the information were upon notification by the cognizant military service component via a revised DD 1300.

I have prepared detailed responses to the committee's questions. They are contained in my detailed statement.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sungenis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. SUNGENIS

I first became involved in the collection and reporting of Southeast Asia casualty statistics in September 1974 when I was assigned to the Summary Management Information Division of the Directorate for Information Operations and Control of the DOD Comptroller. That organization was responsible for the collection and dissemination of information on all aspects of the Southeast Asia conflict. In the fall of 1976 I moved to the Manpower Management Information Division of DIO&C and no longer was involved in the Southeast Asia statistical operations. In October 1977, the Washington Headquarters Services was established and I was selected as the Director for Information Operations and Reports. Subsequent to that reorganization, the Southeast Asia casualty responsibility was transferred to one of my operating divisions. Since that time I have had second level responsibility for the program.

In September 1963, the Department of Defense began collecting reports of U.S. casualties in Southeast Asia from the Military Services. This weekly statistical report was submitted in accordance with a memorandum dated September 27, 1963, from the Director, Statistical Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This reporting requirement was formalized in DOD Instruction 7730.22, "Statistical Report of U.S. Casualties in Southeast Asia" dated December 2, 1963. The information was to be retroactive to January 1, 1961, and information on individuals was not required. On March 20, 1973, the authority for the Combat Area Casualty File on individual serviceman was created (DODI 7730.22). The purpose of the Southeast Asia Casualty Data Base, was to "consolidate guidance and procedures for reporting U.S. casualties in combat areas into one issuance; add uniform procedures and formats for reporting automated weekly detail data on casualties; and designate a single point-of-contact for maintaining the official DOD Combat Area Casualties Data Base."

The Southeast Asia Casualty Data Base contains selected personal data on U.S. military personnel who became casualties in the Vietnam conflict. Currently, the official Southeast Asia Casualty Data Base contains 55,939 individuals whose remains have been recovered and 2,226 individuals whose bodies have not been recovered.

In agreement with the National Archives and Records Administration, the Southeast Asia Casualty file was transferred to that organization on July 3, 1980. At that time the Archives became the official custodian of the file and agreed that all inquiries or requests for information contained in the file would be handled by the Archives. DIOR did agree to act as the liaison between the Military Departments and the Archives for the purpose of updating the file as subsequent changes occurred.

It should be noted that at the time the casualty file was created, a hard copy DD Form 1300 was on hand for every individual listed in the file. However, at the time the official file was transferred to the Archives, the backup materials such as the hard copy DD Forms 1300, and other supporting documentation were discarded. It was determined that the materials in DIOR were not the official file copies. The official personnel records were available from the respective military services if required.

In 1982, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was dedicated in Washington, DC; the names for the Memorial were provided by the National Archives. After the Memori-

al was erected, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Inc. (the private group responsible for establishing and dedicating the Memorial) requested that DIOR participate with them in validating and updating the names on the Memorial. We have continued to work with the National Park Service in that capacity to this day.

DIOR is an operational organization and as such, did not establish policy concerning the casualty reporting system. All of the data collection systems in DIOR are sponsored by a policy organization in OSD. In regard to Vietnam conflict statistics, this office, and its predecessor prior to the creation of the Washington Headquarters Services, was responsible for the compilation and consolidation of reports on U.S. Casualties in Combat Areas, as reported by the casualty offices of the military services in consonance with DOD Instruction 7730.22. To the best of my knowledge, at no time did this office engage or participate in any policy determination or jurisdictional matter concerning the reporting criteria used by the respective military services.

We compiled and published the data submitted via DD Form 1300 "Report of Casualty." Any changes made to the information, were upon notification by the cognizant military service component via a certified DD Form 1300.

Following are my responses to the committee's questions which were contained in the memorandum to Mr. Cooke, the Director, Washington Headquarters Services dated June 5, 1982.

Question 1. What instructions did the senior casualty officials in the Defense Department receive regarding Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions to exempt cross-border losses in Cambodia and Laos from normal casualty reporting during 1965-1970?

Answer: I have no information on any instructions given to exempt cross-border losses in Cambodia and Laos. When the data were reported to my office the country of loss was provided by the service. There was no visibility in the reports as to the nature of the operations involved.

Question 2. How did the Department of Defense describe and define military casualties from the Southeast Asia Combat Zone?

Answer: The Department of Defense Instruction 7730.22, "Reports on U.S. Casualties in Combat Areas," dated March 20, 1973, provides the definitions for several categories of casualties in the section entitled "Explanation of Terms." The Instruction also refers to Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," authorized by DOD Directive 5000.9, August 20, 1969, for casualty definitions.

Question 3. What is the chronology of countries included within the Southeast Asia Combat Zone?

Answer: The Department of Defense Instruction, "Statistical Report of U.S. Casualties in Southeast Asia," dated December 2, 1963, required in enclosure 1 that data be provided for casualties incurred in the countries of Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

Subsequently, Executive Order 11216, "Designation of Vietnam and Waters Adjacent Thereto as a Combat Zone for the Purposes of Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," dated April 24, 1965, further defined the combat zone.

DODI 7730.22 dated January 20, 1967, under the Paragraph Definitions stated that "Southeast Asia for purposes of this report consists of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and adjacent waters."

The revised Department of Defense Instruction 7730.22, "Reports on U.S. Casualties in Combat Areas," dated March 20, 1973, in the section entitled "Explanation of Terms" stated that "Southeast Asia, for the purposes of these reports, consists of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, and adjacent waters as defined in Executive Order 11216." The above listed DOD Instructions required that the casualty data be cumulative beginning January 1, 1961.

Question 4. Who has been authorized to provide casualty statistics within the Department of Defense and how has this authority been changed over the past 30 years?

Answer: The Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR) and its predecessor organization have been the official office of record within the Department of Defense for collecting and tabulating data on the conflict in Southeast Asia since a memorandum was sent by the Director, Statistical Services, OASD (Comptroller) to the Military Services on September 27, 1963, subject: "Statistical Report of U.S. Casualties in Southeast Asia." The Department of Defense Instruction 7730.22, "Reports on U.S. Casualties in Combat Areas," dated March 20, 1973, superseded the previous version of DODI 7730.22 dated January 20, 1967, and designated the Directorate for Information Operations, OASD (Comptroller), as the "central data repository (responsible) for casualty information on all U.S. conflicts (i.e., his-

torical data on prior conflicts to the extent that data are available, current, and future emergency situations (exist)." The Department of Defense Instruction 7730.63, "Reports on Active Duty Military Personnel Casualties in Official Combat Areas and in Noncombat Areas," dated August 26, 1982, superseded DODI 7730.22 (March 20, 1973), and designated the "DIOR, Washington Headquarters Services, as the focal point for the collection, processing, and dissemination of casualty statistics." The Department of Defense Instruction 1800.18, "Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures," dated December 27, 1991, superseded DODI 7730.63 (August 26, 1982) and requires that DIOR "Maintain and operate the Department of Defense Worldwide Casualty System . . ." and "Prepare consolidated casualty information reports for use by the Department of Defense, and as required, for use by the President, the Congress, other Federal Agencies, and the general public."

Question 5. How does the Department of Defense verify the accuracy of information contained in casualty reports and audit the accuracy of information it enters into its own Southeast Asia Casualty data base?

Answer. The official Department of Defense Southeast Asia Casualty file is an automated file of the most recent information on U.S. military personnel determined to have been a casualty in Southeast Asia, based on information contained on a final DD Form 1300 from the respective military service. Only data from a final DD Form 1300 or other appropriate record is entered into the official file.

The official Southeast Asia Casualty file is a matter of public record. The complete official file is available to any requester from the National Archives and Records Administration, and the information is displayed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Directory of names. Through these avenues alone, the official data is reviewed by families, friends—and any and all interested persons—who can and do bring possible inconsistencies to our attention. We welcome this type of review. Anyone in the public can come to us with questions concerning the data. We take these requests extremely seriously and carefully investigate any and all claims.

Recently, the Senate Select Committee suggested that DIOR reconcile the official file with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Military Services, and the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (formerly the Joint Casualty Resolution Center). We were in complete agreement with this suggestion and immediately took steps to initiate the process. We met with and provided our file to DIA for comparison with their records. DIA provided a list of possible discrepancies that required investigation. DIOR staff personnel were dispatched to the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, MO to obtain the final DD Forms 1300 for the respective cases. The results of that effort will be discussed in the section on Country of Loss Changes.

We are currently taking steps to work with the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, to complete a similar reconciliation. We hope to finalize the arrangements for an on-site review within the next few weeks.

Currently, all automated information provided by the military services is verified manually against the hard copy source documents. Printouts of these verified data, with any annotated changes made by DIOR, are returned to the military service for their review and correction, if applicable.

All DD Forms 1300 received from the military services for the Southeast Asia Casualty database are reviewed and if information is entered into the system, the resultant data are printed for manual verification by DIOR staff. Periodically, a copy of the data is provided to the military services for their review and validation.

All known errors in the data base are corrected as they are identified. Whenever any error is brought to our attention, the error is researched and applicable errors are corrected based on information contained on the DD Form 1300. If the error is on the DD Form 1300, the applicable military service will provide a corrected DD Form 1300 with the correct information which is then entered into our data base.

Question 6. What is the accuracy of that data base today, particularly with regard to the process dates, the dates your Department actually entered a particular casualty data transaction?

Answer. DODI 7730.22 dated March 20, 1973, required for the first time that casualty information by name be provided. The data were to be cumulative from 1961. The instruction required the military department provide punch card information on all casualties which had occurred from 1961 to 1973.

One of the fields in the punch card was Date Processed. The instructions were to record a year from 1961-1973 in that field. Fifty six thousand, three hundred and forty five records show a process date of 1961-1973. This was a one time effort. In

1974 submission of punch cards was discontinued and process date was entered as the period when the record was entered into the file for the first time. There may be instances where changes were made and the original process date was retained. Following is a table which shows process date and service by number of servicemen:

SOUTHEAST ASIA CASUALTIES
Total by Process Date and Service

Process date	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Coast Guard	Total
61	6	0	0	6	0	12
62	28	3	5	17	0	53
63	72	4	10	28	0	114
64	146	7	4	37	0	194
65	1,062	86	450	121	0	1,719
66	3,732	240	1,857	205	2	6,036
67	6,441	563	3,768	273	0	11,045
68	10,584	593	5,040	271	1	16,489
69	8,159	425	2,686	228	3	11,501
70	4,980	215	686	177	0	6,058
71	2,110	54	79	93	0	2,336
72	368	72	13	91	1	545
73	55	52	13	123	0	243
74	51	26	26	95	0	198
75	17	42	30	51	0	140
76	27	5	11	25	0	68
77	26	23	6	41	0	96
78	152	38	29	207	0	426
79	32	0	6	94	0	132
80	3	5	6	8	0	22
81	0	1	0	5	0	6
82	0	1	1	21	0	23
83	31	1	62	158	0	252
84	7	9	4	0	0	20
85	4	8	3	5	0	20
86	5	27	10	74	0	116
87	12	3	3	1	0	19
88	17	14	15	58	0	104
89	22	21	5	39	0	87
90	26	7	2	17	0	52
91	5	3	1	10	0	19
92	8	3	5	4	0	20
Total	38,188	2,551	14,836	2,583	7	58,165

Question 7. What information is available about the number of dependents and Department of Defense civilian employee or DOD contractor casualties from the Southeast Asia combat zone?

Answer. There is no information on civilians or dependents in the official Department of Defense Southeast Asia Casualty file.

Question 8. What was the number of U.S. military casualties, accounted for and unaccounted for as of January 27, 1973?

Answer. The number of U.S. military casualties accounted for and unaccounted for as of January 27, 1973, are as follows:

Died hostile action—45,941.

Died nonhostile—10,308.

Unaccounted for:

Missing in action—1,220

Missing nonhostile—118.

Prisoner of war—591

Question 9. How were those found to have died during the war and without the recovery of remains accounted for in casualty statistics?

Answer. The following chart depicts how the personnel who died during the war without the recovery of remains were accounted for in the DOD Southeast Asia Casualty file:

Casualty type	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Coast Guard	Total
Hostile						
A1—Killed	50	66	143	87	1	347
A3—Died while missing	404	174	96	691	0	1,365
AA—Died while captured/interned	33	11	5	7	0	56
BB—Current captured	0	0	0	1	0	1
Nonhostile						
C1—Died of other causes	31	117	36	4	0	188
C3—Died while missing	156	82	3	28	0	269
Total	674	450	283	818	1	2,226

Question 10. What were the numbers of accounted for and unaccounted for in your casualty statistics as of the first week of June 1973?

Answer. The numbers of U.S. military casualties accounted for and unaccounted for in the casualty statistics as of the first week of June 1973 are as follows:

Died hostile action—46,040.

Died Nonhostile—10,304.

Unaccounted for:

Missing in action—1,103.

Missing nonhostile—113.

Prisoner of war—67.

Question 11. What were the numbers of accounted for and unaccounted for in your casualty statistics as of the first week of January 1975?

Answer. The numbers of U.S. military casualties accounted for and unaccounted for in the casualty statistics as of the first week of January 1975 are as follows:

Died hostile action—46,371.

Died Nonhostile—10,339.

Unaccounted for:

Missing in action—819.

Missing nonhostile—75.

Prisoner of war—37.

Question 12. What were the numbers of accounted for and unaccounted for in your casualty statistics as of the week of March 30, 1977?

Answer. The numbers of U.S. military casualties accounted for and unaccounted for in the casualty statistics as of the week of March 30, 1977 are as follows:

Died hostile action—46,572.

Died Nonhostile—10,390.

Unaccounted for:

Missing in action—648.

Missing nonhostile—61.

Prisoner of war—33.

Question 13. What casualty status changes were made from missing in action or missing nonhostile to POW after January 27, 1973?

Answer, part a. Following is a listing of 65 U.S. Military Personnel—Southeast Asia Casualty Status Changes from January 27, 1973, through September 30, 1977, involving Prisoners of War, as reported by Winfield S. Scott, Director for Management Information Operations and Control, subject: Southeast Asia Casualty Data, Post Cease-fire Period Update, dated October 3, 1977.

Name	Rank	Country	Date of Casualty	Week reported
Army				
Young, Robert M. (Date of death)	Capt.	Cambodia	May 2, 1970	April 14, 1973
Ray, James M. (Date and place of death)	SSgt	South Vietnam	September 17, 1972	April 14, 1973
Salley, James Jr. (Date of death)	MSGT	Cambodia	June 11, 1969	April 28, 1973
Delong, Joe L. (Date of death)	SSgt	South Vietnam	November 30, 1969	April 28, 1973
Terrill, Philip B. (Date of death)	Sp5	South Vietnam	March 31, 1971	April 28, 1973
Van Bundeboom, James L. (Date of death)	SSgt	South Vietnam	May 18, 1967	April 28, 1973
Ferguson, Walter Jr. (Date of death)	SSgt	South Vietnam	November 8, 1967	April 28, 1973
Rehe, Richard R. (Date of death)	SSgt	South Vietnam	March 31, 1971	May 19, 1973
Sykes, Derri (Date presumed dead)	SSgt	South Vietnam	April 30, 1971	May 19, 1973
Reilly, Edward D., Jr. (Date presumed dead)	SFC	South Vietnam	July 12, 1967	May 19, 1973
Arroyo-Baz Gerasimo (Date presumed dead)	SFC	South Vietnam	July 31, 1967	May 19, 1973
Pidemore, Dallas R. (Date presumed dead)	SFC	South Vietnam	August 23, 1968	May 19, 1973
Navy				
Walters, Jack Jr. (Date of death)	LTJr	North Vietnam	July 30, 1970	May 26, 1973
			January 9, 1968	May 26, 1973
			January 10, 1968	May 26, 1973
			January 9, 1968	May 26, 1973
			April 26, 1966	December 8, 1973
			December 6, 1973	October 18, 1976
			March 24, 1969	October 18, 1976
			October 15, 1976	April 4, 1977
			September 8, 1968	April 4, 1977
			April 7, 1977	April 4, 1977

Grilling, David S. (Date presumed dead)	Cdr	North Vietnam	July 24, 1968	September 22, 1973
Tromp, William L. (Date presumed dead)	LTJr	North Vietnam	September 14, 1973	September 22, 1973
Clark, Richard C. (Date presumed dead)	LT	North Vietnam	April 17, 1966	October 27, 1973
Powers, Trent R. (Date presumed dead)	Capt	North Vietnam	October 24, 1973	October 27, 1973
Giffin, James L. (Date presumed dead)	Cdr	North Vietnam	October 24, 1967	November 10, 1973
Hanson, Robert T., Jr. (Date presumed dead)	LTJr	North Vietnam	November 2, 1973	November 10, 1973
Cameron, Kenneth R. (Date of death)	Capt	North Vietnam	October 31, 1965	December 1, 1973
Patterson, James K. (Date presumed dead)	LTJr	North Vietnam	November 27, 1973	December 1, 1973
Hariman, Richard D. (Date of death)	Cdr	North Vietnam	May 19, 1967	January 19, 1974
Abbott, John (Date of death)	Capt	North Vietnam	January 16, 1974	January 19, 1974
Smith, Homer L. (Date of death)	Capt	North Vietnam	February 3, 1966	January 26, 1974
Connell, James J. (Date of death)	LTJr	North Vietnam	January 21, 1974	January 26, 1974
Dennison, Terry A. (Date of death)	Cdr	North Vietnam	May 18, 1967	April 20, 1974
Sullivan, James E. (Date of death)	Capt	North Vietnam	October 4, 1970	April 20, 1974
			May 19, 1967	April 20, 1974
			April 16, 1974	April 20, 1974
			July 18, 1967	May 18, 1974
			July 22, 1967	May 18, 1974
			April 20, 1966	May 25, 1974
			April 27, 1966	May 25, 1974
			May 20, 1967	June 1, 1974
			May 21, 1967	June 1, 1974
			July 15, 1966	June 1, 1974
			January 14, 1971	June 1, 1974
			July 19, 1966	June 1, 1974
			July 21, 1966	June 1, 1974
			October 29, 1972	July 6, 1974

Name	Rank	Country	Date of Casualty	Week reported
(Date presumed dead)			June 28, 1974	
Tucker, Edwin B.	Capt.	North Vietnam	April 24, 1967	July 13, 1974
(Date presumed dead)			July 11, 1974	
Stamm, Ernest A.	Cdr.	North Vietnam	November 25, 1968	August 17, 1974
(Date of death)				
Bowling, Roy H.	Capt.	North Vietnam	November 17, 1965	April 25, 1977
(Date of death)			April 12, 1977	
Borah, Daniel V., Jr.	LT	South Vietnam	October 16, 1972	July 25, 1977
(Date presumed dead)			July 26, 1977	
Marine Corps				
Hammond, Dennis W.	SSgt	South Vietnam	March 7, 1970	April 14, 1973
Zawrocki, Joseph S., Jr.	SSgt	South Vietnam	December 24, 1969	April 14, 1973
Godwin, Solomon H.	CW3	South Vietnam	July 25, 1968	May 19, 1973
Schmidt, Walter R., Jr.	Capt.	South Vietnam	June 9, 1968	November 17, 1973
Frederick, John W., Jr.	CW4	North Vietnam	December 7, 1965	May 25, 1974
(Date of death)			July 19, 1972	
Air Force				
Clarke, George W., Jr.	Maj.	North Vietnam	October 16, 1967	November 10, 1973
(Date presumed dead)			November 8, 1973	
Gregory, Robert R.	LIC	North Vietnam	December 2, 1966	November 24, 1973
(Date presumed dead)			November 19, 1973	
Storz, Ronald E.	LIC	North Vietnam	April 23, 1965	December 1, 1973
(Date of death)			April 23, 1970	
Grobb, Wilmer N.	LIC	North Vietnam	January 26, 1966	April 6, 1974
(Date of death)			February 4, 1966	
Burdett, Edward B.	BGen	North Vietnam	November 18, 1967	April 6, 1974
(Date of death)			November 18, 1967	

Cobell, Earl G.	LIC	North Vietnam	November 5, 1967	April 6, 1974
(Date of death)			November 5, 1970	
Atterberry, Edwin L.	LIC	North Vietnam	August 12, 1967	April 27, 1974
(Date of death)			May 18, 1969	
Moore, Thomas	CMS	South Vietnam	October 31, 1965	May 18, 1974
(Date of death)			December 31, 1965	
Ducat, Bruce C.	Capt.	North Vietnam	December 2, 1966	June 1, 1974
(Date presumed dead)			May 28, 1974	
Adams, Samuel	CMS	South Vietnam	October 31, 1965	June 29, 1974
(Date of death)			December 31, 1965	
Dusing, Charles G.	CMS	South Vietnam	October 31, 1965	July 13, 1974
(Date presumed dead)			July 9, 1974	
Meltz, James H.	Col	North Vietnam	April 15, 1968	May 23, 1975
(Date presumed dead)			May 19, 1975	
Dexter, Bennie L.	MSGT	South Vietnam	May 10, 1966	May 17, 1976
(Date presumed dead)			May 10, 1976	
Butt, Richard L.	Maj.	North Vietnam	November 11, 1966	June 7, 1976
(Date presumed dead)			June 2, 1976	
From Missing in Action to Died While Captured				
Army				
Varnado, Michael B.	CW2	Cambodia	May 2, 1970	April 14, 1973
(Date of death)			September 21, 1970	
Calloway, Porter E.	SSgt	South Vietnam	March 11, 1968	April 21, 1973
(Date of death)			March 12, 1968	
Finch, Melvin W.	Capt.	South Vietnam	March 30, 1972	April 28, 1973
(Date of death)			September 6, 1972	
Lynn, James M.	Capt.	South Vietnam	February 5, 1970	May 5, 1973
(Date of death)			February 6, 1970	
Dexter, Ronald J.	SMG	Laos	June 3, 1967	May 5, 1973

Name	Rank	Country	Date of Casualty	Week reported
(Date of death)			July 29, 1967	
Simpson, Joseph L.	SSgt	South Vietnam	May 12, 1968	May 5, 1973
(Date of death)			May 13, 1968	
Air Force				
Pemberton, Gene T.	Col	North Vietnam	July 23, 1966	April 27, 1974
(Date of death)			July 24, 1966	
Newsom, Benjamin B.	Col	North Vietnam	July 23, 1966	April 27, 1974
(Date of death)			July 26, 1966	
Dodge, Ward K.	Col	North Vietnam	July 5, 1967	April 27, 1974
(Date of death)			July 12, 1967	
Dahl, William C. Jr.	LtC	North Vietnam	November 7, 1967	April 27, 1974
(Date of death)			November 8, 1967	
Sijan, Lance P.	Capt	Laos	November 9, 1967	April 27, 1974
(Date of death)			January 22, 1968	
Heggen, Keith R.	Col	North Vietnam	December 21, 1972	June 8, 1974
(Date of death)			December 26, 1972	
Schmidt, Norman	Col	North Vietnam	September 1, 1966	February 15, 1974
(Date of death)			August 31, 1967	
From Non-Hostile Missing to Died While Captured				
Army				
George, James E. Jr.	SSgt	South Vietnam	February 8, 1968	May 5, 1973
(Date of death)			February 9, 1968	
Smith, William Mark	Sgt	South Vietnam	March 3, 1969	May 19, 1973
(Date of death)			June 30, 1970	

b. Following is a list of 17 servicemen that are in the data base as Died While Captured who were added to the file after October 1977 whose remains have not been returned.

Name	Service	Country	DOC	Process date
Estocin, Michael John	Navy	North Vietnam	November 10, 1977	7711
Mayer, Roderick Lewis	Navy	North Vietnam	October 31, 1977	7711
Small, Burt Chauncy Jr.	Army	South Vietnam	October 31, 1977	7711
Bisz, Ralph Campion	Navy	North Vietnam	December 2, 1977	7712
Hrdlicka, David Louis	Air Force	Laos	November 21, 1977	7712
Derimon, David Stanley	Army	South Vietnam	February 8, 1978	7803
Graf, John George	Navy	South Vietnam	February 1, 1978	7803
Wiles, Marvin Benjamin Chr.	Navy	North Vietnam	August 2, 1978	7808
Bowers, Richard Lee	Army	South Vietnam	September 29, 1978	7810
McLean, James Henry	Army	South Vietnam	September 18, 1978	7810
Price, Bunyan Durant Jr.	Army	Cambodia	November 20, 1978	7812
Phillips, Robert Paul	Army	South Vietnam	February 13, 1979	7902
Rozo, James Milan	Army	South Vietnam	May 18, 1979	7905
Sparks, Donald Lee	Army	South Vietnam	November 5, 1979	7912
Cook, Donald Gilbert	Marines	South Vietnam	February 26, 1980	8003
Hall, Harley Hubert	Navy	South Vietnam	February 29, 1980	8003
Burns, Frederick John	Marines	South Vietnam	January 2, 1969	9206

c. There are 19 additional servicemen who are reported in the data base as Died While Captured with a date of casualty after January 27, 1978. The remains of these individuals have been recovered.

Question 14. What are the most recent numbers of unaccounted for Americans by country of loss and how are they categorized by casualty category?

Answer. The most recent numbers for casualties where the body has not been recovered by country of loss and casualty category are as follows:

U.S. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Whose Remains Have Not Been Recovered

Country of loss	Total by type	Total
Casualty Type		
North Vietnam		561
Hostile—killed	64	
Hostile—died while missing	400	
Hostile—died while captured	8	
Hostile—current captured	0	
Nonhostile—died while missing	31	
Nonhostile—died of other causes	58	
South Vietnam		1,075
Hostile—killed	220	
Hostile—died while missing	460	
Hostile—died while captured	41	
Hostile—current captured	0	

U.S. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA—Continued

Whose Remains Have Not Been Recovered

Country of loss	Total by type	Total
Nonhostile—died while missing	226	
Nonhostile—died of other causes	128	
Laos		510
Hostile—killed	48	
Hostile—died while missing	444	
Hostile—died while captured	4	
Hostile—current captured	1	
Nonhostile—died while missing	11	
Nonhostile—died of other causes	2	
Cambodia		76
Hostile—killed	15	
Hostile—died while missing	57	
Hostile—died while captured	3	
Hostile—current captured	0	
Nonhostile—died while missing	1	
Nonhostile—died of other causes	0	
China		4
Hostile—killed	4	
Hostile—died while missing	0	
Hostile—died while captured	0	
Hostile—current captured	0	
Nonhostile—died while missing	0	
Nonhostile—died of other causes	0	
Total		2,226
Hostile—killed	347	
Hostile—died while missing	1,365	
Hostile—died while captured	56	
Hostile—current captured	1	
Nonhostile—died while missing	269	
Nonhostile—died of other causes	188	

Question 15. What role did your staff play in advising DIA and others about corrected country of loss locations associated with Laos and Cambodia?

Answer. As to what role the staff played in advising DIA and others about this, I have no information on this subject other than hearsay.

Question 16. What was the impact of these country of loss locations on the credibility of reports of casualty and the confusion on the part of the next of kin regarding the credibility of casualty statistics issued by the Department?

Answer. I have no information on this subject.

Question 17. How many instances in your data base are there changes in country of loss location?

Answer. There are 12 individuals in the DOD Southeast Asia Casualty file where the country of loss had been changed. These are as follows:

Name	SSN	Service	Casualty Place Code Change		Process date
			From	To	
Albasio, John Anthony	562643502	Air Force	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	8804
Caffarelli, Charles Joseph	177327626	Air Force	Laos	South Vietnam	7301
Clarke, George William, Jr.	226500591	Air Force	North Vietnam	Laos	7311
Conklin, Bernard	116245400	Air Force	Laos	North Vietnam	6607
Finnagan, Sherman Edward, Jr.	2226997	Air Force	South Vietnam	Laos	7209
	213249423	Air Force	Laos	South Vietnam	9206
Hall, James Shreve	241504899	Air Force	Laos	North Vietnam	6607
Kennedy, James Edward	155423333	Air Force	Laos	Cambodia	8804
Lapham, Robert Grantham	375248655	Air Force	Laos	South Vietnam	9206
McCormick, John Vern	381401444	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam	8810
Piskula, Richard	185307227	Air Force	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	8805
Stafford, Ronald Dean	507503284	Air Force	Laos	South Vietnam	7301
Woodward, Samuel Alexander	442340476	Air Force	Laos	North Vietnam	9206

Question 18. How does this agree with the actual number of corrected country of loss reports you provided over the years to DIA?

Answer. There are 40 cases where the DOD Southeast Asia Casualty file and the Defense Intelligence Agency file list different countries of loss. DIOR is in the process of resolving these with DIA and the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting. Thirty-two of the servicemen are Navy. The DD Form 1300 for these casualties does not list a specific country. A list of the casualty place differences including name, DIOR country of loss and DIA country of loss is as follows:

CASUALTY PLACE DIFFERENCES

Name	SSN/Service number	Service	DIOR country	DIA country
1. Baxter, Bruce Raymond	21289734	Army	South Vietnam	Laos
2. Borja, Domingo, R.S.	50008052	Army	South Vietnam	Laos
3. Kusick, Joseph George	202348813	Army	South Vietnam	Laos
4. Shriver, Jerry Michael	315461629	Army	Laos	Cambodia
5. Smith, Ronald Eugene	315404807	Army	Laos	Cambodia
6. Morrissey, Robert David	366286305	Air Force	North Vietnam	Laos
7. Holt, Robert Alan	093186	Marines	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
8. La Voo, John Allen	084231	Marines	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
9. Belknap, Harry John	265564874	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
10. Callahan, David Francis, Jr.	550157	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
11. Carlson, Paul Victor	694417	Navy	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
12. Carter, Gerald Lynn	528487807	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
13. Fegan, Ronald James	675103	Navy	North Vietnam	China
14. Prosis, Robert Clarence	532815	Navy	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
15. Gosen, Lawrence Dean	630561	Navy	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
16. Green, Gerald	646904	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
17. Hill, Charles Dale	8515834	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
18. Jones, James Grady	680941	Navy	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
19. Kustigian, Michael John	010405939	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
20. McDonough, John Richard	154308223	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam

CASUALTY PLACE DIFFERENCES—Continued

Name	SSN/Service number	Service	DIOR country	DIA country
21. McKinley, Gerald Wayne	655021	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
21. Miller, Carleton Pierce, Jr.	018341135	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
23. Mitchell, Harry E.	303525682	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
24. Murphy, Terence Meredith	647826	Navy	North Vietnam	China
25. Neislar, David Philip	703942	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
26. Nyman, Lawrence Frederick	535368550	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
27. Patterson, Bruce Merle	708088	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
28. Payne, Kyllis Therod	231667788	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
29. Reedy, William Henry, Jr.	1197842	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
30. Rogers, Billy Lee	317523673	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
31. Schoeder, Eric John	9175626	Navy	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
32. Stephenson, Richard C.	292403773	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
33. Sullivan, Martin Joseph	58976	Navy	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
34. Talken, George Francis	545544055	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
35. Thompson, William Joseph	605294	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
36. Trowbridge, Dustin Cowles	335360810	Navy	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
37. Tunnell, John Wallace	564442566	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
38. Westbrook, Norman Philip, Jr.	046343306	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
39. Whittemore, Frederick H.	510465	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam
40. Wood, Rex Stewart	562050	Navy	South Vietnam	North Vietnam

Question 19. How can we be sure that all information in the Department's South-east Asia casualty data base is totally accurate, even today?

Answer. We can never be certain that every item for each of the 58,165 personnel listed in the file is totally accurate. However, when any entry for any individual is questioned, we research their official record; if an error is identified, a change to the file is made. At the same time, we are not certain that all of the individuals who were casualties are included in the casualty file. As recent as June 8, 1992, Sergeant Donald Eugene Kramer was added to the file. He was wounded in 1966 while serving in the Republic of Vietnam and died on October 28, 1966, at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. When he was brought to our attention through official notification from the Department of the Army, SGT Kramer was added to the file.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sungenis.

What I would like to do, at least for the first round, is 5 minutes each. We will see how it goes after that. We have a lot of Senators and we have a lot of questions.

There are a lot of detailed questions we need to ask you to get them on the record about the accounting procedures and how things happened, but I'd like to ask you a couple of big picture questions if I can to start with.

Both of you, Mr. Sungenis and Mr. Trowbridge, have been there for 20 years, a long time. You were there when the first reporting really began in a substantive way. You were there during the transition and Operation Homecoming. Did either of you work with Dr. Shields?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your relationship with Dr. Shields?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We had a very close relationship. Our agency supported Dr. Shields with intelligence information.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Sungenis?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Senator, I was involved in casualty reporting beginning in September of 1974 through the fall of 1976, so I was not personally familiar with anything that transpired before that date. As far as Dr. Shields is concerned, he was in the organization when I was there. I have never met the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when Dr. Shields, Mr. Trowbridge, says we have no indication at this time that there are any Americans alive in Indochina, do you agree with that?

Senator REID. Will you repeat that question, John, please?

The CHAIRMAN. When Dr. Shields says we have no indication at this time—this being in 1973 or 1974, correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That we have any Americans alive in Indochina, a public policy statement of the Department, did you agree with that statement?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, the agency's position at that time was that we held no current information that individuals at that time were being held against their will.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what about the list of 80 people that had been presented and that you were following up on as Government policy with the Vietnamese? What was that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I'm not sure what you're talking about when you mention the 80 individuals. I will make an assumption here that maybe we're talking about those that were listed as prisoners that did not return. Is that a correct assumption?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is. I'm asking about the 80 people who were carried as prisoners of war, but who did not return. You thought they were alive. You expected them to come back. They did not come back.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, we carried 97 individuals. As far as I know, at that point in time the U.S. Government carried 97 individuals listed as prisoners of war that did not return. This is at the completion of Operation Homecoming.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a different number from any that I think you've given us yet. I have your DIA casualty data summary from February 5, 1973 right here, which we will enter into the record. [The information referred to follows:]

DIA CASUALTY DATA SUMMARY

AS OF FEBRUARY 5, 1973

The figures and data depicted below are based on intelligence information and estimates and may not correlate with official Defense Department or service casualty figures. This summary is provided on a limited basis only to selected personnel and offices. This classified summary is not for public release.

PRISONERS OF WAR

	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	Civilian	Total
Acknowledged As Alive on Enemy Lists And To Be Returned						
Total to be returned	76	136	324	26	24	586
Total returned						
Still to be returned						
Reported Dead on Enemy Lists						
Reported dead*	7	8	9	5	5	34
Held by the People's Republic of China						
China	0	1	1	0	1	3
Not Accounted For on Any Enemy Lists						
North Vietnam	0	22	14	0	0	36
South Vietnam	20	2	1	3	7	33
Laos	0	2	3	0	1	6
Cambodia	1	0	0	0	4	5
Total	21	26	18	3	12	80

*The reported dead figures do not include 21 individuals already carried by the Services and DIA as dead.

PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION

	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	Civilian	Total
Reported Dead on Enemy Lists						
Reported dead*	2	1	6	0	0	9
Not Accounted For on any Enemy Lists						
North Vietnam	3	117	326	26	0	472
South Vietnam	267	4	82	65	7	425
Laos	56	11	272	14	5	358
Cambodia	18	0	3	0	1	22
China	0	7	0	0	0	7
Total	344	139	683	105	13	1,284
Grand total	450	311	1,041	139	55	1,996

*The reported dead figures do not include 21 individuals already carried by the Services and DIA as dead.

The CHAIRMAN. The number, the total for North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is 80—36 in North Vietnam, 33 in South Vietnam, 6 in Laos, 5 in Cambodia, for a total of 80.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I believe what you are holding there is a statistical document that certainly was subject to change on a weekly basis at the completion of Operation Homecoming, statistics—

The CHAIRMAN. That particular week, during Operation Homecoming, you expected 80 people who didn't come back in Operation

Homecoming, because you have total to be returned, 586, at the top.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, of those individuals who were listed as prisoner there was information or judgments that were made by our agency at the time. When I said 97, or to use your term, 80, actually at the completion of Operation Homecoming our agency held 115 individuals in a prisoner status that did not return home. What did we do? Well, they did not come home.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just interrupt you there for a minute. You interviewed prisoners, did you not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The prisoner said, so-and-so was alive, he did not come back, correct? Yes or no. Did prisoners say—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I know of no prisoners who came home who said, I saw an individual who was alive who we left behind, without other information that may have supported the fact that he died.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is not accurate, according to your own records. You have a list of people who, according to the returnees, suggested that they were left alive, that they were alive. It didn't say that—there are some. There are 111.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, are you saying that there is a list that the PW's gave us that said were left behind alive? I know of no such list.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, according to the lists we've gotten, there were 111 people accounted for through the returnee debriefings, 111 names—we can give you the names—of people who prisoners said so-and-so died in captivity, but outside of those 111 there are a grouping, and we have the list, of those that people suggested they last saw them alive. They don't know if they died. They might have, but they were last seen alive and reported to you as such.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, without seeing your actual list—in fact, I saw a list yesterday that was provided to us by the committee that I could just comment on that had 115 names on it. Allegedly, those individuals came from prisoners, prisoners who had mentioned these individuals by name.

We took a quick scrub of that list. Excuse me. Actually, it was 51 names, not 115. We took a quick look at that last night. As I say, that was provided to us yesterday. When we debriefed the prisoners, we asked them information that they may have known relative to anybody that was unaccounted for, did they have knowledge, and we had various lists that indicate a returnee had said yes, I have information about individuals, and they list them by name.

Of this list that was provided to us yesterday by the committee, it had 51 names on it that it claimed came from debriefs. Well, as I said, we asked these prisoners, did they have any information relative to unaccounted for Americans, not just information on known prisoners of war.

So if you just take a list of names that came from the returned prisoners that said yes, I had knowledge on this individual or I received knowledge in prison on this individual, when you do the analysis of these names—in fact, we quickly looked at those 51 last night, for instance, only 6 percent of those names, were of individuals who the returned prisoners had indicated he actually saw the person.

Many of the names of those 51 names that were reported, they were heard in the prison communication system. When they were investigated after the debriefs of Operation Homecoming, they broke out into various categories.

Many of the reports were from prisoners who made queries within the prison system. Someone had asked about a particular individual. If you asked that returnee, did he have that name, yes, he gave you a name. We looked into it. It was a query that was in the prison system—Does anybody know about this individual?—not that he was a prisoner. None of the prisoners may have seen him.

There were returned prisoners who came up with that information and said yes, I heard about a particular individual. It may have been hearsay information. But when you get that information or you go to the original source—where did he get it?—I heard it from another prisoner, and that may lead to another prisoner.

At the time of Operation Homecoming, these lists and these names were reviewed very thoroughly. If we had information such as a name, the returned prisoner who provided that name may be hospitalized in the Philippines. His debrief may have led to the original source of the name of a returnee who was in a hospital in New Orleans.

We would contact that returnee's debriefer, set up a conference call, and we would clear up any discrepancy right on the spot. Some of the reports were of possible PW's, based on the individual name they brought out. Some names were written on the walls, yet no one ever saw some of these individuals in a prison environment.

The CHAIRMAN. If we did not have evidence in 1973 that someone was alive potentially, then you have to ask what the Vessey discrepancy list is.

Moreover, there is a specific Air Force list listing people as prisoners post-homecoming. Now I find it hard to see how you could say there was not evidence when you are carrying people as POW's, they have been carried as POW's, and suddenly post-homecoming you decide that that is not evidence that they might be still alive.

Until homecoming, you expected them home alive. When they did not come home alive, you ceased to think they should be home alive.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No sir. We did not cease—

The CHAIRMAN. Then there was evidence that people were still POW's.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. In some cases of those 97 that were listed as prisoner, some individuals were made a prisoner by virtue of the fact, they were a crew member of a dual-seated aircraft. We had firm evidence that—and I'm not saying that DIA put them in that category, but the service classified both individuals as prisoners based on the fact that it was known that one individual had been captured.

Sometimes it was based on information received that said the enemy had captured an individual. That information may have been used that put the man in a prisoner status may have been dated back to 1967. There was never any other information developed on that individual from the time of that initial 1967 loss inci-

dent. The man was never seen in the prison system based on the debrief of the returned POW's.

So there was that one bit of information in 1967 that the services made the man a prisoner, based only on that information, nothing was ever subsequently developed on it. He was never seen in the prison system. He did not come home in 1973. Are we still pressing for additional information and that man?

Today, those are the core cases for General Vessey's initiatives and our search efforts in the field. Those are the discrepancy cases.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some follow-ups to that. But I have gone well over my 5 minutes. Senator Smith, and then we will come back.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, there are many Members who I know cannot spend the entire time here today. So I would like to yield my time to whoever the next, I think it is Senator McCain and then come back at the end, because I will be here.

But I just wanted to put one question out and hopefully respond and then yield to Senator McCain. I have not seen any records at all in any of the casualty files that I have looked at to verify anything you are talking about; any of these phone calls to people in the Philippines. Do you have records of all that stuff? You made calls to POW's in the Philippines and verified these—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Individuals in my office talked with individual debriefers. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you have records of that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I have people who will testify to that. We looked in the casualty files of these individuals and we did follow-up on this information.

Senator SMITH. Not in any of them that I have seen.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, sir, I'm telling you we did.

Senator SMITH. I would like to see the documentation of that.

Senator SMITH. DIA asked to provide documentation of the efforts DIA took to resolve names of unaccounted for personnel provided by returnees during their debriefings, as such information is not in individual case files.

Answer. The documentation of the effort to resolve the report of names of unaccounted-for servicemen by returning POW's at Homecoming is in fact compiled in the Air Force contract study, informally entitled "(U.S. Service) Personnel Not Returned from SEA, May 5, 1978." Each of the names cited therein represents a separate, single report of a name. In each of these instances the DIA checked back with the source of the report to learn the basis for his report, and once identified, checked back through all sub-sources and all collateral sources to track down the ultimate validity of the information. This process was followed in each and every instance until the truth of the matter was learned.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, it would be helpful to the committee. Senator McCain?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to perhaps try and put this in a framework for the record that maybe would make it more understandable in years to come as to exactly what we are talking about here.

What the committee has compiled, the committee staff, and I think in a very professional excellent fashion, is 244, in their view, unique names of individuals, all of whom should have been listed

in captivity by DIA at the end of Operation Homecoming after our returnees had been debriefed. Basically, what is on that chart over there.

I just want to make sure we are talking about the same framework here, Mr. Trowbridge. Of those 244, as this chart says, 111 died in captivity and I do not believe there is any question about that. There is, of 50 of those, 57 remains covered. Two military deserters died in captivity, 16 civilians died in captivity, 15 military confirmed by DIA as POW's as of February 1973. DIA changed the status of 14 within 6 months. The last one was changed in 1976.

So, we get down to about 90 people, which we get down on this chart, I think this committee and others have significant question about. Are you with me so far, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Why did the DIA change the status of 20 of these individuals between February and May 1973 to died in captivity? And if you want, you can supply some of these answers for the record.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir, on those particular cases, that's probably what I'd have to do, because you know, I don't have that information.

Senator McCAIN. Was it based on evidence? Was it based on hearsay or was it based on a whole body of different sources?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I'd say it probably had to go with a cross-section of information. Our best source of information happened to be the POW's that came home.

Senator McCAIN. OK. What is the difference between that category of 20 and the 21 following that who quote, may have died in captivity, precise fate unclear?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I can't address that. I don't—without knowing those 21 names.

Senator McCAIN. OK. We obviously have two categories here that—

The CHAIRMAN. I thought we gave you the names, Mr. Trowbridge, prior to this. We provided you with these categories, so that you could explain them.

Senator McCAIN. I would like you to do that for the record, Mr. Trowbridge. Go ahead and answer right now.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. All right, sir. Could you just give me your definition of the 21 again? Maybe I can explain it.

Senator McCAIN. According to this chart and I admit you are at some disadvantage because this is provided by the committee, not by you, there is a category of 20 military missing. DIA changed that in February 1973 to died in captivity. And then there are 21 personnel who may have died in captivity, precise fate unclear. In other words, I am very curious what the difference in those two categories would be.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Let's start with the 20. If we changed their status, I'd have to say that was probably based on information where we had, perhaps we had or the service had declared a man POW. After the debriefs at homecoming, we may have acquired additional information directly from say, the crew member involved or the fact that the services had made him a prisoner based on in-

formation where we had a good parachute. But we later had additional information that the man was killed in action.

The other category of the 21 military personnel may have died in captivity—I think the judgment is just what it says. Maybe we had information that was not quite precise, but the indication that he died was there.

Senator McCAIN. OK. Then we get to the category of the 51 military personnel reported in captivity by returnees during Operation Homecoming. Now, in response to Senator Kerry's question, you are saying that POW's say, look I heard about this person or I may have. And your follow-up information indicated what about these 51? You may have already responded to Senator Kerry on that.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We received that list from the committee and we took a quick look at it. Again, at the time of Operation Homecoming, all of this was reviewed.

But if you take the list of these individuals, these 51—we found based on the debriefs of the prisoners that indicated knowledge of these 51 by name. There were some of those individuals on that list were the—the returnee said, I saw the individual dead.

Now that's either in prison or en route to the prison or shortly after the loss incident.

Senator McCAIN. For the record, would you provide responses on each one of those 51 for us?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We'll do it name by name, yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator McCAIN. DIA asked to provide a by-name analysis of the fate of the 51 names listed on the Air Force returnee debrief study.

The by-name analysis of the fate of the "51 name list," provided by the Senate Select Committee, from the Air Force informal study titled "(U.S. Service) Personnel Not Returned from SEA, May 5, 1978," was provided to the Senate Select Committee as part of DIA's "Assessment of Captive Status at Homecoming of Individuals on the Senate Select Committee Lists," by the Central Documentation Office, on or about July 10, 1992. It is provided once again in the attached enclosure.

TAB A

ALLEGED POW NAMES REPORTED BY RETURNEES DURING HOMECOMING (DOES NOT INCLUDE U.S. GOVERNMENT PRIORITY CASES)

Robert D. Avery

Returnee report: Norris Charles, based on a list that had been passed along to him while captive, recalled that a USAF major named Avery was a POW.

Comments: Initially, this information was deduced to potentially relate to USMC 1st Lieutenant Robert D. Avery; however, this was based on Charles' memory of the last name only; the rank and service he associated with the name are incorrect for Robert Avery. No corroborating information was forthcoming from any other returnee. Charles, an early releasee, was charged with keeping a "memory list" of fellow prisoners. Most of the names on his memory list were validated; a few, including this one, were not.

Conclusion: The correlation of this name to 1st Lt. Robert O. Avery is insupportable.

Richard Lee Ayers

Returnee reports: Leo G. Hyatt reported hearing that "Ayers" was a POW at Cu Loc in 1972. Hyatt also suggested that Ken Johnson may have more information regarding Ayers. (NOTE: Kenneth Johnson, returnee, did not report seeing or hearing of Ayers.) Hyatt has no firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Ayers (refno 1596-1) was believed downed near the DMZ while on a daylight RF4C reconnaissance mission over Laos on April 16, 1970. Wreckage was sighted which was believed to be that of Ayers' aircraft; Hanoi radio broadcast the shoot down of an RF4C at that location on April 16, 1970 without mentioning the

fate of the crew. This report correlates to Ayers' loss incident. No other returnees reported any knowledge of Ayers.

Conclusion: There is no analytical basis on which to conclude that Richard L. Ayers survived his loss incident. It is possible that Hyatt heard of, and was reporting on Timothy R. Ayres, returnee, who was held at both Hoa Lo and Cu Loc.

James A. Beene

Returnee report: James A. Beene reported as POW name at Homecoming. James A. Mulligan reported secondhand hearsay information that he heard Beene's name in the prison communication system. No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Beene was flying over water off the coast of North Vietnam at night when he ran into foul weather. No further contact was made. SAR efforts observed an oil slick in the general area of Beene's last known location resembling an oil slick consistent with what would be produced from aviation fuel leaking from a submerged aircraft. No evidence was discovered to indicate Beene could have survived his crash. No other returnees reported Beene's name in the communications system.

Conclusion: The initial correlation to James A. Beene was in error. Most probably the "Beene" Mulligan was reporting correlates to either James E. Bean or William R. Bean, both returnees.

Burris Nelson Begley

Returnee reports: Leroy W. Stutz reported that while at Hoa Lo in the spring or summer of 1967, he heard via tap code that an unidentified POW saw the name "Begley" scratched on the floor of one of the interrogation rooms. He had no firsthand knowledge of Begley, and no one else reported on Begley.

Comments: Begley (refno 0542-1) was downed by a MIG northwest of Hanoi on December 5, 1966. Wingmen observed pieces falling from Begley's F105D aircraft, and heard him broadcast that he was going to eject. No parachute was observed, however, and no beeper signal was heard. Aircraft was observed to crash on a wooded hill.

Conclusion: There is no indication that Burris N. Begley survived his loss incident. It is possible that Stutz' report correlates to returnee Bobby R. Bagley, who was shot down in September 1967 and held first at Hoa Lo.

William George Bennett

Returnee reports: Norris M. Overly reported hearing over radio Hanoi that "Bennett" was a prisoner. He has no firsthand knowledge regarding Bennett, and no one else reported anything about Bennett.

Comments: On September 2, 1967, wingmen watched as Bennett failed to complete his pull up maneuver after a strafing pass, and observed his F105D crash into a small hill and explode on impact. No chute was seen, and no beeper was heard.

Conclusion: It is extremely unlikely that William G. Bennett survived his loss incident. The correlation of the Radio Hanoi report is probably erroneous.

Michael L. Bouchard

Returnee report: Michael L. Bouchard reported as POW name at Homecoming. Roger A. Miller reported Bouchard's name via reading prison notes. No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Miller learned of "Bouchard" (phonetic, first name unknown) through reading of notes passed through the prison system. The POW was described as being in average health. Miller was unable to identify a photo of Michael Bouchard. No other returnee had any firsthand or hearsay knowledge of Bouchard.

Conclusion: The initial correlation to Bouchard was in error. The individual referred to by Miller was Jack L. Butcher, returnee.

Michael Paul Burns

Returnee reports: A.C. Brady said he heard through prison communications that Mike Burns was a prisoner. William Tschudy also was aware that Mike Burns was a POW, in "good condition."

Comments: There is no analytical basis to consider Michael Paul Burns a prisoner of war.

Conclusion: This hearsay information relates to Michael Thomas Burns, a returnee.

James A. Butler

Returnee report: VC soldier told a U.S. POW that a Cobra aircraft had been shot down and that both the pilot and gunner had been injured.

Comments: W1 James E. Butler (refno 1575) was lost when the L-19 aircraft he was flying in crashed in South Vietnam. First-hand live and hearsay live sighting

reports correlated to that loss incident indicate one crewmember was killed when the aircraft crashed and the other crewmember was killed when he was shot resisting capture.

Conclusion: There is no analytical evidence to conclude that Butler survived his loss incident.

Billie E. Cartwright

Returnee report: Billie E. Cartwright reported as POW name at Homecoming. John Heilig reported hearsay information that Billie Cartwright was dead. No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Cartwright was on a pre-dawn bombing mission over Haiphong when all contact with his plane was lost. Due to heavy enemy presence, no SAR operations were conducted. However, the next day, friendly aircraft overflew the area and saw no evidence of a crash and heard no electronic signals indicating that Cartwright and his crewmember might have survived the incident. No other returnees reported Cartwright's name in the prison communications system.

Conclusion: It is plausible that Heilig overheard someone inquiring if any information was available to confirm the death of Cartwright.

Jimmy L. Coleman

Returnee report: Robert Woods said that in February 1967 someone (he thought it was Charles Tanner) tapped out the name Coleman, who was thought to be in room 5 or room 6 of the "Barn," a compartment at the "Zoo." Woods indicated he did not hear the name again and questioned the accuracy of the identification.

Comment: Robert Woods was captured just 4 months before this "tap-code" communication occurred and his memory that it occurred in February 1967 is probably fairly accurate. Jimmy Coleman, the only missing serviceman with that last name, was not lost until 2 years later, March 1969. Coleman was lost in the Delta region, under the control of COSVN, who maintained a permanent camp system for U.S. POWs; none were ever transferred to North Vietnam. Neither Charles Tanner or any other returnee had any knowledge of Coleman.

Conclusion: There is no analytical basis to believe Jimmy Coleman was ever a prisoner of war.

Donald M. Cramer

Returnee report: Norris Charles had memorized the name Cramer based on a note passed to him by another POW in February 1972. He was sure that the spelling he had received began with "C," not "K." Robert Jeffery had also heard that the "memory bank" included Cramer.

Comments: Charles, an early releasee, had been charged with keeping a "memory bank" of U.S. POW names. Other than Robert Jeffery, whose information is attributed to the "memory bank," there is no other information from returnees to corroborate Donald Cramer's presence in the prison system. Charles had no firsthand knowledge of the individual. Donald Cramer's fellow crewman was found washed ashore in South Vietnam, indicating their helicopter had gone down at sea. While Charles was certain that the spelling he had received began with a "C," there is no assurance that the note had been accurately rendered. Galand Kramer, a returnee, was held in the northern Vietnam prison system.

Conclusion: The circumstances of Cramer's loss, while not absolute, mitigates against capture. Given the sparsity of detail from Charles and the lack of corroboration from any other returnee, there is no sound analytical basis to believe that Donald Cramer was captured.

Clifton Emmett Cushman

Returnee reports: Leo G. Hyatt reported hearing that Cushman was a POW at Cu Loc in 1972. Hyatt also suggested that Ken Johnson may have more information regarding Cushman. (NOTE: Kenneth Johnson, returnee, did not report seeing or hearing of Cushman, nor did anyone else.) Hyatt has no firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Cushman's F105D was hit by AAA on September 25, 1966, burst into flames, and broke into several pieces. A wingman observed what appeared to be an ejection seat arch out of the aircraft debris, but he saw no parachute deploy before the object fell behind a ridge line. A French news report mentioned Cushman, along with D.G. Waltman and N.L. Wells. A Vietnam Courier article was published which showed photos of Waltman and Wells (both returnees) and described their capture, but there was no mention of Cushman.

Conclusion: There is no analytical basis for concluding that Cushman survived his loss incident. Further, had Cushman been at Cu Loc as reported, others would have seen him or reported on him via the well-developed prison communications system.

James E. Dooley

Returnee report: James E. Dooley reported as POW name at Homecoming. Lenard E. Daugherty reported that he thought Richard Perricone mentioned seeing Dooley's name scratched into a prison wall. No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Perricone makes no mention of having seen Dooley's or a similar name scratched into a prison wall. No other returnees reported Dooley's name in the prison communications system.

Conclusion: Dooley crashed in coastal waters off North Vietnam. No signs of survival were indicated during SAR aerial searches. It is highly probable that Dooley died in his crash.

Harry S. Edwards

Returnee report: Harry S. Edwards reported as POW name at Homecoming. Fredric Flom reported hearsay gossip that Harry S. Edwards was dead. No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Wingman reported observing Edwards' aircraft crash into a large fireball. No parachute was seen nor were emergency beepers heard. After the smoke from the crash cleared, friendly aircraft overflew the site and believed no one could have survived the incident. In September 1988, the Vietnamese turned over a set of remains with the name of Harry S. Edwards. Subsequent analysis by CILHI determined the remains to be those of another unaccounted for American. The Vietnamese could provide no further information. No other returnee reported Edwards' name in the prison communications system.

Conclusion: All evidence indicates that Edwards died in his incident.

Norman Eidsmoe

Returnee report: Norman Eidsmoe reported as POW name at Homecoming. Robert Naughton heard from Dick Dutton and Gene Smith that while they were at Son Tay, a name that could possibly have been "Eidsmoe" was tapped on the wall only once. Naughton reported the name could have been "Moe." No firsthand knowledge.

Comment: A review of Dutton's and Smith's debriefs reveals no mention of either "Eidsmoe" or "Moe." No other returnee mentioned Eidsmoe.

Conclusion: The initial correlation to Eidsmoe was in error. The individual referred to by Naughton was probably Thomas Moe, returnee.

John C. Ellison

Returnee report: John C. Ellison reported as POW name at Homecoming. Robert Flynn reported that, during his incarceration in a Peking prison, he was given a stack of "bookmark sized" photos. On one "bookmark" he claimed to recognize a photo of Ellison. The photo reportedly showed Ellison in a group of other POWs. No firsthand knowledge.

Comment: A Nhan Dan report was received describing the shootdown of an American aircraft with the pilots being "blown apart." The details in the report correlate to Ellison's incident. The Ellison family reported that sometime after Homecoming, two unidentified returnees contacted them and claimed to have seen Ellison's name carved into a tree at the Dogpatch prison camp, near the Chinese border. DIA asked the family to provide the names of the returnees for followup. No other returnees ever reported name "Ellison" as being either dead or alive. On March 27, 1992, the Vietnamese turned over a box of personal effects allegedly corresponding to Ellison's incident. (NFI)

Conclusion: The photo that Flynn probably saw was one taken during the "Hanoi Parade." He was shown numerous photos from this unique event but was unable to identify the exact photo he purportedly viewed in Peking. The Chinese Government was asked to locate the photo shown to Flynn during his incarceration but it was unable to do so. DIA believes that Flynn saw a photo of the "Hanoi Parade," all POWs seen are returnees.

Ralph Foulks

Returnee report: Ralph Foulks reported as POW name at Homecoming. Arthur Ballard reported hearsay information of the name "Fox." No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Foulks was on a night bombing mission over North Vietnam when his plane disappeared. No crash was sighted; no parachute was observed; no electronic beepers were monitored. No evidence is available to indicate that Foulks survived his crash. In December 1988, the Vietnamese repatriated a set of remains associated with Foulks. CILHI analysis indicates the remains suffered a high impact crash; they are consistent with a Caucasian. However, the remains are insufficient in quantity and quality to warrant positive identification at this time. Further analysis

is ongoing. No other returnees reported Foulks' name in the prison communications system.

Conclusion: All evidence indicates that Foulks died in his crash.

John G. Gardner

Returnee report: Frank Cius reported that John Gardner was inside their downed helicopter with a tourniquet on his leg while the helicopter was "saturated" with small arms fire over a 45 minute period. He believed Gardner may have been killed.

Comments: Neither Frank Cius nor any other returnee has indicated that John Gardner was a prisoner of war.

Conclusion: There is no analytical basis, either returnee debriefs or intelligence information, to believe John Gardner was ever captured.

William Glasson

Returnee report: William Glasson reported as POW at Homecoming. Phillip Smith claimed to have heard on Peking Radio, and read in a Peking bulletin, that an A-3B had been shot down between Hainan and China. The crew was reportedly captured. Upon his capture, Smith questioned his captors about the report, they denied any knowledge about the incident. No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Glasson was shot down in 1966 over Chinese waters. He was flying an A-3B. SAR aircraft overflew the area but saw no indication of survivors. Over 70 junks were in the area; this precluded further searches. Peking International Radio Service, in English, reported the shootdown of an A-3B in 1966. There was no mention of the crew's fate. No other returnees reported knowledge of Glasson.

Conclusion: Glasson was killed in plane crash over water. Remains unresolved.

Bobby G. Harris

Returnee reports: James Hestand, fellow crewmember of Bobby G. Harris, examined Harris' body after the crash of his helicopter and noted severe lacerations at his throat; lifeless. Wendell Rivers reported hearsay knowledge of an individual named Harris but could reveal no detail.

Comments: Information from Hestand indicates Bobby Harris died in his loss incident. Rivers' hearsay information cannot relate to Bobby Harris.

Conclusion: Bobby Harris was killed at the time of loss. Hearsay of an individual named Harris in the prison system relates to either Jesse Harris or Carlyle Harris, both returnees.

Tilden Stewart Holley

Returnee reports: Leonard C. Eastman reported hearing, while at Hoa Lo, on Radio Hanoi that Holley was a prisoner. Leon R. Ellis and Kenneth Fisher heard on March 13, 1973 that Holley was a prisoner at Cu Loc. Donald L. Heiliger heard that Holley was a prisoner. None had any firsthand knowledge regarding Holley.

Comments: Holley was on a nighttime F4C armed recon mission on January 20, 1968. Weather was marginal with ceilings of 1,000 to 1,500 feet. Holley's wingman reported seeing a rapid streak of orange glow through the clouds after Holley elected to go down to have a look at the target beneath the cloud layer. A momentary weak beeper signal may have been detected, but this is not at all certain. A further electronic search was conducted, but without success.

Conclusion: It is quite likely that Holley perished at the time of his loss incident. Returnee reports of "Holley," all hearsay, may have been referring to returnee Edwin A. Hawley, who was captured in February 1972 and resided at both Hoa Lo and Cu Loc facilities, among others.

Fred Holmes

Returnee report: Fred Holmes reported as POW name at Homecoming. Richard Keirn reported secondhand hearsay that Holmes' name was in the prison communications system. No firsthand knowledge.

Comments: Holmes and his co-pilot were hit by enemy fire. Both men were seen by SAR helicopter in their parachutes. The co-pilot was rescued. Holmes' life raft was spotted still attached to the ejection seat but the parachute was missing. No evidence of Holmes was seen. No other returnees reported Holmes' name in the prison communications system.

Conclusion: The evidence suggesting that Holmes survived his ejection is inconclusive. The fact that the co-pilot was rescued and SAR aircraft were successfully operating in the area, and the fact that no contact with Holmes was made after his plane was hit tends to indicate that Holmes did not survive his incident.

Eugene Millard Jewell

Returnee reports: Edward A. Brudno had heard that Jewell was killed. Robinson Risner, Weldell B. Rivers, and Howard E. Rutledge all had heard the phonetic spelling, "Jual", on the Voice of Vietnam or camp radio. The man's rank was "sergeant" and his service was unknown.

Comments: Jewell was aboard an F4C on a strike mission over North Vietnam on September 4, 1965. Wingmen saw the aircraft taking ground fire during a strafing run, and the aircraft exploded on impact with the ground. No parachutes were sighted.

Conclusion: It is extremely unlikely that Jewell survived his loss incident. The correlation of "Jual" to Jewell is probably erroneous, and in any event provides no information to support a supposition of survival.

Bobby Marvin Jones

Returnee reports: James A. Mulligan and Richard D. Vogel heard Bob Jones mentioned in prison communications. William J. Metzger reported seeing Bob Jones at a movie at Dogpatch in November 1972. Orson G. Swindle reported firsthand observation of B. Jones. No others reported seeing or hearing of Bobby Jones.

Comments: Bobby M. Jones was a flight surgeon passenger aboard an F4D ferry flight from Udorn, Thailand, to Danang, South Vietnam, on November 28, 1972. The aircraft disappeared from radar view approximately 20 miles NW of Danang. An unsuccessful SAR effort was conducted for 5 days; two beeper signals were believed to be heard in the area on November 30.

Conclusion: This is an obvious case of misidentification. Both returnee Robert C. Jones and returnee Murphy N. Jones were held at Dogpatch prison camp in November 1972. No doubt it is one or both of these individuals who prompted the reports cited above.

John R. Jones

Returnee report: Jon Cavaiani said that prior to his capture he shared a bunker with John Jones, who was wounded in the legs by a grenade, then shot several times in the chest when he tried to surrender. The bunker then burned for 6 to 8 hours.

Comments: None.

Conclusion: John Jones is not a prisoner of war.

James E. Kennedy

Returnee report: Mark Smith, a returnee, "had no knowledge of" Kennedy. He "did not recognize the name and could not identify (his) photo as being anyone he had had contact with."

Comments: None.

Conclusion: There is no information, from returnees or otherwise, to suggest James Kennedy was ever a prisoner of war.

Larry Gene Kier

Returnee report: A man described as possibly a pilot shot down in December 1972 was seen in January 1973 in Hoa Lo prison. Two other individuals communicated with this individual but no name is known.

Comments: PFC Larry G. Kier (refno 1613) was lost in a ground incident when his position located near an ammo dump was hit with a rocket propelled grenade. The resulting explosion damaged the ammo dump which caused a leak in a napalm container which then exploded, causing a fire. A 2 day search of the area after the incident did not produce any trace of Kier.

Conclusion: Kier loss incident does not match the loss description of the unknown man seen in Hoa Lo in 1973. There is no analytical evidence to conclude that Kier survived his loss incident.

John Henry Sotheron Long

Returnee reports: Harvey G. Brande reported firsthand observation of Long, saying that Long was held with the "Lao Group" at the Citadel. No one else reported on Long.

Comments: John H.S. Long was the co-pilot of an HU-16B Albatross which disappeared in bad weather over the South China Sea on October 18, 1966. An extensive search effort revealed no trace of the aircraft or 7-member crew.

Conclusion: This appears to be another case of mistaken identification. There is no reason to believe that John H.S. Long survived his loss incident. Returnee Stephen G. Long was one of the "Lao Group", and was held at the Citadel, among other locations.

Howard B. Lull

Returnee report: Albert Carlson and Mark Smith at time of last observation knew Lull to be evading contact with the enemy during the timeframe of their loss incidents. Carlson last saw Lull with Smith. Smith said Lull had then separated from him, seeking help. Smith claims he later heard from his captors that Lull had been captured, and that Carlson had told him that Lull was a POW. Carlson had no such firsthand or hearsay knowledge, however. In fact, James Walsh, while in a Cambodian POW camp with Smith, learned from Smith that after Lull had left him, Smith had no further information about him.

Comments: Information from debriefs of returnees shed little light on the fate of Lull, except to demonstrate that Lull was not known by them to be captured and that he did not show up in the COSVN prison system. Other intelligence information, however, indicates that Lull was captured and subsequently killed in an unsuccessful escape attempt.

Conclusion: There is sufficient reason to believe Lull was initially captured but did not survive to be interned in the prison system.

Joseph W. McDonald

Returnee report: King Rayford had direct contact with another POW at the "Hanoi Hilton" on March 12, 1973, apparently an individual whom he personally had not previously encountered in the prison system. He identified the photo of Joseph McDonald as the individual he saw, stating that he was an Air Force captain, that he was from Oregon, that he had red hair, and that he was in good condition.

Comment: The photo album reviewed by Rayford contained only black-and-white photos. Joseph W. McDonald was not an Air Force officer, not a captain, not red-headed according to his records, and neither his place of birth nor home-of-record was Oregon.

Conclusion: The individual met by Rayford was not Joseph W. McDonald.

Fred H. McMurray

Returnee reports: Burton Campbell saw a note on a cigarette wrapper that Fred McMurray, captain, USAF, was a POW. Ernest Moore heard at the "Zoo" that Fred McMurray was a POW.

Comments: Fred H. McMurray Jr. was an Army first lieutenant, not an Air Force captain.

Conclusion: This information correlates to USAF captain Frederick C. McMurray, a returnee.

William Thomas McPhail

Returnee reports: Roger A. Miller reported firsthand contact at Hoa Lo on March 4, 1973 with "McPhail, Don Alan", an Army E3 from a long-range recon patrol. David W. Sooter reported his firsthand observation of Army E4 "McFale" at Hoa Lo on March 3, 1973.

Comments: Captain William T. McPhail was aboard a C-130A which disappeared while on a nighttime flare dropping mission over Laos on May 22, 1968. Photographic and electronic search of the area indicated no evidence of any survivors.

Conclusion: Don Allen MacPhail, an Army E3, was among those repatriated from Hanoi during Operation Homecoming in 1973. The correlation of the returnee report to William T. McPhail is an obvious error.

Everett A. McPherson

Returnee report: Norris Charles stated he thought the name McPherson was on one of the lists passed to him by other POWs at Cu Loc Prison.

Comments: There is no corroborating information from any of the other returnees from Cu Loc Prison, either as the source of a list containing the McPherson name or as someone who had seen him there. There is no other hearsay information validating McPherson's name in the POW "grapevine." Charles' uncertainty concerning this name further dilutes its potential value. Charles, an early releasee, was charged with keeping a "memory bank" of fellow prisoners. Most of the names on his memory list were validated; a few, included this one, were not.

Conclusion: There is no analytical basis to believe Everett McPherson was a prisoner of war.

Hubert C. Nichols, Jr.

Returnee reports: Myron A. Young reported that the name "Nickoles" was seen on a wall at Heartbreak and at the Zoo around November 1972. The name was also reported by returnees Rudolph U. Zuberbuhler and Cecil H. Brunson.

Comments: Hubert C. Nichols was shot down while piloting an A-1E on a SAR mission over North Vietnam on September 1, 1966. Another pilot saw the wreckage on the ground, but saw no signs of life. No parachute was seen, nor beeper signals heard.

Conclusion: It is unlikely that Hubert Nichols survived his loss incident. The name seen on the prison walls was most likely correlatable to Aubrey Allen Nichols, a Homecoming returnee. Prior to November 1972, he had resided at both Heartbreak in Hoa Lo, and at the Zoo.

Woodrow Wilson Parker, II

Returnee reports: Norris M. Overly reported indirect contact (wall-tapping) at the Citadel, Country Club, on December 20, 1967 with "Parker". No other returnees reported knowledge of any Parker.

Comments: Woodrow W. Parker was aboard an F4D on a nighttime combat mission over North Vietnam on March 24, 1968. After reporting his intention to descend to a lower altitude for a closer look at the target, Parker's aircraft was seen by the wingman to impact the ground. No beepers were heard, nor parachutes seen. Subsequent intelligence reports indicate that neither occupant of the aircraft survived the loss incident.

Conclusion: It is extremely unlikely that Parker survived his loss incident. The wall-tapped name of "Parker" provides no analytical basis to alter this presumption.

Randolph Allen Perry, Jr.

Returnee reports: Thomas J. Klomann (fellow crewman) could not verify Perry's ejection from the aircraft at the time of the incident. Robinson Risner and Wendell B. Rivers both heard a phonetic reference to Perry's name on Voice of Vietnam or the camp radio.

Comments: Perry was one of six crewmen aboard a B-52D hit by a SAM on the evening of December 20, 1972 near Hanoi. The aircraft burst into a large fireball and crashed. No chutes were seen, and electronic monitoring by other aircraft failed to establish contact with any of the crewmen; however, it was later learned that two of the crew had survived and were in captivity.

Conclusion: The name references heard on the radio provide no analytical basis to conclude that Randolph A. Perry survived and was a captive. In any event, the radio broadcast also could have referred to either Richard Clark Perry or Ronald D. Perry, both of whose remains have been repatriated to U.S. custody.

William C. Pierson III

Returnee report: Norris Charles said that the name "Pierson" sounded familiar and may have been on a note he received in February 1972, but was unsure. James Mulligan heard the name at some time in prison communications but could recall the context.

Comment: There are four individuals named "Pierson/Pearson." There is no information in these cases to suggest any were prisoners of war.

Conclusion: This tenuous information does not constitute an adequate basis to infer William Pierson was a prisoner of war.

Dean A. Pogreba

Returnee report: Hearsay that Pogreba was lost over China and may have been captured or killed.

Comments: Maj. Dean A. Pogreba (refno 0162) is an off-the-scope case and was last seen delivering his ordnance. Pogreba was noticed missing when the strike flight rendezvoused over water. Peking Radio claimed they shot down an aircraft on the day Pogreba's aircraft was lost. Pogreba's flight plan would have taken him no closer than 30mm of Chinese border on egress.

Conclusion: No analytical evidence to conclude that Pogreba survived his loss incident.

Frederick J. Ransbottom

Returnee report: Julius W. Long reported firsthand contact with Army 2Lt Ransbottom on May 9, 1968, adding that Ransbottom was located at an outpost adjacent to Long's in the vicinity of Kham Duc. An entry indicates that Long also states Ransbottom was a prisoner. (NOTE: Long makes no mention whatsoever of Ransbottom in his debrief following his return to U.S. custody.)

Comments: Ransbottom was manning an outpost near Kham Duc Special Forces camp when the area came under attack by a superior enemy force on May 12, 1968. According to survivors, Ransbottom was last known to be fighting from a bunker

location, shooting the enemy as they entered his bunker. Two search operations were later conducted in the area, and a number of remains were recovered. No further information was obtained regarding Ransbottom, however.

Conclusion: There is no indication that Ransbottom survived his loss incident. Returnee Long, who was manning a nearby outpost, was wounded and eventually captured on May 16 during the same battle. The absence of any mention of Ransbottom as a prisoner during his debrief calls into question the accuracy of the entry cited in the returnee reports, above.

Paul D. Raymond

Returnee report: Hearsay in prison communications of Raymond's name.

Comments: Paul D. Raymond (refno 0829) was shot down and his wing man saw the aircraft turn into a large fireball heading toward the ground. No parachute or beeper were noted.

Conclusion: No analytical evidence to conclude that Paul Raymond survived his incident of loss.

Joseph S. Ross

Returnee reports: Name "Ross" was seen on wall at "Heartbreak" prison by three individuals.

Comments: Joseph S. Ross (refno 1243) and his crewmember, William Thompson, were on a night armed reconnaissance mission in North Vietnam. Another crew in this flight saw a large fireball on the ground near the intended target and then could not raise Ross or Thompson on the radio. No parachutes or beepers were noted. There were no individuals whose last name was Ross who were known to have become prisoners.

Conclusion: No analytical evidence to conclude that Joseph Ross survived his loss incident.

Charles S. Rowley

Returnee report: Rowley was identified by a returnee as having been in a propaganda photo or in a group of Laos POWs viewing films at the Hanoi Hilton in February 1973.

Comments: Charles Rowley (refno 1600) was shot down with 10 other individuals in Laos, on April 22, 1970. According to U.S. operational data, only one crewmember is known to have gotten out of the aircraft before it crashed. This is supported by another generally reliable source. That individual was rescued at the time of loss and SAR efforts found no trace of any other survivors.

Conclusion: There is no analytical evidence to conclude that Charles Rowley survived his loss incident.

Jerry M. Shriver

Returnee reports: Returnee Norris A. Charles (a "memory bank") reported receiving a passed-down list of POWs on which was the name of "Shriver", an E7. (NOTE: Charles was reminded of the name and rank after viewing the FMSEA data list.) No other returnee reported any knowledge of Jerry Shriver.

Comments: On April 24, 1969, Shriver was a member of a 25-man platoon which came under intense enemy fire following their insertion into Cambodia. Shriver was last seen entering a treeline at which time he was still in radio contact with the remainder of the platoon. Shortly thereafter, however, radio contact was lost, and Shriver was never seen again. Later, an enemy soldier was seen picking up a weapon of the type which Shriver had been carrying.

Conclusion: There exists no evidence that Shriver survived his loss incident. The lack of any other reporting on Shriver strongly suggests that Charles' recollection of Shriver was in error.

William J. Thompson

Returnee report: The identity of a "Major Thompson" was passed by wall tap code.

Comments: William J. Thompson (refno 1243), and crewmember Joseph Ross, were on a night armed recon mission in North Vietnam. The other crew in this flight saw a large fireball on the ground near the intended target and then could not raise Ross or Thompson on the radio. No parachutes or beepers were noted.

Conclusion: The "Major Thompson" referenced in tap code was probably Major Fred Thompson, returnee, who was shot down 5 months prior to William J. Thompson. There is no analytical evidence to conclude that William J. Thompson survived his loss incident.

Francis W. Townsend

Returnee report: A returnee reported that Townsend's name had been "passed" in 1972. Additionally, a NVN captor indicated to the other crewmember from Townsend's aircraft, William Gauntt, returnee, that Townsend had perished in the aircraft.

Comments: Francis Townsend (refno 1908) crashed in South Vietnam on September 13, 1972. Based on operational reporting from Gauntt, Townsend was ejected out of the aircraft. However, Gauntt reported that Townsend should have landed behind him on the ground but he did not.

Conclusion: There is no analytical evidence to conclude that Francis Townsend survived his loss incident.

Lewis C. Walton

Returnee report: Jon Cavaiani purportedly indicated in an early post-release debrief that he had heard about an Army captain named "Watson" who was a POW. Specifically, he was told by someone (not identified) that an enemy message asked for instructions regarding captives Watson and Entrican, and that they were in turn told to take them north to Hanoi and to kill all future captives.

Comment: This debrief does not exist in full text, but only in an abridged database form and there is no mention of the matter in the record of his subsequent extensive debrief. There is reason to suspect Danny Entrican was captured by hostile forces; Entrican is included on the last known alive list.

Conclusion: There is no independent basis to believe Lewis C. Walton (a staff sergeant, not a captain) was captured by hostile forces.

Larry A. Zich

Returnee report: Lawrence Stark, although he could not make a positive identification, believed that the photo he was shown of Larry Zich matched someone he had seen in a propaganda picture or among the "Laos Group" (i.e., POWs who had been captured in Laos) while watching a propaganda film in February-March 1973.

Comments: Larry Zich, had been present at any gathering of POWs, would certainly have been extensively corroborated as a POW by other returnees. He definitely was not among the so-called "Laos Group" at Hoa Lo.

Conclusion: It is not possible to determine who Stark saw, but his identification of Zich is tenuous and not supported by any other evidence.

Senator McCain. Again, for the benefit of the record, what is the so-called Vessey discrepancy list and where did that come from? Now it is my understanding the Vessey discrepancy list is a list that General Vessey took to use in his negotiations with the Vietnamese as men who are still unaccounted for and that we expect them to help us out. Is that—can you tell about that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. I understand General Vessey is going to explain this in detail during his testimony. But I can give you a quick summary of it.

There are presently 269 priority cases of those cases that are—
Senator McCain. Two hundred and fifty-nine.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. One hundred and sixty-nine in Vietnam.

Senator McCain. And these are cases that he got from you or from—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. They were developed over a period of time. The first group was a combination of DIA, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and some other individuals in making a selection of these cases.

And they ran the broad spectrum. There were cases within General Vessey's cases that we—the individual, we knew he had been captured, but he was now dead. We had information that he was dead, yet he was on that list that was provided to the Vietnamese.

The categories or the definitions of these individuals changed over time. There are individuals, for instance, who were last known alive. They're part of these discrepancy cases. They may have been talking with the man on the radio, after a good chute, he said, I'm

getting some small arms fire. I'll see you around the club. And the last we've ever heard of that individual. He might be a General Vessey case.

Those that were on the prisoner list, say the 97 that were listed as prisoner that have not subsequently been accounted for. They have made their way into the General Vessey list as priority cases. And those are the cases that are the core of the search efforts that are ongoing right now.

Senator McCain. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I will wait for the next round.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR McCain

Today, we will try to trace the origins of the confusion and distrust that have attended this issue for the last 20 years. There are a great many questions we hope to answer today for ourselves and the American people.

I strongly agree with the view that until the American people are allowed to see for themselves the information which our government and this committee has had access to we will never resolve this confusion and distrust. That is why I authored legislation last year to declassify POW/MIA information, and I am pleased that the Government has begun that process. Nearly 700 formerly classified intelligence reports concerning alleged live sightings of American POWs are available for public inspection in the Library of Congress. That is a good first step, and I am eager for the declassification process to proceed and expand.

The Government has also cooperated closely with this committee to provide us the necessary information to meet our responsibility to provide the most thorough investigation of this issue ever undertaken. All the information which we are seeking to understand in these hearings was provided to us by this Administration. I am grateful for that cooperation, and I anticipate that it will continue.

The committee is only at the half way mark of our investigation. Our work, as will be evident today, has raised many questions about the fate of our unaccounted for veterans of the Vietnam War and our Government's efforts to resolve those questions. Thus far, we have not obtained the definitive answers to those questions. For myself, I feel it is our responsibility to completely examine the information we have now obtained, and thoroughly investigate the questions this information has raised before we conclude anything. To do anything less would be irresponsible and would constitute a breach in this committee's obligation to the families of our POW/MIAs and the American people. Our investigations are far from complete. I intend to await the completion of our examination before I announce my conclusions. These hearings should bring us closer to that moment. I thank today's witnesses for joining us in this critically important endeavor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerrey?

Senator KERREY. Mr. Trowbridge, could you try to describe to me the environment in 1973? Do you see the political environment of 1973, the attitude of the American people in 1973 being substantially different than in 1992 in regards to MIA-POW?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, sir, I don't know if I can make a good political statement relative to that. At that time, I was really involved maybe 12 hours a day, trying to manage our office's work on the POW information. I think perhaps at that time everybody was thankful the war was over and we were going to move ahead.

I think your statement about today—a lot of times the POW-MIA issue is looked at through the lens of 1992, which are a lot different than what they were in 1973. We've learned an awful lot since then. We've acquired information out of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Just for instance, those Gen. Vessey cases Senator McCain just asked about. Those were the cases that were presented to the Vietnamese, but as we've done our work, 61 of those cases have been confirmed dead. We know what happened to me.

Senator KERREY. When you say happy the war was over or glad the war was over, I do not remember exactly which word you used—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I was.

Senator KERREY. Did that have an impact? Were you ever told by somebody, the war is over, let us not drag this out any further with energy expended in areas that are not apt to be terribly useful?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir, never. And in fact, our mission during the war, as was mentioned in my statement, our focus was the prisoner and the missing and after the war, we also started looking for those individuals that were listed as killed. We wanted a determination of what happened to these individuals and where were they. It became an accountability process.

So actually we worked harder for the overall effort, trying to make an accounting of everybody.

Senator KERREY. Do you have any recollection of ever having anybody say to you during that period of time in 1973, after Operation Homecoming, that we should just let this matter rest?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

Senator KERREY. I am not talking about politicians now or people in the Department of Defense or in the Joint Chiefs, I am just talking about friends, neighbors, people that might know what you were doing.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I've heard public comment to that effect, yes.

Senator KERREY. In 1973? Do you not think it is fair to say there was an attitude in 1973 that we were indeed glad the war was over and that we wanted it to be over. We wanted very little further discussion of anything in regards to the war, including the status of our own prisoners.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Oh, I think that there may have been some individuals who thought that way, but I think the moral fiber that runs through the American citizen is we don't leave our unaccounted for. We go get them.

I did have people make comments to me.

Senator KERREY. I must say that I agree that there is a moral fiber running through the American people in that regard, but my recollection is certainly not an overwhelming desire to continue the debate about the war by pursuing POW's and MIA's.

I think the concern for the POW/MIA has increased rather than decreased over the years, which implies that it was not terribly high in the early days after the war.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I think the mission has changed as well. We have access to these countries now. The numbers of people involved are greatly increased. We have teams in all three countries now, so—we have the joint task force in the Pacific that has really boosted the numbers.

Senator KERREY. Let me also say that I believe an awful lot of the increased attention to the POW/MIA status has come of a consequence of disclosures from our own Government, not from disclosures by the Vietnamese Government. Does that track with your own view of what is going on?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. At varying periods of time since 1973, the emphasis has gone up and down through various administrations.

Senator KERREY. Did you have a written procedure for determining the status of individuals in Southeast Asia, written criteria for judgments about—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. There is no matrix or check list that says you have to have each one of these documents to make somebody a prisoner of war. It's an analytical judgment. You judge each case on its own, and the availability of information and reliability of information differs from case to case.

Senator KERREY. You, on the one hand say that there is no matrix and then you say it is an analytical judgment. How can it be an analytical judgment if there is no matrix? You mean it is a subjective judgment?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, if we had an American prisoner that came home and said, I saw a certain individual and he was alive and in prison, we'd certainly say that was valid.

Senator KERREY. So there were no written criteria?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

Senator KERREY. No attempt to establish written criteria for—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

Senator KERREY. Do you believe that that contributes to some of the discrepancies today that we are having? Do you have any regrets over not establishing written criteria? You appeared today to be confident that it would have been difficult to put one together.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir, I don't. In fact, I think it probably enriches the analytical process and hypothesis. It doesn't put bounds on the analysts. They can consider all the information.

Again, I'd just like to go back when we talk about status replacing individuals in these analytical positions that were held by DIA relative to these individuals. The services that looked at the information are the ones that actually made that official status, not us.

Senator KERREY. With respect, it seems to me that while the services were making that evaluation determination, that you did have authority and responsibility that would lead one to conclude that at least the question would arise as to whether or not written criteria would be developed by your office.

You seem to be saying that that question did arise and that your evaluation was that written criteria would restrict your capacity to carry out your mission.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Oh, I think if you had a firm check list and you had to meet these certain requirements before you could call an individual a POW, in my view, I don't think that's the way to do it.

Senator KERREY. But the problem of discrepancy never occurred to you at that time? The problem that later evaluations might cause people to have doubt simply because of the discrepancy, that problem was not one that you anticipated at that time?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

Senator KERREY. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid?

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sungenis, how do you say that?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Sungenis.

Senator REID. Where were you at Operation Homecoming?

Mr. SUNGENIS. I was in the Department of Defense in another part of the organization that was responsible for casualties. There was an umbrella organization.

Senator REID. At the time of Operation Homecoming, did you have a belief at that time or did you develop one at a subsequent time, that there were prisoners of war still left in Southeast Asia?

Mr. SUNGENIS. No, sir, I had no involvement with the summary management information division, which was the Southeast Asia casualty organization.

Senator REID. OK. The rest of the question was did you, at any time later, develop an opinion that at the time of Operation Homecoming, there were prisoners of war, American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Yes, sir. We had a list of people that were being carried in our official records as prisoner of war.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, at that point in time, that was a possibility. And, of course, we have tracked that over the years as well. Right now we have, I believe, 40 unresolved reports about Americans living freely in Vietnam. We do not know who they are.

So, we have tracked it over the years. At that point in time, we had information that two individuals—Bobby Garwood was one that we felt was in the country someplace, but we knew he was not a prisoner at least, and that was based on information we had gotten from returnees.

There was one other individual. We did not know where he was at the time, but he had gone to the other side, and he was married to a Vietnamese woman and had children, but we did not know where he was at the time. But again, he was not a prisoner.

Senator REID. What was his name?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. McKinley Nolan.

Senator REID. What subsequently happened to him?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We still do not know, sir.

Senator REID. How were military casualties reported? Well, no, I think you have answered that. How were deserters in Southeast Asia categorized and accounted for by the Department of Defense?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Deserters were not our responsibility, sir. Perhaps the service reps could answer that.

Mr. SUNGENIS. Deserters are excluded from the official DOD Southeast Asia casualty files, sir, by direction.

Senator REID. By direction of the Secretary?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Yes, sir. There is a directive.

Senator REID. Does the Department of Defense have an accurate number of deserters from each of the services?

Mr. SUNGENIS. I have no knowledge as to what the services have, sir.

Senator REID. How could we obtain that information?

Mr. SUNGENIS. You might query—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trowbridge, you know what the deserter status is, do you not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. Over the years we have tried to determine exactly what a good number is, and we have worked over the years with the services. Again, a lot of those individuals that fit those various categories—they went on the rolls. They may never have made it into Vietnam some who are called a deserter.

We continue to try and review that list. As late as 1988, we had an analyst from our office go through the service files on people in that status. For the Army alone, we went through over 1,000 files.

Senator REID. Over 1,000, you say?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We went through over 1,000 files. That was the Army alone. We went through the Navy files but did not go through Air Force records, but they were down to just a very few.

Our office carries something like 15 individuals who we track. Not that we are tracking, but that are in our database, because we had information after reviewing these files on our own that they may have deserted in country. That does not mean they are still there. They may have left very shortly after that incident. As you may recall, a number of years ago somebody came out of Australia.

The CHAIRMAN. Would my colleague yield for a minute?

Senator REID. I would yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trowbridge, are you saying that the Defense Intelligence Agency carries only 15 people as deserters in country? Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Based on what we have been able to obtain from the services, that is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me why, then, this committee got a list from the Defense Department, the National Archives, which we were about to submit to the FBI of 1,284 deserter names last known with their units in Vietnam?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I cannot answer that. As I said, we had an analyst that went through the records in 1988. Again, if you have a list—I do not know where these lists come from and what the criteria was to make these lists.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that not say something to you? You are supposed to be analyzing live sighting reports. You have got a potential base of some 1,200 people who supposedly deserted in country. I am not suggesting—this committee, incidentally, is not focusing on deserters. This committee is focused on POW's, military people who had been taken prisoner. But obviously there is a possibility that someone who is a deserter could be the source of a live sighting report.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is absolutely correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how can you then operate an intelligence operation that does not take into account the base?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, we follow up that report and we do not care who the individual is. If we can determine that there is somebody held at that location, it does not make any difference if that is somebody on the unaccounted for rolls or the deserter rolls. We are trying to determine, is there somebody at that location.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but if you are only carrying 15 people, then something is wrong with your database.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I would like to see the list.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will just tell you. The committee got a list of 1,284 names. We gave them to the FBI, the IRS, and the Social Security Administration. We requested that they attempt to determine the last known location of these individuals whom the services last knew to be in Southeast Asia—last recordation of the services that they were in Southeast Asia.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. What is the date of that list, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The date of the deserter list—as of February 1973. Let us just fill you in. The FBI located records on 1,198 of the 1,284 names provided. They found evidence in Federal investigative files that 747 might correlate to deserters. Apparently, many of the records held by the FBI contained outstanding arrest warrants, unclear that any of them were wanted for desertion. They only appeared as wanted because the military services had failed to request the removal of warrants for those allegedly returned to military control.

The IRS indicated they cannot respond to us due to public law considerations. The Social Security Administration's preliminary report indicates that over 200 of the 1,284 departed Southeast Asia alive, and the SSA's list will be compared with the FBI's to try to develop a finalized list of unique individuals.

But, you know, I do not think that we should be doing this 20 years later. It seems to me that this is sort of fundamental to trying to decide who might be in Southeast Asia and who might not be.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well as I said, sir, if we take that list that was dated in 1973 and after all that information is correlated, we will find out that that list has come down considerably. I mean, very small. We had gone through the service files individually and that is what we did find, that these individuals had left Southeast Asia or never went to Southeast Asia.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, let me just close by saying the reason I am concerned about this, and I think it is part of what could be a significant problem, is that—I am reading here from a report given to us by our own committee staff.

The select committee is also thoroughly investigating the possibility that some servicemen who deserted their military units in Southeast Asia during the war remained behind and might be the subject of live sighting reports. Part of the impetus for this investigation is the inability of the Department of Defense to determine the number of deserters in Southeast Asia who have not been accounted for as having left the region.

For example, when asked for a list of possible deserters last known in Southeast Asia, DIA provided the committee with a list of 21 names. By contrast, the same inquiry to the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii resulted in 56 possible names. Those individuals who deserted, or who were absent without leave, AWOL, from the units in Southeast Asia, were not carried on casualty lists as they were exempted, as we have been told here a few minutes ago, from normal casualty reporting unless they returned alive from captivity.

My point, and I stress it, is that we cannot just disregard the deserters because it is possible every one of the live sightings could have been a deserter wandering around there on their own free will. I mean, it is unlikely, but it is possible. So we cannot exclude the deserters, can we?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As I said, sir, we get a report. We try to determine, is there someone there. The fact that there may X number on a deserter list, or X number on a prisoner list, or X number missing in action—we track the report down itself, not who the individual may be.

Senator REID. But, of course, we need both. We need to track down the report and do our best to determine—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. If we track it down and determine that there is somebody there, and then we find out he is a deserter, well, certainly.

Senator REID. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wondered, Mr. Trowbridge, if you view developing the comprehensive list of those who have not come back, correlated the records, making sense out of these numbers as the committee has tried to do—if you view that as your responsibility or someone else's?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, we cannot start looking for someone until the service tells us he is missing, or whatever his status may be, or the State Department says we have a civilian in Southeast Asia that is missing. Our numbers are compiled based on what is provided to us, and, again, working with Mr. Sungenis' office, or the services.

During the war, things were moving very rapidly. There was a small intelligence outfit with each of the services. The State Department was also involved. We met at least once a week—many times more if a man was missing, for instance, and we knew it by the message traffic. He was immediately put on our rolls.

But we did not keep track. We were not the accountants as to who was unaccounted for in the Department of Defense. That had to come from the services to us.

Senator BROWN. So, in terms of trying to make sense out of these numbers and correlate, for example, who might be missing.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That was our responsibility, correlating information to somebody who may be missing. But, until somebody told us he was missing, he was not on our rolls.

Senator BROWN. Well, what portion of the reconciliation job the committee is trying to do does not fall under your responsibility?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I guess if the committee found a discrepancy where they actually found more or less people unaccounted for in Southeast Asia than were on the Department of Defense rolls, that is not our responsibility.

Senator BROWN. So the effort to reconcile who was alive or who might have been alive at the end of the war and not returned was your responsibility?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. And as you look at that, are you comfortable with what your agency has done in that regard? Or do you feel there is more that you folks should have done?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. I think we did a good job then, and we are continuing to do a good job. For instance, the services carried—I think I made this point before—the services carried 97 individuals in prisoner status at that time. Well, our efforts since then, gaining intelligence information over the years—now we are going into our archival records and doing searches—of that 97, there are only 55 that are still unaccounted for.

We have gotten remains and confirmed the fate of those individuals and other individuals. The number is even higher for the 115 that DIA carried in a prisoner status.

Senator BROWN. I do not mean to belabor the point. You may not have anything you want to add. My impression as I listen is that the correlation efforts that the committee has tried to do were necessary because somebody had not done them. My impression is that the intelligence files, particularly in this area, had simply not correlated information that existed that your agency had, had not made it file-specific with regard to the individuals.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is not true.

Senator BROWN. My impression is that the reports that I have looked at your handling of this area have come back to be extremely negative, and it occurred to me that you might have some observations in that area that would perhaps cast all of this in a different light. And if you do, I think the committee would be interested in hearing it.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I think we did a fine job of correlation. In fact, those 97 that the services did carry as a prisoner—some correlated or agreed with the DIA status and some did not. But of those, we have found that, at least of that 97, 55 of those individuals were not prisoners of war.

The CHAIRMAN. At least how many?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Excuse me. Fifty-five of that 97 are still unaccounted for. Forty-two of them we have accounted for.

Senator BROWN. Do you all, when you reach these determinations, follow up with the services?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. When I say we reach these determinations, any of the information that is gathered, and the analysis that is done, and the correlation to the individual, that information is provided to the services. DIA does not make a declaration of death or change anyone's status, as I mentioned earlier. We do that in-house, because it is part of the analytical hypothesis.

Senator BROWN. So theoretically there should not be a difference between the records the services maintain and the records that you maintain.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As far as the numbers are concerned, no.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. But there are.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, that is what I am hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the first time that you have heard that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, sir, I only know of two individuals that are different from what DOD holds, that we hold.

The CHAIRMAN. You have 2,236 on one list, and there are 2,266 on the other.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Department of Defense's list does not carry civilians and we do.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only difference?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I know a few individuals that the Department of Defense has on their rolls that we do not have on our rolls. We are aware of these individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that adds to the confusion?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you do that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We have direction not to add these individuals to our lists.

The CHAIRMAN. Direction from whom?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. From the Deputy Assistant Secretary's office. Senator BROWN. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. I think my question would be more along the lines of further clarification, and probably following up on dialogue you had with Senator McCain. It is just for clarification, as I indicated.

In regard to the numbers, 51—that is military personnel reported in captivity by returnees during Operation Homecoming. And then the 111 military died in captivity. Fifty-seven remains recovered.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley, I apologize for interrupting. We have a roll call vote on, and we want to try not to interrupt the process. So I think some of us will go vote now and try to ask them to hold the vote for you, and we will try to get back here.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. I will not be very long here. So, my clarification, Mr. Trowbridge, would be along the line of the amount of information, or what is the universe of information that you possess that will clarify your disagreement with the figure 51?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, sir, I hear the statement that this list contained 51 individuals that the returned POW's said were alive. Well, we have checked those debriefs of those 51 individuals and, as I said to Senator McCain, we would provide that name by name for the record as to what was actually said by the returned prisoners. That is not what they said. They did not say all of these 51 were alive.

I went through a little rundown here very quickly that some of these individuals said that they saw them die—saw them die before they even got into the prison system. Some of them were nothing but queries by returned POW's that they had heard. Someone made an inquiry about an individual and they brought that name back with them, and said, yes, this is my knowledge. I have heard this name. And that is the extent of it.

Senator GRASSLEY. Then, along that line, describe to me the extent to which there may have been follow up to clarify or expand knowledge.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. For instance, again, a returnee is being debriefed. He just came back from Hanoi. He is now going through his initial medical checks in the Philippines. One of our first concerns, of course, is medical attention. Second is, what do you know about Americans that are unaccounted for. What knowledge do you possess about unaccounted for Americans?

And they would tell us, yes, I heard this name or I saw this individual in captivity. Someone asked me about this individual. Well, every name that they gave us we would follow up on.

For instance, to use an example, if the POW said, well, I heard the name Trowbridge. Well, who did you hear it from? Well, it was from another returnee. We would go to that returnee if he had been out of Hanoi at that time. Maybe he had been processed through and was in a military hospital elsewhere. We would contact his debriefer and say, follow up with him.

He would then ask that returnee, where did he get the name. And he would say, I was in a cell with another POW who roomed with, say, on a carrier with this individual. He got shot down a

month before the other prisoner arrived, and all I did was ask about him. Does anybody know about him? No one ever saw him in the prison system. That is how his name got into the system.

Senator GRASSLEY. I feel good about your explanation. Now, as a follow up, what you just described to me, will that be reflected in the information that you give to the committee, and will that information be available so that we can know how you have arrived at each conclusion?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We will do it name by name, as far as these 51 are concerned. That is no problem.

Senator GRASSLEY. So we will have access to that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. You were given this list of names yesterday. Did you bring these files with you today to clear up any discrepancies, and if not, why not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. I did not bring any cases here today.

Senator GRASSLEY. Can you tell me why you did not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I was not asked. I did not think it was appropriate to go case by case here. But I can certainly, as I mentioned, provide the committee with that analysis. That is no problem.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Trowbridge.

Senator SMITH. We only have about 5 or 6 minutes left on that vote. We probably should suspend for a few minutes. Let us take a 5-minute recess. I am sure Senator Kerry will be back by then, and we will go ahead down and vote.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. While I wait for colleagues to return, I am going to proceed with some of the mundane but record-necessary questions, if we can, and then I want to get back into some other more substantive matters.

Mr. SUNGENIS, let me ask you if you would, please, so we can establish this formally on the record—would you explain the categories that your office used to classify casualties during and after the Vietnam War. In other words hostile, killed, died non-hostile, POW/MIA. I would like to have your explanation of the categories.

Mr. SUNGENIS. Yes, sir.

[Pause.]

Mr. SUNGENIS. My office published what was called a post-cease-fire book.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you put the mike down a little bit.

Mr. SUNGENIS. And it had the following categories: died, hostile action; died, non-hostile action.

The CHAIRMAN. Well what about during? I do not want post-cease-fire. And the point is that this all changed, correct?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Excuse me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what were the first categories?

Mr. SUNGENIS. If you will just bear with me one moment, sir.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to you—I am going to interrupt my own question since you have not answered it. These are some of the detailed questions we need to ask, but other colleagues are here who have not had a chance to ask questions yet so I am going to cede to them. Then we can always come back to this if we can.

So let me turn first to Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, because I have been out presiding on other matters, I do not have the continuity. I will yield the time at this point back to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Daschle.

Senator DASCHLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too have had scheduling conflicts this morning, but I wanted to clarify some of the points that were addressed in earlier questioning.

You had indicated, Mr. Trowbridge, that it was under the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense that you were required to report certain numbers that appeared to be in conflict with numbers given to us by the services. What I am confused about is why it would be the assistant secretary who would authorize you, or as I understand it determine for you that these numbers be reported differently than what numbers were reported by the services?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Actually, as I mentioned earlier, we start tracking individuals when the services provide the names to us or, in the case of civilians, State Department. As far as I know, there is some differences in numbers. The DOD numbers plus the civilians. As far as I know we are totally in sync with the Department of Defense number-keepers, or Mr. Sungenis' office, with the exception of two individuals.

And I mentioned the Deputy Assistant Secretary's Office for Prisoner of War. We know who those individuals are. They happen to be two Navy losses that were lost overboard. The Navy can address those. We know who they are. They are not in the numbers, but we know who they are and, in effect, we have them in our database.

Senator DASCHLE. Well, Mr. Trowbridge, that is not the answer you gave to the chairman when he asked you to clarify the disparity that existed just in the number of deserters that we were presented versus the number that you indicated to exist. I mean how does one clarify just that one indication of the disparities that exist in numbers that go beyond the explanation you have just provided.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, we have no responsibility for deserters. As to who is a deserter, who is not a deserter, I understand the questioning was you certainly should have them in your database to track. We went through those files of the individual services trying to get a handle on who was a deserter in country, and we came up with a different number.

Senator DASCHLE. So do I understand that all of the services are exactly in sync with DIA, except for the two that Mr. Trowbridge has indicated are not in sync. Is that a correct interpretation?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Those are individuals that are unaccounted for. It has nothing to do with deserters.

Senator DASCHLE. I understand it had nothing to do with deserters.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's my understanding.

Senator DASCHLE. What I am asking is is there agreement, is there unanimity between DIA and the services with regard to all the numbers presented to the committee this morning?

Mr. SUNGENIS. May I answer that one, sir?

Senator DASCHLE. Yes.

Mr. SUNGENIS. I have—

The CHAIRMAN. Can I ask you, Mr. Sungenis, do you know if there is?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Yes, sir. I just wanted to get the detailed numbers. In the official DOD file there are today 2,226 names listed for those whose bodies have not been recovered. I use that term because that is the term that my organization uses. I don't use any other term other than, if you remember in my introductory statement, I said so many remains had been recovered, so many remains had not been recovered. So I don't understand, nor do I fully know what the intelligence community does with these other categories.

Senator DASCHLE. Let me stop you there, right there, because therein lies the problem. What you have just said is more revealing than you may realize. You just said you do not understand, nor do you fully appreciate the DIA interpretation of these numbers. We're all under the same roof, and for the life of me I don't understand why there hasn't been more cohesion, more effort made to try to correlate these numbers so you do understand after 20 years.

Mr. SUNGENIS. I have no explanation for that, Senator.

Senator DASCHLE. Therein lies the tragedy.

Mr. SUNGENIS. I have a directive which I follow meticulously. It tells me what I will report, how I will report. I deal directly with the military services. I have no instructions anywhere to deal with the Defense Intelligence Agency. It's outside of my realm.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, can I try to add something to that.

Senator DASCHLE. Well, if you think you can.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. The number that he just gave you is the same number that our agencies carries, the 2,226 individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not always in sync, were they?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Over the years, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, so they got into sync by getting together and agreeing to get them in sync, right?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And a lot of names were kind of scrubbed, so to speak, in that process.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. At various periods of time, yes. DOD did not have some individuals that we had and vice versa.

The CHAIRMAN. And to follow up on Senator Daschle's comment, therein lies another part of the problem. You agree. You are nodding your head.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Sungenis, let me just follow up on something. You said you were not directed to work with DIA in trying to find some accommodation for the differences that exist in your approaches and your calculations. I take it from that that because you were not directed to do so, you did not do so. Was there a prohibition?

Mr. SUNGENIS. No, sir. I may have misled you. Over the years I have maintained the official casualty file. Periodically, and I mean regularly, my information is provided to anybody and everybody who is interested and involved. Periodically, when I rerun my file, I'll distribute it to all the military services with the request that they review what we have and if there are any discrepancies, let us know. DIA has always been a recipient of our information. It's just

that I have never participated in making decisions about the people; this is the point I wanted to make.

Senator DASCHLE. It just seems to me, as involved as you were, as you are, and as interested as everyone here proclaims to be in trying to acquire the best information, the most coordinated effort to acquire that information, then it would seem just common sense that you would pick up the phone and say Mr. Trowbridge, we have got a problem here I do not understand, and so let us sit down and try to work this thing out so we can better understand and work in a coordinated fashion.

But I hear you saying is that because you were not told to do so, you may have sent them a message once and a while, to anybody and everybody. I mean that could include the families, it could include the Congress, it could include the press. Mr. Trowbridge isn't just anybody. I mean you are sending us messages here that I do not know you fully appreciate the consequences of. But the message I am getting is that you might as well have been in two different countries trying to look into this thing; for as little cooperation and coordination that there was.

Let me just clarify one other matter, and I will not belabor this because I guess my time is up. You had said, Mr. Trowbridge, that there was no information—this was in answer to a question by Senator Reid—that there was no information that anyone was held against their will in 1973. Is that the same as saying that you had information that all known POW's were released?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir, it's not.

Senator DASCHLE. Well I would not think it is either. So what solace was there in being able to say—I mean what satisfaction do you have in saying that you did not have any information that people were being held against their will, when the fact was that there was very little information period?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. In some cases, as I indicated, an individual may have been put into prisoner status, say in 1968, based on the fact that he had a good chute and reached the ground and was alive. We never had anything more on the individual. He never appeared in the prison systems. We never had any other information on him. He was carried as a prisoner up to that time.

In 1973, after Operation Homecoming, you know we reviewed all the intelligence that they had. We had nothing at that point in time that would indicate that individual was in captivity.

Senator DASCHLE. And it was on that basis you made decisions about the way in which the investigation would continue.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. These discrepancies still exist today. These are the core of our investigations. These are the cases that are the discrepancy cases. Since 1973 we have pressed for the information on these cases. The fact that the services may have placed them in a presumptive finding of death in a status review has had no bearing on us trying to continue to follow, or to find information on that individual. And as I indicated—of that original 97, in a prisoner status, we have determined the fate of all but 55.

Senator DASCHLE. Well I have used more than my time and I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to just intercede here, if I can, for a minute, because I do not want to lose the train of thought here.

But I am very troubled, from my first round of questioning through now. I think there is a semantical game being played here, and it is a kind of semantical game that has driven families around the bend over the course of 20 years and, frankly, not really done yourself a lot of credit.

This committee has found various kinds of evidence. What we deem—as a lawyer, I certainly am not going to tell you what I would say the weight of it is or what standard of proof there might be yet, but it is evidence. Mr. Trowbridge, you know as well as I do, there is signal intelligence that tracked people. Is that not correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You know as well as I do there is human intelligence that reported on people. Is that not correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is evidence, is it not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. It's evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. And people were carried in the title prisoner of war based on that evidence, were they not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were expected to come home in 1973 in Operation Homecoming, correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did not come home, some of them, did they?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So when you sit there and say that on the March date you did not have evidence they were held against their will, that is not, in fact, true. Because the last evidence you had was that they were held against their will. Maybe a year earlier, maybe 9 months earlier, but the last—the United States of America knew about its service person—he was held against his will, correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. In some cases they were made—I want to say yes to you, but I want to give you a little qualifier. There were some cases, he was last known alive and he was in the proximity where he should have been captured. And based on that information, he was made a prisoner.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We have information, for instance, two individuals in Laos. We knew they were in captivity; they did not come home. We had information that they probably died.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, it gets back—yes, but I am not talking about the ones we then gained information on that they had died. I am talking about the people that you carried as POW. They did not come home. And to go back to what Senator Bob Kerrey raised earlier, there was an attitude then. We wanted out.

The fact is, that when Roger Shields turned around and said there is no evidence anybody is alive, that was not true. The last evidence we held was that people were in captivity, correct? Some people, yes or no?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Some people, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There you have it.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, if you would like to engage in a dialog on this, I would be glad to. Is it not true that in many, many cases, there was a presumption that they were alive unless we had

proof they were dead, which in my view is the proper way to address any person who is missing in action. Is that correct, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir; that is the Government's position today. We work on the assumption that someone is still alive if we do not have that evidence.

Senator McCAIN. There were people who were shot down in flames. There was no evidence of them being alive but there clearly was no evidence of them being dead. Is that correct, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now it is fair to say that we are making a greater effort today to find out about these people than we did in 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, are we not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, yes, sir, we have access to those countries. We have people there traveling all over those countries now.

The CHAIRMAN. But I think the critical component here, the one that raises ire—I want to emphasize I am not saying that we knew to a certainty they were alive. That is the difficulty here. But we also did not know they were dead.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's true, we never said they were dead.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not accurate. The way the information came out was that they were dead. I mean there are plenty of stories that interpreted the Shields statement as saying we don't believe anybody's alive. In fact Richard Nixon was quoted as saying that. They were also quoted as saying, specifically, all the prisoners have returned. I can show you the quote.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I can't speak for them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, why do you think this issue is alive today 20 years later?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I can't speak for them or why they said what they did.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not correct, were they?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I don't know what they said, so I won't say one way or another.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know that the President of the United States said that all the prisoners of war have returned. You do not know that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You never read that.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I never read that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have never had anybody tell you that Richard Nixon said that.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I don't recall that, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot believe, Mr. Trowbridge, nobody ever said that to you in your position, that you never heard a comment that that was the official policy of the United States.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. If I had heard it at one time, I certainly don't remember it today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As far as our agency was concerned, a man was classified as a prisoner regardless of what the services may have

done in the status reviews. We have still tracked that man just like he was a prisoner today.

The CHAIRMAN. But the question is do you see, Mr. Trowbridge—as a human being—do you see the reason that there is such a gap in credibility here just based on what you have now said in answer to my questions and based on what is there for anybody to judge? Do you see the gap?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Oh, I can see where there's confusion, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robb, Senator Kassebaum was next, but I will come right back to you unless you want to intercede quickly.

Senator ROBB. It is on the same topic. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Just a quick question, and if it has been clarified earlier, I will get it from the record, but could you tell us what was done by DOD or DIA to clarify any discrepancies that were discovered when the list was received from North Vietnam of Americans that were being held? What actions did you take at that time to resolve any differences between your lists and the lists that we received from the North Vietnamese?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well there were a number of lists, but the government lists that were provided, we compared those, of course.

Senator ROBB. The question, essentially, though, is what actions did either DOD or DIA take to try to resolve any of the discrepancies at that point?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Of those discrepancies, people did not return, this information was made known to the policymakers. As far as I know, there were various demarches that were made to the various governments of Vietnam relative to these discrepancies, these last known alive cases that were unaccounted for. And that continues on until today.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, do we have copies of any of the demarches or whatever, that might have been made to document that particular activity? I do not think I have the Chairman's attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, I apologize, Senator.

Senator ROBB. I was asking if we have copies of any of the demarches or other communications that might reflect the kind of activity that took place when the list was received from the North Vietnamese about the list of people that they held. And we checked our own list, whatever list, at the time, and any activity we took to verify those discrepancies.

The CHAIRMAN. We have located a very extensive archive: an index of that kind of information within the Archives within the Kissinger papers. As I mentioned before you got here, Dr. Kissinger has agreed to let us look at those, but we are still tugging with the White House over the issue of Executive privilege. It is our hope we will get access to them, forthwith.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Statements of Service Casualty Officers Follows]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLONEL MICHAEL SPINELLO

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER OF MICHAEL THOMAS SPINELLO, COLONEL

Date and place of birth: April 14, 1945, New London, Connecticut.

Years of active commissioned service: Over 24 years.

Present assignment: Director, Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22331, since January 16, 1990.

Military schools: Airborne, Ranger, Air Defense Artillery—basic and advanced courses, Armed Forces Staff College.

Educational degrees: United States Military Academy—BS degree—no major. Indiana University—MS degree—physical education.

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

From	To	Assignment
January 1968	March 1968	Platoon Leader, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 61st Artillery, Okinawa
March 1968	September 1968	Executive Officer, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 61st Artillery, Okinawa
September 1968	February 1969	Executive Officer, A Battery, 2d Battalion, 61st Artillery, Okinawa
February 1969	June 1969	Battery Commander, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 61st Artillery, Okinawa
June 1969	September 1969	Watch Officer, G-3, XXV Corps, Phu Bai, Vietnam
September 1969	March 1970	Liaison Officer, HQ XXV Corps, Phu Bai, Vietnam
March 1970	June 1970	Aide-de-Camp, HQ XXV Corps, Da Nang, Vietnam
June 1970	April 1972	Assistant G-1, HQ XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
April 1972	June 1973	Company Commander, H&S Company, Support Battalion, 5th SFGA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
June 1973	June 1978	Instructor, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
August 1975	June 1980	Personnel Distribution Officer, MILPERCEN, Alexandria, Virginia
June 1978	July 1983	Senior Personnel Advisor, 78th Division (Training), Edison, New Jersey
January 1981	June 1984	Chief, Combat Service Support Branch, EPMD, 1st PERSCOM, Schweitzingen, Germany
July 1983	June 1986	Adjutant General, US Command Berlin, Berlin, Germany
June 1984	June 1986	ACoS, G-1/DPCA, US Command Berlin, Berlin, Germany
June 1986	June 1988	Operations/Executive Officer, ROBUST Task Force, OCSA, Washington, DC
June 1988	December 1988	Operations Officer, Management Initiatives Task Force, OCSA, Washington, DC
December 1988	January 1989	Team Chief, Total Quality Management Team, OCSA, Washington, DC
April 1989	January 1990	Director, Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center and Chairman, Central Joint Mortuary Affairs Office, US Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

Promotions	Temporary	Permanent
2d Lieutenant.....	June 7, 1967.....	June 7, 1969
1st Lieutenant.....	June 7, 1968.....	June 7, 1970
Captain.....	June 7, 1969.....	June 7, 1974
Major.....	January 3, 1978.....	June 7, 1981
Lieutenant Colonel.....		December 1, 1983
Colonel.....		July 1, 1990

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Legion of Merit (w/Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Bronze Star Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Air Medal
 Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Army Achievement Medal
 Army Parachute Badge
 Ranger Tab
 Army General Staff Identification Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION

USMA

STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY CASUALTY AND MEMORIAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS CENTER

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Army's casualty reporting program and operation of this system during the Southeast Asia Conflict. The Army's casualty reporting policies and procedures varied little during the period 1961 to 1973, and remain essentially the same today.

The Secretary of the Army is authorized to make casualty determinations on the basis of Title 37, Chapter 10, Sections 555 and 556, U.S. Code (The Missing Persons Act). The Army Secretary exercises his authority through Chapter 10, Army Regulation 600-8-1, Army Casualty and Memorial Affairs and Line of Duty Investigations.

Before I begin a discussion of how casualties were reported during the Southeast Asia Conflict, defining the casualty terms used is necessary. Authorization for use of these terms comes from the Department of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and Title 37, U.S. Code Chapter 10 (The Missing Persons Act).

Prior to 1966, there were six categories of battle related casualties and three categories for casualties not related to battle. A battle casualty was defined as: Any person who is killed, wounded, missing, captured, or interned, provided the incident occurs in action, or death later results from wounds received in action. "In action" characterizes the casualty as sustained in combat or going to or returning from a combat mission, when the occurrence was directly related to actions of a hostile force, actions of our own or allied forces while engaging hostile forces, or actions of a neutral power in protecting its neutral status. Injuries or illnesses due to the elements, exhaustion, or self-inflicted wounds and injuries were not to be considered battle casualties.

The six battle casualty categories were:

- 1) Killed In Action: Those killed outright or those who died of wounds before reaching any medical treatment facility;
- 2) Died Of Wounds Received In Action: Died after reaching a medical treatment facility as a result of wounds;
- 3) Wounded In Action: Included were all kinds of wounds or injuries, whether there was a piercing or tearing of the body, as in a penetrating wound, or none, as in a contused wound, all fractures, burns, concussions, as well as the effects

Back-up: Major K.H. Schultz, Head, Personal Affairs Branch, Human Resources Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Department, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

Captain D.J. Greco, Head, Casualty Section, Human Resources Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee on Marine Corps casualty reporting during the conflict in Southeast Asia until the present day.

I will begin by briefly outlining the reporting procedures for Marine casualties during the conflict in Southeast Asia. During the conflict in Southeast Asia, casualty reporting procedures were governed by title 37, United States Code, Chapter 10, Sections 551 to 558, referred to as the Missing Persons Act; DOD Instruction 1300.9 which specified the categories of personnel losses; and by DOD Instruction 7730.22 of December 2, 1963, which outlined casualty reporting for the Services. Based on this higher direction, the Marine Corps Casualty Procedures Manual (MCO P3040.4), established specific reporting criteria for Marine casualties.

Casualties during this period were categorized in accordance with the above statutes and regulations. While there are a number of categories describing casualties in general, I will address only a few of these terms. The term "Battle Casualty" was used to describe any Marine lost because of death, wounds, missing, capture, or internment, providing such loss occurred in action. The term "Killed in Action" described battle or hostile casualties, or those killed outright in the presence of the enemy, or died of wounds or other injuries before reaching any medical treatment facility. "Missing in Action" described all battle and hostile casualties whose whereabouts or actual fate could not be determined, and who were neither known, nor reasonably determined to be, in an unauthorized absence status. "Captured" described all battle or hostile casualties definitely known to have been taken into custody by a hostile force as a result of, and for reasons arising from any armed conflict in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged. The term "Prisoner of War" is derived from the Geneva Convention of 1949 and has come to be associated with those captured. Regulations further describe all captured personnel officially reported through the International Committee of the Red Cross, or otherwise officially determined as having been taken into custody by a hostile force as "Prisoners of War".

During the conflict in Southeast Asia the reporting of casualties was the direct responsibility of the division and wing commanders. Within their commands, internal casualty reporting procedures were further established. Commanders in the field used the criteria established in Marine Corps Order P3040.4 for casualty reporting. Reporting of casualties was based on reports received from a variety of sources such as morning reports, intelligence data reports, and medical reports. Commanders reported casualties by message to Headquarters, Marine Corps. The following agencies also received the commanders casualty reports by means of message; Secretary of the Navy; Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; the Marine Corps Finance Center; Mortuary Facilities (Da Nang, Vietnam) and others as appropriate. Casualty losses were reported to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) who was responsible for maintaining the official DOD statistics and who served as the central repository for all U.S. casualties in Southeast Asia.

I will now briefly describe how "Presumptive Findings of Death" were made for Marines reported missing in action. A Marine missing in action was reported by the commander in accordance with the criteria established and was carried in that status until the Marine was officially determined otherwise. The Secretary of the Navy designated the Head, Personal Affairs Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps as the office authorized to make presumptive findings of death. If the reporting commander discovered conclusive evidence of death after initial submission of a report of missing in action, the commander immediately reported his findings to Headquarters, Marine Corps by message with a recommendation that death be determined. Conclusive evidence of death was considered to exist, even though the Marine's remains were not recoverable, when the circumstances attending his disappearance, statements of witness, results of search operation, or local conditions such as terrain, depth of water, temperature and other climatic conditions indicate that the possibility of the Marine's survival was too remote to be logically considered. Upon receipt of findings to support a determination of death for a Marine missing in action, the Head of Personnel Affairs Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps reviewed all available information concerning the case. If a determination of death was made, Headquarters, Marine Corps reported such to the commander by message. In addition, as established in title 37, United States Code, Chapter 10, Section 555, the Head, Personal Affairs Branch, Headquarters, Marine Corps, conducts reviews of cases of missing Marines. In this review, intelligence reports, information

received from repatriated POWs, or other information or findings may be used to determine a presumptive finding of death. Additionally, a presumptive finding of death may be determined in the absence, thereof, of any information from all sources that the Marine survived in conjunction with the lapse of time without indication of survival.

The Marine Corps currently provides a monthly report of casualties to Washington Headquarters Service for inclusion in their master data base. During the conflict in Southeast Asia casualty reports were sent to the Directorate for Information Operations (Comptroller), which was designated as the central repository responsible for collecting, processing and dissemination of official statistical data on U.S. casualties.

Currently the Marine Corps records reveal that 283 Marines are unaccounted for from Southeast Asia. Of this number, 179 were classified as having been killed in action, bodies not recovered. The remaining 104 have been determined to be dead through a presumptive finding of death.

Those Marines that were classified as unauthorized absentees during the Southeast Asia conflict or deserters are not considered casualties. Should evidence be received to indicate otherwise the status would be changed accordingly.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MARGARET S. DEBIEN, USN

A native of Port Clinton, OH, Captain Debien is a graduate of Bowling Green State University, where she earned a B.S. in education with a major in English. Prior to entering the Navy in 1970, she taught English at the senior high school level.

After graduating from Officer Candidate School, Captain Debien was assigned to the Fleet Intelligence Center Atlantic, Norfolk, VA, as Top Secret Control and Special Security Officer. She followed that tour with an assignment to the Personnel Exchange Program with the Women's Royal Naval Service, United Kingdom, as Assistant Training Officer for recruit training. Captain Debien was subsequently assigned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the Officer Recall and Release Section. In 1980, she reported to Commander Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, as Flag Secretary.

From 1981 to 1983, Captain Debien served as Executive Officer, Personnel Support Activity, Hawaii, and subsequently she reported as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Material, Washington, DC. From 1983 to 1985, she served as Commanding Officer, Personnel Support Activity, Northern Europe, London, United Kingdom. Following graduation from the Naval War College in 1988, she reported as Head, Congressional Policy Coordination Section (OP-806D), staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Debien returned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1990 and currently serves as the Director, Personal, Family and Community Support Division (Pers-66).

Captain Debien holds a Master of Science degree in Administration (Personnel Management) from George Washington University and a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Her personal awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (with Gold Star in lieu of second award) and the Navy Commendation Medal (with two Gold Stars in lieu of third award).

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to provide a Navy perspective on casualty reporting during the Vietnam conflict.

Throughout the conflict in Southeast Asia, Navy personnel casualty reporting was governed by federal statute and Department of Defense directive, which provided the parameters within which each category of casualty was reported. Title 37, United States Code, Sections 551 to 558, defines missing persons for pay and allowance determinations, while DOD Instruction 7730.22 defines the categories of personnel losses. Navy personnel casualties which fell within the scope of these two mandates were reported in compliance with their guidelines.

During the course of the conflict, Navy reported 2,551 service members as having died, of whom 448 remain unaccounted for today. Of these 448 personnel, 120 were initially reported as either missing in action or captured.

In reporting casualties during Vietnam, Navy casualties were assigned to categories in accordance with the following terms established by DOD: killed in action, missing in action, captured, and interned. Killed in action applied to any battle casualty in which a member was killed outright or who died as a result of wounds or

other injuries before reaching any medical treatment facility. Missing in action applied to all battle casualties whose whereabouts or factual fate could not be determined and who were not known to have deserted or to have been absent without leave. Captured applied to all battle casualties definitely known to have been taken into custody of a hostile force as a result of or for reasons arising out of any armed conflict which armed forces of the United States were engaged. Interned applied to all battle casualties known to have been taken into custody of a nonbelligerent foreign power as the result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which armed forces of the United States were engaged. No Navy personnel were placed in the beleaguered or the besieged category.

The commanding officer of the unit to which a service member was assigned bore responsibility for initially placing a service member in a particular casualty status. The determination made by the commanding officer, who was clearly in the best position to determine a member's status, was based upon all available information, including observation, radio contact, and intelligence reports. The determination was reported to the Chief of Naval Personnel by electronic message. Additionally, occurrence of a personnel casualty which was operationally related required submission of an operational report, commonly referred to as an OPREP, also by electronic message, to the Chief of Naval Operations.

The only Navy personnel losses not reported under personnel casualty reporting procedures were those members classified as unauthorized absentees or deserters, who fell under entirely separate reporting and tracking procedures. Of the 448 Navy members currently unaccounted for, two were initially listed as deserters. After 1973, the status of both was changed to missing and finally to deceased based on further investigation into their disappearance. Two other members who were listed as deserters continue to be carried as such. Neither is reflected in Navy or DOD unaccounted for statistics, and no other absentees or deserters have been added to the Southeast Asia casualty numbers since 1973. There is no information available to the Navy that indicates the number of MIA's is expected to grow.

Upon receipt of a personnel casualty report, the Bureau of Naval Personnel reported all information to the DOD Comptroller, who was responsible for maintaining the official DOD statistics and who served as the central repository for all United States conflict casualty information. The Bureau of Naval Personnel also submitted to the DOD Comptroller a weekly report of casualties, followed by a copy of the Certificate of Casualty (DD Form 1300), which is prepared at the Bureau, for each Navy casualty. Navy also maintained, for internal and cross-checking purposes, a running log that listed unaccounted for members. Navy currently uses lists generated by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting. To the best of our knowledge, Navy has not generated Vietnam casualty lists since the last status changes were completed in the early 1980's, by which time all unaccounted for personnel were officially considered deceased.

The final authority regarding casualty determination rests with the Service Secretaries, as established in Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code (Missing Persons Act). This law requires the Secretary of the Navy or his designee (the Director, Personal Family and Community Support Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel) to make the determination of a missing service member's status and to review that determination within 12 months of the member's classification as missing. A finding of death is made only if the service member can no longer reasonably be presumed to be living, where the circumstances of disappearance, the passage of time without information, and an extreme improbability of receiving any meaningful information at a subsequent date warrant such a determination. Upon receiving any new evidence, for example information obtained through interviews with repatriated prisoners of war, a further review is made in applicable cases. The status of all unaccounted for personnel has been reviewed and established as deceased, with no alterations to status since the early 1980's. We have no information that a Service Secretary casualty determination was ever overridden by higher authority.

Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that we in the Navy have historically felt a deep commitment, indeed obligation, to maintain the most accurate records and provide full and complete information, as available, to the Department of Defense and to our affected families. It is one important way in which we can and do take care of our own.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL D. MCGINTY

Brigadier General Michael D. McGinty is Vice Commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

General McGinty was born September 20, 1942, in Waukegan, IL, and graduated from Hopkins (Minn.) High School in 1960. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics from the University of Minnesota in 1964 and a Master of Science degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg University in 1983. The General completed Squadron Officer School in 1974, Air Command and Staff College in 1979, and Army War College in 1983.

He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program in 1964. General McGinty then entered pilot training at Vance Air Force Base, OK, in March 1965 and was awarded wings in March 1966. After completing fighter training at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AR, he became an F-4 pilot with the 497th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand.

In September 1967 he was assigned as an F-4 pilot to the 9th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, West Germany. He transferred to Hahn Air Base, West Germany, in July 1968 and served with the 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron until July 1969, when he moved to the 10th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 50th Tactical Fighter Wing.

General McGinty became chief, Promotions and Performance Reports Division, Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, in October 1971. In December 1972 he became assistant for senior officer management.

The General was an F-4 flight commander with the 90th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Clark Air Base, Philippines, from November 1975 to July 1976, when he became Chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Division, 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing.

In December 1976 he transferred to the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, Holloman Air Force Base, NM. There he served as Chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Division, and later, as operations officer for the 9th Tactical Fighter Squadron from January until August 1978. The General was assigned as Chief of the Rated Officer Assignments Division, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA, in June 1979, and as Chief of the Officer Assignments Division in September 1980.

General McGinty was Assistant Deputy Commander for operations, 355th Tactical Training Wing, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AR, from June 1983 until May 1984, when he became Deputy Commander for Operations. In March 1985 he became Chief of the Colonels' Group, Air Force Military Personnel Center. He was assigned as Vice Commander of the 10th Tactical Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Station Alconbury, England, in July 1987, and became Commander in March 1988. In June 1990 he transferred to Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Requirements. In October 1990 he became Vice Commander of the Air Force Military Personnel Center and Deputy Assistant, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for Military Personnel, at Randolph. He assumed his present position in February 1991.

The General is a command pilot with more than 3,200 flying hours. He flew 115 combat missions in Southeast Asia, including 100 over North Vietnam. His military awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Air Medal with nine oak leaf clusters and Air Force Commendation Medal.

He was promoted to Brigadier General August 1, 1990, with same date of rank. General McGinty is married to the former Karen Dibble of Hopkins. They have two children, Shannon and Timothy.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss Air Force procedures for determining and reporting the status of casualties of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code, establishes the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force, or his designee, to make casualty determinations. The law, which focuses on payments to missing persons, was enacted to alleviate financial hardship suffered by dependents of members of Uniformed Services who are officially carried or determined to be in a missing status. The term "missing status" as defined in Title 37 includes those personnel categorized as missing; missing in action; interned in a foreign country; beleaguered, besieged or captured by hostile force; or detained in a foreign country against their will.

During the Southeast Asian conflict, the specific casualty category of an individual was determined by his or her commander. Commanders would report individuals "missing" as a result of hostile action as either "missing in action" or "captured" based upon the information available to them at the time. The commander

of gases and like chemical warfare agents or effects of exposure to radioactive substances;

4) Missing In Action: Whereabouts and status unknown and absence appears to be involuntary;

5) Captured: Definitely known to have been taken into custody of a hostile force as a result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged; and

6) Interned: Definitely known to have been taken into custody of a nonbelligerent foreign power as the result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged.

The three nonbattle casualty categories were:

1) Nonbattle dead: All deaths other than "killed in action" and "died of wounds received in action." Exceptions to this were to be personnel who died of nonbattle causes while in a captured status. These soldiers were to be classified as battle dead;

2) Nonbattle missing: Whereabouts and status unknown, and absence appeared to be involuntary and not in action; and

3) Nonbattle sick and injured: Personnel whose illnesses or injuries were not sustained in action and who were admitted to a hospital or who were evacuated from their units for admission to a medical treatment facility outside the division, ship, or similar area.

Beginning in 1966, battle casualties began being referred to "as a result of hostile action," with only four categories, killed in action, died of wounds or injuries received in action, wounded or injured in action, and missing. Based on the Missing Persons Act, the category missing was further divided into seven sub-categories describing the physical status or condition of the missing personnel:

1) Missing;

2) Missing in Action;

3) Interned in a foreign country;

4) Captured by a hostile force (Captured): described all casualties as the result of hostile action definitely known to have been taken into custody by a hostile force as a result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which Armed Forces of the United States are engaged, provided a state of war exists;

5) Besieged by a hostile force: used to describe an organized element which has been surrounded by a hostile force to preclude escape of its members;

6) Besieged by a hostile force: used to describe an organized element which has been surrounded by a hostile force for the purpose of compelling it to surrender; and

7) Detained in a foreign country against his will: used to describe all casualties as the result of hostile action who are definitely known to have been taken into custody by a hostile force while apparently alive and there is no conclusive evidence that they died after being taken into custody, provided the casualty occurs at a time when the United States is not in a state of war.

Soldiers who were being carried as absent without leave (AWOL) or in a deserter status were not reported as casualties. Deserters are dropped from the military rolls and have no status until returned to military control. If information became available that indicated that the soldier did not absent himself voluntarily and was reportable in one of the casualty categories, he was, at that time, reported as a casualty. This would have included soldiers for whom definite information became available that the soldier had been taken into custody by hostile forces. The reporting command would then report this soldier as captured.

The term "Prisoner of War" (POW) is primarily defined in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. The Army does not use this term as a casualty status; instead, a soldier known to be in this situation would be reported as "captured."

The best way to explain the casualty reporting process is to describe a casualty incident. The following describes the steps involved in each casualty case.

Army Doctrine dictated that DA Form 1155 (Witness Statement) and DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Report) were to be completed by every witness to the incident and the appropriate unit, respectively. These forms were to be forwarded to the unit personnel section at battalion level within 24 hours of occurrence, or as soon as the battlefield situation permitted. The unit personnel section consolidated these reports. The consolidated report was forwarded to the Brigade for delivery to the Division. From the Division, the reports were submitted by telephone to United States Army Vietnam (USARV) headquarters where they were transmitted to the Casualty

Division, Office of The Adjutant General, Department of Army, by the most expeditious method, usually electronic message.

Minor wounds and injuries of soldiers who had stated in writing that they did not want such injuries reported to their Next of Kin were sent to Department of Army by U.S. Mail.

In the case of missing persons, the commander reports the soldier missing. This determination is made based on a formal investigation. Once reported as missing, only The Adjutant General, acting for the Army Secretary, may change that status. The Missing Persons Act prescribes that the Service Secretaries will ensure that missing person cases are reviewed before the end of a 12-month period in that status. After that review or a later review, when warranted by information received or other circumstances, the Secretary, or his designee, will make one of two determinations:

1) the service member can reasonably be presumed to be living and direct a continuance of missing status; or

2) make a presumptive finding of death.

Any determination made by the Secretary, or his designee, is binding on all other departments and agencies of the United States. The Secretary, or his designee, may, when warranted by circumstances, reconsider a determination. To the best of my knowledge, the Secretarial authority to make these casualty determinations has never been overridden.

To my knowledge, all casualties were reported using these procedures. The only change was to report the location of casualties that occurred during special operations missions as within South Vietnam or Southeast Asia. The actual location was later revised when the mission became declassified.

During the Southeast Asia conflict the Army compiled and reported the statistics required by the Department of Defense Instruction 7730.22, Statistical Report of U.S. Casualties in Southeast Asia. These statistics included breakdowns of casualties resulting from actions by hostile forces and those not the result of actions by hostile forces. Under the hostile force actions, casualties were separated by killed, wounded or injured, missing, and captured or interned. Those casualties not as a result of hostile actions were separated by died, seriously ill or injured, and missing. Casualties in each of the classifications were further identified as occurring in Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand. A 1967 change to the Department of Defense Instruction 7730.22 required that deaths also be categorized as to whether they occurred on the ground or from an aircraft accident or incident. These were the only statistics regularly maintained, produced, and disseminated by the Army Casualty Division, Office of The Adjutant General. Other reports would have been one time requests from various sources.

The Army works very closely with the Department of Defense POW/MIA section in compiling and maintaining statistics on unaccounted for Americans. The most recent figures, as reported in the June 1, 1992 DIA "Monthly POW/MIA Statistical Report", show a total 674 unaccounted for Army losses. This report also breaks down the losses as 317 Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered and 357 as Prisoners of War/Missing in Action.

Although the DIA "Monthly PW/MIA Statistical Report" excludes deserters, there were cases where the individual was originally carried as-AWOL, but later changed to Missing which resulted in the Presumptive Finding of Death.

In 1972, the USARV/Military Assistance Command Vietnam prepared a consolidated roster of 924 Army deserters. A further screening of this roster with records at the Army's Deserter Information Point and the DIA has reduced this list to 16.

No Army personnel have been added to the "MIA list" since January 1973. Should further, unexpected, information become available, any of these 16 people may have their status changed, to include being added to missing or missing in action.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Are there any questions?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF A.A. QUEBODEAUX, COLONEL, UNITED STATES MARINES
CORPS

WITNESS LIST

Primary: Colonel A.A. Quebodeaux, Director, Human Resource Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

Back-up: Major K.H. Schultz, Head, Personal Affairs Branch, Human Resources Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Department, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

Captain D.J. Greco, Head, Casualty Section, Human Resources Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee on Marine Corps casualty reporting during the conflict in Southeast Asia until the present day.

I will begin by briefly outlining the reporting procedures for Marine casualties during the conflict in Southeast Asia. During the conflict in Southeast Asia, casualty reporting procedures were governed by title 37, United States Code, Chapter 10, Sections 551 to 558, referred to as the Missing Persons Act; DOD Instruction 1300.9 which specified the categories of personnel losses; and by DOD Instruction 7730.22 of December 2, 1963, which outlined casualty reporting for the Services. Based on this higher direction, the Marine Corps Casualty Procedures Manual (MCO P3040.4), established specific reporting criteria for Marine casualties.

Casualties during this period were categorized in accordance with the above statutes and regulations. While there are a number of categories describing casualties in general, I will address only a few of these terms. The term "Battle Casualty" was used to describe any Marine lost because of death, wounds, missing, capture, or interment, providing such loss occurred in action. The term "Killed in Action" described battle or hostile casualties, or those killed outright in the presence of the enemy, or died of wounds or other injuries before reaching any medical treatment facility. "Missing in Action" described all battle and hostile casualties whose whereabouts or actual fate could not be determined, and who were neither known, nor reasonably determined to be, in an unauthorized absence status. "Captured" described all battle or hostile casualties definitely known to have been taken into custody by a hostile force as a result of, and for reasons arising from any armed conflict in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged. The term "Prisoner of War" is derived from the Geneva Convention of 1949 and has come to be associated with those captured. Regulations further describe all captured personnel officially reported through the International Committee of the Red Cross, or otherwise officially determined as having been taken into custody by a hostile force as "Prisoners of War".

During the conflict in Southeast Asia the reporting of casualties was the direct responsibility of the division and wing commanders. Within their commands, internal casualty reporting procedures were further established. Commanders in the field used the criteria established in Marine Corps Order P3040.4 for casualty reporting. Reporting of casualties was based on reports received from a variety of sources such as morning reports, intelligence data reports, and medical reports. Commanders reported casualties by message to Headquarters, Marine Corps. The following agencies also received the commanders casualty reports by means of message; Secretary of the Navy, Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; the Marine Corps Finance Center; Mortuary Facilities (Da Nang, Vietnam) and others as appropriate. Casualty losses were reported to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) who was responsible for maintaining the official DOD statistics and who served as the central repository for all U.S. casualties in Southeast Asia.

I will now briefly describe how "Presumptive Findings of Death" were made for Marines reported missing in action. A Marine missing in action was reported by the commander in accordance with the criteria established and was carried in that status until the Marine was officially determined otherwise. The Secretary of the Navy designated the Head, Personal Affairs Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps as the office authorized to make presumptive findings of death. If the reporting commander discovered conclusive evidence of death after initial submission of a report of missing in action, the commander immediately reported his findings to Headquarters, Marine Corps by message with a recommendation that death be determined. Conclusive evidence of death was considered to exist, even though the Marine's remains were not recoverable, when the circumstances attending his disappearance, statements of witness, results of search operation, or local conditions such as terrain, depth of water, temperature and other climatic conditions indicate that the possibility of the Marine's survival was too remote to be logically considered. Upon receipt of findings to support a determination of death for a Marine missing in action, the Head of Personnel Affairs Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps reviewed all available information concerning the case. If a determination of death was made, Headquarters, Marine Corps reported such to the commander by message. In addition, as established in title 37, United States Code, Chapter 10, Section 555, the Head, Personal Affairs Branch, Headquarters, Marine Corps, conducts reviews of cases of missing Marines. In this review, intelligence reports, information

received from repatriated POWs, or other information or findings may be used to determine a presumptive finding of death. Additionally, a presumptive finding of death may be determined in the absence, thereof, of any information from all sources that the Marine survived in conjunction with the lapse of time without indication of survival.

The Marine Corps currently provides a monthly report of casualties to Washington Headquarters Service for inclusion in their master data base. During the conflict in Southeast Asia casualty reports were sent to the Directorate for Information Operations (Comptroller), which was designated as the central repository responsible for collecting, processing and dissemination of official statistical data on U.S. casualties.

Currently the Marine Corps records reveal that 283 Marines are unaccounted for from Southeast Asia. Of this number, 179 were classified as having been killed in action, bodies not recovered. The remaining 104 have been determined to be dead through a presumptive finding of death.

Those Marines that were classified as unauthorized absentees during the Southeast Asia conflict or deserters are not considered casualties. Should evidence be received to indicate otherwise the status would be changed accordingly.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MARGARET S. DEBIEN, USN

A native of Port Clinton, OH, Captain Debien is a graduate of Bowling Green State University, where she earned a B.S. in education with a major in English. Prior to entering the Navy in 1970, she taught English at the senior high school level.

After graduating from Officer Candidate School, Captain Debien was assigned to the Fleet Intelligence Center Atlantic, Norfolk, VA, as Top Secret Control and Special Security Officer. She followed that tour with an assignment to the Personnel Exchange Program with the Women's Royal Naval Service, United Kingdom, as Assistant Training Officer for recruit training. Captain Debien was subsequently assigned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the Officer Recall and Release Section. In 1980, she reported to Commander Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, as Flag Secretary.

From 1981 to 1983, Captain Debien served as Executive Officer, Personnel Support Activity, Hawaii, and subsequently she reported as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Material, Washington, DC. From 1983 to 1985, she served as Commanding Officer, Personnel Support Activity, Northern Europe, London, United Kingdom. Following graduation from the Naval War College in 1988, she reported as Head, Congressional Policy Coordination Section (OP-306D), staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Debien returned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1990 and currently serves as the Director, Personnel, Family and Community Support Division (Pers-66).

Captain Debien holds a Master of Science degree in Administration (Personnel Management) from George Washington University and a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Her personal awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (with Gold Star in lieu of second award) and the Navy Commendation Medal (with two Gold Stars in lieu of third award).

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to provide a Navy perspective on casualty reporting during the Vietnam conflict.

Throughout the conflict in Southeast Asia, Navy personnel casualty reporting was governed by federal statute and Department of Defense directive, which provided the parameters within which each category of casualty was reported. Title 37, United States Code, Sections 551 to 558, defines missing persons for pay and allowance determinations, while DOD Instruction 7730.22 defines the categories of personnel losses. Navy personnel casualties which fell within the scope of these two mandates were reported in compliance with their guidelines.

During the course of the conflict, Navy reported 2,551 service members as having died, of whom 448 remain unaccounted for today. Of these 448 personnel, 120 were initially reported as either missing in action or captured.

In reporting casualties during Vietnam, Navy casualties were assigned to categories in accordance with the following terms established by DOD: killed in action, missing in action, captured, and interned. Killed in action applied to any battle casualty in which a member was killed outright or who died as a result of wounds or

other injuries before reaching any medical treatment facility. Missing in action applied to all battle casualties whose whereabouts or factual fate could not be determined and who were not known to have deserted or to have been absent without leave. Captured applied to all battle casualties definitely known to have been taken into custody of a hostile force as a result of or for reasons arising out of any armed conflict which armed forces of the United States were engaged. Interned applied to all battle casualties known to have been taken into custody of a nonbelligerent foreign power as the result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which armed forces of the United States were engaged. No Navy personnel were placed in the beleaguered or the besieged category.

The commanding officer of the unit to which a service member was assigned bore responsibility for initially placing a service member in a particular casualty status. The determination made by the commanding officer, who was clearly in the best position to determine a member's status, was based upon all available information, including observation, radio contact, and intelligence reports. The determination was reported to the Chief of Naval Personnel by electronic message. Additionally, occurrence of a personnel casualty which was operationally related required submission of an operational report, commonly referred to as an OPREP, also by electronic message, to the Chief of Naval Operations.

The only Navy personnel losses not reported under personnel casualty reporting procedures were those members classified as unauthorized absentees or deserters, who fell under entirely separate reporting and tracking procedures. Of the 448 Navy members currently unaccounted for, two were initially listed as deserters. After 1973, the status of both was changed to missing and finally to deceased based on further investigation into their disappearance. Two other members who were listed as deserters continue to be carried as such. Neither is reflected in Navy or DOD unaccounted for statistics, and no other absentees or deserters have been added to the Southeast Asia casualty numbers since 1973. There is no information available to the Navy that indicates the number of MIA's is expected to grow.

Upon receipt of a personnel casualty report, the Bureau of Naval Personnel reported all information to the DOD Comptroller, who was responsible for maintaining the official DOD statistics and who served as the central repository for all United States conflict casualty information. The Bureau of Naval Personnel also submitted to the DOD Comptroller a weekly report of casualties, followed by a copy of the Certificate of Casualty (DD Form 1300), which is prepared at the Bureau, for each Navy casualty. Navy also maintained, for internal and cross-checking purposes, a running log that listed unaccounted for members. Navy currently uses lists generated by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting. To the best of our knowledge, Navy has not generated Vietnam casualty lists since the last status changes were completed in the early 1980's, by which time all unaccounted for personnel were officially considered deceased.

The final authority regarding casualty determination rests with the Service Secretaries, as established in Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code (Missing Persons Act). This law requires the Secretary of the Navy or his designee (the Director, Personal Family and Community Support Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel) to make the determination of a missing service member's status and to review that determination within 12 months of the member's classification as missing. A finding of death is made only if the service member can no longer reasonably be presumed to be living, where the circumstances of disappearance, the passage of time without information, and an extreme improbability of receiving any meaningful information at a subsequent date warrant such a determination. Upon receiving any new evidence, for example information obtained through interviews with repatriated prisoners of war, a further review is made in applicable cases. The status of all unaccounted for personnel has been reviewed and established as deceased, with no alterations to status since the early 1980's. We have no information that a Service Secretary casualty determination was ever overridden by higher authority.

Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that we in the Navy have historically felt a deep commitment, indeed obligation, to maintain the most accurate records and provide full and complete information, as available, to the Department of Defense and to our affected families. It is one important way in which we can and do take care of our own.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL D. MCGINTY

Brigadier General Michael D. McGinty is Vice Commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

General McGinty was born September 20, 1942, in Waukegan, IL, and graduated from Hopkins (Minn.) High School in 1960. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics from the University of Minnesota in 1964 and a Master of Science degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg University in 1983. The General completed Squadron Officer School in 1974, Air Command and Staff College in 1979, and Army War College in 1983.

He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program in 1964. General McGinty then entered pilot training at Vance Air Force Base, OK, in March 1965 and was awarded wings in March 1966. After completing fighter training at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AR, he became an F-4 pilot with the 497th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand.

In September 1967 he was assigned as an F-4 pilot to the 9th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, West Germany. He transferred to Hahn Air Base, West Germany, in July 1968 and served with the 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron until July 1969, when he moved to the 10th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 50th Tactical Fighter Wing.

General McGinty became chief, Promotions and Performance Reports Division, Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, in October 1971. In December 1972 he became assistant for senior officer management.

The General was an F-4 flight commander with the 90th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Clark Air Base, Philippines, from November 1975 to July 1976, when he became Chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Division, 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing.

In December 1976 he transferred to the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, Holloman Air Force Base, NM. There he served as Chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Division, and later, as operations officer for the 9th Tactical Fighter Squadron from January until August 1978. The General was assigned as Chief of the Rated Officer Assignments Division, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA, in June 1979, and as Chief of the Officer Assignments Division in September 1980.

General McGinty was Assistant Deputy Commander for operations, 355th Tactical Training Wing, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AR, from June 1983 until May 1984, when he became Deputy Commander for Operations. In March 1985 he became Chief of the Colonels Group, Air Force Military Personnel Center. He was assigned as Vice Commander of the 10th Tactical Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Station Alconbury, England, in July 1987, and became Commander in March 1988. In June 1990 he transferred to Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Requirements. In October 1990 he became Vice Commander of the Air Force Military Personnel Center and Deputy Assistant, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for Military Personnel, at Randolph. He assumed his present position in February 1991.

The General is a command pilot with more than 3,200 flying hours. He flew 115 combat missions in Southeast Asia, including 100 over North Vietnam. His military awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Air Medal with nine oak leaf clusters and Air Force Commendation Medal.

He was promoted to Brigadier General August 1, 1990, with same date of rank. General McGinty is married to the former Karen Dibble of Hopkins. They have two children, Shannon and Timothy.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss Air Force procedures for determining and reporting the status of casualties of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code, establishes the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force, or his designee, to make casualty determinations. The law, which focuses on payments to missing persons, was enacted to alleviate financial hardship suffered by dependents of members of Uniformed Services who are officially carried or determined to be in a missing status. The term "missing status" as defined in Title 37 includes those personnel categorized as missing; missing in action; interned in a foreign country; beleaguered, besieged or captured by hostile force; or detained in a foreign country against their will.

During the Southeast Asian conflict, the specific casualty category of an individual was determined by his or her commander. Commanders would report individuals "missing" as a result of hostile action as either "missing in action" or "captured" based upon the information available to them at the time. The commander

could change the "missing" status upon receipt of conclusive evidence of death. Law required the Secretary of the Air Force to fully review the individual's casualty status prior to completion of 12 months in a "missing" status. During the review, the Service Secretary could direct a continuation of the missing status with reasonable presumption of life, or make a finding of death. The Secretary may review the status whenever additional information is received. Change in status could be based on receipt of conclusive evidence or reasonable presumption of death by the Secretary.

After the Paris Peace Accords were signed and our prisoners of war returned in 1973, the Secretary initiated a review of the status of all who remained in a "missing in action" or "captured" category. These reviews were temporarily halted in August 1973 due to litigation by several next of kin. The litigation charged that Title 37, Chapter 10, Sections 555 and 556, were unconstitutional in that the law did not allow next of kin due process rights. At the same time, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested that the Service Secretaries make each proposed status change a matter for their personal attention; thereby requiring the Secretaries' active and personal role in the status determination process. With the exception of approximately 200 cases in which the next of kin specifically requested that status reviews continue, the process of reviewing the remaining cases did not resume until 1977. These reviews resumed in 1977 under the authority of a new Air Force Regulation. These reviews included hearing rights and provided all facts used to support the proposed status determination. The regulation also required membership on the boards considering the status of individuals to be at least three members who were rated Colonels with Southeastern Asian experience. Recommendations were personally reviewed by the Secretary. To my knowledge, no Air Force status determination has ever been overridden by a higher authority, nor has any information been received to render a secretarial status determination incorrect or invalid.

During the Southeast Asian conflict, Air Force military casualties were reported by message sent electronically from commanders in the theater of operations to the Air Force Casualty Operations Center. The initial casualty report triggered the process for casualty notifications to the next-of-kin, statistical reporting to the Department of Defense, and follow-on casualty assistance to the next-of-kin. Subsequent message traffic provided additional information of the casualty as appropriate. Military deserters and those absent without official leave were not reported as casualties, unless it was later confirmed that they became casualties. The Air Force has no unaccounted for deserters from the Southeast Asian conflict. One Air Force member absent without official leave was subsequently determined to be captured and later killed by the Viet Cong, and was entered into the casualty reporting system.

Department of Defense Instruction 7730.22, entitled "Statistical Report of U.S. Casualties In Southeast Asia," defined casualty categories and the reporting format (attached). As casualties were reported to the Air Force Casualty Operations Center, they were phoned in daily to the office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), followed by a weekly written report.

At the time, there was no formal definition for "missing in action", however, a member who was lost as the result of hostile action was categorized as "missing in action" if there was no conclusive proof of death.

Also, there was no formal definition of the category "captured." However, the "captured" category was used only if there was sufficient evidence the individual was held captive. This evidence may have consisted of propaganda statements, letters from the prisoner of war to his family, media releases, or statements made by repatriated prisoners of war.

At the conclusion of Operation Homecoming, 712 Air Force airmen were unaccounted for and categorized as either "missing in action" or "captured." In 1984, at the direction of the DOD, the Services added personnel categorized as "killed in action/body not recovered" to the Southeast Asia "unaccounted for" list, bringing the Air Force total to 1,025. To date, 207 remains have been returned and forensically identified, leaving 818 unaccounted for; 565 were categorized POW/MIA and 253 as "killed in action/body not recovered. No absentees or deserters have been included in or added to the Air Force total of Southeast Asia casualties, and there is no reason to believe the Air Force "MIA" total will increase.

The casualty status of all 818 unaccounted for airmen has been changed to deceased, except for one captured pilot, Colonel Charles E. Shelton. By direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, Colonel Shelton remains in a captured category to symbolize, on behalf of all unaccounted for Americans, that their true fate has yet to be determined.

The Air Force maintains close contact with about 1,600 next of kin of these unaccounted for airmen. We serve as the liaison between the next of kin and other government agencies, and communicate any additional information received about their unaccounted for family member. We provide by telephone and follow-up personal letters any applicable information we receive including refugee reports, grave and aircraft crash site reports, aircraft loss investigations and excavations, remains recovery and repatriation, and purported live sighting reports.

I am confident that the Air Force carried out its responsibilities to report casualties accurately and completely during the Southeast Asian conflict. Our responsibilities to the families of these airmen continue. The Air Force will never forget.

TERMS

Missing: Not present at his or her duty location due to apparent involuntary reasons and whose location may or may not be known. Personnel who are absent without leave, dropped from the rolls, or deserters are not included.

Missing In Action: Those who are hostile casualties not present at a duty location due to apparent involuntary reasons and whose location is unknown. Not included are victims of terrorist activity.

Interned In A Foreign Country: Individuals known to have been taken into the custody of a non-belligerent foreign power as the result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged.

Belonged: Individual who is a member of an organized element which has been surrounded by a hostile force to preclude escape of its members.

Besieged: Individual who is a member of an organized element surrounded by a hostile force intent on compelling the element to surrender.

Captured: Individual who has been seized as a result of action on an unfriendly military or paramilitary force in a foreign country.

Detained: Individual is prevented from proceeding or is restrained in custody for alleged violations of international law or other reason claimed by the Government or group under which the person is being held.

and/or U.S. ACTION SHEET

UNCLASSIFIED

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ROUTINE			

3. Our commanders have been and must continue to be extremely cautious in reporting members killed in action. If any possibility exists, no matter how remote, that a member could have survived an accident, he must be reported as missing in action. Casualty reports are of interest at the highest levels within the Air Force and this point is extremely sensitive.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Message prepared at direction of General Wade to reemphasize the

Chief's concern with KIA/MIA reporting.

W. B. G. and
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 AFPMSC (by plane) AFPMSC (by draft) AFPMSC (by draft)

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOO	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

7730.22 (Encl)
Jan 20, 67

Format A

Department or Service _____

CASUALTIES INCURRED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Cumulative from January 1, 1961 through _____

	Vietnam	Laos	Thailand	Total
A. Number of casualties resulting from actions by hostile forces:				
1. Killed (died before reaching medical treatment facility)				
2. Wounded or injured				
a. Died of wounds or injuries				
b. Nonfatal wounds or injuries				
3. Missing				
a. Died while missing				
b. Returned to military control				
c. Current missing				
4. Captured or interned				
a. Died while captured or interned				
b. Returned to military control				
c. Current captured or interned				
5. Total deaths resulting from actions by hostile forces (sum of lines 1, 2a, 3a & 4a)				
B. Number of casualties not the result of actions by hostile forces:				
1. Died (other than reported in lines 2a and 3a)				
2. Seriously ill or injured				
a. Died of serious illness or injury				
b. Nonfatal serious illness or injury				
3. Missing				
a. Died while missing				
b. Returned to military control				
c. Current missing				
4. Total deaths not the result of actions by hostile forces (sum of lines 1, 2a and 3a)				

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask a bit about procedure. Prior to 1966, did the Department of Defense keep all of the figures and keep track of the casualty lists, or did each of the military services keep track of their own lists?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Each of the military services was required to provide to my office, beginning in 1963 retroactive to 1961, the numbers of casualties that occurred in the various countries.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Was that standard military procedure in other conflicts, that each of our services kept track of their own casualty figures. Does anybody know, General McGinty?

General MCGINTY. I only know of the ones from Vietnam that we had to submit.

Senator KASSEBAUM. During the Korean conflict, did each of the armed services keep track of their own casualty numbers, or did the Department of Defense? Does anybody know?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Senator, I find no records in my office of weekly reports of casualties during Korea and certainly no name listings. Because, as a special project about 10 years ago, we were asked to come up with name listings and we have initiated a special project with the various military services. We're attempting to get that information now.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess what I find troubling in the testimony so far is just the lack of coordination. I was interested, Mr. Trowbridge, in your saying that you gave the numbers to the various branches of the armed service, or to DOD, I guess, but the legal status was determined by the service.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Senator, it was just the opposite. DIA doesn't start to track someone until the service tells us that they're missing or that they were killed or whatever happened to them.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But I thought you said that the legal—I wrote this down, I thought—the legal status was assigned by the services.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct. It is the responsibility of the service to place an individual into whatever their status may be. We kept very close coordination during the war. When we talk about coordination and lack of coordination, throughout the war there was a small intelligence outfit with each of the military services. And it was their sole responsibility to deal with the prisoner of war/missing in action issue. We talked with those individuals practically on a daily basis, and we had a formal meeting once a week.

Any information relative to losses that the services may have incurred during that week was made known to us. Any information that we may have had or wanted to exchange with the services was made with the services at that time. There was total interface with the service casualty officers by these small units, again on practically a daily basis.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Why was there not just one centralized list for that, that had been legally assigned prisoner of war?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. There was an office that was responsible for that, which is now Bob Sungenis' office. And when the military service declared someone in a missing status, or whatever the status they put them in—killed, whether it be hostile, nonhostile—

a DOD Form 1300, was filled out by the service and provided to Mr. Sungenis' office and then he formulated the official Government list, but that takes time.

So they're the official keepers of that list, but as the war went on, day to day, yes, DIA did keep a list. We would read message traffic where an aircraft went down on that particular afternoon and the crew were missing. We immediately picked them up on our rolls. We did not wait for paperwork to make its way through the system to Mr. Sungenis' office. It was the same way with the war in the Gulf, the same process applied.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So you picked it up on your roll. But then if they were say, downed pilots, Navy pilots for instance, whose responsibility, whose list did they go on at that point: DIA, the Navy?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I'll let the Navy address that. They were Navy individuals.

Captain DEBIEN. Yes, they would be on the Navy list.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You assigned the status at that point, determining whether they were missing in action or presumed to be prisoner of war.

Captain DEBIEN. The statuses originally assigned by the commanding officer of the unit to which the individual was assigned.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Then DIA, though, kept track of that person at that point.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

Senator KASSEBAUM. What about those areas that were part of the black operations where there was a falsifying of locations? Has this made it difficult to really be accurate in accounting for an accurate determination of status, and is that standard procedure?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As far as individuals that were lost at the time the U.S. Government, as least as far as the DIA was concerned, was in areas that we weren't admitting we were in, the individuals that were lost in those areas were known to the Defense Intelligence Agency. As well as to the services, of course, because the services are the ones that initially said they were missing.

We did put those individuals on our rolls. I can only speak for what I know about our agency following them at the time. We had their names. If they were lost in a cross-border operation in an area that the U.S. Government wasn't admitting to, initially we had their names. There was a sort of generic lost coordinate that was used.

It's my understanding in 1971, as far as the Defense Intelligence Agency is concerned, at that point in time we were provided the classified loss coordinates of these individuals as to where they were actually lost. That was entered into the database.

Again, it's my understanding, having talked with individuals that were involved at the time, that by 1972 all the actual loss coordinates for these individuals were in our database. And when the government declassified the information that we were operating in these areas, then it became declassified as far as we were concerned as well. Again, it was the services' responsibility to tell where these individuals were lost and who they were. And, yes, we did know who they were.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Was that the correct location that they gave?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. It's my understanding that initially it was not. Senator KASSEBAUM. So nowhere at that point was their correct location kept with the data.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We got that information from the (operations) in the JCS, who had that information.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So you feel pretty confident that there was good working coordination between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the various branches of the armed services involved, and then you coordinated your figures with the department run by Mr. Sungenis.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We kept very close contact with the service casualty officers, and we have since the war—during the war and after the war. Following the war, we did make some reviews of the list with Mr. Sungenis' office, and periodically from that time on we have run through the lists with Mr. Sungenis' office. However we have not done that on a regular basis, like every few months or every 6 months or even every year.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Is my time up? Just one more question I would like to ask, just because I am trying to understand this. Now if legal status was determined by the Army regarding one of the personnel as prisoner of war, assumed to be prisoner of war, they report that to you. And do you investigate at that point? Does that immediately kick in some investigation?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, ma'am. As soon as we received that information—it doesn't make any difference whether it's missing or prisoner—we would start to track that information immediately.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Then if you had any reservations about the status that had been determined by the service, did you express that to the service?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As I mentioned, we had close coordination with the services. They had a small intelligence outfit that met with us, and we talked on a daily basis and met once a week. Any information that we had relative to a case was passed through them to their service casualty office, so they were totally aware of what we had relative to those cases.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Was there ever a time that there was any change in the status made because of intelligence information?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I believe there was.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. I wanted to thank the JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for making available to us that information. That is in the spirit of cooperation and openness, and I think they are to be congratulated for making that available. And I am going to enter into the record now the report by the J3 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which sets out the history and change with respect to the cross-border operation process, and that will be made part of the record now.

[The information referred to follows:]

COPY NO. 42
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JCS 2478/716-1

23 October 1973

Pages 2 - 11, Inci.

REPORT BY THE J-3
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING
CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS CASUALTIES
Reference: JCS 2478/716

In consonance with the provisions of JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 37, the recommendations in paragraph 11 of JCS 2478/716-1 will be recorded as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

30 October 1973

and implemented, provided that no appropriate request for further consideration thereof shall have been made prior to that date.

COORDINATION:

Agency

Concur or
Nonconcur

Name

Army
Navy
Air Force
Marine Corps

Concur
Concur
Concur
Concur

Names

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(DC/S, P&O, MC)	(3)		

JCS 2478/716-1

2

RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING
CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS CASUALTIES

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to CSAM 69-73," dated 28 September 1973,
subject: "Release of Information Concerning Cross-Border
Operations Casualties."

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. US Service casualties in SEAsia include personnel who
have been declared killed in action (KIA) or missing in action
(MIA), while engaged in MACV Studies and Observations Group
(MACVSOG) covert operations in Laos and Cambodia from 1965
through 1972. On 28 September 1973, the Chief of Staff, US
Army, recommended in CSAM 69-73" that the next of kin of these
personnel be provided with operational details of the mission
on which the Service member was lost, if they request such
information. This action would conflict with previous public
affairs guidance regarding these operations.

3. Prior to 9 May 1973, public affairs guidance for MACVSOG
operations in Laos** and Cambodia,*** as modified**** in March
1970, directed that in order to preserve the covert nature of
these operations, next of kin of casualties would neither be
given the loss location nor details of the mission. On 9 May
1973, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Services to
release the location of loss on a private basis to the next
of kin; however, operational details of the mission were not
to be provided.

* Attachment to JCS 2478/716
** Joint State/Defense msg to AMEMB Saigon and other
addressees, 147744/030225Z Mar 67
*** Joint State/Defense msg to AMEMB Saigon and other
addressees, 6569/292144Z May 67
**** (1) SECDEF msg to CINCPAC and other addressees,
3017/131456Z Mar 70
(2) SECDEF msg to CINCPAC and other addressees,
3101/132322Z Mar 70
(3) SECDEF msg to CINCPAC and other addressees,
3728/232311Z Mar 70
Appendix B to JCS 2478/675-1

4. MACVSOG operations in Laos and Cambodia have been
publicized extensively by news media since 1967; however, because
of the political and military sensitivity of these operations,
they were not acknowledged by the US Government until
recently. On 24 July 1973, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs), during the morning press briefing,
acknowledged that such operations were conducted and provided
casualty data regarding losses in Laos and Cambodia. On 10
September 1973, DOD provided an unclassified report* to Congress,
"Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and
Laos," which provided, in considerable detail, information on
MACVSOG cross-border operations.

5. The casualty data released to the press on 24 July 1973
listed the total number of personnel KIA as a result of cross-
border operations in Laos and Cambodia. Because of certain
discrepancies in the casualty data base, personnel in the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OASD(C)), in
conjunction with Service Casualty Officers, are continuing
to refine the figures provided. A compilation of missing
MACVSOG personnel has not been released.

DISCUSSION

6. In view of the recent public disclosure by DOD of opera-
tional details of MACVSOG cross-border missions, it would
appear that public affairs guidance regarding these operations
is no longer valid.

7. Release of information regarding circumstances of loss
to next of kin is a humane act which might ease the burden of
the loss which these people have experienced.

* Attachment to JCS 2478/716

8. Since OASD(C) has not completed the refinement of KIA figures and MIA statistics have not been released, it would be inappropriate for the Services, as a result of this action, to release a compilation of casualties resulting from cross-border operations.

9. It is unlikely that private release of circumstances of loss to next of kin would result in a significant increase in coverage of these operations by news media. Release of the information could forestall additional pressure which might be generated by MIA family organizations or other agencies.

CONCLUSIONS

10. The circumstances surrounding the loss of MACVSOG personnel engaged in cross-border operations should be released privately to next of kin on an individual basis, if they request such information.

11. The course of action recommended by the Chief of Staff, US Army, should be approved.

12. A compilation of the total number of casualties involved in MACVSOG cross-border operations should remain classified information and not be released as a result of this action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. Copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. Copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer: *NANC*
Special Operations Division, J-3
Ext 72602

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Release of Information Concerning Cross-Border Operations Casualties

1. Reference is made to:

a. A Joint State/Defense message, 187744/030225Z March 1967, which provided public affairs guidance for ~~South~~ (Laos) operations.

b. A Joint State/Defense message, 6569/292144Z May 1967, which provided public affairs guidance for ~~South~~ (Cambodia) operations.

c. A Secretary of Defense message, 3017/131456Z March 1970, which directed that information concerning certain aircraft losses and casualties related thereto be released effective 10 March 1970.

d. A Secretary of Defense message, 3101/132322Z March 1970, which exempted certain cross-border operations from reporting requirements.

e. A Secretary of Defense message, 3728/232331Z March 1970, which rescinded the exemption granted by reference 1d and required losses to be reported.

f. A Secretary of Defense message, 5991/092054Z May 1973, which permitted private release of loss location to next of kin but prohibited release of operational details of the cross-border mission.

2. US Service casualties in SEAsia include personnel who have been declared killed or missing in action while involved in MACV Studies and Observations Group (MACV SOG) cross-border operations which were conducted in Laos and Cambodia during the period 1965 through 1972.

Appendix B to JCS 2478/676-1

JCS 2478/716-1

Enclosure

3. Next of kin of many of the missing personnel have repeatedly asked the US Army for information concerning the circumstances surrounding the loss of the missing Service member and have expressed concern that information known to the US Army is being unjustifiably withheld.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that, heretofore, a number of diplomatic, political, military, and security implications dictated restrictive public affairs policy guidance concerning cross-border operations. Recent events, however, such as information disseminated during DOD morning news briefings; widespread coverage in the media; and most notably, the disclosures addressed in the DOD White Paper: "Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos," dated 10 September 1973, invalidate the concern which previously prohibited disclosure of cross-border operational information to the next of kin.

5. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that public affairs guidance be changed to permit private release to the next of kin, on an individual basis, of the circumstances surrounding the loss of the missing Service member, if such information is requested by the next of kin. Policy should also allow for the release to the next of kin of the circumstances of loss of personnel reported as killed in action as a result of cross-border operations, should the next of kin request such information.

6. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in conjunction with the Services, is continuing the refinement of casualty data associated with these MACV SOG operations. Until this refinement is completed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Services continue to regard a compilation of these figures as classified information.

Attachment to JCS 2478/716

JCS 2478/716-1

Enclosure

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a proposed message, substantially the same as that contained in the Appendix hereto, announcing this change to current public affairs policy be dispatched to the addressees indicated.

APPENDIX

DRAFT

ROUTINE

FROM: SECDEF WASH DC

TO: CSA WASH DC
CNO WASH DC
CSAF WASH DC
CMC WASH DC
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSSAO 7AF NAKHOM PHANOM RTAFB THAILAND

INFO: CIA WASH DC
STATE DEPT WASH DC
WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
AMEMB SAIGON VIETNAM
AMEMB VIENTIANE LAOS
JCS WASH DC
USDAO SAIGON VIETNAM

SECDEF sends

Subj: Release of Information Concerning Cross-Border Operations
Casualties

Ref: SECDEF 5991/092054Z May 73

1. Ref permitted private release of loss location on an individual basis to next of kin by the parent Service headquarters but prohibited release of operational details of the mission.

2. Effective immediately, guidance contained in para 2 of ref is modified to permit disclosure by the Services to next of kin on an individual basis of the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of missing in action (MIA) personnel and the loss of killed in action (KIA) personnel, if so requested by the next of kin. Only so much of the operational details of a mission should be disclosed as is relevant to the individual case.

3. Compilation of the total number of MIA and KIA
involved in these operations will remain classified information. 1
GDS 79 2

WRITER:

Special Operations Division, J-3
Ext 72602

The CHAIRMAN. I might just add that Senator Kassebaum makes a good point. That clearly if you do not have accurate—you did not have the accurate locations with respect to those losses at the time, did you?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It makes intelligence gathering very difficult, does it not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. At that time, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is the relevant time in terms of families. I would like to ask each of the casualty officers who are representing each of the branches of the service whether or not they are aware of any period in time, going back to 1973, when their legal authority for casualty status determination was usurped? Did anybody at any time instruct that they would be responsible for any of the classification process, and not your particular branches of the service.

If we could go right down, Marine Corps, Army, Marine Corps. Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Mr. Chairman, the only time was on July 6, 1973 when there was a request that all services provide their casualty determination information to the Secretary of the Navy for his decision. At that point in time we went up there with recommendations and they would come back, based on our recommendations for casualty status.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember when that was?

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. July 6, 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. July 6, 1973.

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why that took place?

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Basically, what we were trying to do at that point in time—I believe there was an injunction that came about in New York City that identified to the services that they did not want us to change statuses with regards to our casualties unless we had an opportunity for the next of kins to get information on their particular categories at the time.

It was made more for us to coordinate efforts to make sure that we had all the intelligence information at the time in order to make those decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, was that revoked at some point? Did that revert to original policy?

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Yes, sir. I think it was issued for a short period of time with regards for us to ensure that the next of kin had an opportunity to review information that we may have available.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what specific status did that order apply to? Did that apply to all stati?

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Well this was simply with the Marine Corps as it works with the Department of Navy. And basically on several of our casualties which we had previously reported as missing, or missing in action. When there was information that came from Operation Homecoming, or any other source—we would take that information and evaluate it.

At that point in time, we would forward our recommendation as to whether or not we intended to change the status of the individual Marine. That recommendation was forwarded to the Secretary

of Navy who at that point in time reviewed that information, and forwarded back down to us whether or not they agreed with the service's recommendation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel. I appreciate that well-ordered and accurate answer. Colonel.

Colonel SPINELLO. Sir, in the case of the Army the secretarial authority to make casualty determinations has never been overridden to our knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Including in 1973?

Colonel SPINELLO. Sir, that authority still rested with the Secretary of the Army. I believe what the Colonel from the Marine Corps was referring to was the activity that took place between their casualty operation and secretarial level.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you giving me that answer knowing that you have checked all the data and that is accurate, or is it your belief?

Colonel SPINELLO. Sir, what has just been referred to with respect to 19—I believe—73.

The CHAIRMAN. 1973.

Colonel SPINELLO. And the Missing Persons Act specifically and any decision that accrued to the change in the Missing Persons Act, those changes also applied to the Army. And what I'm trying to answer for you sir, is your question as I understood it, which was did our secretary—or the authority of our secretary, was it ever overridden. The answer to that question, sir, is no it never was.

Captain DEBIEN. There's no indication from the 1973 change that the secretarial prerogative was overridden.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

General MCGINTY. No, sir, there has never been an overriding of the Secretary of the Air Force's decision. And as was mentioned by my Marine colleague, that was part of the direction that we were given in 1973 for conducting the status hearings that the Secretary of the Air Force would make them a personal matter of review.

For those status hearings subsequent to that, the Secretary of the Air Force did, in fact, review the transcripts of each status review hearing. But that was all within the Department of Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have to sort that out. I am going to put in the record now a memorandum to the Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and Director of Defense Intelligence Agency from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bill Clements, which is now declassified.

Which is a memorandum saying, quoting it: I request that all actions which recommend reclassification of military personnel from missing in action to captured status be submitted to me for approval. Proposed reclassification action should first be routed through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for preliminary review before referral to me.

So—and that is signed June 8, 1973, which is around the time, Colonel, you mentioned there was some kind of change, at least in Marine Corps policy. We are not exactly sure why that reclassification focus went into that office, or what happened as a consequence of it, but it raises some questions that the committee is going to pursue. And we are interested to see what each of the services un-

derstood as to their casualty reporting requirements at that point in time, because it is, obviously, a critical point in time.

So that will be placed in the record in full.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JUN 8 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Missing in Action Status Reclassification

I request that all actions which recommend reclassification of military personnel from missing in action to captured status be submitted to me for approval. Proposed reclassification actions should be first routed through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for preliminary review before referral to me.

H. P. Clement
Deputy

PH 6-28

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

6 July 1973

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Subj: Change of status in the case of Vietnam MIA's

I have recently been advised that we have about 150 Navy and 110 Marine Corps personnel being carried as MIA's. I realize that, as more information becomes available, action is being taken under delegated Secretarial authority to change the status of the individuals involved.

Until further notice, I desire that no action be taken to change the status of Vietnam MIA's without my concurrence. Please establish whatever procedures are necessary to insure that Secretarial designees do not act on status changes without my personal clearance.

John W. Warner
John W. Warner

Copy to:
CNO
JAG

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Encl (3)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator—I think we are on a new round here, and I have usurped my time a little bit. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Trowbridge, I want to go back to a comment or a response that you made, I believe, to Senator Reid, but I am not certain who it was, regarding POW's who returned and during their debriefings identified certain people that they felt were alive at the time that they left—or believed or said were alive at the time that they left, and who subsequently may have died or did not come home.

You said that no POW who returned ever ID'ed a POW who was carried as a POW who did not come back. Is that correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well I think in our analysis, as we went through and reviewed these, there may have been a case where someone said I ID'ed somebody and I saw him in a group of other prisoners, for instance. That man did not come home. But—you know, I'm using this as an example, sir.

Well we knew who those other PW's were in that group that he identified this individual as being with. And upon interviewing these returnees, they said we never saw this man. So a case like that would have been a mistaken identify, but yet that returned PW did say I saw that man. And there's cases like this, and similar cases where I think this might have been the man, they're just not certain.

Senator SMITH. So there was never—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Again, I can't comment on every debrief right here.

Senator SMITH. There was never any positive identification, to the best of your knowledge, of any individual—any individual POW who returned, of an individual who was a POW and was carried as a POW by DOD or by DIA.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Excuse me, a PW may have made that statement. There may have been subsequent information that was developed from other PW's that clarified that comment. The fact that we had additional information that he may have died, that that prisoner wasn't aware of.

Senator SMITH. I mean one that was carried, one that you were carrying as a PW yourself, that did not return.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That did not return.

Senator SMITH. Right.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That we did not have some sort of information that would indicate—

Senator SMITH. That he died in captivity.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That he wasn't left behind. To the best of my knowledge, that's correct.

Senator SMITH. You're familiar with the casualty resolution report called the Egress Recap, correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

Senator SMITH. This is a copy of one here. Are you familiar with a returned POW by the name of Tangeman?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I recognize the name, sir.

Senator SMITH. Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Tangeman identified an individual, that he said was a POW that you were carrying as a POW, in his debrief?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I may have been at the time. Right now I can't answer that, no.

Senator SMITH. Well you made the statement that nobody had made any identification. I just asked you again.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I tried to clarify that, sir. There may have been individuals that came back that said yes, I saw an individual and, in fact, he may have been a PW. But we may have information from other PW's that have returned that have clarified that situation.

Maybe they did see him. In fact, I know there's PW's that were seen in captivity by other PW's and they were reported by those returnees, but we have subsequent information that they died from other returnees.

Senator SMITH. This is one that you do not have subsequent information that he died. This is, as I say, an Egress Recap report, a casualty resolution report, in which you are carrying—I have the permission of the family to use his name—Dominic Spinelli as a prisoner of war.

He was, according to your report, it says here, verified in photo-identification by Mr. Tangeman. Mr. Tangeman, a returning POW said, looking at a photograph—in looking at a photograph of Mr. Spinelli said that is Spinelli and he was a POW incarcerated with me.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. All I can say at this point in time is we can go back and look at all the facts surrounding that particular case and we can probably clarify that.

Senator SMITH. Well, I am trying to clarify it now. You made the statement that this has not happened. That is what you said. You said it to me and you said it, I believe, to Senator Reid, that there was no such case happening. Now, this is a very specific photo identification. Did he recant that? Did he ever recant that? Does anybody know that is here from DOD or DIA?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. All I know is we reviewed those cases very carefully at the time. There has to be something in the man's file. He may have indicated, again, that he was in a certain group or that he was held in a certain cell, maybe, with others and other individuals who were held with him did not see him. I don't know. I don't know, sir, until I read the file.

Senator SMITH. Well, I would like for the record that the specifics on that case be presented to the committee. Because as I said before, to clarify, Mr. Tangeman identified Mr. Spinelli of the U.S. Navy as being a POW. He was in your system as a POW, on your own reports as a POW. It says on your report that he was verified. It does not say there was any challenge to that. It just says he was verified, as many individuals who came home made identifications of prisoners, and as you said, many of those were substantiated to have died in captivity. This is one that was not substantiated as having died in captivity, according to the family and according to the records that I have seen. So I would like that information provided to the committee.

I might also say that to make a blanket statement like that, Mr. Trowbridge, when in fact you do not know this case, then I just do not see how you can make such a statement. I mean, that is one of the problems, is we try to identify these people. That is one of the

problems that we face. You come before a United States Senate committee and you say that there was not any such case. And here is one.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Again, I didn't walk in with all these cases in my head. I gave you that blanket statement based on the judgments that were made at the time and we continued to scrub that list. There may be other documents after that date that certainly clarify that. I don't have that in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, if I could just intercede here, in fairness to Mr. Trowbridge and what I think he is saying, what we need to do—this underscores two things. Number one, I heard you say that it may be that somebody said that but that you, in quote, scrubbing it, which I think is a term people need to have a better sense of what that means, that other information may have given you an answer. The problem is the committee does not have that. And the committee and others have no real way of discerning, as you can see. That is part of the tightness of this thing.

Now, we need to figure out a way to protect the debriefs of POW's, which we all understand is sensitive and important, but at the same time to allow the committee to get its work done so that we can help you, if you will, to explain where it is legitimate to explain and where we can legitimately leave a question out there if a question deserves to be out there. We are not seeking to leave one hanging out there if it does not deserve to be out there. But I think we need your help, Mr. Trowbridge.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Glad to work with the committee on that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us hope we can work out a way to do that.

Senator SMITH. I know that fortunately or unfortunately, I guess, depending on how you look at it, Chuck, you will be on the next panel. So if it is possible for somebody to get that information to me by the time the next panel meets I would appreciate that.

Let me just ask one or two quick questions and stop. Did you have any information at all in January 1973, or let us move that to April 1973 when the last group of POW's came home, that Robert Garwood was alive? Any information of any kind?

[Information on Lt. Tangeman and Lt. Spinelli follows:]

Senator SMITH. DIA provide for the record the specific resolution of the debriefing information on MIA Dominic Spinelli, received from returned POW Richard G. Tangeman.

A compilation of photographs of all missing or captured servicemen were made into a book for DIA's use for identification purposes. The pictures were generally obtained from the service records of the individuals concerned and the pictures would have been taken prior to their missing status. As the returnees were debriefed they were shown the pictures of those still missing. The returnee may recognize the picture because he knew the missing man before he became missing or perhaps saw him in the prison system.

When shown LT Spinelli's picture located in this volume of identification pictures, LT Tangeman made a positive identification that he knew LT Spinelli. This is amplified in the comments where he explains that he knew LT Spinelli before he became missing. He knew him at NAS Sanford. LT Tangeman had never seen LT Spinelli in the prison system or heard his name as being in the prison system.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
WASHINGTON, DC 20370-5000,
August 15, 1990.

Mrs. MONA WRIGHT,
414 Washington Street,
Mt. Vernon, WA 98273.

DEAR MRS. WRIGHT: I have located the debrief of LT Tangeman conducted after his return. The paragraph concerning your father has been extracted from the complete message relaying the debriefing results. Each paragraph in the message covered a different missing man. Let me explain some of the data as it is presented.

A compilation of photographs of all missing or captured servicemen were made into a book for DIA's use for identification purposes. The pictures were generally obtained from the service records of the individuals concerned and the pictures would have been taken prior to their missing status. As the returnees were debriefed they were shown the pictures of those still missing. The returnee may recognize the picture because he knew the missing man before he became missing or perhaps saw him in the prison system.

When shown your father's picture located in this volume of identification pictures, LT Tangeman made a positive identification that he knew your father. This is amplified in the comments where he explains that he knew your father before he became missing. He knew him at NAS Sanford. LT Tangeman had never seen LT Spinelli in the prison system or heard his name as being in the prison system.

I hope this explains the line "ident very positive", and puts it in the context it must be to be understood. I explained the debriefing report to your mother over the phone and she stated she did not need a copy, but to forward a copy to you. If you have any further questions, please feel free to write or call toll-free at 1-800-443-9298.

Sincerely,

LAUREN M. MAHONEY,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy, Special Assistant, POW/MIA Affairs.

Encl: (1) Paragraph "C" from NAS JAX FLA 222114Z March 1973

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, I think that that time we were operating under the assumption that he was alive and that he had probably moved to North Vietnam. But do I have anything that said he was actually alive on a specific date in April 1973, I don't know.

Senator SMITH. Given just that fact and other reports that Senator Kerry has already gone into, why would those of you actively working the issue of trying to resolve the fact of missing Americans at the end of the war in 1973 not challenge the statement made by Roger Shields and the President of the United States that all of the men had returned and, to use Trowbridge's language, everybody else was dead? Why would you not challenge that? Why would you not, not necessarily publicly, but—did you challenge it internally?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I think there's all sorts of documentation, as far as DIA is concerned, where our position was, these were discrepancy cases. They were people that were last known alive in a certain point in time, and we had no other information on them. And that still stands today.

Senator SMITH. Let us jump up to the 1980's. Do you know of any evidence of any kind, other than human intelligence and other than the testimony of Robert Garwood, that would give indication that Americans were alive in Vietnam up through 1989?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, when you say give indications, we continue to get human reporting over the years. We've continued to.

Senator SMITH. Take out human intelligence. And take out Robert Garwood who is human intelligence. Take that out. Did you

receive any type of reports that Americans were alive using means other than human intelligence up to 1989? Yes or no?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, without getting into—I think we did receive some information relative to Americans, but they weren't prisoners of war.

Senator SMITH. So you have received no information—I am going to be very clear on this, you are under oath—no information, no information, evidence, whatever you want to call it, that Americans were alive after 1973—no, excuse me—up to 1989 other than human intelligence?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, sir, when you say evidence, again, if we received information or a report by some other means—

Senator SMITH. I am not talking about that. I am talking about nonhuman—I do not want to get into sources here.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Fine. Nonhuman. I'll answer it nonhuman in terms if we received information, whether it be from imagery or some other of intelligence that we received information that may have indicated an American was held, there probably was.

Senator SMITH. Well, yes or no. Did you receive it or did you not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Oh, I can think of a couple indications, yes.

Senator SMITH. So the answer is yes, that you did see information other than human intelligence that Americans were alive up until what year? What year are you saying?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. These were reported indications. That doesn't mean that they're true.

Senator SMITH. Well, what do you mean by that? I am not talking about human intelligence. I am not talking about people saying they saw somebody. I am talking about the sophisticated means that the United States Government has which I am not going to go into, all I am asking you to say is from those means—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I know of no sophisticated intelligence that I'm aware of—

Senator SMITH. No signal intelligence?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. —that has proved, that has given indications of proof that American prisoners of war were being held against their will in the 1980's.

Senator McCAIN. Proof.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Proof.

Senator McCAIN. I would concur, frankly, but it is not up to me to testify.

Senator SMITH. I am sorry. Repeat what you said about proof. I missed that point. I do not understand.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I said I'm not aware of any.

Senator SMITH. That would what? That would be proof, is that what you said?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That would be proof.

Senator SMITH. Are you aware of evidence?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, if there's a report or there is information that could be considered as evidence, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's true. It could be good evidence, it could be false, good evidence or bad evidence.

Senator SMITH. Last question: in all of the time that you spent at—or any of you—have spent on the job in what you do, in trying to resolve this issue, have any of you ever heard formally or infor-

mally any information about any offer from the Vietnamese, any indication through the Vietnamese, that they had American prisoners? Yes or no.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. You're asking me to think through 20 some-odd years.

Senator SMITH. Wait a minute. My goodness. You guys are in charge of trying to determine whether there is anybody alive. I asked you this question. Let me repeat it. Are you aware by any superior, any individual that you work with in the United States Government, of any Vietnamese offer stating that they had American prisoners and they wanted to talk with you about it? Yes or no.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Some of those offers that were made maybe during the war.

Senator SMITH. I mean after the war.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. After the war. Let's see. When you say Vietnamese official, what level of official are we talking about? Any official?

Senator SMITH. Let us not qualify it.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I guess my answer is I just don't know. I can't recall any.

Senator SMITH. No more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. I thought I might go back through, Mr. Trowbridge, not to belabor the point but perhaps to clarify where we are with regard to the use of evidence and proof and all of that. If I understood correctly, what you have said or implied is that when administrative officials in the past have indicated that there is no evidence of American POW's surviving in captivity or being in captivity that what is meant is that there is no conclusive evidence.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

Senator BROWN. You also, I think, indicated earlier that in terms of information that could be classified in evidence from a legal point of view, not conclusive, that there is evidence of that.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well certainly, we've had many reports over the years that talk in terms of Americans in captivity. We have tracked many of these down. In fact, most of them. We have very few that are unresolved. Senator Smith talked of technical reports a minute ago that indicated Americans may have been held captive. I can cite you an example of one where one of these technical means indicated they had captured somebody, and I can cite many others as well where they claimed they have captured somebody but they had not.

They talk in terms of shootdowns when no one was shot down. They talk in terms of having captured somebody when we know it's absolutely false. So there's that information, and if you want to call that evidence, well, maybe it's evidence but it's not good evidence.

Senator BROWN. Well, I think there has been some confusion in the public, and I just think it is helpful for us to be precise if we can. I am not trying to mislead you, but if I understand the difference here it is that the administrative officials that have voiced an opinion in the past when they have said that there is no evidence of Americans being held captive against their will in Southeast Asia or in Vietnam, what they have meant was or at least what

information your operation has put out has been that in your view there is no convincing proof or no convincing evidence that that is the case.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. I think you'll find that written somewhere as the Government's position, if you go back.

Senator BROWN. It does not mean that there is not information available that could indicate people are being held. The difference is whether you are convinced by the evidence or not, whether it has risen to the level of proof, not whether or not there is some information to that effect.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

Senator BROWN. I must say I talked to a number of people about this issue, including even one reporter yesterday. The question was do you believe there are Americans being held. I guess the answer is consistent. We have information. Do I know for certain that it is true? Absolutely not. We have information, and I think the point is we have to do all we can to find out the facts. But I think that is a clear difference.

Now, Senator Smith, I thought, had touched on a very important point when he asked do you have nonhuman evidence, evidence from other sources, radio intercepts, other telemetry, and so on, that would indicate there may be prisoners held against their will. If I understood your answer there, you indicated that there is not what you considered convincing proof, but there may well be some evidence that has not risen to a level that you find it compelling, at this point. Maybe you would want to improve on my phraseology.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I agree with that, yes.

Senator BROWN. OK. I think that puts it in context. I do not think there is a question of people lying or prevaricating here, it is a matter of making sure we are clear with the terms that are used.

A mechanical question: dealing with your process from 1973 on, and even up to today, you indicated you get your list of potential prisoners from the services, that that information comes to you from them, and that is the instigator for developing your file.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir, it is. As I also mentioned, we're ahead of that curve at times. During the war, of course, the services may have been receiving that message traffic at exactly the same time we did and we entered people that went unaccounted for on our roles immediately, officially. The Gulf War is an example of that. We did the same thing there. It was fast-breaking, there were journalists sitting on the end of the runway, and when an aircraft didn't return from a mission it was practically reported instantly. There were people that were appearing on TV on prisoners that families had not been notified of.

So we certainly didn't wait for a report to come directly from the service or from Mr. Sungenis' office before we started tracking it. It had no official capacity, but as an intelligence agency we wanted to be on top of it and moving as fast as we could.

Senator BROWN. So hypothetically only, assuming that a Captain Jones is reported to be in captivity through signal intelligence or moved to somewhere from one prison camp to another and you came across that signal intelligence, and I do not mean to indicate that you have that, I am trying to give an example for what might have happened. You check and you do not have a Captain Jones

listed, that does not mean you would dismiss that information. I take it what you would do would be to retain that information and contact the service to see if, in effect, there was a Captain Jones.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Oh, absolutely, sir. In fact, just because it had a name in it, the first thing we'd do would be to search our data base on times and locations and see, maybe they had the name wrong but they had somebody else there.

Senator BROWN. So we can have some level of confidence that vital information of that kind did not just slip through the cracks because the services may not have reported to you in the first place?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir, that's correct. And in fact, we may have made a judgment, maybe as sketchy as the information may have been, that there was a shootdown in the area, maybe the name wasn't there. It could have applied to four incidents that day within a 20-mile radius. We didn't know who it was. That information went into all four files, which of course later could cause a problem because the family got that information, and maybe later through additional information we were able to determine exactly who that individual was. We did not pull that information from the other files, so you can see where that also caused problems.

Senator BROWN. As you are well aware, one of the items the committee will consider is whether or not it is appropriate to declassify some of this information. Is there anything you could give us in the way of guidance as to things you feel should not be declassified with regard to the intelligence relating to Southeast Asia and our POW's?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes. My comment on that would be if it had to do with sources and methods it should not be declassified. Any of the substantive information that had to do with individuals unaccounted for, should be made available to the public. I know over the years great efforts were made to get that information to the families. In all cases it didn't happen.

Another thing that I would protect would be the debriefs of the returnees. If they have substantive information relative to somebody that's unaccounted for in the debriefs, that information should be made available and it was made available to the families. However, the debrief, itself, that's privileged information between the returnee and the U.S. Government, and that should be protected.

Senator BROWN. So sources, methods, and debriefs. If indeed all of that information is declassified and made available, would I be correct in assuming that the debate we have had over proof and evidence and information would then be on the table for everyone to judge for themselves? In other words, will the fact be out so people can make their own judgments as to whether or not it is convincing?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. It will be out on the table. I'm not so sure it will resolve anything. There will be lots of judgments that will be made by some people on one side of the line and others on the other, but there will be judgments made on the same information to where people disagree.

Senator BROWN. So the debate we are having now about it will be one where people will have the facts to judge for themselves.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. Is there anything this committee ought to do or others ought to do to—

The CHAIRMAN. Be polite now.

Senator BROWN. —to prepare to summarize that information, to interrelate that information, to make sure the information that comes out is balanced? Or is there some work we ought to be thinking about so that a report is complete and understandable?

Let me give you a for instance, that is perhaps helpful. It is very possible you could have a report that John Jones was seen at Road X. It is also possible that you would have reports that indicate that is impossible from three other witnesses.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

Senator BROWN. Should we be thinking of some sort of effort to make all of that information available in a joint manner and a collective manner? How do we index? Do we simply release this in total, or should an effort be made to index it and correlate it?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I would agree with the latter, try and do some kind of indexing because so often, there is the problem about perception of the public. You will find individuals that will take one document and say there it is, there's the smoking gun. But they won't show you the other two documents that follow it that put that to rest. And I think the committee has a tremendous task ahead of them in writing this report, I really do. And in making the materials available in a manner that somebody—certainly, it's not going to be something that somebody even looking at this material is going to be able to make judgments within a few years.

Senator BROWN. Speaking for myself, but there may be others who share this, if you have thoughts or suggestions that would help in this process, help make sure that the information is put together in an understandable manner, where it is considered in context, ones that would help index it or help make it more useful, I think that would be something all of us would appreciate hearing.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. The committee might get some suggestions. I hate to volunteer things, but the central documentation office that is working with this committee in the declassification of information and providing documentation to it is already working along the lines and thinking along those lines in response to Senator McCain's legislation for declassification, and I know they have some views on classification of documents and things which may be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, my sense is, Mr. Trowbridge, if I could just interject, that there is a way to deal with this. I think we are on the road to it. Frankly, I think that today, while some may focus on the fact that there was deception in the reporting of where somebody died, I think the real story is, in a sense, the narrowing of the universe here. I do not think we are complete in that, but unless there is some family in America that can come forward and say, look, my son/brother/father was lost and I have reports he is over there and you have never handled it and we have not seen anything like that, we are dealing with this list. Here it is.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. If we are dealing with this list, this committee is beginning to get a pretty good picture of what is real and what is not as to who might or might not be missing.

Now, yesterday The Wall Street Journal had an article which was a reflection, frankly, of what you have just articulated, when you take one piece of information and say here it is, this is the whole story. I am not saying it is not the story. It may be the story. But we have a responsibility to find out what you and others have done in terms of analysis and make our own judgment, that we think your analysis is lousy, phony, not real, or accurate. And then say we think this may be real evidence. We have got to weigh the evidence a little bit. As you said, there is evidence here. There is a lot of it. But some of it may be right out of the sky. And we have seen that there are those willing to subject this to hoax. We have seen it most recently in the photographs. You cannot just sit here like a goon and accept everything at face value.

On the other hand, I am not soft-pedaling this. I think today has been extraordinarily illuminating in terms of an attitude and kind of something that happened back in 1973 with a Government policy that was created that was in opposition to the facts. To me, that is sort of the story, the narrowing of the universe and the reality of where the policy was versus it. It has created a lot of this energy that people are willing to grab at any straw because they have felt so damn frustrated that they cannot get the truth.

Now, we have a lot more work to do to get at that truth. There are unknown things here. But, Mr. Trowbridge, we need your help, and we need the Joint Chiefs of Staff's help to evaluate those KIA-BNR's to see where they fit.

Let me ask you a question. Of the 2,226 or 2,266, you always see POW-MIA, 2,200 and some. Are there 2,266 POW-MIA?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. Of that figure, 1,095 were declared dead at the time of their incident by the service. Now is there an exception to that? There may well be. They declared one individual dead during the war that walked out as a prisoner alive. He was in a helicopter that they had a mass burial on that crew of that helicopter. That is one exception.

But to misrepresent all of those individuals as the possibility of POW's is giving, certainly, the wrong impression to the public.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact of the matter is that you guys never stood up and said that until right now. The Defense Department has never really tried to clarify that. The Defense Department stands up with everybody else and says 2,266 POW-MIA. It is not real.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, DIA is not in the DOD public affairs business, but once a month we put out a statistic sheet that has clearly stated those numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, today this committee is trying to narrow the universe. What we are really talking about in terms of question marks is somewhere in the vicinity of this 133 names which we do not claim is—I mean, that's unscrubbed, so to speak. Those are names that we felt ought to be listed. But you know there are about 90, correct? Or 60—the Vessey list. Is that accurate?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Of the discrepancy cases?

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Throughout all of East Asia, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, I think the total discrepancy cases came to about 269. There are 135 on the Vessey list for Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. And what about the potential, as Senator Smith says—we had 500 and some people lost over Laos. We do not know what happened to them, do we?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Approximately 300 of them were declared missing. The services declared 4 of that group as prisoner, the rest missing up to approximately 300. The rest were declared dead at the time of their incident in Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is going to need to analyze those cases, obviously, so that Senators can make a judgment, frankly, not to second guess but to help in this process. Again, to try to let people make a common sense judgment.

I know I have read some of those reports. When two or three people in an aircraft alongside another aircraft saw it blow up, there was no chute, it was a fireball of significant proportions and they report dead, common sense from three different pilots and from the investigative report, et cetera, it lends to a judgment, I think, that sadly that person lost his life. We cannot allow this process to get into a sort of wishful thinking that creates something beyond reason here. That is the truth that we are trying to deal with here. It is not going to be easy.

But we really need your help to try to break that log jam, if you will, and understand the real universe. Now, that does not relieve us of any responsibility whatsoever for 1, 2, 5, 10, 50 or 100 people that were listed as POW that we had reason to believe were alive. I by no means suggest that whatever narrowing of the universe takes place diminishes the reality or the importance. Senator McCain?

Senator McCain. Mr. Trowbridge, is it true that there was talk in 1974 of shutting down your office?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. It never shut down, but—

Senator McCain. But you vociferously opposed that. Is that correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Let us get back to this. It really is to a large degree semantics here. I have heard media reports that there were certain satellite photos or other information that may have shown markings on the ground or people in caves. There were allegations that there was a tape of prisoners marching. All of that in nonhuman intelligence, is that not correct? You have heard a lot of that information. Sometimes rumor, sometimes not. Is that right?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is correct. The business of the videotape was provided through human source. The other images on the ground were through overhead photography.

Senator McCain. That, of course, is information and in the view of some may even be evidence, right?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. Some view it that way.

Senator McCain. But has any of that information which has come to you in your view, and in that of the—you are speaking for the Department of Defense in your areas of responsibility—provided you with proof that there were Americans alive up until 1989?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Absolutely not, sir.

Senator McCain. OK. Now let us talk about offers by the Vietnamese, if I could. Are you aware of any offer, official offer of the Vietnamese government, to return American POW's in return for whatever—money, recognition, lifting embargoes, et cetera?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. If it was made in the diplomatic channels, I may not be aware of it. I am not aware of any, let me say, officials. That is why I paused a while back.

Senator McCain. First of all, I want to say the Vietnamese government. Are you aware of any offer by the Vietnamese government?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Not directly, no sir.

Senator McCain. Have you indirectly heard of any offer by the Vietnamese government?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

Senator McCain. So, you have never heard of any offer or of any allegation of the Vietnamese government itself offering that. Is that true?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, if I did, I do not recall it today.

Senator McCain. I think that, frankly, that do not recall is not really a good answer, because it seems to me you would be startled if the Vietnamese government had made an offer.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is why I think I would recall it.

Senator McCain. OK. Now, we have heard rumors over the years, is it not true, of certain Vietnamese military people, Laotian military people, nonmilitary people who have made offers to return POW's for money. Is that not true?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. That is why I paused a while back, and I wanted to explain, when you say foreign governments—is this an official? For instance, we have somebody that says, my uncle is a guard and he is guarding 400 POW's and for \$75,000 each, he will bring them out. I do not consider that a government approach.

Senator McCain. No, but we have heard that many times over the years.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. But, I want to reemphasize, you know of no Vietnamese government offer to return POW's in return for anything, much less nothing.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I know of none.

Senator McCain. Your answer is?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I know of none.

Senator McCain. And you think you would recall if there was an official offer on the part of the Vietnamese government that had come to your attention?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I think so. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. I just want to make that clear because I have heard many times over the years of different people who have, quote, made offers. And we have sent people, sometimes in U.S. airplanes, to Bangkok to go in and track these down. And they must be tracked down. But so far is it true, Mr. Trowbridge, there has been no proof that any of these offers or any of this evidence shows that there is an American alive? Is that true or false, in your view?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I know of none that has proven true.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. One final question, Mr. Chairman. Because of the incredible leaks out of this committee it is well known in the media that there are reports that will be declassified by the committee that have been very critical over the years of the procedures, the methodology, the effort made by your organization and other organizations in attempting to resolve the POW-MIA issue.

I hope that when those documents are declassified that you will be able to respond both with the responses to the reports at the time, and with the reports now. Again, Mr. Chairman, it has been in the media. There is a Gaines report, a Brooks report, and Tighe report, and all that. Would you care to comment on what actions were taken in response to those reports over the years that were issued which were critical of the methodology and the procedures that were used by your organization?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I think I would have to agree with some portions of those reports that had to do with, say, we needed more personnel and we needed more equipment, maybe some updates in some areas. I certainly would agree with that. Those fixes were put into place. As far as anything that was critical of the analytical judgments or some decisions that may have been made, those were looked at by individuals outside of our office at the time, and as you said, these documents are still classified. And until they are declassified I cannot comment on them.

Senator McCAIN. Finally, Mr. Chairman. How much has it complicated your work and your people, the effort to track down these allegations that have proven to be hoaxes? Not those that you believe to be hoaxes but that have proven to be hoaxes?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, at times they have totally paralyzed the office because of the immense attention that they bring through the media, and to the Congress, and to the families. You know, we practically have to stop everything to investigate these. Some of these reports are fairly complicated, and we are traveling all over the world. There have been times where our office has practically come to a standstill following these leads that have been provided by the charlatans, scams and artists.

Senator McCAIN. It is a great regret of mine that this committee has been unable to uncover the hoaxes which have been proved to be hoaxes, but the media has been able to. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Mr. Trowbridge.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to you, Senator McCain, you may not be aware of it. The committee has actually worked quite closely with some members of the media with respect to the hoax issue, particularly on the Carr photograph. I think the committee deserves some credit for its efforts there.

In addition the fraud part of this is a later focus of the committee, but it is one that will take place. I have personally been in touch with some people in talking to them about that aspect of it. So I think that, you know, our principle focus up front has been on live sightings, POW's, but there is that other part of this.

Senator McCAIN. Could I just say to the Chairman, when there is that other part of it, as Mr. Trowbridge says, it paralyzes his office. And clearly, it impedes our progress and their progress.

The CHAIRMAN. I totally concur with that. On the other hand, I know Mr. Trowbridge understands that the reason hoaxes work is that this issue is there 20 years later to be exploited. It is there 20 years later to be exploited not a small part because of the confusion, the different terminologies, the changes in categories, and the very thing that we highlighted earlier in this, that there was evidence in 1973 of some prisoners who did not come home. Because that was not dealt with right up front, openly, it has allowed this thing to gain a life of its own. I cannot avoid making that judgment.

I am not saying that you did, but it was a policy. I mean, look, we have an assistant secretary, deputy secretary of defense saying I am going to make all the classifications back in 1973. We have got a whole series of events that took place where major public officials, not the least of which, the President of the United States of America, made a statement contrary to what people who were deeply concerned with this issue knew to be true. That is partly why it goes on. It is exactly why we are here.

I am not unsympathetic to difficulties that you have faced. You know, you did not make the budget priorities. You did not set the priorities of the government. And you certainly did not make the policy. I am aware of that, and I think the committee takes note of that. But there was a policy and there was an attitude that has put us where we are today. I think we are sorting through it. And I, again, applaud JCS for coming forward.

Nobody is sitting here trying to create ancillary issues here. The issue is what happened. I think Americans will be grateful, finally, for some people helping them to know it. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just three quick points. Mr. Trowbridge, in following up on the line of questioning that Senator McCain asked, I just want to make very clear the question that I asked and what I meant by the question. The question that I asked—and I do not know if I stated it clearly, but I will repeat it so that it is clear. What I meant was, an offer, and official offer, through official diplomatic channels by the Vietnamese indicating that they had American prisoners of war and wanted some sum of money for those prisoners.

Two questions. Nothing to do with any some field commander that says, I want \$75,000 for them. None of that. Official channel. A, do you have any knowledge of that directly, and B, were you ever involved in a discussion or ever hear of any discussion about such an offer?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, if I did, I think I would recall it. However, I do not.

Senator SMITH. OK. Two other quick questions. Somebody else can answer this. Chuck has the microphone there, but in trying to account for these numbers on the missing, I think somebody used the term 300. I am talking about Laos now. We did not have an accounting process in Laos really, as you know. We just declared—I think the term was declared—missing 300. There were 500 or over 600 lost. Some remains have been returned. But I am talking about in trying to come up with the numbers here, the universe of numbers, I know that the numbers that the Chairman has quoted here include Laos.

In trying to make some determination as to whether or not somebody was a POW or not at the conclusion of the war in 1973, these people were declared missing. But we did not have any direct evidence either way, did we, of either being dead or being captured in a large number of cases? Somebody else can answer it if they like.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I will answer in part, and then I will let the services answer that. As far as the Defense Intelligence Agency was concerned, an individual that became missing, killed, or whatever status the service attached to them in Laos, that information made its way to us. And sometimes, we were aware of it right away.

I think the 300 figure may have been one that I threw out, and it is not an exact figure. I was talking about the numbers that the services had put in the status of prisoner or missing, relative to Laos. Then if you add in those that the services had declared killed in action in Laos, it becomes over 500. So there was a process—and I will let the services speak to that. The process was there.

Senator SMITH. In the answer from the services, what I am getting at—I want to make it very brief because the Chairman wants to wrap up—what I am getting at is at the table in Paris in 1973, there were negotiators there on behalf of the Vietnamese, and there were negotiators there on behalf of the United States. There were no negotiators there on behalf of Laos. They did not have anybody at the table.

So how do you account for these people when you had no information other than whatever you had on your own circuits when you lost them? You gave some indications of those that you know were killed upon impact. You also said that you knew some were captured. But there is a large number that you do not know what happened to them either way.

So, what I am pointing out is, in these numbers as we, as the Chairman says, try to bring the universe down, we do not have any direct information on these Laos losses to bring it down, do we? I mean, do we have anything, anybody?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, there are 500 some odd lost in Laos, and again we could come up with the statistics. We know at least enough to bring it down close to 300, if that is what is trying to be accomplished here, those the service declared dead at the time.

Senator SMITH. They are declared dead without any evidence one way or the other what happened to them?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I will not addresses that. I will let the services address that. I do not think that the services carry anybody dead unless they have evidence.

Senator SMITH. Well, that is not true.

The CHAIRMAN. That is actually not accurate.

Senator SMITH. That is not accurate.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I will let the services address that.

Senator SMITH. I just have one final point, Mr. Chairman. Since the satellite photo issue came up, let me just ask this question. If you get a satellite photo which indicates, for whatever reason, whether you believe it is fraudulent or whether you believe it is true, but there is some signal given. How do you determine that that signal is not legitimate? If I said to you, what is the best way? Let us say, you take a satellite picture and it spells out Jones,

POW. You get that from the air and it is in Timbuktu, someplace, Laos. How do you determine that that is a fraud?

Let me start back this way. Is it not true that we have such a satellite photo; at least one. Is that correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. OK, that is correct. Now, the testimony of your agency is that that information is not valid. It is not accurate. That it is, in fact, not truly a missing person giving that signal. That is what we have been told.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I do not want to get into the discussion—

Senator SMITH. I am not asking for the specifics. I am not asking for any specifics because that is classified, and I understand that. All I am asking you to say is, in a generic way, how do you make the determination, which you have the in cases which we cannot discuss—how do you make that determination, in a generic way?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. To give you the complete answer, what you are looking for here, I would have to discuss some things that I do not want to discuss in this session.

Senator SMITH. Fair enough, fair enough.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That information is available to this committee.

Senator SMITH. Fair enough. We can do that in other session. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. A quick question, if I may, for the service branches. Did each of the individual service intelligence staffs keep their own file information on POW's and MIA's during the war? Colonel, did the Marines keep a separate file on POW's and MIA's during the war?

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army?

Colonel SPINELLO. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy?

Captain DEBIEN. Are you talking about the intelligence?

The CHAIRMAN. The intelligence.

Captain DEBIEN. Yes, we believe the Navy did.

The CHAIRMAN. Navy intelligence kept their own files?

Captain DEBIEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason we have not been able to get them?

Captain DEBIEN. In 1987, I believe, all the files were turned over to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that true, Mr. Trowbridge? Did you receive from the branches of the service all files they kept on POW-MIA?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I cannot say all files. Certain information that they had in their files they did provide to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, do you have any files to this day on POW-MIA?

Captain DEBIEN. Sir, I am not in the intelligence area. I am in the casualty reporting area.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you not responsible for how people are listed?

Captain DEBIEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not the intelligence report to you?

Captain DEBIEN. The intelligence people have told us they turned their files over to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. At the time, anything that we received from the services relative to intelligence that they may have had, I am sure was—well, I know was compared against ours. Most of that information came from us to start with.

The CHAIRMAN. And what about the Air Force? I have not asked you that. Did you keep files?

General MCGINTY. We reported our casualty data to OSD. As we previously discussed, we reported it monthly to the JCS. There was some limited data kept by the Air Force Intelligence Service which I believe was recently turned over to your committee, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it was. That is accurate. I appreciate it. Is there any service branch that has at this date a list of those people who were, according to that service—their casualties in Vietnam—either MIA or POW? KIA-BNR? Is there any branch that has such a list? Marines? Colonel?

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Our list matches the one of DIA. We have 283 individuals listed in Southeast Asia. One Hundred and seventy-nine of those, I believe, are listed as killed in action, body not recovered. One hundred and four of those are listed as missing, and then with a presumptive finding of death.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the background data with respect to the presumptive finding of death, as well as on the KIA-BNR?

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Yes, sir. We have it contained in our casualty records, which were turned over to the committee, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So, it will be possible for you to review that and make a judgment in 1992 terms with respect to the presumptive finding, and also with respect to the body not recoverable.

Colonel QUEBODEAUX. Yes, sir. From our retained casualty records, we can establish basically, from the DD-1300s which we produce, what happened to that individual.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is good to hear. I think it will be very helpful to us. Can the Army do the same?

Colonel SPINELLO. Yes, sir, we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Could the Navy?

Captain DEBIEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I know the Air Force is going to say yes. Let me tell you why. I think it would be very helpful to us; very helpful to the process, because in the effort here of the committee to eliminate doubts, to try to have a reality base, and to try to deal with the strong emotions that suggest that something has been hidden here and people are not coming clean, if the committee can make a judgment and provide its stamp of approval on that, I think it is going to help enormously not to include in any base of potential real MIA or POW a group of people who just do not belong there.

Also, it means for families that there is, in a sense, a modern-day judgment which the Senate concurs in, which we all concur in, that for those for whom there is still an issue—I know many families have put that to rest and they do not have doubts. But for those for whom it might remain an issue, it helps the committee to be able to deal with that sensitively. I think that is very important for us.

So, I would ask you if you will do that for us. Obviously, we will forward that request appropriately through the Joint Chiefs and service secretaries, but it is something that you say you can do, correct, each of you, and you are willing to do? And you tell the committee today that you could do and in what kind of period of time. I know it varies by service, because some have more than others. Obviously, for the Army, it is a larger task, and for the Marines.

Colonel SPINELLO. Sir, those documents have been turned over to the central documentation office, and are available to you as we speak as far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but we are going to need some help in that. Number one, we are willing to try to work the process to help review it. But we are not staffed sufficiently to be able to review each and every one of those, nor will we understand each and every one of them. So, I think we need to do this jointly. So, if we could try to do that in short order, that would be helpful.

We will have written questions that go into details of chain of authority, of chain of custody of some of these items. We are not going to bore everyone with them here now, but the committee will submit those to you in writing and they will be submitted back to the committee under the same oath. And we would ask you that they be submitted back.

If we were to ask them now, you would answer them here, immediately. So we really need those back within a week. And we will submit those to you. That is not for you, Mr. Trowbridge. This is just for the separate services.

Then, Mr. Trowbridge, and Mr. Sungenis, you will return with us this afternoon with General Tighe and with Admiral Moorer, and we will talk more about the process of accountability and listings.

So, we will stand in recess until the hour of 2:30 p.m.
[Whereupon, at 1:24 p.m., the hearing was recessed.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

[2:32 P.M.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you Mr. Trowbridge and Mr. Sungenis, for staying with us. We are particularly grateful to Admiral Moorer and General Eugene Tighe for joining us this afternoon as we go into the second panel. It is really to look at the issue of the accountability process, from Operation Homecoming on, but also obviously to touch on some of the issues raised this morning and some questions about the war period itself that remain outstanding from this morning.

If I may, I would like to ask Admiral Moorer and General Tighe to make their opening comments, and Mr. Trowbridge and Mr. Sungenis' opening comments from this morning will stand. Before you make your opening comments this morning, gentlemen, if I may ask you as a matter of committee procedure, all testimony is sworn and I will ask you if you will stand so I may swear you in.

If you would, raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Admiral MOORER. I do.

General TIGHE. I do.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I do.

Mr. SUNGENIS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Moorer, I would like to ask you to lead off with your opening statement, and then General Tighe. If you could, bring the microphone right next to you, admiral.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THOMAS MOORER (USN RET., FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After 18 years of inactive duty, you might find my memory somewhat mixed, but I'm going to do my best to assist you in the important work that you're doing. Because, as evidenced even by the news recently, this is a problem that frankly that will not go away.

I, along with all Americans, feel the deepest sympathy for those who that have lost loved ones and who cling to any shred of news, rumor or otherwise, with a devoted hope for a termination of their torment. I knew many of the missing, even since they were small children and, as a matter of fact, one of them is now on this committee, I refer to Senator McCain.

It makes my blood boil to hear others suggest that senior officers or civilians in our government have specific knowledge about the whereabouts of a POW and because of some imagined conspiracy, do not reveal such knowledge. Certainly, General John Vessey who worked his way up to chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs from a battlefield promotion, who is now the representative—has been for

two presidents, has been to Hanoi several times, and I just can't imagine anyone questioning his statements or the announcements he makes.

Certainly the answers to the many questions this committee is seeking would be relatively easy but for one sad fact, and that is we lost the war politically and I emphasize the word *politically*, and I will explain that somewhat in just a minute.

The CHAIRMAN. No need to explain it.

Admiral MOORE. Nineteen years after Operation Homecoming we are not free to roll around and roam around and look and go any place we choose in Indochina. We permitted a small country with a population of less than two counties in one state to defeat us and we lost 58,000 men in the process. Before I address the questions proffered to me by the committee, I would like to go back and describe the general atmosphere and attitude overlaying the country during the late 1960's and early 1970's that made the Vietnam War a very painful experience.

In fact, the country at times was in a state of near anarchy. Demonstrators were pouring blood on the Pentagon steps, lying down on Constitution Avenue blocking traffic, harassing military personnel, instigating riots such as the tragedy at Kent State University, and many of our young men were escaping to Canada. The Congress itself went through three phases.

As I read it, they said, get in there and win. Win or get out, and then get out. When I became Chief of Naval Operations in 1967, the orders by the Johnson administration were not to inform wives of the POW's how roughly these men were being treated. I felt, at the time, that that was just wrong. Fortunately, this policy was later reversed by Secretary of Defense Laird, and following that, much time was spent planning a means of rescuing some of the POW's and the Sontay Prison raid was the result.

The morning the raid was to get underway, we received some information that the prisoners may have been moved. We all felt that even if we had less than a 50/50 chance of rescuing a few, that would reveal to the public just what kind of people the North Vietnamese were. I thought that the attitude concerning the war may change.

Unfortunately, the prisoners had been removed from Sontay Prison and moved back to Hanoi. There were no injuries to participants in the Sontay raid. I think I would just like to emphasize the courage and the skill that the men demonstrated in making that raid which was very complex, and which incidentally could only be done on a certain day, because we had to have the moon in a certain place in order to do it. It was done at night.

We set up a rubber duplicate of the camp down in Florida so we could deflate it in the daytime. It could not be observed from the air. I was just talking about the general outlook. Senator Fulbright, of course, immediately said that this raid was being conducted for political purposes but the Congress passed a joint resolution commending the men conducting the raid, and Senator Fulbright refused to vote for it. He was the only one.

The South Vietnamese War now had dragged through 1972, and highlights being the buildup of the South Vietnamese forces, the Cambodian and cross-border operations, the South Vietnamese op-

eration aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. At the same time the United States began a large-scale withdrawal program.

In October, as a result of intensive negotiations, Secretary Kissinger reported that a successful end of the war had been negotiated, but peace was still not at hand. True to form, the North Vietnamese commenced immediately to violate the terms of the agreement to the degree that it was obvious that they intended to continue the war. I was personally concerned about the fact that if we continued the withdrawal of our forces, there would come a time when the only Americans left in Vietnam would be POW's.

This was also of grave concern to President Nixon with whom I discussed ways and means of forcing the release of the POW's and bringing the war to a close. It was from these discussions that the Christmas bombing followed and continued from December 18 to December 29, 1972. This decision by the President took great courage since he knew full well the hue and cry that would follow, and in this regard neither the media nor the Congress failed to live up to expectation.

The criticism was universal. When I testified before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees only one Congressman and no Senator approved the bombing. But the North Vietnamese got the message and on January 22, they signed the agreement that brought the war to a close.

In addition to the release of the POW's which drew most of the attention, there were many other details to arrange and monitor, such as withdrawal of men and equipment, reconnaissance limitations, supervisory committee, Geneva Accords, and so forth. I mention these details of the agreement to call attention to the fact that it took some time to comply with all the details of the agreement.

During this time, it was hoped to obtain more information about the POW's by careful interrogation of the some 591 that were released. There was also hope to learn additional information by observing the unfolding of events after the cessation of hostilities.

I will now turn to the specific questions raised by committee counsel. Question: In the spring of 1973, did you believe that the North Vietnamese held more American POW's than were included on the list provided on January 27, 1973, and how strong was your belief and what was the basis of your belief?

Having been involved in the Vietnam War for 8 years, I had no expectations whatever that the North Vietnamese would be forthcoming on all aspects of the cease-fire. On the other hand, we did know that about the time of the Sontay Prison raid, the North Vietnamese had concentrated the POW's in the Hanoi area. Consequently, I expected the interrogation of the POW's that were released to reveal some information on the POW's that were still held in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi.

I also hoped that factual information would be developed as to the existence of POW's in outside areas of North Vietnam. However, since the terms of the cease-fire did not permit verification by U.S. personnel, it would be difficult to separate rumor from fact.

What intelligence information did you have access to as chairman of the JCS?

All information that was addressed to the Defense Department. This was voluminous. I assigned a navy captain as action officer to keep an up-to-date summary and keep me advised of new developments. The other services did the same thing. Mr. Roger Shields was the senior civilian who kept the Secretary of Defense informed and I believe he's scheduled to come here tomorrow.

The next question. Did the process of debriefing the POW's who returned during Operation Homecoming change your strong belief that American POW's were left behind in Vietnam?

It is incorrect to describe my belief as strong at that time. My hope was certainly strong. In addition, the returnees added very little to the information already on hand.

Those that I talked to could not pinpoint circumstances regarding specific individuals. However, I do recall that the debriefs mentioned two individuals who were not on the list but had been seen in captivity. I am not familiar with the details.

Question: What was your opinion of the completeness of the Laos list provided by the North Vietnamese on February 1, 1973? I do not recall a specific opinion on this point, and neither was I given a list of names or numbers relating to Laos, but certainly due to the nature of the operations conducted in Laos and the nature of the terrain, the nature of the people, it would certainly be small, that is the number of POW's when compared to the North Vietnamese list.

Here again, I hoped to find others as events unfolded. I do not remember exactly when I learned the February 1st list was not captured by Laos forces. I do not recall having seen an estimate prepared by an intelligence organization of a specific number, and perhaps General Tighe can help in this regard.

What were the reactions of the other members of the National Security Council to the prisoner of war list provided by the North Vietnamese on January 27 and February 1, 1973? I cannot speak for the others attending the National Security Council meetings, other than to say that it is a lie to suggest that senior Government officials at that time or now do not make every effort possible to rescue Americans that may be confined overseas against their will.

However, as the Secretary of State said only last Sunday, discussing this overall problem with respect to Mr. Yeltsin's announcement, the Government can only act on fact. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to expand on this point just a minute while summarizing my remarks. In 1973, we had been involved in Vietnam for about 9 years. We had spent billions of dollars and lost thousands of men.

The public had been heavily flooded with antigovernment news very often untrue. The rules of engagement imposed on the military forces excessively restricted and violated common sense and military principles. The Congress passed several amendments limiting or removing funds to prosecute the war. For instance, the Second Supplementary Act of Fiscal 1973 prohibited use of funds appropriated in the act to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam, or off the shores of these countries.

From the North Vietnamese point of view, this amendment eliminated any responsibility they may have felt to comply with the terms of the agreement with the United States in Paris on Jan-

uary 27, 1973. We could no longer pressure them militarily and there was no way to verify any statements they chose to make about the location of POW's.

That was not unlike the problem we had after Desert Storm, when the Government first announced that all of the nuclear facilities had been destroyed, and then to really check on them, we had to put men on the ground. We had the same problem here, I think, to locate all and run down all the rumors, and all the information we had on POW's that was simply not possible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared testimony of Admiral Moorer follows:]

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I will try my best to assist the committee in their frustrating investigation of a problem that simply will not go away. I, along with all Americans, feel the deepest sympathy for those who have lost loved ones and who cling to any shred of news, rumor or otherwise, with a devoted hope for a termination of their torment. I knew many of the missing, even since they were small children. And it makes my blood boil to hear others suggest that senior officers or civilians in the government have specific knowledge about the whereabouts of a POW and because of some imagined "Conspiracy" do not reveal such knowledge. Take General John Vessey for instance; he is a man that earned his commission on the battlefield and then moved up to serve for years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has since served two presidents as POW/MIA representative. He has been to Hanoi several times where he has established an office to facilitate his contacts with the Vietnamese in search of dead and missing Americans. It is ridiculous to suggest that he would withhold information of any kind no matter what the source. I have talked to General Vessey about his experience in Hanoi.

Certainly, the answers to the many questions this committee is seeking would be relatively easy except for one sad fact. We lost the war politically. Nineteen years after "Operation Homecoming", we are not free to roam around old Indochina. We permitted a small country with a population of less than two counties in one of the 50 States to defeat us, and lost 58,000 men in the process.

Before I address the questions presented to me by the committee, I would like to go back and describe the general atmosphere and attitude overlaying the country during the late sixties and early seventies that made the Vietnam War a very painful experience. In fact, the country at that time was in a state of near anarchy. Demonstrators were pouring blood on the Pentagon steps, lying down on Constitution Avenue and blocking traffic, harassing military personnel, instigating riots such as the tragedy at Kent University, escaping to Canada, etc.

The Congress itself went through three phrases. As I read it they said: "Get in there and win", "win or get out". When I became Chief of Naval Operations in 1967, the orders by the Johnson Administration were not to inform wives of the POW's how roughly they were being tortured. I felt at that time just the opposite. This policy was reversed by Secretary Laird. Much time was spent planning a means of rescuing some of the POW's and the Sontay Prison Raid was the result. The morning the raid was to get underway we received some information that the prisoners may have moved. We all felt that even if we had less than a 50/50 chance of rescuing a few they would reveal to the public just what kind of people the North Vietnamese were that attitude concerning the war would change. Unfortunately, the prisoners had been removed from Sontay Prison and moved back to Hanoi. No injuries to participants in Sontay raid. Fulbright accused Nixon of conducting raid for political purposes. This was of course nonsense but it shows the environment we were working in during the SVN War.

The SVN war dragged on through 1972, highlights being the buildup of the SVN forces, the SVN operation aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. At the same time the United States began a large scale withdrawal program. In October as a result of intensive negotiations Secretary Kissinger reported that a successful end of the war had been negotiated. But peace still was not in hand. True to form the NVN commenced immediately to violate the terms of the agreement to the degree that it was obvious that they intended to continue the war. I was personally concerned about the fact that if we continued the withdrawal of our forces there would come a time when the only Americans left in Vietnam

would be POWs. This was also of great concern to President Nixon with whom I discussed ways and means of forcing the release of the POWs and bringing the war to a close. It was from these discussions that the "Christmas Bombing" followed and continued from December 18 to December 29, 1972. This decision by the President took great courage since he knew full well the hue and cry that would follow. Neither the media nor the Congress failed to live up to expectations. The criticism was universal. When I testified before the Armed Services and Appropriation Committees, only one Congressman and no Senator agreed with the bombing. But the NVN understood the message and on January 22, signed the agreement requiring them to list and release all POWs.

In addition to the release of the POWs, which drew most of the attention there were many other details to arrange and monitor such as: withdrawal of men and equipment, reconnaissance, supervisory committee, Geneva Accords, etc. I mention these details of the agreement to call attention to the fact that it took some time to comply with all details of the agreement. During this time it was hoped to obtain more information about the POWs by careful interrogation of the some 591 that were released. It was also hoped to learn additional information by observing the unfolding of events after the cessation of hostilities.

I will now turn to the specific questions raised by Committee Counsel.

Question. In the spring of 1973, did you believe that the North Vietnamese held more Americans POWs than were included on the list provided on January 27, 1973? How strong was your belief? What was the basis of your belief?

Answer. Having been involved in the Vietnam War for 8 years I had no expectation that the North Vietnamese would be forthcoming on all aspects of the cease fire agreement. On the other hand we did know that about the time of the Sontay Prison Raid the North Vietnamese had concentrated the POWs in the Hanoi area. Consequently I expected the interrogations of the POWs that were released to reveal some information on POWs that were still held in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi. I also hoped that factual information could be developed as to the existence of POWs in outside areas of North Vietnam. However, since the terms of the cease fire did not permit verification by US personnel it would be difficult to separate rumor from fact.

Question. What intelligence information did you have access to, as Chairman of the JCS?

Answer. All information that was addressed to the Defense Department. This was voluminous. I assigned a Navy Captain as "action officer" to keep an up to date summary and keep me advised of new developments. Mr. Roger Shields was the senior civilian who kept the Secretary of Defense informed.

Question. Did the process of debriefing the POWs who returned during Operation Homecoming change your "strong" belief that American POWs were left behind in Vietnam?

Answer. It is incorrect to describe my belief as strong. My hope was certainly strong and in effect the returnees added very little to the information already on hand. Those that I talked to could not pinpoint circumstances regarding specific individuals. However I do recall that the debriefs mentioned two individuals who were not on the list but had been seen in captivity. I am not familiar with the details.

Question. What was your opinion of the completeness of the Laos list provided by the North Vietnamese on February 1, 1973?

Answer. I do not recall a specific opinion on this point other than to say due to the nature of the operations conducted in Laos it would be small when compared to the North Vietnam list. Here again I did hope to find others as events unfolded. I do not remember exactly when I learned the February 1 list was not captured by Laos forces. I do not recall having seen an estimate prepared by intelligence organizations of a specific number.

Question. What were the reactions of the other members of the National Security Council to the POW lists provided by the North Vietnamese on January 27 and February 1, 1973?

Answer. I can not speak for the others attending the National Security Council meetings other than to say that it is a lie to suggest that senior government officials at that time or now do not make every effort possible to rescue Americans that may be confined overseas against their will. However, as the Secretary said only last Sunday discussing this overall problem, the government can only act on fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony. I might just note personally, that I am sure John

McCain feels the same way that we are delighted to have you here. On a personal level, you had an impact on both of our lives. I was a young ensign just turning JG when you were CNO, and you made a great impression on all of us then, so we are delighted to have you.

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. General Tighe.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR. (USAF RETIRED)

General TIGHE. First of all, I'd like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I will restrict my statement to the answers to the specific questions that you asked that I address. I welcome the request that I discuss with you certain aspects of U.S. military preparation in the Pacific for the anticipated successful conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords and the return of our military personnel held prisoner by the Southeast Asia enemy governments.

I was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces in August 1971, and in March of the following year, upon retirement of the incumbent, reassigned as director of intelligence at headquarters of the Pacific camp command on assignment to Commander-in-chief of all military forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, and at that time, he was Admiral John McCain.

He was relieved on retirement by Admiral Noel Gayler. I reported to each of them directly in turn. In this brief statement, as I said, I will respond specifically to the questions you asked and the facts I received from you on June 8, 1992. I also regret the reputation I may once have deserved, for a near photographic memory is no longer a valid one. But then again, 20 years ago may only be a long time in the memory of younger people who are here today.

As the Paris peace negotiations neared their conclusion, CINCPAC received tasking relative to his responsibility as military commander of Pacific forces from either the Secretary of Defense and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that he forward as accurate a list as possible of the military personnel CINCPAC and his component commanders expected to be returned by the enemies on the anticipated successful conclusion of the Paris peace negotiations.

CINCPAC directed that I assemble a group of senior intelligence officers from my CINCPAC intelligence staff and from the headquarters of the component commanders' staffs and build a master CINCPAC list in response to the request. Each of the component commanders, that is the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Air Forces, the United States Army Pacific, the Commander of the Pacific fleet, and Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, quickly named a senior intelligence specialist to work under my direction, and an additional analyst, personnel specialist and clerical personnel as necessary to complete the task.

Their role was to assemble all of the records and intelligence available at each of their headquarters in the CINCPAC intelligence conference room and to compile a list by military service of the names, rank, and other relative data on each missing individ-

ual on which sufficient intelligence and other data was available to reasonably expect that they had survived and would be returned on successful conclusion of the Paris negotiations. Toward that end, a complete evidentiary dossier was to be compiled on each individual and all together, some 30 people were directly involved in the project. I remember that CINCPACAF was represented by Colonel James Crichton, and that my principal deputy for the project was United States Army Colonel Logan.

For construction of the list, I instructed the analysts to gather any and all pertinent data which could support or deny the possible survival of the missing in action. Information and intelligence included operational reports, HUMINT reports, eyewitness reports of fellow combat personnel, jolly green reports of attempted rescue from helicopter crews, communications intercepts, photographs, and other data from the print and other news media, and any other data from any other source which might shed light on the fate of the missing.

Much of the data had been collected by the individual military departments who were responsible for casualty reporting. I do not remember what DIA was doing parallel to that tasking at PACOM, nor what OSD/ISA was doing on the task, if I ever knew.

The standards we used for determining whether to show a missing individual on the list or not as an anticipated returnee may have been more liberal or less than that used elsewhere. I have no way of knowing. They were intended to be as accurately anticipatory as humanly possible. Logistics planning and a great deal of human endeavor and emotion were tied into the determination of naming an individual to the list.

As I recall, the lists were compiled by country coordinates of last sighting by service and any other descriptive that would enable those who had to work with the list to do the best job they could with the data. The very highly classified and sensitive lists were sent by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Admiral Gayler to the Secretary of Defense, to whom he reported directly and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I don't remember whether the data was sent to other information addressees, but presume it was also addressed for action to the component commanders on Oahu. When they had been sent, I had no idea whether there were other lists compiled or how it might compare if there were. I don't remember any feedback from the lists or inquiry on it. There may have been questioning, comparing and communications with Admiral Gayler, which I most certainly would have shared, but I don't remember any reaction prior to the actual release of the names of the POW's by the Hanoi Government.

I certainly remember the shock and sadness at the paucity of the lists of names we received versus what we expected. I know my boss, Admiral Gayler, certainly reacted and there was lots of discussion on what might be done about it and so forth. I do not recall, however, what form CINCPAC's responses used, whether he responded by telegram, that is TWX or secure phone or other.

I do remember that we discussed all kinds of possibilities, including the expectation of separate talks with an extraction of POW's from Laos and Cambodia, and so forth. Alas. Thank you for allow-

ing me to come before you. I believe that you are compiling the largest and most comprehensive body of evidence on the subject of missing in military action that has ever been assembled.

And it is extraordinarily important that this body of data be carefully preserved and seriously acted on, in the most open way possible for future generations of Americans, both as a reference and historical base, but more importantly as an action base of reassurance for the women and men of the armed forces down through the years ahead and for all those they may leave behind to mourn their loss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared testimony of General Tighe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. GENERAL EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR., (RETIRED)

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. I welcome the request that I discuss with you certain aspects of U.S. military preparation in the Pacific for the anticipated successful conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords and the return of our military personnel held prisoner by the southeast Asia enemy governments. I was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff-intelligence at Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces in August 1971 and in March of the following year, upon retirement of the incumbent, reassigned as Director of Intelligence at the Headquarters of the Pacific Command. On assignment, the Commander-in-chief of all U.S. military forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas was Admiral John McCain. He was relieved, on retirement, by Admiral Noel Gayler. I reported to each of them, directly—in turn.

In this brief statement, I will respond specifically to the questions you asked in the fax I received from you on June 8, 1992. I so regret that the reputation I may once have deserved for a near-photographic memory is no longer a valid one, but, then again 20 years ago may only be a long time in memory for the younger people here today.

As the Paris Peace negotiations neared their conclusion, CINCPAC received tasking relative to his responsibility as Military Commander of Pacific Forces, from either the Secretary of Defense and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he forward as accurate a list as possible of the military personnel CINCPAC and component commanders expected to be returned by the enemies on the anticipated successful conclusion of the Paris Peace negotiations.

CINCPAC directed that I assemble a group of senior intelligence officers from my CINCPAC intelligence staff and from the headquarters of the component commanders' staffs to build a master CINCPAC list in response to the request. Each of the component commanders, CINCPAC Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army, Pacific, CINCPAC Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific quickly named a senior intelligence specialist to work under my direction and additional analysts, personnel specialists and clerical personnel as necessary to complete the task. Their role was to assemble all of the records and intelligence available to each of their headquarters, in the CINCPAC intelligence conference room, and to compile a list, by military service, of the names, rank and other relative data on each missing individual on which sufficient intelligence and other data was available to reasonably expect that he had survived and would be returned on successful conclusion of the Paris negotiations.

Toward that end a complete evidentiary dossier was to be compiled on each individual. Altogether, some thirty people were directly involved in the project. I remember that CINCPACAF was represented by Colonel James Crichton, my principal deputy for the project was United States Army Colonel Logan.

For construction of the list I instructed the analysts to gather any and all pertinent data which could support or deny the possible survival of the missing in action. Information and intelligence included operational reports, human reports, eyewitness reports of fellow combat personnel, "jolly green" reports (of attempted rescue from helicopter crews) communications intercepts, photographs and other data from the print and other news media and any other data from any other source, which might shed light on the fate of the missing. Much of the data had been collected by the individual military departments who were responsible for casualty reporting. I do not remember what DIA was doing, parallel to that being done at PACOM—nor what OSD/ISA was doing on the task, if I ever knew.

The standards we used for determining whether to show a missing individual on the list or not as an anticipated returnee may have been more liberal or less than those used elsewhere. I have no way of knowing. They were intended to be as accu-

rately anticipatory as humanly possible. Logistic planning and a great deal of human endeavor and emotion were tied in to the determination of naming an individual.

As I recall, the lists were compiled by country/coordinates of last sighting, by service and any other descriptive that would enable those who had to work with the list to do the best job they could—with the data.

The very highly classified and sensitive lists were sent by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific—Admiral Gayler—to the Secretary of Defense (to whom he reported directly) and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't remember whether the data was sent to other information addressees but presume it was also addressed for action to the component commanders on OAHU. When it was sent I had no idea whether there were other lists compiled or how it might compare if there were.

I don't remember any feedback from the lists or inquiry on it. There may have been questioning, comparing and communications with Admiral Gayler—which I most certainly would have shared—but I don't remember any reaction prior to the actual release of names of POWs by the Hanoi Government. I certainly remember the shock and sadness of the paucity of the lists of names we received versus what we expected. I know my boss, Admiral Gayler certainly reacted and there was lots of discussion on what might be done, etc. I do not recall, however, what form CINCPAC's responses used—whether by telegram (twx) or secure phone or other. I do remember that we discussed all kinds of possibilities including the expectation of separate talks with and extraction of POWs from Laos and Cambodia, etc. alas!

Thank you for allowing me to come before you. I believe that you are compiling the largest and most comprehensive body of evidence on the subject of missing in military action that has ever been assembled. It is extraordinarily important that this body of data be carefully preserved and seriously acted on, in the most open way possible, for future generations of Americans—both as a reference and historical base, but more importantly as an action base of reassurance for the women and men of the Armed Forces down through the years ahead and for all those they may leave behind to mourn their loss. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. There are obviously a lot of questions and we are going to try and work through them here, and hopefully in an orderly fashion. Let me begin, if I can, building on what you just said about the gathering of this information, laying it open.

You have had a number of different roles here. One was the role that you described in helping to gather the lists. I understand the situation during the war and right at Operation Homecoming. Subsequently, you became the head of DIA. You were sitting in the cat-bird seat with respect to trying to analyze and determine where we stood. A great many of your feelings have been articulated publicly in one article or another and characterizations of a still classified report have been made in the public media and you have testified before us previously.

We are trying to sort that out. This morning we came up with a grouping of 244 names, specific names we have which immediately diminished by 111, which only could have occurred, however, after Operation Homecoming. The 111 that were taken away were taken away as a consequence of debriefings and information that came subsequent to the peace accords.

So as of the peace accords, that 244 would have been something we would have expected. The committee fully expects 133 can get scrubbed down a little bit more and we have asked Mr. Trowbridge to help us do that. I am sure it will happen, and that is a very important part of this process. But even Mr. Trowbridge is sitting with, he thought, 169 names, now reduced significantly.

General Vessey has a body of names. Our Government policy today is a Government policy based on the premise that some folks may have been alive. That is the very reason General Vessey is

seeking accountability. I have personally read some of the reports on those people. There is a report, for instance, on a flier shot down. They watched the chute open. He is in communication on the ground talking to his wing man who is flying above him, and then signs off, and that is the last we know. It is the last we know that the person was alive.

There are significant questions about those kinds of cases. Obviously, you have analyzed all of them and seen them. Going back to 1973, the time of the accords, the time you were sort of accruing these lists, what was your expectation about how many should be returning and what did you think when you saw the lists presented by the North Vietnamese, personally?

General TIGHE. My personal view was shock because I had a great deal of faith in the approximate numbers of those lists that we had compiled and the dossiers, and my reaction was that there was something radically wrong with the lists versus our information, that they should have contained many more names. That was my personal judgment and that was a collective judgment of all those that had worked compiling the lists. It pertained to the personnel aspects of casualty reporting and the intelligence reports.

The CHAIRMAN. This is what point in time now, we are talking Paris Peace Accords, 1973?

General TIGHE. It was 1973, Senator. I was out there through 1974.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you communicate that to anybody at that time?

General TIGHE. Only to my commander. I had no reason to go beyond that. It had been made very sensitive.

The CHAIRMAN. That was to Admiral Gayler.

General TIGHE. That was to Admiral Gayler. To the best of my knowledge, I probably also discussed it with the intelligence personnel of the component commands and probably in various and sundry meetings with my opposite numbers back in Washington, but I have no memory for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee a sense of that disparity of the numbers in terms of your expectations, and I am not dealing with facts here yet. I am dealing with your expectations.

General TIGHE. Now here I think probably we kept reassuring ourselves there was something yet to come, and the whole aura surrounding the release of the lists and the preparation to bring them home dealt with a feeling we were only dealing with part of the numbers. There was more to come that we weren't aware of.

The CHAIRMAN. When the committee today talks about 100, 133, 90, whatever the number is in that range, would that fit within your sense of the expectation you had at that time?

General TIGHE. I would say probably, yes. I would like to say something about the numbers though, and I applaud your universality. Numbers list exploration is very important, but it seems to me that we should be way past the time when we're dealing with lists or numbers. We should have available to each of you gentlemen a computer sitting in front of you in which each of these numbers could be a name, in which you would have a complete file available to you. I mean, it's certainly readily available technology today.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, General, that regrettably it is a source of anxiety with the committee. We have been laboring for 6 months to really collect the data base, get it into one base and make comparisons, put it in as solid a grouping as we can beside each person. Now, I am not here to pick on agencies and individuals, but you have criticized that in the context of your report and otherwise.

Mr. Trowbridge this morning has acknowledged that there have been some shortcomings with respect to both resources and methodology, and I think that we understand that now. That is one of the facts that is becoming evident and accepted here. We do not need to overly belabor it, but let me come back to Admiral Moorer on this. Could you comment on the same sense of expectation and your understanding of what you thought was coming through the lists that you were compiling and the knowledge you had, both as CNO and ultimately as JCS, Joint Chief of Staff?

Admiral MOORER. Of course. In 1970, I became chairman. Up until that time I think that by and large, the numbers that you have on the board are fairly accurate up until 1970 or so, but then the war went on another 3 or 4 years. And, as I said in my statement, I certainly was aware of the kind of people we were dealing with who have an entirely different sense of value and who view a POW as having value which could be measured as a source of intelligence, or even a trading item such as occurred when the French bought several of their POW's.

After the lists came out—as you may recall—they came out, I think, in three separate messages, wasn't it, the total lists. They were in Hanoi prison. I too was disappointed in view of the fact that we'd been fighting 8 or 9 years and at one time we had over 500,000 men down there.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, let me try to interrupt you there and suggest it is important for the committee to separate disappointment from expectation based on fact. Now, as we all know, the circumstances over there in terms of survival, et cetera, were difficult. There were a lot of differences in this war, of which you are well aware, we are all well aware of. The question is really what did the intelligence base—not a hope that we are going to have a grand exodus of a lot of people we lost—but what did your intelligence base say to you in terms of that expectation?

Where there hard cases and hard numbers that you said, wait a minute, I know we have got more POW's there, or was it just a hope?

Admiral MOORER. Well, it wasn't hard numbers as I recall, that I could—I'm talking about in addition to the 591 or whatever it was that came out of Hanoi. I don't recall a hard number that people said, well, having analyzed what took place when a plane crashed, or the pilot in the air described, what it looked like to him and trying to judge how many people were still out there.

I don't recall a hard number. There may have been one, but I don't recall it. I do know that, by and large, the figures that General Tighe is referring to that were prepared there in CINCPAC were sent in and I'm sure that Mr. Shields can give a better answer than I can give. But I don't recall a hard number where we could

go to the Vietnamese and say, hey, you've still got a couple of hundred or 300, or 400 of our people and we want them back.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you forward a number to Dr. Kissinger?

Admiral MOORER. No, but he gets the messages, all those messages I was reading.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever give him a specific number that was to be expected through the Paris peace talks?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir. I did not do that because the way the thing worked, he of course was dealing with the Secretary of Defense who was giving him all the numbers that were finally peaked up at that level from the services and the unified command.

The CHAIRMAN. I would assume that the Secretary of Defense got them from you.

Admiral MOORER. Well, not all of them. He was getting—each service was working on this and he was getting numbers. I was getting numbers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and from the unified commander, and also the commander in Saigon, and it was not a hard, hard figure that I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. I have obviously some more questions, but I want to go around here to Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Moorer, can you give me some sense of the atmosphere during the Paris Peace Accords as we went into the negotiations with the Vietnamese? Were we anxious to get in and get out? Were we focused heavily on POW's? Were we not focused on POW's and more focused on getting out of the war? I do not want to characterize it for you. You characterize what you felt—I am not asking you to mention names, just atmosphere.

Admiral MOORER. Well, as you know, we had this agreement in October when Kissinger made his speech, Peace is at Hand, and it was quite clear that the North Vietnamese had no intention of complying with the terms of that agreement. As I said in my statement, the withdrawal of POW's—I mean, our forces continued to the point where, if we kept it up at that rate, the only Americans left in North Vietnam would be POW's. That's when I had the discussions with the President about what to do about it, and to do what we could to force them to sign that agreement.

I'm sure you're familiar with it. So the facts are that the North Vietnamese did agree to sign this agreement which they ultimately did in Paris, I think, on January 27. So to answer your question specifically, I think it's quite true that the United States, and I'll have to include the public in this, wanted to finish and get out. And so, the objective was to, of course, have the POW's released and, at the same time, to certainly bring the war to a close because the Defense Department was out of money, for one thing, so we couldn't continue with the war.

Senator SMITH. In your deposition to the committee, without quoting you directly, you intimated that there really was not, for want of a better word, stomach among those who were negotiating on our side, the U.S. side, to resume the war. Is that fair? In other words, is that a fair characterization of what you implied?

Admiral MOORER. Yes sir, that's exactly right. I mean, at that point, there weren't very many that wanted to continue. Most of

the people, including the Congress, I must say, wanted to get out as I said.

Senator SMITH. With that in mind and again, I am trying to get a sense. We went to Vietnam. The committee went to Vietnam. We talked to the Vietnamese on their side of this, but we really have never had much opportunity to talk to those who were involved on our side. But you said in your deposition that—let me just quote you: There was general agreement among the members, meaning those who were there on behalf of the United States, that it was highly likely that there were U.S. prisoners of war being held by the Pathet Laos who were not going to be released during Operation Homecoming.

But that for political and Congressional reasons there really was little or nothing, at least at that time, we could do about it, unquote. Could you respond to that?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. Let me make a point. In the agreement, there was—the first agreement was made in October. Laos was included as to be viewed just like we were handling North Vietnam. In the second and final agreement that was signed on January 27, I think—I don't recall whether Laos was actually put in there, but it was assumed again that if there were POW's in Laos, they would come out.

But while we're talking about Laos, I would like to emphasize two or three things. In the first place, as you know, Laos had a government in Vientiane where the Prime Minister was Souvanna Phouma. They had another kind of civilian guard at Ulong Prabong, commanded by a general called Van Pao, and then there was the Pathet Laos forces and there were the South Vietnamese forces, but the operations in Laos were primarily air and some intelligence penetrations.

In other words, what I'm trying to get across is that the volume of people that would be POW's in Laos, the number of people, would not approach that in North Vietnam, because of the scope of the effort in North Vietnam compared to Laos.

Senator SMITH. Let me also state that in your deposition you were very forthcoming in stating your very strong opinion, and I will not get into the method that you stated it because it is classified, but I will say that in your deposition to this committee you did state that you did provide to your superiors, and correct me if I am wrong, indications that you were extremely concerned about the fact that we had no Laos prisoner lists, that we did not have an accounting of Laos prisoners.

Correct me if I have characterized any of this incorrectly, and that the troop withdrawal really ought to be stopped unless we get an accounting and that you provided that, to your credit—your immense credit. You provided that information to your superiors and essentially were overruled. Is that a correct assessment of your position at the time?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, and I think by and large that's correct. As a matter of fact, eight or nine, or ten, I've forgotten what it was, came out on February 1, were reported, I believe, by the North Vietnamese as being Pathet Laos prisoners. I think it turned out not to be the case, isn't that right?

Senator SMITH. I think there were eight, but I think it was certainly your opinion and the opinion of many others that that was far less than what we thought that they had.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, they should have had more, but on the other hand, nothing—I want to try to differentiate between eight and nine, and maybe a few tens on one hand and what was in North Vietnam. I think that people have overestimated the number of prisoners that were in Laos, but there were undoubtedly some from some of these operations that were conducted.

Senator SMITH. My time is up, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and I welcome both our distinguished witnesses for whom I have great respect, admiration and affection, and we are very grateful that you are both here. General Tighe, you might remember that you and I have had several encounters like this. The last one I remember was when I was in the House of Representatives and we had a hearing at which you testified and, of course, at that time you stated that you were under the belief that there were Americans left behind against their will in Southeast Asia after the completion of hostilities in 1973. Are you still of that view, general?

General TIGHE. I haven't had access to any data since 1986 to change my views that I expressed at that time to that effect. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. At the time, if I remember correctly, I asked you—

Senator REID. I am sorry, Senator McCain. Did you say that you changed your mind?

Senator MCCAIN. No, he has not. He has seen no evidence to change it. If I remember our exchange at that time, you stated to me that it was the weight of the body of evidence that gave you this—caused you to hold this belief. Maybe you can tell me that again, or for the record, or exactly what the specifics are that have led you to this very important conclusion.

General TIGHE. Yes. I think the discussion this morning, I sat through this morning's session and listened to the discussion of evidence, and I take it for granted many of your lawyers and you talk about an evidential base.

Senator MCCAIN. Do not include me in that group.

General TIGHE. That might have been quite different in the conclusive evidence that we heard someone talk about later on, but I think the questions that were usually addressed to me then and today, you're talking about the weight of evidence again, and here we're talking about the value of largely human intelligence reporting which we went to great lengths to prove or disprove. In those cases where we could not disprove it and could only uphold the veracity and integrity of the witness provided evidence that there were alive Americans still held against their will in Southeast Asia.

It had the inevitable result, such testimony, on my part of asking me what proof did I have and I've answered for the record many times that I didn't have any proof, and that to ask for proof was to get on the ground in Southeast Asia and examine every inch of the ground, or to have a cooperative government there from which we

could get some straight answers. My recommendation at that time, and still is, that we establish diplomatic relations again and get on as friendly a basis with the Hanoi Government as possible, as quickly as possible, and get into the files ourselves if that will ever be permitted.

Senator McCAIN. General, and I say this with great respect, my hometown newspaper this morning had an article that stated irrefutable proof. Now, I think that is a little different and that is quoting you as saying: A former Pentagon intelligence chief says the United States had, quote, irrefutable evidence that prisoners were being held in North Vietnam.

I get a different impression from what you are saying. I am not trying to be in any way combative here, but I think it is very important—

General TIGHE. Senator, I'd ask you first of all to please try to tie down the origins of the press reports. I don't think I've ever used the word irrefutable about any of the evidence that I've talked about. I'd also like to say for the record today that in the case, in the last few days of my having been, or a report that I was alleged to have written having been reported in the Wall Street Journal, that I asked a reporter on the phone who sounded as if he were quoting from a classified document, are you quoting from a report that I wrote in 1986, submitted to General Peroots, and he said yes, I am.

I said, is it classified, and he said yes. And I said, well, I don't have access to that document. It's classified top secret and that's the end of our discussion. This was a telephone discussion. Now, the quotes that are in there, they are even more interesting because of one word the Wall Street Journal report said used the word probable. The report I submitted to the Congress said possible, and he is referring to a copy of the report that was not submitted officially at all and is, therefore, traceable. I immediately called the security shop of the Defense Intelligence Agency and reported that they had a classified document in their hands, the press, and that I had been asked to comment on it and refused.

So I think if you'll check the sources sometime of the words irrefutable and others, you won't find them in my vocabulary.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much. Please note that I do not think that detracts from your opinion, which is a product of many many years of work in the intelligence field, because I think you bring to this committee and to the record a very impressive and very forceful—I think a very impressive resume that I think lends great weight to what you have to say.

At the same time, I am sure you understand why we want to clear up your conclusion as the weight of evidence as opposed to irrefutable proof. I think there is a significant difference there. Could I ask your opinion as far as what you have seen progress—and I know that you have not been on active duty in some years—the progress that has been made as far as the cooperation of the Vietnamese is concerned?

What brings it to mind is you have just mentioned we have got to get people on the ground and find it. Are you favorably impressed, at least to some degree, that the Vietnamese have cooperated somewhat?

General TIGHE. Senator McCain, I would suggest that, from what I read in the press, that I detect more cooperation than I've seen in the past, for a very good reason on their part. I have suggested that it is important that we get into the files of the ministry of interior and all of the communications in that apparatus in the Hanoi area in Vietnam.

I am not privy to the information as to whether or not your committee has determined that we have had access to the ministry of interior files, so I don't know how far that cooperation has gone. But I would suggest that unless we do get full access to those files, we'll never really know what the true story has been, the numbers and the names.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. One final question, Mr. Chairman. And this is very important, General. Have you ever had any belief or seen any evidence or had any indication that there was a conspiracy or a cover-up on the part of the intelligence services, any one you were associated with, or any knowledge of a cover-up or conspiracy taking place on this issue?

General TIGHE. No. And, as you will recall, in the report that I rendered, the small task force report that I rendered, that was the principal question that was asked me; have you detected a cover-up in Government, in any part of the Government, DIA or elsewhere, on this issue. My response was absolutely not.

I doubt it very much that you can have a conspiracy, a real conspiracy in Government, with the investigative press and all the other means we have at our disposal. It is very difficult to believe this could have been covered up at all by the Government for this length of time.

Senator McCAIN. Do you share that view, Admiral Moorer?

Admiral MOORER. Absolutely, yes.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Just as a follow up to that, is it fair to say that this issue has been handled in such a way as to give credence to that theory of possibility?

General TIGHE. I'd respond to that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral MOORER. I've read this over and over, in books and papers and so on. Yes, sir, I know people who make that accusation, but I don't know of any possible reason or credence to a statement like that.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but the fact that information is hard to get, the disorganization at times, all of the things that have been articulated by the committee and by witnesses, I am saying would give credence, would give people the ability to say something's fishy here, something's not working.

Admiral MOORER. There are several books that say something's fishy. I mean that's why people write books. Let us say that in my presence I have never seen the slightest indication of that, and I think that I know the people too well that I'd just consider it as an insult to suggest that they would—that any of the people I've dealt with would do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Can either of you explain why the Government said they are all back or they are dead, when, in fact, there was evidence to the contrary?

Admiral MOORER. I think that statement was referring to the first list that came out. I remember it came out in three sections, and the messages. It also listed four or five—I've forgotten which—that were dead. I don't agree if that's what the Government said. Whoever said it, I don't know who. I never have found out who the Government is. But I think you need a direct statement from some individual to make that meaningful.

The CHAIRMAN. Well we have direct statements. But you agree, then, that that is not accurate?

Admiral MOORER. I agree that it's not accurate that there's any kind of conspiracy.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree that those statements are also not accurate, that they are all back and that they are all dead as of 1973?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, I doubt that's accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. General Tighe, do you agree that is not accurate?

General TIGHE. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. You are aware of the statements I am referring to.

General TIGHE. Yes, I am.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are in direct contradiction to the state of the evidence, are they not?

General TIGHE. I presume whoever prepared the statements for the individual that gave them had a great deal of fog in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. And would you not agree that that has contributed significantly to both confusion and to the whole—not just conspiracy theory, but to all of the turmoil around this issue over the last 15, 20 years?

General TIGHE. That, and the semantics that we used and the different bureaucracies involved in this whole issue contributed to this same idea, plus the fact—you brought up a desire to get on with it and get it over. We've had an overwhelming sentiment in this country to get on and get out of it.

I can remember holding prisoners in Camp Lucky Strike, 20,000 of them, who only wanted to come home after World War II. It's the same thing after every war; let's get over, get out of this. But then the bureaucracies that are all involved, whether they are personnel or casualty reporting people or the intelligence agencies and so forth—too many people in the act all doing their same thing with their own definitions and their own directives. It's just brought total confusion to the people of this country, and particularly the ones that have a vested interest in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I am just curious. Either General Tighe or Admiral Moorer, were there factors in this war that made accountability more difficult than in previous conflicts?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, ma'am. I think there's no question about that. In the first place, you know, we didn't defeat North Vietnam; we had no access to the area. As I said in 1973 the amendment to the appropriation for fiscal 1973 said that none of these funds will be used for combat action, on, above, or off shore Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, North Vietnam.

And to my knowledge the North Vietnamese, when they read that, they, for all practical purposes, just threw the agreement of January 27, out the window. So they didn't feel any obligation to comply with it, because they knew we wouldn't have any means of bringing pressure.

In that regard, I think also I would add the fact that, as I said in my opening statement, the entire Nation—you've got to bring the public into this thing too. They wanted to get out and the Congress was responding to all of the pressure they were getting. It was kind of a mindset nationwide that wanted to get out as soon as possible.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess I was wondering, too, if the fact that it was undeclared, that there was never any declaration of war, if that had any effect on how there were any—

Admiral MOORER. You just hit on my pet project. I mean, certainly, if we're going to commit 500,000 and fight for 9 years, we ought to declare war. That had a lot to do with it in my view.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Reporting. Did it in any way effect the reporting of the casualties or lists that were kept?

Admiral MOORER. I think, Senator Kassebaum, if we had declared war we would have won it. And if we had won it, we wouldn't ask them, we would just go look.

Senator KASSEBAUM. OK. Let me go back to 1973 and the time when CINCPAC was asked to pull together lists. Is that correct? And those were presented at that time. What was the reaction—your reaction, I guess—to the POW lists that were provided in response by the North Vietnamese, or maybe you have covered this already?

General TIGHE. Yes I have, ma'am.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am sorry.

General TIGHE. In answer to your question, there was quite a bit of shock associated with it, and the expectation that we probably would get additional lists over and above those that we had, that there was something more to come that we weren't aware of.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That you never got.

General TIGHE. Which we never got.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Were you comfortable with the reporting process at this point, just within our own Government between DIA and the individual services?

General TIGHE. You know, having been associated with DIA for so long, I hate to tell you this, but ma'am, I wasn't really very much aware of DIA when I was at CINPAC. I had gone down through an Air Force chain and I ended up out of the Air Force for the first time in a unified command, and DIA had never made much of an impression on me since we were so independent in the Air Force and thought we had all the intelligence apparatus that was needed. DIA was probably not all that important to me in those times. I was a newly starred general officer.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, then, when you switched hats and were at DIA—

General TIGHE. I had to change that rapidly.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But you feel, as you look at both sides, let us say from this vantage point, that there was a close coordination between the two. And that DIA, in their investigation, in their

analysis, was working in close coordination. In other words the left hand and right hand did know what it was doing.

General TIGHE. I, of course, assumed that there were people much brighter than ourselves at CINCPAC and much more capable of getting a lot of resources together, doing a much better job than we could do on the subject, and had access to everything that was available on the subject.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess the only other question I would have, and again, perhaps this was answered. At the time of the peace accords in 1973, was the reaction at that time on the lists from the North Vietnamese a factor in the future, in the next few years in the handling of the whole POW/MIA issue?

General TIGHE. I would suggest it did have a very definite effect, because it had a chilling effect on the uselessness of pursuing the subject when we met no change or alteration or cooperation with the Hanoi Government. After all we were talking about, they were the enemy; it wasn't the United States or any part of it that was the enemy.

I suggest that throughout the military services and the unified and specific command structure, there was a feeling of somewhat uselessness in pursuing the subject for quite a long while. I think that characterized, probably, the early days of DIA's exploration of this, when they got less and less support, and at one time almost were disbanded.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That was basically decisions, I suppose, that were made by the executive and legislative branches.

General TIGHE. And the general opinion of the country.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Tighe, if you would, once again, give me the reasons that you believed there were POW's still alive after Operation Homecoming, these POW's being in Southeast Asia someplace?

General TIGHE. It started, of course, in terms of the Vietnam War, with my association—I was on the Air Force staff in Vietnam. I had returned there quite often with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and also with the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Air Forces.

So I was very very close to what was going on in Vietnam. I had had a long intelligence career up to that date, both after World War II where we had the same debate going on, and after the Korean War, the same thing, I had been in intelligence assignments throughout most of World War II and Korea.

Senator REID. I appreciate that.

General TIGHE. To get down to the evidential base on which I based my decision in Vietnam, it was strictly the reports that there were live Americans still being cited regularly in Vietnam throughout my tenure at CINCPAC, and then at DIA. I came to DIA from CINCPAC.

Senator REID. Admiral Moorer, would you give me your reasons why you believed there were POW's still in Southeast Asia?

Admiral MOORER. Why there are POW's still in Southeast Asia?

Senator REID. Yes, at the time, in the early seventies, why you believed they were still there?

Admiral MOORER. Well, because the scope of the operations and the number of persons that were involved and the number of aircraft that were shot down and so on, where we didn't find immediate information about what happened to the pilot and so on. I thought also, in view of the fact the war had been going on for 9 years, you know, I certainly would expect it to be more than 591. I think that was the number in the initial list.

I didn't think you could clean it up that fast. I didn't even think the North Vietnamese Government knew how many. I dare say if we ever do get a chance to look at their files, we'll be surprised at the incompleteness.

Senator REID. Is there anything that has transpired in the years since to cause either of you gentlemen to think that your initial feelings then were wrong?

Admiral MOORER. I don't think that they were wrong so much as that you're never going to know whether you're wrong or right unless, as General Tighe just explained, we get access to the files and get freedom to go to each point where we have reason to believe that there may be some there.

But, after all, we're talking about 20 years or so. And I think the idea that there are large numbers of Americans in a barbed wire compound somewhere in the mountains of Laos, I don't think that is a practical assumption.

Senator REID. That was my next question to both you, Admiral Moorer, and you, General Tighe. You have both stated here today on a number of occasions, that you believed that following Operation Homecoming, for various reasons—some of which you have enunciated, some of which you have not today—that there were still POW's, American POW's remaining in Southeast Asia, right?

Admiral MOORER. I don't think that we had exhausted all possibilities completely. Consequently until we had, you had to assume that there were people still there. Some day, let us hope, we will find out no.

Senator REID. You have indicated, Admiral Moorer, that you do not believe that there is a compound with barbed wire around it with a large number of Americans now. Do you believe that there are any Americans? Do you have any basis for a belief that there are still Americans alive in Southeast Asia who were prisoners or war or are prisoners of war?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think there could be Americans that have deserted and don't want to come back and get disciplined, who married local girls or even be employed because of their expertise in some very high tech equipment or something of that kind.

But as I said before, I don't think you're going to be able to answer the question precisely until we can get into the area. That's why I answered Senator Kassebaum's question that, until we defeat them, we're never going to know, and no one's going to support a declaration of war today.

Senator REID. General Tighe, is your answer any different?

General TIGHE. I'd like to—and I don't want to introduce a whole new subject on this issue, but something that's bothered me down through the years. If your records, the records of your committee, do indeed show—and I don't know whether this is going to be a fact or not—but if they do, indeed, show that none of our prisoners

of war who returned were ever interrogated by the Chinese or the Russians, then my concern is that those nations which had the most reason to interrogate our prisoners must have had other means of getting information on our technology and all of the things of tactics and operations and so forth that were so important to them.

And my suggestion is that until that is all cleared up and we find out, there may have been another track by which our prisoners were routed and were interrogated by the Chinese and/or the Russians. That introduces a whole new aspect to the question.

Senator REID. What you are saying is the prisoners of war who came home in Operation Homecoming were not interrogated, interviewed, to the extent that—we know some of them were. We had a general here in earlier hearings who did personally interrogate some of the prisoners. Is that not right? Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator REID. He did not.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not personally. He suggested that they had been interrogated, but he also suggested that none of them would have been transferred to the Soviet Union and that it would have a Politburo decision to make such a transfer because of the nature of the Cold War then, and that there were no records to that effect.

Senator REID. Anyway, you raise an interesting point, and that is something we need to follow up on, Mr. Chairman. But I have one last question. With the experience that you have had, do you believe if we had complete access to the files of the Vietnamese Government, the Laotian Government, the Cambodian Government, or any combination thereof, that the files would reveal information relating to people that were left behind for whatever reason?

General TIGHE. I have no way of knowing. I only know what I read in the press. I read a lot of newspapers but I have no way of knowing, other than that that's been reported. I don't know what kind of access you've had.

Senator REID. Do any of your people have any information in that regard?

Admiral MOORER. Is your question, assuming you had access, do you think that would reveal all the POW's?

Senator REID. Yes.

Admiral MOORER. I don't think so. I don't think that they were that accurate or they cared very much about files.

General TIGHE. I would respectfully disagree with that. I would suggest that they kept accurate, very accurate records, and that the reporting system we have of tracing all the way through low-level communications all the way up would contribute to what was, indeed, a very carefully networked accounting for prisoners of war throughout the conflict.

Admiral MOORER. Would you include Laos?

General TIGHE. Laos is another matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Laos, I think—let us make it very clear. Not only did they not have any records, they barely have any pencils or anything to write with there.

I would like to ask Mr. Trowbridge if he would contribute to that answer, because he has been working on this as of late, and we

have just come back from a trip in which we have achieved greater access to records than has ever been had previously. I think there is a mixture of the two answers, but, Mr. Trowbridge, do you want to answer?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We feel records research is one of the areas that will provide answers, if we can get good access—and we're starting to get some inroads into the records. We're getting into the MOI records, as General Tighe had mentioned. We're not having as much success on the military side yet. We're always hopeful, but we've had researchers out of our office directly—analysts from our office doing records research since last July. It was General Vessey's initiative to try and open that up. We always want more than we're getting.

Progress has been slow, but there are some strides being made there, and we are finding documents, a few that they have, and we feel that they kept good records.

Senator REID. You feel they have what?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We feel that they kept good records, the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that we continue to press for further cooperation. The Vietnamese have stepped up that level of cooperation significantly. We think there is more that can be done, and we are hopeful that over the course of the next few months that will be done. It is clear that in some places they had very accurate records.

But I think you also have to remember—I mean the nature of the bombing was such, as we all know, particularly on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, or other movement areas, that prisoners being moved back on some occasions could conceivably have been obliterated by our own bombs, accurate? And there would be no records whatever of anything in that vicinity.

We have to remember that the Vietnamese have some 200,000 MIA and 2 million KIA. And they say to us, you know, we need some help in finding out where you bombed and what happened, because we are trying to answer to some of our families. So this is not exclusively a one-sided effort, and I think we need to keep that in mind. Senator Kerrey.

Senator KERREY. There's a 15 minute roll call vote in progress.

Senator McCAIN. Could I just ask a question real quick, a follow up? General Tighe, you mentioned that it is a possibility that there could have been another route of POW's to China and/or Russia. Have you ever seen any evidence of that?

General TIGHE. No I haven't, but that's what bothers me.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Senator KERREY. This morning, General Tighe and Admiral Moorer, I was pursuing a line of questioning with Mr. Trowbridge about the methodology used in developing the POW/Missing list in the first place. In a second line of questioning, I was trying to determine his evaluation of the political environment in 1973 and what impact that might have had on the effort made to get a full accounting at that time.

I would like to continue that line of questioning with you. Both of you have served at the same time and might be able to provide me, at least, with some information that will be useful in trying to

determine why it is that we ended up with the discrepancies in the lists in particular.

General Tighe, as I understand it you were tasked with the responsibility, as the peace negotiations were going on, of coming up with a list, a master list of people that we were expecting to come home that were serving in the United States Navy. Is that correct?

General TIGHE. My charge was just to come up with a list that the military forces in the Pacific felt should be returned.

Senator KERREY. And how did you come up with that list? Did you simply go to some Naval office where that was already being done, or was there some other means?

General TIGHE. No, I convened—by direction—convened a group of intelligence analysts, and casualty personnel at CINCPAC Headquarters. We examined all of the data that was available that each of these commands, component commands had; determined whether or not there was a possibility that John X was going to be returned as a prisoner of war, whether the odds were favoring his return or not. And so listed and came up with dossiers to support that with the intelligence that we had. That was an analytical judgment. It was based on a variety of both open and closed material.

Senator KERREY. Was there a coordinated effort to try to make sure that we had consistent definitions across the services?

General TIGHE. As far as we were concerned, we were contributing only. I have no idea what happened to the lists once they got into the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator KERREY. Do either of you have an opinion as to why there was not an objective method used to determine who was, in fact, either held as a prisoner or who was missing, who was in any of the other categories? Because one of the things that has happened to us, of course, is the list has changed. If you have no objective method to determine who is going to be on the list, then it is relatively easy to subjectively make a determination of who is going to be off.

General TIGHE. I have a couple of suggestions, hearing the testimony this morning. First of all, the intelligence organizations collected intelligence. They weren't driven by a declaration by one of the military services that somebody was missing. They collected intelligence and it didn't bear solely on somebody being on a list as a probable prisoner of war.

Secondly, right down to the time, at least, that I left the Defense Department and retired, the object was to collect data on all Americans. It did not exclude deserters, it did not exclude the people that might have had other reasons for staying behind. It had to do with living Americans left in Southeast Asia.

Senator KERREY. But no written instructions as to how this classification was to occur.

General TIGHE. There were—to the best of my knowledge, nobody came up with a coordination—coordinated list of instructions any place in Government.

Senator KERREY. Why was that, in your opinion?

General TIGHE. My opinion is that the military services had been charged down through the years with maintaining the data on

people that they had lost. For the intelligence agencies to be tacked on to that casualty reporting responsibility was always, in my judgment, considered kind of an adjunct responsibility. It was supportive, but really the military services were determining who was alive and who was not alive.

Mr. Trowbridge may want to comment on that, but I think, probably, the two-track responsibility may have added more to the confusion. Of course, DIA wasn't in existence at the end of the Korean War or World War II. It had been created, as I recall, in 1961. So it had not entered that kind of an act in previous wars. For the first time now we had casualty reports from the military services and we had intelligence reporting in a general sense. It was very very difficult to coordinate the bureaucracies.

Senator KERREY. Let me connect that to the other line of questioning, which was the political environment at the time. I should disclose to you that it seems to me, at times in discussing that period, a great deal of defensiveness about what was going on. Though I find that understandable—I am not suggesting that you are. I am suggesting only that I hear it a lot when we pursue any line of questioning.

Let me disclose that in 1992 there are political problems of even approaching the POW/MIA issue. You hear all the time people, political advisors, who say, gee, do not get involved with that. Senator Kerry, our chairman, and Senator McCain on previous occasions, you find yourself getting in trouble because people will say either that you are doing too much or you are not doing enough, and it is a very difficult issue.

It was much more difficult in 1973. Admiral Moorer, in your testimony you say that President Nixon, with whom you discussed this, was also greatly concerned about the POW's in Vietnam. The question that I have of you is if that is the case, why in the peace document itself was there not greater provisions for us having on-site personnel for verification, some sort of effort to cut off the potential movement of people over into Laos or the return to Laos. It seems that we did not have, really, much leverage over the Pathet Laos at all.

Why did this not concern become reflected, either in the peace agreement itself or in action that followed the development of that document?

Admiral MOORER. Well, Senator Kerrey, I believe if you read the articles in the agreement—this is an agreement and not a treaty—you see that one of the major requirements was that all—and I think it read all POW's in Indochina, in the four countries, would be returned. There was nothing, I don't believe, in the agreement that stated what would be done if you didn't return them; what pressures were available to force what you were talking about, to force compliance with the terms of the POW agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Except, Admiral, the Laos did not sign the agreement. They were not party to it, were they?

Admiral MOORER. The Laos didn't, no, sir. But, as I mentioned earlier, it was assumed Laos was in it. Le Duc Tho, I think, didn't object, because it was in the agreement, then Kissinger made the speech about peace is it at hand; Laos was included. But then when

they got into the new one that they signed in Paris on January 27, it was not.

It was, I guess, more or less assumed that the agreement they made in October carried over into the agreement they made in January.

Senator KERREY. You mentioned a great deal about the political environment, particularly of 1972.

Admiral MOORE. And 1973.

Senator KERREY. Both before and after the Christmas bombing, and in 1973 as well, did you Admiral—or General Tighe, either one of you, ever hear colleagues or friends either in or outside the military, or in or outside civilian service, suggest or say that perhaps for political reasons we ought to leave this whole thing alone, after the peace agreement itself had been signed?

For the period from, say, October 1973 to April 1975, was it ever mentioned casually that for political reasons, perhaps we ought to move on to something else because it is going to be difficult to discuss; that it is going to create embarrassment; that perhaps we ought to just let this thing cool because the American people want it behind us?

Admiral MOORE. No, sir, I never heard anyone say that, not in my presence.

General TIGHE. It was, by the way, a common mood among military personnel in the Pacific that it had been a political problem from the start and that the military had not been able to do anything about what should, quote, have been done in this, that, or the other instance of conducting the war.

In my judgment, there was overall agreement that this was an almost hopeless political situation in which the United States had lost and was continuing to further lose its leverage to get anything in the way of an agreement.

Senator KERREY. Given the changed environment from 1973 to 1992, it is much easier today to talk about Vietnam and what went wrong and what we ought to be doing about POW's and MIA's than it was in 1973. Today you hear people saying leave it alone. It is hard for me to imagine that in 1973 and 1974 and 1975 there were not people almost all the time saying that, for political reasons, that perhaps we should not pursue this.

The reason I ask it is I am trying to determine whether or not in 1973, 1974, 1975, despite—Mr. Trowbridge, earlier this morning when I asked you this line of questioning you said it was in the fiber of the American people to bring back our people. I am suggesting it may have been in the fiber, but I do not believe it was reflected in our policies during that period of time.

I am putting this line of inquiry to you not to discover whether or not you made some mistakes, but whether or not there were some discussions at that time that, for political reasons, perhaps we ought to leave alone.

Admiral MOORE. I can answer for myself. I have never heard anyone suggest that in any sense. As I recall the POW list, again, by the North Vietnamese complying in part at least by sending in—these messages came from, actually, Paris. They went to Paris and came around. But they listed the 591 plus 5 or 6 dead—I've

forgotten how many dead. And that was kind of the base that was used from then on.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I need to interrupt you and I apologize. We have about 2 minutes left on a vote. I did not want you to think that your testimony was scaring everybody away, but they have gone over to vote.

Admiral MOORE. I wish it was, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to be back momentarily. Let me just say we are going to come back. We have a number of more questions. Mr. Trowbridge, we need your report on the Spinelli case. We have a number of other questions to ask on some important issues, so we are going to come back right away.

But I might add on Senator Kerrey's statement that—I mean I seem to recall a real hunkering down after 1973. I mean this was Watergate time, folks, and there was a real diversion. Am I not right?

Admiral MOORE. Absolutely, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a real hunkering down within the military too. Folks had just come back. This was a very different attitude and different time, and I do not think we should sit here in 1992 and be pompous and pontificate about a certain virtue that simply was not being applied to policy then. I mean is that not accurate, General?

General TIGHE. It is as far as I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trowbridge.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral MOORE. Senator, I'd just like to thank you for saying that, because I've made that point over and over again. People just find themselves unable to move back into the environment that they are asking the questions about.

The CHAIRMAN. A very different time. I do remember it well. Admiral, we are going to recess and we will be back momentarily.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order, please.

We have a fair amount of territory still to cover and we want to get going at it. Senator Smith hasn't had a round yet, so let me turn to Senator Smith.

Let me just ask at the outset. I had asked—Bob, you were not here, but I think Chuck Trowbridge is ready to respond on the Spinelli case. So we might even want to lead off with that.

Senator SMITH. Let me come back just a second. I do have a couple of questions for General Tighe, but I do have just one follow-up for you, Admiral. I didn't want to interrupt the last time because other members had not spoken, but I wish I could have at that time and it would have been clearer, but to look at the framework of time that we're talking about in terms of Shields' saying everybody's dead and your message to your superiors saying that you felt that we had to look at this Laos issue a little closer, that there were indications there were Americans still there in Laos, we ought to perhaps suspend the troop withdrawal, et cetera.

The period of time, the window that we're talking about there, is your response to your superiors was on or about March 22 or March 23, 1973, the Shields comment was April 13, 1973. Now, I

realize that you were not in a policy role there. You were, I believe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as I understand it.

Now, what did you do? What did you say inside the councils of government at that time when you heard Shields say that?

Admiral MOORER. Well, first, I don't think I said that we should stop all the operations. That wasn't just my idea alone. I agreed with it, but there were other people supporting that, too.

So I just want to point out that it wasn't my—I didn't walk up and say, stop the operations, that way. It came from a discussion of what are we going to do in a situation like that.

Senator SMITH. I guess what I'm getting at is, a statement like that is pretty dramatic, when all the involvement in this issue right up until this time is prisoners in Laos, prisoners in Laos, nobody's accounted for, right up there, even to the extent—and you're not the only one, we'll have other people who will be deposed who support your contention and what you said and what you provided to your superiors, that there was evidence that there were Americans still in Laos.

And yet somebody abruptly, within a 2-week, 3-week period, says: Everybody's dead; let's move on. That's a very sudden, dramatic decision. It's a dramatic departure from what was going on in the inner councils of government.

I'm not going to challenge you. I was curious as to what you might have said to your same superiors you sent the message to when you saw that document.

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think, first, you probably will ask Mr. Shields tomorrow just how he said and what he said, how he said it.

Senator SMITH. Did you tell your superiors that you didn't think that was correct?

Admiral MOORER. I don't recall doing that. I don't know why he said it or what was the basis of that at all.

Senator SMITH. Let me just move quickly to General Tighe. General, you've been quoted in the press as saying that—first of all, I want to thank you and Admiral Moorer and the other gentlemen from DIA as well for taking the time and being cooperative with the committee.

I might just say, DIA might want to put your tape recorders on, but in a complimentary way, as far as DIA is concerned, in fairness to them, if the policy is that you feel within the inner councils of government, the highest levels, right up at the Joint Chiefs level, there are prisoners in Laos and then somebody abruptly says they're all dead, that tends to send some very strong messages to those guys that are down there in the trenches investigating this.

As Mr. Trowbridge has already testified, there were some attempts to cut back funding, and most likely as a result of those statements. But I've made my point there.

General Tighe, you've been quoted in the press as saying that you intended your so-called Tighe report to be made public. What happened? Why was it not made public?

General TIGHE. You'd have to ask General Peroots that. I don't know why it was not made public. As you probably know, I wasn't even asked to participate in the press conference that announced its findings, nor was I invited to the House of Representatives to

participate in the closed hearings that were held immediately prior to the open hearings, at which I was a witness on that report.

Senator SMITH. Does that sound strange to you?

General TIGHE. Yes, it was not only strange; it was almost shocking to me. I have never seen that kind of action.

But apparently something in my report or all of it was unacceptable to those who read it or received it or had to act on it, and I don't know why the reaction. Mr. Trowbridge may comment on that. I don't know. I was never privy to the reasons for it.

Senator SMITH. There was a discussion centering around—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a comment, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, that was a command level decision to keep that classified. It had nothing to do with my office.

Senator SMITH. Do both of you, Mr. Trowbridge and General Tighe, feel that it's classified at this point—because if it is I will not discuss this point—to discuss the reason why you felt that report was "scrubbed" and not made public?

General TIGHE. As far as I am able to comment, I see no reason not to comment, No. 1. No. 2, on the matter of classification, it is far past the time when there is anything in that report, to my judgment, that needs to be classified.

Senator SMITH. OK. You feel that it should not be classified. I'm not going to get into the contents.

General TIGHE. It's a very succinct report. Its primary challenge was to find out if there was a coverup and my primary finding was that there was none. That would appear to me sufficient reason to just publish the report.

Senator SMITH. Exactly. I've read it, and I think your characterization is correct. You said that it is not a coverup and you had some criticisms and recommendations toward the process, which we don't have to go into because it's a classified document.

I agree with you. I don't really see any reason why it shouldn't be made public, either, and I think that it will be very shortly.

But in regard to—it's my understanding that the word—and you mentioned it either in response to a question or in your opening testimony, I can't recall which, the term "probability" versus "possibility."

General TIGHE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. It's my understanding that you favored the word "probability" that POW's may remain and that others, and I won't mention names, preferred the word "possibility" be used. Is that accurate?

General TIGHE. Let me spend just a moment answering that question in detail, because it was the most contentious part of the report as far as its receivers are concerned, and I'd like to explain that throughout the process of coming up with this study that we did, we kept General Peroots informed at DIA, and we interviewed members of Mr. Trowbridge's organization and some of his superiors regularly. They briefed us on what was going on, they brought files to us, and so forth. It was an interactive thing.

But as the chairman of that group I felt a deep sense of responsibility not to unduly alarm anyone, not to give hope where hope should not be given and to further hurt people that might be hurt

with hopes, and so I wanted to make sure it was a fair report and that it was as brief and to the point as possible.

For that reason, it is my memory that the majority of the members of my group favored the word "probable" and that it was my decision on my own to reduce in the final version of the report that we submitted to General Peroots, to substitute the word "probable" for "possible."

Now, in addition to the report itself there is a rather lengthy appendix. There was a lengthy appendix prepared to explain the laws of probability as regards intelligence reporting, and I presume you have that available to you. General Peroots requested that we leave that out of the report. So it was submitted, but not as part of the report.

Senator SMITH. So, correct me if I'm wrong. In characterizing your statement, it's fair to say that the majority of the members of your commission felt that it was probable that men were left behind rather than possible, but because of some internal discussions from General Peroots it was changed to "possible."

Now, what about the coverup thing? That's gotten a lot of ink. Was it unanimous on the part of your committee members that there was not a coverup? You don't have to mention who dissented, but if there was any dissent, if there were any dissenters?

General TIGHE. As the best my memory serves, that was a unanimous judgment. We had cooperation from everyone we asked to come before us and we got the files we requested, and we steered that part of the canoe in examining the evidentiary base ourselves.

Senator SMITH. One final question. I see that Senator Grassley has come in. I know it's his turn.

I was around in the Congress at the time, in the House, at the time this Tighe commission was formed to investigate this whole matter, and I have been told by sources that I consider to be reliable—I sound like a reporter now—that you had less than plush conditions to work in over there and that you did not get the kind of response in terms of resource cooperation that you might have liked in terms of room and space.

This is a tough one, General, and I hate to throw it out at you in public, but I'm going to ask you, and if you don't wish to respond I understand. Did you ever have any indication that your work space was bugged during your work?

General TIGHE. It was the conclusion, I believe unanimous conclusion, of each of our members that our room was bugged through the telephone system.

Senator SMITH. Unanimous conclusion of the Tighe commission, that your room was bugged as you worked—

General TIGHE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. [Continuing.] To investigate?

General TIGHE. Yes. We took means almost immediately to check that out and were satisfied to that effect, and took the means to keep our deliberations—

The CHAIRMAN. You were satisfied that it was bugged or satisfied that it wasn't?

General TIGHE. That it was.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you took a sweep, electronic?

General TIGHE. No, we took other means of feeding information into the system and then testing the reaction.

The CHAIRMAN. To determine that it was bugged.

Senator SMITH. Did that extend beyond the room to your personal telephones? Do you know that?

General TIGHE. I have no way of knowing. An intelligence officer is usually suspicious anyway, so I didn't want to add any of that.

Senator SMITH. Kind of extraordinary efforts to go to if you don't have anything that you're worried about, isn't it, General?

General TIGHE. I thought the entire treatment of my group was extraordinary from the first part. First of all, Senator McCain asked that I head it up in October and it was somewhere in the first of February or thereabouts before General Peroots would agree on the members that I suggested be appointed to it and the arrangements for it happening.

I subsequently found out that he in the interim had come up with his own report, had Colonel Gaines do an investigation before he allowed me to start mine.

Senator SMITH. Do you have direct information as to who the bugger was?

General TIGHE. No, I do not, nor did I ever inquire.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You're going to leave me hanging on that one?

Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a lot of questions, but I guess the last exchange that's gone on here between Senator Smith and the General would be a basis for an understanding why there are people out in the grassroots of America that feel there is a conspiracy. I don't happen to believe that there is, or at least I have no evidence of it.

But the point is that when your work is being bugged, obviously that sort of information would lead people to believe that somebody doesn't want information out or the truth to get out.

In the process of your work, to what extent was the sophistication and competence of the people doing the investigation and follow-up, the general work of our Government to check out live sighting reports and all the other information available, the competence of the people involved an issue where maybe things weren't being done as thoroughly as they ought to be done?

General TIGHE. Well, first of all let me say that in the tenures of each of my successors—and there have been many by this time now; I've been retired 11 years—I see a greater effort done than I did during my tenure at DIA to put support behind this investigation. So I want to make sure you understand that I think that they have been doing a more thorough job and added more personal resources as time went on. It's certainly true in the last year since this committee was formed.

Having said that, at the level that you hire investigators in the Defense Intelligence Agency in a shop at the echelon that this is held, you aren't necessarily going to be able to hire the professionals that you might get if you, for example, were able to have seconded to you experienced FBI agents or other investigators that you would find in the ordinary high-level Government agency.

So they were in varying degrees of competence, but they were certainly all devoted to the task.

Senator GRASSLEY. And there was never any question in your mind about their devotion to following through on every lead?

General TIGHE. During my tenure, no. As time went on and I began to read the refinements, for example, in the statements of the Department of Defense on this issue, I began to believe that there was less and less attention to proving the correctness of the reporting they were getting and more and more trying to dispel the evidence that came in.

Senator GRASSLEY. That situation worsened with time?

General TIGHE. I think it has become so refined at this point that I think there is a great deal of analysis over a single word change in the annual report of the Secretary of Defense on this issue.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me come back to a couple of things if I may. First of all, what you just said in answer to Senator Grassley, you said it very politely. It has been labeled in press accounts as a "mindset to debug," correct?

General TIGHE. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you articulate that?

General TIGHE. The effort that went to proving that a source, for example a live sighting report, was telling the truth, had reason to be where he made his observation, and so forth, became an overwhelming devotion to each source that we got. And whether that just grew with time to make sure that we didn't have any phonies in the act or that we could—and there were a lot of phonies in the act that we had to get rid of.

But over time that became the effort, and that is disposal of every live sighting report to the effect that this was not—this was out of thousands that they had and we were down to 101, and only one valid one this year, and five last year, and four—you know, year after year refining down to the point where there was nothing left to believe on the issue really bothered me, because, first of all—

The CHAIRMAN. Over what period of time did you observe this firsthand?

General TIGHE. I observed it right from the start on my arrival at DIA. That began to be a growing thing.

The CHAIRMAN. From 1977?

General TIGHE. From 1974.

The CHAIRMAN. From 1974?

General TIGHE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Until when?

General TIGHE. 1981.

The CHAIRMAN. So you did your report when?

General TIGHE. 1985-1986.

The CHAIRMAN. So in 1985 you did an evaluation in which you felt even more so what you had observed, is that accurate?

General TIGHE. Yes, sir, that is accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is it possible—I mean, let's try to understand this in the context. You also found there was no conspiracy to do this, is that true?

General TIGHE. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So does the committee then understand that perhaps, after 15 years for some people of reading reports and reading reports and not having them pan out, not watching the Government take it very seriously and not having the resources, not having access, you get another report—I mean, I'm trying to visualize myself sitting there for 10 years reading these things and not having anything pan out.

I think I'd probably have a hard time going to work in the morning.

General TIGHE. I think you're right, and that's why my recommendation on my report was that they start with a clean slate and get rid of the political overhead that they had to accept down in Chuck Trowbridge's shop.

There is no doubt about it that there was a total leak of intimate activity going on there on a day by day basis to an organization outside the Government, which made it very difficult to handle all of the crises and criticisms coming from that group on a daily basis as they talked to the press. And here I'm talking about the League of Families, who had representation inside that group on a regular basis.

So Trowbridge's people were besieged with the political consequences of that: the pressure to examine, the challenges to reports, and so forth. It became an almost impossible task and, as you stated, I think I probably would have given up a long time before this.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trowbridge, do you want to respond to this?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Let me respond by starting with the issue of debunking. I'll take the firsthand live sighting reports, for instance. Seventy percent of the reports—and the committee has this information; you have these files—70 percent of those reports, analysis that was done in our office said that those individuals told us the truth.

We didn't debunk those cases. We equated that information to people that were accounted for.

Twenty-five percent of the reported—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how many reports are we talking about? This is the 15,000 or the 1,500?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. 1,500.

The CHAIRMAN. 1,500. So of 1,500 live sighting reports, 70 percent you equated to somebody who came home, accurate?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Not just came home. They may have been equated to a shootdown or someone whose remains we have recovered or a returnee who came home. Missionaries who were in Vietnam, a sighting report may have equated to them. Folks who stayed behind in 1975 and finally came out, reports of this nature.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you verify and equate to somebody who was allegedly held in captivity? Zero?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Zero.

The CHAIRMAN. So 70 percent are OK for people that you can attribute them to, but zero to somebody in captivity?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We have some reports. When I say "zero," I think there's 26 out of the whole group of them where we have made a tentative correlation to someone who was still unaccounted for. In other words, the sighting, say—

The CHAIRMAN. How do you do that? I mean, it seems to me that there is an incongruity there, sort of, that just hits me. I mean, if you've got 1,500 reports and 70 percent of them pan out to somebody who you can identify but they're conveniently home, but none or barely any are true as to, out of hundreds, are true as to someone who might still be there, it just kind of strikes me.

I mean, how do you discount? How do you say they're not telling the truth?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. All I can say is that those files are there. They've been made available to your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we've got them now, but we're going to need your help to understand how you decided. I went through the files, some of them, not all of them obviously, and we've been briefed on some of them.

On the face of what I read in the briefing, I sort of sit there and scratch my head and I say to myself: Gee whiz, you know, here's a person whose whole family is out of Vietnam, the person has a good job in the United States, they don't need a visa, they're not a refugee, they haven't got economic troubles. They've sworn under oath in an American lawyer's office in a city in the United States that here's what they saw.

What they saw strikes me as being fairly documented and against self-interest. I'm not sure they have a great self-interest in coming forward and putting themselves in jeopardy. So I sort of say to myself: Hmm. You know, how does DIA say this isn't real?

I still have that question. That's what we're going to meet on next week. But how do you do that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, again I'd have to know the report that you're talking about. The General has talked about how we attack the source. Well, in a lot of cases of the refugees reporting, they do come in to us and they do tell us a story about 25 percent of those reports we have judged to be fabrications.

They came in to us, they'll come in to us, for instance, and they'll say: I saw prisoners in a re-education camp. Well, we have 50 other refugees out of that same camp that tell us that's not true, there never were any American prisoners there.

The CHAIRMAN. That's a good way to do it, and I understand that that's been done in a lot of cases. And I accept—incidentally, I understand some people failed polygraphs—I understand that some people have alleged things that we know factually, by virtue of the locations or other things, can't be true.

But even when you take the clutter away, you're left with a grouping that at least personally I find troubling. I think what we need to do is obviously meet on that. We'll talk it through. We're not going to resolve it here.

But you do understand the huge question mark that lingers in people when you look at those odds. I mean, let me give you an example. I understand that 300 of the reports refer specifically to Bob Garwood.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Very close to that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very close to that. So in 300 cases, sometimes one person might come back and have reported to you: Gee, I saw Mee, as he was referred, or whatever, or somebody and so forth, and it turns out that Bob Garwood was there. But in the 20 in-

stances where that same one person might report about someone else it gets discounted.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I don't think we have 20 other reports where that same individual reported somebody else.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the same individual, but I'm talking about someone else who happens to come in with the same kind of credentials, same kind of background, same kind of situation.

We need to work through those. I'm not going to prolong it here now.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me. Chuck, did you misspeak when you said, if I understood you correctly, you said there are zero live sighting reports pertaining to Americans in captivity? You didn't?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir; I did not say that. All of these firsthand live sightings deal with Americans in captivity. That's what we've been dealing with.

Senator SMITH. I think you misspoke.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I'm sorry if I did.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you how many of those reports have you affirmed do in fact refer to somebody—

Senator SMITH. In captivity.

The CHAIRMAN. —in captivity.

Senator SMITH. You said zero.

The CHAIRMAN. And you said zero, that none you affirmed refer to somebody in captivity.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We have not affirmed any, but there are about 26 of those reports; for instance, that say prior to Operation Homecoming, where we had a shootdown, where somebody said, I saw an American, and we have equated that information to someone.

Senator SMITH. OK, but the reports—you have reports, lots, hundreds of reports—that said they saw Americans in captivity?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Oh, yes, sir, 1,500 of them.

The CHAIRMAN. But none affirmed. That's all I'm trying to get at.

Please, if you would further respond to General Tighe's comments on the mindset to debunk, et cetera.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, as I started to say there, of all those reports we have made a judgment where we have said the individual told us the truth, and we have made an evaluation of those reports and they're individuals that are accounted for. And I just gave you a list of the type individual some of those reports equate to.

So we didn't debunk those people.

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough, but that's not what people are suggesting. You see, here we're getting into the split. And you're accurate. What you're saying is accurate, and in fairness I want to make sure that the same issue that I raised still stands.

I guess people feel the mindset to debunk is as to those reports that refer to somebody who might be in captivity, not as to the people that you can account for that are back in the United States. They would allege that there is a kind of convenience in the ability to affirm them as to people who came home or are dead, but never to affirm them as to somebody who is in captivity.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I can understand that to a certain extent, because when you don't have capabilities, as we were talking about here today, where you can actually go in on the ground and put

your finger in the wound or you can't check it out yourself, you have to use other means.

For instance, we did use other means, and of course we did go after the source, if you want to put it that way: Was he telling us the truth? And how did we do that? I used that example of, well, he said they were in this re-education camp, that American prisoners were there. Well, what's another way to do it? We canvassed the refugees who were there and we find refugees that were there. In a way, we have discredited the source.

The CHAIRMAN. We had sufficient information at one point in time to actually mount a rescue expedition in the 1980's, did we not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I wouldn't say we had enough information to mount it, not in my view, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We did try to mount it, did we not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That was done, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you're now saying to us there was not sufficient information for the President of the United States to make a decision to mount that effort?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I don't want to get into that in this arena. All that information is available to your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'm not talking specifics. I'm talking generically here. I recognize this is one of the things we're going to declassify and get out. But I'm just asking you whether you disagreed with that decision. I mean, it's public knowledge.

It's been written about in the newspapers before that there was such an effort.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, maybe it's been written about, but as far as I'm concerned and the guidelines that I have it's still classified.

The CHAIRMAN. We'll pursue it in another context.

Do you have other comments that you want to make in order to respond to General Tighe's comments and to help the committee understand the "mindset to debunk"?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think you've covered that. Let me ask you, then—Senator Smith is back. I believe you were going to check the information on Spinelli that was raised this morning, and you want to respond to that.

Incidentally, this morning we talked about why the committee really needs to evaluate these kinds of things, and we want to do that with you so that we can avoid having misinformation out there, and I think this may be one of those kinds of examples.

Do you want to share that with us?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Based on Senator Smith's request and the fact that he had a document which indicated a positive identification of an individual that's still unaccounted for by the name of Spinelli, and it referred to the debrief of a Lieutenant Tangeman, well, we went back to the file, and I have a letter that I will provide to the committee.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL MILITARY PERSONNEL COMMAND
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370-8000

IN REPLY REFER TO
1771
Ser 64DD/0636
15 August 90

Mrs. Mona Wright
414 Washington St.
Mt. Vernon, WA 98273

Dear Mrs. Wright:

I have located the debrief of LT Tangeman conducted after his return. The paragraph concerning your father has been extracted from the complete message relaying the debriefing results. Each paragraph in the message covered a different missing man. Let me explain some of the data as it is presented.

A compilation of photographs of all missing or captured servicemen were made into a book for DIAs use for identification purposes. The pictures were generally obtained from the service records of the individuals concerned and the pictures would have been taken prior to their missing status. As the returnees were debriefed they were shown the pictures of those still missing. The returnees say recognize the picture because he knew the missing man before he became missing or perhaps saw him in the prison system.

When shown your father's picture located in this volume of identification pictures, LT Tangeman made a positive identification that he knew your father. This is amplified in the comments where he explains that he knew your father before he became missing. He knew him at NAS Sanford. LT Tangeman had never seen LT Spinelli in the prison system or heard his name as being in the prison system.

I hope this explains the line "ident very positive", and puts it in the context it must be to be understood. I explained the debriefing report to your mother over the phone and she stated she did not need a copy, but to forward a copy to you. If you have any further questions, please feel free to write or call toll-free at 1-800-443-9298.

Sincerely,

Lauren M. Mahoney

LAUREN M. MAHONEY
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy
Special Assistant, POW/MIA Affairs

Encl:

(1) Paragraph "C" from NAS JAX FLA 222114Z MAR 73

SPINELLI REPORT

-- According to Mona Wright, daughter of missing aviator Lt. Domenick Spinelli, USN, Billy Hendon has told her that her missing father is a captive in Cambodia.

-- The Navy has spoken to Mrs. Wright, who told them that Billy also told her the name of the other POW held with Spinelli, however, she refuses to give the name to the Navy casualty officer.

-- The 24 June story in the WASHINGTON TIMES claiming that Spinelli was seen by a returned POW is totally erroneous. The returnee cited told DIA interviewers several years ago that he identified a photograph of Spinelli as someone who looked familiar, but after meeting with Spinelli's daughters, determined that he knew the missing man when they were stationed on the same base prior to their Vietnam tours. He did not see the missing flyer in captivity, nor did anyone else.

-- There is no intelligence to suggest Spinelli survived his loss incident. Radio Hanoi referenced the downing of an aircraft which was probably his, and his co-pilot's remains were returned and positively identified within the last 2 years, which leads one to conclude that the Vietnamese can account for him.

But it goes to show that, if you take a single piece of a document and you don't have the follow-up to it, how you can go down the wrong track. Let me read something to you regarding the debriefing of Lieutenant Tangeman:

"The compilation of photographs of all missing and captured servicemen were made into a book for DIA's use for identification purposes." This is used in the debriefing of returned PW's. "The pictures were generally obtained from the service records of individuals concerned and the pictures would have been taken prior to their missing status."

"As the returnees were debriefed, they were showed the pictures of those still missing. The returnee may recognize the picture because he knew the missing man before he became missing or perhaps saw him in the prison system."

"When shown the picture that was located in the volume of the unidentified pictures, Lieutenant Tangeman made a positive identification of the photo in that book of Spinelli."

It goes on and further amplifies the comments that were made by Lieutenant Tangeman:

"He explained that he knew Spinelli before he became missing. He knew him at the Naval Air Station in Sanford. Lieutenant Tangeman had never seen Lieutenant Spinelli in the prison system or heard his name being used in the prison system."

When they showed Lieutenant Tangeman the book, he said: Yes, I recognize that picture. Those comments were put into the debrief and they got recorded in that document as a positive identification. What he did was positively identify somebody that he knew at Naval Air Station Sanford.

The CHAIRMAN. But not as being within the system.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Understood.

Senator SMITH. Well, that's a pretty faulty way of doing debriefs, isn't it? I mean, was that commonplace? What good is a debrief if you put that kind of stuff in there?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, that's what happens when you take single source analysis and, as was mentioned, when you put documents on the street. That document that you had in hand was a true reflection of the debrief. We asked individuals what they knew or who they had seen. At that time that information was put in the document. It was recorded, anything that they had to say about any individuals, and we have a record of that.

Of course, if you go into the man's record it's all clarified.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me come back, if I can, because we've got a number of areas we need to cover. On this issue of conspiracy, which is part of the analysis here, I guess, is there a distinction between the notion of a conspiracy, that people are ordered to do this or are consciously part of something and are actually undertaking to keep information, is there a distinction between that and just a habit, just a process that grew out of the mood that Senator Kerrey, Bob Kerrey, and I and others have referred to, that grew out of the repetition, that grew out of the lack of attention, that grew out of the statements of the President and others saying this is behind us, that grew out of the attitudinal turmoil in the after-

math of Vietnam, that grew out of the normal problems of bureaucracy, and all of which just grew into a sort of status quo which nobody could quite break through, which General Tighe ran into in a sense and elucidated in his report?

He couldn't find a conscious conspiracy, but sometimes there's sort of a conspiracy of silence, if you will, a conspiracy of inactivity, of lack of leadership and lack of direction.

Now, my question is, General, first of all to you, is that something the committee ought to kind of begin to perhaps think about in this context? Is that a fair analysis of what may have developed here?

General TIGHE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For a period of time, at least.

General TIGHE. Let me add to that, too. I agree with that statement—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just close off by saying, clearly Secretary Cheney's appearance here, the Bush administration's commitment of people in Vietnam and effort is different. I mean, that is a square facing up to something.

There was a point where this shifted, and we have to analyze exactly when it was. But am I going down the right road in your mind or not?

General TIGHE. Yes, I think you are. Let me give two examples of this. One, during our little task force examination we had personnel from Chuck Trowbridge's shop come up and brief us on various aspects, and one of the analysts who had been there the longest—I don't know whether he's still there or not—verbally attacked me and the other members for daring to come in and ask the questions that we were asking.

He was clearly very much a victim of fatigue. A challenge to his integrity simply by asking questions had become very, very abrasive as far as he was concerned. And that's one point I want to make.

The second point I want to make is that when a very, very high Government official over your head makes a public pronouncement about things that you thought you knew and he says things differently than you know them or you thought you knew them, almost invariably, an intelligence officer "knows" that he had access to special intelligence of some kind that you don't have or I don't have.

I don't know whether or not there are other intelligence officers that will vouch for that, but I can tell you it occurred at my level, because I thought: My God, with all the information this man has, somebody must have given him something I don't have access to. A need to know basis pervades everybody that's in the intelligence analysis on this issue, so that also is a factor.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that's a very candid answer and it makes a lot of sense to me.

Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I don't have any comment on that. I assume we have access, always have, to information, that there isn't anything that's withheld from us. It goes back to the old saying: You only know what you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understand that. But you must admit, I would think—I mean, your office was slated for extinction in 1974. How did that make you feel?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I always felt we had a job to do, and we pressed to do it as hard as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. But did you have a sense that the generals—and I say that generically—that the leaders were there for you? I know it's hard for you, because you work for these folks and it's hard to sit here. So I'm not going to pretend it isn't. But this is a moment of candor and this is the inquiry of inquiries on this subject, if you will, and we need your help.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I think it was difficult at times to maintain what we had and maybe sometimes get what we needed. I think the individuals that worked this issue were treated right along with some of the others as far as cuts were concerned at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there times in this when you were a little demoralized?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I'd have to say yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I just had one more question I wanted to ask. But before that I wanted to express my appreciation to General Tighe and Admiral Moorer. I really think that both of you should be commended for your commitment and your dedication and your honesty through some very difficult times.

Admiral Moorer, you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the Paris Peace Accord.

Admiral MOORER. Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And feeling as you did, I'm sure that you must have conveyed those thoughts that there were perhaps still live prisoners, that there were still prisoners of war there. Was the atmosphere at that time so pervasive just to get this behind us that no one wanted to recognize that? Were you suppressed by those over you as commander, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral MOORER. Well, of course I think the whole Vietnam experience, which I was involved in from the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident until 1974, actually, I think that it was very frustrating, for instance, the rules of engagement throughout, from the very beginning, almost drove me crazy because they had no connection to common sense or military strategy.

But it is true that I think that the general mindset in the country was: For heaven's sake, get this over with. And I believe that so far as I am concerned there were many, many things about that so-called war that I didn't agree with.

Senator KASSEBAUM. At that point, when supposedly there had been an agreement worked out in Paris and these accords were signed, you must have felt discomfort knowing that there was really not a clear picture of the reality of what existed still in Vietnam from personnel in our armed services who were being held, that the accounting was not—

Admiral MOORER. Of course I felt discomfort. But I at that point I don't think anyone could have stopped it. I mean, the Chairman here mentioned Watergate, and the whole atmosphere and so on

was such that, hurray, hurray, we've signed an agreement, the POW's are coming home, and there was great attention to that.

Everybody of course viewed it with some satisfaction, and no one was going to—I think we'd have had really a revolution if we'd have turned around and gone back in there with full-fledged combat at that point in time.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And that's what you felt it would have taken in order to get our prisoners out?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, ma'am, because I still say, and I've said several times today, the only way you're going to prove all of these things is to go over there at the point that is under discussion, so you can query the local people even or examine the sight of a crash.

But I don't think you can—I think you'll dispute all day if someone 400 or 500 miles away says there's a POW at such and such a point, and I saw him 2 months ago.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I just heard you say that it wasn't that you were suppressed, but that you had been ignored in offering your comments at that time on what might be the actual situation as far as the figures and the situation, and I think that's an important part of the record. Not that it would make any difference now, but just that there were those such as yourself and General Tighe who really believed that the accurate picture was not being presented.

Whether it could have been, whether there was even the possibility to do anything about it at that point, can be debated at this juncture. It wasn't done. But certainly there were voices such as both of yours that were raised questioning it at the time.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Kassebaum, let me tell you. After we had had the, I guess you would call it, the disappointment of the falling out and falling in again in October, and then to come in with a final agreement that was put together in Paris, not in the United States and so on, I don't think that anyone could have stopped it.

The point was that the terms of the agreement were literally OK so far as the POW's were concerned, because it said that all POW's will be returned from all four nations.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That's true.

Admiral MOORER. The question is, did you have any confidence that the North Vietnamese would comply with the agreement? And my experience was they never had, and so you could just hope that they would comply or hope that you had some information. But there was no assurance that they were going to do that.

Then when the money was cut off, as I pointed out, in July 1973, I'm sure they just threw the agreement in the wastepaper basket.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

We're coming near to the end of what we're going to do today. Senator Smith, I think you just have one more?

Senator SMITH. A couple.

The CHAIRMAN. A couple of points. Why don't you go and then I'll close it out.

Senator SMITH. In listening to you, Admiral, talk about the behind the scenes, if you will, or the feelings about negotiations, it

reminds me that when we went to Vietnam just a few weeks ago we spoke to some of your counterparts who were there at Paris on behalf of the Vietnamese. Considering the record of perfidy of the Vietnamese, I don't necessarily say that I believe the remark, but it is interesting in terms of perception.

I asked the Vietnamese negotiators, on a scale of one to ten, one being the highest level of concern for POW's, American POW's, in the discussions, ten being the least amount of concern on the part of American negotiators, how would you rate the American negotiating team on that scale of one to ten? His answer was eleven.

I found that to be an incredible remark, and it seems to me that some of the things that I'm hearing tend to, even though it was at the policy level and not at your level, tend to confirm that, regretably.

Let me just make a couple of quick clean-up points here. General Tighe, as the Director of Intelligence, DIA, when you were there, not on the Tighe Commission but as the actual Director when you were in office, did you always feel that you were able to review all information that you felt you needed to review in your capacity to make the proper recommendations to your superiors?

General TIGHE. I guess my judgment would be that I was able to evaluate all that I was able to evaluate, and question that which I—

Senator SMITH. Did you ever request something you didn't get?

General TIGHE. Beg your pardon?

Senator SMITH. Did you ever request something that you felt you needed to evaluate to make a proper recommendation and did not get?

General TIGHE. If my memory serves me right, on a couple of occasions, yes.

Senator SMITH. Would one of those things be the debriefings from the POW's who came home?

General TIGHE. Well, that's an issue I'd like to answer separately, and that is the sacrosanctness of some of the intelligence we had access to. It had to do with compartmented intelligence.

Senator SMITH. So the structure—the system was so structured and so compartmentalized that even you as the Director of DIA really did not see all of the intelligence?

General TIGHE. Since I participated in very small compartments on occasion, I'd say absolutely. I knew that I didn't have access to all the intelligence.

Senator SMITH. A final point. I must say, and I realize the criticism that comes to all of us in Government, including us sitting here in the panel, but I must say—

The CHAIRMAN. Speak for yourself.

Senator SMITH. I am. I always speak for myself, Mr. Chairman.

I was frankly shocked when I had heard that your task force, very reputable people, including Robbie Reisner, former POW, and many other very prominent Americans who served on your Tighe Commission, and it's a matter of public—including yourself, one of the most outstanding public servants in many years—to hear that you were bugged to me is shocking.

I just want to repeat for the record that the task that General Tighe was given—he didn't ask for it; he was asked to do it—was to

simply review the process by which we looked at this intelligence analysis, in an effort to try to correct whatever that process was, to find the mistakes, correct those mistakes.

When you get the chance to read his document, you will find that his document, I think, was fair in the sense that he analyzed errors in procedure and he made recommendations, very specific, and he also came to the conclusion that there was no conspiracy.

Now, to know that you were bugged leads me to one other point which I'd like to raise, and I'd like to raise it to Mr. Trowbridge. We have been—I have received indications that members of Congress have been asked—have been denied information and that there was a policy or a process in place within the agency or within the Government at some place to deny access of information to Members of Congress, to deny access to information to Members of Congress.

Do you know of any such directive, proposal, discussion, anything of the kind?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. As far as I know, anything that the Congress has wanted it has had access to. There are various compartmented programs, but I think when certain Members of Congress desired information they've been provided that information.

Senator SMITH. No tasking within the agency to deny information to Members of Congress?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. I have never seen any such directive.

Senator SMITH. Anybody else wish to answer that?

General TIGHE. I'd like to make a comment on that, sir, because I've been caught on this a couple of times, and that is that you've got to realize that no military man approves the information that goes to the Congress when they get a question.

If you send a question to anybody in uniform, he's going to have to pass it up through the political system of the Defense Department. At least my experience was that I had to clear things, so that they would know, the Secretary of Defense and his people would know, that the Congress had asked the question and this was the reply, because they don't like to get ambushed or they don't like to pass on information that may be contrary—it may be factual, but it may be contrary to what they are trying to accomplish, or something of that kind.

So my plea is, don't ever blame a military man for answering the question and the answer you get.

Senator SMITH. I'm not blaming any military man and I'm not going to put anybody on the panel on the spot, but I do want to say for the record now, so that there's ample warning, I intend to present in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency a request for the identification of the person who authorized the bugging of General Tighe's Commission. And I put that on the record from this Senator at this time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Smith.

We have a number of important questions, but they are questions that could be answered in writing. I think it's been a long day and a day of a lot of revelations, so I'm not going to prolong it.

We are interested clearly in Laos statistics, and I'm not sure it would hurt just to take 3 or 4 minutes quickly to talk about the

difficulty of repatriating people out of Laos. Obviously, it was very different terrain. We had greater rescue capacity. Where there were shootdowns, where we knew somebody, I take it we were able to get them much more than ever in North Vietnam. Is that accurate?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I concur with your comments when we talk about the black hole in Laos relative to people and the numbers that have been repatriated, and we do have some information along those lines that might help answer your questions. We can provide them in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. We need to understand that.

Admiral, I take it you concur with that?

Admiral MOORE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in charge of those operations and aware of it.

We obviously need to understand Laos better, and the committee wants to develop a record. Also, I want to make certain that people who are tuning in to these processes and who are following this, that you don't end the day saying: Well, why didn't they ask them this and why didn't they ask them that?

All these gentlemen have submitted to depositions, which are in the possession of this committee. There's a lot of information we have asked them already that will be part of the record and will be reflected in our report. In addition to that, we will be submitting additional questions in writing.

I can assure you, General and Admiral and also Mr. Trowbridge, it will not be a huge burden and not pages and pages. But there are, Admiral, for instance, questions about the staff criteria and some of what the military intelligence staffs did, some questions about CINCPAC advisory board, and so forth, just things that help us to fill out the record in order to be able to understand the full picture here, but they are not necessary in terms of this public discourse.

I would like to say that, in answer to Senator Smith, I'm not just shocked about the tapping. And I take at face value—you're a General in the United States Army, you've had an extraordinary distinguished career. I gather you said that was the unanimous decision and understanding of everybody on the committee, is that correct?

General TIGHE. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you purposefully put information out in a way as to determine whether or not that was happening?

General TIGHE. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you know that it didn't happen by virtue of leak. It actually happened by virtue of the verbatim language being—

General TIGHE. We were getting unanimous judgments from all the members, so we had no reason to believe that they were leaking.

The CHAIRMAN. But more importantly, there's a sense I have from your experience that you feel that there was a resistance level to what you were doing. The General Peroots pre-report, the process itself, seemed to say: Whoops, we don't really want this inquiry, we don't really want this interference, in a sense.

It fits in many ways with the picture that I've drawn of the sort of process by which people do resist those inquiries. Now, I don't know. The committee doesn't know yet whether there's more to that, whether there's something else that people were trying to avoid. We haven't made that judgment yet.

There's a lot more inquiry to undergo and we're going to undergo it. And I think people can get a sense that we're doing it pretty meticulously, and we will continue to do so.

General TIGHE. Senator, I'd like to make one comment. I had just previously served as the Air Force member on the Beirut Commission to examine the bombing of our barracks in Beirut and had gone there with a team, and I had seen what a very, very well-organized and supported commission operated in the Pentagon.

So I had a very keen sense of comparison with that organization and my own, and it was with that as background that I was able to determine whether or not our commission was treated fairly.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I accept that. And as I say, we will follow up with some written questions for you.

Could I ask you, Admiral and General, if it's possible, that you could submit those? We will get the questions right to you, and would it be possible to get those in the next, say a week or so, 2 weeks at the outside?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

[See appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. And General, I apologize. I put you in the wrong service. We Navy men are prone to doing that.

General TIGHE. You know I served in the Army also.

The CHAIRMAN. The United States Air Force. Well, you served in the Army also, so I wasn't completely wrong, but General of the Air Force.

Mr. Trowbridge, we really need—I know you're overburdened. I know this takes away from other things. But you can understand that there really is nothing more important than clarifying this issue, and it will go a long way to helping you in the long run to do the other work.

If you could assist us in our analysis of these live sighting reports and assist us in pulling together our ability to understand them, then the committee can make much wiser judgments with respect to this issue. So we do need your help in doing that in the next weeks and we look forward to it.

Admiral, I again repeat your service, both of you, General, is extraordinary. You don't need us here to say that, but we're very grateful to you for taking the time to come here and share your observations with us and your candor.

My own sense is that today has shared a lot with this committee and with the public, and I think that if you step back from this issue without looking for recrimination, which for some may be difficult, but we ask people to do it, that today has helped people to understand what may or may not have taken place in it.

There's a lot more to do, but I do personally see a picture beginning to develop and appear. And I think it's one we can deal with as a country, that we can understand in its historical context and in its present day light.

My prayer is that the Vietnamese will assist us to understand it and deal with it. There's a different set of people running the government there than there were 20 years ago. They are not different in philosophy, regrettably. Most of us wish they were. But they are different certainly in their approach to the world and to us. That gives us the opportunity to try to resolve this issue.

So Senator Smith and the rest of the committee express our gratitude to you, and this committee will reconvene tomorrow at 9:30 in the morning. We stand adjourned until that time.

[Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

HEARINGS ON AMERICANS MISSING OR PRISONER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACCOUNTING PROCESS

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1992

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SH-705, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KERRY

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs meets for its second day of hearings in which we are trying to establish the baseline universe, so to speak, with respect to this issue. We appreciate all the witnesses' presence here today.

I will not have a lengthy opening statement as I did yesterday, but just a couple of quick comments, if I may.

I read in one of the news accounts an individual who said, well, they have not listed all of them, or the list should have been bigger. What I want to emphasize is this is reality time. I hope people are not going to run around saying well, the list ought to be bigger. If you have got a reason to put somebody on a list, now is the time to come forward. If you have got evidence to show that somebody ought to be on a list, now is the time to come forward. But it is not sufficient for anybody to simply say gee, it ought to be bigger.

We are dealing with reality. We have taken and put together lists from every possible list we have been able to find, subpoena, summon, locate, uncover in the archives, and there just are not any other lists. Moreover, there is a finite universe of people who went to Vietnam and either came back or did not. We know their names and we know the locations and the dates and times and we have records. And we are going to deal with records. We are not going to deal with hypothesis, theory, supposition, fantasy, and ultimately even hope, no matter how deep that hope may be. We have got to base this on reality. We all have hope, but we are trying to figure out what is real here.

Now, I want to emphasize again that the committee does not assert that every one of the names of the 133 were alive. We do not do that. We cannot do that. No one could do that. We have asserted that there is evidence that some were, and we have also asserted

there is evidence subsequent to that which we are evaluating that alleges that some were. That must be weighed.

What we did say unequivocally is that there were a body, a group of people listed as POW for whom there was a reason they were listed as POW, about whom we knew enough to call them POW. We did not get an accounting at that time. And we had reason to believe that many of them were alive. Now, that is a very straightforward statement.

The committee lists were developed from lists that we have gotten from the Pentagon and that they have declassified. Within a few days, those lists will be on their way to the National Archives for public examination by concerned citizens, and they will indeed be able to examine this record for themselves.

Three weeks ago, to answer another question of concern people have had, 3 weeks ago the Select Committee asked the Pentagon to alert the families of the men that we have been discussing in our findings, and those are the men that the Pentagon's own records listed as believed to be a prisoner of war. The families know who they are, and they deserve privacy if that is what they desire. The law guarantees them that. The committee is asking the Defense Department to release these lists in accordance with the families' rights, and the DOD's responsibilities are obviously to balance those rights against the public's right to know.

Senator Smith, do you have any additional comments?

Senator SMITH. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR REID

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that we have now spent a lot of time in this committee, and when I say we have spent a lot of time, my time pales in comparison to the time that you and Senator Smith have spent getting us to the point that we are now. I would like to confirm what you said.

You know, we have worked this until we have actual lists. We have people who are testifying who are talking about actual events. And I cannot confirm any more, underline, underscore, what you said. If anyone anyplace in this room or in this country that has any information that they feel this committee should have, this is the time to bring it forward. Because we have to get past the point of speculation and guessing and get to actual facts, because we are dealing and have dealt with people's lives.

I have said this privately and I will say it publicly. I appreciate very much the work that you and Senator Smith have expended on behalf of this committee. The time that I have spent, I repeat for the second time, pales in comparison to the days, hours, and weeks that you have spent. I personally am appreciative of the leadership that you have both shown.

The CHAIRMAN. I know I speak for Senator Smith when I thank you for that. We appreciate it.

I think we have work to do yet, as you all know. We are going to be proceeding through the Paris peace talks to try to understand

them. I think most of us feel that the story has been handled responsibly. We are not looking for somebody to be the fall person for this. We are looking for real answers, and I think we are on the road to finding them.

We have, joining us today, a number of people who were here yesterday, as well as some new people. Mr. Robert Sungenis is back and Mr. Charles Trowbridge; Colonel Michael Spinello, the director of casualty affairs and operations of the U.S. Army; and General McGinty. I think they are available, but we are going to proceed with Dr. Roger Shields, with Frank Sieverts, the former special assistant for POW/MIA matters to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; General Robert Kingston, U.S. Army, retired, former commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center from 1973 to 1974; and Michael Oksenberg, a former National Security Council staffer from 1976 to 1978.

We appreciate all of you coming here this morning. If I could ask you all if you would stand to be sworn.

Do you each individually swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel SPINELLO. I do.

General MCGINTY. I do.

Dr. SHIELDS. I do.

Mr. SIEVERTS. I do.

General KINGSTON. I do.

Mr. OKSENBERG. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you have some prepared statements which we would welcome. Dr. Shields, would you start off, please. We will just run down the list here.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROGER E. SHIELDS

Dr. SHIELDS. I'm going to read excerpts, in the interest of time, from my full statement which is available. I have a statement which has several sentences in addition to the statement which you have before you, and I will make that available to the committee.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you to testify on a very important subject, and one with which I was officially associated for many years. Before I turn to the substance of my remarks, I should stress that my official role in this area as a member of the Department of Defense ended some 16 years ago. My last official association with the issue of Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia occurred in 1977 as a representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Presidential commission on missing Americans. That was the Woodcock Commission.

I have maintained an active interest in the matter of those Americans who yet remain unaccounted for from the conflict in Southeast Asia, but I have not been privy to all of the information on this subject which has been gathered since the termination of the Woodcock Commission, nor am I aware of all of the significant events which have transpired in this area since that time.

It is my belief from what I do know, though, that significant aspects of the problem of accounting for missing Americans remain virtually unchanged from the time my official role on the subject

ended. I should add that my association with many of the families of the missing has continued, and I extend my heartfelt sympathy to them for the trials they have faced and continue to endure.

Before I turn to your questions, there is something that I feel compelled to say today. We have had many obstacles in our efforts to provide an accounting for our missing. As distressed as I have been with these past impediments to an accounting, I am even further incensed by what the families of our missing have been subjected to by some of our own citizens. The issue of the missing demands the greatest care and precision possible as it is pursued in a responsible way. But it has become a subject in which even the well-meaning have done a great disservice to the families of the missing by dealing casually and carelessly in rumor and gossip.

I will turn now directly to the topics which you asked that I address in my testimony. In considering my views and answers, I reviewed the extensive testimony which I have presented in the past to the Congress. I find that much of what I have to say is already a matter of public record. Although much of that testimony is many years old now, I find that my views on the key issues relating to the missing remain essentially unchanged. And for that reason, I fear that I will be adding little, if anything, new to this important issue.

On the subject of POW/MIA lists which you asked that I address, the subject of prisoner and missing lists appears to be causing some confusion now, many years after these lists were compiled. I want to stress that the various lists were never a source of confusion or contention to those within the Government who created and used them during my time in the Department of Defense. I also want to stress that the Department of Defense lists were complete with regard to the listing of all of our men who became missing or were killed without the recovery of remains. They were also factual with regard to the circumstances of loss. Any errors were just that, inadvertent, and not committed as a matter of policy.

There were many lists relating to our men who became prisoner and missing, all created for specific purposes. Some were compiled by Government and service groups, and some originated from other sources. Within the Government, all of those lists were considered official for their intended purposes, and I will detail some of these lists.

Each service maintained a list of its own prisoners (POW) missing in action (MIA) and those killed in action whose bodies were never recovered (KIA/BNR). Some of these lists were for the purpose of maintaining pay accounts, keeping track of benefits, providing support to families, and other similar uses. Similar lists were formatted in various ways. These were lists based on the chronology of loss, alphabetized lists, lists by country loss, lists by accession number, and so forth.

There were also subsets of all-inclusive lists, with lists by category, by country of loss, and by other criteria, depending on need. And it should also be emphasized that these were not static lists, but lists that changed as more information became known about an individual. The dates associated with each list therefore were very important. As status changes were made, these changes were incorporated in the various lists. From the service list, the Comptroller

of the Department of Defense also compiled a list relating to the missing categories.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, also maintained a list of the missing. There has been some concern, I believe, over the fact that DIA carried some men in classifications, in particular the prisoner category, which differed from those of the services. The reason for this is simple, and I believe valid. There was discussion during my term in the Defense Department about whether DIA should be made to conform its internal classifications to those of the military services. I opposed that idea and the view that DIA should be forced to conform to service designations never became policy.

I believed at that time, and I do today, that DIA as an intelligence gathering and interpreting body should be free and unconstrained in its own internal efforts to develop information about missing and captured Americans. I believe that provided a more effective and complete intelligence effort than forcing DIA to conform to service decisions about what happened to a man. In effect, DIA's own internal classifications were worksheets designed to help their own analysis, and I considered them as such.

I want to emphasize that DIA's internal list did not result in confusion about a man's status. I met with intelligence experts virtually every week to go over information relating to individual men. The facts regarding individual cases were not in dispute. If a man listed by the Navy as missing was carried by DIA as captured and that led to better correlation of intelligence reports, then our own efforts were improved. I knew, and all those associated with the prisoner and missing effort knew, what the official status of an individual was. The families also knew. During my tenure in the Department of Defense, we did everything in our power to make sure that the families of our prisoners and missing knew the substance of everything known to us about their loved ones. That was Defense Department policy, and it was scrupulously observed.

DIA also compiled another POW/MIA list at my request. This list grouped the missing into five categories, based upon our estimate of the degree of knowledgeability of the hostile governments concerning our missing. Its purpose was to give us some way to gauge the response we were receiving to our inquiries about the missing.

There was only one official list regarding a man's status. The aggregate military status list was compiled from the list provided by the individual military services, and it was based on status determinations made by the service secretaries pursuant to their duties, as spelled out by sections 551 through 558, Title 37 of the United States Code. By law, only the service secretaries have the legal authority to determine an individual's status, and the law was observed in this regard during my tenure in the Department of Defense.

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), based overseas, also maintained a list of prisoners and missing. The JCRC was responsible for efforts in the field to obtain an accounting. And the JCRC list contained information designed to further that effort.

There were other lists, as well. Some lists were passed to U.S. citizens by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the DRV as it was then, to private U.S. citizens, and in one case to

representatives of Senator Kennedy, showing a number of U.S. military as having been captured or having died in captivity.

These lists were never considered to be official and complete lists. They were not transmitted by official representatives of the DRV to the U.S. Government.

The information the lists contained did not conform to the requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. And we believed the list, with good reason as it turned out to be incomplete. Statements by the enemy that they held an American prisoner were accepted by the United States as confirmation of POW status and were welcome. Statements relating to those who died in captivity were not accepted as a basis for a status change.

It is important to understand what the various lists meant from a practical standpoint. The lists, including our own list showing official status, were nothing more than an aggregation of the names of individuals. Every name on every list represented a person with a unique history and unique facts concerning the incident of loss. Those of us who worked intensively in this area became familiar with the individual cases. I know many men I have never met. Today, when discussing the fate of individuals for whom we have still received no accounting, it is simply not enough to refer to the status on the official list. The facts of the individual cases must be examined.

We knew that our own official list was not accurate and complete. It was based on our best efforts at finding out what happened to a man. But those efforts were stymied by noncompliance with the Geneva Convention by the other side, and by the difficulties surrounding the incident of loss. We knew that our designation of a man as prisoner did not guarantee him that status or that the designation of MIA did not mean a man was not a prisoner.

Another significant list is the one passed by the DRV to representatives of the U.S. Government in Paris in January 1973, as required by the Paris peace accords. That list was official in the sense that it represented for the first time an official statement by the other side about the Americans they were holding prisoner and those whom they reported as having died in captivity. This list was not accepted by us as a complete accounting for those held prisoner or for those who died in captivity. First, that list did not include the names of those prisoners missing in Laos. It also omitted the names of men we knew to have been in captivity at one time. The list of those reported as having been captured in Laos passed to us a short time later by the DRV was viewed in the same way.

The question of lists is one that I believe should give way to questions about individuals. As I have already noted, the practical impact of lists relating to status was always limited. As I also mentioned earlier, it had a mixed impact on family members, depending on what status a man had. It appears also to have had a limited impact on our prisoners and missing. Ronald Ridgeway was classified as killed in action, but that did not prevent his repatriation. Frank Cius was carried as missing in action in Laos, but he also returned home to his loved ones. David Demmon was carried as a prisoner in South Vietnam, but to this day, he remains unaccounted for.

Now, I will turn to the sources of intelligence. The basis for a man's status was the information concerning his incident of loss and the intelligence received relating to him afterward. That intelligence was gathered from a number of sources. The most important and accurate information came from prisoners released prior to Homecoming. Some information came from the lists mentioned earlier that were passed on to private citizens, as the list passed on to Cora Weiss. Some intelligence came from the constant monitoring of radio broadcasts, television tapes, and newspaper and magazine articles in North Vietnam, the U.S.S.R., and Eastern European countries. Friendly and not so friendly governments, including the then Soviet Union, were also asked for assistance and on occasion were helpful in providing us with information relating to our men who were missing.

Enemy soldiers who rallied to the allied side and captured enemy soldiers were the subject of a standard interrogation requirement aimed at extracting information about our missing. Dead enemy soldiers, too, were routinely searched for documents or other types of evidence relating to our men. Enemy communications intercepts were another source of information, sometimes accurate, but frequently not.

We also used aerial reconnaissance when it was feasible and appropriate. Agents were also used to the extent possible, and its important to note here that the Cooper-Church amendment precluded the use of U.S. intelligence agents in Laos, where our intelligence lack was greatest.

Indigenous civilians who may have had knowledge about prisoners and missing were also questioned, as were refugees. We understood long before we received the DRV-PRG list in Paris in January 1973 that Operation Homecoming would be only one phase of our work. It was evident that the process of accounting for those who did not return would be long, arduous, and complicated under even the best of circumstances.

For this reason, Article 8(b) of the accords was negotiated. Article 8(b) provided for an accounting for the missing, including any who may have been listed as prisoner and did not come home in repatriation during Operation Homecoming. And if it had been implemented, which it was not, we would have received the fullest possible accounting which we desired, and which the families of these men deserve.

As I have noted, the list which we received in Paris omitted men held prisoner in Laos, and that, in itself, constituted a violation of the Paris Agreement because, as negotiated, that agreement covered those lost throughout Southeast Asia. A short time later a list purporting to cover Laos was received.

While both lists contained some pleasant surprises, the most surprising thing about the lists was the lack of surprises. We knew immediately upon receiving this list of those to be repatriated and those said to have died in captivity, that men whom we knew had, at one time, been alive and in captivity were omitted from the list altogether. After debriefing those who returned, we knew also that the names of some men who may have died in captivity were also not on the lists.

On the other hand, we received the name of one individual, a civilian, that was totally unknown to us. In another surprise, Captain Robert White, carried by us as prisoner in South Vietnam but whose name was not on the list of prisoners, was repatriated shortly after the negotiated period of repatriation had expired. We were told that the enemy unit holding him in South Vietnam had been unable to report that they were holding him in time to include his name on the list of prisoners and release him during the official repatriation period.

It was obvious by the conclusion of Operation Homecoming that the accounting problem was going to be even more difficult than we had anticipated. We had hoped that our returnees would be able to provide us with substantial information about the missing, but relatively few cases were cleared up on the basis of returnee information.

Colonel Robert Standerwick's crew member came home, but had little information about Colonel Standerwick, for whom no accounting has been received. Commander Harley Hall's crew member was also repatriated, but no accounting has been received thus far for Commander Hall, who was lost only a few hours before the cease-fire agreement took effect. And so it went.

At the termination of Operation Homecoming we had no current hard evidence that Americans were still held prisoner in Southeast Asia—and I emphasize current, hard, evidence. None of those who returned had any indication that anyone had been left behind. We knew that there was a possibility that defectors were alive in enemy-controlled areas, but had no firm evidence to confirm this either.

Robert Garwood was an example of an American whom we felt might be alive and in an enemy-controlled area, but according to the returnees who saw him last, he was not being held as a prisoner. To repeat though, we did know that we had received no accounting for some men who at one time had been alive and in captivity.

I want to comment at this point on the so-called discrepancy cases; the cases of men we knew to have been captured, or for whom the information indicated a high degree of probability of capture. Those cases certainly exist. It is almost certain, though, that there are other men about whom we know nothing who were also just as surely captured. What we do not know, in many cases I am sure, is just as disturbing as what we know about the discrepancy cases.

This knowledge, common to those who have worked in this area, made the accounting for the missing even more urgent. Efforts to implement the accounting provision, Article 8(b), began even before homecoming was completed. An early request, for example, was for information relating to a Naval Officer carried as prisoner in South Vietnam. Other requests were made to repatriate the remains of Americans reported as having died in captivity.

The record of our efforts to implement Article 8(b) have been well documented. Without cooperation from the other side, the JCRC sent teams into the field to investigate crash and suspected grave sites. An extensive and sophisticated underwater search

effort was made off the coast of South Vietnam at suspected crash site locations.

The last U.S. military man to die from hostile fire in Vietnam in a United States initiated action was killed in December, 1973. He was a member of a JCRC field team, and with the ambush of that team and his death, our field efforts ceased. Even then, an intensive public communications effort to obtain information from anyone in South Vietnam who might have knowledge of American prisoners or dead was begun, and ended only with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.

At the end of Operation Homecoming the distinction between our own official categories blurred. It was ominous for those carried prisoner that they were not acknowledged as such by the other side and repatriated. The KIA/BNR's were in a much more definite status, although we knew that in a very small number of cases we had made mistakes in declaring a man dead.

A careful examination of individual files would reveal that if major status errors were made, they were made in declaring some who died MIA. In any case, after Operation Homecoming the problem was to determine what had happened to those who did not return, and to recover the remains of those who had died. As we know, and the primary reason we are here today, Article 8(b) was never implemented. No general accounting for the missing has been received.

After Operation Homecoming we developed specific and hard evidence concerning the whereabouts of McKinley Nolan, an Army deserter who was living with a wife and child on the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975. Emmet Kay, an Air America pilot, was captured in Laos after the cease-fire agreement and was repatriated after a period of captivity.

The only individuals whom hard, and at the time current information indicated were in captivity and for whom no accounting has yet been received were two civilians; an American, Charles Dean, and Neil Sharman, an Australian, who were captured in 1974. They were unquestionably in the hands of the Pathet Lao when the events that led to the fall of Saigon and Vientiane in mid-year 1975 occurred. Our intelligence capability and our ability to track them in captivity ended with the collapse of the friendly governments.

It is unlikely, I believe, that an accounting is obtainable now which will resolve the doubts of many families about the status of their loved ones missing in Southeast Asia. The record has become too convoluted and distorted for that to happen.

While Congressman Montgomery was in Hanoi being assured that no Americans were being held captive in Vietnam, Arlo Gay was being held at Son Tay prison, and Tucker Gougelmann was being held in Chi Hoa prison in Saigon. Gay was later released but Gougelmann died in prison, and only his remains returned home.

Now we are told American prisoners were transferred from Southeast Asia to Russia where, according to Boris Yeltsin, they may be alive today. If this hope, too, turns out to be illusory, hundreds and perhaps thousands of family members will agonize anew about the fate of their loved ones. Assurances that there was a misunderstanding will have little credibility. Some early releases came home from Vietnam via Moscow, but we never had any indication

that prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union and detained there.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Shields follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER E. SHIELDS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you to testify on a very important subject, and one with which I was officially associated for many years. Before I turn to the substance of my remarks, I should stress that my official role in this area as a member of the Department of Defense ended some 16 years ago. My last official association with the issue of Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia occurred in 1977 as the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Presidential Commission on Missing Americans (Woodcock Commission). I have maintained an active interest in the matter of those Americans who yet remain unaccounted for from the conflict in Southeast Asia, but I have not been privy to all of the information on this subject which has been gathered since the termination of the Woodcock Commission, nor am I aware of all of the significant events which have transpired in this area since that time. It is my belief from what I do know, though, that significant aspects of the problem of accounting for missing Americans remain virtually unchanged from the time my official role in this subject ended. I should add that my association with many of the families of our missing have continued, and I extend my heartfelt sympathy to them for the trials they have faced and continue to endure.

I am grateful for this Committee's interest in the subject of the missing and for the commitment which it demonstrates of this great nation's determination to achieve the fullest accounting possible for these men. I am profoundly dismayed, nevertheless, that my appearance today comes more than 30 years after the first American became missing in Southeast Asia, and almost 20 years after the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement which ended the active role of the U.S. military in the conflict.

There are many things which I would like to include in my testimony today. I would like to pay tribute once again to the great courage and bravery of the families of our missing, and to the enormous effort extended by those within the Government who have worked so diligently on their behalf and on behalf of their missing loved ones. I would like to detail once more the unprecedented lengths to which our nation has gone to support the families of our missing and to obtain an accounting for those whose fate still remains undetermined today. In the interest of time, however, I will leave those subjects for another day.

Before I turn to your questions, there is something which I feel compelled to say. I realize full well that, given the almost incomprehensible difficulties inherent in efforts to obtain a satisfactory accounting for men lost during the time of war, often in remote and physically hostile terrain, and for the most part in incidents involving the violent shootdown and crash of high performance military aircraft, it will be impossible to account for all of our missing. The problem for the families of the missing has been further compounded by the history of noncompliance with the Cease-fire Agreement and an extensive record of noncooperation by the other side.

As distressed as I have been with these past impediments to an accounting, I am even further incensed by what the families of our missing have been subjected to by some of our own citizens. The issue of the missing demands the greatest care and precision possible as it is pursued in a responsible way, but it has become a subject in which even the wall-meaning have done a great disservice to the families of the missing by dealing casually and carelessly in rumor and gossip.

Most reprehensible of all are those guilty of outright fraud and deceit. In recent months we have seen an effort to pass off a photo of a German crook as a U.S. serviceman who became missing in Laos, and the cropped photo of a Soviet general as another missing American.

We have also heard from former employees of the U.S. government, men who worked at the NSA, about intelligence intercepts relating to literally hundreds of missing servicemen who were allegedly captured but never repatriated during Operation Homecoming. I am perplexed at the silence of the U.S. Government about these reports. During the time I was in charge of prisoner and missing affairs I never heard of any such reports. If the existence of these reports can be verified, their implications for the honesty of government efforts to account for the missing are overwhelming. It would indicate a conspiracy within the government of which I

was, and am, unaware. I personally give these reports no credence at all. But I am at a loss to understand why there has been, so far as I know, no official statement from the Administration, or from your Committee, about the veracity of these reports. The NSA is not an agency of a foreign government, it is an agency of the United States government, and ascertaining the truth about the alleged reports should be a simple matter.

Finally, if our laws do not adequately cover fraud and the perpetration of deliberate hoaxes concerning our missing, laws should be passed by the Congress which do. The subject is too serious and the grief and agony of the families too real to subject them unceasingly to the barrage of deliberate misinformation which they have had to endure.

I will now turn directly to the topics which you asked that I address in my testimony. In considering my views and answers, I reviewed the extensive testimony which I have presented in the past to the Congress. I find that much of what I have to say is already a matter of public record. Although much of that testimony is many years old now, I find that my views on the key issues relating to the missing remain essentially unchanged. For that reason, I fear that I will be adding little, if anything, new to this important issue.

PW/MIA LISTS

The subject of prisoner and missing lists appears to be causing some confusion now, many years after these lists were compiled. I want to stress that the various lists were never a source of confusion or contention to those within the Government who created and used them during my time in the Department of Defense.

There were many lists relating to our men who became prisoner and missing, all created for specific purposes. Some were compiled by Government and Service groups, and some originated from other sources. Within the Government, all of those lists were considered official for their intended purposes. I will detail some of these lists. Each service maintained a list of its own prisoners (PW), missing in action (MIA) and those killed in action whose bodies were never recovered (KIA/BNR). Some of these lists, were for the purpose of maintaining pay accounts, keeping track of benefits, providing support to families and other similar uses. As status changes were made, these changes were incorporated in the various lists. From the service lists the Comptroller of the Department of Defense also compiled a list relating to the missing categories.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also maintained a list of the missing. There has been some concern, I believe, over the fact that DIA carried some men in classifications, in particular the prisoner category, which differed from those of the services. The reason for this is simple, and I believe valid. There was discussion during my term in the Defense Department about whether DIA should be made to conform its internal classifications to those of the Military Services. I opposed that idea, and the view that DIA should be forced to conform to Service designations never became policy. I believed at that time, and I do today, that DIA, as an intelligence gathering and interpreting body, should be free and unconstrained in its own internal efforts to develop information about missing and captured Americans. I believe that provided a more effective and complete intelligence effort than forcing DIA to conform to Service decisions about what happened to a man. In effect, DIA's own internal classifications were worksheets designed to help their own analysis, and I considered them as such.

I want to emphasize that DIA's internal list did not result in confusion about a man's status. I met with intelligence experts virtually every week to go over information relating to individual men. The facts regarding individual cases were not in dispute. If a man listed by the Navy as missing was carried by DIA as captured, and that led to better correlation of intelligence reports, then our own efforts were improved. I knew, and all those officially associated with the prisoners and missing effort knew, what the official status of an individual was.

DIA also compiled another PW/MIA list at my request. This list grouped the missing into five categories based upon our estimate of the degree of knowledgeability of the hostile Governments concerning our missing. Its purpose was to give us some way to gauge the response we were receiving to our inquiries about the missing.

There was only one official list regarding a man's status. The aggregate military status list was compiled from the lists provided by the individual military services, and it was based on status determinations made by the Service Secretaries pursuant to their duties as spelled out by Sec. 551-558, Title 37 of the U.S. Code. By law, only the Service Secretaries have the legal authority to determine an individual's status,

and the law was observed in this regard during my tenure in the Department of Defense.

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) based overseas, also maintained a list of prisoners and missing. The JCRC was responsible for efforts in the field to obtain an accounting, and the JCRC list contained information designed to further that effort. I should note here that the chief problem involved with the maintenance of similar lists in several locations was that occasionally information generated in the U.S. or in the field failed to reach the other locations. For example, a letter which Sergeant John Sexton had written while in captivity was not forwarded to Army Casualty files in the U.S., although information relating to the substance of the letter was forwarded to the U.S. and given to his family. Sergeant Sexton was released before Operation Homecoming, and the fact that his family had not been shown an exact copy of his letter resulted in criticism in the press of our procedures for maintaining files on the prisoners and missing.

There were other lists as well. Some lists were passed to U.S. citizens by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) as it was then, to private U.S. citizens and, in one case, to representatives of Senator Kennedy, showing a number of U.S. military as having been captured or having died in captivity. These lists were never considered to be official and complete lists. They were not transmitted by official representatives of the DRV to the U.S. government. The information the lists contained did not conform to the requirements of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and we believed the lists, with good reason as it turned out, to be incomplete. Statements by the enemy that they held an American prisoner were accepted by the U.S. as confirmation of PW status, and were welcomed. Statements relating to those who died in captivity were not accepted as the basis for a status change.

It is important to understand what the various lists meant from a practical standpoint. The lists, including our own list showing official status, were nothing more than an aggregation of the names of individuals. Every name on every list represented a person with a unique history and unique facts concerning the incident of loss. Those of us who worked intensively in this area become familiar with the individual cases. I know many men I have never met. Today, when discussing the fate of individuals for whom we have still received no accounting, it is simply not enough to refer to the status on the official list. The facts of the individual cases must be examined.

We knew that our own official list was not accurate and complete. It was based on our best efforts at finding out what happened to a man, but those efforts were stymied by noncompliance with the Geneva Convention by the other side, and by the difficulties surrounding the incident of loss. We knew that our designation of a man as prisoner did not guarantee him that status, or that the designation of MIA did not mean a man was not a prisoner. For some family members, our official list was a source of comfort, but for others it was a source of despair. It was never considered to be a statement of fact accurate with regard to each individual case.

Another significant list is the one passed by the DRV to representative of the U.S. government in Paris in January 1973, as required by the Paris Peace Accords. That list was official in the sense that it represented, for the first time, an official statement by the other side about the Americans they were holding prisoner, and those whom they reported as to having died in captivity. This list was not accepted by us as a complete accounting for those held prisoner or for those who died in captivity. First, that list did not include the names of those prisoners and missing in Laos. It also omitted the names of men we knew to have been in captivity at one time. The list of those reported as having been captured in Laos, passed to us a short time later by the DRV, was viewed in the same way.

The question of lists is one that I believe should give way to questions about individuals. As I have already noted, the practical impact of lists relating to status was always limited. As I also mentioned earlier, it had a mixed impact on family members, depending on what status a man had. It appears also to have had a limited impact on our prisoners and missing. Ronald Ridgeway was classified as killed in action, but that did not prevent his repatriation. Frank Cius was carried as missing in action in Laos, but he also returned home to his loved ones. David Demmon was carried as a prisoner in South Vietnam, but to this day he remains unaccounted for.

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE

The basis for a man's status was the information concerning his incident of loss and the intelligence received relating to him afterward. An initial determination of status was made by the military services based on the information concerning his loss. That information ranged from certain proof, as in the case of some KIA/BNRs,

to virtually nothing, as in the case of men whose last communication was heard as their aircraft climbed out over the airfield as they departed on a mission. Without compliance with the Geneva convention requirements concerning notification of status, intelligence pertaining to our men became critical to our own knowledgeability.

That intelligence was gathered from a number of sources. The most important and accurate information came from prisoners released prior to homecoming. Some information came from the lists, mentioned earlier, that were passed to private citizens, as the lists passed on to Cora Weiss. Some intelligence came from the constant monitoring of radio broadcasts, television tapes and newspaper and magazine articles in North Vietnam, the USSR and Eastern European countries. Friendly and not so friendly foreign governments, including the then Soviet Union, were also asked for assistance, on occasion were helpful in providing us with information relating to our men who were missing. Enemy soldiers who rallied to the allied side and captured enemy soldiers were the subject of a standard interrogation requirement aimed at extracting information about our missing. Dead enemy soldiers, too, were routinely searched for documents or other types of evidence relating to our men. Enemy communications intercepts were another source of information, sometimes accurate, but frequently not. We also used aerial reconnaissance when it was feasible and appropriate. Finally, agents were used to the extent possible. It is important to note here that the Cooper-Church Amendment precluded the use of U.S. intelligence agents in Laos, where our intelligence lack was greatest.

We understood long before we received the DRV-PRG list in Paris in January 1973, that Operation Homecoming would be only one phase of our work. It was evident that the process of accounting for those who did not return would be long, arduous and complicated under even the best of circumstances. For this reason, Article 8(b) of the Accords was negotiated. Article 8(b) provided for an accounting for the missing, and if it had been implemented, which it was not, we would have received the fullest possible accounting which we desired and which the families of these men deserve.

As I have noted, the initial list which we received in Paris omitted men held prisoner in Laos. That in itself constituted a violation of the Paris Agreement because as negotiated it covered those lost throughout Southeast Asia. A short time later a list purporting to cover Laos was received. While both lists contained some pleasant surprises, the most surprising thing about the lists was the lack of surprises. We knew immediately upon receiving this list of those to be repatriated and those said to have died in captivity that men whom we knew had at one time been alive and in captivity were omitted from the list altogether. After debriefing those who returned, we knew also that the names of some men who may have died in captivity were also not on the lists. On the other hand, we received the name of one individual, a civilian, that was totally unknown to us. In another surprise, Captain Robert White, carried by us as prisoner in South Vietnam, but whose name was not on the list of prisoners, was repatriated shortly after the negotiated period of repatriation had expired. We were told that the enemy unit holding him in South Vietnam had been unable to report that they were holding him in time to include his name on the list of prisoners and release him during the official repatriation period.

It was obvious by the conclusion of Homecoming that the accounting problem was going to be even more difficult than we had anticipated. We had hoped that our returnees would be able to provide us with substantial information about the missing, but relatively few cases were cleared up on the basis of returnee information. Colonel Robert Standerwick's crew member came home, but had little information about Colonel Standerwick, for whom no accounting has been received. Commander Harley Hall's crew member was also repatriated, but no accounting has been received thus far for Commander Hall, who was lost only a few hours before the Cease-fire Agreement took effect. And so it went.

At the termination of Homecoming we had no current, hard evidence that Americans were still held prisoner in Southeast Asia. None of those who returned had any indication that anyone had been left behind. We knew that there was a possibility that defectors were alive in enemy controlled areas, but had no firm evidence to confirm this either. Robert Garwood was an example of an American whom we felt might be alive and in an enemy controlled area, but according to the returnees who saw him last, he was not being held as a prisoner.

To repeat, though, we did know that we had received no accounting for some men who at one time had been alive and in captivity. I want to comment at this point on the so-called discrepancy cases—the cases of men we knew to have been captured, or for whom the information indicated a high degree of probability of capture. Those cases certainly exist. It is almost certain, though, that there are other men about

whom we know nothing who were also just as surely captured. What we do not know, in many cases, I am sure, is just as disturbing as what we know about the discrepancy cases.

This knowledge, common to those who have worked in this area, made the accounting for the missing even more urgent. Efforts to implement the accounting provision, Article 8(b) began even before Homecoming was completed. An early request, for example, was for information relating to a Naval officer carried as prisoner in South Vietnam. Other requests were made to repatriate the remains of Americans reported as having died in captivity.

The record of our efforts to implement Article 8(b) have been well documented. Without cooperation from the other side, the JCRC sent teams into the field to investigate crash and suspected grave sites. An extensive and sophisticated underwater search effort was made off the Coast of South Vietnam in suspected crash site locations. The last U.S. military man to die from hostile fire in Vietnam in a U.S. initiated action was killed in December 1973. He was a member of a JCRC field team, and with the ambush of that team and his death, our field efforts ceased. Even then, an intensive public communications effort to obtain information from anyone in South Vietnam who might have knowledge of American prisoners or dead was begun and ended only with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.

We were accused by some in those days of being interested only in the KIA/BNRs, that we were not looking for living Americans. In fact, we were looking for information and evidence of any kind relating to Americans, whether they were dead with remains never recovered, carried as MIA or carried as PW. The search began at the last known location. Inspection of a crash site might reveal remains or the fact that a man survived. Inspection of a grave site might reveal that the story of an American's was untrue, or might result in the recovery of remains. Folders on all of those unaccounted for were passed to the Communists in the hope, vain as it turned out, of receiving an accounting.

At the end of Homecoming, the distinction between our own official categories blurred. It was ominous for those carried prisoner that they were not acknowledged as such by the other side and repatriated. The KIA/BNRs were in a much more definite status, although we knew a very small number of mistakes had been made in declaring a man dead. A careful examination of individual files would reveal that if major status errors were made, they were made in declaring some who died MIA. In any case, after Homecoming the problem was to determine what had happened to those who did not return and to recover the remains of those who had died.

As we know, and the primary reason we are here today, Article 8(b) was never implemented. No general accounting for the missing has been received. After Homecoming, we developed specific and hard evidence concerning the whereabouts of McKinley Nolan, an Army deserter who was living with a wife and child on the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975. Emmet Kay, an Air America pilot, was captured in Laos after the Cease-fire Agreement and was repatriated after a period of captivity. The only individuals whom hard and at the time current information indicated were in captivity, and for whom no accounting has yet been received, were two civilians, an American, Charles Dean, and Neil Sharman, an Australian, who were captured in 1974. They were unquestionably in the hands of the Pathet Lao when the events that led to the fall of Saigon and Vientiane at mid-year 1975 occurred. Our intelligence capability and our ability to track them in captivity ended with the collapse of the friendly governments.

It is likely, I believe, that an accounting is obtainable now which will resolve the doubts of many families about the status of their loved ones missing in Southeast Asia. The record has become too convoluted and distorted for that to happen. While Congressman Montgomery was in Hanoi being assured that no Americans were being held captive in Vietnam, Arlo Gay was being held at Son Tay prison, and Tucker Gougelmenn was being held in Chi Hoa prison in Saigon. Gay was later released, but Gougelmenn died in prison. Only his remains returned home.

Now we are told American prisoners were transferred from Southeast Asia to Russia, where, according to Boris Yeltsin, they may be alive today. If this hope, too, turns out to be illusory, hundreds and perhaps thousands of family members will agonize anew about the fate of their loved ones. Assurances that there was a misunderstanding will have little credibility. Some early releases came home from Vietnam via Moscow, but we never had any indication that prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union and detained there.

Even with the full cooperation of governments in the areas where our men were lost, a complete accounting will be impossible. In the midst of our efforts to obtain an accounting after Homecoming, two member of Congress became missing in the crash of their aircraft along the Alaska Coast. No track of the aircraft and its occu-

pants was found despite an intensive search effort in an area which was inhabited only by friendly U.S. citizens, and controlled by the State of Alaska and the U.S. Government. In the same time frame the wreckage of an Army Air Force plane on a World War II training flight was found on the slope of Mount Graham, in Arizona. Mount Graham, too, is hardly a hostile location. One of my brothers and his family have a vacation cabin on Mount Graham. In 1974, in an air show at Dulles Airport, a member of the Air Force Thunderbirds reported a malfunction of his F-4 Jet, and ejected in full view of the air show crowd. They cheered when they saw a good parachute deploy. What they didn't see was his parachute melt as he came down, out of sight of the crowds, through the fireball which erupted as his aircraft impacted the ground. He fell to his death, with hundreds in the viewing stands, only a short distance away, unaware of the tragedy.

Efforts should be pressed at full speed in the field nevertheless to find as much of the story of our missing as remains now in that area of difficult terrain and unfriendly climate. These men and their families deserve no less.

This concludes my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Sieverts.

STATEMENT OF FRANK A. SIEVERTS, FORMER SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR POW/MIA MATTERS TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, 1969-77

Mr. SIEVERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad to have this opportunity to appear before this select committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say that the full text will be placed in the record as if read in all cases.

Mr. SIEVERTS. Thank you—in this public session, and I share the committee's hope that its work will finally lead to a full resolution of the questions that have persisted about Americans lost in Southeast Asia.

Let me just say a word about why I'm here. During the years 1966-78 I was the State Department Special Assistant, and later Deputy Assistant Secretary, for POW/MIA's. My position was attached for a time to the office of Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman, who was also responsible for the so-called search for peace, then the responsibility shifted to the office of the Deputy Secretary of State.

It became part of the new Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in 1976, and I was designated a Deputy Assistant Secretary for this subject in 1977. In 1979 I became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugees, and in 1980 I went to the U.S. Mission Geneva, Switzerland as Minister-Counselor for Humanitarian Affairs. At both those latter positions, I continued to have some oversight over the MIA subject.

Let me emphasize that my previous responsibilities in this area are unrelated to my current work for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

I wish to say at the outset that the return of our prisoners of war from Indochina and the fullest possible accounting for the missing were the principal objectives of my office during this entire period. My appointment as an assistant to some of the highest level officials of the State Department was prompted by the Department's desire to raise the subject of our POW's to a high level and to give it prominence in the Department and within the Government as a whole. At any time during my years working on this that I felt I needed to have access to the Secretary of State or another high official, it was there and the action, the necessary action, was taken.

Other people in prominent positions took a similar attitude. When Roger Shields and I were in Saigon, we called on General Creighton Abrams, the head of the U.S. forces there, and one of the purposes was to review with him the structure of the searches for Americans lost in South Vietnam. We wanted to have what we call an action officer and General Abrams simply said I am your action officer, come to me if you have a problem. And if there was one, we did and it was solved. The same was true at CINCPAC, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in the Pacific, with whom we had a similar relationship.

It is important to note that the January 1973 Paris Agreement was the first agreement ending an armed conflict that contained such extensive provisions for accounting for the missing and dead. Not only paragraph 8(b) but an entire protocol to the document was related almost entirely to this subject.

A few years later, the 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which set forth the rules and principles of humanitarian law in armed conflicts, for the first time stated a general obligation to account for the missing and dead. I served as a member of the American team at the diplomatic conference that negotiated those Protocols, and it was my privilege to serve as the chairman of the working group that drafted this, to me, very important provision of international law. I ask that the text of this section be printed in the record at this point.

[The information referred to follows.]

PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
(PROTOCOL I).
OF 8 JUNE 1977

SECTION III

MISSING AND DEAD PERSONS

Article 32 — General principle

In the implementation of this Section, the activities of the High Contracting Parties, of the Parties to the conflict and of the international humanitarian organizations mentioned in the Conventions and in this Protocol shall be prompted mainly by the right of families to know the fate of their relatives.

Article 33 — Missing persons

1. As soon as circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall search for the persons who have been reported missing by an adverse Party. Such adverse Party shall transmit all relevant information concerning such persons in order to facilitate such searches.
2. In order to facilitate the gathering of information pursuant to the preceding paragraph, each Party to the conflict shall, with respect to persons who would not receive more favourable consideration under the Conventions and this Protocol:
 - a) record the information specified in Article 158 of the Fourth Convention in respect of such persons who have been detained, imprisoned or otherwise held in captivity for more than two weeks as a result of hostilities or occupation, or who have died during any period of detention;
 - b) to the fullest extent possible, facilitate and, if need be, carry out the search for and the recording of information concerning such persons if they have died in other circumstances as a result of hostilities or occupation.
3. Information concerning persons reported missing pursuant to paragraph 1 and requests for such information shall be transmitted either directly or through the Protecting Power or the Central Tracing Agency of the International Committee of the Red Cross or national Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Societies. Where the information is not transmitted through the International Committee of the Red Cross and its Central Tracing Agency, each Party to the conflict shall ensure that such information is also supplied to the Central Tracing Agency.
4. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to agree on arrangements for teams to search for, identify and recover the dead from battlefields areas, including arrangements, if appropriate, for such teams to be accompanied by personnel of the adverse Party while carrying out these missions in areas controlled by the adverse Party. Personnel of such teams shall be respected and protected while exclusively carrying out these duties.

Article 34 — Remains of deceased

1. The remains of persons who have died for reasons related to occupation or in detention resulting from occupation or hostilities and those of persons not nationals of the country in which they have died as a result of hostilities shall be respected, and the gravesites of all such persons shall be respected, maintained and marked as provided for in Article 130 of the Fourth Convention, where their remains or gravesites would not receive more favourable consideration under the Conventions and this Protocol.
2. As soon as circumstances and the relations between the adverse Parties permit, the High Contracting Parties in whose territories graves and, as the case may be, other locations of the remains of persons who have died as a result of hostilities or during occupation or in detention are situated, shall conclude agreements in order:
 - a) to facilitate access to the gravesites by relatives of the deceased and by representatives of official graves registration services and to regulate the practical arrangements for such access;
 - b) to protect and maintain such gravesites permanently;
 - c) to facilitate the return of the remains of the deceased and of personal effects to the home country upon its request or, unless that country objects, upon the request of the next of kin.
3. In the absence of the agreements provided for in paragraph 2 b) or c) and if the home country of such deceased is not willing to arrange at its expense for the maintenance of such gravesites, the High Contracting Party in whose territory the gravesites are situated may offer to facilitate the return of the remains of the deceased to the home country. Where such an offer has not been accepted the High Contracting Party may, after the expiry of five years from the date of the offer and upon due notice to the home country, adopt the arrangements laid down in its own laws relating to cemeteries and graves.
4. A High Contracting Party in whose territory the gravesites referred to in this Article are situated shall be permitted to exhume the remains only:
 - a) in accordance with paragraphs 2 c) and 3, or
 - b) where exhumation is a matter of overriding public necessity, including cases of medical and investigative necessity, in which case the High Contracting Party shall at all times respect the remains, and shall give notice to the home country of its intention to exhume the remains together with details of the intended place of reinterment.

So I hope there is no question about the commitment and dedication of those of us who had responsibility for this subject during what I believe must be recognized, and I assume the committee does recognize, are the crucial years; namely the time leading up to the 1973 Paris Agreement; the 1973-75 period of implementation of that agreement which, of course, included the release and the return of the prisoners of war and civilian internees on both sides; and then the period of the communist takeovers and United States withdrawal from Indochina in 1975.

As stated above, our overriding objectives during this entire time were to assure that all our prisoners were returned, and to assure that we were pursuing all available means to secure the fullest possible accounting for our men.

The committee has asked me to address several issues in this testimony. Your first question asks which U.S. Government agency was responsible for collecting information about U.S. civilians. The Department of State carried this responsibility within the U.S. Government, as a result of its general responsibility for assistance to American citizens abroad.

My office worked closely with other bureaus in the State Department to make sure that the information on civilians, all American civilians, was collected and carefully collated; information from a great variety of sources. In this and in each of the answers I am going to present to your questions, I am going to make the same point. We cooperated fully with the Defense Department's efforts to account for our civilian and military personnel. There was complete consistency in the efforts to amass information and the efforts regarding release and accounting for civilians, as for military personnel.

The State Department's responsibility differed in one respect from that of the Defense Department and the military services, since with a few exceptions, the civilians were not direct employees of the State Department, and came under a different set of laws; the law that Dr. Shields referred to does not apply to civilians. Nonetheless, our efforts on behalf of civilians were just as intensive as the Defense Department's efforts were for the military personnel.

It should also be noted that our records differed, in retrospect, in an important way. For civilians we did not attempt to categorize each person as prisoner, missing, or killed. In some cases we had definite information that an individual was alive; in others there was no doubt that someone had died.

But in the absence of official documentation, we did not label these individuals in this way. We simply kept files that were as complete as we could make them. Those files had a number of civilian legal consequences, for example in relation to the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs at the Department of Labor, an office which provided financial support for the families of those who were eligible for these benefits.

We had information about our civilians that we received, at the time of the Paris Agreement. It was heartwarming, and gratifying to receive back a number of those civilians in whom our interest was just as intense as it was for the military personnel. It was a moment of great joy for me personally to be able to greet American

civilians released from South Vietnam on February 13, 1973 when they arrived at Clark Air Base in the Philippines and at the same time, on the same flights, as American military personnel returned from Hanoi.

Roger Shields and I were two of the small number of American officials who were in Hanoi for that first release of American POW's that took place the day before that, on February 12, 1973. It was an occasion and a day that neither of us will ever forget.

The process of treating civilians, in ways similar to the military continued during Homecoming. Medical care, transportation, and other assistance were provided. That, of course, included the same complete, thorough debriefing of all the civilians that also applied to the military personnel.

The information from civilians and military was correlated and commingled in such a way that anything, any piece of information that came from any source in the debriefing process or elsewhere, would be retained and fitted into our analytic process. Similarly, when we began to provide names in the four party joint military team and in other places to request further information and exploration, civilians were included with the names of the military personnel.

Your next question asks that I describe U.S. foreign policy after Operation Homecoming regarding the fate of American citizens and U.S. Government officials. Here, again, our efforts paralleled those that were undertake for the military. To some extent it was done through military liaison channels, as in the four party joint military team. Later it was done through the Woodcock Commission, on which I served as a supporting staff person, as did Roger Shields.

We did it in a variety of other relationships and negotiations with Vietnam. Two notable ones were the bilateral talks with Vietnam that took place in 1977-78, and in the very unusual, when they first began, visits by Vietnamese officials to our casualty resolution and identification facilities in Honolulu.

In some cases, exceptional efforts were made for civilians, such as initiatives on behalf of United States and international journalists missing in Cambodia, and for civilians missing in Laos, such as the Dean and Sharman incidents that Roger Shields mentions.

Missionaries were also the subject of special humanitarian concern. Friends and organization affiliates of people like these made extensive efforts, often through anti-war groups or through missionary alliances. They would attempt to have relationships with the Vietnamese and the Lao and the Cambodians that perhaps were not possible for U.S. Government officials. All that information, all this kind of effort, was brought into the picture as far as we were concerned.

With the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975 and the collapse of the noncommunist governments in Cambodia and Laos, there was a renewed exodus of American and foreign civilians from the region. U.S. embassies, while they were there, had advised Americans to leave and most had done so, departed on the same flights on which American official personnel and many refugees, also departed.

But a number of Americans stayed on, chose to stay on. A few, journalists, missionaries, and some voluntary agency personnel,

hoped to continue to function under the communist authorities. For a time in South Vietnam this seemed to be possible, but by early 1976 all foreigners had been ordered to leave.

The remaining Americans in Phnom Penh were forced to depart shortly after the Khmer Rouge takeover was complete. If you've ever seen the movie *The Killing Fields*, its whole opening sequence is about the way the Americans and other foreigners were rounded up and forced to depart. Cambodians were kept behind and were subjected to the killing fields experience under the Khmer Rouge.

Foreigners were not expelled en masse from Laos, where American and other foreign embassies continued to function, although only a very small number of Americans continued to stay on, one of whom I recall managed an international airline office, so it was possible to continue to fly in and out of Vientiane.

I want to address one other subject before concluding my statement because it reflects experience that I gained both on the POW/MIA subject and on my work with refugees. It concerns the large number of refugee reports that were received during and after the exoduses from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

U.S. officials always debriefed refugees for a variety of intelligence information, including information about missing Americans. In 1978-1979, responding to requests from family organizations, U.S. officials put posters in refugee camps in several languages advising of our interest in information about American prisoners and MIA's. These were rather large posters, substantially larger than the ones you have there, on the dias, and in five or six languages frequently.

In response to this campaign, we began to receive a large flow of refugee reports concerning alleged Americans in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Defense Department and military services carried out a continuing and thorough analysis of all reports, and in many cases were able to correlate them with Americans imprisoned before 1973, foreign visitors, Americans staying behind in Southeast Asia until 1975 or early 1976, or other explanations. But the fact remained that a large number of these reports were not and could not be proven or disproven.

My work with refugees has made me deeply aware of the desperation that these people face and feel. Bereft of home and livelihood, their overriding concern is somehow to secure a better future for themselves and their families. Once it was announced to them that Americans had a strong interest in information on our missing men, it was only human nature for refugees to begin to offer the information which was so welcome to us and, in their eyes, might result in favorable treatment for them.

Refugees were also motivated by hatred—an understandable feeling—hatred of the regimes that had caused them to flee, and they assumed that reports of imprisoned Americans would reflect adversely on the communist authorities.

The very large number of these reports should have triggered caution, since it was clearly improbable that there were ever enough prisoners to correlate with all the alleged sightings.

It is noteworthy that in most of these reports no information was provided on the name or names of the people reportedly seen.

While the war was underway, we received reports on captured Americans which often had names associated with them. This was so even if the reports came from indigenous, illiterate people who would render an American name phonetically, in the same way that we might pronounce a Vietnamese or a Lao name.

An example of that which remains in my memory is the case of Charles Dean and Neil Sharman in Laos in 1974. These were two civilians—Dean was an American, Sharman was an Australian—way off the beaten path. As the reports on them began to come in, lo and behold there were the names as well. I mean these were coming in from Pathet Lao and local peasants and observers. The Dean would be spelled D-i-n, the Sharman was like two words, Sha, mun, but it was—they even had the Neil for Sharman, as a matter of fact, Roger reminds me. There was also a photograph.

All I'm getting at is that here was an example of two foreigners way off the beaten path. They could have totally disappeared, as in the end they did. We have reason to think that they were possibly killed in an escape attempt off the back of a truck; that was very unclear.

Nonetheless, the names were there and it was the way of validating that information. Among American prisoners we learned over the years that the exchange of names was the highest priority. Even prisoners held out of sight or contact with each other would find ingenious ways to communicate; the first information they would convey would be their names.

One can imagine the terrible isolation of a person in captivity and the desperate need to tell another human your name and thereby to assure that someone else knows you are alive. Prisoners would go to great lengths to get this information out.

I met many of the prisoners when they were first released, especially the ones that came out a few at a time in the earlier years in the sixties and early seventies, and I saw at firsthand their desire, their intense desire to convey information on others in captivity. Sometimes they would hand me papers on which they had scribbled names while they were flying on the aircraft.

There was one case of a released man who memorized over 300 names of his fellow prisoners during the weeks prior to his release. They called him the mail box because they knew he was going to be released, and he brought all this information out. It was a very important way of validating lists that we had obtained from other sources.

When Robert Garwood contacted an international visitor in Hanoi in 1979 to say he wanted to come home, the first thing he did was to give that visitor his name and his U.S. military service number, written on a cigarette paper. The instant we received that information at the State Department in Washington, we worked out arrangements for his departure from Vietnam with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

I know the committee recognizes the crucial importance of names in evaluating refugee reports, because without names reports are simply descriptions: descriptions of people, of places, of dates. They may be detailed, they may correlate with other reports and this can give them a surface plausibility, but without names it was my experience that there is always the potential for wishful

thinking, exaggeration, a shift of dates which can make all the difference, whether something was happening in 1972 rather than 1974, for example, or whole cloth inventions by sources perhaps too eager to tell us what we wanted to hear.

It's well known that when names were provided in later years, they sometimes turned out to be fabricated from our own lists and other public sources. Our lists were widely available throughout the regions, even in refugee camps; the same lists that you have up there on the table.

There's also the experience of trafficking in fake dog tags which for a long time was quite a problem until it was discovered that those dog tags in many cases correlated with men safely home in the United States. They were being manufactured; we were never quite sure whether it was by individual profiteers or whether this was some kind of disinformation campaign with official sanction.

I know the committee is sensitive to the problem of false reports and only wanted to present this background information from my own observations at the time many of the reports were first received.

I want to repeat again that a great many dedicated people, several of whom are at the table today, worked on this subject for many years. We are well aware that the passage of time has not healed the wounds or brought comfort to the families whose hopes have been repeatedly raised and dashed. I deeply hope that this committee will be able to conclude its work in a way that resolves these questions once and for all. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sieverts follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK A. SIEVERTS

I am glad to have this opportunity to appear before the Select Committee in this public session. I share the Committee's hope that its investigations and analysis will achieve a full resolution of questions that have persisted about Americans lost in Southeast Asia during the Indochina conflict.

During the years 1966-1978 I was State Department Special Assistant and later Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIAs. From 1966-68 I served as Special Assistant to Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman who had been designated to lead U.S. efforts towards a peace settlement in addition to his responsibility for POW/ MIA's. In 1969 this responsibility moved to the office of the Deputy Secretary. In 1976 my position became part of the new Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and I was designated a Deputy Assistant Secretary in 1977. In 1979 I became a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugees and maintained some oversight of the POW/MIA question during that period as well. In 1980 I was appointed Minister-Counselor for Humanitarian Affairs at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland with responsibility for liaison with the International Red Cross and international refugee programs, an assignment that continued to involve me in the POW/ MIA question during the massive refugee flow from Southeast Asia.

I should emphasize that my previous responsibility for this subject is unrelated to my current position as Spokesman for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I want to state at the outset that the return of our prisoners of war from the Indochina conflict and the fullest possible accounting for the missing were the principal objectives of my office during these years. My appointment as an assistant to some of the highest ranking officials of the State Department was prompted by the Department's desire to raise the subject of our POW/MIAs to a high level and to give it prominence within the Department and our Government as a whole. At any time during the period under review I was able to gain immediate access to the highest officials of the Department, and often in other agencies, for the purpose of taking actions necessary to assist our POWs or to obtain information about the missing. People such as General Creighton Abrams in Saigon or the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific would say: "I am your action officer on this subject." It

was a way of stating the determination of these senior officials to do everything possible to aid our men, and this was the case in the State Department as well.

It should be noted that the January 1973 Paris Agreement on Vietnam was the first agreement ending an armed conflict with such extensive provisions for accounting for the missing and dead. A few years later, the 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the first time stated a general obligation in international humanitarian law to account for the missing and dead. I was privileged to serve on the U.S. delegation for the negotiation of the Protocols and to chair the working group that drafted this new and to me very important section.

So there should be no question about the commitment and dedication of those of us who had responsibility for this subject during what I believe must be recognized as the crucial period, namely the years leading up to the 1973 Paris Agreement, the 1973-75 period of implementation of that Agreement, including the release and return of prisoners of war and civilian internees on both sides, and the period of the communist takeovers and the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina in 1975. As stated above, our overriding objective was to assure that all our prisoners were returned and that we were pursuing all available means to secure the fullest possible accounting for the missing.

The Committee has asked me to address several issues in this testimony. Your first question asks which U.S. Government agency was responsible for collecting information about U.S. private citizens and civilian Government officials missing in Southeast Asia.

The Department of State carried this responsibility within the U.S. Government, flowing from its general responsibility for assistance to American citizens abroad. My office in the State Department worked closely with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of East Asian Affairs in assuring that all possible information was obtained that might relate to U.S. citizens lost in Southeast Asia, whether ordinary civilians, journalists, missionaries, State Department or USAID employees, employees of firms working on contract with the U.S. Government, or civilians employed by the military. We would draw information from a wide range of sources including the U.S. military and intelligence agencies, other governments, private citizens, press reports, and anything else that might bear on the fate of these people.

The Committee's next question asks who was responsible for accounting for the fate of these individuals. While the State Department's responsibility was different from that of the Defense Department and military services for our military personnel, in that with a few exceptions the missing civilians were not our direct employees, our efforts to obtain the fullest possible information on all American civilians and an accounting of what happened to them were as intensive and thorough as for our military personnel.

Files on each missing civilian were maintained in my office and in the Consular Affairs Bureau, with the master file retained in that Bureau in view of its continuing responsibility for overseas citizens services. For many civilians records were also maintained in the Office of Workers Compensation in the Department of Labor which was responsible for financial support to the families of persons covered by this program.

Our files were as comprehensive as we could make them. They differed from the records kept by the military services in that we did not categorize each person as "prisoner," "missing," or "killed." In some cases we had solid information that individuals were alive, in others there was little doubt they were dead, but in the absence of official documentation we did not label them in this way. The actual information was what counted, and we did our best to make the files complete and to keep relatives informed of any information that might be received from any source.

Your next question asks what information the Department of State had about the identity and status of unaccounted for civilians as of the date of the Paris Agreement, and at the end of Operation Homecoming, that is April 1, 1973. We were of course pleased to receive the return of American civilians, among them Foreign Service Officer Douglas K. Ramsey, who had been captured in South Vietnam in early 1966, and Ernest Brace, who had been held for many years by the Pathet Lao under exceptionally arduous conditions. It was a moment of great joy for me personally to be able to greet American civilians released from South Vietnam on February 13, 1973, when they arrived at Clark Air Base in the Philippines.

The returned civilians generally were received and treated during Homecoming in the same way as our returning military POWs, including medical care, transportation, and other types of assistance. They were debriefed thoroughly, and their information was correlated with that obtained from the returning military prisoners. The names of missing civilians were included with those of our military personnel

provided to the Four-Party Joint Military Team that was established pursuant to the Paris Agreement at Tan Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon. It was our continuing policy to give the families of the civilians all information bearing on each individual, including the fact of no information, which for many was the sad reality.

The Committee also asks that I describe U.S. foreign policy after Operation Homecoming regarding the accountability for the fate of missing U.S. citizens and Government officials. Here again, our efforts were consistent with and part of the overall effort to obtain an accounting for our military personnel. In the Four-Party Team, during the Woodcock Commission visit to Vietnam and Laos in 1977, in the bilateral talks with Vietnam in 1977-78, and in the visits by Vietnamese officials to our casualty resolution and identification facilities in Honolulu, the discussions covered civilians as well as military personnel.

In some cases exceptional efforts were made for civilians such as the initiatives that were taken on behalf of U.S. and international journalists missing in Cambodia, unaccounted for civilians in Laos, and missionaries and others of special humanitarian concern throughout the region. We continued to maintain detailed records on civilians, including information obtained from military and other intelligence services and from other governments and other sources.

With the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, and the collapse of non-communist governments in Cambodia and Laos, there came a renewed exodus of American and foreign civilians from the region. U.S. embassies had advised Americans to leave before the communist takeovers and most had done so, in many cases being evacuated on flights that also carried embassy personnel and refugees.

However, a number of Americans and other foreign nationals stayed on. Among them were a few, such as journalists, missionaries, and voluntary agency personnel who hoped to continue to function under the communist authorities. For a time in South Vietnam this seemed to be possible, but by early 1976, all foreigners had been ordered to leave. The remaining Americans in Phnom Penh were forced to depart shortly after the Khmer Rouge takeover was complete. Foreigners were not expelled en masse from Laos, and the American and other foreign embassies continued to function in Vientiane, although only a small number of Americans stayed on.

I thought it might be helpful to the Committee for me to briefly review the subject of refugee reports of MIA information in view of my past responsibility for these subjects.

The largest number of refugee reports were received during and after the exoduses from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, including the "big boat" refugee flow from Vietnam and the "killing fields" flight from Cambodia. U.S. officials regularly debriefed refugees for a variety of intelligence information, including information about missing Americans. In 1979, responding to requests from family organizations, U.S. officials arranged to put posters in refugee camps in several languages advising of our interest in information about American prisoners and MIA's. Stimulated in part at least by this publicity campaign, we received a large flow of refugee reports concerning alleged Americans in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. While the Defense Department and military services carried out a continuing and thorough analysis of all reports, and in many cases were able to correlate them with Americans captured before 1973, foreign visitors, or other explanations, the fact remains that a large number of these reports have never been proven or disproven. Thus the question of their validity remains.

My work with refugees made me deeply aware of the desperation that they face and feel. Bereft of home or livelihood, their overriding concern is somehow to secure a better future for themselves and their families. Once it was announced to them that Americans had a strong interest in information on our missing men, it would be only human nature for refugees to offer the information which was so welcome to American officials and might result in favorable treatment for them. Refugees may also have been motivated by hatred of the regimes that had caused them to flee, assuming that reports of imprisoned Americans would reflect adversely on the communist authorities. The large number of these reports should have triggered caution, since it was clearly improbable that there were ever enough prisoners to correlate with all the alleged sightings.

It is noteworthy that in most of these reports, no information is provided on the name or names of the people reportedly seen. While the war was underway we received reports on captured Americans which often had names associated with them. This was so even if the reports came from indigenous, illiterate people, who could render an American name phonetically, in the same way that we might pronounce a Vietnamese or Lao name. This was one of the best ways to validate a report.

Among the American prisoners themselves the exchange of names was the highest priority. Even prisoners held out of sight or contact with each other would find

ingenious ways to communicate, and the first information they would convey would be their names. One can imagine the terrible isolation of a person in captivity under these circumstances, and the desperate need to tell another human your name and thereby to be sure that someone else knows you're alive. Prisoners would go to great lengths to get this information out. I met many of our prisoners when they were released and saw at first hand their intense desire to convey information on others in captivity. In one case a released man memorized long lists of names of his fellow prisoners during the period prior to his release. When Robert Garwood contacted an international visitor in Hanoi in 1979 to say he wanted to come home, the first thing he did was to give the visitor his name and service number written on a cigarette paper. The instant we received that information in Washington we worked out arrangements for his immediate departure from Vietnam with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

I am sure the Committee recognizes the crucial importance of names in evaluating refugee reports. Without names, the reports are simply descriptions of people, places and dates. The fact that the descriptions are detailed and correlate with other reports might seem to give them a surface plausibility. But without names there is always the potential for wishful thinking, exaggeration, or whole-cloth inventions by sources perhaps too eager to tell us what we wanted to hear.

When names were provided they sometimes turned out to be fabricated from our own lists or other public sources. These lists were also used to traffic in fake dog tags, in some cases with names of men safely home in the U.S. I know the Committee is sensitive to the problem of false reports and wanted to present this background information from my own observations at the time many of the reports were first received.

A great many dedicated people inside and outside the U.S. Government have worked on this subject now for more than 17 years since the communist takeovers in Indochina, nearly 20 years since the Paris Agreement, and even longer for those whose engagement goes back farther. The passage of time has not healed the wounds of memory or brought comfort to families whose hopes have been repeatedly raised and dashed. I deeply hope that this Committee will be able to conclude its work in a way that resolves these questions once and for all.

NEWS RELEASE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES, BUREAU OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

POW'S: THE JOB ISN'T FINISHED YET

APRIL 4, 1978

With the return of the last POW's from Vietnam and Laos, U.S. authorities are gearing up for what may prove to be the toughest task of all: accounting for the men still missing in Southeast Asia.

At the State Department, the officer in charge of POW-MIA affairs, Frank Sieverts, says: "We're not ready to relax yet. We are continuing with the very serious work of searching for information about the missing-in-action."

Sieverts emphasizes that the search is going to be a grim, heart-breaking job. Of some 1900 men missing in action in Southeast Asia, only 588 have been accounted for so far, leaving more than 1300 whose fate is unknown. In Laos, for example, only nine Americans have turned up out of a total of more than 300.

"We intend to be as thorough and as quick as possible," says Sieverts. "No one wants to prolong the uncertainty."

Sieverts makes it clear that the State Department and U.S. military officials won't let up until they have exhausted all efforts to account for the MIA's.

"The peace agreement with North Vietnam contains detailed, specific provisions for gathering information on the missing and dead," he says. "The protocols to the Laos agreement also have specific language on this."

"Right now we are pressing the Pathet Lao for additional information. We have made clear our dissatisfaction with what we have gotten so far."

Sieverts notes that the U.S. has set up a Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand, near the Laos and Vietnam borders, from which search parties will go out to try to find and inspect plane crash sites and places of burial. U.S. officials are also carefully debriefing all returning POW's.

The State Department is just as intent on learning the fate of civilians who have disappeared during the fighting in Southeast Asia.

"The bulk of our work concerns military POW's and MIA's," Sieverts says. "But civilians have always been a special responsibility of the State Department."

"We know of 52 American civilians reported missing. Of these, 24 were released during the prisoner exchanges. They returned home on the same flights as the military prisoners."

"The State Department also helped with the release of foreign nationals—Germans, Filipinos, Thais, and Canadians. And we are continuing to press our efforts to find out what has happened to newsmen missing in Cambodia."

"There are 20 missing newsmen in all, five of them Americans. We are working on this problem with a number of organizations, such as the International Committee to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia, headed by Walter Cronkite."

Sieverts is well qualified to assess the POW-MIA situation: He has been the State Department's man on POW-MIA affairs for more than 6 years. In that time, he has worked all aspects of the problem, from the negotiating tables at Paris, to liaison with POW families in towns and cities across the country. Last year he personally met with officials of the Pathet Lao, the Communist guerrilla movement in Laos.

In February, Sieverts flew to Gia Lam Airport in North Vietnam with the U.S. team to pick up the first American prisoners released by the North Vietnamese—one of the first American diplomats in Hanoi in nearly 20 years.

Sieverts stayed at Gia Lam until the last prisoner boarded a plane that day, and then joined the final flight to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. He was the slim, handsome civilian seen on television greeting the returnees there.

In every modern conflict involving the United States, the State Department has played a key role in trying to assure that prisoners of war are treated in compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and in the repatriation of prisoners and civilians displaced by hostilities.

But the Vietnam war brought special problems. Part of Sieverts' job, for example, has been to work with the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross. In theory, the ICRC is supposed to make periodic inspections of prison camps on both sides.

In fact, while the ICRC made hundreds of visits to POW camps in South Vietnam, where some 35,000 Communist prisoners were held, they were never able to get into North Vietnam.

Had International Red Cross officials been permitted to make onsite inspections, some of the mistreatment charged by returning POW's might have been avoided.

Sieverts says the State Department made "repeated efforts" to open up North Vietnam to ICRC inspection teams. The Department made numerous contacts with neutral governments, as well as with Communist countries, seeking intercession for the POW's.

In 1969 Secretary of State William P. Rogers assigned overall responsibility for POW's to the Deputy Secretary of State—the number two man in the Department—then Elliot L. Richardson, who is now Secretary of Defense, with Sieverts as his Special Assistant for POW and MIA matters.

When Richardson left State, the responsibility stayed with his successors—first John N. Irwin II, now U.S. Ambassador to France, and, at present, Kenneth Rush, the current number two man—with Sieverts continuing as POW/MIA special assistant.

Over the years, Sieverts has been involved in every phase of the POW-MIA program. He prepared negotiating papers for the Paris Peace Talks, wrote information material and newsletters, briefed Members of Congress, and made countless talks around the country. Through the years he was also part of the U.S. Government's extensive information gathering network on men missing or captured by the enemy.

"We used the vacuum cleaner approach," Sieverts recalls. "Every available scrap of information was collected and analyzed. By the time North Vietnam released its list we had a pretty good idea of who they held."

Given the opportunity, Sieverts hasn't hesitated to face the Communists themselves. In early 1972, he met privately in Vientiane Laos, with Soth Petrasi, the chief representative there of the Pathet Lao guerrillas.

He pressed the Communist official for information on Americans held by the Pathet Lao.

"He was totally unresponsive," Sieverts remembers. "I pressed him repeatedly for word on our men, even for an indication of how many were held. But he refused to provide any information at all."

Sieverts confirmed that U.S. officials continue to press Pathet Lao officials for information, although with little success thus far. American officials have made clear their hope that additional information will be forthcoming in the wake of the February 21 Laos agreement.

Sieverts is probably best known publicly for heading the State Department's liaison efforts with POW and MIA families. Through the long years of captivity, he was

a principal source of information and reassurance for relatives of missing or captured men.

Dozens of letters have come into the Department praising that work. Sieverts has been described as one who "never lied, never misled" . . . always friendly, gracious and charming, but always with an air of professionalism."

For some of the returnees, Sieverts was the source of the first word they had of their families.

"I could associate faces of POW's I had never seen in person with their families with whom I had been in contact," he recalls. "The first night at Clark Air Force Base, we stayed up most of the night. I was able to tell the men about families they had been away from for so long."

Sieverts was born in Germany, coming to the U.S. as a child with his parents. He grew up in Wisconsin, the eldest of five children. He attended college at Swarthmore, and then spent four years as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, studying international relations.

The most vivid memory of the past 6 years for Sieverts is the scene at Gia Lam Airport in North Vietnam last February 12. The small team of American officials waited for the first prisoners, wondering if the years in captivity had broken the spirits of U.S. prisoners.

Then the busload of prisoners arrived around a corner of a hangar. As the men stepped off the bus, they set their own formation taking command away from the North Vietnamese guards—for the short march to the release point, where they saluted the American officers.

In that swift changeover, Sieverts recalls, "we knew that no matter what they had gone through, the men had prevailed. They kept up their strength through all the years of captivity."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sieverts. General Kingston, I must note we are going to use a 10 minute time here, so if you can summarize. We want to get to questions, obviously, and we have a lot of questions. So General Kingston.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT C. KINGSTON, USA RETIRED,
FORMER COMMANDER, JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
(JCRC), 1973-1974, ALEXANDRIA, VA**

General KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman and Members of this select committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you pull the mike close to you, General, please, and bend it down.

General KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, Members of the select committee, I am very glad that you asked me to be here today. I am, like a lot of other people, very interested in your outcome, your findings and if I can contribute I would be just too pleased to do so.

You've asked me to answer six questions, which I have done. You and your staff members have those questions. With your permission, I would like to deviate for a few moments to tell you about the establishment of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and some of the experiences we had setting it up and on a couple of type examples of operations that we conducted, to give you a feel of what the organization was—you have the mission in my statements—and how we went about conducting those missions.

In January 1973 I was a brigadier general and deputy senior adviser to Military Region II in the Second Corps. I was in Plaiku. General Weyand, COMUS MACV, a four-star general down in Saigon after the Paris accords, called me down and handed me a piece of paper that came from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Commander in Chief, Pacific. It was instructions to establish the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Central Identification Laboratory.

It was general guidance. It gave a mission and it gave suggestions on what the staff and field teams should look like. At that time the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision were formed. They were manned by personnel already in MACV Headquarters, the advisory headquarters, which meant that a lot of good people were not available for me to enlist or ask to volunteer for the headquarters of the JCRC.

I knew I would have to have field teams, so I went to talk to Brigadier General Stan McClellan, who headed a group of U.S. Special Forces, then in South Vietnam, who were training Cambodian battalions a battalion at a time, and sending them back trained to continue the operations in Cambodia.

I asked General McClellan who his field grade officers were. He told me and I invited Major Charlie Beckwith, who was on the Iranian operation, and a Major Sully Fontaine, and asked them if they wanted to be my two field team commanders.

Major Fontaine was a Belgique who in World War II, at 17 years of age, jumped into France with an OSS—OSE jethird team. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1950 under the Lodge bill, and had vast information and knowledge of Southwest Asia and was by this time a major in the U.S. Army.

Both agreed. And I told them to select 11 recovery teams of 5 men each from the Special Forces personnel in Vietnam. My two requirements were that they had to all be volunteers, and they had to spend 1 year with the Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

I then began to solicit volunteers from within the MACV and the advisory groups, for the headquarters. I succeeded in getting about 50 to 60 percent of the personnel with the right occupational specialties that I needed, and the right rank and experience that I needed to staff that headquarters.

We moved the Joint Casualty Resolution Center to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, where it was under the U.S. Support Activities Group which was headed by four-star Air Force General John Vojt. I reported through him to Admiral Galyer, who was the CINCPAC Commander in Chief at that time.

We established the Central Identification Laboratory in Saigon and moved that to Samieson; that was a port south of Bangkok where the ammunition was coming in by water and transported overland to Cambodia. It was a nice camp and it turned out to be the right place for the Central Identification Laboratory.

Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Tucker, U.S. Army, was the first commander of the Central Identification Laboratory. I want to thank Dr. Shields and the other members of the Department of Defense for getting really renowned forensic anthropologists to staff that initially.

The initial chief anthropologist was Dr. Warren, who came from a year's sabbatical from the University of Michigan. He had done this type of work during the Korean War for the U.S. Army. At that time he was a GS 13. DOD recruited him as GS 11 and he spent 1 year doing very fine work over there.

The two types of operations that we went on, I'd like to just explain the type of work we were doing. I had JCRC personnel in Saigon and in all the four provinces. One night in a hamlet, in the

vicinity of Cu Che where the 25th Infantry Division Headquarters had been, the Vietcong came into a hamlet and told one of the people in the Hamlet that they understood the Americans were looking for their missing and their dead.

He told the individual that a five man VC patrol went through that village one night, and he gave them the date and the month. He said while they were in the village a U.S. serviceman fired on them and hit one of their soldiers. They in turn wounded the American, bound his hands with wire, took him to the well, shot him three times in the head and dropped him down the well. I'm sure the water was very tasty after that.

This individual told the hamlet chief who told the district chief who told the province chief. My representative in the province went down there to ascertain himself what was going on and if it was actually—the reporting up the chain was true. He found it to be true. We got the information through Saigon, to us up at NKP, and I sent down a recovery team.

The first two people down the well were demolition people to make sure it was not booby trapped with demolitions. There was about 3 feet of water in the well and about 2 feet of silt. In several hours of work they found most of the bones of a complete skeleton. His hands were bound behind him, and the skull had three bullet holes.

In working our recovery operations we did a radius. If we had a suspected individual crash, or a gravesite, we drew a 1 mile, 3 mile, and 5 mile radius. In this case we drew a 1 mile radius and there were several people missing. So my Central Identification Laboratory people went and got those folks' records and they identified the individual. He was a soldier who had been on duty on the perimeter of the 25th Infantry Division; he disappeared at night and they never heard of him again.

Another type of operation, thanks to the information program that we were allowed to put out, and were allowed to put out in that part of South Vietnam held by the South Vietnamese, that's the only area that we were allowed to send in recovery teams. Into those areas that we thought were secured by South Vietnam only, not in accordance with Article 8(b) of the Paris accords.

Again information came to us from one of the friendly villages. This time, that an American aviator had crashed his helicopter on the beach. He had mechanical problems or maybe shot down, the village didn't know. He told us where he thought our man was buried. The VC, by the way, recovered him, killed him, and left him on the beach. The local inhabitants buried the man on the beach.

I sent a team down there and for 3 days we sifted and shoveled about 100 tons of sand. A local fisherman came up and asked what are you doing. We said we've got this information, and the fisherman took us about 200 yards down the beach and said dig here. In a very short period of time we found the remains of the aviator.

The CHAIRMAN. General, the time is a little fouled up. We actually have a yellow light on, so if I could as you to summarize.

General KINGSTON. In the first 10 months we did over a dozen search operations. We recovered 21 remains of which 11 were identified as Americans. You don't walk into a job, an assignment like

that JCRC and walk away without emotional baggage. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Kingston follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT C. KINGSTON

ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

1. What was the mission of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center when you were its first Commander in 1973-74?

Did the JCRC's work include investigating the possibility that live Americans remained in captivity against their will in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming, or was the JCRC's work limited to searching for remains of dead U.S. personnel?

2. What POW-related intelligence information did you have access to as Commander of JCRC?

Did you have access to intelligence information held by the DIA and the military services?

Did you have access to intelligence information from other sources?

3. Based upon the intelligence information you reviewed as Commander of JCRC, did you conclude that approximately 100 U.S. prisoners of war were left behind in captivity after Operation Homecoming?

In each of these approximately 100 cases, was there strong, hard evidence of captivity and no evidence of death?

4. To what extent were you aware of the number of incorrect country of loss locations associated with cross border losses in Cambodia and Laos from the 1965-1970 time frame? At what point did you ever come to believe that our unaccounted for in Laos was higher than that being reported? What did you do to bring this problem to the attention of U.S. officials?

5. What specific lists and casualty statistics were you provided, or did you have access to at the time you took command of JCRC? How reliable was the information you received? How were cross border operations losses reflected?

6. What files existed about those reported dead and without the recovery of remains? If no detailed files existed, how were you able to deal effectively with your North Vietnamese and VC counterparts in resolving the fate of those declared dead and without the recovery of remains? Precisely how many such cases were there and were they in addition to or part of the unaccounted for totals?

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Select Committee, I am pleased to be here this morning as I appreciate as a retired professional soldier with two tours of duty in Korea during that conflict and three tours of duty in Vietnam, and as an American citizen who hopes that you will obtain what I have read to be the objectives of this Select Committee. I have been asked to answer six questions given to me by Senators Kerry and Smith. I have prepared answers to all of those questions and, of course, will answer any subsequent questions the Committee may desire. I learned very early as I was building the JCRC organization, that it was to be an investigative organization.

Question 1

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center was activated on January 23, 1973 in Saigon, by General Orders 17. Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Joint Command was under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command and under the Operational Control of the Commander, United States Support Activities Group.

The mission of the JCRC was:

"To resolve the status of Missing in Action (MIA) personnel in Southeast Asia and to effect recovery of remains of personnel Killed in Action in Southeast Asia." With the permission of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command I revised the JCRC mission to read: The mission of the JCRC is to assist in resolving the status of those U.S. MIA, and those personnel declared dead whose bodies were not recovered (BNR), through the provision of information/coordination and/or conduct of operations to locate and investigate crash and grave sites and recover and identify remains throughout Indochina. The JCRC work did not include investigating the possibility that live Americans remaining in captivity against their will in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming.

I believe that the United States had assumed that all signers of the official document entitled "The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," would honor and abide by the contents of the document. This document, referred to as the "Paris Accords" included in Article 8(b) specific provisions for dealing with the resolution of the fate of those Americans, and others, still unaccounted for at the conclusion of the hostilities. Article 8(b) reads as follows: "The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties MIA, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered MIA." We soon learned that compliance with the Paris Accords would be honored only by South Vietnam and the United States.

I interpreted that my mission was to search for, recover and identify dead and missing U.S. personnel. On one occasion when a CH-53 Helicopter crashed into Tong le (a lake in Cambodia) we undertook the rescue from the water of two crew members who parachuted from the helicopter—JCRC personnel retrieved the dead body of one of the pilots, the other pilot's body was not recovered. (Prior to the rescue mission personnel going into the lake to retrieve the pilots, an analyst informed me that there were 12-15 foot land locked crocodiles in the lake.) After my departure JCRC personnel recovered the remains of 23 American Servicemen who died in captivity in North Vietnam.

Question 2

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center was an outgrowth of the United States Government efforts to identify, document, and maintain records of known or suspected Missing in Action and prisoners of war. Those records were initially maintained by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) which was activated under the Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in 1966 when the JCRC was activated in Saigon on January 23, 1973, the records of the JPRC were turned over to my organization. Additional information on POW-related intelligence information was provided to the JCRC from the Headquarters, Pacific Command, the Military Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency and I assumed from other governmental agencies and from the private sectors, domestic and foreign, that those agencies dealt with. The JCRC had access to debriefings of all POWs who were released during Operation Homecoming in February and March 1973.

Question 3

On November 19, 1975, I testified before the House Select Committee Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. The Committee met at 8:30 p.m. with Mr. Montgomery, Chairman of the Select Committee providing.

During my testimony in answering the Committees questions I stated in "We had information that the other side, particularly the North Vietnamese, had in their possession American Prisoners of War (POW). We had photographs from newspapers, Japanese, Eastern Europe. Lieutenant Dodge comes to mind—we had pictures of him being held by two helmeted Vietnamese. He never showed up, he died in captivity. He never showed up on the released POW lists." I was also asked, "How many cases did you have of men that were seen live in captivity but not heard from subsequent to that time?" I replied "I do not know accurately."

I was then asked "Can you estimate how many there were?" I replied "around 100."

As I recall my reply of the estimated figure of 100 was based upon similar evidence that we had on LT Dodge—no hard evidence of what happened to them when they were not returned during Operation Homecoming or were not among those remains that the JCRC recovered from cemeteries in North Vietnam in 1974.

During additional testimony at the above hearing (November 19, 1975), I was asked "Is it your feelings or opinion that there are Americans yet live in Vietnam." I replied "No, sir, I do not believe there are Americans still alive in Southeast Asia with the possible exception of Eastern Cambodia, and they are probably not military."

LT Dodge's remains were returned to United States custody on July 8, 1981. The remains were identified by the Central Identification Laboratory (which I also activated on March 23, 1973). According to Defense Intelligence Agency personnel LT Dodge is buried in Arlington Cemetery.

Question 4

To my recollection I never questioned locations or numbers of missing personnel as the JCRC did not develop neither the numbers of missing, under what circum-

stances nor locations. That information came from different sources, primarily from the Services through the Department of Defense. Perhaps Dr. Shields can provide some information.

Question 5

The JCRC was provided the files from the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, plus information from the Department of Defense, the Military Services and other governmental departments and agencies.

The JCRC had a casualty data division in the Headquarters that was responsible for maintaining necessary liaison with supporting information organizations and agencies; providing input to and monitoring the output of the ADP system (site development, data analysis, casualty records); correlating information obtained through the public communication program, requesting and receiving and analyzing specialized photographic and sensor information required in support of casualty resolution operations; maintaining records on crash/grave site locations; prepare site folders for field operations, conducted required liaison to obtain information concerning operational factors pertaining to missions such as order of battle, terrain and weather information; maintained records and personal information related data on all MIA/BNR and recovered personnel (casualty records); analyzing existing files and requesting amplifying data from Military Services and other sources. They maintained data on aircraft type/serial numbers and engine serial numbers. They also developed casualty resolution operations After Action Reports. Additional casualty statistics provided to the JCRC after receipt of the JPRC files came mostly from the Service Casualty Officers usually through DOD. I have no way of evaluating the reliability of information received. Actual evaluation was by conducting Casualty Resolution Operations in the field based upon information provided as to locations, type aircraft and number of persons supposed to be associated with the crash or grave site.

Question 6

I hope that I have partially answered some of this question in my previous answers, particularly pertaining to JCRC files and when, where and how we obtained information.

I had no direct contact with the North Vietnamese or the VC and certainly I did not consider them to be my counterparts.

After coordination and approval by the American Embassy in Saigon, the U.S. Delegation Team Chief to the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) briefed the team on planned JCRC activities at selected sites. All FPJMT members were invited to observe JCRC activities on Casualty Resolution Operations. Only South Vietnam and U.S. team members accepted.

During every U.S. briefing to the FPJMT the North Vietnamese and the VC delegates refused to discuss JCRC operations, noting only that the FPJMT had not approved the investigations.

A major criteria for site selection was site security. I was allowed to conduct operations only in that territory to be well within control of South Vietnam. I had a requirement for one of my liaison officers stationed with the State Departments Council General in every Province to inspect that friendly troops had secured the site location and were in place. However, on December 15, 1973 a JCRC Casualty Resolution Team was ambushed at a site they had been at working for the past two days. U.S. Army Captain Richard Rees was killed and four of his U.S. Army soldiers on his team were wounded. One Vietnamese was killed and three wounded, and one helicopter destroyed.

There were no more Casualty Resolution Operations conducted by the JCRC in the remaining short period that I commanded the JCRC.

While this has nothing to do with the six questions I was asked to address and I would like to inform this Committee that on May 20 I gave about a 7 hour deposition to Mr. Neal Kravitz an Investigative Counsel to this Committee and wish to thank him for providing me information on my testimony on November 19, 1975. I gave him some pertinent papers dealing with the activation of the JCRC and the CIL.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL OKSENBERG, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF [1976-78]

Mr. Oksenberg.

Mr. OKSENBERG. Thank you, Senator. You are to be congratulated for these hearings and the work of your committee and its staff. Such a congressional inquiry has long been overdue. From January 1977 to January 1980, when I returned to the University of Michigan, I was the staff member of the National Security Council responsible for POW/MIA issues.

I worked closely with my colleagues at the Defense Department and the State Department. They were much more deeply immersed in and understood better than I the subtleties and complexities of the POW/MIA issues and the recovery of remains.

I did not have much background to prepare me for the MIA/POW issue. I am primarily a China specialist. Gradually I became aware of its complexities, its history and the politics surrounding it. The Carter administration inherited from the Nixon/Ford administrations a set of policies, institutional arrangements and a negotiating record with the Vietnamese that established the parameters within which we initially operated.

The policies we inherited then evolved through two overlapping stages. In order to seek a full accounting of POW/MIAs and to recover remains, an effort to establish diplomatic contact with Vietnam peaked in 1977-1978, and diminished but did not end following the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Then with the increased reporting of live sightings derived from the massive flow of refugees from Indochina from 1977 on, we intensified our efforts to interview refugees and verify their reports.

Certainly no issue in which I was involved during my 3 years in the Government was more tragic, emotional and heart rending than this one. Fifteen years have passed and my memory has dimmed considerably concerning many of the details, but I vividly remember two particularly moving meetings with family members of MIAs. One was the elderly mother of a missing American soldier from New Jersey. During her visit she showed me worn pictures of her son as a child and a honor student in high school.

It became clear to me that her life had been devoted to the nurturing of her son. She assured me that her son was still alive. She sought my commitment to help recover her boy. I felt that this woman would not survive if her faith and hope somehow were ever lost.

Equally moving was a meeting with the wife of a missing American pilot whose plane had been shot down over North Vietnam. She told me she was desperate. She explained that she had lived in suspended animation for I think 6 or 7 years. She wanted to know whether the U.S. Government thought her husband was alive or dead.

She could ask the Pentagon what was known about her husband's fate. This request might lead to his being reclassified from being missing to being dead, but she told me that she was psychologically incapable of initiating such a review. She felt that in some sense her request for a review would be an abandonment of her loved one. She wanted to remain faithful to her husband as long as there was any hope, and she would do nothing to destroy that hope. But if the Government informed her that her loved one were dead, she would then reluctantly seek to rebuild her life. That is

what her husband would have wanted her to do especially for the sake of their son.

She felt that the Government owed her its best judgment about her husband's fate without her having to do anything to ascertain what that judgment was. She requested that the Government change its policy and implement an automatic review of all cases including that of her husband.

Such meetings and other information available to us greatly affected me and my colleagues. They convinced us that we had to pursue several not easily reconcilable objectives. First, our Government had to make every reasonable effort to obtain a full accounting from the Vietnamese of the fate of MIAs. The Government owed it to the New Jersey soldier and others like him as well as to their families and friends, to persist in a search for them as long as a straw of hope of their survival existed and to recover their remains if all hope had vanished. But we also had a responsibility not to arouse false hopes and unjustified expectations.

Second, the American Government owed the pilot's wife and others like her the Pentagon's best judgment about the fate of their loved ones unless the next of kin preferred for the Government not to review the status of the missing relative. But a reclassification of someone from MIA to KIA status should not diminish our resolve to ascertain the precise fate of the soldier involved.

Third, this issue became a constant reminder of the high human cost of war. It prompted the Carter administration to redouble its efforts to help build a more peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific region. We would best honor soldiers who sacrificed so much by our contributing to the long-term stability of a region where we had fought three costly wars in 30 years.

Fourth, the POW/MIA issue was full of continuing human tragedy, so we sought to avoid playing politics with it. The entire Government owed it to those involved, the soldiers, their families and friends to treat this issue with the resoluteness and decorum it deserved.

The Carter administration therefore eschewed using this issue for such purposes as to demonstrate its patriotism, to inflame public opinion or to advance other foreign policy objectives.

Before providing my summary of the Carter administration's actual record on MIA/POWs two other points should be mentioned. The Defense Department and State Department stressed to me that information about MIAs supplied by the government in Hanoi could not be taken at face value, and Pentagon officials informed me that there was sound evidence that the authorities in Hanoi were holding back the remains of deceased American servicemen.

In early 1977 there was no firm evidence, either to confirm or challenge Hanoi's assurances that no Americans were being held against their will in Vietnam. But the flood of Vietnamese refugees beginning in late 1977 and 1978 led to an upsurge of refugee reports of sightings of live Americans. Efforts were then redoubled to ascertain whether any live Americans remained.

This was done through extensive cross-checking of refugee interviews and use of other sources of intelligence. Despite this massive effort, as I recall at the time I left Government in early 1980 no firm evidence existed to substantiate claims that American service-

men either voluntarily or involuntarily remained in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

Finally, it must be recognized that one reason the POW/MIA issue achieved such salience was the excellence of American recordkeeping compared to our previous wars. In no previous war it was possible to identify remains with the precision of the Vietnam war. The precision of recordkeeping in Vietnam makes the unknown category even more vexing. Many Americans did not in 1977-80 and evidently do not now accept that a residual category of soldiers exists whose precise fate may never be known.

All of these considerations help explain the many measures that the Carter administration undertook. One of the first initiatives in Asia was the dispatch to Hanoi of the commission led by Leonard Woodcock. This grew out of a pledge that President Carter made during his campaign for the presidency. The Woodcock Commission sought to encourage the Vietnamese to provide a full accounting of the MIAs.

Partly because of humanitarian concerns such as those raised by the pilot's wife that I have just described, we reinstituted a review of the status of MIAs. I vaguely recall, and I may be incorrect, that due to the concerns such as those raised by the New Jersey's soldier's mother, these reviews could be halted if the family wished.

In all contacts with the Vietnamese in 1977, 197-78, we always stressed the importance of obtaining a full accounting of our soldiers' fates. Whether a soldier was listed as MIA or KIA with remains not recovered was irrelevant to our desire to obtain a full accounting.

The reclassification process had no impact upon our resolve to pursue this issue. Many in our Administration believed that improved diplomatic relations with Vietnam would encourage Hanoi to be more forthcoming and more cooperative on MIA issues.

That was one reason some officials sought to cultivate diplomatic contact with Vietnam or to permit Vietnam to enter international organizations; however, we were not prepared to offer reparation payments or economic assistance to Hanoi in order to improve relations. Until early fall 1978 Hanoi considered such assistance to be related to normalization.

As the number of Indochinese refugees soared in 1977-78, the Administration established an extensive system for interviewing refugees about any knowledge they might have, either about live Americans or the location of remains. This information was systematically compiled and carefully evaluated.

As I recall, at the time I left Government this information was not so persuasive or compelling as to justify new policies or actions. Most officials privately remained skeptical that any American was being held against his or her will, but out of consideration for such as the New Jersey's soldier's mother we did not express this skepticism openly and more importantly we did not allow our skepticism to intrude on our resolve to press forward for a full accounting and recovery of all remains.

In sum, as I try to reconstruct Carter administration policy on Indochina, POW/MIAs and the recovery of remains, recognizing that after 15 years my ability to recall events is quite limited, I think my colleagues and I discharged our duties as responsibly, and

properly as possible given the complexity and understandable emotions involved.

I thank the committee for this opportunity to convey my recollections to a broader audience.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL OKSENBERG

Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, and Associates: You and your associates are to be congratulated for these hearings and the work of your committee and its staff. I welcome this thorough examination of the POW/MIA issues and the effort to recover the remains of our MIAs arising from the American involvement in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Such a congressional inquiry has long been overdue.

From January 1977 to January 1980, when I returned to the University of Michigan, I was the staff member of the National Security Council responsible for POW/MIA issues as part of my overall assignment on China and Indochina affairs.

Whenever POW/MIA issues arose, I worked closely with my colleagues at the Defense Department and the State Department. They were much more deeply immersed in and understood better than I the subtleties and complexities of POW/MIA issues and the recovery of remains. In the Carter years, a special team at the Defense Department handled POW/MIA affairs, and at the State Department, the issue fell within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs. I tended to look for guidance to the relevant personnel in these agencies. My views to a considerable extent were based on information that I derived from State and Defense. But my views were also shaped by the extensive correspondence and conversations that I had with families whose loved ones were classified as missing or whose remains had not been recovered. And my views were also influenced by the League of Families, whose officials saw me regularly and who had a great impact upon me. Finally, and most important, I knew that President Carter, Vice President Mondale, and Dr. Brzezinski—my bosses—were deeply committed to obtaining a full accounting of the fates of those who had not returned home alive or whose remains had not been retrieved.

I did not have much background to prepare me for the MIA/POW issue. Gradually, I became aware of its complexities, its history, and the politics surrounding it. The Carter Administration inherited from the Nixon-Ford Administrations a set of policies, institutional arrangements, and a negotiating record with the Vietnamese that established the parameters within which we initially operated. The policies we inherited then evolved through two overlapping stages. An effort to establish diplomatic contact with Vietnam in order to seek a full accounting of POW/MIAs and to recover remains peaked in 1977-78 and diminished but did not end following the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Then, with the increased reporting of live sightings derived from the massive flow of refugees from Indochina from 1977 on, we intensified our efforts to interview refugees and verify their reports.

Certainly no issue in which I was involved during my 3 years in the Government was more tragic, emotional, and heart rending than this one. Fifteen years have passed, and my memory has dimmed considerably concerning many of the details. But I remember with considerable vividness two particularly moving meetings with family members of MIAs. One was with the elderly mother of an American soldier from New Jersey, whose fate was unknown. She had written me letters on several occasions, and she then visited me personally in the Old Executive Office Building. She showed me pictures of her son as a child and an honor student in high school. Clearly, her life had been devoted to the nurturing of her son, and his absence had totally and irretrievably shattered her. She was unable to accept his possible loss; indeed, she told me that through prayer, the Lord had assured her that her son was alive. She sought my commitment to help recover her boy. I felt that this wonderful woman would not survive if her faith and hope somehow were ever lost. I promised her that I for one would make every reasonable effort to persist in the search for her son. I pledged to myself to help sustain her faith.

Equally moving was another meeting, this one with the bereaved wife of an American pilot whose plane had been shot down over North Vietnam. Her loved one was classified as "missing in action," that is, MIA. She told me she was desperate. She wanted to know whether the United States government thought her husband was still alive. She explained that she had lived in suspended animation for, I think, 6 or 7 years. She knew that she could ask the Pentagon to review what was known about her husband's fate, which might lead to his being reclassified from being listed as MIA to his being listed as dead, i.e., killed-in-action. But she told me

that she was psychologically incapable of initiating such a review. She felt that in some sense her request for a review would be an abandonment of her loved one. She wanted to remain faithful to her husband as long as there was any hope, and she would do nothing to destroy that hope. Tears then started to pour down her cheeks. If the government informed her that her loved one were dead, she explained, she would then reluctantly seek to rebuild her life. This is what her husband would have wanted her to do, especially for the sake of their son. And she felt that the government owed her its best judgment about her husband's fate, without her having to do anything to ascertain what that judgment was. She told me that the wives of many other missing pilots felt very much as she did. At the time, the Pentagon had halted its review of the status of the MIAs, unless a family member specifically requested such a review. Although she was incapable of initiating a review, she requested that the government change its policy and implement an automatic review of all cases, including that of her husband.

Such meetings and the other information available to us greatly affected me and my colleagues. They convinced me that we had to pursue several not easily reconcilable objectives:

First, our government had to make every reasonable effort to obtain a full accounting from the Vietnamese of the fate of MIAs.

Second, the government owed it to the New Jersey soldier and others like him to maintain their family's faith as long as a straw of hope of their survival existed and to recover their remains if all hope had vanished. But we also had a responsibility not to arouse false hopes and unjustified expectations.

Third, the American government owed the pilot's wife and others like her the Pentagon's best judgment about the fate of their loved ones unless the next-of-kin preferred for the government not to review the status of the missing relative. But a reclassification of someone from MIA to KIA status should not diminish our resolve to ascertain the precise fate of the soldier involved.

Fourth, this issue became a daily reminder of the high human cost of war. It prompted the Carter Administration to redouble its efforts to help build a more peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region; we would best honor soldiers who sacrificed so much by our contributing to the long-term stability of a region where we had fought three costly wars in 30 years.

Fifth, the POW/MIA issue was full of continuing human tragedy. Above all, we must avoid playing politics with it. The entire government owed it to those involved—the soldiers, their families and friends—to treat this issue with the resoluteness and decorum it deserved. The Carter Administration therefore eschewed using this issue for such purposes as to demonstrate its patriotism, to inflame public opinion, or to advance other foreign policy objectives.

Before summarizing the Carter Administration's actual record on MIA/POWs, two other points should be mentioned. The Defense Department and the State Department stressed to me that information about MIAs supplied by the government in Hanoi could not be taken at face value. Hanoi's calloused treatment of American POWs during our military involvement in Vietnam demonstrated Hanoi's attitude toward our servicemen. And Pentagon officials informed me that there was sound evidence that the authorities in Hanoi were holding back the remains of deceased American servicemen. As I recall, most officials at State, DOD, and CIA believed that the Vietnamese were cynically releasing the remains in their possession a few at a time, whenever it suited their purposes. In early 1977, there was no firm evidence either to confirm or challenge Hanoi's assurances that no Americans were being held against their will in Vietnam. But the flood of Vietnamese refugees beginning in late 1977 and 1978 led to an upsurge of refugee reports of sightings of live Americans. And in 1973, Robert Garwood surfaced in Hanoi; he was a Marine defector whose existence must have been known to authorities in Hanoi. His appearance was a reminder that Americans could have voluntarily remained in Vietnam. Given Hanoi's record, its assertion that no Americans were being held against their will was never fully trusted, and efforts were redoubled to ascertain whether any live Americans remained in Vietnam. This was done through extensive cross checking of refugee interviews and use of other sources of intelligence. Despite this massive effort, as I recall at the time I left government in 1980, no firm evidence existed to substantiate claims that American servicemen either voluntarily or involuntarily remained in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

Finally, it must be recognized that one reason the POW/MIA issue achieved such salience was the excellence of American record keeping compared to our previous wars. In no previous war was it possible to identify remains with the precision of the Vietnam War. In both World War II and the Korean War, in the carnage of the

battle, many soldiers were literally lost. Their remains were never located, and the identity of many remains was impossible to establish. Sensing this reality, most Americans accepted that the missing in action, if not in enemy prison camps, were almost certainly dead. The precision of record keeping in Vietnam makes the unknown category more vexing. Many Americans did not in 1977-80 and evidently do not now accept that a residual category of soldiers exists whose precise fate many never be known.

All these considerations help explain the many measures that the Carter Administration undertook:

One of our first initiatives in Asia was the dispatch to Hanoi of the Commission led by Leonard Woodcock.

It sought to encourage the Vietnamese to provide a full accounting of the MIAs.

Partly because of humanitarian concerns such as those raised by the pilot's wife that I just described, we reinstituted a review of the status of MIAs. However, due to the concerns such as those raised by the New Jersey soldier's mother, these reviews could be halted if the family wished.

In all contacts with the Vietnamese in 1977-78, we always stressed the importance of obtaining a full accounting of our soldiers' fates. Whether a soldier was listed as MIA or KIA with remains not recovered, was irrelevant to our desire to obtain a full accounting. The reclassification process had no impact upon our resolve to pursue this issue.

Many in our administration believed that improved diplomatic relations with Vietnam would encourage Hanoi to be more forthcoming and more cooperative on MIA issues. That was one reason some officials sought to cultivate diplomatic contact with Vietnam or to permit Vietnam to enter international organizations. However, we were not prepared to offer reparation payments or economic assistance to Hanoi in order to improve relations. Until early fall, 1978, Hanoi considered such assistance to be related to normalization.

As the number of Indochinese refugees soared in 1977-78, the administration established an extensive system for interviewing refugees about any knowledge they might have either about live Americans or the location of remains. This information was systematically compiled and carefully evaluated. As I recall, at the time I left the government, this information was not so persuasive or compelling as to justify new policies or actions. Most officials privately remained somewhat skeptical that any Americans were being held against their will, but out of consideration for such as the New Jersey soldier's mother, we did not express this skepticism openly. And more importantly, we did not allow our skepticism to intrude on our resolve to press forward for a full accounting and recovery of all remains.

In sum, as I try to reconstruct Carter Administration policy on Indochina POW/MIAs and the recovery of remains—recognizing that after 15 years, my ability to recall events is limited—I think my colleagues and I discharged our duties as responsibly and properly as possible, given the complexities and understandable emotions involved. I thank the Committee for this opportunity to convey my recollections to a broader audience.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Oksenberg. Let me say obviously for all Members of the committee that the emotion of this issue is obvious to everybody and we respect and understand for each of you that that doesn't go away, and General, I appreciate your comments. There is a burden, and that is why we are here.

And I hope that each of you will respect in our questions not an effort to dump that burden on somebody but an effort to get at this, to try to understand it ourselves and we can't avoid some of the tough questions that exist as a consequence of it, and so those questions will I know come from each member in that spirit.

There are a lot of questions obviously, not all of which we will be able to proceed forward with today, but I would like to go if I can to the heart certainly of some of the issues that we face and if I may I would like to just share - - this is a tape Mr. Shields, and I

just want to be absolutely accurate so I share this with you and with those listening.
(Tape.)

Question: Do you think there still are POWs alive and well somewhere in either Laos or Cambodia? Answer: We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive in Indochina.

The CHAIRMAN. That was your statement at a press conference on the April 12, 1973. We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive.

Now it is a fact, is it not that as of February 1973, you personally had information about an EC or an EQ-47 shot down in Laos and you believed that four members of that crew had survived, did you not?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, in that case, the Air Force had investigated the incident and had declared those men dead.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked what you believed.

Dr. SHIELDS. My concern was that someone may very well have survived. I hold that concern today.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't you believe personally, you had made a determination, you thought that four people had survived based on intelligence?

Dr. SHIELDS. I thought that it was possible that four individuals had survived. We did not have a complete investigation. The Air Force went into that crash site and found remains within that aircraft. They were not able to establish how many remains they saw. There were very serious questions about that and I had learned that it was unwise to make early opinions about serious questions like this without investigating the facts.

Now I am a still concerned about that, although I am told by DIA that a very thorough analysis of the intelligence relating to that aircraft does not support the contention that people were alive. I still have very serious questions about that, yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. But in point of fact, you in your deposition said to us that you disagreed with the quick determination of the Air Force and you said: My own feeling was, I disagreed with the services in their determination. That is your quote.

Dr. SHIELDS. That is correct. There is an alternative to carrying men as prisoner, and that is a missing category, and that is exactly what I believe that category is for.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is an indication that men were alive.

Dr. SHIELDS. A missing in action category indicates that you do not know whether the man—

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you, Mr. Shields, that is an indication that men were alive?

Dr. SHIELDS. That being an MIA is an indication—

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. You made a determination based on intelligence that four people might have survived.

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, yes, they might have, and they might not have—

The CHAIRMAN. Stop there, yes, they might have. That is an indication that people might have been alive?

Dr. SHIELDS. Certainly people might have been alive.

The CHAIRMAN. And on April 12, 1973 you made an announcement, we have no indication at this time there are any Americans alive in Indochina.

Dr. SHIELDS. I don't believe the circumstances of that case indicated those men were alive. Saying that men might be alive—

The CHAIRMAN. Let's come to another circumstance, if you want to contradict your own determination—

Dr. SHIELDS. Am I allowed to answer your question, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Dr. SHIELDS. Then I would like to be able to do that if I could. My concern would be about whether men were prisoner or missing. The MIA category is specifically appropriate to cases where you do not know whether men are alive or dead. That is the case of those men in the EC-47, in my own mind. I did not know.

The CHAIRMAN. In your deposition: Question: Then just to review the bidding again on February 4th and 5th, we had the downing of the EC-47Q and within several weeks after that we have intelligence, you said, I think we had the intelligence sooner than that. Question: That the four may be prisoners of war. Answer: Yes.

Dr. SHIELDS. May, Senator, and every man who became missing might have been a prisoner of war. Don't write off the missing.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not writing off the missing, but you made a judgment in February based on intelligence that four people might have been a prisoner of war. You stood up in April and said, we have no indication that anyone would be alive. That was not true.

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, if you—

The CHAIRMAN. That was not true, was it, Mr. Shields?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, it was true.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, you wrote a memo to Ambassador Hill on May 24, 1973 in which you said, in a DOD sponsored press conference held April 12, 1973, I made the statement that DOD had no specific knowledge indicating and any U.S. personnel were still alive and held prisoner in Southeast Asia. This statement has been the basis for all subsequent answers from DOD to questions concerning the possibility that Americans may still be held prisoner in Southeast Asia.

Quote, it was a totally accurate and factual statement at the time it was made, which I take issue with: In light of more recent events, I believe that answer is no longer fully satisfactory. You then cite a downing of an aircraft in Laos but you specifically site the EC-47 crew and the four people.

You made your own judgment later that you were not accurate.

Dr. SHIELDS. I believe I said, if you would quote that, that may no longer be correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it was not correct as of February when you had the knowledge and as of April when you made the statement.

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, those men were in the same condition that many other men were who might have survived their incident. Many of those were carried, and appropriately so, as missing in action. I said that those individuals may have survived, and you carry them in a missing in action status until you can ascertain whether in fact they are prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shields, we have uncovered some 244 people should have been carried and were carried—excuse me, were car-

ried—were carried by DOD as POW, prisoner of war. You did not know until after the debriefs that 111 of them died in captivity. When you made this statement, those debriefs had not been completed, had they? Yes or no?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, the debriefs went on—

The CHAIRMAN. Had they?

Dr. SHIELDS. No, they had not—I assume that they had not been completed, although many of them had.

The CHAIRMAN. So you did not have the information from the returning prisoners when you made this statement to inform you that 111 had died in captivity, did you? Yes or no? You did not have the information.

Dr. SHIELDS. I did not have negative information, I did not have positive statements from them that they were alive.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. But they were carried as prisoners of war, based on the latest information we had that they were still prisoners, is that not accurate?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, it is, Senator. And that was well known to everyone involved in the issue. I have testified in many other occasions to that fact, that men certainly were carried as prisoner of war at one time and had not come home.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shields, do you not think it is a little disingenuous to stand up before the Nation and have a policy announced that says we have no indication that there are any Americans alive when you know people are carried as POW and have nothing to suggest they are dead?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, if you have the rest of that transcript, you might hear the circumstances which surrounded that. You will find out that we were debating the issue about whether we had current, hard information relating to men who were alive or who were dead, and we had no hard, specific, current information at that time. And I think we had done enough of our debriefings at that time, because we had asked men immediately if they knew about living Americans, and the men who had come home, although they had not completed their debriefs with regard to the conditions of their activity, they certainly would have completed their debriefs with regard to men that they knew were still alive and in captivity.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Department of Defense never corrected your statement, did they?

Dr. SHIELDS. I think they believed it to be accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. They never corrected it, did they?

Dr. SHIELDS. I don't believe they did.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated yourself in May that it was not accurate. It is in your own memo.

Dr. SHIELDS. I said it may not have been, Senator. We were very concerned about these issues. We did not want to rush to judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you did not say that. You said I believe the answer is no longer satisfactory.

Dr. SHIELDS. Would you read the complete statement for me?

The CHAIRMAN. In light of recent events, I believe that answer is no longer fully satisfactory.

Dr. SHIELDS. We may have subsequently investigated those incidents, and if you will find out later, Senator, if you want to talk

about Department of Defense corrections, I have a hearing here from the House committee which investigated this, and if you'll allow me to read just very briefly, I will tell you what I said and what other individuals in the Defense Department said about this.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do, can I read you your own statement?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, please.

The CHAIRMAN. From your deposition: Now, did you ask that a retraction be made for this? Answer: No, no. Question: Did you consider that a substantial misstatement of what had taken place at those news conferences? Answer: I considered it to be erroneous, just as I consider many things that the newspapers said over the years to be erroneous, but I did not ask for retractions.

Dr. SHIELDS. I did not ask the newspapers for retractions? Is that what we're—

The CHAIRMAN. You did not ask—no, you did not ask the Defense Department.

Dr. SHIELDS. I think we were talking about the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. No. The question was about the misstatement at your news conference, the inaccuracy that you had stated.

Dr. SHIELDS. And who would I have asked—the Department of Defense could not correct what a newspaper said. If you are asking whether I asked the newspapers for a retraction, I did not.

Senator, if you will allow me to read—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, can I finish? You keep changing reality here. Here is the next question: Did you ever ask the Department of Defense through the Secretary of Defense for a retraction or correction, because that is what you would have needed. Answer: No, we didn't.

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct. We did not. I did not have to ask for corrections.

If you'll allow me to read here.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Dr. SHIELDS. A statement I made, and that I made shortly after that period of time. This is to the House committee known as the Montgomery Committee.

"With regard to the other reports we have received, we have never been able to correlate them positively with Americans, with military, who would still be held captive in Southeast Asia. We have endeavored even through the use of such things as polygraph tests for informers who would come over and tell us these things to find out if we could pinpoint these reports which we had received so that we could refine them and say yes, that's valid, we are sure some Americans are there. We have never been able to do that."

It continued here in an exchange with Congressman Gonzalez. Mr. Gonzalez says, "so in terms of numbers, what or how many would you feel there is reason to believe are alive?"

Answer: "That's the most difficult question of all to answer. My own feeling, and anyone working in this area simply forms his or her own judgment, frankly is one of question. There were men alive at one time. Whether these men are still alive or not is an open question. There are men who should have been captured who were alive, having successfully ejected from an aircraft, who were seen alive on the ground, who talked to the men in the air and said

here comes the enemy and I'll see you when the war is over, and of whom we have heard nothing more.

As for how many men are still alive, it's certainly possible that some men are, but throughout this whole thing we have not been able to put our hands on a missing man who was alive and say he is alive."

So that was a statement officially on the record, Senator Kerry, and probably better than a press conference and a newspaper report.

The CHAIRMAN. But Mr. Shields, the point is that the policy—you have to understand, 1973 is the critical point. You are talking about the Montgomery Commission, that was 3 years later.

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, people were asking if we knew whether we had left anyone behind, and the answer was we do not have indications at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been the official line, and that has been the line that was articulated in 1976 and 1980. But the question is what did we know in 1973 and what did we do?

Dr. SHIELDS. We knew that men had been alive in captivity at one time.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Dr. SHIELDS. And those who returned did not know of men who had been left.

The CHAIRMAN. To say that all prisoners had returned as the President announced on March 29, a week before your press conference, was wrong. He knew it was wrong. Let me tell you why. You recall going to see Secretary of Defense William Clements in his office in early April, a week before your April conference, correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you heard him tell you, quote, all the American POW's are dead. And you said to him, you cannot say that.

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And he repeated to you, you did not hear me. They are all dead.

Dr. SHIELDS. That's essentially correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you reported to the ambassador that your statement about POW's saying there is no indication anybody is alive became DOD policy, correct? In 1973.

Dr. SHIELDS. That was a response regarding the question of do we know that men are alive.

Senator, Defense Department policy—

The CHAIRMAN. But why did you not say—here is the disingenuousness—why did you not say you know, we have got 244 questions. We have got people we list as POW and we do not know, instead of saying there are no indications that anybody is alive. Because the last thing you knew was that they were alive.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt for one second here? I believe that according to this document you just quoted, Dr. Shields did say that. He said I am scheduled to testify on the MIA issue before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. With your concurrence, I will maintain the position that we do not know whether those now unaccounted for are alive or dead. The same one you just quoted from.

Dr. SHIELDS. I do not know whether they are alive or dead, Senator Kerry, and that is Defense Department policy as I understood it, and this was Defense Department policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us come back. You had indications that some were alive. Now, in your own testimony—let me go back to it—the question was asked of you during the deposition, do you agree with the statement that the absence of information about a known POW's fate does not allow you to logically make the statement there are no Americans alive in Indochina as of April 12, 1973.

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, I agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then to say there are no indications that anybody is alive when the last information you had about a prisoner was through intelligence that they were captured, that somebody returning earlier as a prisoner saw them alive, that you had either signal intelligence or tracking intelligence that they were alive. To stand up, as you have said, within a framework of 6 months or 12 months later and say there are no indications anybody is not alive is simply not correct.

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, there is a difference in saying people are alive and in captivity and saying we don't have indications now that they are.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the disingenuous piece of this.

Dr. SHIELDS. It is not disingenuous, Senator. This was and still is a very serious issue. I read in the newspaper yesterday that your committee has information that an American was alive in Indochina in captivity in 1989.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. That is wrong.

Dr. SHIELDS. It was reported in the paper, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just make it very clear. Senator Smith has an opinion personally as to that. I will tell you I personally do not share a judgment on that or that opinion, nor do I think has the rest of the committee come to any conclusion whatsoever as to anyone in 1989, and I will tell you that this committee has no evidence today of any specific individual in any specific place being alive now.

Dr. SHIELDS. And that's exactly what I said, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. But it's not.

Dr. SHIELDS. The information you have on an individual in 1989 is more recent than a lot of the information that I was dealing with, and that's exactly why I did not say they were all alive, nor did I say they were all dead. And I did not know that.

What I said here, and this was Defense Department policy if you are looking for policy, because it is not a newspaper, it's not a press clipping, it's an official document of the U.S. Congress in which I say people were alive at one time, they should have been accounted for. They weren't. The question now is an open one. I don't know if they are alive or dead.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did Bill Clements, your boss, want to say they were all dead?

Dr. SHIELDS. I suspect it was his view, just as it's Senator Smith's view that someone was alive in 1989, and you don't have evidence enough to believe it. People disagreed on this issue, and they still do.

General Vernon Walters, a deputy CIA director, in this document also testifies that there is no firm evidence about Americans being alive, and I can read that and quote that to you if you would like to read that.

The conclusion also states that the intelligence community—and this is what I based my information on, the intelligence community—also states that the intelligence community did not have firm evidence. And so what we were talking about, Senator, to family members, wives, children, fathers, husbands, of men who had been in captivity for years was that we did not know specifically whether a man was alive or dead.

Warrant Officer Frederick, who was held with Senator McCain, died just a few months before the repatriation of our men in 1973. Had we said that Warrant Officer Frederick was alive, it would have been a misstatement of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask you to say that.

Dr. SHIELDS. And I didn't say that.

The CHAIRMAN. No one on the committee is suggesting that the 1973 policy should have suggested that you say yes, they are all alive.

Dr. SHIELDS. What is the difference between saying they are alive and we have indications now that they are alive?

The CHAIRMAN. We did have indications that some people were alive. We had absolute intelligence. You in your own deposition—I am going to end my questioning here and give Senator Smith an opportunity and the others. But let me just say that in your deposition you agreed that recent information could go back 6 months, 12 months. And we had recent information 6 months and 12 months that so and so was seen alive or so and so was alive.

Dr. SHIELDS. I'm not aware of that, Senator. Within 6 months? Recent information specifically relating to a man? I'm not aware of that information.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can go into that in a second.

Dr. SHIELDS. I hope that we do.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not realize we were going to get to a debate here on differences between members, but since that has come up let me just say what I had said on the record before and speaking only for myself, that based on the intelligence analysis that I have seen by our investigators I stand on what I said that that intelligence does indicate that Americans were alive through 1989. I stand on that and I do not ask anyone else to share that view. All I am saying is that the evidence, when it is presented, will be allowed to be judged by all of you, including you, Mr. Shields. I believe Dr. Shields had an opportunity to review it and see it long before I did.

Let me just pursue this a little bit on the line of questions that Senator Kerry was following, Dr. Shields. Let me just quickly cite some chronology. I know this is emotional for you. Just relax for a minute.

Dr. SHIELDS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Let me come back through this. On January 27, 1973, the Paris peace accords were signed and we exchanged lists with the North Vietnamese. On January 28, the POW/MIA Task

Force analysis shows 56 POW's on our Government list were not on the NVN list. February 1, 1973, a list of 10 POW's were received from Laos. On February 5, the so-called EC-47Q, which was basically a reconnaissance aircraft, was shot down over Laos and men were lost. Four, we know died. Four, based on intelligence information, we had good reason to believe were alive.

We can dispute that, and I want to get into that specific intelligence a little later. But the point is the difference between what you said—let me finish the line. On March 23rd there were some memos written by your superiors. You should not sit here and take all of the heat. I might also point out that Mr. Clements who agreed to come here today refused to come. For whatever reason, he is not here. He did provide a deposition, but he refused to come, and we may have to deal with that later.

On March 28, another memo higher up, and I do not want to get into the specifics of this at this point because they are classified, but they do basically say that there are POW's in Laos. Hey, there are POW's in Laos, the President is about ready to bring the last prisoners home, what do we do? Essentially, that is the thrust of it.

And on April 6, you have the meeting with Mr. Clements which you have already discussed with Senator Kerry, and on April 12, your press conference which speaks for itself.

So my point is on January 27 and 28 there were lists exchanged and provided. But we still were flying missions over Laos after those lists were exchanged. We were losing Americans in Laos in a secret war, if you want to call it. Families did not even know, and we were losing people. So when you say on April the 12th that you do not have any information on live Americans, that is simply not true.

As an official of the Government at that time, how long did we fly reconnaissance or do anything in Laos, how long did we do that after the Paris peace accords were signed, roughly?

Dr. SHIELDS. I'm not certain, Senator. You'd have to look at the record on that. I don't recall when those flights ended.

Senator SMITH. Well, it was certainly months, and it certainly went beyond February because we lost people on February 5.

So the point is we negotiated an agreement; Laos was not a party to that agreement. We negotiated that agreement with the Vietnamese. We were losing people; we knew we were losing people. We know we lost eight. We know four of them died. Whatever happened to the other four, we know we lost them on February 5. You knew that when you gave that press conference, and you knew we had also lost other people over Laos, and we had no idea what happened to those people, no idea whatsoever.

So for the President of the United States to come out and say all of the POW's from Indochina are returned, maybe all the POW's and maybe not, as far as Vietnam, but we certainly had no information on Laos, is that not true?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, I agree. I can't speak for the President on that issue. To go back to this EC-47, and I think it is important, that was an aircraft that was downed. I would have put those individuals, had I been doing it, in a missing in action status, because I think that's exactly what it's for.

Senator SMITH. How were they classified?

Dr. SHIELDS. They were classified as killed in action.

Senator SMITH. It is a very important point, and I am not accusing you of making the classification.

Dr. SHIELDS. I did not, Senator, I can assure you.

Senator SMITH. I know that. I understand that.

So here are four people on the EC-47 who we received intelligence on, whether it is accurate or not, but we received it almost immediately that four of these people survived. Whether they did or not is a matter of conjecture. But we do know that we received intelligence that said they were alive. We immediately classified them KIA, correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. That is essentially what happened. The report said that four pirates had been captured.

Senator SMITH. The report said that four were captured, but we classified them KIA/BNR. Now, I would like to pursue that at some point in time to find out who did make that classification, specifically.

Let me get to another matter I would like your comment on. This is a communique from Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. ambassador. The Four Party Joint Military Team's responsibility was to follow up and implement Article 8(b) regarding the return of American POW's. It was supposed to be a priority, correctly. Frank, you said that, and others said it was a priority. Let me list what the priorities were in order on this memo from Ellsworth Bunker.

The first priority, in accordance with informal Washington instructions, and I want to pursue just what they are, but here is the first priority. This is now the follow-up of Article 8(b), which is the implementation of the Paris peace accords regarding accounting for POW's and MIA's in accordance with informal Washington instructions: Recovery of remains of 70 U.S. and third-country nationals who appear on the DRV and PRV lists presented in Paris as having died in captivity. That is the second priority—remains.

The second priority, and I am reading exactly what it says right off the memo, the second priority should be to seek information from the other side on specific MIA persons who, according to U.S. records, were believed captured alive. This is April 1973—April 14, 1973, right about the time you made your statement. What is going on here? Who knows what?

We have got a period of time here, and you happen to be the focus because you are sitting here, but truthfully, we had memorandums sent to the President of the United States from the Secretary of Defense, from the national security adviser, with input, I am assuming, from Admiral Moorer, who testified yesterday, and other very high-ranking military officials and policy officials, that Americans were alive in Laos, that we believed they were, and in spite of that—in spite of that—2 1/2 to 3 weeks later a pronouncement is made that there are not any more MIA's/POW's. The President said it, and basically, you said it. Now, why the change? Response?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, I understand your consternation. First of all, again, to go back to my statement. My statement was about current information. There were questions, and if we had the full tape of that press conference it might shed some light on that. We had questions about the status of Americans. Did we leave anyone

there? Did we know that they were there? And did we know so we could go get them? The answer to that was we did not know at that time about any man that we could put our finger on and say he was there. We carried some individuals as prisoners. My statement here was echoed many times. Official Defense Department policy was that that was an open question. We did not know whether they were alive or dead.

With regard to the EC-47, there were a number of crew members. Four, according to the intercepts, might have survived. We don't know who those four would have been. We would have put them in an MIA category again.

We went to Laos, Senator, with the message that said tell the Lao we know you have Americans and you're holding them prisoner. We said that. The reason we said that was because we were not going to acknowledge to the other side that we had accepted their confirmation that there were no more prisoners.

Senator SMITH. I read that in your deposition.

Dr. SHIELDS. That explains that.

Senator SMITH. My time has expired, but I just want to say that the point is that we continued operations in a third country that we were not supposed to be at war with, and we were losing people while we were bringing home American POW's from Vietnam. We were still losing people and still standing up saying that there are no prisoners when we had no idea what happened to them. And somebody has to be accountable for that.

Dr. SHIELDS. I believe those flights were known. They were certainly known to the families of the crew members who were flying, because in this one aircraft we're talking about, one man sent a letter home to his wife expressing his concern, or to his family, expressing his concern about that flight. I think they were acknowledged. To my knowledge, they were not secret flights that were considered unlawful in any way. I think that was a statement of fact.

The question, of course, is what happened to those men, and I still wonder. But I did not have information at that time that would have allowed me to say they certainly are prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to ask you again, Dr. Shields, you said with your concurrence, I will maintain the position that we do not know whether those now unaccounted for are alive or dead. Was that the official position of you, of your Department, or the administration, or who?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, Senator, I think that's a fair statement. We did not know at that time because we lacked the current specific information that would have allowed us to put our finger on an individual. It was not the kind of information we had later with regard to Emmet Kay, for example, or with regard to Dean or Sharman.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Sieverts, was that the policy on your watch, that we did not know whether they were alive or dead? Or was it that we assumed they were all dead, or what?

Mr. SIEVERTS. Let me answer that with a little broader perspective. Our approach during that entire period was to present information in a positive spirit through the channels that were available pursuant to the Paris agreement and, to the extent that it was

possible, and it was not at all easy, to do so in Laos, as well. At every opportunity, we would shade the interpretation of cases and lists in a favorable direction.

Senator McCAIN. What do you mean by favorable?

Mr. SIEVERTS. In the direction of saying we know you have more information. This is a list of prisoners.

Over a period of time, we broadened those lists. We added to them, we gave specific case records, detailed case records. One of the innovations that I was responsible for was translating them into the local language in each case. For years, we presented cases with this positive assumption, exactly, I believe, the way the committee would have wanted us to pursue this issue.

Senator McCAIN. You were assuming they were alive?

Mr. SIEVERTS. For the very purpose the committee is concerned about, we were going on that assumption. The difficulty was that at the same time if you overstated that assumption for a domestic audience you would create what was clearly an exaggerated and possibly an entirely false hope among families, among many thousands of Americans who were needing to deal suddenly with the reality and the grief that their men weren't coming back.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

General Kingston, you were head of the DIA from 1973 to 1975, is that correct?

General KINGSTON. No, Senator.

Senator McCAIN. I am sorry, JCRC.

General KINGSTON. JCRC from January 1973 to December 1973.

Senator McCAIN. And your involvement after that?

General KINGSTON. When General Vessey was appointed Presidential emissary to Hanoi, my having established the JCRC and having worked for him in Korea, he asked me to join him on the trips to and from Vietnam. I accompanied him on five trips.

Senator McCAIN. When you were head of the JCRC, did you ever see any hard evidence that Americans were alive?

General KINGSTON. Not to my recall.

Senator McCAIN. Were you assuming that there Americans alive?

General KINGSTON. I don't recall that either, because I do know that the Pacific Command had an op plan for the JCRC to go after and recover victims of crash and grave sites. They also had an operational plan for the recovery of evadees, escapees, and POW's. I was not involved in that one.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Oksenberg, what was the policy on your watch?

Mr. OKSENBURG. We never assumed that there were was no live American left in Indochina. We always felt that we had a major obligation to pursue this issue and pursue it through all channels available to us.

Senator McCAIN. Did you see any hard evidence or any evidence that Americans were alive?

Mr. OKSENBURG. I saw no hard evidence that Americans were alive. Obviously, with the upsurge of refugees came increasing reports of live sightings.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Mr. Trowbridge, you have been sitting here with some patience for some time; do you have any comments on the proceedings or anything you would like to suggest for the record to clarify anything that has gone on?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. I think my position along these lines has been stated, and I agree with the comments that I heard from Dr. Shields this morning relative to the live sighting issue.

Senator McCAIN. Which is?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That we had no current information at the time where we could go and put our hands on some individual that was alive at that time.

Senator McCAIN. Dr. Shields and Mr. Sieverts, are we talking to some degree about semantical differences, here? Or are we talking about the fact that the American Government and people abandoned those who were still listed as missing in action? In other words, if Dr. Shields said—in his memorandum, he says DOD had no specific knowledge, that is different in my view than no indications. That is a very different use of language. I think, frankly, that in your memorandum no specific knowledge is a defensible position. No indications, I think, is not.

I think what I am trying to get at here is what was the thrust of the belief? Is it that the President of the United States said there are no more Americans alive in Southeast Asia and we closed the book until the agitation on the part of families and other Americans brought this back to the attention of the American people, or has there been a good-faith effort, or is it somewhere in between, in the view of many of us, that during the 1970's the issue was ignored to a certain degree because of the desire of the American people and the American Government to put this issue behind us, which could have led us to some failed opportunities to return some Americans who may have been held alive.

I know that is very difficult, but I think it is a philosophical question that is important to be cleared up, and maybe we could begin with you, Mr. Sieverts, and Dr. Shields, your response after that.

Mr. SIEVERTS. The root question is whether there were any opportunities to achieve the return of living Americans. That's the sole question. And no, I don't think there were any. I don't think we had any indications of Americans in captivity. Some of my testimony is intended to bear on that question, by describing our past experience of the lengths to which Americans would go—we're talking about POW's held against their will in captivity—the lengths they would go, one way or another, to let us know of this. It bears on the photographs, for example. The idea of Americans cheerfully being photographed and not using that opportunity to somehow convey who they are and what the circumstances are is beyond my imagination.

It's beyond my experience, more importantly, of being responsible for this subject during a long time when we really did have Americans in captivity and we did get indications which were quite solid, that included information that you could really hang on to, and then do something about as we did in the case of Garwood in a very obvious way. Once the name arrived, we, of course, immediately got him out of there.

So I think it's not merely a question of semantics. It is, rather, a question of phraseology, of dealing on the one hand with Vietnamese, Lao, and other Indochinese in a positive spirit to hold them accountable, to seek that accounting which in many cases, of course, was going to involve the return of remains, but at the same time not to present a false impression, a misleading, overly hopeful impression to the American people. I think the difficulty of phrasing it in a way that handles that situation properly is essentially what's being discussed right here today. It may well be that it is a question of semantics. I think it's a question of phrasing for different purposes.

Dr. SHIELDS. Let me describe again some of our efforts. Regardless of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's message, one of the first individuals that we asked about was Commander Graff of the Navy, who was carried as prisoner of war in South Vietnam in approximately the same area that Captain Robert White had been repatriated from. So we had hoped that perhaps he had been held there, too. That was an inquiry made even while homecoming was underway, or shortly thereafter, while we were trying to find out what happened.

The issue at the time that the men came home was one where we had Article 8(b), providing for a full accounting of the missing. Now, the missing at that time were the people who had not been repatriated, who were carried as MIA because we did not know, carried as prisoner of war because we hoped and had reason to believe that they were prisoners of war, but did not come home either. We pinned our hopes on Article 8(b). We negotiated. We staffed the FPJMT in the field. We had the JCRC in the field, to the extent that one of our soldiers was killed on a humanitarian mission, killed by the enemy. Now, that details some of the records of the efforts that have been made.

You are aware of the chronology. You have in your possession the chronology of the efforts of the Four Party Joint Military Team. We did not have access to Laos. We did not have access to North Vietnam. We did not have access to most of the areas in South Vietnam where we thought we could go. The man who was killed, Captain Reese, was killed in an area which we felt was under friendly control. As it turned out, of course, it was not. So we could not go into the field. We were limited to negotiations, a part of a treaty which was never observed, and never implemented.

We faced extraordinary difficulties in those days. You are aware of the efforts that were expended on behalf of Chai Charn Harnavee, Lieutenant Dat, and so forth. They were men that you and your comrades said had been left behind. And even though they were not Americans, we left no stone unturned to bring them home. And in fact, they did return home to their loved ones. In the case of Emmet Kay, we knew he was a prisoner, and we pursued his release and he was returned. In the case of Charles Dean and Neal Sharman, we knew that they had been captured. That was not a secret. We made that evidence available to anyone, and we acknowledged that. We did not bring them home. We were not able to do that.

So we did our very best to bring Americans home, because not knowing means you have questions, you want to know what hap-

pened to someone. But you do not write them off. You do not say they are dead. You say you expect an accounting. And ultimately, we should expect an accounting for far more than 244 men.

Senator MCCAIN. How do you account for the President of the United States saying all POW's are home?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, I don't control the statements of the President of the United States. I did not at that time. I was as dismayed at that statement as anyone else was.

General KINGSTON. Senator McCain, with your permission I'd like to discuss the circumstances of Captain Richard Reese's death.

It was my requirement that JCRC personnel go down to the potential crash or gravesite to ensure that was secured by Vietnamese, either the local force or Vietnamese army. Obviously on every case I had to get the approval of the American embassy, Four Party Joint Military Commission. The U.S. chief discussed it. The South Vietnamese agreed, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese would not discuss it and say only that we disapprove of these missions.

On the 13th of December we were going into a crash site southwest of the airfield out of Saigon. It was about a 15-minute flight. It was in a fairly open rice paddy, scrub brush area. The area had been flooded. On the 13th they located it and they started building a dike around the area they wanted to search.

I allowed the people to return to into Ton Son Nhut Airfield overnight so they didn't have to stay in the field. On the 14th they completed the dike and on the 15th they were coming in with pumps. As the first ship landed it received an RP-40 rocket grenade and RPG and automatic weapons fire. The pilot was killed. The team jumped out of the aircraft. The two succeeding aircraft circled around, pulled up and were circling around the area. My people wore international orange on their headgear and international orange on their pockets. The aircraft had international orange stripes, so it obviously could not be mistaken for what it was.

When we finally had access to the area, there was no indication of any spent rounds and we could find no indication of who sprung that ambush. Capt. Reese, drawing fire, stood up, waved his arms shooting stop firing we are unarmed, that is when they killed him.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Oksenberg, a question was asked at least you answered that there came, because the posters and other things live sightings reports. Did you believe any of those?

Mr. OKSENBERG. As I recall, I would choose to say that I had neither a belief nor disbelief. I felt that the information merited pursuit, but I recall that I did not reach any judgment, definitive judgment about those reports.

Senator REID. Dr. Shields, tell me, you were at the time that we have made inquiry Deputy Assistant Secretary, is that right?

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct.

Senator REID. Was this a political appointment?

Dr. SHIELDS. It was a schedule C, I believe it was called at that time, appointment, yes.

Senator REID. What did you do prior to coming into the Government?

Dr. SHIELDS. I had been at General Electric Tempo which is a General Electric think tank, and prior to that I had been at the University of Texas at Austin.

Senator REID. Mr. Trowbridge, it is my understanding that the Pathet Lao declared after Operation Homecoming that Laotian communist forces were holding American POWs and were prepared to give an accounting, is that a true statement?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, the Pathet Lao over the years they had a spokesman, Soth Petrasay who made many statements relative to American POWs.

Senator REID. I ask you the same question I asked Mr. Oksenberg, did you believe the statements that he made?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As far as the intelligence reporting that we had, it wasn't supporting his statements. We have talked with him subsequent to that time and he has indicated to us that his statements about holding prisoners were for the purpose of propaganda.

Senator REID. So the statements that he made, there has been a determination made based upon his statements that he was doing this strictly for propaganda purposes.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is what he claims, but as far as the intelligence that we had coming out of that country, again, that has been stated here this morning, we had no information that these prisoners remained there. We did have information on prisoners such as has been discussed here this morning.

Senator REID. My question is, based upon your vast knowledge of this area was he telling the truth or not?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We have no indications that there prisoners beyond that. We had information on—I mentioned yesterday, two prisoners that were in captivity, however, we also had indications that they died prior to 1973. They did not come home in 1973. They are among those discrepancy cases that we are talking about here this morning.

Senator REID. So based upon what you have said, when the Department of Defense declared a week or 10 days later after he had made some these statements, right after Operation Homecoming that people were alive, you know of no information that would substantiate his claims that they were holding Americans alive?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. At that particular time, no, sir, we did not.

Senator REID. At any time?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We don't today either.

Senator REID. Pardon me?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We do not today either.

Senator REID. Dr. Shields, do you recall a memo that you sent to the Secretary of Defense in 1976 indicating your concern that POWs were not all dead?

Dr. SHIELDS. I would have to look at the specific memo, Senator. I frequently expressed my concern that there might be Americans alive in Southeast Asia.

Senator REID. You did that on at least one occasion in a memo to him, isn't that true?

Dr. SHIELDS. It may be, Senator, I would have to look at the memo.

Senator REID. Do you recall what your response was? What his response was to you?

Dr. SHIELDS. I believe that the Secretaries of Defense that I served under felt like I did, that the question of the missing Americans had never been resolved. It was a possibility that men had been held captive. We know that they certainly were at one time. We certainly should have an accounting for them and we ought to find out what happened to them. I think that was the way all of the Secretaries felt.

Senator REID. But in fact, one of the deputies issued an order to say that they were all dead, is that true?

Dr. SHIELDS. I never saw an order from a Deputy Secretary saying that they were all dead and I don't believe, Senator, you will ever find a statement made from a responsible official within the Department of Defense publicly that they were all dead.

Senator REID. And any statements that you heard in that regard were oral in nature then to you?

Dr. SHIELDS. The one series of statements that I heard referred to the Deputy Secretary at that time, William Clements. This would have been 1973, and we had a discussion about that. He was new to the Defense Department at that time and I pointed out the men who at one time had been held prisoner. It would be interesting to me and useful, I think, to have the entire transcript of that statement which Senator Kerry played in the beginning so we could discuss what the whole issue was, because—

The CHAIRMAN. I have the entire transcript here and it will be made part of the record and I would be happy to share it with my colleague if he wants to see it.

[The information referred to follows:]

RESPONSE FROM ROGER SHIELDS

PRESS CONFERENCE, APRIL 12, 1973

Response. Two months ago today, we received the first increment of men held captive in Indochina and since that time we have received back in our control a total of 600 individuals—599 men and 1 woman. Of this total, 591 were American and 566 of this number were U.S. military personnel. With regard to the military personnel, over half of these men have now completed their processing and are on convalescent leave. Others will be continuing their processing and we anticipate that many of them will be finishing soon. With regard to the medical condition of these men that you are so interested in, we were pleased generally with the physical and mental condition of these men as they came back. Nevertheless, we have uncovered a number of medical problems. For example, we have a number of orthopedic injuries, fractured limbs, dislocations of joints, and the like. Some of these will require no further medical treatment. Others will. That medical treatment will continue as long as necessary. There are a number of other problems, the usual problems that one would expect with regard to teeth and dental problems. These men had spent many of them a long period of time without adequate dental care and there were a number of problems with regard to dental problems, these also are being taken care of. There are problems with regard to internal parasites, not only with regard to the men who were released in the South, but also those who were released in the North, and treatment for these problems are also continuing. Many men are out of the hospital and are receiving these on a convalescent patient basis. We found that there were a number of problems associated with nutritional deficiencies. For example, eye problems. Eye problems due to various deficiencies vitamin and mineral deficiencies. The doctors anticipate that some of these eye problems will be reversible with the proper treatment. In other cases, they are not sure. Some permanent damage may result. We find other problems, other diseases, for example bari bari, things of this nature. Again, I think the prognosis is good for the

return to health, good health, of most of the men. There are problems of course that are going to continue that—in which case irreversible damage has been done, stiff limbs, things of this nature, and that of course, is inevitable. We find that with regard to the men who were captured in the South, that there were the problems that we expected with regard to malaria. Much of this had been treated before the men were released. In some cases we found active cases of malaria. With regard to the men who had been held in North Vietnam for the duration of their captivity, the incidence of malaria was surprisingly low. We have debriefed these individuals. Some of the debriefing is continuing. We are particularly interested, as you know, in the casualty-related information which these men might be able to provide us, because of the fact that we had had so little information concerning the numbers of men held prisoner or their identities or their conditions. The families had gone for many years in many cases without this information. We were particularly interested in casualty-related information. The debriefs have provided some casualty-related information and some status changes have been made. More are in the works and are anticipated. I won't try and quantify the information that we received with regard to those men who did not return. We did not receive as much as we had hoped. A number of cases are outstanding, as you know, in which our men are unaccounted for. The total number of men still unaccounted for as of today, is 1359. Now you've been working with a figure of 1328. And the difference in that number, and the difference of 31 relates to men who had been reported as having died in captivity, but whose status change has not yet been made. That should bring you up to date with regard to those numbers. We are continuing with our efforts—

Question. Could we ask about the 31 reported to have died in captivity—
Response. Reported to have died in captivity. That is correct.

Question. Status changes
Response. Beg your pardon?

Question. How has the status changed?

Response. The status change has not been made. I said that these men are still in an unaccounted for category. We do have that statement, of course, and as I say, we are proceeding with a number of status changes, some based on our own information which we obtained in the debriefs. With—yes.

Question. Was that that they died in captivity?

Response. These were on lists. When lists were passed to us by the other side, we received lists that contained the names of not only men who were currently held and who were going to be released and who in fact were released, but also the names of men who were reported as having died in captivity. You'll recall the first list that we ever received back in December of 1970 received through representatives of Senators Kennedy and Fulbright contained the names of 20 men who were reported as having died in captivity in North Vietnam. When we received the list from the North Vietnamese, the DRV, as a result of the Paris Agreements, we received the names of an additional 3 men from North Vietnam who they said had died in captivity and an additional list that we received from the PRG in which they also listed a number of men as having died in captivity. Now, with regard to these men who are still unaccounted for—

Question. Dr., will you stop for just a moment there please.
Response. Yes.

Question. We got a list around January 27, shortly afterward, of 55 names of those that we were officially notified had died in captivity—
Response. Had died in captivity.

Question. Was this all-inclusive?

Response. Well, we, as you know, with regard to lists, we received a list of 10 names of men who were held prisoner in Laos. No names of men having died in Laos, and nothing with regard to men having been captured in Cambodia. As far as we are concerned here in the Defense Department, we have not yet received all information concerning our men in Laos and in Cambodia, and we are continuing to press for information on men captured in those areas. Now with regard to other information, we have received from the North Vietnamese at various times, the names of individuals whom the North Vietnamese said had died as a result of their initial shootdowns. They have given us names of men who had died, men whom they said never survived to be taken captive but had died initially, were dead when they were recovered. We anticipate that we are going to receive more of this type of

information, and as you know, the agreements in Article 8(b) call for an exchange of all information, a cooperative effort in this area, including exchange of all information on men known to have died, cooperation with regard to a return of remains, and an exchange of all other information on men who still may be unaccounted for.

Question. Dr. Shields, I'm still not clear on that.

Question. Thirty-one name difference. As opposed to what Fred pointed out. There were an initial—there was an initial list of 55 names.
Response. That's correct. That's correct.

Question. Are these 31 names in addition to that that you have since 3 been told by the North Vietnamese were also—

Response. These were names of men originally handed to us as being on the list. Now, some of these individuals that were passed on. We received only the list that was given to us officially. It was a list that was handed over to us in Paris. Now, that list contained the names of men who were alive, and we subsequently had a return of those men. In addition, of course, we had 3 men returned from the Peoples' Republic of China. We also had 2 men whose names were not originally on the list, 1 man who had been captured just prior to the cease fire, another man who was headed back to us whose name did not appear on the list because the PRG said they had had trouble with their communications. Now, we still have a certain number of men whom we consider to be still in a status that would indicate that we have not yet had a full accountability for them. We have made some status changes based on information which we have. A number of other status changes are in the works. I give you a figure as of this morning, because these figures are changing constantly as status changes are made. Now, with regard to those men whose status has not been changed, those men who are still unaccounted for, we are continuing our work in this regard through the Four Party Joint Military Team, which was a successor to the Four Party Joint Military Commission. The work of the Four Party Joint Military Team is to provide the implementation of Article 8(b) of the agreement which calls for the exchange of information and a cooperative effort with regard to the return of the remains of those who may be dead. We have received assurances from both the PRG and the DRV that they will cooperate in this effort. The meetings have been going on now for approximately one week, and the charter of the group, its mode of operation has been discussed, and we are hopeful that very shortly we will begin the actual operational work of accounting for the missing. We have, as you know, formed a Joint Casualty Resolution Center at Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand. The JCRC is headed by an Army Brigadier General, and he has under his command in the JCRC experts in Gray's registration activities. Also in crash site inspection. Men who are trained to identify aircraft when the obvious signs of identification, such as a serial number, are not easily readable or have been obliterated. They know what part of the aircraft to look at to identify this aircraft and match it with the men who flew it. They can look at the aircraft and say the ejection seats were activated, the men at least got out of the aircraft prior to impact. Gray's registration specialists are experts at the recovery of remains. We also have identification specialists, anthropologists, forensic pathologists who are expert in the identification of remains. We anticipate that with these teams, we'd be able to go out into the field in areas where Americans have been lost either on the ground or through air crashes throughout Indochina, and we'd be able to carry on the search for the missing.

Question. Dr. Shields—
Response. Yes.

Question. Back to this 31 reported died. I still don't understand where you got it, but do you bring it up because you're not changing their status yet because they might still be alive?

Response. We are in the process of making status changes. As you know, the Service Secretary has the responsibility and is the only one who can make a status change. The individual Service Secretary concerned. Now with regard to a man, we review all information available concerning his incident, what happened to him, what category he might be put in. When the Service Secretary receives what is to him conclusive proof that a man is either prisoner or missing or dead, a status will be determined. With regard to men whom we have carried as missing in action, or prisoner, and whom we find subsequently whom the Service Secretary subsequently finds to have been killed, a status change will be made to killed in action. We have made a number of these status changes. We will continue to make these status

changes as information becomes available. In cases where we are unable to find any information with regard to a man, there's no indication that a man may be alive and we don't have a realistic prospect of receiving more information, a presumptive finding of death will be made. We have men, for example, who were downed over water. Some cases we have only a last-known position of an aircraft or a man on the ground who was in an area, but a poorly defined area. As you know, this is going to be a very difficult task to account for these men. It will be a time-consuming task, in some cases we may never know. It is not our intention to continue a man in a missing status and to continue the carrying the family in that state of anxiety and uncertainty with all the legal problems, for example, which attend this thing, without regard to the emotional problems, which are considerable also. It is not our intention to continue to carry a man in this status. We will make a presumptive finding of death, as I say, when, if we uncover no indication that a man is alive, and we have no prospect for a quick finding of other information regarding what may have happened to him.

Question. Dr. Shields, do you think there still are POWs alive and well somewhere in either Laos or Cambodia?

Response. We have no indications at this time that there are any 5 Americans alive in Indochina. As I said, we do not consider the list of men that we received from Laos, the recovery of 10 individuals 9 of whom were American and 7 military, to be a complete accounting for all Americans who are lost in Laos. Nor do we consider it to be a complete statement of our information known to the LPF Pathet Lao in Laos. With regard to Cambodia, we have a number of men who are missing in action there, some that we carried as captive. We intend to pursue that too. With regard to these men and these uncertainties which we have, even though we have no indication that there are any Americans still alive, we are going to pursue our efforts through the process of accounting for the missing. This is exactly what this procedure is for. And we anticipate that if any Americans are yet alive for one reason or another, that we would be able to ascertain that through this process of accounting for the missing.

Question. Dr. Shields, you haven't said anything so far about the general psychological and emotional condition of the POWs.

Response. The general emotional psychological condition of the men who have returned, I think, is excellent. You run into the problems which you would expect. I suppose we could call it culture shock. A man who has been gone for 8 or 9 years, or even a lesser period of time, has returned home to a country which has changed a great deal. This was very evident at Clark Air Base with regard to the things that the men saw when they returned, new fashions, new hairstyles, different attitudes, these kinds of things. These really aren't problems for men, this is to be expected, and they're handling this very well. So I think in general you can say that the psychological state of the men, mental state is very good.

Question. Dr., to get back to the 556 men who say came back

Response. 556.

Question. Five hundred sixty-six you said came back generally good conditions. How many needed treatment for fracture limbs, dislocated joints, and other medical problems associated with their imprisonment?

Response. I don't have the hard numbers on that. I would have to go back and look at those numbers.

Question. What percentage?

Response. I can't even give you a percentage figure. Some of these men, of course, had had these injuries as a result of their shutdown. These had healed in a satisfactory manner, and for all intents and purposes these men are completely healed. With regard to others, as I said, continuing medical care will be necessary.

Question. Do you have any indication that any of the people who were shot down in Laos may have been executed?

Response. There have been a number of stories regarding executions of Americans, and I have heard stories, for example, of 200 Americans who were systematically executed. There is no basis in fact for this story at all. I have received no indications of this, no firm indications at all. There has been a lot of rumor, a lot of stories that I might say do the families of these men a disservice. No indications whatsoever. People have volunteered numbers, statements of numbers with regard to men who might have survived in Laos or whom we might have expected to find, and I don't believe that we can put a number on these men. For example, if you

compare the numbers of men downed in Laos, aircraft downed in Laos, men downed in Laos, with the number of men downed in North Vietnam, including those men who were recovered, through subsequent rescue operations and those who returned as prisoners, you will find that we recovered approximately 70 percent of all men who were downed in Laos. Well, the figure for North Vietnam is lower than that. And this is because we had a much greater rate of recovery—successful recovery operations. We were closer to our own lines of communication, our own bases, the areas in which these men went down were such that they offered a greater prospect for a successful rescue attempt. The circumstances of the missions in these things made it possible for us to recover initially a much larger number of men. And I think when we talk about prisoners and men who are missing, we ought to pay tribute to those brave men of the rescue forces for the great work that they did, because had it not been for their work, we would have had a much larger number. So, when you look at this, and this is not to say that we can't expect to find anyone else coming back from Laos, it simply is pointing out that any attempt to put a number to quantify a number of men coming out of Laos is a very hazardous kind of thing, it's guesswork, it's speculation, and it does no one any good. We are going to proceed, not on the basis of guesswork, but through our diplomatic channels as we are right now, pressing for information concerning Americans who were lost in Laos. We are going to do everything we can to put our Joint Casualty Resolution teams in Laos to pursue on the ground our effort to account for those men about whom we received no information or conclusive information from the agency.

Question. Do you have any idea when the search teams can begin?

Response. I do not at this time. As I said, the Four Party Joint Military Team is taking up this subject, they are having these discussions now, they are only now at the end of their first week of discussions, and they have been talking about procedural aspects. And we are confident that we are going to have this first exchange which might, for example, concern those men who are again listed as having died in captivity. We are hopeful that we will get on with that fairly soon.

Question. Do you have any reason to believe that you would be able to start the searches before there's a cease fire in Cambodia?

Response. Well, we are very much aware of the dangers that will attend these teams who go into these areas. Even if there is a cease fire, this work is going to be very dangerous work, and this is why all the men of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center are highly trained and highly skilled volunteers. For example, we know that the areas in which our aircraft went down were hostile areas that were heavily boobytrapped. We might expect to find a great deal of unexpended ordnance in these areas. So there are other hazards, as well as the hazards of hostile action. You know that we have a cease fire in Vietnam right now, and yet an ICSS helicopter carrying 9 men was shot down, the men on board killed. So, we are not anxious to put out our Joint Casualty Resolution Center teams into an environment which will produce more MIA's.

Question. What kind of security will they have? Will they have any security at all?

Response. Well, we would think so. For example, we are very desirous of obtaining the active cooperation of the host governments involved. For example, if we have a team operating in a PRG-controlled area of South Vietnam, we would like to have along with that team, a representative of the PRG. Representatives, I should say. The mission of these men from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center is a peaceful and humanitarian mission. We want to have host country representation on the team. We are very anxious, for example, to talk to the inhabitants of a local area. They may know something about an aircraft. They may have removed the remains from an aircraft, or they may have found a man who died as a result of a ground action, and they may have buried these remains. They may know that, and if we are able to go in and talk to those people through the use of interpreter and through the use of host government representatives, we anticipate that we would find more information. So we would like to do this, and I think that's one of our best guarantees of security.

Question. Witnessed their comrades who were tortured to death. How many do you have in your debriefing?

Response. We have had reports of men who suffered severely from the results of mistreatment. I don't know that we have any firsthand eyewitness accounts of any man who was actually tortured to death. We do have the results or the reports of

men who suffered severely as I said, were in very poor condition and subsequently were reported as having died in captivity.

Question. How many of the men who returned were treated for example for orthopedic problems that were inflicted as a result of torture?

Response. I really don't have any figures on that. I think that far and away the large number of orthopedic problems were the results of ejection. For example, the flight surgeons at Clark Air Base when talking about the men as they came back indicated that they were going to use this information to help devise new techniques of ejection. They commented, for example, on how previously we had experienced a large number of lower extremity damage to legs and so forth, and as a result methods to strap in those legs were found, but we kind of had the arms flailing around a bit. And they found a lot of shoulder and arm injuries, and they're going to use this to try and devise a better system.

Question. When the North Vietnamese gave you the reports of the people who had died in captivity, did they indicate what was done with the bodies, and if so, will those bodies be returned?

Response. We have had indications that when a man died in captivity, or a man may have been found to have died that at least in many cases good records were kept, and that remains should be locatable and we should be able to have a return of those remains.

Question. But were they buried, and...?

Response. We do know. We already have evidence. We have, for example, carried on this question of accounting for the missing for a long period of time. We have recovered remains previous to this cease fire, prior to this cease fire. We have found remains that were buried, and we had prisoners, for example, who were able to locate the location of a grave, or in liberated areas, villagers were able to take us to grave sites, and we have recovered from graves the remains of our men. And these remains have been subsequently identified and status changes made based upon that recovery.

Question. What about in North Vietnam, that's what I was

Response. We have good reason to believe that remains were buried. We have, for example, in various photographs seen what was reported to be the gravesite of an American who had been killed.

Question. Is there an American graveyard in Hanoi?

Response. I don't know. If there is, we are going to find about it. I don't know, I can't answer that.

Question. Is there any likelihood or any plan that any of the former POWs that have come out will be going back over there on search teams to help out?

Response. Our search teams are fully manned now, or will be very shortly. The men who will fill out these teams have been identified. They do not include men who have been released.

Question. How many are involved in this search operation?

Response. We anticipate that the initial search operation will involve some American experts, and they will be supported by local nationals.

Question. But how many?

Response. For example, we would anticipate that perhaps the initial search—and you have to divide this effort into probably the search phase and then the recovery phase. The search phase will have a limited number of Americans, perhaps 4 or 5. A number of other people who would provide support to that group, they're going into jungled areas, they need help with regard to setting up camp and simply going out and looking for a crash site or a gravesite. Once that site has been discovered, we will then deploy our experts at crash site inspection or Gray's registration who will go in and will thoroughly examine that site for any evidence which it might yield concerning our men.

Question. Maybe I didn't make the question right. How many are involved in this whole search op—the Casualty Resolution Center and the whole bit?

Response. Well, there are a number of men assigned directly to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and then there are other elements currently over Southeast Asia and Thailand who would be supporting the operations of that group. Now I can't give you a precise figure on that, because it depends, for example, on the need for air support. We anticipate to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center would task some

of the 10 air elements in the area to provide a reconnaissance aircraft for aerial photography of an area, or to provide airlift or helicopter lift into that area. Now these men would not be assigned on a regular basis to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, but would be available as needed.

Question. How many men will be regularly assigned to this center?

Response. 158 individuals.

Question. Dr. Shields, we've had reports of 1 MIA, Robert Garwood, interrogating prisoners for the VC and another guy, a deserter, McKinley Nolan, who was supposedly writing tracts for the VC and living with a Vietnamese wife in their camps. Can you shed any light on those reports?

Response. I can not shed any light on those reports. I do know that periodically, we have reports of deserters. Some have been reported as being in the underground system in Saigon. So I really can't shed any light on that.

Question. Have returned POWs not identified any Americans as working for the VC?

Response. Not that I have—that has come to my attention at all.

Question. What about the whole situation of charges, Dr. Shields, can you tell us now whether there are going to be charges filed against any of the prisoners?

Response. There are no charges pending against any man who has returned right now. What might happen, I really don't care to comment on. I think that's speculation. We have no charges right now. No men who are returning have preferred charges against any other man, and neither has the Department of Defense.

Question. Are there any investigations?

Response. We are prepared to as the debriefings proceed we are prepared to look into any kinds of situations which bear investigations. We are going to proceed as we do in any normal case if we uncover any evidence of misconduct, or if any man prefers charges against another man, then of course certain procedures would be followed. But as of this time, no man has preferred any charges and neither has the Department of Defense.

Question. Has there been any evidence that has led to any investigations underway now?

Response. We have heard, as you have, reports of certain individuals who were alleged to have done something—I don't want to comment about this. I think it would be improper to comment on the conduct of any individual, really, be it valorous conduct or otherwise. I don't care to get into that. We will do as we have said. We are not going to prefer charges, for example, against any man on the basis of any statement that he may have made simply on that basis.

Question. We're not asking for any names, but are there any investigations underway against any number of individuals?

Response. We, with regard to investigations or charges, will proceed as the situation indicates at the present time as I say I will not speculate on the future course of events. I think that would be improper to talk about.

Question. Right now, are you investigating any?

Response. I really don't care to comment in this area. Right now, as I say, it does not serve any useful purpose to comment on these things. I think that you ought to wait and see how things develop. If there were investigations, or if anything else were going on, it would indicate something improper. I don't think that we ought to indicate anything at all. The men that we have seen coming back, as you have seen, have expressed their pleasure at coming back to this country and being here once again, so I don't want to comment on that.

Question. I don't want to belabor it, but let me just ask you one more question. Have any of the returning prisoners indicated to the Department that they intend to file charges?

Response. I have not heard any man nor am I aware of specific intentions in these areas to proceed along these lines. We are not interested in this right now. We are still concerned with our men who are not accounted for; our debriefs have specifically gotten into these areas first. We are prepared, as we say, to follow up on anything that the men might indicate needs attention. For example, the men have commented on their intention to pursue with us the experiences that they learned. They have some comments for example, that might be helpful with regard to our search

and rescue techniques. And they intend to provide information that would help us improve those techniques and other things which they learned in the course of their camp life. We have not yet gotten into those areas.

Question. What is your feeling toward the senior commanders writing effectiveness reports, efficiency reports on the prisoners who were captured?

Response. Well, that's a question of the efficiency reports as a service prerogative. I'm not qualified to speak...

Question. Dr. Shields, have you been able to shed any light on the case of Lt. Dodge?

Response. We have turned up nothing at all with regard to Lt. Dodge. One man coming out of Hanoi with the second group that I returned with—accompanied the first two groups out of Hanoi—commented to me on Lt. Dodge, and I thought, well here's a man who's going to give us some information. That's Commander Dodge, now. And when he talked about, it turned out that he had been an individual who had flown in a search and rescue effort aimed at rescuing Cmdr. Dodge and subsequently, he asked me if we had any information about it, and I was able to tell him that we felt that the North Vietnamese would be able to shed some light on his case, but that we had nothing. We are going to follow up his case and the case of all our other men as we attempt to account for the missing.

Question. Dr. Shields, how many men do we know through radio transmissions or what have you actually made the ground in Cambodia, Laos or North Vietnam, or South Vietnam and we know they reached the ground safely after their planes were downed, and yet we have no trace of them?

Response. I don't know what that precise number would be. As you know, our men ejected under a number of different conditions. We—I am hesitant to talk about this because we have many men, a number of men, who returned from incidents in which all reports would have led us to believe and probably an uninformed prudent man to believe that the individual could never have survived. I talked to a Navy Commander not long ago who was a former member of the Blue Angels and who had been flying a long time, and knows his aircraft and had flown many combat missions in North Vietnam, and he was describing an incident which he saw in which a SAM impacted almost directly on an F4 and there was a resultant fireball, and he said he watched the aircraft all the way, there was nothing, there were no chutes, nothing was ever heard, no beepers, no indication that anyone ever ejected safely and yet both of those men showed up very quickly as having been captured. Without any injuries, I might add. So I don't think that that really gives us any indication of—

Question. Sounds like he watched the wrong airplane.

Response. Well, you know, when you're flying an airplane that fast, you do have many things to do. And if you watch other things too closely, you might end up on the ground yourself. So we have had this kind of experience, and we have also had the experience of men on the ground. So I really don't think what I'm saying is that this really doesn't give us an indication of whether a man would have survived or not—

Question. I understand.

Response.—and we can't write off a man about whom we know nothing.

Question. But at least we know that he survived the original shootdown. How—can you give me a ballpark on that?

Response. I can not give you a ballpark on that now. As you know, we have put out examples of this kind of thing. We would prefer to talk about these number and this kind of information in the form of our Joint Military Team. We feel that there are certain methods that we should use as we go about accounting for the missing that might have some impact on the length of time that it might take to do this or might have an impact on the kind of information which we received so we want to talk about that kind of question in that form.

Question. Dr. Shields, you said you're not satisfied with the information you've gotten from Laos so far. Are you implying that you think there are additional prisoners being held there?

Response. Well, I'm implying that I would expect to receive more information about men in Laos. I said that it would be foolish to put any kind of number on this, whether it be zero or whether it be over 300—the number of men who are missing. I think that the small number of men which returned and the number of men which

are missing would indicate that we should receive more information concerning our men in Laos, and I think it's foolish to try and say any more than that.

Question. Dr. Shields, you said you have no indication that there is any man on this list who is alive.

Response. At the present time, we have no indications that there are men yet alive held prisoner in Indochina.

Question. Have you learned from your debriefings when Son Tay was cleared?

Response. Son Tay was cleared some time prior to our

Question. Days, weeks, (laughter)...

Response. I guess you gentlemen are aware of the fact that Son Tay was cleared before our people landed there.

Question. Two weeks, a month, six weeks?

Response. The reason why, I think, is an instructive question. Apparently they simply moved these men as they did often. We know after Son Tay that they moved the men back to Hanoi, into the environs of Hanoi. So this seems to have been another one of those times in which we just didn't have things going for us. No indication at all that any of our plans were compromised or that there was any information known to the enemy concerning our plans. I think the fact that our men went in and came out again testifies to that.

Question. How long had they been out of there?

Response. I don't know. It seems to me it was a matter of weeks, but how many, I would have to go back and check.

Question. Can you get a figure on that?

Response. I think that some of our—we can look.

Question. Dr., there was one point—

Response. I don't think it was embarrassing. We don't apologize for that raid. It was an effort which we owed those men and which we owed any man, and as former Secretary Laird said, who was here when that raid occurred, we would do that kind of thing any time we felt we had the reasonable chances for success. Now, we did not have good information concerning our men. The men were supposed to receive one letter a month from their families, they were supposed to write one letter a month. They didn't write that many letter, at least not that received their families, nor did they receive that many. Our information was very scarce. The Geneva Convention conditions were never adhered to. Our information was limited. Had we known that those men had the benefits of the Geneva Conventions, we may not have felt so constrained to do that kind of thing. It did have a definite effect on the morale of these men. They knew that we had been there, they knew what we were trying to do, and they appreciated that, they knew they were not forgotten.

Question. There was a difference in treatment, Doctor, from the early days and then in the latter years that changed. Was that due to Son Tay, or what was the reason?

Response. Well, it's very hard to say what the reason was. That change in treatment occurred in October 1969, about that time, and people ask, how could these men who endured so much come out looking so healthy? One reason, of course, is that after October 1969, or the fall of 1969, treatment did improve and it improved further in October 1972 when it became apparent that these men would be released soon. But we don't know exactly what to attribute the change in treatment to, as you know, in early, in the early part of 1969, the policy of this government changed. The Nixon Administration initiated the policy of going public. No longer did we confine this to under the table quiet diplomacy which got us nowhere, we made it a public issue, the public responded to that in the way we would expect this great country to do, and they made inquiries around the world, wrote letters in behalf of the men. We pursued the diplomatic channels throughout the world. We pressed for adherence to the Geneva Conventions, and I think these things had an effect, without any question. We find a little bit of a lag, which is exactly what we would expect. Another thing that might have contributed to it may have been the death of Ho Chi Minh, who died prior to that time.

Question. On the matter of executions, I think you referred specifically to Laos. Could we broaden that,—do you have any evidence of any executions anywhere in Indochina?

Remember, the men, we know that the operations of 3 Americans were announced by the FBI. There were Captain Ferrante and Sergeant Rex and Brinkman. And there are the only operations that we have got firm testimony on. There are other individuals which we, of course, will investigate, but we of course are going to have to prove that, as it is, there are the only three operations that we have got which I can say we know were operations. With regard to our other men mentioned and men that they have died in captivity, we are going to have to wait and find out.

Question: Thank you.

Dr. Shields: In the Department of Defense position, as I have stated in this hearing, and I think in a number of other hearings as well, was that the question of what had happened to these men was an open question and one that needed to be resolved.

Senator Reid: Do you have any information—why don't you tell me what information was available during Operation Homecoming about the details and numbers of Americans found to have died during the war years. Have you related generally everything you know about that here this morning?

Dr. Shields: I think that information, Senator, would be available from DIA. We are talking about a very large number of individuals. We had lists at the time that categorized men, an official list that said so many prisoners of war, so many missing in action, etc., by service and by country.

And that is the information that I would have been dealing with, and you have talked to Commander Trowbridge extensively about that. My information was received from the intelligence community. I was not an intelligence analyst, although I think I became one in an amateur sense because I read these briefs myself and certainly had my own views of them.

Senator Reid: So in short, because you have received a lot of attention here today, during your tour of duty, you are stating that you did not know whether or not Americans were still alive?

Dr. Shields: We had no certain evidence, Senator, either way. We had known the—

Senator Reid: Or I could have said just the opposite and your answer would have been the same, you had no information as to whether the live sighting information, all the other reports you got, you had no information generally speaking whether they were alive or dead?

Dr. Shields: We could not correlate them specifically to those individuals about whom we had information of prior captivity, nor about individuals whom we could say were at that time specifically there. We had tons of information such as your committee, I am sure has seen, and such as all we have seen, as the recent photographs. We had that kind of information, and it did not allow us to say specifically we know that individuals are alive in captivity in Vietnam.

You list one POW returned alive, Robert Garwood. There is a book called Prisoner of War, POW, and on page 400 on that book—that is written by an author by the name of Hubble and put out in 1970, I believe, by the Readers Digest that explains his circumstances very well and includes an instance in which he was holding a rifle on fellow Americans in a prison camp. We did not consider him under those circumstances to have been in captivity. We always knew that he might have been there. We know about

McKinley Nolan who was in fact alive, farming as well as we could tell, in the Fish Hook area of Vietnam at the time that Saigon fell.

Senator Reid: My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid.

Senator Grassley:

Senator GRASSLEY: I want to deal with, try to get away from semantics and deal with what are some discrepancies here, some disagreements. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, it would cause some confusion about the April 1973 statement, I would like to set straight, it was Mr. Trowbridge yesterday said he never heard the statement that all of our men were home. Today Mr. Shields says that he disagreed with that statement.

I would like to get clarification on that, so Mr. Trowbridge, if you would, in your response to the chairman, that you had never been aware of the statement that Mr. Nixon and others in that administration made that there were no prisoners remaining, that we get them all home, and that statement was made in April of 1973 and was made often subsequently.

I suppose I am without a doubt, we are all dumbfounded that a gentleman of your stature, as deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Special Office for these POW/MIA affairs would be totally oblivious to the one question around which the entire controversy over this issue swirls. Without this statement, that the President made and of course those attendant follow-on policy decisions, there is absolutely no electrifying conflict. People are incensed. I don't suppose people are incensed with bureaucratic incompetence, they have learned to handle that, but they are incensed because of the deception around this issue, deception by our own Government.

So I want to follow up—and ask if there is any clarification today that you have had, now 24 hours later, to your response yesterday to Senator Kerry's question, particularly in light of what Dr. Shields had to say about President Nixon's statement.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE: Senator, yesterday if I said I didn't recall that statement or hadn't recalled hearing that statement, my comment today is exactly the same. There certainly isn't any deception or anything behind that. If that is what my recollection is. The position of our Agency relative to the information that we may have had relative to somebody being in a prisoner status or the intelligence that we may have had of anybody being a prisoner status that we could put our hands on right at that time or the information that said someone was there, that is common knowledge, it is today and it was then.

The fact that I made no recollection of that statement has no bearing on the information that our Agency was putting out.

Senator GRASSLEY: Yes, but 20 years later, 19 years later, we all, at least people on this committee know that President Nixon said we brought them all home. That has been the policy position of this Government ever since and it seems to me that that is very telling and dividing comment, a point of departure for this whole issue that we are dealing with.

I want to go on to the others, except for Dr. Shields, he has already commented on this. I would like to ask each of the other panelists whether or not they are aware that that statement was made in April 1973 by the President? Go ahead.

Mr. OKSENBERG. I must confess that (some 20 years later), I do not remember that statement being made, but I would like to say that the Carter administration's policy on this issue was not governed by Mr. Nixon's statement. Our policy, as I indicated in my statement, was based on the assumption that we did not know whether there were any live Americans in Indochina being held against their will and we pursued a policy that reflected that view.

That was one of the reasons that Leonard Woodcock was dispatched to Vietnam so early in the Carter administration. That was one of the reasons that we mounted a major effort to debrief the refugees. I can assure you, Senator, that at no point during my time on the watch did we come to the conclusion that there were certainly no live Americans in Indochina.

I would also however be less than truthful to you if I did not say that in my private thoughts, I harbored some skepticism as to whether there were live Americans. I never gave voice to that skepticism however because that skepticism did not govern my resolve and the resolve of all of my colleagues to pursue this matter with the vigor that it truly deserved.

Senator GRASSLEY. Before General Kingston answers, let me make clear for Mr. Trowbridge, I am not talking about deception on your part, I am talking about the question of deception of Nixon's possible deception and the public thinks that this is the case.

Mr. OKSENBERG. My President was President Carter.

Senator GRASSLEY. I am talking about President Nixon's statement General Kingston.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Senator, I certainly can't comment on President Nixon's statement.

General KINGSTON. In 1973, I was spending my time between South Vietnam and Thailand. If I ever heard that statement I certainly do not recollect at this time.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Sieverts.

Mr. SIEVERTS. Senator Grassley, I never thought it would fall to me to defend President Nixon in this context but let me do so by offering a bit of 1972, 1973 perspective. I think it is clear from some of the materials the committee's staff has seen that in the run-up to the Paris agreement and in the preparations for the return of our POWs, probably the overriding concern we had on our part was that there would be a hang-up in the process of the POW releases. On our side we had to arrange for the release of over 60,000, what we called enemy, that is to say Vietnamese communist prisoners of war, and a larger number of civilian internees of the communist side who had to be released, actually before the Paris agreement.

That is a substantial number of people to return, in most cases across the North Vietnamese border. The way the agreement was written, each side could in effect interpret compliance with that agreement in such a way as to determine the pace of release of those POWs.

So as of the early spring of 1973, when Dr. Shields and I spent 2 weeks at Clark Air Base in the final preparations for the first release, one of our major concerns was that there would be a hang up in the release of the POWs. I would just urge you to think of the

statements you are referring to in that context, namely, here was a big group of men that we knew were there. They were in the POW camps in South and North Vietnam and also possibly in Laos.

They were expected home. Were we going to get them? You may recall that in the Korean war, that war went on for almost 2 years, General Kingston I think served in that war, almost 2 years of extension of that war resulted from the issue of Big Switch and Little Switch, whether we would get our POWs back, and how to release Koran POWs without forcing them to go to North Korea.

So to say that this was a trivial or a light issue is simply wrong. It was a great concern. It was resolved. Our men came back including ultimately one or two that were not even on the Vietnamese or other lists.

So it was, I think, in that sense of: "they are back," that I would understand the statement by President Nixon that you referred to, rather than in the sense the committee is now attempting to concentrate on which is the question of what does this say about those left unaccounted for, the missing in action, and that is the problem you are focusing on very properly.

But I think there is a line I would draw between those two subjects.

Senator GRASSLEY. Let me ask a question on something mechanical before my time runs out here.

This is in regard to a job for the chairman of the committee that Senator Robb and I are doing on declassification purposes. It has been mentioned that for declassification purposes, we need only protect the names of sources and methods. What about the names of analysts? What about the names of interrogators? What about bits of information from one document which, when made public, could be combined with bits from other documents and, perhaps, reveal certain capabilities. I would like to have your feelings on that. Maybe Mr. Trowbridge.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I think you have brought up some very valid points there that should be considered for declassification, and the individuals that are responsible for that as they go through this declassification process are taking all those into consideration.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, do you have a view on analysts or on interrogators as an example?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I certainly feel there are times when certain analysts that are involved in the field, or otherwise, may jeopardize their position and they shouldn't be released.

Senator GRASSLEY. So you are saying sometimes we should protect the names of analysts and interrogators. Is that what your answer is?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. It doesn't necessarily mean it has to be classified. It could be for official use only.

Senator GRASSLEY. That is a much more complicated category of redaction. That was not explained yesterday as we went through some of this. We need to know how long this would take because, you know, this declassification process is going on; going fast through this town on a steam roller basis almost.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I am not directly involved in that, but there is an office that is that can address that to this committee. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown?

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Mr. Trowbridge, I wanted to go back to a statement you made earlier because I think it bears on discussions we had earlier in the day with Dr. Shields, and in the past, with you, and perhaps with others involved in Defense Intelligence. If I recall what you said earlier today, it was something to the effect that we simply had no information that would lead us to think that Americans were being held captive.

My understanding is that there were literally hundreds of sworn statements of people who had passed polygraph tests who say that they saw Americans being held captive. Now, is that understanding incorrect, or do you consider sworn statements, where someone has passed a polygraph as not information.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I wouldn't go, sir, to the point that we have thousands.

Senator BROWN. I did not say thousands. I said hundreds.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Even hundreds.

Senator BROWN. So there is not more than 100 or 200?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Even at that, I could show you polygraphs that have been passed by individuals where what they have said is physically impossible for them to have made those statements. They haven't been correct.

Senator BROWN. I asked a pretty direct question. Do you want me to repeat it?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, please.

Senator BROWN. My understanding is that we have hundreds of statements that are sworn statements, where people have passed a polygraph test, indicating there are Americans being held as POW's. You have said that there is no information, if I understand your statement correctly and, obviously, I hope you will correct me if I have misunderstood it, but I thought you just said earlier today that we have no information that indicates Americans are being held.

Now, how do we reconcile that? Do we not have hundreds of statements, or do you consider a sworn statement, where someone has passed a polygraph test as not information? Or is there another explanation?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I guess we had a similar discussion on this yesterday on the term of evidence and information. There is information that individuals have indicated that there are prisoners being held. Of that information, we don't have convincing information, or we have none that we have confirmed.

Senator BROWN. Your statement, though, unless I misheard it, was that we have no information.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I'm sorry if it came out that way. There was no intent.

Senator BROWN. I am trying to get our terms correct. I assume the purpose of these hearings is to get the facts out. What you meant to say, or what you feel is the clear implication of your remarks is that you are not convinced with that information. That there is information, but you do not find it convincing or rising to a level of proof?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's correct.

Senator BROWN. I think that is important because what has been said publicly is similar to the statements that I think Dr. Shields

had made on a consistent basis. There is no information and that simply is not accurate. Dr. Shields, I guess I would ask you, in looking back on it, do you find, about no information, to be something you would prefer to have raised a different way?

Dr. SHIELDS. Well, Senator, as I quoted from this hearing, I have phrased that in a different way a number of times in which I have said, we know that people were alive in prison at one time. We do not know, subsequently, what happened to them. That is my feeling today. If I may take the indulgence here of reading something. Senator McCain, with your indulgence, this is a statement by your father, the Commander in Chief at CINCPAC. Let me read this to you so you will understand—

Senator BROWN. My time is very limited. I know we would be happy to put that in the record. But I have some questions I would like to go ahead with, if I may.

Dr. SHIELDS. Certainly.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Sieverts, I thought you did a fine job defending President Nixon. I think better than he has done for himself, at least, speaking for me, personally. And I thought you touched on, earlier, a very important point, and I think General Kingston did as well, about the key question here. I think others of you have. The key question here is, did we act? Did we take the proper action?

I just want to take one specific example. Maybe there is others, but as I understand it, we had information that Bobby Garwood was held in North Vietnam. We had statements from returning POW's that indicated his activity, not only that they had seen him but seen things he had done. We had information come to us from intelligence reports of people who said they had seen him—that we have later identified as Bobby Garwood.

Did this Nation, during all those years, ever specifically ask the Government of North Vietnam if they held Bobby Garwood?

Mr. SIEVERTS. The answer to that is, yes. Except without the word "held" in there. The whole key is, as Dr. Shields mentioned a short while ago, and I think it is very well documented, particularly from the sworn statements that were given in the debriefings and, subsequently, in legal proceedings, by the Americans held with Garwood in South Vietnam, that Garwood was a defector.

I don't mean to use that in a legal sense, but that he had gone north with his captors at his own will. When he contacted a visiting international official at a hotel in Hanoi during the Tet holiday period in 1979, we instantly were able to arrange for him to depart. During the prior years, his name was on lists that we gave to the Vietnamese. We did so on a number of occasions.

Senator BROWN. And what was their response?

Mr. SIEVERTS. No response at all.

Senator BROWN. They did not say that he was not there, they simply did not respond?

Mr. SIEVERTS. That's correct. They made no response on Garwood until 1979 and, at that point in their own statement, they simply said that Garwood had stayed in North Vietnam "at his own will." They also used the word "voluntarily." That was the statement from the North Vietnamese government which, frankly, equated to the description that had been given at the time of Garwood's—

Senator BROWN. The implication was that they did not lie. They simply did not respond.

Mr. SIEVERTS. That's correct. They didn't respond. They also didn't respond, for example in 1977, to the Woodcock Commission. There have been other Vietnamese, subsequently through the years, who have made the point that he was what they regarded as a "rallier."

Senator BROWN. Are there other names like Garwood where we submitted and asked and they simply would not make a response?

Mr. SIEVERTS. A great many. Just about everybody. We were, needless to say, comprehensive, and we provided them with the entire MIA list. And then, shortly thereafter, the entire MIA and BNR lists. One of the things that we specified, I think I asked for this to be done, was that the MIA's and BNR's would simply be listed alphabetically without that faintly adverse indication that one is killed, BNR, the other is MIA.

They had all those lists, and we attempted to add depth to that by picking out the best kinds of cases, making case files with maps and records, translating them into Vietnamese, or into Lao in some cases.

So that was a continuing effort but I think Garwood was covered and I can only accept the fact that the decision on the Vietnamese side to hold back information reflected a situation in which this man was staying there, as they said, at his own will. Those are recorded statements.

In fact, if I could just add one anecdote about it, one bit of memory. When we got the word that Garwood wanted to come home and we had that with a little information written on a piece of paper with his name on it, we immediately set out to get him back. One or 2 days later, there was a statement made by a Marine Corps spokesperson which referred to him as a POW. That's because the Marines had never changed his status from POW despite the indication that I have referred to.

The Vietnamese at that point balked and said, no, we can't agree to that. We can't sort of just let him go, because he is not a POW. He is someone who stayed at his own will. We straightened that out with a further communication. We involved the International Red Cross, and he was home on the next flight.

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Dr. Shields, would you be willing to share with us that information you had indicated earlier you wanted to put in the record?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, sir. It is a very short statement and it, I think, goes back to the comments and concern about the statement I made shortly after the end of Operation Homecoming. The first statement that I made.

Admiral McCain repeatedly asserted that he felt—he was being asked about whether there were prisoners still left and he repeatedly asserted that he felt a small number of American were still alive in Indochina. When asked how many, he opined that perhaps 20 to 30 were alive. When asked whether he had any evidence at all that there is anybody alive, he admitted he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that? I missed that.

Dr. SHIELDS. This was the Commander in Chief of the Pacific forces, Senator McCain's father. Senator McCain was in another

place at this time. This was Admiral McCain, who certainly knew about what was going on in the area, and certainly had a very deep interest in the subject. He said, Senator, just about what I would have said.

Senator MCCAIN. Should we not correct the record though? When was that statement made?

Dr. SHIELDS. I think this would have been 1976.

Senator MCCAIN. Remember that he retired in July of 1972.

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct.

Senator MCCAIN. So his knowledge of what happened during Operation Homecoming and all those things was clearly not very specific as is true of any retired person.

Dr. SHIELDS. The point, Senator, is that at that point in time, he did not have specific evidence. I think the time we are speaking of here would have covered the time in which we would have had information, had we had it. I don't know of any hard evidence we would have uncovered from the time of his retirement to the time of Operation Homecoming.

So when we are speaking in specific terms, we are talking about we don't know, rather than saying, yes, we do know there are people there—that was a statement I could never make.

Mr. OKSENBERG. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I have a plane to catch. I want to thank you for the privilege of appearing before your committee and I wish you the best.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, Mr. Oksenberg, we have some questions. The timeframe of a lot of Senators use up a lot of time quickly. And with a large panel, we do not get to all the questions that we want to ask you. But the record remains open. We would like you to respond to some questions in writing for the purposes of building the record, here, so we can draw later information, if you would consent to do that.

Mr. OKSENBERG. I'd be delighted.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At this point, you always wonder if you have anything you can add to the questioning, but I would just like to add to Mr. Sieverts that I feel you did a very good job in kind of setting up the atmosphere which existed in the winter and spring of 1973. I think, from the panel yesterday, there really was no major disagreement in the feeling that there were live Americans still in Southeast Asia after the end of the peace accord and after Operation Homecoming.

Admiral Moorer and General Tighe both indicated their belief that, at that time, there were. I guess one thing I would like to ask, if anybody would know here, did each of the individual services sign off on a statement indicating, as has been argued, Dr. Shields, about this statement that there were no prisoners—there was a belief that there were no prisoners remaining?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, I hope I'm not dealing in semantics with you. There was never a statement that we had no more prisoners or that all men were dead. The statement was that we really did not have proof positive, at that time, or current information that would allow us to go back. I'm sure that had we known at that time of the evidence of people, had Senator McCain, or some of his comrades said, we left a man in this camp, I'm sure we would have

done something about it. There were three foreign nationals and we did.

The services, I think, agreed with this statement. The indication from the Montgomery Committee is that the Intelligence Committee agreed with this statement. If there were people who had feelings, they were based on a belief that maybe, perhaps someone was there. Not with regard to evidence. And, when I made my comment, I was dealing with regard to specifics and I think it is important that we understand that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would agree with that. I think it was clearly not a statement based on evidence so much as, however, wanting to create an overall policy statement. Sort of a presumptive statement that there were no further live Americans.

It just would seem to me that it was done, perhaps, out of a desire, whether it was that specific or not, to create a belief. That they wanted to get this behind us and we were bringing people home. I guess what I would like to ask, and I do not want to belabor that point because everybody has talked about it, is, that there must have been specific names; DIA had specific names, the services had specific names. Was there any effort made to investigate at that point in April specific evidence? Were we going after specific evidence at that point?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, I have already commented that even while Operation Homecoming was in process we asked about the first individual, a specific Navy commander in a specific area of Vietnam, and we inquired about him. We followed that up with regard to specific requests about all of our men. Those who we believed to have been captured and those for whom the evidence was less compelling.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I heard you say that. I guess I should have been a little more specific. Were we following it up? Were we getting any kind of cooperation from the Lao at that point? They were not even a part of the Paris accord.

Dr. SHIELDS. They were part. And we received no cooperation at all.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And from the North Vietnamese, there was no cooperation there?

Dr. SHIELDS. We received limited cooperation with regard to the repatriation of the remains of those individuals that they said died in captivity. Even that took about a year to accomplish.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And that they said, too. So I guess, perhaps, I would ask how good our intelligence was, Mr. Trowbridge, at that time, so we that were really being able to get some feeling of whether, in the specific instances that we were checking out, we were able to do much. To do much in country, even. Were our sources such that you were confident that we were being able to really get some of the information we were hoping to track down?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Senator, intelligence analysis is not a perfect science. We can only work with what we have. What we were working with at the time was the best the intelligence community could do, and that was provided to our office for our analysis and as has been stated here this morning we had nothing—we didn't have any definitive proof that any were left there. We just didn't know in a lot of cases, and we don't know today.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I realize that. It's just, I think, that the confusion lies in that unfortunately, perhaps, it was not handled with as much forthrightness as it should have been at the time, and out of all that has come a great deal of uncertainty largely because it was a very traumatic time for all sorts of different reasons, but I think this lack of forthrightness and sort of differing agendas which frequently happens on the part of various agencies and departments has made it extremely difficult.

I am just not one who believes in conspiracy theories, but I think unfortunately because we have been such a long time coming to terms with this and doing it in a way and being as forthright as possible we have created and added a great deal of sorrow and confusion to the process.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum, thank you very much. Those are wise comments as usual. I think it is very important for people to understand as we go through this process that when we finally get around to writing a report there will be a lot of the kind of thing that Senator Kassebaum has just articulated that I imagine will be reflected in our judgments that doesn't necessarily leap out in a witness' testimony but which does leap out in the context of the times and of the issue.

I want to assure the witnesses, all of them, particularly Dr. Shields, since you and I lock horns a little on this, that we are not insensitive—none of us are. I am not insensitive to the difficulties under which you were operating and the times. We cannot analyze this without recognizing the political undercurrents, the mood of the Nation, the difficulties of our leverage, and that is something I want to get out with you a little bit.

Clearly we were not exactly in the strongest negotiating position, and the ability to get some answers was not there, but there are some realities here and I think we have to come back here. I apologize. Senator Robb was gone, now he is back. I want to cede to you for questions, so I am going to hold off on any comments I had. I thought I was into the second round. I apologize.

Senator ROBB. I did not actually leave, but the deputy chairman is a sizeable man and I may have been in deflated position temporarily.

The CHAIRMAN. Deftly handled. I appreciate it.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll just be very brief, because I think most of the relevant questions for this panel have been asked. I would start with an observation, and thank Dr. Shields for at least reading into the record the testimony from Admiral McCain.

His son and our friend, a member of this panel, cannot say anything beyond correcting the record with respect to retirement date, but for those of us who served in another branch of the Naval Service, and who had an opportunity to meet and work even briefly with Admiral McCain during that period, like Chesty Puller was the marine's marine, Admiral McCain was the sailor's sailor at the very least. We had an extraordinarily high regard for him and his son has some very big shoes to fill that he is working hard to fill at this point.

Just a couple of very quick questions, one with respect to your testimony, Dr. Shields. In reviewing your testimony, I do not recall seeing any reference to any coordination with the CIA during the course of your testimony or analysis. I'm just curious, was there any that related to this particular matter, the whole question of POW's and MIA's?

Dr. SHIELDS. Well, there was, Senator. Most of that coordination was accomplished through the DIA and the intelligence areas. We asked that the CIA be included and they were included. From time to time I had contacts with some of the individuals at the CIA, so yes, we did. Most of their information came to me through the DIA.

Senator ROBB. We can pursue that in a different vein.

General KINGSTON. Senator, if I may, the JCRC had reports from CIA also through DOD.

Senator ROBB. Let me just go back to the question that I think has troubled the panel or the committee yesterday and again today, and ask this in as neutral a way as I can.

Dr. Shields, it has to do with the whole question of compartmentalization of information during a critical period and what appeared to be the lack of sharing of information and/or critical questions being directed to those who might have been able to help in that reconciliation process.

General Tighe observed during his testimony yesterday that when policymakers in the early 1970's made statements about non-Americans being left behind, that the intelligence analysts tended to believe them despite contradictions with most current intelligence simply because they felt that the policymakers had access to compartmentalized information not available to them.

I wonder if you could comment on whether or not you believe this is a reflection of your own assessment of the state of the art, if you will, at that point, or the way that the various agencies operated with respect to each other, and indeed, with respect to themselves? If you could just comment on that, and then Mr. Sieverts, I am going to ask you to comment on that as well, too, if I may.

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, to my knowledge, all of the intelligence agencies, including the NSA, were part of our process. That information was fed in, the interrogator reports from the field were fed in, and through various State Department sources who talked to these people, made them available to interrogators, and that came into the DIA.

The DIA coordinated with the military intelligence services, and that was the basis for the information which we had. You need to understand again at the time, after Operation Homecoming, we had families who were very much concerned about individuals who did not come back, some of them carried as prisoners of war, and the comment was from a lot of these individuals and interested individuals, did we leave someone behind, and the answer really was, we didn't know.

We had people for whom we had to account, and that's why we had Article 8(b). The services, the intelligence agencies, did not have any information which was funneled to us which indicated that we could put a specific finger on an individual and say he's a prisoner of war at that time.

Senator ROBB. But it seems to me there was a rather passive acceptance of the possibility that somebody else had information that the particular analyzing agent or Agency did not have that related directly to the most pressing, certainly, emotional concern before the services immediately after Operation Homecoming.

I guess the question I am trying to get at is, why was there not more of an effort within various Agencies that had information that appeared to contradict what the policy people were saying—why was not some effort made, either institutionally or individually, to say hey, we have got information that is simply at odds, at variance with the information that you have just announced or articulated through either policy papers or official pronouncements, whatever the case may be? Why was there not some critical questioning or skepticism that can be raised at that time, and why was there a passive acceptance?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, there are statements by General Walters at the CIA. I don't know him well, but my understanding is he doesn't accept much passively at all. He made his own statements with regard to this issue and they do not conflict with DOD policy statements.

We asked the DIA and the service intelligences units and of course General Tighe at that time served with the DIA, or at some point in that period, about this issue so I don't think that the U.S. Government possessed the kind of information that you are speaking of.

I certainly was not made aware of that. I know about the men who were held prisoner. I know when we last received information about them, and I know in many instances we received negative information.

Several years ago, about 12 or 13 years ago, I suggested before a congressional body in testimony, in a hearing, that we create a volume, and I didn't want to call it a memorial volume because that indicated that people were dead and that the issue was over. I advocated that we create a volume in which we listed all those who did not come home and where remains were not recovered if they were killed, or were MIA or prisoner and did not come home, with capsule information on what happened to each man, to the best of our knowledge. Now, that would have been available to everyone throughout this country.

When I was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we held a hearing, or I should say, a press conference, in Secretary of Defense Laird's dining room, and we put up a number of cases, more than 10 cases of individuals whom we believed the other side should have information. We asked the families about whether we could release that information and they agreed that we could. We did that.

I think that is where we will find the answers. Let us make available all of the information relating to any individual, and people who have information that is not contained in that can come forward and provide it, but I don't know of anyone who has that information.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, could I ask, do you have in your current possession—I'm not sure I understood Dr. Shields' re-

sponse. You said you proposed, or you did in fact prepare such a volume?

Dr. SHIELDS. No, I was out of the Government at that time, Senator. I proposed at a hearing that we do that, because I thought that the issue should be washed and aired before the American people.

Senator ROBB. And the response to your proposal was what?

Dr. SHIELDS. Simply, we'll look at the issue, and I never heard a response from it after that, but I think that would have put out all the intelligence information that we had on every individual about whom we were concerned.

Senator ROBB. Do you have any reason to believe that that proposal was ever specifically declined or negated?

Dr. SHIELDS. No. I just heard nothing about it. I was never told about it. I have no information on it.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Sieverts, could you address the same general question from the State Department side?

Mr. SIEVERTS. The State Department had every reason to think that all the intelligence agencies and the military services and all the others of our Government were fully seized of their responsibility to seek out by all available means information about Americans, and they did so with some success, often remarkable success, and we obtained very definite information with names and so forth right through 1973 with the return of our men.

To my knowledge, they kept up that effort. I think it's a question that you might want to review, but I have no reason to think that there was any diminution of effort.

There's a phrase in the intelligence business about having a primary tasking and a secondary tasking. I.e., the primary goal may be to discover exactly where airplanes are based, but the secondary would be then three other ones: where do the pilots live, are there any POW's, and so forth. This remained an active if not primary secondary mission of all the American intelligence agencies to my knowledge right into the mid-Seventies and even to this day.

The problem is that the kinds of information that began arriving after 1973 were qualitatively different from what was coming in before 1973. It's not a question of attitude by analysts, but rather simply the information itself. It's for that reason that I drew attention to what is, to me, a significant difference. And that is the sudden absence, even when you have very detailed information, of many alleged live sightings, the absence of that kind of verifying information in which the name or some other detail that in a court proceeding or something else would let you know that this was real, something that could only be real if it was really real, tended to be missing.

I have said that the very large number of sightings themselves raised incredulity. There could not have been as many American prisoners as the live sightings suggest were there, so you have an information problem. If there had been just a few live sightings I would find that more convincing than to have a thousand live sightings or several hundred live sightings over the years.

There's a real problem of credibility of information after 1973, so I don't think it's correct that there was any loss of effort by those agencies. I think there was a loss of product for the reason that it just wasn't there.

Senator ROBB. I don't want to beat a dead horse, and I'll conclude with this: the question of why there wasn't, in terms of official policy-side pronouncements, internal or external, some degree of skepticism or at least acknowledgement of the fact that there were conflicting claims that might not rise to the level of verifiable information but nonetheless information that was at variance with what appeared to be the official position—

Mr. SIEVERTS. What I am saying is, I don't believe in my experience that skepticism or a mind-set, an adverse mind-set, was ever the problem. People like Commander Trowbridge can speak to that more directly than I can. This has been asserted. I'm aware of that.

What I'm suggesting is rather different. The mind-set remained perfectly open, and believe me, had we had something come in which was for real, the action by the U.S. Government would have been forceful and instantaneous to resolve that, to get the man back, if there really was somebody there. I just don't think the case should be assumed valid that there really were people there.

I think the committee is saying there are indications, but an indication remains some distance away from a living, breathing American with a name that we could then go for, and we did of course get Garwood back very quickly when he let us know that he was there.

So I am suggesting that the intelligence agencies were motivated, were committed, carried this out. I'm not aware of internal directives, but I certainly know of none that the State Department was involved in which would ever have said, OK, stand down, it's all over, stop looking.

I think there might have been a shift in some cases in the direction of what they called a secondary objective, so that you no longer are targeted quite exactly in the same way on this exclusively as was at some points the case, but that doesn't mean in our system that you don't have a highly sophisticated array of methods at work which would have produced such information if it was there.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Sieverts, Dr. Shields, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I know my time is up. I am going to have to depart.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may come back to where I was, Dr. Shields, there are a number of things I want to raise with you, but I want to emphasize at the outset that there's an obvious difficulty here in our trying to piece this together after 20 years, and I am sure you would agree with me that the best time to get the accounting was 20 years ago and not now, is that correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. I think that's unquestionably correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that, therefore, mean that we failed to get that accounting for reasons we can explain 20 years ago?

Dr. SHIELDS. I believe we failed to get as complete an accounting as we could have gotten at that time. Yes, I do. There is no question about it. In mind, had Article 8(b) been implemented, we would have had the accounting that we desired.

The CHAIRMAN. And your interpretation of why it was not implemented is?

Dr. SHIELDS. We never had access to the areas where we needed to go. We needed to go into the areas where our men were lost. We

needed to begin with the incident of loss and track down what happened to them from that point.

We searched some over-water areas where we had men lost. I think we received an accounting for men lost in those areas. We had a very limited accounting in other areas. But in the areas of Laos, we did not have access. We were not allowed to go. The government was hostile. The same was true of North Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. But what about Vietnam itself? Did we raise that? I do not remember us raising that to the kind of level of concern that expresses this breach, if you will, with the agreement.

Dr. SHIELDS. You mean with the Four-Party Joint Military team?

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, sir. We did raise those issues, and we raised them with a great deal of vigor.

The CHAIRMAN. You recall that being a sort of publicly perceived grievance that was expressed, or you raised them in private channels? I do not recall this Nation being in turmoil over the notion that we thought Vietnam might be holding people. In fact, it was the opposite, as everything has suggestion.

Dr. SHIELDS. I think, Senator Kerry, that the Nation was probably ecstatic that the conflict was over, and that we were not adding to those POW/MIA lists.

The CHAIRMAN. So we kind of get to something here, do we not? I mean, does that not begin to say something about where the stated public priority was?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, I think what it says something about is the public mood. The public was very happy to have the people who came back. I think a lot of families at the time felt that the Nation as a whole had lost a lot of interest in this area and a lot of interest in this issue.

I can assure you that in the Department of Defense we did not, as we cited the case of an individual who was killed in the field trying to pursue an accounting. Even though we were not having the cooperation that we needed, we made overtures to the Vietnamese time and time again. A Presidential commission went to Hanoi and to Vientiane, Laos, in 1977 appointed by the President, and manned by distinguished Americans specifically for this purpose of accounting for the missing.

We had a complete set of hearings, and numerous other hearings within the Congress on this issue, and the Department of Defense spoke out and maintained contact with families, and let the families know exactly where this issue was. So if there was not a hue and cry in the country, it was not for want of effort on our part.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Commission came back with a letter that the Vietnamese gave them saying, Henry Kissinger promised that we were going to get \$3.5 billion. Where is it? Is that not right?

Dr. SHIELDS. That is correct, Senator. That was one of the issues and one of the obstacles to an accounting, I suppose.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back over one other area. I mean, I think what you are saying helps shed a lot of light on something, and I will try to draw it together in a few minutes, if I can.

I do not want to leave this other issue that Senator McCain raised, as if we are trying to score debating points here or some-

thing, because that is not what this is about. And I am not trying to put one piece of a letter in or memorandum and leave another piece out.

The part that Senator McCain read to you I agree with completely. There is no argument here. In fact, the record that you are reading from is already part of the record of this committee. We are incorporating into this committee all of the past investigations, and that will be part of our public record at the end. Whatever analysis we make will analyze the statements that you have referred to. But as Senator McCain pointed out, Admiral McCain's own knowledge at that point was not an intricate involvement, but it still obscures the real issue here.

Let me point out, the end of the letter says, with your concurrence, I will maintain the position that we do not know whether those now accounted for are alive or dead. I agree with that. You did not know it. You did not know it in 1973. So, that is not an issue. And this committee said yesterday, we do not know if those 133 were all alive.

But there is a distinction between the first part of your letter and your statement—and I am not trying to corner you. You know, as two people talking about this, I would like you to maybe try to put yourself in the shoes of the families, which I know you have done before.

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, sir, I have.

The CHAIRMAN. If you hear this statement, can you not agree with me, there is a distinction between this sort of phrase, specific knowledge, and any indication. Is there not a distinction?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, there is. I tried to make that distinction. I tried to make the distinction between specific information that related to a man that would have allowed us to pursue a point target.

The CHAIRMAN. Agreed. We do not have that today.

Dr. SHIELDS. And we did not have evidence at that time that those people were there; recent, confirmed evidence that would have allowed us to do that.

We did have questions, and we tried to inform people of the fact that people were alive at one time, that there was intelligence of one kind or another. There is no disagreement about that. I still wonder today like you, Senator. I agree with you on that. We do not know yet today what happened to these men.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we are in total agreement on the lack of knowledge, on the question of specificity, and on the fact there is a distinction between an indication, etc. Now, if you are looking at this issue as we are, and as we did back then, we have presumptions about what was going to come back. Correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. We assumed, Senator, for example, with regard to Laos—I assumed that we were going to have far more men repatriated than we did. I did not have a specific number associated with it. None at all.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have speculated a range. I believe you have suggested that the range was between 20 and 30 more POW's for North Vietnam, and 50 or 60 more for Laos, correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. That is an idea that was in the back of my mind but, as with Senator McCain, I had no basis for that other than hope—Admiral McCain, excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. But in point of fact, was there not an official military list of POW's that did not come back which was used by you, which was 56?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, we did have that list of prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just stop you. If you have a list of 56 prisoners that you expect back, and you have a presumption they are going to come back, and they do not; you have information that allowed you to say, these men were prisoners; you have intelligence of one kind or another that indicated, or the incident report; so there is a presumption, a list, 56 people, but they do not come back, correct? Is there not a very obvious expectation by families and by the Nation that there is a terrible gap here that we have got to account for?

Dr. SHIELDS. That is correct, and we all shared that same feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. But is it not also fair to say—I mean, it is my judgment that notwithstanding the, quote, official position, that because of the mood of the Nation, because of the leverage of the talks, because of the nature of the talks, because the terms, because of all kinds of problems, those 56, let one the 133 or 244 or whatever you want to call it never really rose to a level of public demand. We have got to have these folks accounted for, or we do not go forward. There never was that kind of confrontation. Is that not true?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, there was that kind of confrontation in certain groups. That clearly is true.

The CHAIRMAN. But never really publicly, as a national policy.

Dr. SHIELDS. I do not believe the debate ever rose—even with the Montgomery Committee, we commented on the discrepancies. I did, with regard to the Presidential commission that went to Hanoi, express my concerns. We were at the Vientiane cemetery and we were told we were going to receive a certain number of remains, and I said, but that does not include one man that we knew was buried in this cemetery. And the reaction of the Vietnamese to that was, we are not sure about that. We will have to find out about that. Later on, during the course of that visit, they acknowledged that.

So, we were raising these issues, Senator. What we had was a Nation—and I might point out that we still have skeptics today who really do not believe that, one, our intelligence was ever accurate in the first place or, two, that whatever happened to those people, they were alive after Operation Homecoming, because they read accounts like accounts of Dieter Dengler. I had to escape or I would have died in captivity. They read the book of Nicholas Rowe. They knew that certain men died in captivity. Aroyo Baez, Sergeant Aroyo Baez died.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite a few died in captivity.

Dr. SHIELDS. Exactly. And including one man who, if we had had repatriation 9 months earlier, would have come home, and he did not. So, those fact were known.

The CHAIRMAN. But we also know of some people that returnees came back and said to us, I saw so and so in captivity, and I cannot tell you he died in captivity, but he did not come back with us. Richard Van Dyke.

Dr. SHIELDS. Richard Van Dyke. Commander Ford. There were a number of people like that. And that is why we said, and I said in my statement, that we knew that it did not include the names of people whom we assumed may have died in captivity. We did not know.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not know, but the last indication is that they were alive. Is that correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, yes, and I brought those cases up. But when someone asks you, do you know that Richard Van Dyke is alive today, I could not have said yes, and that is my point.

The CHAIRMAN. I absolutely agree with you, but regrettably, you see, and I know you can understand it, there is a gap between what was perceived by the families as the policy versus what you are articulating. And I am not suggesting you set out to do it. In fact, I am a little disturbed by the notion that your superior suggested to you that they were all dead. Was that a prevalent attitude?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, I do not believe it was. I think the attitude was—and you spoke to Admiral Moorer yesterday. He may have believed, may well have believed, that Americans were there. If you had asked him, do you have specific evidence, I do not know what his answer would have been. But that was the question that was frequently asked.

Now, the families had all of the information which we had available. The family of Richard Van Dyke, now living I think in Salt Lake City, knew about his case. They knew about what the men in the prison camp had to say about him. They knew about Commander Ford. So this information was passed onto families. It was not information that anyone tried to hide.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point is, obviously, that here we are 20 years later with a list called, discrepancy cases. And General John Vessey who will testify later, who is an extraordinary public servant who has devoted his time going over there, has a list of people that 20 years later we are saying to the Vietnamese, hey, wait a minute, we thought these folks were alive.

Now, if 20 years later we are doing that, it just occurs to me that 20 years ago the presumption, the information, the probability, the expectation, was a hell of a lot higher, and the moment was riper.

Dr. SHIELDS. Certainly, Senator. We had at the time of the Paris peace accords an Article 8(b) which, as Mr. Sieverts has pointed out, contained all of the authorities we needed for an accounting.

The CHAIRMAN. So there was a real failure to pull off the Accord itself and get the accounting?

Dr. SHIELDS. Absolutely. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

General KINGSTON. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I would like to interject. The JCRC did conduct as sizable sea search. It lasted for 82 days. It was very disappointing.

The CHAIRMAN. Which case? I am sorry.

General KINGSTON. The sea search.

The CHAIRMAN. The sea search you referred to earlier. I saw you shaking your head there, and I appreciate that.

General KINGSTON. Very disappointing. We only got one piece of skull bone from a helicopter.

The CHAIRMAN. I also want to say, there are a lot of dedicated people who have worked a long time at this under very difficult circumstances. There were some real lost opportunities in 1970's all across the board. I think attitudinally the reaction to the invasion of Cambodia and the efforts with respect to the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen come back to haunt us today, even in the United Nations effort to get peace there, which includes the Khmer Rouge.

So there have been a lot of lost opportunities. That is not the subject of this hearing now, but it may well weigh into some judgments that are made about what could have been done previously. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we have heard some discussion today centering or focusing around the issue of evidence. And, frankly, I am somewhat angry because I have been singled out as one member of the committee, both by those on the panel and, to some extent, comments made by the chairman and others on the panel regarding my position on evidence.

I want to get into that very specifically. Mr. Trowbridge, you said that there is no evidence that Americans were alive after 1973 or alive up until 1989. Is that correct?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Prisoners of war. And after 1973, to your comment, for instance, we did know of—

Senator SMITH. I am sorry, after the accords.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Talking about individuals related to the war that we could verify.

Senator SMITH. So there was no evidence of any American POW after the accords and after Operation Homecoming from 1973 until 1989?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I think we had Dean and Sharman. We had Emmet Kay. Individuals of that nature.

Senator SMITH. Take Garwood out. Take Emmet Kay out.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. None that we were able to confirm that I am able to recall.

Senator SMITH. So, there is no evidence.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Again, we are getting into information and evidence. We had information.

Senator SMITH. No, I want to get into evidence. To hell with information, I want evidence. Let me read you the dictionary definition of evidence. Facts or signs on which a conclusion can be based, is the first definition. The second definition is, an indication. Does anybody disagree with Webster on the definition of evidence?

Listen, it is not funny. My integrity has been challenged by members of this panel.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I interrupt, Bob, for one second.

Senator SMITH. Please let me finish my line of questioning. You have had your opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. But I want to make sure you understand, no one is challenging your integrity. All someone has said is, there is a difference in judgment with respect to the evidence.

Senator SMITH. I am talking about evidence. Mr. Trowbridge has said that there is no evidence. We are not talking about judgment of evidence. I have not gotten to that point yet. Is there evidence or is there not evidence that Americans remained alive as prisoners of

war, taking out Garwood, from 1973 to 1989? That is a simple yes or no question. Is there or is there not, based on your opinion?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Based on my opinion and what I have seen, we have nothing that would indicate that an American prisoner—confirmed information or evidence, firm evidence, or convincing evidence, that an American prisoner was being held against his will.

Senator SMITH. Do you agree with that Dr. Shields?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, the second definition—indications. We certainly knew that people were alive at one time. I do not have anything that would allow me to make the judgment, which you suggested is the first definition, that would allow me to make the judgment that those Americans were still alive, and say that to a family member, for example. And say, I am confident that based on the information I have your husband is alive. I could not have said that.

Senator SMITH. Let me give you some specific examples, and I am not going to pick on anybody specific, I would just like a yes or no down the panel, all right?

A deposition from a high-ranking government official to this committee that says that lists of POW's were discussed being in Laos after the war. Is that evidence in your definition?

Dr. SHIELDS. I know of no such list.

Senator SMITH. I did not ask you that question.

Dr. SHIELDS. It would depend on that list. If it were hearsay evidence, I don't think it would be evidence.

Senator SMITH. Supposing it wasn't hearsay. What do you mean by hearsay?

Dr. SHIELDS. If you told me, for example, that there was a discussion among Lao authorities of a list of American prisoners, then I would say this is something I would want to follow up on. I would not accept it uncritically.

Senator SMITH. So it is not evidence. Is that evidence to you, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As I mentioned the other day, there's good evidence and there's bad evidence, in my view. If you have evidence—

Senator SMITH. I just want to separate this out for the American people so that when somebody goes out there like Senator Smith or Senator Kerry or Mr. Trowbridge or Dr. Shields or anybody else, I want people to understand what evidence is.

Dr. SHIELDS. If it could be confirmed, Senator, I would accept it as evidence.

Senator SMITH. I'm going by the dictionary definition of evidence, which I have just put in the record. Let me give you some more examples. Is this evidence, a satellite photo which is a message—could be a message. It is a message—it says it is a message from a POW. Just no other verification, a satellite photo that is a message.

Dr. SHIELDS. It could be a message, and if it could be, it could be evidence. If it isn't, it isn't evidence. Could means it might or might not.

Senator SMITH. So if you get the satellite photo and you don't have another set of criteria, then it is not evidence. Is that what you are saying?

Dr. SHIELDS. You said it might or might not be, and I said—

Senator SMITH. I am saying you get a satellite photo, you take a picture and there is a message.

Dr. SHIELDS. It is evidence that there is a message.

Senator SMITH. It is not evidence that it is a POW if it says Smith, POW. Suppose there is a guy named Smith and he is missing at such and such a location. You get a message in a satellite photo stamped in the grass that says Smith, POW.

Dr. SHIELDS. If it had his personal authenticator with it, I would say that it was probably evidence.

Senator SMITH. So if we have a personal authenticator, then it is evidence, correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. It would be strong evidence to me, yes.

Senator SMITH. Is that true, Mr. Trowbridge, if we have an authenticator?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I would say it would be evidence, strong evidence, yes.

Senator SMITH. I maintain we have that. Are you aware of that, Mr. Trowbridge, that we have such a message?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No.

Senator SMITH. I am sorry to hear that. What about radio traffic, as we had in EC-47? A radio intercept, is that evidence?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I'm sorry, I was writing a note.

Senator SMITH. A radio intercept, an intercept discussing POW's. I am asking anyone who wants to respond.

Dr. SHIELDS. It is certainly evidence that they were communicating to each other about prisoners. We also know that they communicated many times—

Senator SMITH. So it is evidence or is it not evidence, Dr. Shields? Is it evidence?

Dr. SHIELDS. It's evidence they were talking to each other about prisoners. If you ask me if it's evidence that Americans were captured, I would say not yet. It has to be developed.

Senator SMITH. So what do you need now? Let me use the radio intercept as an example. You have got a radio intercept. It is our people, our intelligence people. They have got an intercept and it says—taking the Vietnamese or the Lao in this case, you have eavesdropped and you have picked it up and it said we have got American POW's and they named them, or maybe they do not but they say we have got them. What do you need now to make it evidence? What is next? That is not evidence, so what is next?

Dr. SHIELDS. It could be evidence, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I know that. What is next?

Dr. SHIELDS. You authenticate the message that relates to these people and you track it down, you analyze it, because we had many intercepts in which we heard units bragging about having shot down American aircraft and having captured Americans on days and in places where no American aircraft were lost, and we knew that it was simply one unit bragging to another.

Senator SMITH. So radio traffic from our intelligence interceptors is not evidence. That is all I want, is a yes or no.

Dr. SHIELDS. It's information until it's verified.

Senator SMITH. So it is not evidence, correct?

The CHAIRMAN. Evidence of what, I would ask?

Dr. SHIELDS. It's evidence of a communication, I certainly agree to that. It's evidence, or information and evidence that needs to be followed up.

Senator SMITH. I want to try to get through this real quickly. A double-polygraphed source who has all the bona fides challenged and you cannot break his bona fides. A double-polygraph says he saw Americans in a prison environment some time between 1973 and 1989. Is that evidence?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, I'd consider it evidence. It doesn't confirm it.

Senator SMITH. Do we have that information? Have we had reports like that?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I would believe we have one.

Senator SMITH. Robert Garwood, claiming to have seen Americans in captivity, is that evidence? He is an American.

Dr. SHIELDS. I would hope that he would name Americans and give convincing proof of that, Senator. That's what I would ask him to do.

Senator SMITH. So that is not evidence either.

Dr. SHIELDS. It could become evidence. But what you need to do, Senator, is put these things together and hope that it will lead you to something that's correct. I talked to Robert Garwood, and at the time I spoke to him he told me that he did not know of other Americans, so in that context I would say that what you just said is probably not evidence.

Senator SMITH. A couple final points. Live sighting reports multisourced, dozens of them, hundreds of them, analyzed and clustered together showing one specific location, unrelated sources showing one specific location or a number of specific locations in clusters. Is that evidence?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. What do you mean by multisourced?

Senator SMITH. Different sources who do not relate to each other, have no connection with each other, who say they saw Americans in a captive environment. And you put them all together, cluster them, and they show the same location.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. It's still information until it's confirmed.

Senator SMITH. Still information, not evidence. Let me ask you then, in conclusion on this point, what is evidence? I want a specific example of what this panel would accept as evidence that there is an American POW in Southeast Asia today. What would you accept? If I said I saw one. If I said to you I just spoke to one in Vientiane, Laos yesterday, and he gave me his name and it is such and such, would that evidence?

Dr. SHIELDS. I would believe you, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. Would you believe me, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Certainly.

Senator SMITH. So that is evidence. Now so who do we have to get to verify the information that I have given you to consider it evidence. What do we need? Does the President of the United States have to see some of these people, or what is evidence? You cannot play games with the families and the American people like this. You just cannot do that. You have to say what the definition of evidence is and be honest about it, and we are not doing that.

Mr. Chairman, I would like an answer to this question before I conclude. What would you consider evidence short of a Senator or a Congressman saying that he saw the person individually? What is evidence, what would you accept?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, if you will go back and look at the case of Emmet Kay, who was the last person who was downed on an aerial mission and was returned, you will see the evidence that was developed at that time. That might be a classic case. You can understand the kind of information that was developed and why we believed he was a prisoner.

You could do this also with Dean and Sharman, and you'll see the kind of reports, and you'll see the differing sorts of proof and why, in some cases, things start off as hearsay. Even with regard to clustering, Senator, I don't know where these clusters are, but I do know that we put out locations, physical locations on maps, of suspected prison camps. And that information has been made public.

Now these clusters may coincide with those points. That may be because someone read that, and said if I'm going to find a prisoner and I want to make the story convincing, I'll point to that location. So that information is in the public domain. You would have to check those out first.

Senator SMITH. So none of the things that I have read off, all of the things that I have listed, they are not evidence.

Dr. SHIELDS. I don't know, Senator. I would have to examine them beyond what we've discussed here. It may very well turn out to be evidence.

Senator SMITH. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that it is evidence. And I submit that when I say, as one U.S. Senator, that I have seen evidence, that is what I mean. And I do not, frankly, appreciate having my reputation and my integrity challenged as a result of it and that is exactly why we need this stuff declassified: every single one of these documents, every single one of these depositions.

There is a gentleman sitting in the audience right now by the name of Barry Toll who is a former Government official who claims that he can verify what Boris Yeltsin said that aircraft not only flew Americans from Vietnam, POW's—from Vietnam to Russia, the Soviet Union, but that we knew it and followed those aircraft. We tried, in some cases, to take them down or to divert them.

Now is that evidence?

Dr. SHIELDS. Senator, if it can be verified it would be.

Senator SMITH. How do you verify that?

Dr. SHIELDS. I know of no such thing. You'd have to ask the source of this information. It's certainly worth looking into. I know of no such evidence. I'm not impugning your integrity, Senator. I don't know the nature of your evidence. I can only say that with regard to this gentleman, I do not know of anything that I have heard that would corroborate that. I'm just unaware of that.

Senator SMITH. Well, in conclusion, the only thing that I can see that is acceptable evidence is that somebody walks out on their own, as Garwood did. And contrary to what you said, Mr. Sieverts, we did not do a hell of a lot to get Bobby Garwood out of Vietnam. He got himself out with the help of the Swiss.

And a lot of the information that you have provided regarding Mr. Garwood was simply inaccurate. He was not a defector. As a matter of fact he was shot and wounded; you do not defect—I have never seen a defector shot and wounded in the process of defecting, but maybe it has been. And he also killed some enemy in the process, so that is a bad rap on Bobby Garwood which I must correct for the record.

Mr. Chairman, given the challenges to some of the things that I have said in terms of definition, we must have a vote on declassification. We have to have this vote on declassification. I know you agree with me, and we are now in a question of time. And every Member of the committee except you and me is not here, and I would call for that vote right now. [Laughter and applause.]

Senator SMITH. I mean, Mr. Chairman this—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, if I could just interject on a couple of things here. First of all, there has never been an issue about this committee seeking declassification. And, frankly, you know that.

Senator SMITH. I do know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there is not a big need for a call for the vote. We have set the vote for next week and you know that too, correct?

Senator SMITH. We did agree to have the vote next week, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So there is a vote that is set and we have a process in place with Senator Robb and Senator Grassley, who are reporting to the committee; I think a letter is being drafted today. We are proceeding in a responsible way to try to figure out how to ask for the declassification to get the maximum declassification, but to protect those who deserve privacy in the process.

All 12 Senators will vote on this issue, and the chair set out that that would be an objective of this committee the day I accepted the chairmanship and the day that you and I stood up together months ago and announced we would do this. So there is no new news in this call for declassification. We are going to do it, we have always been going to do it, and it is going to happen.

Senator SMITH. The only new news, Mr. Chairman, and the only issue that I take with you—and I know that you agree with me on the declassification; I do not mean to quarrel with you publicly on that. It is just that the statement was made that Smith said that there was evidence available that Americans were alive until 1989 and that was Smith's opinion, and that the other Senators did not agree that there was evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. No, there is no—there has never been a statement that other Senators do not agree that there is not evidence. But other Senators—I will speak for myself—do not agree yet with the interpretation of the evidence. The evidence, to me, is still as likely that there might be fraud as that there is evidence of a prisoner.

Now we have seen plenty of people stand up in response to a photograph and say that is my husband. And we have seen too many families torn through agony of belief that a loved one represented in a photograph is their family, their loved one, only to have it proven to be fraud. Now if you stood up on day one and you

said this is evidence, evidence of what? I mean you have to analyze it.

Senator SMITH. I did not use photographs.

The CHAIRMAN. Well you have mentioned one photograph: one image, one photograph, whatever you want to call it. I personally do not interpret it yet the same way. I do not know how to interpret it. And I want, personally, more interpretation of it.

I can guarantee the public that 12 U.S. Senators will make a decision on how we treat evidence. And 12 U.S. Senators will report to their colleagues on our interpretation and evaluation of evidence.

Now I will agree with the Senator, there is evidence of people who have been held. The question is how do you qualify it; how do you interpret it. We have yet to go through a lot of that interpretive process. My personal opinion is it should be interpreted responsibly and cautiously by this committee during its period, and not tried in a piecemeal fashion in selective news journals, reputable and competent as they may be. But I just do not think that that is the way to do it.

Now the committee is going to vote next week to declassify massively. I will state as a guiding principle, there is nothing the committee does not want unclassified, with the exception of something that can be legitimately shown to 12 Senators as being in current national security interest or something that protects sources and methods of the U.S. Government.

Beyond that, we will have to have a strong showing of cause for why it should not be made public, and that will be the vote we will take next week. I am confident it will be a unanimous vote. I do not think it is an issue with this committee.

I absolutely want the Senator to understand that nobody is challenging his integrity on this. I know you believe there is evidence. And I concur with you, there is evidence. The question yet to be determined is what is the quality of this evidence. Is it evidence in which we are willing, as Senators, to make a judgment that we side with it, or we side against it, or we cannot determine what it is.

Now on that note, we have about a 1 hour break here before General Vessey testifies. And he has an airplane to catch, so we will start promptly at 2 p.m. and we stand recessed until that time.

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. this same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(2:02 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. This is the last panel in the sequence of these 2 days of hearings, which really begin to set the stage for further analysis of the 1972 and 1973 period. I would like to say that this panel is a very important panel in the context of what we are doing.

This afternoon we look at the question of what is happening today? What is our policy now? What progress are we making? What presumptions are we operating on in 1992? What is the relationship with Vietnam, with Laos, with Cambodia? What resolution of this, 20 years later, can we really look for?

I am delighted to have General Vessey, whom I have been getting to know well over the course of the last year and a half. His dedication to this is really extraordinary. For 5 years now he has been laboring in the vineyards in an effort to help bring this to a close, and I know his testimony is going to be very important.

He has an airplane scheduled, which will mean that the committee will hear his testimony and then have a dialog with the General, and then we will excuse him from the panel. We will proceed with General Christmas and Mr. Bob Sheetz of DIA and Mr. Sungenis, should we have questions that we need to proceed with.

General Christmas, we are delighted also to welcome you. We thank you, as a committee, for your help when we traveled to the Far East in April. Your staff was very helpful to us; we got a good sense of how things are progressing. And I am very appreciative for your travel to Washington today to share with us an up-to-date sense of where this is going.

I want to, obviously, point out that the committee feels very strongly that the effort of the last 2 years, has increasingly been augmented. That the Bush administration and the Department of Defense and Secretary Cheney have put money and personnel where they have put their stated priorities. And today we can boast greater attention to this issue and greater effort to put it to rest than at any time, I think, in the history of the issue. So it is not something that we are still struggling to achieve. It is something that, I think, we are achieving and we are doing it on a good schedule.

We now have, as General Christmas will testify to, a lot of people on the ground in Vietnam. We have an unprecedented level of cooperation, though there are still things we all think could be better and we hope they will be. But we will, I am sure, touch on some of the reasons for some of those problems and go through that.

I would like, also, just to make part of the record at this time, if I can, a document which we received from the declassification process. And this is a memorandum from DIA to the various superiors in the chain of command regarding the 1974 process. It specifically addresses the proposed reduction of personnel, which goes a long way, I think, toward explaining the atmosphere within which we were working back in 1973 and 1974, and the attitude about this issue.

O January 4, 1974, in fact, significant personnel reductions were proposed to take place in the PW/MIA section of DIA. And literally, the personnel within that section had to go to bat to explain to superiors why they were important to the resolution of the accountability process.

There is one paragraph of note. I will read it, paragraph 13, page 10: The personnel in the PW/MIA section, and I myself, would be the first to cite possible phase-down and eventual dissolution of the section when its functions or usefulness ceased. This memorandum should not be construed as an attempt to maintain an office entity for its own sake. This memorandum was written because I feel the decision to reduce the PW/MIA section was premature.

Clearly, 20 years later, we can understand that such a decision was premature, but it goes a long way to explaining some of the problems of attitude that we explored earlier this morning in our panel, as well as yesterday. That will be made a part of the record, if there is no objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

DI-GA
DI-6

DI-6A4

Proposed Personnel Reduction of the PW/MIA Section (U)

1. (U) On 4 January 1974 I was informed of the proposed personnel reductions involving the PW/MIA Section. This memorandum constitutes a response to the request for consideration of the proposed reductions and the reasons outlined below.
2. (FOUO) First, the proposed reductions would appear to suppose that the mission of the PW/MIA Section is either complete or nearly completed. Nothing could be further from the truth. The situation in Cambodia and Laos remains unclear because there have been no peace agreements. In other countries that have resulted in a PW/MIA situation, there are over 1,100 persons unaccounted for. In Laos, there are over 1,000 other persons unaccounted for. There have been recovered in Southeast Asia, some of whom have been one time listed as missing or captured. The responsibilities assigned to DIA by the Joint Chiefs of Staff require that the PW/MIA Section continue to exist.
3. (FOUO) Second, high interest continues to be placed on the PW/MIA question by Government officials and private individuals. Within the Government, various organizations depend substantially on the PW/MIA Section.
 - a. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
 - b. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically J-1 and J-3.
 - c. Chiefs of the Military Services, specifically the intelligence branches and casualty branches.

1. CINCPAC, specifically J-1, J-2, and J-3.

2. USARPAC, specifically J-2.

3. Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

4. Department of Defense, specifically for the Civilian and Military Personnel.

In addition to the above, the Congress continues to have a deep interest in the PW/MIA situation. As recently as October 1973, a Congressional Subcommittee held hearings on the PW/MIA situation. One of the witnesses was the Chairman of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, who stated that the Government's failure to account for missing personnel is a "national disgrace". Organizations such as "The National League of Families" and "Vital Voices in America" are in the forefront in demonstrating concern for the PW/MIA situation.

1. (FOUO) Third, the major - and in some ways, the most difficult work lies ahead: attempting to determine what happened to the personnel unaccounted for, to include developing information leading to the recovery of their remains. This requires a full-time effort to comprehensively respond to this requirement.

2. (FOUO) Fourth, the current daily workload and responsibilities of the PW/MIA Section can only be accomplished thoroughly and competently with the present manning levels. Among the daily activities that generally go unmentioned are that of analyzing and evaluating every PW/MIA report received, informing appropriate personnel and offices of the analysis, evaluations, incorporating the reports and analyses into the ADF and personnel files, taking the necessary actions to meet specific requirements or initiate follow-up actions on reports received, reviewing the Operation Homecoming tables, and responding to specific queries from the national level and the field. What the above activities mean in terms of specifics is illustrated by the following:

a. Analyzing and Evaluating Reports

(i) (FOUO) A report is received stating that two helicopter crewmembers were captured in February 1969 in Cambodia. They clearly are not personnel returned during Operation Homecoming, and the reporting officer speculates erroneously that they could be from a crew of five MIA Army personnel. Army has an immediate interest in the report because of the possibility that there may be 5 MIA Army personnel alive who were not returned during Operation Homecoming. OJCS/J-3 (DOCM) has an interest in the report because some of the men were associated with CHINUMAC/POC operations. Upon evaluation, we can tell Army and OJCS/J-3 that the four personnel were indeed captured as reported but were released in 1969.

(ii) (FOUO) A report is received that a jet crashed into a river near Phnom Penh in late July 1967. The pilot was killed, the aircraft wreckage was pulled from the river, the body removed and placed in a makeshift coffin and taken in the direction of Hanoi. Upon analysis, we can with reasonable surety tell Navy that the incident described equates to a Navy PW unaccounted for during Operation Homecoming (based on this new information, he never survived the crash). Additionally, this information was provided to GMD (INA) for possible use in the negotiations involving the United States Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team.

(iii) (FOUO) A source reports he obtained information that an aircraft crashed in Cambodia in May 1973 and the crewmen were captured. Upon evaluation, Air Force is told that the information probably relates to two USAF personnel listed as MIA. Action was taken by the PW/MIA Section to solicit additional information on the validity of this report.

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(iv) (Four)

Three different sources report the downing of a light aircraft near the DMZ in December 1972. One American and one Vietnamese were in the aircraft, and both died in the crash and were buried nearby. Upon analysis, it is clear these sources are providing information about a Marine Corps pilot, and the Marine Corps and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center are so informed.

(v)

(v) (Five)

A source returns to Saigon, and says he knows that a Frenchman was captured at Angor Wat in 1971, and the source still believes he is being held prisoner. Upon evaluation, we tell the State Department that the source most probably has information on a known Frenchman who was released in 1972 but that a remote possibility exists that the information could equate to a French national still missing.

~~incorporating Reports into Files~~

(1)

(11)

(111)

c. Taking the Necessary Actions

(1)

(111)

356

Earlying Operation Homecoming Debriefs

(i) Although Operation Homecoming is completed, the debriefs of the men are still being received. They continue to be reviewed and filed for easy retrieval and reference. They contain a wealth of information that is used in daily analytical activities.

(ii) ^(cont) A report is received that a pilot was captured by Chinese personnel in August 1967. The Joint Casualty Resolution Center erroneously identifies the individual, but our knowledge of the experiences of the returnees from their debriefings resulted in our accurate analysis of the report.

(iii) ^(cont) A source reports he saw about 20 U.S. PWs in Cambodia in 1973. Could he actually have sighted a group of 20 PW's who were being held in Cambodia prior to release in South Vietnam during Operation Homecoming? A review of the debriefs and telephone calls to some returnees were necessary to evaluate this report.

(iv) ^(cont) A North Vietnamese guard told one returnee that a specific individual was alive in a Hanoi PW camp, but yet this individual did not return. The Service contacted requests an appraisal that can only be made from the debriefs of the returned men and an appraisal of the guard who provided this information.

(v) ^(cont) The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) needs information on the possibility that the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong had established some type of custody system for the disposition of the remains of dead U.S. Servicemen. This request was for support of the United States Delegation, Four Party Joint Military

(vi) (FOUO) Admiral Sumwalt saw a report of U.S. PWs in South Vietnam and requested an assessment of the report. Sumwalt is the recognized central point of contact for PW/MIA intelligence, and Admiral Boettner's office called for our analysis (which was provided telephonically).

6. (FOUO) Fifth, various miscellaneous projects involving PW/MIA matters will continue to come to DIA for action. Future projects may include a review of the Code of Conduct, review of service survival/eviction/resistance/escape, review of various publications and other subjects of a routine, but nevertheless important nature.

7. (FOUO) Sixth, the important review of the role of intelligence in the Southeast Asian PW/MIA experience will not be undertaken. If this review is not completed, there will be no unified product summing up the "lessons learned" from Southeast Asia.

8. (U) It is possible, that the approach outlined in the proposed personnel reduction may not have taken the above factors into consideration. I have recently recalled that the PW/MIA Section has already lost one military and one civilian position (a factor that has caused readjustment of our work priorities) and there has been some delay (beyond the Section's control) in filling two civilian positions, one professional and one clerical (this too has affected the current workload).

9. (U) The proposed personnel reductions will, in effect, result in the closing of the PW/MIA Section and MIA's capabilities in this area. It is my opinion that PW/MIA matters cannot be handled on a part-time basis or by a few personnel at this time.

10. (U) I strongly recommend the following points for consideration:

A. Keep the PW/MIA Section at its current Manning level through FY 1975.

B. Conduct a Manning and responsibilities review at the end of CY 1974 to determine what future courses are advisable.

C. As the Section's mission/responsibilities diminish, phase down the PW/MIA Section on a piece-meal basis.

1. (U) However, should the decision be reached (such as that in the current proposed reductions) to seriously cut back MIA's capabilities in PW/MIA matters, special consideration should be given to officially dismantling DIA's PW/MIA responsibilities. If this were done, the PW/MIA Section could be completely disbanded and the personnel assigned to other DI elements. The current PW/MIA responsibilities are such that they cannot be performed effectively with the personnel reductions presently envisioned. The JCS could say DIA's current PW/MIA responsibilities on COMFAC who would have to adjust its mission and responsibilities to include the functions previously performed by DIA.

2. (FOUO) DIA's responsibilities in the PW/MIA program are outlined in the enclosure, an extract of GAO GN 676-71, dated 18 October 1971, subject: Delineation of Responsibilities for Eviction and Escape (U). As will be noted, these responsibilities are general in nature, covering a wide spectrum of the PW/MIA's project. In the past, they have been included such diversified tasks as maintenance of intelligence on the USS Pueblo crew detained in North Korea, providing long term support to the Son Tay SAR effort, operation of the DOD Homecoming Intelligence Center, and providing security Reviews of PW release articles, speeches and books in support of the OASD(PA). At the present time, these broad responsibilities cover a variety of matters dealing with the PW/MIA subject, to include providing intelligence assistance to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, The United States Delegation to the Four Power Joint Military Team, and the Department of State, in addition to supporting the various Defense Department organizations and normally associates with PW/MIA matters (e.g. OASD(MIA), OJCS and the Service intelligence and casualty organizations).

3. (U) The personnel in the PW/MIA Section and I myself could be the first to cite possible phase down, and eventual dissolution, of the Section when its functions or usefulness ceased. This memorandum should not be construed as an attempt to maintain an office entity for its own sake. This memorandum was written because I feel the decision to reduce the PW/MIA Section was premature.

4. (U) I respectfully request that the proposed personnel

reductions involving the PW/MIA section be reconsidered along the lines suggested in paragraphs 10 and 11.

Enclosure
Extract of JCS
SN-676-71 dated
18 Oct 71 1 CR (S)

CHARLES F. TROWBRIDGE, JR.
Commander, USN
PW/MIA Section

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other opening statements, we will proceed to the testimony. I would like each of you who are not yet sworn, if you would rise so I can swear you.

General Vessey, for this purpose I think this is new testimony, so I would ask you to rise as well.

General VESSEY. I plan to continue to tell the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you do. Do you each of you individually swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General VESSEY. I do.

General CHRISTMAS. I do.

Mr. SHEETZ. I do.

Mr. SUNGENIS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. General Vessey, as I mentioned, you are on first. We appreciate your being here.

Senator McCAIN. May I say, General Vessey, I am a little embarrassed too, that you should have to be put under oath. Go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say it is not because we doubt you will tell the truth. It is because I want to be able to look at everybody as we go down the road here, and say that the committee is swearing everybody's testimony so no one, at the end of this, can say to us why did you not get sworn testimony. It has nothing to do beyond that.

Senator McCAIN. I understand that and appreciate it.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN VESSEY, U.S. ARMY RETIRED,
FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 1982-86, PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL EMISSARY TO HANOI ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
1987-92, GARRISON, MINNESOTA**

General VESSEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to come back and appear before the committee again and help with the important work that this committee has.

In your letter of June 5 you ask me five specific questions. Many of those were questions, the answers to which I covered in my testimony last November. In the interests of time, since you've had my statement, I'd like to have it included in the record. I would like to pay attention to three of those questions which I think are very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all testimonies will be placed in the record in full as if read.

General VESSEY. The first question you asked of me was what were my instructions from the President. My first instructions came from President Reagan in 1987. And as you know from earlier testimony, President Reagan started an effort in 1982 to bring more focus to this issue. Negotiations had been underway for about 4 years and they stalled in 1986, in late 1986, and I was asked to take on the job in early 1987.

I was instructed by the President to conduct negotiations with the Vietnamese Government to attempt to get cooperation on a number of humanitarian issues, and the specific goals were as follows:

The first goal, and the number one priority, was to get the cooperation required to achieve the fullest possible accounting for all

Americans missing from the war in Vietnam. And I'd like to emphasize that goal as an overriding goal and the premiere goal that I had: the fullest possible accounting for all Americans missing from the war in Vietnam.

It has been the center of all POW/MIA activities before I was involved, it's been the goal throughout my involvement, and it remains the goal today. And as I said in my prepared statement, I can't imagine any modification to that goal.

Both President Reagan and President Bush repeatedly emphasized that goal to me. I emphasize it here today because of their emphasis, but also because when people look at the steps we are taking, sometimes they lose sight of that goal. They'll look at a given set of lists that were used in a specific set of negotiations and think that we have lost sight of fullest possible accounting, or we're going to let someone else lose sight. And I want to reassure you that that's not the case.

Within that goal of fullest possible accounting, the first priority, was to go after the business of whether or not live American prisoners were continuing to be held by the Vietnamese Government. And if there were live Americans either in captivity or living freely, to seek their immediate return.

Then the third point was to get Vietnamese cooperation and an expanded effort in the return of remains that had already been recovered, and in searching for and recovering and returning those remains which had not yet been recovered.

Then there were some other humanitarian goals beyond the POW/MIA goals, which were important goals. The first of those was to seek the release of all remaining reeducation camp inmates. And as I told the committee last fall, in 1987 we estimated that number to be about 8,000 at that time.

To get the orderly departure program going so that separated Vietnamese families could be reunited. And get agreement on—

The CHAIRMAN. Orderly departure, for those who are not familiar with it, is the process by which Vietnamese gain exit permission from Vietnam to the United States, correct?

General Vessey. Yes, without having to escape by boat and run the gauntlet of the pirates in the South China Seas or the other hazards.

And the third part of those was to get agreement to establish a mechanism for getting the Amerasian children and their immediate family members out of Vietnam.

I was also told to listen to Vietnam's humanitarian concerns and seek some ways to help within existing legal, political, and policy constraints. And as I told the committee last November, whatever we were to do was to be solely for humanitarian concerns and was to be done for humanitarian reasons, and not as a trade for Vietnam's POW/MIA efforts. I was also told to listen to Vietnam's political concerns and bring those concerns back to the President.

President Bush reappointed me in the spring of 1989 and confirmed the same general set of instructions, modified slightly to take into consideration progress that had already been made. It is worth remembering that original instructions were given in light of conditions which existed in 1987.

Vietnam's military forces were in Cambodia. We had no relations with the Government of Vietnam other than those preliminary talks I mentioned earlier. We had consistently said that the POW/MIA issue should be settled as a humanitarian issue. We had regularly told the Vietnamese that resolution of the POW/MIA issue was not a requirement for discussing normalization, but we'd also said consistently that the pace and scope of cooperation on POW/MIA matters would affect the pace and scope of our talks on normalization.

Now your second question was what have you accomplished over the past 5 years. And I'll just say that I'm not sure that I've accomplished anything, but I've put in a lot of hours. And what I'd like to do is tell you what has happened in the last 5 years in this matter, and recognize that the credit goes to many many people who have worked very hard.

But I also want to say that I believe everyone involved understands that, despite whatever we've accomplished, a lot remains to be done. And that the work—there's at least as much work to be done as has been done, in some cases statistically more work.

Just to point out the support we've had from the people of the United States and the Congress. When I first went there I had resolutions of support from both the House and the Senate, thanks to some of the people in this room. And those resolutions were important in getting the Vietnamese Government to recognize the importance of the subject matter, but here we are 5 years later, we're still wrestling with it.

I've had 13 major sets of meetings with senior Vietnamese officials and made 5 trips to Hanoi. I've exchanged countless letters and messages with senior Vietnamese officials. I've spent many hours in meetings and communications with U.S. Government officials, and several sessions with the House and Senate committees; hours and hours responding to questions from the news media and answering letters and telephone calls from concerned citizens. But most importantly, I've spent many hours studying and conferring with the very competent Americans who have been doing the field work and the analytical work.

Now what has happened on the larger political scene in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese have reported that they've withdrawn their forces from Cambodia. The peace agreement was signed last October. The U.N. is supervising the implementation of that agreement. The United States has laid out a road map which would be used to pursue normalization of relations between the two countries. The first talks on the issue have been held, and we've taken a couple of tentative steps down the road.

In the area of humanitarian concerns other than POW/MIA, I am very pleased to report that the Vietnamese have reported that all of the former reeducation camp inmates—that is, the officials and military officers of the South Vietnamese Government—have been released. We have some information that there may be someone who was not necessarily a government official still in one of the reeducation camps; but only one, so that's great progress.

The Orderly Departure Program is working and about 200,000 Vietnamese families have been reunited in this country. And as I told you last November, about 60,000 people involved in Amerasian

children and their immediate family members have been resettled into this country. The system for bringing the reeducation camp inmates who have been released into this country is working—seems to be working reasonably well.

A considerable amount of American nongovernmental humanitarian assistance has been given to the people of Vietnam. There's a very good prosthetics programs going and a number of nongovernmental humanitarian organizations are working. And the administrative mechanism for enabling that nongovernmental support has been improved and simplified, and we have, in fact, now given some governmental humanitarian assistance.

In the area of POW/MIA, a lot of work has been done but the resolution of individual cases has been slow and plodding. In many cases you look at, the results have been somewhat disappointing. Nevertheless, we have completed 22 sets of technical talks between our experts and Vietnamese experts. We've had two special meetings of information and archival experts searching for ways to get information from the Vietnamese archives.

We've had some preliminary talks trying to get investigations underway for cases of individuals lost in the border areas of Cambodia and Laos that were then under the control of Vietnamese forces. In 1988 we agreed to joint field investigations in Vietnam with American and Vietnamese investigators participating. We are entering now into our 18th set of joint field investigations, attempting to learn what happened to individuals involved in a specific set of discrepancy cases.

In the past 5 years we've received 332 sets of remains. I had 308 in my testimony and I found out more had been returned since I wrote the number. Of those, 125 have been identified and returned to their families. Another 107 might be those of Americans, but have not yet been identified, and the remaining 100 sets are not remains of missing Americans.

In the 119 discrepancy cases which have been the focus of our joint field investigations, 22 have been resolved through recovery, return and identification of remains. In 39 other cases we and the Vietnamese have agreed that the individuals involved are dead which confirms an earlier presumptive finding of death. In four of those cases we agree that we will not be able to recover the remains.

For the other 35 of those cases we believe that there still may be an opportunity to recover the remains or that the remains may already have been recovered and are somewhere in Vietnam. Consequently, those cases remain open.

The other 58 cases continue to be investigated. They have all been investigated at least once and most several times. My understanding is, as I told you in November that, of the new evidence gathered, although there has been considerable new evidence, that none of it points toward any of the individuals being alive.

Perhaps the most important accomplishments in the past 5 years have been in improved communications with the Vietnamese Government and an improved organization for dealing with the issues. With the Vietnamese Government we have moved from a condition of almost nonexistent communication and cooperation to a condition where we usually understand each other now and can speak

probably published in January 1989 and certainly covers the activities in which I was involved.

Your fifth question for me—back to this other question of what has been made public. Certainly more needs to be made public and I commend the committee. I saw the broadcast reports of your Southeast Asian trip; those were superb, the clips from that trip. The American public desperately needs to see the whole picture rather than sensational tidbits that seem to come out. So I certainly commend the committee for its work and I think the committee's report eventually will turn out to be one of the most important documents we have in the public record on this issue.

Your fifth question for me was what lists of individuals have you presented directly or indirectly to the Southeast Asian Governments? Which agency prepared those lists and what was the criteria for placing names on them and what is the difference between what has been at times termed your Vessey-1 and Vessey-2 lists?

I want to tell you, those were not my terms.

The CHAIRMAN. Pull the mike down—

General VESSEY. Yes. Let me say first that all of my dealings have been only with the Vietnam Government, so any list that I have given have been given to the Vietnam Government. I will try to trace the development of those lists.

As the committee well knows and as you have delved into in recent days, through the years there has been much speculation on the issue of whether or not the Vietnamese Government continue to hold live Americans who were not returned at the time of Operation Homecoming in 1973.

The Vietnamese Government continually denied holding live prisoners. The U.S. Government position at the time of my appointment was, although it had no specific evidence of any particular prisoner being held, the possibility of live Americans being held could not be ruled out. That position was based on much of the information that you have heard in the last few days—the cases of the people that the United States believes should have been captured and were not returned in 1973 and on a series of live sightings reports of Americans in Vietnam that came out after the war.

In preparation for my first meeting in 1987, I knew of the Vietnamese Government's position and I wanted to be able to confront that assertion that they had held no live prisoners with the sort of glaring examples that led Americans to believe that there may well have live American prisoners held. So at that time, the Defense Intelligence Agency officials gave me a list of about 70 cases and they were then referred to as I recall, "compelling discrepancy cases."

They were the cases for those individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have been able to account readily, some of them were not cases of people we thought had a chance of being alive. Some were people we knew had been reported to have died in captivity, but the remains had not been returned and we believed that the Vietnamese Government should be able to account for them.

But most of them were in fact people who the United States believed we had the evidence to show that they were alive when we last saw them, they were captured or about to become captured.

They did not come home at Operation Homecoming in 1973, their bodies were not returned later and no explanation was given.

And I was told at that particular time that the list included those cases for whom, at least the people who prepared the list thought there was the best chance of producing a live American if we were to find any in Vietnam.

I elected to use the cases from that list to confront the Vietnamese assertion that they had no live prisoners. On the way to that meeting in Hanoi I conferred with the then commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and discovered that he had a longer list of cases that he believed the Vietnamese should be able to resolve readily. Many of those cases were not cases of people they believed to be alive, but were cases where the information involved made it clear that the Vietnamese Government should have been able to resolve the case.

But many of the cases were coincident with the list that I had gotten from the Defense Intelligence Agency. The JCRC commander at my suggestion reviewed the list I had from DIA and he suggested that a few of those names be deleted because he thought those cases had been resolved, and then he suggested I add some other cases from his list. So I did, and I had around 70 cases with 80 names. That is because, in some cases, there were more than one person in the incident. For example, if there were a two-man air crew, even though we believed that one of those persons didn't survive, if we believed that one did survive we had both on the list.

I used that list on my first trip to Hanoi, and that is the list that I believe is referred to by some as Vessey-1. At that time, I also told the Vietnamese officials that the longer list of cases that we believed they should be capable of resolving readily and told them we would provide that list to their embassy in Bangkok. That was done. The best of my recollection is that list was about 200 names overall.

The examples worked. The then foreign minister, Nauyen Co Thach listened to my recitation of those particular cases. I gave him a recitation of the evidence and he agreed that those in fact were "discrepancy cases" and said that the Vietnamese Government would help us find the facts in those cases and resolve them.

These particular cases were discussed again in more detail at my meeting with Minister Thach in New York in June of 1988. I gave him the list again at that time. I had asked our people to prepare that list in an order of priority. They had examined the list, put them into cases they thought the Vietnamese could answer very quickly; those that would take more work and so forth. I gave that to Minister Thach at that time and from that meeting grew the agreement with the Vietnamese Government that we would conduct joint field investigations of those particular cases.

Now as the field investigations got underway the analysts at JCRC and DIA and the people interested in policy began to look at the list more and realized that perhaps that list of 70 should be expanded. There were similar losses that we knew had occurred in the areas of Laos that were under the control of the Vietnamese forces during the time of the war. So in early 1989 I asked DIA and JCRC to work together to refine the list and include all cases where the evidence showed that the person involved was alive.

when we last knew of him and we had evidence that he likely came under Vietnamese control or was captured and for whom we had not yet had an accounting.

And I also asked that the border areas be searched for the same sort of cases. As a result of that effort we added 39 people lost in Vietnam and came up with 49 so-called discrepancy cases in the border area.

As in the earlier list, my understanding is that it included some people we believe to have died but they were included because they were associated with an incident where there was one of the members we believed had a good chance of surviving.

I presented those additional cases to the Vietnamese government in November 1989 and that is the list that I believe is referred to by some as Vessey-2.

Now as analysts continued to examine available information additional concerns were again raised about whether or not we had produced the best possible list. In early 1990 I again asked the DIA and JCRC review all the information and to refine the list and that examination was to cover all Southeast Asian losses. The work produced 77 more cases for Vietnam, 15 additional for Laos and 9 cases for Cambodia. Like the earlier lists, I believe that it may have included people that did not survive. I did not give those particular lists to the Vietnamese but I authorized that they be given through Admiral McDevitt.

So that is the story of the lists as I understand it, and I want to emphasize that these lists are not the only people that could have been alive. It is important to understand that what we did is we looked the information that we had to come up with the people that we thought had the best chance of being alive in order to shed light on the issue of whether or not the Vietnamese had live Americans. We knew that even if we resolved all those cases we still weren't going to answer that question with certainty, but we thought that we would certainly shed a lot of light on it if the people that we thought had the best probability of being alive weren't alive, then the likelihood of others being there was certainly lower.

But it was not to mean that we weren't going to investigate the other cases. We were going to investigate all the cases, but these were the priority cases because they appeared to be the cases of those people who had the best chance of being alive.

Now the last question you asked of me specifically, who has been accounted for since you provided these lists to the Indochina Governments and define precisely how they have been accounted for, who has not yet been formally accounted for but you believe that a final accounting can be imminent. I want to say, this is a very important question and a question which I have a great deal of interest, but I am not the one to answer that question. I have specifically kept myself out of deciding on either which names would be presented or what the results of investigations were, because I have an emotional tie to some of the names of the missing, and I don't want to be involved in deciding priorities.

I would close my prepared statement by saying that as we address these questions, it is important to remember that we are seeking two different but related goals. One is to get as full as pos-

sible accounting for all missing. The other is to answer this glaring question that is before us, that keeps being raised, is do the Vietnamese have live Americans or are there live Americans living there? So that is the reason for the way the work is being done.

I believe that we now have the mechanism in place. We have a good organization there. If the cooperation continues to grow and we get into the archives, and the field investigations continue and we resolve those earlier live sightings cases and continue to support that mechanism to resolve any new live sighting cases that we can shed enough light on the issue to permit us to make intelligent decisions.

That is the end of my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman and I am ready for any additional questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of General Vessey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear again and help the Committee with its important task of examining the issues in resolving the fates of our missing comrades.

The enclosure to your letter of June 5 asked me to address five specific questions. I will do my best to answer those questions. A great part of the answers were provided in my testimony to the Committee on November 5, 1991, but in the interest of completeness for what I understand to be the objective of this set of hearings, I will repeat the complete answer. Some of the questions you asked me are about work which was done by others. I will provide the best answers I can to those questions, but, for more complete information, you may want to question the people who did the work.

Your first questions was, "What were your instructions from the President?"

My first instructions came from President Reagan in early 1987. As the Committee knows from earlier testimony, under President Reagan's guidance, in 1982, the United States had increased efforts to get Vietnamese cooperation in resolving the fates of our missing. The then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Armitage led a delegation to Hanoi in February 1982. In the following 4 years, a number of meetings were held, and some progress was achieved. By the autumn of 1986, the progress appeared to be stalled. President Reagan asked me to take on the job in February 1987. I was instructed to conduct negotiations with the Vietnamese Government to attempt to get cooperation in a number of humanitarian issues. The goals were as follows:

(1) Get the cooperation required to achieve the fullest possible accounting for all Americans missing from the war in Vietnam. I want to emphasize that goal as the overriding and continuing goal for the US POW/MIA activities. It was the goal before I was involved. It has been the goal throughout my involvement. It remains the goal today, and I cannot imagine any modification to that goal. I emphasize the point because both President Reagan and President Bush have repeatedly emphasized it to me. I do it also because, from time to time, people looking at various steps taken, or various lists compiled, sometimes forget that fullest possible accounting is the primary goal.

(2) Within the goal of fullest possible accounting, as a first priority, shed as much light as possible on the question of whether or not live American POWs were being held by the Vietnamese Government. If there were live Americans either in captivity or living freely, seek their immediate return.

(3) Get Vietnamese cooperation and expanded effort in the return of recovered remains and in searching for, recovering, and returning those remains which had not yet been recovered.

(4) There were other important humanitarian goals which were to be pursued as opportunities were presented.

(a) Seek the release of all remaining reeducation camp inmates. In 1987, we estimated that about 8000 former South Vietnamese government and military officers remained in the camps.

(b) Get the "orderly departure program" (ODP) restarted. ODP is a program which permits separated Vietnamese families to be reunited.

(c) Get agreement to establish a mechanism for getting the Amerasian children and immediate family members out of Vietnam.

(5) I was to listen to Vietnam's humanitarian concerns and seek some ways to help within existing legal, political, and policy restraints. I repeat what I said to the Committee last November, whatever was to be done on Vietnam's humanitarian concerns was to be done solely for humanitarian reasons and not as a trade for Vietnam's POW/MIA efforts.

President Bush confirmed the same general set of instructions in 1989 when he asked me to continue with the duties. The specifics of the instructions have been modified to keep abreast with progress made. For example, I was instructed to try to establish an office in Hanoi, and then later instructed to seek additional support for that office.

I stated it last November, but it is worth mentioning again that those original instructions were given in the light of conditions which existed in 1987. The United States had consistently said that the POW/MIA issue should be settled as a humanitarian issue. We had regularly told the Vietnamese that resolution of the issue was not a requirement for discussing normalization, but we also had consistently said that the pace and scope of cooperation on the POW/MIA issue would affect pace and scope of normalization discussions. Vietnam's military forces were in Cambodia in 1987. The United States had maintained that normalization discussions could only begin after complete withdrawal of those forces and within context of an acceptable settlement of Cambodian conflict.

Your second question was, "What have you accomplished over the past five years?"

I would prefer to answer that question by summarizing what has happened during the past five years rather than try to attribute accomplishments to me. Much has been accomplished; many people have been involved, and many deserve a lot of credit for the accomplishments. At the same time, I believe everyone involved understands that, despite the accomplishments, much remains to be done, and that the work to be done is at least as important as what has been done. For example, my first trip to Hanoi was supported by resolutions of support from the House and Senate. The support of the Congress was important in conveying the importance of the mission to the Vietnamese Government; yet here we are in the Senate looking into the matter 5 years later.

My own involvement has consisted of 13 major sets of meetings with senior Vietnamese officials, including five trips to Hanoi, the exchange of a number of letters and messages with senior Vietnamese officials, countless hours in meetings and communications with US Government officials, several sessions with House and Senate Committees, many hours in responding to questions from the news media, many more hours answering letters and telephone calls from concerned citizens, and, most importantly, many hours studying and conferring with the very competent Americans who do the field work and the analytical work. The connection between those efforts and what has actually happened, I will leave to others. What is important is what has happened.

On the larger political scene in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese have reportedly withdrawn their forces from Cambodia, a peace agreement was signed last October, and the UN is supervising the implementation of the agreement. The United States has laid out a "road map" to normal relations between our two countries. The first talks have been held, and we have taken the first steps along the road.

In the area of our humanitarian concerns other than POW/MIA, I am very pleased to report that we believe that all but one of the reeducation camp inmates have been released. Many of those former inmates and immediate family members are now in this country, and the system for processing applications for those who want to come to this country seems to be working fairly well. The orderly departure program is working, and about 200,000 Vietnamese families have been reunited in this country. As I told you in November, about 60,000 Amerasian children and family members have been resettled in this country. A considerable amount of American non-governmental humanitarian assistance and some Governmental humanitarian assistance has been provided to the Vietnamese people. The administrative mechanism for enabling the non-governmental support has been improved and simplified.

In the area of POW/MIA, a great deal of work has been done, but the resolution of individual cases has been slow and plodding work. We have completed 22 sets of technical talks between our experts and Vietnamese counterparts. We have had two meetings of information and archival experts searching for ways to get information from Vietnamese archives. We have had some preliminary talks trying to get investigations underway for cases of individuals lost in the areas of Cambodia and Laos

then under the control of Vietnamese forces. In 1988, we agreed to joint field investigations in Vietnam with American and Vietnamese investigations participating. We are entering into the 18 joint field investigation attempting to learn what happened to individuals involved in a specific set of "discrepancy cases". In the past 5 years, we have received 308 sets of remains from the Vietnamese. Of those, 125 have been identified and returned to their families. Another 109 might be those of Americans, but have not yet been identified. The remaining 74 sets are not remains of missing Americans. In the 119 discrepancy cases which have been the focus of our joint field investigations, 22 have been resolved through recovery, return and identification of remains. In 39 other cases, we and the Vietnamese agree that the individuals involved are dead. In four of those cases we agree that we will not be able to recover the remains. For the other 35 of those cases, we believe there still may be an opportunity to recover the remains or that the remains may already have been recovered and are somewhere in Vietnam, consequently, those cases remain open. The other 58 cases continue to be investigated. They have all been investigated at least once and most several times. My understanding is that none of the new evidence gathered points toward any of the individuals being alive.

Perhaps the more important accomplishments of the past 5 years have been in improved communications with the Vietnamese and in improved organization for dealing with the issues. With the Vietnamese, we have moved from a condition of almost non-existent communication and cooperation to a condition where we usually understand each other and can speak quite frankly about difficult and contentious matters, and can sometimes even move toward solving the problems cooperatively. We continue to have a lot of differences and difficulties. Cooperation on the POW/MIA matters is colored by the different political views in the two nations, but we have made a lot of progress. The US has a full-time permanent office operating in Hanoi. We have made progress in "on the ground" investigations of the unresolved "live sighting" cases. The size and scope of the joint field investigations has been steadily increased. Access to archival information has improved, but it needs far more improvement. On the US side, as opportunities for increased cooperation have arisen, Secretary Cheney has provided more people and support. A Joint Task Force has been organized to command and direct all POW/MIA efforts in Southeast Asia. Its commander, Brigadier General, recently selected for promotion to major general, Tom Needham has had relatively good access to the area and is developing working relations with officials in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. There is a lot of work to do, and we will need even further improvement in cooperation from the governments in the region; nevertheless, I believe that the organizational and procedural framework is now in place to achieve our goal of fullest possible accounting.

Your third question for me was, "What can you tell us about those 'last known alive' and those reported to have died in captivity whose remains have not been recovered to date?"

You should get the answer to that question from the Government experts who have studied the issue. I am not a good source for an answer to the question.

Your fourth question for me was, "What reports have you made which are available to the American public?"

Needless to say, reports of all my meetings and communications with the Vietnamese officials have been made to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. As I recollect, at least at the time they were made, most of those reports were classified. After most of the meetings, joint press conferences were held disclosing the general substance of the agreements reached. When I returned from the first trip, I held a press conference in the White House. At various times during the 5 years, some reasonably good reporting has taken place covering progress to that time, but it was not widely disseminated. The best and most complete articles were in the Armed Forces publications such as the Air Force's "Airman". The VFW magazine published a good interview a few years ago. I testified at open hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs twice. The most comprehensive and up-to-date report ever made which should be available to the American public was my testimony to this committee last November. I don't know if the record of those hearings has yet been published. I do know that live C-Span broadcast of my testimony was interrupted for coverage of another hearing. I do not know if later rebroadcasts included the complete testimony.

Your fifth question for me was, "What lists of individuals have you presented directly or indirectly to the Southeast Asian governments? Which agency prepared those lists, and what was the criteria for placing names on them? What is the difference between what has been at times termed your Vessey I and Vessey II lists?"

First, let me say again that my dealings have been only with the Government of Vietnam, and the lists with which I have worked have been lists for that government. I will try to trace the development of the various lists.

Through the years, there has been much speculation on the issue of whether or not the Vietnamese government continued to hold live American prisoners who were not returned at the time of Operation Homecoming in 1973. The Vietnamese Government had continually denied holding live prisoners. The US government position at the time of my appointment was that, although it had no specific evidence of any particular prisoner being held, the possibility of live Americans being held could not be ruled out. That position was based on the cases of people the US believed have or should have been captured and who were not returned in 1973 and on a series of reports of "live-sightings" of Americans in Vietnam. In preparation for my first meeting in 1987, I wanted to be able to confront the Vietnamese assertion that they had no live prisoners with glaring examples of why many Americans believed the contrary. At that time, Defense Intelligence Agency officials gave me a list of about 70 cases that were then referred to as "compelling discrepancy cases." The cases were those of individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have been able to account readily. A few of them were people we believed to have died in captivity and whose remains had not been returned. Most of them were people who the US believed the evidence showed had survived their loss incident and were likely to have been captured and who did not return at Homecoming and whose remains had not been returned nor had any other explanation been given. I was told at the time that the list included those cases for whom we thought there was the best chance of producing a live American, if there were any. I elected to use cases from that list to confront the Vietnamese assertion that they had no live prisoners. On the way to the meeting in Hanoi, I conferred with the then commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and discovered that he had a longer list of cases that he believed the Vietnamese should be able to resolve readily. Many of those cases were not people we believed were alive, but his list also contained most of the names on the DIA list. The JCRC commander suggested a few changes to the DIA list because of cases that appeared to have been resolved. As I recall, I agreed to his suggestion, and about ten names were deleted from the DIA list and ten cases with twenty individuals were added from his list. The list included some people we believed did not survive the loss incident, but were included because they were involved in the same incident with a person we believed did survive, for example both members of two-man air crews were included. That list of 70 cases involving 80 individuals was used on that first trip to Hanoi and was given to the Vietnamese. That is the list I believe is referred to be some as "Vessey I." I also told the Vietnamese officials of the longer list of cases which should be capable of ready resolution and told them we would provide that list to their embassy in Bangkok. That was also done. It is worth noting that the names on both these lists had been given to the Vietnamese during earlier meetings.

The examples worked. The then Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, listened to my recitation of a number of those cases and agreed that they were indeed "discrepancy cases" and that the Vietnamese Government would help find the facts in those cases and resolve them. These particular cases were discussed again in some detail at my meeting with Minister Thach in New York in June of 1988. I gave him the list again with more complete information on each case and a suggested priority for investigating them. At that meeting we agreed to conduct joint field investigations in Vietnam to search for the facts in those cases.

As the field investigations got underway, some concern was raised that perhaps our list of 70 cases was not as complete as it should be to shed light on the live prisoner situation. Additionally, there were similar losses which had occurred in areas of Laos which were under the control of Vietnamese Forces at the time of the loss. In early 1989, I asked that DIA and JCRC work together to refine the list and include all cases where the evidence showed that the person involved was alive when we last knew of him and we had evidence that he likely came under Vietnamese control and for whom we have not yet had an accounting. I also asked that the border area losses meeting the same criteria be included. As a result of that effort, 39 people lost in Vietnam were added to the list, and 49 "discrepancy cases" from the Lao border area were identified. As in the earlier list, my understanding is that it included the names of some we did not believe survived. I presented those additional cases to the Vietnamese Government in November 1989. I understand that list is referred to by some as "Vessey II."

As analysts continued to examine available information, additional concerns were raised about whether or not we had produced the best possible lists. In early 1990, I asked that DIA and JCRC review again all available information to refine

the lists. The examination was to cover all Southeast Asian losses. The work produced 77 more cases for Vietnam, 15 additional for Laos, and 9 cases for Cambodia. Like the earlier lists, they include names of people we believe did not survive the incident but who were included because of being part of an incident which included someone we believe did survive. The cases have all been given to the governments in Southeast Asia. I believe that Rear Admiral McDevitt actually presented these last lists to the governments.

The last question you asked of me was, "Specifically who has been accounted for since you provided these lists to the Indochina governments and define precisely how they have been accounted for. Who has not as yet been formally accounted for but you believe that a final accounting may be imminent?"

This is a very important question and one in whose answer I have great interest. It is not, however, in my area of expertise or responsibility. I believe that only the responsible Department of Defense authorities should give the definitive answer to this question. Obviously, there has been an accounting for the 125 people whose remains have been identified and returned to the families. My understanding is that no additional formal accounting has been made, even though the discrepancy cases investigations have led us to agree with the Vietnamese that the death of 39 of those individuals has been confirmed. You will recall that remains have not yet been repatriated in those cases.

As we address this question and the results of our work with the Vietnamese government, it is important to remember that we are seeking the answers to two different, although related, general questions. The first is our goal of fullest possible accounting for all missing Americans. The second is shedding light on the issue of whether or not the Vietnamese Government continues to hold live American prisoners from the war. Achieving the goals requires a lot of cooperation from Vietnam. Vietnam has its own goals, and they include getting the US to lift the trade embargo and normalize diplomatic and economic relations. Unless the US is satisfied that Vietnam is fully forthcoming on the issue, it will be difficult for the US to move ahead with normalization. There is no way for Vietnam to prove the negative—that they are not holding live Americans, but, through an honest search for the information on the discrepancy cases and through a workable system for investigating the "live-sighting" cases, I believe we can shed enough light on the issue to permit us to make intelligent decisions.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my answers to the questions you forwarded to me. I am ready for additional questions from the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. I am going to try to ask if we can to keep the answers fairly tight so that all Senators can have a chance and we can meet your schedule, we want to try to do that.

As I mentioned earlier and I just say it again, you are an American of extraordinary reputation and you come to this with impeccable credentials. You are a combat veteran, field general and now you have undertaken this 5 year mission, and in a sense you come to this without a portfolio on the POW/MIA issue except for the emotional linkage that you have cited.

This has not been your field, correct?

General VESSEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor did you have responsibilities within the military service for this issue?

General VESSEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. So you come to it as somebody who has assumed responsibility with one goal and that is to get the truth and get an accounting, is that accurate?

General VESSEY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In the course of the last 5 years you have had occasion to travel to Vietnam how many times?

General VESSEY. Five times.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have had successive days of meetings with the Vietnamese, correct?

General VESSEY. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever had occasion privately to take former Foreign Minister Thach aside and say to him, hey, look, why don't you come clean on this? Why don't you—if you need money, if you need something for it, just give us the guys who are alive, did that ever happen?

General VESSEY. I have raised that issue at every meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever had any nibble or any indication whatsoever that there was a deal to be made if the right terms were struck?

General VESSEY. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anyone ever offered you at any level of the government entrée, to live Americans by virtue of your position?

General VESSEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any evidence today whatsoever from those five trips and from your journeys around Vietnam that someone is alive today in Vietnam?

General VESSEY. None of the new information we have gathered leads one to believe or adds to any of the information we had before that led one to believe there might be live Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a difficult question in some regards but one I know you are up to and willing to tackle, based on your knowledge of the country and your ability to travel around it that you have had, and your involvement with Vietnamese, etc., is there a plausibility in your mind to the notion that the Vietnamese Government would be holding 20 prisoners, 30 prisoners somewhere secreted away?

General VESSEY. One looks at the build up of information from—through the 1960's and 1970's and one can come up with a case and say, yes. If you look at what we see today, it is hard to come up with it. You say what is plausible and you say is it plausible you have to ask why. I frankly can't find a reason why other than it might have occurred and there was no way to explain it so the Vietnamese Government continued to do it. But otherwise, I don't find it plausible.

The CHAIRMAN. But there is a distinction, is there not, between the state of the evidence as it stood in 1973-74 and those probabilities today, is that not accurate?

General VESSEY. That's correct. The goal for us has been to examine these cases where we thought there was a probability that an individual serviceman might be alive and investigate those cases and find the facts in those cases and see whether or not they are alive and if they are get them back.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole premise of our policy today, General, is based on the notion, the whole concept of a discrepancy case is based on the notion that there is evidence that somebody might have been alive, is that accurate?

General VESSEY. That's exactly correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So a statement in 1973 that there is no indication that anyone was alive would simply be inaccurate, would it not?

General VESSEY. I would say yes. You could say we have no firm evidence or something like that, but certainly, the discrepancy

cases we have were clearly discrepancies that were unanswered at the time.

I want to say I don't know what statements were made back in 1973 and 1974.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. I am simply asking you based on the reality of your cases.

Now, we have exhaustively gone through every list we can get our hands on, every potential and possibility, and we came up with 244 names that we thought were legitimately people one should have thought were POW's in 1973. With the return of the POW's, after the debriefings, we were left with a pool of about 133. What is your reaction to that number, in terms of all the numbers you have worked with?

General VESSEY. Well, that number comes very close to the number that we're working with now as discrepancy cases. Yours is slightly smaller than ours, but I would suggest that the workers here, that General Christmas and his people get with your staff and make certain that we have scrubbed those lists. And if you have any that we ought to have on our list, we ought to add to them to that list.

The CHAIRMAN. We intend to do that. And incidentally, I am going to ask General Christmas later for his help in doing that. I am also going to ask Bob Sheetz for their help on two aspects of this. And my hope is that we are really going to narrow this down and then air the joint information that comes out of that to the public and people can make some judgments. I think it will add a lot to this.

My time is up, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me repeat what the chairman said, General Vessey, in thanking you for the service that you have provided long after your, quote, unquote, retirement from the service of your country as you try to help us try to resolve this very difficult issue. Certainly, the American people owe you thanks for the service that you are doing.

Within the last 5 or 6 months we have gotten different signals from both State and DOD regarding how cooperative the Vietnamese have been. I am not trying to embroil you in that debate, but just your own sense—State basically says they are being very cooperative or more cooperative and DOD says they are not being as cooperative as they should be, we need more information. Where do you see it?

General VESSEY. Cooperation has grown steadily through the time that I've worked on this issue, and particularly starting with 1988. The cooperation is far greater today.

One of the problems with evaluating Vietnamese cooperation is we don't know how capable they are of cooperating. For example, the major issue that concerns the field work to be done by General Needham and his task force needs support from Vietnamese archival records, from their wartime records. In fact, we don't know how good those records are. We make assumptions based on the intelligence that we gathered during the war that we knew they said record certain things. Now, whether or not those records have been maintained, we don't know. But we need Vietnamese cooperation

in searching for those records, and I think there's room for more cooperation. But I also want to say that cooperation has increased greatly.

Senator SMITH. On a relative scale, I guess.

General VESSEY. Yes.

Senator SMITH. General Christmas—I am sorry, you have not testified yet. I apologize.

Mr. Chairman, at this time, then, I would be happy to yield. Because I did have a question I will move when General Christmas testifies, I will come back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General Vessey, for all of your outstanding service, not only on this issue but to our country, I believe since sometime in 1943.

General VESSEY. 1939, Senator. I was only a child.

Senator McCain. Well, we are very grateful for it and we are grateful to have American citizens like you who have contributed so much.

You stated in your comments, you said so far as a result of your investigation or mission you have no evidence that any individual is alive today in Southeast Asia. Is that accurate?

General VESSEY. What I said is none of the new evidence that we have gathered as a result of the work that I've set in motion, none of the additional evidence supports that contention.

Senator McCain. Have you seen any evidence at all?

General VESSEY. Well, the evidence we have is the evidence in these cases, these discrepancy cases.

Senator McCain. Which clearly indicates the possibility.

General VESSEY. Yes, sir.

Now, the other point is the live sighting reports, and there are unresolved live sighting reports through the years. And what we need to do is resolve those reports.

Senator McCain. And you have never heard of any offer on the part of anyone in authority in Vietnam to return Americans in return for money or assistance?

General VESSEY. Absolutely not. In fact, the contrary. The Vietnamese officials with whom I've dealt have said we cannot do it, whatever you were to offer. We cannot do it because we do not have any.

Senator McCain. Have you ever seen any evidence of any conspiracy or coverup?

General VESSEY. No, sir, I have not.

Senator McCain. Did you when you were in your position as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General VESSEY. No, sir.

Senator McCain. Or at any other time in your military career?

General VESSEY. No, sir.

Now, I guess the one thing I do want to say, I know that operations that were conducted in Laos, that the names of Americans who were lost in Laos were not reported as having been lost in Laos because under the agreement at the time we were not supposed to have people in Laos, and we had people in Laos, including me.

Senator McCain. What if in 1973 the Government had said we do not know if any Americans are alive or dead. Would you have agreed with that policy?

General VESSEY. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. What is your—now over these many year relationship with the issue—best explanation, even if it is instinctive or intuitive, as to why there were so many not returned from Laos as opposed to Vietnam?

General VESSEY. Well, Laos is a sparsely populated and rugged country, as the committee well knows from looking at it on the ground and in the air. We lost physical things in Laos that we wanted to recover and couldn't find after they had been dropped from airplanes or something like that. So just finding anything in remote regions of Laos is difficult.

Additionally, Laos is a different sort of a country. It is a tribal country with different ethnic groups. The central government under any regime in Laos has had very little control over many parts of Laos. Even though it is adjacent to Vietnam, in terms of culture, geography, economy, and so forth, languages, it's completely different from Vietnam.

So there are a lot of reasons for the number in Laos not accounted for. We didn't have as much surveillance on what our own people did in Laos during the war. That is to say, airplanes were outside the radar coverage in Laos, where they were not necessarily in Vietnam. They were doing different sorts of things.

Senator McCain. I just have two more questions, Mr. Chairman. One is you said that the Vietnamese are being more cooperative, and Senator Smith said relatively speaking. How cooperative are they being, in your view? Are they sincere or just giving you lip service or somewhere in between, and what more specifically do they need to do?

General VESSEY. Well, I think the committee has received the same manifestations of cooperation from the highest levels of the Vietnamese Government that I have received, and that is to say that they are going to provide full cooperation in resolving these issues.

Getting down to the workers in Vietnam, the cooperation has been a little spottier. Getting things done in Vietnam specifically isn't particularly easy. The economy is in bad shape; they have a lot of other things on their mind. But certainly, the one area where cooperation is needed, as I said to Senator Smith and Senator Kerry, is the business of archival research. Both the prime minister and the foreign minister promised a complete and diligent search of their archives for all information about missing Americans. That's difficult to do. We need to work with them to guide them to do it. But at the same time, it can only be done with their cooperation and work. They have to do it. It's just tough work.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they doing it?

General VESSEY. I think General Christmas can give you more up to date information on that. I read the task force reports and it seems to me that yes, cooperation is improving. But it's not inhibited by lack of room for more improvement.

Senator McCain. Finally, in the many years since 1939 that you have been either in or associated with the military—let me re-

phrase that. In order for there to be a conspiracy or a coverup of this issue, do you agree with me that it would have required the active participation of hundreds of members of the military?

General VESSEY. Yes, sir. And I think that's an improbable sort of thing. American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are not conspirators. It's hard to keep military secrets long enough to get the operation going without the enemy knowing what's going on. Even at the time when we were at low ebb, we still had 100-and-some-odd people involved, and those rotated. Many of them rotated every 2 or 3 years. So I'd say the prospect or probability of a conspiracy being kept without it being blown wide open is almost zero.

Senator MCCAIN. And that would certainly not be in keeping with the behavior of members of the military that you have known since 1939.

General VESSEY. It certainly wouldn't, except a few that I've helped chuck out. [Laughter.]

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Vessey, I would like to ask if from your experience was there much interrogation done by the Soviets or the Chinese of Americans in Hanoi? Or do you have any indication from anything that you have discerned, both in being there and later, that they were taken to China or to the Soviet Union?

General VESSEY. The information we've gathered, and some of this has been from reports made by other governments. We are sort of at the mercy of spokesmen of other governments now. We have President Yeltsin saying that he knows of Americans coming from Vietnam to Hanoi. The Vietnamese Government has given a statement that says it didn't happen. I have sent a message to the foreign minister asking him to have the Vietnamese Government institute a complete investigation of this issue and give us the results of the investigation.

As you'll recall earlier, General Kalugin was in this country some time ago and said that he knew of reports of Americans having been interrogated in Vietnam after 1975. The Vietnamese Government said they conducted an investigation of that and that it did not happen, and they said that one American—perhaps it was two, but I don't have it right at my fingertips, but one or two Americans had been permitted to be interrogated. I think it was one American was interrogated. The Vietnamese said he was a CIA officer who had been captured, and they specifically permitted the Russians to investigate this.

Kalugin's source—

Senator MCCAIN. He was not active duty military?

General VESSEY. He was not active duty military.

Senator MCCAIN. He was CIA?

General VESSEY. He was CIA.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And this is a known case.

General VESSEY. This is a known case, and we knew that, too. And Colonel Nadje Perenko, who was Kalugin's source, said that isn't what I told Kalugin. I told him I interviewed one person in 1973.

Now, I said he wasn't active duty military. He may have been active duty military seconded to the CIA at the time, if I'm not mistaken. But at any rate, he was interrogated. Nadje Perenko, Colonel Nadje Perenko from the KGB, said yes, I interrogated one and I did it in 1973. The Vietnamese say yes, that's what happened. And that squares with our information. So that's the only case we know of.

Now, surely the Soviets gave questions to the Vietnamese. There are all sorts of information that the Soviets desperately wanted from our people, and surely they had worked out some sort of an arrangement to try to get that information from our people. As far as we know, from debriefing the prisoners who returned, none of them reported having been interrogated by Soviets. There were some Cubans involved, but none were interrogated by Soviets.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Any Chinese?

General VESSEY. And so far as I know, none by Chinese.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Now, of course, again, we do not have much in the way of information from either Laos or Cambodia.

General VESSEY. That's right.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Is there anything that you have found that would indicate that any prisoners were sent into—how forthcoming are the Chinese? Have we put any pressure on the Chinese?

General VESSEY. I am sure we have. I know we have. But I'm not the one to answer exactly how we've done that. But I know this question has been raised with the Chinese.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So in your work in Vietnam and with the archives that you have seen and had access to, there has been nothing there that has had a trail that led—

General VESSEY. No, we found nothing.

Now, you know of the NSA analyst, and I think he's testified to the committee, has he not, who says that he believes he saw information showing prisoners were transferred. Other analysts have looked at the same information and said, no, we don't come up with the same conclusion. So it is another one of the negatives. There are all sorts of people who we knew to be prisoners who did not come back. We don't know who interrogated them.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Perhaps this is something you could not even really answer, but would you think that we should be pressing the Chinese to be more forthcoming now that President Yeltsin has ostensibly said that and given Senator McCain his personal assurance that he was going to be forthcoming and make sure that the records were available?

General VESSEY. Well, certainly. If there are any questions that we believe the Chinese can answer, we should press them for it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum. General, I think we have just a few more questions and then I think we are going to be able to boast that a U.S. Senate Committee did something not only on time but ahead of time. We are going to get you out of here.

Very quickly, I would just like to ascertain. You personally have been through those files when you started putting these lists together?

General VESSEY. The lists were put together by others. I want to make that clear. I didn't put the list together. I went through the files, that is, I had the people who put the lists together explain the cases to me.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am getting at is, you are familiar with the cases that make up the files.

General VESSEY. Yes. To say I am familiar with them—don't ask me any questions about any specific case, but I went through each of the cases that was to be presented and I was satisfied that they were in fact discrepancy cases.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. And you are satisfied that there is a body of evidence within these cases that legitimates our having a concern that those people might be alive or might have been alive?

General VESSEY. Makes it legitimate for us to investigate those cases? Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. So this is not a fool's mission. This is not something for hype?

General VESSEY. No. We are seeking the answers to questions that ought to be answered.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are real?

General VESSEY. They are real questions.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are legitimately questions that would have been even more real in 1973, is that not true?

General VESSEY. They certainly wouldn't have been less.

The CHAIRMAN. Another quick question, and this is again sort of the murky area that the committee is trying to wade through but it is, I think, at the center of this. Senator Kassebaum has hit on it. Senator Kerrey has hit on it, Bob Kerrey. I have hit on it a few times. I think some others. That is the whole mood of the period and what we were able to leverage and what we were not; what America was willing to deal with back in 1973.

It is easy for us to sit up here, and sort of say why did you not do this, and why did you not do that? Families probably feel particular anguish about this because—not probably, they do feel particular anguish about this. Because many of them were saying, hey, wait a minute. And there just were not a lot of ears around.

Do you share a feeling that that climate of 1973 may have contributed to, not a conspiracy in the terms that Senator McCain talks about it, but to an attitudinal approach that accepted. A sort of unwillingness to, perhaps, ask some tough questions and deal with some realities. Would that be your judgment?

General VESSEY. Well, I think that certainly the analysts, some of whom are still working on the program now, and as you point out from that memorandum from DLA, there were many people interested in this issue at the time. There were unanswered questions at the time.

At the same time, the country seemed to be desperate to get out of Vietnam and be separated from that issue. And I think that people made the decisions that they thought were the best decisions at the time, based on the information that they had.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley has come back. Senator Grassley, I had promised the general that we were going to do something

unprecedented and get him out of here on time. He needs to catch a flight.

General VESSEY. I've still got time.

The CHAIRMAN. We have got about 10 minutes or so.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, because it was General Christmas that I did have some questions for.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to come back for General Christmas. It is only a question of General Vessey, who has to leave.

Senator GRASSLEY. I do not have any questions of General Vessey.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we are very appreciative to you for your time. I look forward to continuing to work with you on this. I hope we can get together soon to follow up on some of the information the committee has acquired.

Senator GRASSLEY. I do need to offer congratulations to General Vessey for the hard work he puts into this. I know that he is working very hard toward the same goals as this committee and I want to pledge him my cooperation and appreciate his cooperation with us.

General VESSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My best wishes to the committee in this very important task that you have.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. Senator Grassley has particular respect for you because he knows you know how to manage chopsticks. When we went out to the Far East, he said, please do not tell the citizens of Iowa that I learned how to do this.

Senator GRASSLEY. You just did. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thought I could sneak that one by. Just trying to sneak it by. Let me tell the citizens of Iowa, he did learn, and he did not do a very good job. [Witness excused.]

The CHAIRMAN. General Christmas, if we could ask you please to share your prepared testimony. If you could summarize, we will put the full text in. And then, Mr. Sheetz, if you could proceed, we will come back for a round of questioning. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. CHRISTMAS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS (J-3), U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

General CHRISTMAS. That's what I will do, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate your agreement to accept my presence here today in place of Brigadier General Needham, the Commander of our Joint Task Force for Full Accounting. He was unable to attend these hearings because he is in Vientiane discussing upcoming operations with the Lao officials.

I am pleased to respond to your questions regarding the work of the Joint Task Force, and I have submitted a very detailed statement for the record which responds to the three issues as well as the many other questions which you raised in your letters to me and also to General Needham.

I would like to make an opening statement, however. As you and your committee observed during your recent trip to Southeast Asia, we have a number of highly skilled and dedicated men and women committed to resolving the POW/MIA issue.

These people, together with those from our supporting commands and agencies, are doing everything they can do to find the answers which your committee—which certainly the families and surely, indeed, all Americans are asking.

The mission of the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting is to execute a full range of POW/MIA operations. Our number one priority is to resolve live sighting reports and the last known alive discrepancy cases. In Vietnam our field operations are focused on investigating discrepancy cases associated with 135 unaccounted for Americans, who were last known to be alive.

And in the course of these investigations, our teams are attempting to account for roughly 700 other individuals who were lost in the geographic proximity to those discrepancy cases. Once we finish these operations, we intend to mount a province-by-province search of all remaining unaccounted for Americans in that country. And that's our operation and that's our plan.

We are employing a two-tracked approach toward resolving cases in Vietnam. First our detachment in Hanoi, consisting of experts skilled in interview techniques, Vietnamese wartime records, and graves registration specialists are engaged in a day in and day out effort.

Second, our Hawaii-based search teams are conducting intensive 30-day periods of investigations and remains recovery operations. Between these periods of intensive field activities, our detachment staff and Vietnamese officials accomplish a number of tasks essential for the success of these field operations.

They work with Vietnamese provincial and district officials to locate witnesses and documents pertaining to the cases which our search teams will investigate. And they complete the necessary logistical arrangements for the next field activity.

Once these advance preparations are completed, our search team is deployed to Vietnam. Their objective is to find unaccounted for Americans or their remains. In the absence of either the individual or his remains, the teams attempt to obtain information sufficient to make a reasonable determination of the person's fate, and to assess whether further search efforts will lead to the recovery of that individual's remains.

To this end, the teams interview Vietnamese cadre and villagers who have knowledge of our war losses. They survey and excavate crash and grave sites and they review any archival records provided by their Vietnamese counterparts.

We use a similar approach to case resolution in Laos and Cambodia. With this overview of our field operations in mind, I will now turn to the matter of progress made to date and the degree of host government cooperation.

Since the establishment of the Joint Task Force on 23 January 1992, our search teams have completed 2 periods of field activities in Vietnam. These periods have involved upwards of 60 people assigned to task-organized teams. These teams have investigated cases associated with 32 of the 135 last known alive discrepancy cases, and have acquired information on 85 other individuals who were lost in geographic proximity to these priority cases.

A third round of field investigations is currently ongoing and began on the June 19. During the last completed period of field ac-

tivities, our teams recovered or obtained from villagers fragmentary remains believed to be from 7 loss incidents and involving 10 individuals. We believe that 2 remains are associated with those from our priority listing of 135.

From the other last known alive individuals whose cases we investigated, we found no evidence which suggests they are alive. In some instances, we interviewed witnesses to the death and burial of Americans. Further efforts now are required to locate and to recover those remains.

These mixed results reflect a number of variables. Certainly the very nature of many combat losses precludes the recovery of all remains. Adding to the difficulty is the harsh terrain in some areas, and the time which has elapsed. A second factor affecting the success of our operations is the completeness and accuracy of records compiled by our units during the war.

Some records contain first-hand accounts, which provide a fairly accurate location of a crash site, as an example. Other records are simply not complete. Those of us who served in combat can understand why some records are incomplete. They reflect the realities of war. For example a rifleman may be within sight of his buddy for one moment. The next moment, they and the rest of their unit are fighting for their lives in an intense firefight. After the battle, they regroup and the buddy is missing.

But what do we—what do our files contain for cases like these? Regrettably for many, they contain a report prepared by the unit following the engagement which provides an account of the battle, an approximate location where the individual was last observed, but little else.

Other loss records may contain additional information which a refugee provided to our interviewers years after the incident. But the key element of information is missing: the current location of the person or his remains.

This is why we need Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to share whatever records they possess on American prisoners and the missing, and make available for interview former members of their military units.

A third variable which has certainly had an affect on results is the degree of host nation cooperation. Vietnamese cooperation in some areas has been good. However, in other areas their officials do need to do better. We find the best way to assess Vietnam's cooperation is to measure the implementation of the five agreements reached during Assistant Secretary Solomon's visit to Hanoi last March.

The first concerned access to former cadre and archival records. While some improvement has been noted, this is an area in which we feel the Vietnamese can do better. Per the committee's request, I will provide for the record a list of archival documents which the Vietnamese have turned over to the Joint Task Force, or our DIA personnel assigned to our search teams, and our Hanoi detachment staff, and ensure that the committee receives translated copies of those materials.

The second agreement concerned the implementation of a credible live sighting investigation mechanism. In this area, we have seen progress.

The third agreement was to implement an expanded plan for joint field operations to resolve the last known alive discrepancy cases and others in close proximity. Here, too, the Vietnamese are compliant. Their vice foreign minister recently agreed to step up the tempo of these investigations so that the teams can investigate cases involving all 135 last known alive by mid-January 1993.

Conversely, we have seen little progress on the fourth agreement, to facilitate the resolution of cases which occurred in areas of Laos and Cambodia which the People's Army of Vietnam forces controlled during the war.

To resolve these cases, the Vietnamese must, at a minimum, turn over archival documents and provide other leads to American and Lao or American and Cambodian search teams. They have not yet done so. They have, however, indicated a willingness to permit search teams to cross into Laos from Vietnam. Unfortunately, the Government of Laos has not agreed to this arrangement, nor to trilateral talks.

The fifth agreement concerns unilateral turnover of remains. Since March, the Vietnamese have repatriated, unilaterally, five remains.

In describing the effort in Vietnam, I sometimes use the metaphor of overlapping circles. The efforts to recover remains, the efforts to investigate in the field the known cases of missing servicemen, and the efforts to establish a working procedure for the short-notice investigation of live sighting reports. These three major overlapping processes are mutually supporting and should never be seen as either separate or competitive. These efforts must be done together.

We all agree that answering the question of whether there are Americans being held prisoner is our first priority. Investigating known loss cases, particularly the last known alive discrepancy cases, recovering remains and investigating live sighting reports must proceed as a comprehensive campaign. Now the Solomon five agreements have great potential in supporting that campaign.

Turning to Laos, we have investigated, since January 1992, the circumstances of loss involving 30 unaccounted for. These activities have resulted in the recovery of three remains, one of which we are confident will be identified. We had hoped to have investigated by this point in the year, cases involving over 100 other individuals, but the Lao Government has not kept pace with our proposed operations.

One of the reasons for General Needham's visit this week to Laos is to impress upon them, his counterparts, our desire to pick up the tempo of operations.

With regard to Cambodia, our teams have investigated cases involving 22 individuals since January. During the period, they have travelled to Tang Island to investigate the loss of 18 Americans during the 1975 S.S.±. Mayaguez incident. These activities resulted in the recovery of four sets of remains believed to be those of missing journalists. Partial remains from Tang Island have also been recovered and are undergoing analysis.

The Phnom Penh authorities have been most cooperative. They have even agreed to allow our teams to travel to sites by U.S. military helicopters, a proposal which the Governments of Vietnam

and Laos have flatly rejected. Our efforts in Cambodia are not without problems. The remains of millions who were killed by the Pol Pot regime lay on or below the ground in Cambodia. Among those millions are the remains of our war dead.

Altogether, 81 American service members and civilians are unaccounted for in Cambodia.

The committee also has a number of questions concerning categories of cases and figures on unaccounted for which various Department of Defense organizations have published and maintained over nearly 20 years since the end of the war. The Joint Task Force has reviewed its records, and those of the former Joint Casualty Resolutions Center, or JCRC. I will submit for the record four listings compiled in response to the committee's letter of June 5.

The first is a list of discrepancy cases which field teams assigned to the former JCRC began to investigate in September 1988. The second list contains additional discrepancy cases which General Vessey proposed for field investigation during a meeting with Vietnam's Foreign Minister in October 1989. These two lists go to 119 individuals and served as our search team's priority focus from September 1988, until October 1991.

The results of the search effort over this period were mixed. Of the 119, the remains of 22 were repatriated and later identified. For four others, the results of these investigations confirmed that they had died and that further efforts to recover their remains would be to no avail. For 35 others on the lists of 119, the results of the investigations led the JCRC, DIA, and the POW/MIA inter-agency group to conclude that these men died during, or a short time after, the incident of loss. Through further joint or unilateral efforts their remains may still be recovered.

For the remaining 58 who comprise the 119, the investigations were inconclusive. A reasonable determination of their fate could not be made. The third list constitutes the Joint Task Force's current operational focus. It includes a total of 135 individuals as you know. Fifty-eight of those are from the first list on whom the initial investigations were inclusive.

There are 64 other individuals on which there is information that they survived the lost incident and fell into Vietnamese hands. These cases have not been the subject of previous field investigations. Rounding out the list of 135 are 13 other individuals who, during the war, were classified by their commanders and service secretaries as prisoners of war, but did not return during Operation Homecoming in 1973.

The Vietnamese have agreed to investigate these specific cases and others in close proximity. Our Joint Task Force search teams have already looked at 32 of the 135 cases, and with the agreement of the Vietnamese Government will investigate 135 by mid-January 1993. I must give a word of caution. While we will in fact have investigated all 135 by mid-January, the Vietnamese cooperation willing, we will, of course, in some cases only develop superficial information and will have to go back again and again, until we clear that 135.

Mr. Chairman, I will also submit a fourth list which provides a complete breakout by country, of all Southeast Asia unaccounted for which the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting maintains in

their data base. Of note, we have completed a thorough review and reconciliation with the Defense Intelligence Agency to assure that our data bases agree.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I know the committee's concern for how many remains of our war dead may yet be recoverable and those which are nonrecoverable. I believe it is premature to attempt to identify a specific figure or even a range of figures which once reached, will represent the fullest possible accounting. Despite the nearly 20 years which have elapsed since the war, it has only been recently that American teams have been permitted to carry out anything approaching sustained search operations.

As we obtain increased access to loss locations and records from these Southeast Asian nations, I believe we will obtain a clearer picture of what we can expect to achieve. Mr. Chairman, when I appeared before the committee last November, I indicated that the establishment of the POW/MIA Joint Task Force would provide the necessary command structure and resources to launch a sustained effort, and that is exactly what General Needham has done over the past 6 months.

We now have a full-time presence in each of the Southeast Asian capitals, and are deploying our search teams to conduct field operations with increasing frequency. To be sure, much remains to be done. But I think it would be a mistake, Mr. Chairman, not to acknowledge once more the hard work in which our people are engaged.

Many of these losses occurred in remote areas where the temperature routinely exceeds 100 degrees. Our teams are exposed to risks of tropical diseases and unexploded ordnance. They are carrying out their mission diligently and with the highest morale. The Pacific Command has begun an aggressive campaign to publicize the work which our teams are doing and to ensure total openness about the Joint Task Force ongoing operations and what we find.

Additionally, through the Service Casualty Affairs Office, we are keeping individual families informed of developments. The only information which we do not make available to them are the names of assigned personnel or their Southeast Asian sources. This is in accordance with departmental directions.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee. I hope that I have answered satisfactorily in my detailed statement for the record, many of your questions. I also hope that my comments today, together with the insights which you obtained during your recent visit to our field sites show you the extraordinary and exceptional efforts of the men and women who make up the Joint Task Force Full Accounting, and our supporting activities, the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

We are there for one reason, one reason only and that is to bring about the fullest possible accounting for our missing Americans. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Christmas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE R. CHRISTMAS

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to respond to your questions regarding the work of Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, JTF-FA.

As you and your committee observed during your recent trip to Southeast Asia, we have a number of highly skilled and dedicated men and women committed to the search effort. These people, together with those from our supporting commands and agencies are doing everything they can to find the answers for which your committee, the families and, indeed, all Americans are asking.

General Needham is unable to attend these hearings; he is in Vientiane discussing upcoming operations with Lao officials.

I appreciate your agreement to accept my presence here today. I will respond to three issues and other questions which you raised in your letter to General Needham and me of June 5 and 17, respectively. Concerning the three issues, first, I will describe the JTF's mission and ongoing field efforts. Second, I will assess progress to date and the degree of cooperation which the Southeast Asian governments are affording. Third, I will address the issue of numbers—that is categories of cases and lists of unaccounted for.

The mission of Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, is to execute a full range of POW/MIA operations. Our number one priority is to resolve live sighting reports and discrepancy cases.

Live sighting reports typically come from refugees who claim that on a certain date and at a certain location, he or she saw an unidentified person who may be an unaccounted for American. Discrepancy cases are those about which we believe that the Southeast Asian governments have knowledge. These include loss incidents in which our records indicate specific service members survived and were likely captured, yet neither the individuals nor their remains have been repatriated. If we can resolve these compelling cases, we will have done much to illuminate the live prisoner question.

In Vietnam, our field operations are focused on—investigating discrepancy cases associated with 135 unaccounted for Americans who were last known to be alive. And in the course of these investigations, our teams are attempting to seek information on and recover the remains of roughly 700 other individuals who were lost in geographical proximity to the discrepancy cases. Once we finish these operations, we intend to mount a province-by-province search for all I remaining unaccounted for Americans in that country.

We are employing a two-tracked approach toward resolving cases in Vietnam. First, our detachment in Hanoi is engaged in a day-in, day-out effort. Our six-person staff—which we are requesting the Vietnamese allow us to increase to 10—consists of experts skilled in interview techniques, Vietnamese wartime records, and graves registration specialties. Because of the ever expanding scope of field activities throughout the country, we have placed in command a very capable Army officer who has extensive experience in planning and conducting large scale field operations.

Second, our Hawaii-based search teams are conducting intensive 30-day periods of investigations and remains recovery operations. Between these periods of intensified activities, our detachment staff and Vietnamese officials accomplish a number of tasks essential for the success of these investigations. They work with Vietnamese provincial and district officials to locate witnesses and documents pertaining to cases which our search teams will investigate. They arrange for the prepositioning of helicopters and vehicles and complete other logistical arrangements.

Once these advance preparations are completed, our search teams deploy to Vietnam. Their objective is to find unaccounted for Americans or their remains. In the absence of either the individual or his remains, the teams attempt to obtain information sufficient to make a reasonable determination of the person's fate and assess whether further search efforts will lead to the recovery of the remains.

To this end, the teams interview Vietnamese cadre and villagers who have knowledge of our war losses. They survey and excavate crash and grave sites. They review any archival records provided by their Vietnamese counterparts. We use a similar approach to case resolution in Laos and Cambodia.

With this overview of our field operations in mind, I will now turn to the matter of progress made to date and the degree of host government cooperation. I will limit my remarks to discrepancy case investigations and remains recovery operations. The DIA will discuss live sighting investigations.

Since the establishment of the JTF on January 23, 1992, our search teams have completed two periods of field activities in Vietnam. These periods have involved upwards of 60 people assigned to task organized teams.

These teams have investigated cases associated with 32 of the 135 last known alive and have acquired information on 85 individuals who were lost in geographical proximity to these priority losses. A third round of field investigations began on June 19.

During the last completed period of field activities, our teams recovered, or obtained from villagers, fragmentary remains believed to be from 7 loss incidents which involve 10 individuals. We believe that 2 remains are associated with those from our priority listing of 135.

For the other last known alive whose cases we investigated, we found no evidence which suggests they are alive. In some instances we interviewed witnesses to the death and burial of Americans. Further efforts, however, will be required to locate and recover their remains.

These mixed results reflect a number of variables. Certainly the very nature of many combat losses precludes the recovery of all remains. Adding to the difficulty is the harsh terrain in some areas and the time which has elapsed. Moreover, Vietnam may have recovered remains unilaterally which they have not yet repatriated.

A second factor affecting the success of our operations is the completeness and accuracy of records compiled by our units during the war. We have provided copies of each of our casualty records to the Central Documentation Office in Washington. These as well as the original files which we maintained in Hawaii are open to the Committee members and staff. As you will see, some records contain firsthand accounts which provide a fairly accurate location of a crash site. Other records are not as complete.

Those of us who served in combat can understand why some records are incomplete. They reflect the realities of war. For example, a rifleman may be within sight of his buddy at one moment. The next moment, they and the rest of their unit are fighting for their lives. After the battle, they regroup and the buddy is missing.

What do our files contain for cases like these? Regrettably for many, they contain a report prepared by the unit following the engagement which provides an account of the battle, an approximate location where the individual was last observed, but little else. Other loss records may contain additional information which a refugee provided to our interviewers years after the incident. But the key element of information is missing—the current location of the person or his remains.

This is why we need Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to share whatever records they possess on American prisoners and the missing and make available for interview former members of their military units.

While JTF-FA files contain only limited wartime intelligence on units which operated in the areas of our losses, the DIA provides our search teams with information of this type. Our people use it to plan and carry out the investigations.

A third variable which has certainly had an effect on results is the degree of host nation cooperation. Vietnamese cooperation in some areas has been good; however, in other areas, their officials need to do better.

I would like to take a few moments to assess Vietnam's cooperation in implementing five agreements reached during Assistant Secretary Solomon's visit to Hanoi last March.

The first concerned access to former cadre and archival records. I will defer to the DIA to describe in detail the basis for intelligence judgements that Vietnam possess such records. From an operational perspective, however, I can say that our search teams have observed wartime documents and artifacts during their field operations. But thus far, their Vietnamese escorts have provided only limited access to these materials.

I will provide for the record a list of archival documents which the Vietnamese have turned over to JTF-FA and DIA personnel assigned to the search teams and Hanoi detachment staff. These materials range from one-page summaries to an 84-page document which chronicles the activities of a Vietnamese Air Defense Regiment. The JTF has 35 individuals who are capable of translating documents provided by the Vietnamese government. We will ensure that the committee receives translated copies of these materials.

The second agreement concerned the implementation of a credible live sighting investigation mechanism. In this area, we have seen progress. The DIA will provide you further information concerning short-notice live sighting investigations.

The third agreement was to implement an expanded plan for joint field operations to resolve the last known alive discrepancy cases. Here too, the Vietnamese are complying. Their Vice Foreign Minister recently agreed to step up the tempo of these investigations so that the teams can investigate cases involving all the 135 last known alive by mid-January 1993.

Conversely, we have seen little progress on the fourth agreement: to facilitate the resolution of cases which occurred in areas of Laos and Cambodia which Peoples Army of Vietnam forces controlled during the war. To resolve these cases, the Vietnamese must, at a minimum, turn over archival documents and provide other leads to American and Lao, or American and Cambodian search teams. They have not yet

done so. They have, however, indicated a willingness to permit search teams to cross into Laos from Vietnam. Unfortunately, the Government of Laos has not agreed to this arrangement.

The fifth agreement concerns the unilateral turnover of remains. Since March, the Vietnamese have repatriated unilaterally five remains.

In describing the effort in Vietnam, I sometimes use the metaphor of overlapping circles. The efforts to recover remains, the efforts to investigate in the field the known cases of missing servicemen, and the efforts to establish a working procedure for the short-notice investigation of live sighting reports—these three major overlapping processes are mutually supporting and should never be seen as separate competitive efforts. We all agree that answering the question of whether there are Americans being held prisoner is first priority. Investigating known loss cases, particularly the last known alive discrepancy cases, recovering remains, and investigating live sighting reports must proceed as a comprehensive campaign. The five agreements have great potential to support our campaign.

Turning to Laos, we have investigated since January 1992 the circumstances of loss involving 30 unaccounted for. These activities have resulted in the recovery of three remains, one of which we are confident will be identified. We had hoped to have investigated by this point in the year cases involving over 100 other individuals but the Lao government has not kept pace with our proposed operations.

Adverse weather and an extremely poor infrastructure in that country have contributed to the slow progress to date. Nevertheless, we believe the Lao government can and should do more. One of the reasons for General Needham's visit this week to Laos is to impress upon his counterparts our desire to pick up the tempo of operations. Given the importance of these talks, we certainly appreciated the Committee's approval to excuse General Needham from the proceedings here in Washington.

Of note, during our previous talks with the Lao, we have I asked them to work with us and the Vietnamese to resolve cases I which occurred in Vietnamese controlled areas of Laos. The Lao, however, rejected our recent proposal to hold a trilateral, U.S., Laos, and Vietnam meeting to discuss these cases.

With regard to Cambodia, our teams have investigated cases involving 22 individuals since January. During this period they also travelled to Tang Island to investigate the loss of 18 Americans during the 1975 SS MAYAGUEZ incident. These activities resulted in the recovery of four sets of remains believed to be those of missing journalists. Partial remains from Tang Island have also been recovered and are undergoing analysis. The Phnom Penh authorities have been most cooperative. They have even agreed to allow our teams to travel to sites by U.S. military helicopters—a proposal which the governments of Vietnam and Laos have flatly rejected.

Our efforts in Cambodia are not without problems. The remains of millions who were killed by the Pol Pot Regime lay on and below the ground in Cambodia. Among those millions are those of our war dead. Altogether, 81 American service members and civilians are unaccounted for in Cambodia.

This leads me to the third and final topic—the issue of numbers. You have asked a number of questions concerning categories of cases and figures on unaccounted for which various Department of Defense organizations have published and maintained over the nearly 20 years since the end of the war.

The JTF has reviewed its records and those of the former Joint Casualty Resolution Center, JCRC. I will submit for the record, four listings compiled in response to the committee's letter of June 5.

The first is a list of discrepancy cases which field teams assigned to the former JCRC began to investigate in September, 1988. These investigations came about as the result of an agreement reached between General Vessey and Vietnam's Foreign Minister. These cases were illustrative of those which suggested that Americans might still be alive in captivity. It became known as the 70-name list, although in its final form the list contained 62 cases associated with 80 unaccounted for individuals.

The second list which I will submit contains additional discrepancy cases which General Vessey proposed for field investigation during a meeting with Vietnam's Foreign Minister in October 1989. It totals 32 cases associated with 39 individuals. These two lists total 119 individuals and served as our search teams' priority focus from September 1988 to October 1991.

The results of the search effort over this period were mixed. Of the 119, the remains of 22 were repatriated and later identified. For four others, the results of the investigations revealed that they died and that further efforts to recover their remains would be to no avail. For 35 others on that list of 119, the results of the investigations led the JCRC, DIA, and the POW/MIA Interagency Group to conclude that

these men died during or a short time after their loss. Through further joint or unilateral efforts, their remains may yet be recovered. For the remaining 58 who comprised the 119, the investigations were inconclusive. A reasonable determination of their fate could not be made.

The third list which I will submit constitutes the JTF's current operational focus. It includes a total of 135 individuals. Fifty-eight are those from the first two lists whose initial investigations were inconclusive. There are 64 other individuals on which there is information that they survived the loss incident and fell into Vietnamese hands. These cases have not been the subject of previous investigations. Rounding out this list of 135 are 13 other individuals who, during the war, were classified by their Commanders and Service Secretaries as Prisoners Of War but did not return during Operation Homecoming in 1973. The Vietnamese agreed to investigate these cases during Assistant Secretary Solomon's discussions in Hanoi last March. As I indicated earlier, JTF-FA search teams have investigated 32 of these 135; and, with the agreement of the Vietnamese government, will have investigated all 135 by mid-January 1993.

Mr. Chairman, I will submit a fourth list which provides a complete breakout by country of all Southeast Asia unaccounted which JTF-FA maintains in their data base.

Last month, the JTF-FA and the DIA staff met to reconcile this listing with that maintained by the DIA. While both organizations for years have carried identical figures on the total number of Southeast Asia losses, the breakout of these losses by country differed. JTF-FA listed 422 unaccounted for who were lost over water in a separate, distinct category. The DIA included these over water losses with those which occurred on or over the Vietnam land mass.

Other differences in their data bases related to losses for which there is no precise location. For example, if a plane was last noted over Vietnam en route to a target in Laos, JTF-FA listed the crew as a Vietnam loss based on the last known location. DIA carried it as a Laos loss based on its intended target. Other differences related to analytical judgements on which side of the Laos and Vietnam border a loss occurred.

We have completed our data base review and reconciliation. You also asked for information on individuals who were carried as POW and MIA during the war and on the findings of various boards convened during the 1970s which have declared service members Killed in Action, Body Not Recovered and identified others who have been the subject of a presumptive finding of death. Neither the Pacific Command nor Joint Task Force files address this aspect of casualty resolution in a complete and comprehensive manner.

Regarding your question concerning the identity of remains held at the Central Identification Laboratory, they currently maintain about 100 unidentified remains which were repatriated from Southeast Asia. Half of these are so sparse that few, if any, biological determinations will be made. Bone samples from 21 other remains have been taken for possible DNA extraction. The other are either still under analysis, awaiting board or Next of Kin approval, or scheduled for DNA sampling.

Finally, you asked about figures for how many remains of our war dead may yet be recoverable and those which are non-recoverable. I believe it is premature to attempt to identify a specific figure or even a range of figures which, once reached, will represent the fullest possible accounting. Despite the nearly 20 years which have elapsed since the war, it has only been recently that American teams have been permitted to carry out anything approaching a sustained search effort. As we obtain increased access to loss locations and records from the Southeast Asian nations, I believe we will obtain a clearer picture of what we can expect to achieve.

Mr. Chairman, when I appeared before the committee last November, I indicated that the establishment of a POW/MIA joint task force would provide the necessary command structure and resources to launch a sustained effort. And that is exactly what General Needham has done over the past 6 months. We now have a full-time presence in each of the Southeast Asian capitals and are deploying our search teams to conduct field operations with increasing frequency.

To be sure, much remains to be done. But I think it would be a mistake Mr. Chairman, not to acknowledge once more the hard work in which our people are engaged. Many of these losses occurred in remote areas where the temperature routinely exceeds 100 degrees. Our teams are exposed to risks of tropical diseases and unexploded ordnance. They are carrying out their mission diligently and with high morale.

The Pacific Command has begun an aggressive campaign to publicize the work which our teams are doing, and to ensure "total openness" about JTF-FA's ongoing operations and findings. Additionally, through the Service casualty affairs offices,

we are keeping individual families informed of developments. The only information which we do not make available to them are the names of our assigned personnel and their Southeast Asian sources. This is in accordance with existing departmental guidance.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I hope that I have answered satisfactorily in this statement many of your questions. I also hope that my comments today, together with the insights which you obtained during your recent visit to our field sites, show you the extraordinary and exceptional efforts of the men and women who make up JTF-FA and our supporting commands—CILHI and DIA—to bring about the fullest possible accounting for our missing Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, general Mr. Sheetz?

STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. SHEETZ, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OFFICE FOR POW-MIA AFFAIRS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. SHEETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I could ask you in the interest of time to summarize. I will not cut you off at all.

Mr. SHEETZ. I have got a very short statement.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Mr. SHEETZ. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in these important committee hearings. We, at DIA, are proud to be part of the overall U.S. Government effort to account for Americans still missing from the Vietnam War. Our working relationships with the Joint Task Force Full Accounting and the Army Central Identification Laboratory are strong and productive.

We stress communicating effectively with the Service Casualty Offices to assist them in keeping the families fully informed of new developments, and we at DIA take very seriously our responsibility to support senior Government policy and decisionmakers, including the President's Special POW-MIA Emissary to Vietnam, General Vessey.

DIA senior leadership and each and every person in the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action clearly understand that this is the crucial time in the long quest for answers about our unaccounted for men from the Vietnam War. The time when the governments of Vietnam and Laos, and Cambodian officials, are beginning to take steps to facilitate our quest for answers.

However, we know that this quest leads immediately to the question of legitimate access, and I mean access in broad terms to include freedom of movement for live sighting investigators and JTF field teams; to include short notice inspection of prisons and other possible detention facilities; access to records repositories in Hanoi and in the field; access to witnesses in areas of live sighting reports and at last known alive locations; access to government officials and military personnel who have knowledge of both overall procedures and individual incidents; and last, access to artifacts and documentation from crash sites in lost locations. With this access beginning to open up in Vietnam and Laos, I might add here parenthetically that Cambodian officials have been incredibly supportive in the last 6 months or so, and there has literally not been anything that we have asked for that they have not been willing to support us on, DIA realizes that our supporting role is becoming even more important in the search for answers in Southeast Asia.

The Director of DIA, Lieutenant General Clapper, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, Admiral Larson have signed a memorandum of agreement that formally designates DIA as a supporting command to CINCPAC's Joint Task Force Full Accounting. Under this agreement, DIA functions as Admiral Larson's executive agent in vigorously pursuing the JTF's number one priority mission—that is determining if there are any Americans still alive in captivity, and should any be located, doing all we can to facilitate their release.

DIA pursues this responsibility through every means available, to include actually stationing in Vietnam DIA personnel from our Stony Beach debriefing element in Bangkok to conduct live sighting investigations. In order to properly fulfill our responsibility as a supporting command to CINCPAC's JTF Full Accounting, DIA has increased the manpower of its Stony Beach element in Bangkok, so we can not only continue our refugee debriefing program, but also conduct on the scene live sighting investigations, and support JTF investigation teams in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

My office here in Washington, also recently increased in size, produces field-support packages which analyze the areas involved in upcoming JTF field operations, with a principal focus on identifying archival research targets and key information gathering objectives. We also assist the JTF in analyzing results obtained from field activities to determine if information collected has a direct bearing on the fate of individuals.

This entire process is involved, difficult, and unfortunately, time-consuming. But, I am confident that the teamwork and full cooperation that has developed between the JTF and DIA elements, both here in Washington and in Southeast Asia, will provide the kind of results this committee, the American people and, most importantly, the families of unaccounted for personnel deserve.

Mr. Chairman, my experience is that most people who become well-informed on this issue have no trouble agreeing that accounting for our missing men means obtaining information from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Those who maintain that there is some secret set of files being kept by misguided U.S. Government personnel intent on maintaining some type of bizarre coverup are deluding themselves and the American people.

The answers are in Southeast Asia and that is where the U.S. Government is, correctly in my view, putting its emphasis. Yet, Mr. Chairman, when I read or hear of the criticism heaped by some on DIA's efforts, I wonder if these people are talking about the same office in which I work. Are they talking about the truly outstanding military personnel in our office like Army Lieutenant Colonel Alan Young, Navy Lieutenant Paul Maguire, Army Captain Sandy Caughlin, Air Force Technical Sergeant Mike Deckert, and all the others who work 10 and 12-hour days, day in and day out, weekday and weekends, to help develop investigative leads for field research in Vietnam?

Are they talking about the civilians in our office who served military tours in Vietnam during the war. People like Chuck Trowbridge, Bob Destatte, Gary Sytow, Warren Gray, Lloyd Nash, and all the others, men who have personal friends among the unaccounted for. Just where are these heartless, faceless bureaucrats

that would take active measures to cover up information and continue to keep agonized families of missing comrades-in-arms in the dark?

Mr. Chairman, the answer is that there are no such people at DOD, or at DIA, nor are there any at the Joint Task Force Full Accounting, at the Central Identification Laboratory, or at the Service Casualty Offices. We are conscientious, hardworking people, both military and civilian. We go to church, serve our communities, and try to raise our children to have proper values. While at the office, we tirelessly work together, each doing his or her small part in the overall effort to determine if there are any unaccounted for personnel still alive in Southeast Asia, and to reach the fullest possible accounting for those who perished there in defense of their country.

In this final panel, the committee will explore the remainder of the story, that being the efforts being aggressively taken by these conscientious dedicated personnel to account for our missing men. To be sure, mistakes were made over the years and erroneous decisions were sometimes reached when fragmentary information was all the analysts and decisionmakers had with which to work.

It is far too easy to criticize the past when looking back through the lens of today, when so much more is known, both about individual cases and about the wartime procedures employed by our former adversaries. But, much more still remains to be learned. What I can promise this committee, the American people and, most importantly, the friends, comrades and families of our missing men, is that at DIA we will continue to keep the faith by tirelessly carrying out our responsibility until our intelligence mission in helping to reach the fullest possible accounting is complete.

I look forward to participating on the panel. I and all the others in DIA dedicated to the POW-MIA issue are proud to play a part in the extraordinary efforts being undertaken today in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. I look forward to telling DIA's portion of the story and to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheetz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. SHEETZ

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in these important committee hearings. We at DIA are proud to be a part of the overall U.S. Government effort to account for our missing men from the Vietnam War. Our working relationships with the joint task force full accounting and the Army Central Identification Laboratory are strong and productive. We stress communicating effectively with the service casualty offices to assist them in keeping the families fully informed of new developments. And we at DIA take very seriously our responsibility to support senior U.S. Government policy and decision makers, including the President's special emissary to Vietnam, General Vessey.

DIA's senior leadership and each and every person in the special office for prisoners of war and missing in action clearly understand that this is a special time in the long quest for answers about our unaccounted for men from the Vietnam War—a time when the Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are beginning to take steps to facilitate our quest for answers. However, we know that this quest leads immediately to the question of legitimate access. And I mean access in broad terms to include:

- Freedom of movement for live sighting investigators and JTF field teams, to include short notice inspection of prisons and other possible detention facilities
- Access to records repositories in Hanoi and in the field
- Access to witnesses in areas of live sighting reports and at loss site locations

- Access to Government officials and military personnel who have knowledge of both overall procedures and individual incidents
- Access to artifacts and documentation from crash sites and other loss locations

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In order to properly fulfill our responsibility as a supporting command to CINCPAC's JTF full accounting, DIA has increased the manpower of its stony beach element so we can not only continue our refugee debriefing program, but also conduct on-the-scene live sighting investigations and support JTF field investigative teams. My office here in Washington, also recently increased in size, produces summary packages which analyze the areas involved in upcoming JTF field operations, with a principal focus on identifying archival research targets and key information gathering objectives. We also assist the JTF in analyzing results obtained from field activities to determine if information collected has a direct bearing on fate accountability. This entire process is involved, difficult, and unfortunately, time consuming. But I am confident that the sense of teamwork and cooperation that has developed between the JTF and DIA elements, both here in Washington and in SE Asia, will provide the kind of results this committee, the American people, and most importantly the families of unaccounted for personnel, deserve.

Mr. Chairman, my experience is that most people who become well informed on this issue have no trouble agreeing that accounting for our missing men means searching for answers in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Those who maintain that there is some super secret set of files being kept by misguided U.S. Government personnel intent on maintaining some bizarre type of "cover up" are deluding themselves and the American people, the answers are in Southeast Asia, and that is where the U.S. Government is, correctly in my view, putting its emphasis.

Yet, Mr. Chairman, when I read or hear of the vituperative criticism heaped by some, upon DIA's efforts, I wonder if these people are talking about the same office in which I work. Are they talking about the truly outstanding military personnel in our office, like army LTC Alan Young, Navy LT Paul Maguire, Army Capt Sandy Caughlin and Air Force Tech Sergeant Mike Deckert, who work 10 and 12 hour days, day in and day out, week day and week ends, to help develop investigative leads for field research in Vietnam? Are they talking about the civilians in our office who served, during the war, military tours in Vietnam—people like Chuck Trowbridge, Bob Destatte, Gary Sydow Warren Gray, Loyde Nash and all the others, men who can count personal friends among the unaccounted for? Just where are these heartless, faceless bureaucrats who would take active measures to cover up information and continue to keep agonized families of missing comrades in arms in the dark?

Mr. Chairman, the answer is that there are no such people in DOD, at DIA, nor are there any at the joint task force full accounting, at the Central Identification Laboratory or at the Service Casualty Offices. We are conscientious, hardworking people, both military and civilian, who go to church, serve our communities, and try to raise our children to have proper values. While at the office, we tirelessly work together, each doing his or her small part in the overall effort to determine if there are any unaccounted for personnel still alive in SE Asia, and to reach the fullest possible accounting for those who perished there in defense of their country.

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to keep the faith by tirelessly carrying out our sacred responsibility until our mission in helping to reach the fullest possible accounting is complete.

I look forward to participating on this panel. I and all the others in DIA dedicated to the POW-MIA issue are proud to play a part in the extraordinary efforts being undertaken today in Vietnam, LAOS and Cambodia. I look forward to telling DIA's portion of the story and to answering the committee's questions, as best I can, on where the future will, with hope, take us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sheetz. General Christmas, let me begin with you if I may, and then come back and comment on Mr. Sheetz's testimony and ask a few questions. The committee, I think, is particularly concerned obviously on the issue of whether or not somebody might be alive and that is one of our primary missions, is to try to help ascertain what that likelihood or probability is.

Much of the energy that we observed and that you have even talked about here is energy directed at remains recovery, and I want to make certain and I think the committee wants to make certain that the highest priority is the follow-up on live sighting reports. Now, my first question to you is how many live sighting reports do you now have that you are actively following up on?

General CHRISTMAS. First of all, Senator, let me indicate to you that, as I said in my statement and you will see in detail in the detailed statement, that obviously the first priority is the search for live Americans. The key to that, however, I believe is the campaign plans that we have established which are those three intertwining circles of search and recovery of remains, investigation, of the last known alive discrepancy cases, and the live sighting investigations, because they are mutually supporting.

What I mean by that is very simply, if in fact you see an excavation going on as you visited, we have constant contact during that excavation.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

General CHRISTMAS. The same with the search in that shared information leads to developing those cases, not only for the last known alive discrepancy cases, but in fact also potential live sighting cases.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that and you well articulated that to us when we met with you in Hawaii and General Needham followed up on that. But the question still is, even within that context, how many live sighting reports are in front of the group that they are going to actively work on in that context, or they have as a priority.

General CHRISTMAS. I'm going to ask Bob Sheetz to help me out in just a moment, but right now we have completed about 25 live sighting investigations. We have completed, up until last week, nine short-notice investigations, the very last one being in Dien Bien Phu. Now, part of that was getting our live sighting investigator established within the Hanoi detachment. He is now firmly established within that detachment, has established his particular Vietnamese counterpart contacts and he is now moving very rapidly.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any of the live sighting reports produce any sighting of a Caucasian?

General CHRISTMAS. At this point sir, all of them have been negative.

The CHAIRMAN. Negative as to any American, or negative as to any Caucasian?

General CHRISTMAS. Negative as to any Caucasian being sighted in those reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sheetz, how many live sighting reports are you forwarding to the Joint Task Force for resolution?

Mr. SHEETZ. Our current inventory as of last week was 109 first-hand live sighting reports in active investigative status. We have approximately 45 reports that are pending further resolution because we have to go back to the original source and ask follow-up questions that were not properly developed when information first came to us.

We call these source-directed requirements or SDR's. So of that 109, there are approximately 45 SDR's that are out with Stoney Beach for field follow-up. Once those SDR's are complete, the analyst will go back over them and determine whether or not some they may be appropriate for nomination as live sighting investigator cases. There are 38 additional cases that are out there right now with the live sighting investigators.

The CHAIRMAN. 38 in addition to the 109?

Mr. SHEETZ. No, in addition to the 45.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very helpful to the committee to have any viable current live sighting report and, obviously have us concur with you as to what is current and viable, have those run down and reported on during the timeframe of this committee's existence, and that would mean within the next several months, so that we would be able to report clearly on this progress. Would that be feasible?

Mr. SHEETZ. Mr. Chairman, if this committee has developed any information which has come directly to the committee—

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what I am asking. I am going to ask you that as a matter of fact, because we are developing some of that, but I do want to ask you, with respect to the numbers of live sighting reports you have already identified as active, can this committee know that those live sighting reports, as a matter of national highest priority, will be examined within the next few months?

Mr. SHEETZ. I can assure you they are being examined now. And I can feel confident in saying that because we have put a team of personnel out in Bangkok and in Vietnam to speed up the investigation of our existing inventory.

The CHAIRMAN. So your answer is yes, we can anticipate it within the next few months?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes.

General CHRISTMAS. And as you know, Senator, anything you give us in the way of questions, and anything you give the Joint Task Force in the way of desires, we will work them into our work plans as best we possibly can.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we also anticipate, Mr. Sheetz, that anything that the committee develops in terms of a lead, or information, or if we just happen to have questions, like Senator Smith might on a particular piece of evidence that the committee makes a judgment about that is different from yours, can those be run down by your people? Can we jointly—

Mr. SHEETZ. I would encourage the committee, if you've developed information that we have not seen before that could somehow add to what we have, we'd be pleased to include it in our investigative agenda.

[List of 133 names follow.]

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ANDREWS	WILLIAM R	X
AVERY	ROBERT DOUGLAS	X
AYERS	RICHARD LEE	X
BEENE	JAMES ALVIN	X
BEGLEY	BURRIS NELSON	X
BENNETT	HAROLD G	X
BENNETT	WILLIAM GEORGE	X
BLACKBURN	HARRY LEE JR	X
BLOOD	HENRY F	X
BOLLINGER	ANTHUR R	X
BOWHARD	MICHAEL LORA	X
BRANDENBURG	DALE	X
BURNS	FREDERICK J	X
BURNS	MICHAEL PAUL	X
BUTLER	JAMES E	X
CAPLING	ELWIN REX	X
CARROLL	ROGER WILLIAM JR	X
CARTWRIGHT	BILLIE JACK	X
CICHON	WALTER ALAN	X
COCHRO	RICHARD NEWELL	X
COLEMAN	JIMMY LEE	X
COOK	DWIGHT WILLIAM	X
CHAMER	DONALD MARTIN	X
CREED	BARTON SHELTON	X
CUSEMAN	CLIFTON EMMET	X
DEBRUIN	EUGENE H	X
DOOLEY	JAMES EDWARD	X
DONLOP	THOMAS E	X
EDWARDS	HARRY SANFORD JR	X
EIDSMON	NORMAN EDWARD	X
EISENBERAUN	WILLIAM F	X
ELLISON	ROBERT MALCOLM	X
ELKISON	JOHN COOLEY	X
ENTRICAN	DANNY DAY	X
ERSKINE	JACK D	X
EVANS	JAMES JOSEPH	X
FINCH	MELVIN W	X
FINLEY	DICKIE WAINE	X
FLYNN	GEORGE E	X
FLYNN	SEAN LESLIE	X
FORD	RANDOLPH W	X
FOULAS	RALPH EUGENE JR	X
FRANCISCO	SAN DEWAYNE	X
FREDERICK	WILLIAM V	X
GARDNER	JOHN GARDNER	X

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GARWOOD	ROBERT RUSSELL	X
GERBER	DANIEL A	X
GLASSON	WILLIAM ALBERT JR	X
GREENLEAF	JOSEPH GALES	X
GRIFFIN	JAMES LLOYD	X
GRISSETT	EDWIN R JR	X
GREYB	ROBERT H	X
HALL	HARLEY H	X
HANGEN	WELLS	X
HARRIS	BOBBY GLENN	X
HARRIS	JEFFREY LYNDOL	X
HAUKNESS	STEVEN	X
HESTLE	ROOSEVELT JR	X
HOLLAND	LAWRENCE T	X
HOLLEY	TILDEN STEWART	X
HOLMES	FREDERICK LEE	X
HORNE	STANLEY HENRY	X
HUBERTH	ERIC JAMES	X
JEWELL	EUGENE MILLARD	X
JONES	BOBBY MARVIN	X
JONES	JOHN	X
KALIL	TANCOS E	X
KENNEDY	JAMES EDWARD	X
KIER	LARRY GENE	X
KROSKE	HAROLD WILLIAM JR	X
LANE	CHARLES JR	X
LONG	JOHN HENRY SOTHORON	X
LULL	HOWARD BURDETTE JR	X
LUNA	CARTER PURVIS	X
MATEJOV	JOSEPH A	X
MC PHAIL	WILLIAM THOMAS	X
MCDONALD	JOSEPH WILLIAM	X
MCINTIRE	SCOTT WINSTON	X
McKINNEY	CLERIE	X
MCURRAY	FRED HOWELL JR	X
MCPHERSON	EVERETT ALVIN	X
MCRAE	DAVID E	X
MELTON	TODD M	X
HIMS	GEORGE I	X
HITCHELL	ARCHIE EMERSON	X
MOON	WALTER H	X
MORRISON	JOSEPH C	X
NICHOLS	HUBERT CAMPBELL JR	X
NIERHOUSE	DANIEL LEE	X
NOLAN	MCINTLEY	X
OLMSTEAD	STANLEY E	X

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OLSEN	BETTY ANN	X
PARISH	CHARLES C	X
PARKER	WOODROW WILSON II	X
PARKS	JOE	X
PERRY	RANDOLPH ALLEN JR	X
PIERSON	WILLIAM C III	X
POGREBA	DEAN ANDREW	X
PORT	WILLIAM D	X
PRIDM	SEVERO J	X
PROSPALE	THOMAS W	X
RANSBOTTCH	FREDERICK JOEL	X
RAYMOND	PAUL DARWIN	X
REYNOLDS	TERRY L	X
RORABACK	KENNETH M	X
ROSS	JOSEPH SHAN	X
ROWLEY	CHARLES STODDARD	X
RUFFIN	JAMES THOMAS	X
SALLARULO	RAYMOND P	X
SCHOTT	RICHARD S	X
SCHUMANN	JOHN R	X
SHAFFER	PHILIP RAYMOND	X
SHELTON	CHARLES ERVIN	X
SHERIVER	JERRY MITCHELL	X
SIDFSON	JAMES EDWARD	X
SMITH	WILLIAM	X
SPITZ	GEORGE R	X
STONE	DANA	X
TADIOS	LEONARD	X
THOMAS	KENNETH D JR	X
THOMPSON	WILLIAM JAMES	X
TOWNSEND	FRANCIS WAYNE	X
TOWNSEND	WILLIAM JAMES	X
TRANT	ALLEN ROBERT	X
TRIMBLE	LARRY A	X
VERSACE	HUMBERT R	X
VIETTI	ELEANOR A	X
WALKER	ORLEN J	X
WALTON	LEWIS CLARK	X
WEATHERMAN	EARL C	X
WILES	MARVIN BENJAMIN	X
WILKINSON	DENNIS EDWARDS	X
WILLIAMS	RICHARD F	X
ZICH	LARRY ALFRED	X
ZOOK	HAROLD JACOB	X

The CHAIRMAN. Could we also request assistance from you, which I think would be extremely helpful to us, and that is to try to take the 133 names that we have been left with, take the names that General Christmas has come up with, and your names—frankly one of the problems is, there are too many lists around. That has been a problem for 20 years. And some folks cannot make sense of why one is here and one is here. This committee needs to—we have got to make sense of that. So we need your help to scrub those. Can we anticipate that in the next couple of months we can do that together?

Mr. SHEETZ. Absolutely.

General CHRISTMAS. Certainly, sir. If you will provide that list of your 133, we'll make that comparison. We will do that analysis between the Joint Task Force and the DIA and we will provide you an answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Sheetz, I really respect your statement and it was a good statement. And I particularly respect your defense of hard working and good people. I do not think that I have ever questioned that. I do not think this committee is here to question anybody's commitment to their job at this moment. But I think that policy is somehow different from that kind of commitment within an Agency of our Government. If often is. That is the nature of the beast.

And 20 years ago there was a policy and there were people trying to carry out what they could of it, but we had testimony earlier today that 8(b) of the peace accords was simply not implemented. There was not a capacity for full accounting. It was not your fault. Certainly, you were not there at the time. And it was not Mr. Trowbridge's fault at that time. That was the reality of the world that he was trying to work in. And they were even trying to cut the office, as we have evidenced.

But there have been criticisms, over the years, and you have admitted it. Mistakes were made. I am not here, now, to rehash all of them. But there have been mistakes made. I mean this database is simply inadequate. I think you would agree with me, would you not?

Mr. SHEETZ. The database contains many, many records from lots of sources.

The CHAIRMAN. It is inadequate in its current form. It is inadequate, do you not believe? Should we not have one list which is inclusive of everybody?

Mr. SHEETZ. I think one of the major accomplishments that we have reached here in the last couple of months with the formation of the JTF is combining our files with their files.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. And I applaud the effort you are making now. It is going to help us. We are doing the same thing. But 20 years later we are putting this database together, correct?

Mr. SHEETZ. Data has been kept in different places. We have all tried to exchange it from time to time in the past. But the point is, at this time, we have a good team that is working together and we have a game plan.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. I think there is a good team. I think it is working together, and that is obviously very important to people. But we have to sift out the history of this effort. And

that is what we are trying to do, obviously. I do have some more questions, but my time is up. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, in the shuffling in and out, Senator Grassley missed his first round, so I am going to yield to Senator Grassley at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you very much. General Christmas, I want to ask you some questions. My point is, hopefully, you will have the answers. If you do not have the answers—and maybe even General Needham would be the one who should be asked—but what I want to establish here when we are done is a process so I can get answers to these questions.

First of all, let me observe that you are the first person from Hawaii to come here and not be darkly tanned. You are doing your job, obviously. So I want you to know that I observed that. I think that you must be dedicated to getting the job done.

General CHRISTMAS. I hope you'll tell my boss that, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. The first thing I would like to raise with you is an issue that we raised in Hawaii, perhaps with the admiral as much as with you, but that involved Bill Bell. Has he left Hanoi for Bangkok yet? Does he have an office and telephone yet? And just kind of in general has he been treated in a manner expected by this committee? As I think we made very clear at our meeting and which was attested to by the Defense Department.

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, the answer to the first two questions is, yes, yes. The third question: Mr. Bell currently has assumed his duties as our Special Assistant for Negotiations. He has just recently come back to Hawaii to be fully briefed on his position and how that position as Chief of Negotiations works. Obviously, there were some areas that he had not previously worked in. He has since returned to Bangkok.

As you know, we feel very strongly that Mr. Bell has an awful lot to offer this entire process and this entire effort. He brought with him very fine recommendations as he always does. And to the betterment of the program. General Needham is evaluating those. Some have been taken. Some won't be able to, but it is my judgment that Mr. Bell continues to serve very well and continues to be a very important part of our entire POW/MIA effort.

Senator GRASSLEY. So, I think you are saying, in regard to the third question that, at least as you would define it, he has been treated in the manner that we have expected and was stated to you in those meetings we previously had and attested to by the Defense Department.

General CHRISTMAS. I believe so, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. I would just like to follow up on some private matters and questions, as I said privately, with respect to Mr. Bell, and I would like to know if you would agree to designate someone in your organization with whom I can communicate these matters within just a few days.

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, I would be more than willing to take them myself.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Those must be done outside of this room.

General CHRISTMAS. OK.

Senator GRASSLEY. Now, third, in addition to being a member of this committee, I am also a member of the Budget Committee and I am sure as the military leader you are, you probably would remember my involvement in the 1980's in questioning and exposing excess prices paid by our Defense Department for goods and services.

Now, I noted recently and, again, if you can not answer this, we will wait for the answer. But I noted recently that our Government has just leased two MI-8 helicopters from the Vietnamese at a cost of about \$8 million. Now, these are to be used, and I remember our discussing this while we were in Hanoi, for search missions. So I understand that they are fulfilling a need. And even a need that this committee has been involved in.

I have made some preliminary inquiries, and found that we could buy the same helicopter, brand new, for much, much less. I stress that these are preliminary judgments that I am making, and I would like your response as to whether you think that is a fair price. If you cannot respond to that, then I would wait for an answer when you can give it to me. I just want you to know that I intend to look into this.

As a follow up of that question, whether or not you think that that is a fair price, I would also like to know why we do not use our own helicopters as we are doing in Cambodia?

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, first of all, as far the details of the contract, I would like to take that question and provide you that.

[The information referred to follows.]

The contract covers the period June 1, 1992 through September 30, 1994. The total cost for the entire period is \$8,090,460. This figure includes maintenance, parts, fuel, crew salaries, security fees and landing fees for leasing helicopter support, employing helicopters similar to the UH-60 Black Hawk as detailed in contract N68047-92-D0100 negotiated by the Navy Regional Contracting Center in Singapore. The per hour cost breaks out to be approximately \$2,796 (the figure is based on the contract proviso of helicopter usage of 1240 flying hours per full fiscal year). The fiscal year 1992 Revised Cost per Flying Hour Reimbursement Rates for Army Aircraft indicates the U.S. Government would charge a non-U.S. government organization \$3,501 per flying hour employing UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The charge would include maintenance, parts, fuel and pilots. The cost for the same period as the contract with Vietnam would be \$10,128,393. We consider the negotiated contract we have with Vietnam a "fair price".

Nevertheless, our preference continues to be employment of U.S. helicopters to support our POW/MIA resolution operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. U.S. helicopters would be more responsive, more reliable and we would be more confident of their safety.

General CHRISTMAS. I would inform you, sir, that that contract was done with complete U.S. Government grade A—this is how a contract is supposed to be written.

As you know, Senator, the Vietnamese have flatly refused to allow us to use U.S. helicopters in Vietnam. And, in fact, as part of the negotiations we were very limited as to who we could deal with as far as obtaining that helicopter service. What we did was get the best deal that we possibly could to carry out this expanded period of operations.

And as you know we are now completely throughout Vietnam, both south and north. Right now our teams are in three widely dispersed areas of the country; the country as a whole, south and north. And obviously we need that helicopter support to be able to do the things that we have to do.

I wish we could do it with our own helicopters. As you know, in Cambodia right now, we have a Marine helicopter detachment supporting our operations there. They will do it for two field activities. Then the U.S. Army will come in and do two more. We are very comfortable with that. But in both Vietnam and in Laos, they have flatly rejected our requests.

Senator GRASSLEY. I cannot draw a conclusion until I hear, finally, from you, but I would almost think, based upon just some preliminary investigation I have done, that we could have bought those helicopters and given them to the Vietnamese and done it much more cheaply.

The next is kind of along the same line but, in addition to the helicopter contract, I understand that we are entering into other contracts with the Vietnamese for such things as hotel space, permanent housing, and other things. A couple of follow ups. Are all such contracts being handled by the Navy contracting office in Singapore?

General CHRISTMAS. It's a combination, sir, of both our office in Hawaii, in Honolulu, and some have been worked with the office in Singapore. But it is under the Navy's PACDIV as they call it.

Senator GRASSLEY. What benchmarks do we use for establishing that these are fair market prices?

General CHRISTMAS. I would have to take that question, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Navy Regional Contracting Center in Singapore is administering the helicopter support contract in Vietnam and the vehicle maintenance contract in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command has negotiated and is administering the contract for rental and renovation of the office and quarters site for the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) Detachment 2 in Hanoi. For JTF-FA Detachments in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, contractual support is provided by the respective Embassy General Services Offices. Whenever local purchases in Thailand are necessary, the JTF-FA detachment in Hanoi uses the General Services Office of the American Embassy in Bangkok as its agent. These various contracting officers determine fair market prices based upon the urgency of need, the required service or commodity, and its availability.

Senator GRASSLEY. Would you facilitate a review of these contracts with those of us on the committee who have an interest in this?

General CHRISTMAS. Of course, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. Last, I would like to stress that I am, at this point, not making judgments of whether the price of helicopters are excessive, but I do intend to make some inquiry on the contracts and others, and for that you promised me, and I appreciate your assistance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. I would be happy to have Senator Smith go ahead.

Senator GRASSLEY. It is Alfonse and Gaston and I am caught in between them.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Christmas, I would like to ask you the same question I asked General Vessey. What is the extent of Vietnamese cooperation, in your view, and

what more needs to be done to help resolve this issue on their part? And you might add Laos while you are at it.

General CHRISTMAS. I believe cooperation is greatly improved in Vietnam. I think that the Solomon five agreements are a good measure of how that cooperation is going. In the case of the live sighting mechanism, we do have a live sighting mechanism in place, and we have seen, I think, very great progress in that area which did not have progress before. In the case of them expanding operations with us, and allowing us to do the things we need to do, there has been great improvement in that.

In the area of archival research and in the area of documents provided, there is an area where we need help, where they can, in fact, provide a great deal more. Our investigators as they go out—

Senator MCCAIN. What do you speculate is the reason they have not been more cooperative in that area?

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, as General Vessey, pointed out very well; you may, at the central government level say, this is what we are going to do. But when it comes down to action at the district or province level, it all slow down it might not take place.

The other thing that I would remark to you, sir, is the fact that I don't think we have given enough credence to the power of the district and province chiefs, both in South and North Vietnam.

Part of our entire process and part of these expanded operations is the greater and greater contact throughout the country. I think that is going to reap gains. The other one where we have difficulty is the trilateral agreements or trilateral talks and cross-border operations. That is at a standstill right now, Senator, and it's at a standstill for a number of reasons.

We would like to see the Vietnamese give us more information concerning their operations cross-border in Cambodia and Laos. We have to really crack the Ministries of Defense and Interior for that.

Second, both the Lao and the Cambodians have been very reluctant to enter trilateral talks. The Vietnamese based on the committee getting out there said, yes, you can go from Vietnam into Laos because, in some places, that is the only way you can get into where crash sites would have been. The Lao have disagreed with that and have said, no, we will not allow that. They have also disagreed with trilateral talks.

So I think the point is, we are making measured progress. Can we make more? Sure we can. I think in Vietnam that progress will continue if we continue to accelerate our operations, continue to keep our folks in country face to face with the Vietnamese.

We would like to see more expanded operations in Laos. I must say, though, in the first 6 months in Laos, they've done more than they've ever done. But in our estimate, we would like to be able to do more.

In Cambodia, they have been very receptive, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. I think it would be very important if you would, on a regular basis, send information to this committee through the regular chain of command as to what you feel needs to be done in addition to what is being done, in order to resolve this issue so that members of this committee who are interested can do

what we can in our way to increase pressure on both the Vietnamese and Laotians to show greater cooperation.

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, if I might suggest, every month, using the five agreements, we draft a message which measures that cooperation. That goes right to the central documentation office and it is unclassified. The same with our weekly sitreps. You know, our situation reports. At the bottom of each one, I have tried to evaluate where we have been that last week in the cooperation.

Perhaps, if the committee's staff can, in fact, just establish that with the Central Documentation Office, we would have it on record continually.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Mr. Sheetz, how long have you been with the DIA?

Mr. SHEETZ. I joined the DIA as a civilian in 1987, but I served a tour there as a military officer in the reserves for 4 years.

Senator McCAIN. How long have you been in your present position?

Mr. SHEETZ. 16 months.

Senator McCAIN. Why is it that it took 20 years to get one list, in your view?

Mr. SHEETZ. 20 years to get one list? We always had access to the files of the JCRC in paper files. What's been difficult is that every time a team goes out into the field in a joint iteration we learn something that we didn't know before, and that information causes us to reevaluate what we know about a particular case, and our databases are always sort of chasing after one other as new information comes in.

The critical point is that these numbers are not static numbers. They are always in fluidity. And the exercise that DIA and the JTF just went through was another attempt, one of many, to get our two databases in sync. And we'll have to do that again, 6 months from now, or a year from now.

Senator McCAIN. I hope every effort will be made to do so. I am sure you have seen the Americans recorded in captivity list that is up here.

Mr. SHEETZ. I have, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Have you got explanations for that list?

Mr. SHEETZ. We've seen the list itself the day before the hearing. It came over piecemeal in three letters to us. What I had asked Senator Kerry for, and he promised we would get it tomorrow, would be a breakdown by each name under each of the categories, so that we could see how you have been able to develop this list of names.

And what I promised Senator Kerry, and I promise all of you, is that we will sit down, our analysts with yours, and work through each and every one of those. And, at the same time, share with you what we have in our discrepancy cases and see what the common ground is and where the outlying points are.

Senator McCAIN. Well, it is unfortunate that could not have been done before the hearing, but obviously that is not under my authority. Mr. Sheetz, tell me, finally, what happens to your organization when you get a picture purported to be Lieutenant Commander Borah or Major Carr and it appears in all the newspapers of the country? What happens?

Mr. SHEETZ. Typically, they become very sensationalistic, as compelling photographic evidence sometimes is. And literally many of other efforts are stopped and people are pulled off onto special analytic teams to support a very detailed approach to gather information on every lead that we can develop or these photo cases. Essentially, we set up a series of task forces to run to ground any lead that we can develop from one of these photograph situations.

Sometimes they can be resolved quickly; other times, they take months and months, as was the case in the Carr photo.

Senator McCAIN. Have you seen the impact on the families of something like this?

Mr. SHEETZ. I have indeed. Probably the toughest part of my job is having to speak, either on the phone or in person with people who are agonizing over their particular circumstance.

Senator McCAIN. Have you seen what happens to the families once it is proven to be a hoax as in the case of Borah or Carr, the photos?

Mr. SHEETZ. I can only imagine, but it must be one of the most deflating and emotionally hurtful situations that you could encounter in your life.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I just have one brief question, I have to go to another hearing, that I would like to ask General Christmas as a follow-on on Cambodia. It has been reported that the Khmer Rouge is pulling out of the peace negotiations. You have commented that they have been much more forthcoming. Do you see this as something that is going to be a setback?

General CHRISTMAS. Senator, I don't believe it is going to be a setback as far as our joint field activities. However, one of the things that we are greatly concerned about is the security of our field teams. Right now, we avoid Khmer Rouge areas, and our activities have worked so that we do not, in fact, come in conflict with those areas where the Khmer Rouge have taken hold.

Second, we are working very closely with the United Nations command. We tell them exactly what we are doing, where we're going and when, and we share intelligence, if you will. And please don't take that out of context. We share information, hey, this is not a good place to go. We would back off from that. But we keep them informed of our activities. Obviously, we are concerned that if the peace process falls apart, and the Government of Cambodia falls apart, we will lose all of this cooperative action and spirit that we've had.

It's so good, Senator, that we actually have the deputy minister of Interior, who delayed our operation the last time by 1 day only because he wanted to go, because he's so involved in the activity. We would hate to see that go away.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But you say we cannot go into any area that is controlled by the Khmer Rouge.

General CHRISTMAS. That is correct. We do not go into those areas. Fortunately, at this time, we do not have active cases in those areas.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So there is no active case in that area?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you have anything that would indicate that the Chinese were involved? That any of these that are on any list, any of our people on the list might have gone into China?

General CHRISTMAS. I have no personal knowledge of that ma'am.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Reid.

I might add just before Senator Kassebaum goes, I think, General, am I accurate or not, that there are really very few questions of any live—I do not think there is in fact any live issue in Cambodia. The only issue at this point, I think is remains recovery. Is that accurate?

General CHRISTMAS. Not completely, sir. We continually follow through on cases that indicate that there possibly are Americans in Cambodia, and Bob's people with the—

Senator MCCAIN. How many live sightings in Cambodia?

Mr. SHEETZ. I don't think we have any live sighting reports right now, but we do have nine discrepancy cases in Cambodia that are at the forefront of both the DIA and JTF work in that country.

General CHRISTMAS. The possibility is they could have possibly been alive, so we have to follow through on that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But none in the areas where you say we cannot get into?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct, ma'am.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Is that true, Mr. Sheetz?

Mr. SHEETZ. I don't think any are in Khmer Rouge areas.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Are not in. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Gentlemen, what is the latest live sighting report that any of you know of?

Mr. SHEETZ. We receive them all the time. The inventory of—

Senator REID. When you say all of the time, it would not be unusual to receive a couple a week?

Mr. SHEETZ. Many weeks we could receive two or three or four or more. We have a working inventory that we are investigating aggressively. Between 80 to 125, and about every 3 months, we hold a review board where representatives of the entire intelligence community plus the State Department and the Joint Staff and OSD come in and listen to our analysts describe what we have been able to do to resolve or otherwise investigate the case.

And cases get closed out at that point, and the inventory drops down to maybe 75 or 80, and then over the next couple of months it will build back up. And we will hold another review board. So it's a very fluid figure.

Senator REID. General Christmas, the Cambodian situation you touched upon but it seems clear to me that recovery of bodies there would be, I do not know if I am using the right term, but next to impossible. There are millions of people that are in graves, or remains scattered on top of the ground. Is that not right?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct, sir.

Senator REID. So, even though you are working on the discrepancy cases as far as finding the remains, in Cambodia that is really going to be difficult, is it not?

General CHRISTMAS. Yes, sir. It is going to be difficult. But we owe it to those families to go the full mile, to go the whole way. And, as an example, we just not too long ago, recovered full sets of remains for four newsmen. So there is hope out there. And that's what we have to proceed on.

Senator REID. These are remains that one of the government groups there told you existed?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct, sir.

Senator REID. When are we going to have one list? Do we have an idea when that might be?

General CHRISTMAS. Yes, sir. We have one list now, of the 2,266. In May, both the Defense Intelligence Agency and ourselves sat down. We totally reconciled that list. That list was reconciled by location and country and the like and on June 22 and was totally agreed to.

Senator REID. So a couple of days ago?

General CHRISTMAS. Yes, sir. That list has now gone to the Department of Defense and the appropriate corrections and/or whatever is done is that level, will be made. But that has been completed.

Mr. SHEETZ. Could I add something to that please, Senator? Even this so-called one list is also a fluid list because some of the losses take place in border areas. The last piece of information known to the U.S. Government may have that case on the western side of the border in Laos and when our teams get out on the ground on that particular case, they find out, no, it's not true. The incident actually occurred on the eastern side of the Lao/Vietnamese border in Vietnam.

So, even though we've agreed on needed data adjustment and have recently made adjustments, I would submit to you that there will be more. As we learn from our future field activities, it will cause us to refine our judgments and our information. And the number for Laos, right now it's 522, 6 months from now it, may be 519 or 520, or—

General CHRISTMAS. The important point, Senator, though, is the mechanism in place. Since we've established the Joint Task Force and the supported and the supporting command relationship with the DIA, we have their representatives right in the Joint Task Force. They are in our detachments. And that—we are now tied together. I think that's the important aspect of this.

Senator REID. I have been told that there are Vietnam wartime histories and some of these speak of the death or capture of Americans. Are you familiar with any of those?

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, we know of histories that are written. We are in fact continually asking for any kind of histories that the Vietnamese may maintain. We have analysts ready to totally devour them. Because, as an example, sir, the 84-page document, which we did receive during the last visit, that has given us information on over 1,100 individuals who we could help correlate their particular case.

Senator REID. Some of that information, then, has been helpful?

General CHRISTMAS. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. And you are constantly on the look? On the watch for additional histories published in various areas of Vietnam, is that right?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct, sir.

Senator REID. And to your knowledge you are familiar with only one of them now. Is that right?

General CHRISTMAS. I have given the committee a list of what we currently have.

Senator REID. I will check that out then.

General CHRISTMAS. But I will tell you, sir, they can do better and we want more.

Senator REID. Do you have at your disposal adequate resources? People to read those?

General CHRISTMAS. Yes, we do.

Senator REID. You have no problem with that?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct, sir.

Senator REID. What is being done to develop, or perhaps it already has been done, a reliable list of deserters?

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, that is a difficult question. If you were to ask me, do I have a reliable list of deserters, my answer is no, I do not. Those we do know of, and those that we have been able to find, we have interrogated. But I could not say to you in all honesty that we have, that I have or the JTF has, an accurate list of deserters from the war.

Senator REID. Are we working on one?

General CHRISTMAS. I'd have to defer that to the Department of Defense, sir.

Senator REID. Can anybody answer that?

Mr. SHEETZ. We mounted a major effort, some years ago, to review files to try and see if it was possible to get a handle on deserters who could have deserted in Vietnam, and we found out that it's an incredibly complex topic. The numbers in the way they were kept by the military services during the war, make it almost impossible for you to distinguish between someone who actually deserted in country versus someone who deserted outside the theater. For example a soldier got a set of orders. He just got out of basic training, and he got a set of orders to report to a unit, a combat infantry division in Vietnam. And he never reported. And on the day that his orders called for him to report, he wasn't there, and they count him at that point as a deserter.

He may have never, ever set foot in Vietnam, and you have the circumstance of guys who went on R&R who decided that they weren't going back and never reported back from their R&R. It's an incredibly difficult exercise to sort out who deserted in country versus who deserted from a unit and was carried on the books but, really, wasn't even in country when they deserted. Very difficult.

I understand the committee is trying to work that. I'd be pleased to see what the committee has come up with and see if we can add something to it.

Senator REID. The reason is obvious. You know it is easy to get them mixed up with people who are prisoners of war or missing in action.

Mr. SHEETZ. I had experience of my own that I can relate to you that's of interest. I was in Vientiane with a congressional delegation back in December and, as we were loading our bags into a van and leaving the hotel on our way to the airport, I was looking out the window of the van, and I saw a guy walking down the street. Very tall, darkly tanned, in a white monk's outfit, but I could tell that he was a Caucasian and not Oriental. And I remarked to the State Department liaison official who was in the van with us, that guy looks like an American. Do you know who he is? And they said, yes, we have seen him before. He's a deserter from the war.

I about died. I said, that guy is a deserter? What's his name? The State Department official advised that he had his name in a file, back at the embassy. I said, listen, we've got to get to the airport now. Our plane is waiting for us. But, when you get back to the embassy, I want you to research that file and get me a cable, immediately, describing what this is all about. If that's a deserter, we need to know who he is. Well, to make a long story short, about a week after I got back, I got a phone call followed by a detailed cable reporting that the individual was not a deserter.

Once we had the name, we call this individual's mother here in the States. It turns out her son mustered out, decided that he liked Southeast Asia, and went back, actually converted his religion and became a Buddhist monk.

But they all thought he was a deserter, and it turns out he absolutely wasn't. And we confirmed all that through records and through talking with this man's mother.

So I'm aware of the reasons to follow up on deserters and we'd be happy to work with you and the committee on this topic.

Senator REID. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Do any of you know of any American servicemen in Southeast Asia, like Garwood, who are still there?

Mr. SHEETZ. I do not. And when I met with Vietnamese officials last summer I asked that question, as has General Vessey and General Christmas, and I'll let him speak for himself.

General CHRISTMAS. I have no personal knowledge, sir, that we have any there.

Senator REID. You have no personal knowledge. Do you have any reports, any hearsay information that they are there?

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, we have live sighting reports that we continue to pursue. But we have, at this time, no sufficient information to say that we have a live American in Vietnam or any place.

However, and I would be the first to tell you this, we don't have sufficient information yet to say that there isn't, and that's why we will pursue and continue to pursue these live sighting investigations, the last known discrepancy cases, and through our efforts expand throughout those three countries.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is gone but I have to ask this one last question. You have no personal knowledge. You are following up on all the leads. You can't give up. But let me ask you, gentleman, do you think that there are any people connected with the United States who served in the military in the Southeast in that conflict who are still alive? That is what it is all about.

General CHRISTMAS. I will go on record and say that I personally do not believe that we have any live Americans in the three countries at this time.

Mr. SHEETZ. And I would tell the Senator that if I had that kind of information, the Senator would have already known about it.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid. Just a couple quick questions before we wrap up. First of all, Mr. Sungenis, you deserve the patience of the year award for your remaining available for questioning. It is a tribute to you that we have not come back to you more, but I want to ask you a couple of quick things.

You kept your own set of casualty statistics, is that accurate?

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT SUNGENIS, CHIEF, DIRECTORATE OF INFORMATION, OPERATIONS AND REPORTS (DIOR), OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD), 1973-92

Mr. SUNGENIS. Yes, sir. I have what is generally known as the official file, and it's based on the individual casualty reports provided to my office by each military service.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a record of what each branch of the military gave to you?

Mr. SUNGENIS. I have the names, sir. It's an automated file. As I mentioned in my testimony, my detailed statement, I essentially went out of business in 1980 and the file was transferred to the National Archives, the hard copies of all of those individual 1300's because they contained privacy information regarding the next of kin, it was determined they would not be transferred and the official files were retained by the military services and my copies were destroyed.

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough. And we have, actually, a copy of that.

Mr. SUNGENIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have close contact with DIA in the exchange of your information and the maintaining of your file?

Mr. SUNGENIS. Periodically, sir. Regularly, I'd provide my information to anyone who asks for it.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am asking is was there really a relationship? Did you have an exchange process where your casualty figures, as you have maintained them—the word that has been much here is scrubbed. Was there really a kind of here is what we have got, here is what you have got, are we in sync? Did that process go on?

Mr. SUNGENIS. I do not look at DIA's files. I provide my information to DIA.

The CHAIRMAN. So you just give it to them and that is the end of it.

Mr. SUNGENIS. Well, no, not quite, sir. Because invariably, as I say, periodically—and I mean regularly, I would provide the information to DIA and their staff members, always with the request if you find something wrong, let me know, as I do with all of the military services.

The CHAIRMAN. And your contact with the casualty figures from the services ended when?

Mr. SUNGENIS. It's going on today, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is going on now.

Mr. SUNGENIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is still going on. It started when?

Mr. SUNGENIS. The first casualty reporting requirement from the services was in 1963, and that was a numerical report only. In March 1973 the requirement was made that the services provide us with individual casualty reports. And what they did in 1973 was provide us with a DD form 1300 for each individual and a punched card with that information. Since that day we have maintained the file. But as you know, this was after Operation Homecoming when we got into the business.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General Christmas, I applaud your willingness to take a position on what you believe. I think it is important for people to state what they believe, particularly—

General CHRISTMAS. I wish I was wrong, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Beg your pardon?

General CHRISTMAS. I hope that I am wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. I totally understand that and I know it will not affect what you are doing at all, but I think that as we go along here, we have got to get reasonable people's opinions on where we stand in this. The committee is going to making its own judgments as we wrap it up toward the end of this process. As I have said at the outset of these hearings, and I say it again, anybody who has got real evidence, this is the time to come forward and we are all ready to sift it through.

But I want to ask you a couple of other questions that are very important to this. Yesterday we asked the question of Mr. Trowbridge and others about the 2,266 list. When people in America hear POW/MIA, 2,266, they go wow. Are there 2,266 POW/MIA today, General?

General CHRISTMAS. POW/MIA: Sir, there are 2,266 that are unaccounted for.

The CHAIRMAN. Now are they, in fact, truly unaccounted for?

General CHRISTMAS. We have cases on each and every one of them. Some of those cases are conclusive that we have in fact—as General Vessey testified, that in fact, in the case of the 35 that came off his list. We have good information that they are dead but there is a chance that we might recover their remains, so they remain.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. But that raises the issue of whether there ought to be a new category conceivably. And one hesitates to create categories, but is it not a fact—and I think, Mr. Sheetz, you can help answer this—that there are some cases where somebody may have been, by virtue of all the information, deemed to be killed in action and rather than body not recovered, the body is not recoverable?

Mr. SHEETZ. That's definitely true, certainly among the KIA/BNR cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Now in the 2,266, we have a significant number, do we not, of people about whom it is your judgment and the service's judgment, by virtue of all the input, reviewed and passed by a

casualty board, that in the best judgment of all concerned there is a certitude in their judgment as to that person having been killed in action. Is that accurate?

Mr. SHEETZ. The list breaks down almost in half in terms of people who—

The CHAIRMAN. When are we going to kind of call that one? I mean when are we going to deal with the issue of finality with respect to that, rather than having this larger world that raises people's questions about this? I mean I have not talked to anyone in the Pentagon, DIA, CIA, anywhere, who has anything to do with this issue, who does not confirm to me that there is a significant body of the 2,266 who fall into that category. Is it that there is a timidity? Does nobody want to do that? Are we going to go on? Help me.

General CHRISTMAS. I think for one thing, sir, you are above our pay grade. That is certainly a policy decision. I can assure you, however, from the Joint Task Force perspective, and I know from the Joint Staff perspective, we have made recommendations. And I think that, at the policy level, considerations are starting to be made at this time of looking into what should be the appropriate procedure, based on your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you reviewing those cases in order to make certain as to the judgments that were made so we do not wind up with a situation where someone is so categorized and it is simply not appropriate?

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, those decisions are made at the inter-agency group level. We provide the information.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is in charge of that decision?

General CHRISTMAS. Well, as you know, the interagency group is composed of both the State Department, as well as the Department of Defense and other representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. Should there be this new category of killed in action, body not recoverable?

General CHRISTMAS. I think—and someone may have to correct me—I think the Department of Defense has now put—well I best not say. I'm not sure, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us pursue that after this. I know we need to work with the families and with others, there is no question of that, but I think it is something that ought to be a part of this process.

Another question that is on the minds of a lot of Americans, is there a kind of catch-22 to this process, that we search and search but there is always some ravine in some location that somebody has not been to, so you can never say? I mean it is the nonproving of a negative. Are you fearful of that in any regard? Is that a problem here?

General CHRISTMAS. I believe that we've put into effect an operation that, if given the access to the countries involved, given greater cooperation or expanding or increasing cooperation by those countries involved, I believe we have put into effect the operation that can, in fact, bring about the information where correct decisions can be made on the fate of the 2,266.

The CHAIRMAN. And when will the province by province process be in place?

General CHRISTMAS. That is phase 2. And that takes place as soon as we have completed the last known alive discrepancy cases. Now as I indicated in my testimony, certainly in some of those last known alive discrepancy cases we will have to return to them, because the information we find will need further information to come to more resolution.

But every time we get our teams in the field, we're seeing increasing information that helps us make a determination, and that's the important thing.

The CHAIRMAN. General, that leads me to last sort of question. Every time we get our people in the field we get more and more information. When I was—I have made three visits now to Vietnam in the last year and a half. On each occasion the ambassadors of other countries who are our allies—whether it is France or England or Italy or Germany, Sweden—have all said to me, Senator, why do you not get your people in here? If you want to find the answers, get your people in here.

And you just said the more we get our people out there, the more information we get. It seems to me that our own policy of sort of not dealing, and dealing at arms distance, works counter to our ability to resolve this issue. That the more people we could get in and the more interaction we get, the more we are going to get answers. Am I wrong, or what is your experience thus far?

General CHRISTMAS. Our experience is this, sir. First of all, we've made a great breakthrough by getting those detachments in each one of the capitals, and that day-to-day activity that our Hanoi detachments make is extremely beneficial. We go in at 80 day iterations because, quite frankly, the terrain, the work load, and the stress put on our teams, at the end of that 80 day period they need to come out, they need to rest, they need to write their reports which are so important to get that information into the flow.

And the final thing is that obviously the Vietnamese, the Laotians, and the Cambodians have to agree to the number of people and the number of teams that we're allowed to put in country each time. Now we have gotten the Vietnamese to agree to expand the next field activity to four teams, four investigative teams or search teams and two recovery teams. They'll do that for the next two field activities, and then in the third of these four field activities it'll expand to five teams.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. But that is working within the current framework of people you have assigned, correct?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct. But I think we also must understand that that is within the framework of what the Vietnamese can support also.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, all of which has to do with policy which is not your field. So I am not going to ask you to—you have to deal with what you have to deal with. You do not make the policy and I understand. But if, as a matter of national priority, we thought somebody was alive and we want to find out as fast as possible, I want to get as many people as possible doing this and push the limits.

General CHRISTMAS. But obviously, sir, the host countries have to—have to agree to it. And we're constantly pushing.

The CHAIRMAN. I hear you. And there are some reasons they might not. Mr. Sheetz.

Mr. SHEETZ. I'd like to underscore this. There's something that Senator Smith and Senator Kerry, both, I think, could help us with. I recognize you'll probably be making another trip to South-east Asia before your committee completes it work. If you do, or if another opportunity presents itself—

The CHAIRMAN. We may be.

Mr. SHEETZ. I wish you would underscore to both the Lao Government and the Vietnamese Government the need for unfettered access in conducting live sighting investigations. Basically, not frustrating our officers when they're out there in the field trying to facilitate the process. We're making progress, it's getting better, but it's got to get a lot better before I'm going to be happy. And if there's anything this committee could do to underscore with those two governments.

The CHAIRMAN. You know what I would like to ask you to do. I really would like you to give me, in writing, a memo that sets out specifically examples of the kind of thing you are talking about.

Mr. SHEETZ. I'd be pleased to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

(4) Senator Kerry: Mr. Sheetz provide, in writing, details of the obstructions which DIA/JTF-FA live sighting investigators have been subjected to by the Vietnamese.

(4) Mr. Robert R. Sheetz: Let me say at the onset that in general, and at a policy level, the Vietnamese have become open, with some reluctance, to live sighting investigations. The problems which the Vietnamese have raised to the live sighting investigators have been at a working level and of an operational nature. In the start-up period in the Fall 1991 they demanded a long notice investigation process, sometimes as long as weeks. Through negotiation they have accepted the idea of a short-notice investigation. However, in recent weeks, they amended that to note that it precluded any short-notice visit to any governmental facility, stating that a week's notice would be necessary. Recently, they have suggested that in the future, they would have to be provided a list of the sightings with the substance of the reports, the specific locations, and the sources made known to them beforehand. The Vietnamese indicated that they would like to interview the sources to assess their validity. Additionally, they would like the list to be prioritized and finite since they are unwilling to accede to this process in the long term. However, these objections were denied at the policy level by a Vietnamese spokesman, and in fact, a short notice live sighting investigation was conducted successfully after the objections were raised.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be very helpful to us. I will say that Senator Smith and I could not have impressed on people more—and I think that what General Vessey said, at the upper level there is a lot of agreement. We went out to a prisoner. The upper level was pushing extremely hard to get the permissions; the lower level just had not quite gotten the message completely.

As we all know, there are 20 years of habits. There are a lot of different feelings and ideologies and different levels of willingness. So you have to break through all of that, and I think we understand what you are talking about; we need some help.

Before I summarize, let me ask Senator Smith if he has any additional questions.

Senator SMITH. Three or four points to jump around with, Mr. Chairman.

General Christmas and Mr. Sheetz, would you agree that this committee and the American people would be entitled to see, subject, you know, to any national security problems, all of the data

that this Government has on this issue? Would either one of you disagree with that statement?

Mr. SHEETZ. As long as proper safeguards are worked out, I see absolutely no problem with it.

General CHRISTMAS. Again, the key is those sources that could be compromised and could be hurt by it. But we in the Joint Task Force have been moving very steadily to ensure that everything is unclassified.

Senator SMITH. General Christmas, on May 6 there was an AP report quoting both you and General Needham. General Needham said—this is what he is attributed as having said: There still is no reason to believe any missing American is alive in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, but every live sighting has to be checked out, unquote.

There seems to me to be an inconsistency in that statement. If you have a missing child and somebody calls your home and says I have seen your child, does that not give one some reason to believe that child might be there where they said they saw it? Is that a fair assessment of that statement?

General CHRISTMAS. I think if taken in that way, it is a fair assessment of that statement. I would just indicate to you, obviously, sir, we haven't seen the information that says that there is, but we continue to pursue.

Senator SMITH. No, I understand. But I guess—I am not trying to argue with that. I understand what you said and you have made your point, but to me—again, not in the sense of being confrontational but to be somewhat critical—with the job that you have to do and the importance of the job that you have to do, it seems to me to be somewhat like going to a baseball player and saying now, Smith, you are going out and you are going to play first base—which I used to do—and you will be batting third. Now Smith goes out and plays first base. He does not bring his glove because he is not going to get any ground balls and he does not take his bat up to the plate because he is not going to get a pitch.

I mean that to me is what it sounds like when you take the position you stated. You are entitled to your opinion and I understand that and I respect it, but you are in a position that you are on a very important mission here to find information. I know you stated a personal opinion. However, it is still—I think the fact that there are live sighting reports out there, whether you believe them or not, but the fact that they are there indicates that they have to be pursued.

General CHRISTMAS. Sir, I would like to, if I can—

Senator SMITH. Go ahead and respond.

General CHRISTMAS. It does not mean that I don't believe that live sighting report, and we pursue each and every one of those live sighting reports. Unfortunately, all of them to this point in time—at this time, we have not been able to determine that there have been live Americans.

I am the first one to want to see an American walk out of the jungle. I am the first one to want to make a great discovery and have one of our teams determine that there is an American there. I'm the first one that ensures that there are plans in place to bring Americans back if we should find them.

You know, but you asked for a personal opinion, and from what I have seen to this point, sir, I don't think there are. But I would tell you that that in no way hampers a tremendous effort that the Joint Task Force and the support of DIA, is going to upturn every possible lead.

Senator SMITH. Let me just ask one final question of you, Mr. Sheetz. In your remarks you talked about—you named by name, actually, a lot of the people who work in your office, many of whom I have known over the years as well. And I just—some of the criticism, as you know, there have been two or three internal reviews. And if we are going to comment on all the criticism it ought to be in a way that helps us to resolve the issue and find out what happened to these people. I mean I think that is the spirit of any criticism, as far as I am concerned.

And I think that, as I look at the categories in the so-called Si Report, which is not a classified document but it does go into the categories of the missing, and we have a list of certain people who are missing and their circumstances of missing. And you have some categories—and this is a very brief question, Mr. Chairman.

You have some categories and here is what the categories are. Now these are the categories of the people are missing. One category is unresolved cases—this is on your sheet, a DIA document. One is unresolved cases. That would cases that can be correlated to know—or second category is cases that can be correlated to known individuals such as returnees. The third category is cases that offer no information on POW's. And the fourth category is information on camps only; I assume POW camps. And then there is another category of cases judged by DIA to be fabrications or possible fabrications.

It is interesting, as I read down that cover page, that there is no category for POW's, none. There is no category for somebody who is telling the truth, none. It just seems to me that if you are going into this thing totally open-minded, and you have got a sheet that lists all the missing, you ought to have a category on there for POW's even if you do not have anybody in it. You ought to have a category on there for people telling the truth, even if everybody is lying, because somebody may come along and tell the truth.

Now that is the kind of thing that makes me want to rebut you when you talk about total commitment, and I am not trying to pass any aspersions on any individual. But I see this and these are the kinds of things that bother me very much, and there are other examples of this and this is just one.

Can you give me any explanation—and this is a final question—any explanation as to why such a document would exist that covers 2,200 and some missing people from the Vietnam War, with live sighting reports all over the place and other intelligence as well, that does not ever have a category for POW's or people who are telling the truth. I mean that is what is says, it speaks for itself.

Mr. SHEETZ. The way I would answer that question, Senator Smith, is of the 2,266 unaccounted for, DIA has worked hand in glove with the people at the JTF, the predecessor organization, JCRC, and policymakers, in identifying a total of 269 discrepancy cases in which the last information known to the U.S. Government, or other significant facts that have been developed about that case,

indicate that—there's some information that caused us to believe that that person was still alive the last time we knew about that person.

Senator SMITH. Well I saw the report on the mortician, the infamous mortician who gave us information about the cataloguing, if you will or whatever—processing remains, etc. And as you know, he also said he saw three, I believe, two or three, live Americans.

Mr. SHEETZ. That's true.

Senator SMITH. And he was considered a very credible witness. Nobody was able to debunk him; I read the entire report.

Mr. SHEETZ. That's right.

Senator SMITH. What category does his report fit in on that list that I read? He is not a fabricator. He is not a possible fabricator. He certainly gave you information on POW's. I mean where does it fit?

Mr. SHEETZ. This report, which the Committee has called the Si Report, was one of probably thousands of database runs that we have done at various times to support the analytic process. And in fact the reason it got its name, the Si Report, is that it was conceived of and run by one analyst whose name—whose first name happens to be Si.

Analysts come up with different hypotheses and different approaches to the data when they're working a case, and they'll go in and ask our data processing manager to try to isolate out a group of cases to test a certain hypothesis. And they'll come up with some criteria to make a run. Analysts do that all the time, and I would not want to stifle the freedom of analysts to do whatever they're going to do.

I think the critical thing is that we have focused in our office, and we continue to focus, on those critical cases where we have information that represents a serious discrepancy. Basically we want answers from the Vietnamese on this cause.

Senator SMITH. Is this your database? Is this Si Report your database? Is that your database or not?

Mr. SHEETZ. As to what you call the Si Report, my understanding is that it is one run that was extracted from our database. The run may have actually taken a look at every file in the database, but it is not—it does not represent a definitive view of our database.

It's one way to depict all the information that's in the database. And I could postulate for you hundreds of other ways that I could sort information in the database and categorize it in many different ways by combining different source categories and sort criteria.

Senator SMITH. Just as a suggestion, I would suggest you might put a category in there for somebody that might be telling the truth and that somebody might be a POW.

Mr. SHEETZ. I'll take a look at that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Smith's point is well taken, that there is that possibility. I think you ought to look at it.

But let me just say that with respect to this kind of issue about the various reports and what they mean, we are going to be sitting with you folks—I think next week is the first round—and we are going to be doing a pretty detailed analysis of some of these things so that we can understand how you made judgments and you can explain to us how you made judgments.

I think it gives you a chance to deal with some of these things that kind of come out, as you have characterized them in a sort of sensational fashion when freestanding, but when you measure them against other things, they may change. On the other hand, also it may be that we will discover that they cannot be measured against other things or that there is a reason to believe some of these. The committee cannot just leave that hanging out there.

Mr. SHEETZ. We have lots of work to do.

The CHAIRMAN. We do have lots of work to do. We need to do that work quietly and together, and I know we can do that.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me one second, just one final point because it just occurred to me as I was questioning. A live sighting report comes in and there is no category for it. I just do not understand the thinking. Is that true? Where do you put it?

Mr. SHEETZ. Of the roughly 1,500 first-hand live sighting reports that we've had for evaluation, there's almost 1,100 reports that we've judged that the source, quote, told the truth, and there's only roughly 300 reports where we've said the source fabricated, and there's roughly 100 reports that are still under active investigation.

So if you add 1,100, 300, and 100 it takes us to the 1,500 we've received. Right now, of all the resolved reports, we're telling you that over 1,100 of them the source the truth. We are not, debunking or otherwise casting doubt on what that particular source had to say.

The CHAIRMAN. These are going to be in the public domain pretty soon, so it is going to be vital for you to have explained them to us and to be able to explain them publicly, so you do not have somebody running around the country with a piece of paper saying see, here, I told you so, and it is a meaningless piece of paper.

So whether you do it for us or you do it for the Nation, you are going to have to explain those kinds of things. It is going to be very important, the press is going to inquire, and it does mean you have a lot of work, but it has got to be done in order to explain this issue.

General, let me just say to you that I do not want you to leave here with an impression that there is any doubt in the committee, as a consequence of the question you were asked with respect to your opinion by Senator Reid.

You are a Marine General, and I know from experience that the Marines have a saying that they never leave behind even their dead. And I know that in Vietnam many a mission was run and people lost their lives just trying to bring back the dead. Am I correct?

General CHRISTMAS. That's correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I also notice that you—if I have still the ability to see that far and read my medals correctly, that you wear the Navy Cross and Purple Heart and you were wounded in Vietnam. So I want you to know that this Senator, and the committee, have no doubts about your commitment to follow up any live sighting report or to do this mission.

Let me also say that this brings to a close 2 days of important and emotional hearings. I think we have laid open a lot and I think we have disclosed a lot. I am not going to summarize all of it now,

but I do want to thank my colleagues for their support and effort in this difficult task which produces an automatic tug of war. It is just inevitable around this issue.

But I think the committee has succeeded in showing to a certainty that there were those in Government, Admiral Moorer, General Tighe—even Chuck Trowbridge acknowledges, as have Mr. Sheetz and others, that there was a body of information in 1973 about people that we believed to be prisoners. And that there was evidence beyond mere indications, but evidence that qualified those people to be carried on a list as prisoners of war.

That evidence is sufficient that 20 years later American service people are travelling through the jungles of those countries in order to seek answers. That evidence is sufficient that successive Presidents made decisions to make a commitment to this issue. That evidence was certainly sufficient in 1973 for us to want to seek that full accounting then.

We have heard evidence that there was a failure in that accounting process. That failure is self evident by the fact that we are here 20 years later, but it was a stated failure by virtue of the implementation of the peace accords themselves. It was a failure that perhaps went beyond that, a failure that can be accounted for in the mood of the country and the times and the politics, in a whole lot of things that need further articulation by this committee.

There is also evidence before this committee that there were statements made by high Government officials that misled families. I am not saying consciously, and I do not want to read a headline that I am accusing somebody of lying, but the statements had the effect of misleading. The statements became policy and the policy, for whatever reasons yet to be fully explored by the committee and articulated, resulted in this dissension and tug of war that has engulfed the country around this issue for almost 20 years.

It is certainly my judgment, personally—I speak personally here—that families that have said there was a reason to believe my loved one should have come home were correct. And there is a reason to believe that answers should have been forthcoming and this should not have been a tug of war between families and Government over all these years.

So there is certainly that measure of information that we have received. There are other acknowledgments that I think are not insignificant; acknowledgments that we are not really dealing with a universe of 2,266, it is smaller.

In fact the committee, through its exhaustive review, suggest that somewhere in the vicinity, in 1973, of 244 is a reasonable number, minus those immediately determined to have died in captivity, which leaves you somewhere in the vicinity of 133, which is close, as General Vessey said, to the numbers he has come up with.

So, in point of fact, there is a coming together here of information. And I would suggest to people that, with all of this being made public, with these lists being made public, with the numbers being examined publicly, with the classified information being declassified, America really is one step closer to being able to resolve this. Not there yet, but one step closer.

And on that note, the committee will have further hearings. We will continue to do our work with depositions, with the acquisition

of documents and the review of documents. We welcome people who have suggestions as a consequence of these hearing of questions that need to be asked. There is no closing of a door today. It is June and we will be proceeding into July and August and September and October and November.

We have a great deal of work to do. There will be more hearings. There will ultimately be hearings that will deal with some of the analysis of the issue of live sighting reports. There will be hearings that will deal with the process. There will be hearings that deal with 1973 and Paris, and other officials have yet to testify. All of this, I think, will help us understand this issue and make some judgments.

So on that note, I thank the committee, I thank the staff. So on that note we stand adjourned until further notice.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing adjourned.]

ATTACHMENT FOR MR. CHARLES TROWBRIDGE AND MR. ROBERT SHEETZ DIA'S SPECIAL OFFICE FOR POW/MIA

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

Question 5. During your testimony on Wednesday, June 24 you cited 169 "priority cases" throughout Southeast Asia. Please provide a list of those 169 names broken down by country of loss and whether remains have been recovered.

Answer 5. The list of the 269 as requested has been forwarded to the Senate Select Committee twice before on July 30, 1992 and August 5, 1992. It is herewith forwarded for a third time.

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Page 1

FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	DATE	CHRY_ORIG
ANDERSON, ROBERT DALE	1934	F	XX		
APPOACA, VICTOR JOE JR	0727	F	XX	721006	VN
BACKUS, KENNETH FRANK	0706	F	XX	670609	VN
BISSE, RALPH CAMPION	0785	N	XX	670522	VN
BLACKWOOD, GORDON BYRON	0711	F	XX	670804	VN
BREHMAN, HERBERT OWEN	0928	F	NR	670527	VN
BRUCH, DONALD WILLIAM JR	0322	F	XX	671126	VN
BRUCHER, JOHN MARTIN	1388	F	XX	660429	VN
BUSCH, JON THOMAS	0727	F	NR	690218	VN
CAFFELLI, CHARLES EDWARD	0909	F	NR	670608	VN
CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP	0873	F	XX	671117	VN
CONDY, DOUGLAS CRAIG	0928	F	XX	671024	VN
COOK, KELLY FRANCIS	0904	F	XX	671126	VN
CREN, JAMES ALAN	0904	F	XX	671110	VN
CUTHBERT, BRADLEY GENE	1327	F	XX	671110	VN
DARDEAU, OSCAR MOISE JR	0913	F	XX	681123	VN
DERICKSON, THOMAS G II	0859	F	NR	671118	VN
DOVE, JACK PARIS SR	0761	F	XX	671012	VN
DUKLOP, THOMAS EARL	1816	N	XX	670712	VN
DUNN, MICHAEL E	1004	N	XX	720406	VN
EIDSHOE, NORMAN EDWARD	1004	N	XX	680126	VN
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL JOHN	0656	N	XX	680136	VN
FRANCISCO, SAN DENAYNE	1129	F	XX	670426	VN
FULLAN, WAYNE E	0855	F	XX	681125	VN
GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND	0531	F	NR	671007	VN
GREILING, DAVID SCOTT	1234	N	XX	661202	VN
HAMILTON, JOHN S	0644	F	XX	680724	VN
HANSON, ROBERT TAFT JR	0247	N	NR	670419	VN
HARDY, JOHN K JR	0859	F	XX	660203	VN
HESTLE, ROOSEVELT JR	0366	F	XX	671012	VN
HENLEY, STANLEY HENRY	0986	F	NR	660706	VN
HORNE, STANLEY HENRY	0903	F	NR	680114	VN
HUNYICUTT, CHARLES J JR	0952	N	XX	671110	VN
INNES, ROGER B	0680	F	XX	671227	VN
JEFFERSON, JAMES HILTON	0615	F	NR	670512	VN
KARINS, JOSEPH J JR	0114	F	NR	670311	VN
KOSIG, WALTER	0805	F	XX	650727	VN
LANE, CHARLES JR	0952	N	XX	670823	VN
LEE, LEONARD MURRAY	0913	F	NR	671227	VN
LEHNHOFF, EDWARD W	0105	F	XX	671118	VN
LINDSEY, HARVIN NELSON	0158	F	XX	650629	VN
MASSUCCI, MARTIN J	0168	N	XX	651001	VN
MAYER, RODERICK LEWIS	1882	F	XX	651017	VN
MCCARTY, JAMES L	0124	F	XX	720624	VN
MELLOR, FREDRIC M	0213	F	XX	680813	VN
MIMS, GEORGE I JR	0826	F	XX	651220	VN
MOORE, HERBERT WILLIAM JR	0903	F	XX	670903	VN
MORGAN, JAMES S	1329	F	XX	671110	VN
MORRISON, JOSEPH C	0677	N	XX	681125	VN
NEHERLAND, ROGER M	0641	F	XX	670510	VN
O'GRADY, JOHN FRANCIS				670410	VN

NR= remains returned and identified

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FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY	0691	N	XX	670519	VN
PERRINE, ELTON L	0706	F	XX	670522	VN
POLLIN, GEORGE J	0659	F	NR	670429	VN
POWERS, TRENT RICHARD	0179	N	NR	651031	VN
PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER	0511	N	NR	670309	VN
ROBERTSON, JOHN L	0459	F	XX	660916	VN
SCHEAF, CHARLES J	0158	F	XX	651001	VN
SITTWER, RONALD NICHOLIS	0804	F	XX	670823	VN
SQUIRE, BOYD E	0761	F	XX	670712	VN
STEEN, MARTIN W	0349	F	XX	660531	VN
TATUM, LAWRENCE B	0453	F	XX	660910	VN
TOLBERT, CLARENCE ORFIELD	1943	N	NR	721106	VN
TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE	0304	N	XX	660417	VN
TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON	0650	N	NR	670424	VN
WILES, HARVIN BENJAMIN C	1843	N	XX	720506	VN
WILLIAMSON, DON IRA	0107	F	NR	650707	VN

TOTAL NUMBER OF RECORDS ARE 66

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Page 1

FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO	1258	A	XX	680822	VS
ADAMS, SAMUEL	0180	F	XX	651031	VS
ASHLOCK, CARLOS	0678	M	XX	670512	VS
BABULA, ROBERT LEO	0439	M	XX	660828	VS
BADOLATI, FRANK NEIL	0242	A	BB	650219	VS
BLOOD, HENRY F	1017	V	XX	660201	VS
BODENSCHATE, JOHN EUGEN JR	0439	M	XX	660828	VS
BORAN, DANIEL VERNOR JR	1927	H	XX	720924	VS
BORTON, ROBERT CURTIS JR	0439	M	XX	660828	VS
BOWERS, RICHARD LEE	1414	A	XX	690324	VS
BRAM, RICHARD CRAIG	0108	M	XX	650708	VS
BROWN, HARRY WILLIS	1046	A	XX	680212	VS
BROWN, WAYNE GORDON II	1901	F	XX	720717	VS
BUCKLEY, LOUIS JR	0344	A	XX	660521	VS
CARTER, DENNIS RAY	0439	M	XX	660828	VS
CICHON, WALTER ALAN	1112	A	XX	680330	VS
COCHEO, RICHARD NEWELL	1010	V	PP	680131	VS
COLLINS, WILLARD MARION	0267	F	BB	660309	VS
COMPA, JOSEPH JAMES JR	0096	A	BB	650610	VS
COOK, DONALD GILBERT	0050	H	KK	641231	VS
CORNHWAITE, THOMAS GUY	1318	N	KK	681105	VS
CURLEY, ROBERT LEE JR	0096	A	BB	650610	VS
DARILL, DOUGLAS EDWARD	1428	A	XX	690417	VS
DALZ, CHARLES ALVA	0094	A	XX	650609	VS
DELONG, JOE LYNN	0689	A	XX	670518	VS
DEMOM, DAVID STANLEY	0094	A	XX	650609	VS
DEYTER, BERNIE LEE	0133	F	KK	660509	VS
DINGWALL, JOHN FRANCIS	0108	M	XX	650708	VS
DODGE, EDWARD RAY	0051	A	XX	661231	VS
DUSING, CHARLES GALE	0180	F	KK	651031	VS
EGAN, JAMES THOMAS JR	0235	H	XX	660121	VS
ELLIS, WILLIAM JR	0372	A	XX	660624	VS
ENTRICAN, DANNY D	1748	A	XX	710518	VS
ERSKINE, JACK D	1321	V	PP	681113	VS
FERGUSON, WALTER JR	1260	A	KK	680823	VS
FINLEY, DICKIE V	1308	A	XX	681021	VS
FISCHER, RICHARD WILLIAM	0977	M	XX	680108	VS
FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E	0715	A	XX	670531	VS
FITZGERALD, PAUL L JR	0867	A	XX	671017	VS
FOSTER, ROBERT EUGENE	0267	F	BB	660309	VS
FOWLER, DONALD R	1244	A	XX	680801	VS
GAGE, ROBERT HUGH	0381	M	XX	660703	VS
GALLANT, HENRY JOSEPH	0109	A	BB	650713	VS
GERBER, DANIEL A	0011	V	PP	680205	VS
GODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHEY	1035	M	KK	680205	VS
GRAF, JOHN GEORGE	1523	N	XX	691115	VS
GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G	2048	N	BB	720414	VS
GRIER, ROBERT LEE	0031	N	NR	640607	VS
GROTE, VALE L	1046	A	XX	680212	VS
GRZYB, ROBERT H	0937	V	KK	671210	VS

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FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
GUNN, ALAN W	1046	A	XX	680212	VS
HAGEN, CRAIG LOUIS	0096	A	BB	650610	VS
HALL, HARLEY HUBERT	1982	N	XX	730127	VS
HALL, WALTER LOUIS	0096	A	BB	650610	VS
HAMILTON, ROGER D	0067	M	XX	670421	VS
HAWK, JAMES E	1086	F	XX	680314	VS
HAWMOND, DENNIS WAYNE	1042	M	KK	680208	VS
HARGROVE, CLIN JR	0867	A	XX	671017	VS
HARRIS, GREGORY J	0358	M	XX	660612	VS
HASENBACH, PAUL ALFRED	0646	A	XX	670421	VS
HASTINGS, STEVEN M	1244	A	XX	680801	VS
HELD, JOHN WAYNE	1121	F	XX	680417	VS
HODGSON, CECIL J	0242	A	XX	660129	VS
HUNT, ROBERT W	1065	A	XX	680228	VS
IBARREZ, DI REYES	0723	M	XX	670605	VS
JAKOVAC, JOHN ANDREW	0715	A	XX	670531	VS
JEFFS, CLIVE G	1723	F	XX	710312	VS
JOHNS, VERNON E	1028	A	NR	680203	VS
JOHNSON, BRUCE G	0096	A	XX	650610	VS
JOHNSON, WILLIAM D	0997	A	XX	680119	VS
KALLI, TANGS E	1375	V	KK	690208	VS
KALONE, JIMMY M	0326	A	XX	660504	VS
KANGINO, THOMAS ANGELO	0646	A	XX	670421	VS
MCDONALD, KURT CASEY	0051	F	XX	641231	VS
MCDONNELL, JOHN TERRANCE	1402	A	XX	690306	VS
MOHR, BRIAN KEAT	0715	A	XX	670531	VS
MCLEAN, JAMES HENRY	0054	A	XX	650209	VS
MILLNER, MICHAEL	0930	A	XX	671129	VS
MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON	0011	V	PP	620530	VS
MOORE, THOMAS	0180	F	KK	651031	VS
MORRIS, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	1981	F	XX	730127	VS
MORROW, LARRY K	1868	A	XX	720529	VS
NEWTON, CHARLES V	1428	A	XX	690417	VS
NEWTON, DONALD S	0258	A	XX	660226	VS
NIDDS, DANIEL R	0646	A	XX	670421	VS
NIEHOUSE, DANIEL LEE	0529	V	KK	661125	VS
OLSEN, BETTY ANN	1018	V	KK	680201	VS
OWENS, FRED MONROE	0096	A	BB	650610	VS
PEARCE, DALE ALLEN	1747	A	BB	710517	VS
PEDERSON, JOE PALMER	1639	A	XX	700623	VS
PETERSON, DELBERT R	0267	F	XX	660309	VS
PETERSON, MARK ALLEN	1981	F	XX	730127	VS
PHILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL	1639	A	XX	700623	VS
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD HERBER	1660	M	XX	700911	VS
PLATT, ROBERT L JR	0728	A	XX	670610	VS
PLUMADORE, KENNETH LEO	0639	M	BB	670921	VS
POTTS, LARRY FLETCHER	1820	M	XX	720407	VS
PREVEDEL, CHARLES F	1428	A	XX	690417	VS
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS REESE	1274	A	XX	680908	VS
RAY, JAMES MICHAEL	1093	A	KK	680318	VS
REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND	0976	A	KK	680109	VS
REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR	0318	A	NR	660426	VS

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FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
ROE, JERRY L	1046	A	XX	680212	VS
ROZO, JAMES MILAN	1639	A	XX	700623	VS
RUSSELL, PETER J	1244	A	XX	680801	VS
SARGENT, DONALD RUSSELL	0096	A	BB	650610	VS
SALLEY, JAMES JR	1737	A	KK	670712	VS
SCHIELL, JAMES F	0762	A	XX	710331	VS
SCHMIDT, WALTER T JR	1205	M	XX	670712	VS
SCHRECKENGOST, FRED T	0031	M	NR	680609	VS
SCULL, GARY BERNARD	1572	A	XX	640607	VS
SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD	1218	V	XX	700312	VS
SMALL, BURT CHAUNCEY JR	0607	A	KK	681105	VS
SOYLAND, DAVID PECOR	1747	A	XX	670306	VS
SPARKS, DONALD L	1456	A	XX	710517	VS
STRAIT, DOUGLAS T	1668	A	XX	690617	VS
STROHLEIN, MADISON ALEXAND	1756	A	XX	701018	VS
SYKES, DERRI	0976	A	XX	710622	VS
TAYLOR, FRED (NMN)	0109	A	KK	680109	VS
TERRILL, PHILIP B	1737	A	BB	650713	VS
TERRY, RONALD TERRANCE	0242	A	BB	710331	VS
VANBERGHEM, JAMES LEE	0762	A	KK	660129	VS
VITTI, ELEANOR A	0011	V	PP	670712	VS
WALKER, BRUCE C	0011	V	PP	620530	VS
WHEELER, EUGENE LACY	1820	F	XX	720407	VS
WILLS, FRANCIS DESALES	1598	M	XX	700421	VS
WINTERS, DAVID M	0258	A	BB	660226	VS
WORTH, JAMES F	0646	A	XX	670421	VS
WROBLESKI, WALTER F	1810	M	XX	720401	VS
YONAN, KENNETH JOSEPH	0703	A	XX	670521	VS
	1835	A	NR	720424	VS

Total Number of Records are: 130

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FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
APPELHANS, RICHARD DUANE	0862	F	XX	671016	LA
ARD, RANDOLPH JEFFERSON	1719	A	XX	710307	LA
BAKER, ARTHUR DALE	0070	F	XX	650407	LA
BODDEN, TIMOTHY ROY	0720	M	XX	670603	LA
BOTT, RUSSELL PETER	0536	A	XX	661202	LA
BOYER, ALAN LEE	1108	A	XX	680328	LA
BRASHEAR, WILLIAM JAMES	1437	F	XX	690508	LA
BROWN, GEORGE RONALD	1108	A	XX	680328	LA
BROWNLEE, CHARLES RICHARD	1347	F	XX	681224	LA
BURNETT, SHELTON JOHN	1719	A	XX	710307	LA
CARLOCK, RALPH LAURENCE	0606	F	XX	670304	LA
CLARKE, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	0862	F	XX	680112	LA
CORRON, JAMES DERWIN	0984	A	XX	710313	LA
CREED, BARTON SHELTON	1724	N	XX	710319	LA
CRISTMAN, FREDERICK LEWIS	1730	A	XX	691205	LA
DANIELSON, BENJAMIN FRANKL	1535	F	XX	740910	LA
DEAN, CHARLES	0016	V	PP	630905	LA
DERBURN, EUGENE H	0720	A	XX	670603	LA
DEXTER, RONALD JAMES	1683	F	XX	701212	LA
DUCKETT, THOMAS ALLEN	0480	A	XX	661003	LA
ECHEVARRIA, RAYMOND L	0947	M	XX	671222	LA
FORS, GARY HENRY	1730	A	XX	710319	LA
GARCIA, RICARDO MARTINEZ	0720	M	XX	670603	LA
GARDNER, JOHN C	0297	A	XX	660406	LA
GATES, JAMES W	0720	M	XX	670603	LA
HANSON, STEPHEN PAUL	1062	N	BB	680227	LA
HARTHEIN, JOHN FRANCIS	1100	F	XX	680321	LA
HESFORD, PETER D	0275	F	XX	660315	LA
HOLMES, DAVID HUGH	0084	F	XX	650518	LA
EROLICKA, DAVID LOUIS	0250	F	XX	660210	LA
HUNTER, RUSSELL PALMER JR	1348	F	XX	680328	LA
HUSTON, CHARLES G	1108	A	XX	661003	LA
JONES, JAMES E	0480	A	XX	720409	LA
KETCHIE, SCOTT DOUGLAS	1824	M	XX	660210	LA
KIEFEL, ERNST PHILIP JR	0250	F	XX	681225	LA
KING, CHARLES D	1348	F	XX	660406	LA
LAFAYETTE, JOHN W	0297	A	XX	680323	LA
LANE, GLEN C	0720	A	XX	670603	LA
LANEY, BILLY R	0070	F	XX	650407	LA
LEWIS, JAMES W	1405	F	XX	690310	LA
LUNA, CARTER PURVIS	0253	F	XX	660215	LA
MAUTIER, OSCAR	1782	F	XX	711210	LA
MCINTIRE, SCOTT WINSTON	1062	N	XX	680227	LA
MILLER, PAUL L	1437	F	XX	690508	LA
MUNDY, HENRY G II	1191	A	XX	680523	LA
OWEN, ROBERT D	1063	F	XX	680227	LA
PALMER, GILBERT S JR	0524	F	XX	661116	LA
PIITTMANN, ALAN D					

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FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
PUGH, DENNIS GERARD	1573	F	XX	700319	LA
RAY, RONALD E	1522	A	XX	691113	LA
SEYMOUR, LEO E	0750	A	XX	670703	LA
SHARMAN, NEIL	1994	N	XX	740910	LA
SHELTON, CHARLES ERVIN	0079	F	PP	650429	LA
SKINNER, OWEN C	1683	F	XX	701212	LA
SMITH, WARREN PARKER JR	0370	F	XX	660622	LA
SPARKS, JON M	1730	A	XX	710319	LA
STANDERTWICK, ROBERT L	1698	F	XX	710203	LA
STARK, WILLIE E	0536	A	XX	661202	LA
STOWERS, AUBREY E JR	1100	F	XX	680321	LA
SUBER, RANDOLPH BOTHWELL	1522	A	XX	691113	LA
WILLIAMS, EDDIE L	0480	A	XX	661003	LA
WILSON, PETER JOE	1669	A	XX	701019	LA
WOOD, DON C	0233	F	XX	660116	LA
WRIGHT, THOMAS T	1063	F	XX	680227	LA

TOTAL OF 64 RECORDS

Thursday, 16 July 1992

Page 1

FULLNAME	REFNO	SERVICE	STATUS	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
FLYNN, SEAN LESLIE	1588	V	PP	700406	CB
GRIFFIN, RODNEY L	1610	A	XX	700502	CB
HANGEN, HELLES	1626	V	PP	700531	CB
PRICE, BUNYAN DURANT	1610	A	XX	700502	CB
REYNOLDS, TERRY L	1836	V	XX	720426	CB
RICHARDSON, DALE W	1610	A	XX	700502	CB
STONE, DANA	1588	V	PP	700406	CB
WHITE, CHARLES E	1006	A	XX	680129	CB
YOUNG, ROBERT M	1610	A	KK	700502	CB

TOTAL OF 9 RECORDS

Question 6. You testified on Wednesday, June 24 that after returnee debriefs, the Services carried 97 individuals in a prisoner status and that only 55 are still unaccounted for. Please provide a list of those 97 POW names; a list of 42 who have since been accounted for, and a list of the 55 still unaccounted for.

Answer 6. The lists requested are attached.

FULLNAME	STATUS
ARBOTT, JOHN	KR
/ JYO-BAEZ, GERASIMO	KR
AYERBERRY, EDWIN LEE	KR
BLACKBURN, HARRY LEE JR	NR
BOWLING, ROY HOWARD	NR
BURDETT, EDWARD BURKE	KR
BUTT, RICHARD LEIGH	NR
CAMERON, KENNETH ROBBINS	KR
COBEILL, EARL GLENN	KR
CONNELL, JAMES JOSEPH	KR
DENNISON, TERRY ARDEN	KR
DODGE, RONALD WAYNE	NR
DOYLE, MICHAEL WILLIAM	NR
DUCAT, BRUCE CHALMERS	NR
ESTES, WALTER O	NR
FREDERICK, JOHN WILLIAM	KR
GARWOOD, ROBERT RUSSELL	RR
GRAHAM, JAMES SCOTT	NR
GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND	NR
GRIFFIN, JAMES LLOYD	KR
GRUBB, WILMER N	KR
HANSON, ROBERT TAFT JR	NR
HARTMAN, RICHARD DANNER	KR
HAUNNESS, STEVEN	DR
JOHNS, VERNON Z	NR
LINDLAND, DONALD FREDERICK	NR
METZ, JAMES HARDIN	NR
F. JOE, VINCENT DUNCAN	NR
POWERS, TRENT RICHARD	NR
PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER	NR
REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR	KR
SCHMIDT, NORMAN	KR
SMITH, HOMER LEROY	KR
STAMM, ERNEST ALBERT	KR
STORZ, RONALD EDWARD	KR
SULLIVAN, JAMES EDWARD	NR
TEAGUE, JAMES ERLAN	NR
TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON	NR
VESCELIUS, MILTON JAMES	NR
WALTERS, JACK	KR
YONAN, KENNETH JOSEPH	NR
ZAWTOCKI, JOSEPH S JR	KR

Number of Records Output: 42

UNCLASSIFIED

FULLNAME	STATUS
ADAMS, SAMUEL	KK
E. RALPH CAMPION	XX
BLOOD, HENRY F	KK
BORAH, DANIEL VERNOR JR	XX
BOWERS, RICHARD LEE	XX
CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP	XX
CLARKE, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	XX
COCHEO, RICHARD NEWELL	PP
COOK, DONALD GILBERT	KK
DEBRUIN, EUGENE H	PP
DELONG, JOE LYNN	KK
DEMMON, DAVID STANLEY	XX
DEKTER, BENNIE LEE	KK
DUSING, CHARLES GALE	KK
ERSKINE, JACK D	PP
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL JOHN	XX
FERGUSON, WALTER JR	KK
FLYNN, SEAN LESLIE	PP
GERBER, DANIEL A	PP
GODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHEY	KK
GRAF, JOHN GEORGE	XX
GREILLING, DAVID SCOTT	XX
GRZYB, ROBERT H	KK
HAMMOND, DENNIS WAYNE	KK
HANGEN, WELLES	PP
HRODLICKA, DAVID LOUIS	XX
KATIL, TÁNOS E	KK
M. R. RODERICK LEWIS	XX
MCLEAN, JAMES HENRY	XX
MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON	PP
MOORE, THOMAS	KK
NIEHOUSE, DANIEL LEE	KK
OLSEN, BETTY ANN	KK
PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY	XX
PHILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL	XX
PRICE, BUNYAN DURANT	XX
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS REESE	XX
RAY, JAMES MICHAEL	KK
REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND	KK
REYNOLDS, TERRY L	XX
ROZO, JAMES MILAN	XX
SALLEY, JAMES JR	KK
SCHMIDT, WALTER R JR	XX
SHELTON, CHARLES ERVIN	PP
SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD	KK
SMALL, BURT CHAUNCEY JR	XX
SPARKS, DONALD L	XX
STONE, DANA	PP
SYKES, DERRI	KK
TERRILL, PHILIP B	KK
TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE	XX
VANBENDEGOM, JAMES LEE	KK
V. TTI, ELEANOR A	PP
W. L. S., MARVIN BENJAMIN C	XX
YOUNG, ROBERT H	KK

UNCLASSIFIED

Friday, 7 August 1992

UNCLASSIFIED

FULLNAME

STATUS

Number of Records Output: 55

UNCLASSIFIED

Question 7. You also testified that DIA carried 115 individuals in a POW status at the end of Operation Homecoming. Please provide these names with a breakdown of who has and has not been accounted for since Operation Homecoming and how. (pg. 76)

Answer 7. The requested lists are attached.

UNCLASSIFIED

ACCOUNTED FOR SINCE OPERATION HOMECOMING

ABBOTT, JOHN
 ANDREWS, WILLIAM RICHARD
 ARROYO-BAEZ, GERASIMO
 ATTERBERRY, EDWIN LEE
 BOWLING, ROY HOWARD
 BURDETT, EDWARD BURKE
 BUTT, RICHARD LEIGH
 CAMERON, KENNETH ROBBINS
 CAPLING, ELWYN R
 COBEIL, EARL GLENN
 CONNELL, JAMES JOSEPH
 DENNISON, TERRY ARDEN
 DODGE, RONALD WAYNE
 DOYLE, MICHAEL WILLIAM
 DUCAT, BRUCE CHALMERS
 ESTES, WALTER O
 EVANS, JAMES J
 FREDERICK, JOHN WILLIAM
 FREDERICK, WILLIAM V
 GARNWOOD, ROBERT RUSSELL
 GRAHAM, JAMES SCOTT
 GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND
 GRUBB, WILMER N
 HANSON, ROBERT TAFT JR
 HARTMAN, RICHARD DANNER
 HAUKNES, STEVEN
 HORNE, STANLEY HENRY
 JOHNS, VERNON Z
 LINDLAND, DONALD FREDERICK
 METZ, JAMES HARDIN
 MONROE, VINCENT DUNCAN
 POWERS, TRENT RICHARD
 PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER
 REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR
 RISNER, RICHARD F
 RUFFIN, JAMES THOMAS
 SCHMIDT, NORMAN
 SMITH, HOMER LEROY
 STAMM, ERNEST ALBERT
 STORZ, RONALD EDWARD
 SULLIVAN, JAMES EDWARD
 TEAGUE, JAMES ERLAN
 THOMAS, KENNETH D JR
 TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON
 VAN DYKE, RICHARD HAVEN
 VARNADO, MICHAEL B
 VESCELIUS, MILTON JAMES
 WALTERS, JACK
 WHITE, ROBERT THOMAS
 YONAN, KENNETH JOSEPH
 ZAWTOCKI, JOSEPH S JR

Number of Records Output: 51

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

REMAINS UNACCOUNTED FOR SINCE OPERATION-HOMECOMING

ADAMS, SAMUEL
 BISZ, RALPH CAMPION
 BLOOD, HENRY F
 BORAH, DANIEL VERNOR JR
 BOWERS, RICHARD LEE
 CICHON, WALTER ALAN
 CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP
 CLARKE, GEORGE WILLIAM JR
 COCHED, RICHARD NEWELL
 COOK, DONALD GILBERT
 CREED, BARTON SHELDON
 DEBRUIN, EUGENE H
 DELONG, JOE LYNN
 DEMMON, DAVID STANLEY
 DEXTER, BENNIE LEE
 DUSING, CHARLES GALE
 ERSKINE, JACK D
 ESTOCIN, MICHAEL JOHN
 FERGUSON, WALTER JR
 FLYNN, SEAN LESLIE
 FRANCISCO, SAN DEWAYNE
 GERBER, DANIEL A
 GODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHEY
 GRAF, JOHN GEORGE
 GREILING, DAVID SCOTT
 GRZYB, ROBERT H
 HAMMOND, DENNIS WAYNE
 HANGEN, WELLES
 HRDLICKA, DAVID LOUIS
 KALIL, TANGS E
 LUNA, CARTER PURVIS
 LYON, JAMES MICHAEL
 MAYER, RODERICK LEWIS
 MCLEAN, JAMES HENRY
 MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON
 MOORE, THOMAS
 MORRISON, JOSEPH C
 NIEHOUSE, DANIEL LEE
 NOLAN, MCKINLEY
 OLSEN, BETTY ANN
 PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY
 PHILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL
 PRICE, BUNYAN DURANT
 PRIDEMORE, DALLAS REESE
 RAY, JAMES MICHAEL
 REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND
 REYNOLDS, TERRY L

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ROZO, JAMES MILAN
 SALLEY, JAMES JR
 SCHMIDT, WALTER R JR
 SHAFER, PHILIP R
 SHELTON, CHARLES ERVIN
 SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD
 SMALL, BURT CHAUNCEY JR
 SPARKS, DONALD L
 STONE, DANA
 SYKES, DERRI
 TERRILL, PHILIP B
 TOWNSEND, FRANCIS WAYNE
 TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE
 VANBENDEGOM, JAMES LEE
 VIETTI, ELEANOR A
 WEATHERMAN, EARL CLYDE
 YOUNG, ROBERT M

Number of Records Output: 64

UNCLASSIFIED

Question 8. What percentage of wartime HUMINT reports on POWs captive in each Southeast Asian nation contained a name attached compared to post-war, live sighting reports?

Answer 8. This information is not retrievable from the automated DIA source data base.

Question 9. How many war time POW live sighting reports were there?

Answer 9. As of August 11, 1992 DIA has received 409 first-hand live sighting reports with dates of sighting prior to December 31, 1972.

Question 10. The Montgomery Commission reported that 781 individuals shot down in Laos were rescued in Laos, almost exclusively through immediate Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts. Please provide the crew names, aircraft type, date of incident, etc., for these rescues and whatever other SAR statistical information is readily available for all of Southeast Asia.

Answer 10. The Defense Intelligence Agency is not responsible for maintaining such data in its files. All aircraft loss data to include search and rescue efforts is an operational matter which comes under the purview of the J-3, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question 11. Other intelligence agencies (such as NSA) and even other offices within DIA, have important information on the identity of Vietnamese units and unit commanders responsible for the shootdown, capture, and/or death of particular unaccounted for individuals. What systematic research has DIA undertaken to analyze this information? Has it been provided to the JTF-FA for use in their field, military cadre, and military archives investigations in Vietnam?

Answer 11. DIA POW-MIA has over the year engaged the assistance of NSA, CIA and other elements within the DIA in the research necessary to identify the units and the personalities involved with the hostile action, capture, evacuation, medical treatment (or graves registration), and detention of unaccounted-for servicemen. POW-MIA has conducted two interrelated systematic, informal studies on the organization of Group 559 (Ho Chi Minh Trail) organization, and on the Enemy Proselytizing (the PW Handling) system. The results of both of these studies are selectively incorporated into the case-by-case analyses provided to the JTF-FA prior to investigation of each case, and in District Intelligence Plans also provided to the JTF-FA before it enters a district for investigation of the cases located therein.

Question 12. Was DIA aware that it was receiving incorrect loss locations for those individuals killed, missing or captured in covert cross border operations? When did DIA receive correct loss locations for these individuals? How would you characterize the impact of incorrect casualty loss locations on DIA's efforts to correlate incoming intelligence reports to individuals lost in Laos and Cambodia?

Answer 12. DIA had knowledge of the loss of all individuals who were POW and MIA. In producing statistical data, however, DIA observed all classification directives in operation at the time. When classification guidelines were amended, our database was also amended.

Question 13. Was there type of intelligence to which the individual Service casualty boards were not granted access?

Answer 13. DIA made available all its data to the Service casualty boards. DIA cannot speak for other U.S. intelligence agencies in this regard.

Question 14. When did DIA first begin to include KIA-BNR individuals in its intelligence collection activities and under whose direction?

Answer 14. Although the exact date DIA began to include the Killed in Action-Body not Recovered in its statistical reports is unknown, we believe that this occurred shortly after Homecoming.

This inclusion did not occur as a result of any direction. It was instead the case that DIA believed that inclusion of these individuals would complete DIA's coverage of the POW-MIA issue and the larger issue of full accounting.

Question 15. Please provide a breakdown, by year from 1966 through 1992, of the number of authorized and actual personnel in DIA's Special Office for POW-MIA.

Answer 15. The requested list is attached.

QUESTION NO. 15

AUTHORIZED MANPOWER
PW FUNCTION IN DIA

END FY	OFF	ENL	PERM CIV	OVERAGE	TOTAL	PART-TIME	COMMENT
92	6	5	53		64		
91	6	5	46	3	60	2	SecDef directed increase.
90	3	3	34		40	1	
89	5	3	30		38	2	
88	5	4	30		39	2	
87	5	4	30		39	2	
86	3	1	24		28	2	
85	1	1	15		17	2	
84	1	1	15		17	1	
83	1	1	15		17		
82	1	1	10		12		
81	1	1	10		12		
80	1	1	7		9		
79	1	1	7		9		
78	1	1	7		8		
77	1	1	8		9		
76	1	1	9		10		
75	1	1	9		10		
74	1	1	10		11		
73	1	1	9		10		
72	1	1	8		9		
71					14		Combined with 710 PW element existed.
70					14		Same as above.
69					14		Same as above.
68					14		Same as above.
67					14		Same as above.
66					10		Same as above.
65					10		Same as above.
64					10		Same as above.
63	No record available by element.						

LETTER FROM J.R. SUNGENIS, DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS
AND REPORTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AUGUST 13, 1992

THE HONORABLE JOHN F. KERRY,
Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510-6500.

DEAR SENATOR KERRY: This is in response to your correspondence dated July 24, 1992, in which you requested that we address two additional questions on the Vietnam Conflict casualty reporting as follows:

Question 1. Were you or DIOR aware that the loss location information contained in some casualty reports submitted by the services were deliberately falsified? When were these inaccurate loss locations corrected?

Answer 1. I have no knowledge that loss location information contained in any of the casualty reports submitted to my office by the services was deliberately falsified. Other than from hearsay, I had no direct knowledge that loss locations were ever incorrect. If and when any loss location was changed, it was seen by myself and my staff as a routine change submitted by the Military Department. As you may recall, individual reports were not submitted to this office prior to March 1973; therefore, any changes made prior to that time would not be known to us.

Question 2. Is there a system in place now where DIOR will be notified promptly by the JTFFA, the DIA, or the individual military services, of any information uncovered during field investigations bearing on the casualty status (POW, MIA KIA-BNR, Died in Captivity, etc.) of as yet unaccounted for individuals? How does/will this coordination work?

Answer 2. As required by Depot of Defense Instruction 1300.18, "Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies and Procedures," dated December 27, 1991, DIOR maintains and operates the Department of Defense Worldwide Casualty System. The Military Departments are required to ensure that the casualty information is documented and provided to WHS/DIOR. The method of notification is through a monthly submission of the DD Forms 1300, "Report of Casualty."

If I may be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

J.R. SUNGENIS,
Director.

LETTER FROM M. T. SPINELLO, COLONEL, U.S. ARMY DIRECTOR, CASUALTY AND
MEMORIAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

AUGUST 17, 1992

HONORABLE JOHN F. KERRY,
Chairman,
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510-6500.

DEAR SENATOR KERRY: This responds to your correspondence of July 24, 1992, requesting further information regarding my testimony before your committee on June 24, 1992.

The following responses are provided to the Select Committee questions as restated below.

Question 1. Senator Kerry asked that the individual military services, in consultation with the Select Committee, review the casualty file of each serviceperson listed as Killed In Action-Body Not Recovered (KIA-BNR) for any evidence that the original determination may have been unjustified.

Answer 1. We have no evidence to suggest that the original status determinations on soldiers listed as killed in action-body not recovered (KIA-BNR) were unjustified. Army policy was to initially consider soldiers as 11missing11 if they did not return or their remains were not recovered after an incident. When reported "missing", a soldier's status was decided by a board composed of soldiers from his unit. These boards convened soon after the loss incident and had direct access to any witnesses to the event. Operation Homecoming reports and any other information available

after 1973 were considered in those cases where the soldier was suspected to be a prisoner of war.

Although there is no evidence of unjustified status determinations, it has been consistent Army policy since 1973, that should sufficient information arise to warrant questioning the original status determination a review of the file would be conducted. In the absence of specific and compelling evidence, reviewing all KIA-BNR files would seem to undermine any sense of the integrity of the process initially used to judge these cases and those who participated in it. We, therefore, respectfully request that you reconsider your request for review of all KIA-BNR files.

Question 2. Under what policy guidelines or assumptions did the military services determine the date of death (legal versus actual) of Vietnam War POWs and MIAs who were presumptively found to have died?

Answer 2. Army policy regarding the determination of a soldier's date of death during the Vietnam war period was contained in Army Regulation AR 600-10, implementing the provisions of the Missing Persons Act (Title 10, USC, Chapter 552). Chapter 1-7k of referenced regulation provided the following definition for presumptive finding of death (PFOD). "A finding authorized by the provisions of the Missing Persons Act when the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of an Army member plus the expiration of a year (or longer period of absence) lead to the logical conclusion that the member is no longer alive, but the available evidence is insufficient to establish the date on which the member died. The established date has no relation to the date the member actually died, but is a convenient date authorized by law on which pay will cease and all accounts of the member may be closed. It may not be established sooner than a year from the date absence began, but may be established at any date thereafter on which it is determined that the member may no longer be reasonably presumed to be alive."

Question 3. How did an initial casualty status review board operate during the Vietnam War? How many individuals on the board? What types of reports and evidence was the board to consider? Did these boards have access to all relevant information, regardless of classification?

Answer 3. Army procedures concerning missing person determinations have changed little since the Vietnam conflict. Soldiers were considered missing when they did not return or their remains were not recovered after an incident and there was no conclusive evidence of death. A status determination of "missing" requires the general officer having general court-martial convening authority to convene a board of inquiry to determine the official status of the soldier. These initial casualty review boards, unlike PFOD boards which were conducted a year or more after the loss, were convened within the unit, and within 7 to 10 days after the soldier was determined to be missing.

Prior to 1972, boards were to be convened within 10 days of the missing person report and consisted of not more than three officers. After 1972, boards were convened within 7 days of the incident and the board composition changed to not less than three commissioned officers. At least one officer on the board must have been senior to the person whose status was being determined or a Major, which ever was higher.

Boards were tasked to review all relevant evidence, including the extent and duration of the search and statements from persons knowledgeable of the circumstances of the loss. Boards had access to classified material. The board could recommend that the soldier's status continue as missing or be changed to dead.

Question 4. Did the military services have access to correct loss location data for casualties lost on covert cross-border type operations in Laos and Cambodia? If casualty files did not have the correct loss location information in them, where was this information retrieved from when the decision to correct the loss locations was made?

Answer 4. Information regarding covert operations was classified and compartmentalized to protect the security of soldiers in the field. The actual loss location for covert operations losses is not present in all covert cross-border loss casualty files. All covert loss files list the country of loss based on the most recent intelligence information, while a lesser number indicate grid coordinates where the soldier was reported lost.

The Army had access to correct loss locations data for casualties lost on covert cross-border operations from Military Assistance Command Vietnam and successor organizations that monitored "unaccounted for" soldiers. Upon termination of Army operations in Vietnam, these files were integrated with the other Services' "unaccounted for" records in the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). In 1991, Joint

Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) assumed JCRC's mission and inherited JCRC's "unaccounted for" records. JTF-FA has the correct locations for covert cross-border losses. Revised locations for all losses were based on information provided by DIA.

Question 5. How many casualties were deliberately given false loss locations? Can a list of the names of casualties given false loss locations be reconstructed? If so we would like that list to be provided to the Select Committee as soon as possible.

Answer 5. In August of 1973, the Army reported 137 casualties who had been lost in covert actions in Laos or Cambodia but were previously reported lost in either South Vietnam or in Southeast Asia. At that time, each family was informed of the actual country of loss. Subsequent changes regarding country of loss were based on Operation Homecoming reports, intelligence updates, and recovery of remains. There have been a total of 22 casualties identified in this subsequent group. Families in this later group were informed of the change in loss location as they occurred. A list of the soldiers initially identified in locations other than the actual location is enclosed.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

M.T. SPINELLO,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Director, Casualty and Memorial Affairs.

COUNTRY-CAMBODIA

NAME	RANK	SVC/SSAN
ANTUNANO, Gregory A.	SGT	567-76-2398
ARMSTRONG, Donald G.	SFC	563-42-1620
AUSTIN, James E.	MSG	312-26-3788
BARTLETT, Larry P.	SFC	176-32-1382
BENGSTON, Frank W.	1LT	019-38-0007
BLACK, Paul V.	WO1	573-72-2684
BROWN, Mark L.	SP4	554-76-6384
BURCHARD, Mark W.	PFC	565-80-4307
CARRINGTON, Fred E.	WO1	344-34-0339
CASEY, Richard W.	SGT	545-80-6317
CINKOSKY, David E.	CPT	519-50-8902
DALTON, Randall D.	SP4	322-42-7517
DAVID, Gary C.	SP5	261-96-4818
DULLEY, Kenneth L.	SFC	272-36-6285
EVANS, William A.	SGT	393-52-3288
GIRAD, Christian G.	SFC	020-32-5214
GOULET, Ronald M.	CPT	045-34-2998
HAGEMAN, Joel T.	CPT	512-48-2163
HAMILTON, Milbert W.	WO1	504-50-0068
HARRINAN, Gregory M.	1LT	474-56-1947
HIGGINBOTHAM, Michael J.	SP4	449-90-6785

HILL, Howard S.	SGT	037-30-1021
JAMISON Ernest C.	SGT	189-36-8733
JERSON, James R.	1LT	439-72-3921
JOHNSON, Marlin J.	CW2	330-38-7047
JOHNSON, William J.	SP5	566-76-5118
JOYCE, Van J.	1LT	526-66-7101
KISER, Robert T.	SP4	173-42-3380
KNUCKEY, Thomas W.	1LT	146-36-4029
KUROPAS, Michael V.	SSG	337-40-1141
LEICHLITZER, Vyrl E. Jr.	1LT	097-38-2626
LILLY, Lawrence E	1LT	493-50-4951
MAY, Michael F.	SP5	380-50-8859
MEYER, David P.	WO1	355-34-9392
MURPHY, Barry D.	SP5	428-96-4531
ORR, Patrick O'R	SSG	405-68-2374
PUTEZ, Michael D.	SGT	344-44-4941
QUINTANA, Santiago V. E.	PFC	585-42-2820
RAMIREZ, Armando	SP5	526-68-3184
RATLIFF, Thomas H.	SP5	265-94-5740
ROTHEL, Larry W.	SP4	465-88-3163
SABLAN, Frank A.	SP4	265-96-0550
SHAMBLIN, Kenneth W.	SP4	233-74-3898
SHRIVER, Jerry M.	MSG	315-46-1629
SMILEY, Edward R. Jr.	SP4	158-40-6815
SPARKS, Charles P.	PFC	460-54-9086
STROUT, Philip W.	SP4	005-48-0037

SWANSON, Jon E.	CPT	522-52-0429
TAYLOR, Phillip C.	SGT	232-76-6113
THOMAS, Richard A.	SGT	556-72-7775
UHL, Robert D.	WO1	573-72-0238

COUNTRY-LAOS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SVC/SSAN</u>
ALLEN, Leonard P.	SGT	092-42-9602
ALMENDARIZ, Samuel	MSG	460-64-2257
ANDERSON, Wayne M.	SSG	536-48-5116
ARBETT, Martin I.	SSG	219-50-4074
AYERS, David W.	CPT	555-62-8058
BABCOCK, Ronald L.	1LT	527-66-8585
BARKER, Jack L.	MAJ	252-54-5785
BATES, Carl C Jr.	SP4	432-84-8409
BAXTER, Bruce R.	MSG	011-26-2880
BEAN, John R.	SFC	232-58-3497
BECKER, James C.	1LT	461-74-8172
BILBREY, Edmond D.	CPT	525-96-9400
BINGHAM, Dennis W.	SP4	481-64-6534
BODZICK, William J.	SP4	377-46-4975
BOOKOUT, Charles F.	SFC	444-32-5185
BORJA, Domingo R S	SFC	586-60-5292
BOUDREAUX, Lee J. Jr.	SP4	436-48-5414
BOYLE, William	SFC	203-30-9724
BOZIKIS, Ronald H.	SSG	499-52-2062
BRASSFIELD, Andrew T.	SSG	288-32-0581
BRUNSON, Jack W.	WO2	124-40-8319

BULLARD, Charles D.	SSG	459-62-7345
BURRIS, Donald D. Jr.	CW2	196-36-7814
BUSH, Joseph K. Jr.	CPT	465-64-1755
CARPENTER, Howard B.	SGT	293-44-8958
CECIL, Alan B.	SP5	447-48-6749
CHANEY, Stephen J.	CPT	272-40-7930
COLEMAN, Robert L.	SSG	215-44-4576
CROWLEY, John E.	SP4	093-38-9897
DAVIDSON, David A.	SSG	215-44-4576
DEXTER, Ronald J.	SGM	324-26-2039
DEVANEY, Brian J.	CW2	305-48-5072
DIERS, Richard W.	SGT	120-38-3171
DYER, Irby III	SGT	458-70-9452
FERNANDEZ, William M.	SFC	429-74-2684
FOX, David N.	CPT	057-36-8284
GASSMAN, Fred A.	SGT	266-80-9751
GRAY, Charles H. Jr.	SFC	237-60-6480
GREEN, George C. Jr.	SGT	308-54-4471
HALL, James M.	SSG	402-54-7157
HARRISON, Donald	WO1	069-36-1990
HAWES, Wayne L.	SP4	533-52-2422
HIMES, Earl W.	SGT	203-34-1214
HUNTLEY, John N.	PFC	100-42-9151
JACKSON, Keith M.	CW2	158-38-8559
JOECKEN, Richard K.	SGT	340-40-5070
JONES, Sanderfied A.	SP4	460-72-9252
JOHNSON, Edward A. Jr.	SP4	052-38-7292

JOHNSTONE, James M.	CPT	214-34-9307
KEDENBURG, John J.	SP5	123-36-4049
KING, Paul C. Jr.	PFC	015-36-4991
KUSICK, Joseph G.	SGT	202-34-8813
LANCASTER, David C.	WO1	538-46-2222
LAWS, Delmer L.	SFC	492-36-5749
LOW, James B.	WO1	528-78-9360
LUCAS, Larry F.	CPT	232-66-1778
MANTHEI, James W.	WO1	397-52-5407
MARSHALL, Joseph H.	1LT	370-52-9080
Mc ELROY, Glenn D.	LTC	352-24-8426
McKIBBAN, Michael J.	SSG	541-52-6142
MILEY, Joseph H.	SGT	400-76-3865
MIXTER, David I.	SGT	041-46-5193
MONNETT, Leonard A.	SP5	219-56-7518
MUSIL, Clinton A. Sr.	CPT	470-44-2943
NASH, John M.	CPT	313-34-1278
PALEY, Norman F.	SP4	281-46-9965
PIACENTINO, Michael A.	SSG	219-40-0970
PLATO, Robert D.	MSG	447-32-2904
PREISS, Robert F. Jr.	SSG	056-36-0888
PREMENKO, John A.	SGT	549-76-4894
RIPANTI, James L.	1LT	222-30-4989
RIVEST, Mark H.	1LT	031-34-4563
ROCHE, Jon P.	WO1	123-36-0567
SCHMIDT, Peter A.	SP4	396-54-5986
SHERIDAN, Robert E.	SP4	569-74-7006

SHULTZ, Charles E.	SSG	551-62-4930
SIDDONS, James G.	CPT	333-36-1366
SIETING, Stanley L.	SGT	372-48-3277
SIMMONS, Billy L.	SGT	526-68-4789
SMITH, Ronald E.	SFC	315-40-4807
STEPHENS, Larry A.	SGT	559-62-5429
STRIDE, James D. Jr.	SSG	456-44-7397
SULANDER, Daniel A.	WO1	474-48-3312
SULLIVAN, Robert J.	MSG	014-26-8080
TEETER, Roger L.	SSG	238-72-1261
THORNTON, Dwight J.	CPT	252-60-9321
WALTERS, Tim L.	SSG	304-44-1492
WATKINS, Robert J. Jr	CW2	557-58-3970
WHELAN, Joseph V.	CPT	135-34-0470
WHITED, James L.	MAJ	547-20-4708
WORTHLEY, Kenneth W.	SSG	469-50-8194
ZUMBRUN, James, H.	SFC	215-40-7849

COUNTRY-NORTH VIETNAM

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SVC/SSAN</u>
ALGAARD, Harold L.	WO1	469-52-7807
HENTZ, Richard J.	SGT	393-46-3791
MARKER, Michael W.	CPT	450-72-9399
MUSIL, Clinton A. Sr.	CPT	470-44-2943
OSBORNE, Rodney D.	SGT	537-52-9737
STRAWN, John T.	SSG	543-38-9150
WOODS, Lawrence	SSG	410-64-3101

COUNTRY-SOUTH VIETNAM

NAME	RANK	SVC/SSAN
BERG, James M.	WO2	326-42-9430
DEMPSEY, Walter E. Jr.	SP4	149-42-6942
HUMMEL, John F.	CW3	464-74-8161
JOHNSON, Gary L.	SP4	571-68-8112
LLOYD, Allen R.	SGT	474-60-0494
MILLINER, William P.	CW3	401-74-5001
RAY, James M.	SSG	039-30-0250
WATSON, Ronald L.	CPT	462-72-9563
WOODS, Gerald E.	WO1	544-46-8897

LETTER FROM M.S. DEBIEN, CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, PERSONAL, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SEPTEMBER 3, 1992

THE HONORABLE JOHN F. KERRY,
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510-6500.

DEAR SENATOR KERRY: In your letter of July 24, 1992, you requested information from this office regarding questions relating to recent inquiries at the POW/MIA hearings. The answers provided below are based on a historical review of procedural guidance and casualty personnel files. Although because of staff turnovers and the passage of time, no Vietnam-era decision-makers remain in the Casualty Assistance Branch, we feel the information provided below is a reasonably accurate depiction of the process.

Question 1. You asked that the individual military services, in consultation with the Select Committee, review the casualty file of each serviceperson listed as Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered (KIA/BNR) for any evidence that the original determination may have been unjustified.

Answer 1. We are presently working with Mr. Bill Codhina of your staff to better define the focus of this review. Additionally, we understand that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs has been tasked by your committee to review all 2266 records, which include the KIA/BNR records. We are standing by for further guidance before we begin our review, in order to ensure that one comprehensive, accurately focused review is conducted on all requested cases.

Question 2. Under what policy guidelines or assumptions did the military services determine the date of death (legal versus actual) of Vietnam War POWs and MIAs who were presumptively found to have died?

Answer 2. The United States Navy operated under the policy outlined in the Missing Persons Act, Title 37, USC Chapter 10 and Department of the Navy Regulations. The legal date of death was the date on which the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) designee signed the memorandum legal date of death was the date on which the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) designee signed the memorandum which officially changed the status of the service member from Missing in Action (MIA) to Killed in Action (KIA). This date was used for administrative purposes in terminating all pay and allowances to dependents and in paying survivor benefits. No actual date of death could be established through a status review board since the remains had not been recovered.

Question 3. How did an initial casualty status review board operate during the Vietnam War? How many individuals on the board? What types of reports and evidence was the board to consider? Did these boards have access to all relevant information, regardless of classification?

Answer 3. Prior to 1973, the initial Navy casualty status review board was initiated approximately ten months after the service member's incident. This was done to ensure that a status review occurred before the 12-month statutory requirement. The information for each case was presented to the board based upon a standard list of 11 criteria, into which all information related to the incident could be categorized. These criteria were: I. Day or Night/Date/Weather, II. Mission, III. Aircraft Loss—Location/Terrain, IV. Aircraft Type/Unit/Single or Multiple place, V. Communications From Aircraft/Member, VI. Loss Observed/Witnesses, VII. Search, VIII. Immediate Assessment, IX. Intelligence, X. Propaganda, XI. Repatriated POW Information. The board consisted of two to three officers (O-4 or above). There is no information in our records to indicate that these officers did not have access to all information regarding the incident, regardless of classification. Each officer possessed a security clearance appropriate for the information to be presented to the board.

After examining all available information, each officer made a recommendation to the SECNAV designee regarding a possible status change of the individual. The SECNAV designee then examined the case information and the recommendations of the board members and rendered a decision. The recommendations of the board members were not binding, although the designee afforded them due consideration when arriving at a decision.

In 1974, a hearing process was established as a result of a Third District Federal Court of New York decision on family member claims, which found that status

changes without due process were unconstitutional. In this hearing process, the primary next of kin (PNOK), intentionally given a false loss location. The Bureau of Naval Personnel had access to correct loss locations, as reported by the on-scene commanders. The locations were reported to the families as stated above. Additionally, over-water losses were reported as the "Gulf of Tonkin", vice North or South Vietnam. In some cases, OSD records differed from Navy records (e.g., some Navy losses reported to OSD as "Southeast Asia" or "Gulf of Tonkin" were listed by OSD as South Vietnam when they actually occurred in North Vietnam, etc.). We are presently working with OSD to reconcile our records regarding these countries of loss. However, correct Navy information was made available to PNOK once declassified, as was previously stated.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

M.S. DEBIEN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Director, Personal, Family and Community Support.

MEMORANDUM FROM DAVID SMITH, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION

September 1, 1992.

Subject: Request for POW/MIA Related Information.

- Ref: (a) Senate Select Committee letter dated July 1992
(b) Director MH Div memo 3000/MHP-10 dated August 13, 1992
Encl: (1) Memo for SECNAV dated October 15, 1949
(2) HQMC Route Sheet dated November 16, 1978
(3) SECNAV memorandum dtd July 6, 1973
(4) DON Regulations for Holding Hearings
(5) USMC POW/MIA's from Laos

1. In further response to reference (a), the following information is provided. Reference (b) was our interim response.

Question 2. "Under what policy guidance or assumptions did the military services determine the date of death of Vietnam POW's and MIA's who were presumptively found to have died?"

Answer 2. The Head, Personal Affairs Branch, Personnel Department, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps was delegated in 1949 as the official designee to make all determinations necessary in the administration of the Missing Persons Act (Enclosure (1)).

When information was received which indicated that death may have occurred (for example: eyewitness accounts of repatriated POW's), the Status Review Board was required to make a recommendation as to whether such information should be acted upon as a report of death. If the Board's recommendation was that the information should be acted upon as a report of death, and if the designee was in accord with that recommendation, the Board was required to make a further recommendation as to whether the information could be considered as a reliable report of the date (or approximate date) on which the death occurred. If the Board's recommendation was that the information was considered as a reliable report as to the date (or approximate date) on which death occurred, and if the designee was in accord with that recommendation, the information was acted upon as a report of death and the indicated date of death was included on the official Casualty Report (DD Form 1300) as the date of death with an explanation under remarks as to the basis for assigning the date of death.

In a case where information regarding the fact of death was not received, the Board was required to make a recommendation as to whether the lapse of time without receipt of information of survival was a sufficient basis for a finding of death to be made under the Act. If the Board recommended that the lapse of time without receipt of information of survival was a basis for making a finding of death, and if the designee was in accord with that recommendation, the Marine's missing or missing in action status under the Act was terminated by the making of a presumptive finding of death. In a presumptive finding of death case, the fact of death was determined, and a date of death was assigned for three statutory purposes: Termination of pay and allowances; Settlement of deceased member's pay account; and Payment of death gratuity. The date of death assigned in presumptive finding of death cases was either: (1) the date on which the period a member was carried in a missing status for 1 year and 1 day expired, or, if a member was continued in a missing status after the expiration of that period (2) a date assigned by the designee.

(In almost all cases of Marines carried in a missing status in the Vietnam conflict, the date assigned as the date of death was the date on which the designee made the finding of presumptive death.)

3. Question 3. "How did an initial casualty status review board operate during the Vietnam War? How many individuals on the board? What types of reports and evidence was the board to consider? Did these boards have access to all relevant information, regardless of classification?"

Answer 3. The Status Review Board was composed of four Marine Corps officers and a civilian employee legal advisor. The Board had access to all significant information/records pertaining to an MIA. If the information was classified, to include Special Intelligence (SI), a Special MIA Review Board would have been appointed (Enclosure (2)).

On July 6, 1973, the Secretary of the Navy in effect suspended his delegation of authority under the Missing Persons Act by directing that no action be taken on status changes without his personal clearance (Enclosure (3)). On July 20, 1973, a temporary restraining order limited changing status to death to only those cases in which, unsolicited, the primary next of kin requested in writing that the appropriate Secretary not delay action on available information. To avoid any possible violation of the restraining order, all proposed status changes were to be coordinated with the PW/MIA Task Force. On March 26, 1974, the Secretary of the Navy implemented the court decision of *McDonald v. McLucas* requiring a hearing and certain constitutional due-process safeguards which were prerequisite to any status changes (Enclosure (4)).

4. Question 4. Did the military services have access to correct loss location data for casualties lost on covert cross-border type operations in Laos and Cambodia? If casualty files did not have the correct loss location information in them, where was this information retrieved from when the decision to correct the loss locations was made?"

Answer 4. We are unable to determine if, in fact, any records were ever maintained which contained this information. Over the last 17 years, to the best of our knowledge, all files and information (or copies thereof) concerning POW/MIA's have been provided to DIA, as the executive agent for such matters.

5. Question 5. "How many casualties were deliberately given false loss locations? Can a list of the names of casualties given false locations be reconstructed? If so we would like that list to be provided to the Select Committee as soon as possible."

Answer 6. In reviewing our retain casualty records, the Marines who we know to have been lost in Laos were initially listed as missing in a "classified" location. Each retain casualty record for the names identified in Enclosure (5) reflects a subsequent change in location to correctly reflect Laos.

Question 6. The point of contact for this request is Major Dave Greco, Head, Casualty Section, (703) 696-1177/78.

DAVID SMITH,
Deputy Director,
Human Resources Division.

LETTER FROM MICHAEL D. MCGINTY, BRIGADIER GENERAL, USAF COMMANDER,
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AUGUST 14, 1992.

SENATORS BOB SMITH AND JOHN F. KERRY,
United States Senate,
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
Washington, DC 20510-6500.

DEAR SENATORS: Thank you for your letter of July 24, 1992, requesting answers to additional questions you have concerning my recent testimony to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

Your first question for the record requested that the individual military services, in consultation with the Select Committee, review the casualty file of each service person listed as Killed in Action-Body Not Recovered (KIA-BNR) for any evidence that the original determination may have been unjustified (ref pp. 147-149).

As part of our support to the Committee proceedings, during December 1991 to June 1992, we thoroughly reviewed the casualty data on 253 unaccounted for Air

Force members who were reported deceased (killed in action-body not recovered, KIA-BNR) by their field commanders and have found no evidence that the original determination was unjustified. As a matter of information, to ensure commanders' original determinations were correctly applied, the Air Force Chief of Staff advised CINCPAC on March 13, 1967 that "our commanders have been and must continue to be extremely cautious in reporting members killed in action. If any possibility exists, no matter how remote, that a member could have survived an accident (sic incident), he must be reported as missing in action." See attachment 1 for complete text.

Question 2 asked under what policy, guidelines or assumptions did the military services determine the date of death (legal versus actual) of Vietnam War POWs and MIAs who were presumptively found to have died?

In some cases, the Vietnamese provided the date of death of POWs who died in captivity and this date of death was recorded as the actual date of death. In the cases of missing persons, Title 37, USC, Chapter 10, Section 555, of the law permits the Service Secretary or his designee to declare a member dead in the absence of an actual date of death or any evidence that the member is alive. A specific date of death was not established when a member's status was changed to deceased under this section of the law because the actual date of death was unknown.

The date the Service Secretary or his designee signed the memorandum stating that the service member could no longer reasonably be presumed to be living was the day pay and allowances were terminated. As an aside, this date is accepted as the date of death by financial institutions, such as insurance companies for the purpose of paying insurance proceeds or settling other accounts.

Your third question was how did an initial casualty status review board operate during the Vietnam War? How many individuals were on the board and what types of reports and evidence was the board to consider? Did these boards have access to all relevant information, regardless of classification? During the Southeast Asia Conflict, if conclusive evidence of a missing member's death was not received before the completion of 1 year in a missing status, an initial casualty status review of the case was accomplished in accordance with public law. Procedurally, at the end of 9 months, the missing member's commander furnished the Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) Missing Persons Division a 9-month investigative report. The Division chief, in consultation with the Missing Persons analyst assigned to the case, reviewed all of the data provided to AFMPC, regardless of classification, accumulated on the missing member to that point. A formal recommendation, based upon all known evidence in the case, was then made to the Secretarial designee, who was the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel for Military Personnel, to either continue the member in a missing status, or change the status to killed in action by a report of death or a presumptive finding of death. Upon repatriation and debriefing of the POWs in 1973, subsequent casualty status reviews were initiated on those members that remained in a missing status. The Air Force expanded its procedures to include review of each case by three senior officers prior to final recommendation to the Secretarial designee. The reviewing officers were the Director of Casualty, and colonels from the AFMPC Staff Judge Advocate and the AFMPC Surgeon General's offices. The reviewing officers were provided access to all information, which had been gathered by the Missing Persons Division from all known sources relative to each case, including classified information. If a case included compartmented material which required special handling, reviewing officers who possessed the proper access credentials were chosen from those available for this purpose. When status review hearing boards were instituted as the result of *MacDonald versus McLucas*, the board members continued to have access to available information, regardless of classification. A fuller description of the status review hearing board process is included in my original testimony.

Question 4 asked did the military services have access to correct loss location data for casualties lost on covert cross-border type operations in Laos and Cambodia? If casualty files did not have the correct loss location information in them, where was this information retrieved from when the decision to correct the loss locations was made?

To the best of our knowledge, there were only two incidents of covert cross-border type operations involving Air Force personnel who were casualty losses. These incidents, both in Laos, were coined Project "Heavy Green." This project was a ground operation involving Air Force personnel who voluntarily separated from the Air Force and entered into Laos as employees of the Lockheed Corporation to set up aircraft radar tracking systems (TACAN). Although this was a Top Secret project, family members were flown to Washington, DC and briefed on the operation before

personnel were separated from the Air Force. The radar sites were known as Channel 77 and Lima Site 85. Channel 77 was attacked by Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese forces on 25 December 1967 killing two persons. Lima Site 85 was overrun on March 11, 1968 killing 12 persons. Lockheed and Air Force personnel jointly notified family members, providing as much information as could be released at the time. Personnel who died in these incidents were subsequently reinstated into the Air Force at a date prior to their deaths. Casualty assistance was provided by personal visits to family members from the Air Force Casualty office at AFMPC. In 1970, the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff authorized certain personnel to visit family members and provide them with more detailed information concerning the loss of their relative. In 1986, the Top Secret Project CHECO report, "The Fall of Site 85" was declassified and furnished to the family members.

Your final question asked how many casualties were deliberately given false loss locations? Also, can a list of the names of casualties given false loss locations be reconstructed? And, if so, we would like that list to be provided to the Select Committee as soon as possible.

During the Southeast Asia Conflict, the Air Force Missing Persons Division maintained a classified and unclassified file on each missing person. The classified file contained actual geographic coordinates of loss, search and rescue reports, commander's report concerning the incident and witness statements. The unclassified file contained general correspondence between the Air Force and family members, information concerning pay matters, promotions, family inquiries, etc. Based on guidance from the Department of Defense, during the period of May 15, 1965 to June 27, 1970, the country of loss of aircrew members downed in Laos was not revealed to the next of kin or the public. The families were told the incident occurred in "Southeast Asia." When the U.S. Government acknowledged our involvement in military operations within Laos, family members were provided the actual country of loss. Classified casualty files always contained the accurate country of loss and geographic coordinates so far as could possibly be determined.

The only changes to loss locations occurred in situations when substantiating evidence was later received which concluded that an aircraft went down in a country or location different from that originally reported (i.e., discovery of the actual crash site). Attached is a list of the names of unaccounted for casualties, including those whose remains have been returned, that occurred in Laos between May 15, 1965 and June 27, 1970.

I trust this additional information is helpful. If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL D. MCGINTY,
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USAF COMMANDER.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		73RANG 30 462	
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION		PRIORITY	
INFO		DISTRIBUTION	
FROM: CSAF		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: CMCPCAF		AFPOC (C)	
UNCLASSIFIED FROM AFPMSC 91922			
For Ryan from Wade			
SUBJ: Casualty Reporting (C)			
1. The Chief of Staff has recently conducted a searching review of the casualty reporting policies and procedures, and has reaffirmed the present system. We are most concerned, however, that the rules used to determine whether a lost member is reported as killed or as missing be correctly applied by commanders. 2. If conclusive evidence of death exists, a member is reported as killed even though remains are not recovered. The evidence must be as strong and as convincing as to overbear any possibility of survival, no matter how remote. If no such overwhelming proof exists, the member is reported as missing in action and is carried in this status unless and until conclusive evidence of death becomes available. AFM 30-4 provides guidance and outlines the necessary actions which commanders must take.		DATE TIME MONTH YEAR PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE GORDON H. BAGGARD Major, USAF Casualty Branch		SIGNATURE GORDON H. BAGGARD Lieutenant Colonel, USAF	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		REMARKS/INSTRUCTIONS OF JUDGE, PERSONAL	

DD FORM 1364-173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED

Format B

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON DEATHS
OF U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

	Viet-Nam	Laos	Thailand	Total
A. 5 Total Deaths Resulting From Actions by Hostile Forces				
a. From aircraft accidents/incidents Fixed Wing Helicopter				
b. From ground/surface action				
B. 4 Total Deaths Not the Result of Actions by Hostile Forces				
a. From aircraft accidents/incidents Fixed Wing Helicopter				
b. From ground/surface action				

NOTE: For Army only, include in the above a separate count of Special Forces personnel.

KEY TO LISTINGS

1. MIADT. Missing in Action Date. The date the member was either known to be missing in action or declared missing in action.

2. KIA DT. Killed in Action Date. Either the date the member was killed in action outright as reported by local command authority based upon receipt of conclusive evidence of death, or the date the Secretary of the Air Force or his designee declared the member killed in action based upon an Air Force board recommendation of presumptive finding of death. This date applies to members killed in action outright, died while captured or died while missing in action.

3. DECDT. Deceased Date. The date the member died as the result of nonhostile actions as reported by local command authority based upon receipt of conclusive evidence of death.

4. RRDY. Remains Returned Date. The date a member's remains were recovered by U.S. authority or returned to U.S. custody.

USAF PERSONNEL LOSSES IN LAOS BETWEEN 15 MAY 1965 AND 27 JUNE 1970
 NAME. NAME. MIADT. KIA DT. DECDT. RRDY.

Adachi	Thomas Y.	700422	780911
Adam	John G.	680522	780629
Albright II	John S.	681213	790517
Alise	Richard K.	681221	790817
Allen	Henry L.	700326	780706
Andre, Jr	Howard V.	690708	690708
Appelhans	Richard D.	671016	780428
Armstrong	John W.	671109	740607
Armstrong III	Frank A.		671006
Ayers	Richard L.	700416	780629
Balamoti	Michael D.	691124	730924
Baldrige, Jr	John R.	691120	691120
Bannon	Paul W.	690712	790122
Barden	Howard L.		670131
Barnett	Robert R.		660407
Barra	Gregory I.	681218	790417
Belcher	Glenn A.	671231	780509
Blanton	Clarence F.		680311
Bodahl	Jon E.	691112	740530
Bogages, Jr	Christos C.	690302	790206
Brashear	William J.	690508	740109
Brooks	William L.	700422	790522
Brower	Ralph W.	671109	671109
Brown	Earl C.	691124	740107
Brown	Joseph O.	660419	660419
Brownlee	Charles R.	681224	681225
Burkart, Jr	Charles W.	660613	780403
Burns	John R.	660804	660804
Bynum	Neil S.	691026	691026
Byrne	Joseph E.	680313	680313
Calfee	James H.		690301
Campbell	Clyde W.	690301	690301
Campbell	William E.	690129	780608
Carlock	Ralph L.		670304
Carroll	Patrick H.	691102	780823
Cavalli	Anthony F.	660628	660628
Chambers	Jerry L.	680522	760812
Chorlins	Richard D.	700111	700111
Christiano	Joseph	631224	781106
Churchill	Carl R.	700503	700503
Clark	Stanley S.	690214	690214
Clark	Thomas E.	690208	690208
Clark II	John C.	691205	780911
Clarke	Fred L.	681213	740528
Clarke, Jr	George W.	671016	731108
Clay	Eugene L.	671109	671109
Coady	Robert F.	690118	740726
Cogdell	William K.	670117	670117

USAF PERSONNEL LOSSES IN LAOS BETWEEN 15 MAY 1965 AND 27 JUNE 1970
 LNAME..... FNAME..... MIADT. KIADT. DECDT. RRDY..

Collins	Guy F.	680313	680313	
Collwell	William K.	651224	708229	
Conaway	Lawrence Y.	700503	700503	
Cotten	Larry W.	700309	700309	
Cross	James E.	700424	700424	
Crus	Carlos R.	671229	760719	
Daffron	Thomas C.	700218	750623	
Dalley	Douglas V.	681213	740107	
Danielson	Benjamin F.	691205	760719	
Davis	Daniel R.	690818	740530	
Davis	Edgar F.	680917	790305	
Davis	James W.		680311	
Davis	Robert C.	690323	750502	
Davis	Charlie B.	700422	740528	
Davis, Jr	Rexford J.	691124	770406	
DeWispelaere	James E.	691112	780621	
Dennany	David T.		690317	
Dinan III	Morgan J.	681213	810202	
Donahue	Jefferson S.	690809	760426	
Dotson	Charles G.	660628	660628	
Dudley	Thomas N.	681213	780720	
Dugan	James B.	690426	690426	
East, Jr	Norman D.	690113	780629	
Eaton	Joseph Y.	691105	750121	
Echanis	Robert J.	680205	731025	
Edgar	Dennis L.	651224	771201	
Ellers	Richard G.	700326	780630	
Elzinga	Richard		680311	680311
Etchberger	Patrick M.	690704	790820	
Fallon	Joseph P.	681213	750725	
Fanning	Fielding W.	691230	740528	
Featherston III	Charles K.	691124	780629	
Fellenz	Allen E.	680320	780505	
Fellows	Douglas D.	691230	760503	
Ferguson	Donald G.	700422	790717	
Fisher	Brendan P.	671124	801009	
Foley	Paul L.	671229	750812	
Foster	Russell D.	681211	780808	
Galbraith	Richard O.	691124	780629	
Ganley	James P.		670110	
Gauley	Paul E.	690113	790321	
Getchell	Thomas E.	700218	700218	
Gillen	Henry G.		680311	
Gish	Calvin C.	680522	780629	
Glover	Robert A.	700423	770406	
Gomez	Laurent L.	690809	781129	
Gourley	Robert A.	670401	780306	
Govan	James W.	690614	690614	
Grace				

USAF PERSONNEL LOSSES IN LAOS BETWEEN 15 MAY 1965 AND 27 JUNE 1970
 LNAME..... FNAME..... MIADT. KIADT. DECDT. RRDY..

Green	Norman H.	680109	790717	
Green	Robert B.			661025
Grewell	Larry I.	691124	780629	
Guillemin	Louis P.	680430	780428	
Guillet	Andre R.	660518	741119	
Hall	Willis R.		680311	
Hanley	Larry J.	691104	790206	
Harley	Lee D.	660518	750729	
Harris	Stephen W.	700422	740528	
Harrold	Patrick K.	691205	731119	
Hart	Joseph L.		670225	
Hartness	Gregg	681126	800701	
Hassenger	Alden K.	651224	771201	
Helmsch	Gerald R.	691112	780901	
Helwig	Roger D.	690911	690911	
Hensley	Ronnie L.	700422	780911	
Herrick, Jr	Thomas T.	680317	740528	
Hesford	James W.	691027	771121	
Hess, Jr	Peter D.	680321	780608	
Herrick	Frederick W.	690329	790522	
Hills	Raymond H.		660224	
Holland	John R.		660214	
Holmes	Malvin A.		680311	
Holton	David H.	660315	781106	
Hudlicka	Robert E.	690129	740109	
Hudgens	David L.	650518	771121	
Hunter, Jr	Edward M.	700321	700321	
Ireland	Russell P.	660210	740620	
Irsch	Robert N.	700422	780911	
Jeffords	Wayne C.	680109	740109	
Jensen	Denzell B.	651224	771201	
Johns	George W.	660515	761022	
Jones	Paul P.	680628	780518	
Kahler	Louis P.	671129	671129	
Keller	Harold	690614	790817	
Kerr	Wendell R.	690301	690301	
Kerr	Everett O.	660613	780102	
Kiesel, Jr	John C.G.	670822	670822	
Kieffer, Jr	Ernst P.	660210	790115	
King	William L.	700211	700211	
Kirk	Charles D.	681225	780505	
Klingner	Herbert A.		680311	
Knebel	Michael L.	700406	700406	
Knight, Jr	Thomas E.	680522	780629	
Koonce	Roy A.	670519	670519	
Krogman	Terry T.	671225	780428	
Kryszak	Alva R.	670117	670117	
	Theodore E.	660603	780118	

USAF PERSONNEL LOSSES IN LAOS BETWEEN 15 MAY 1965 AND 27 JUNE 1970
 LNAME..... FNAME..... MIADT. KIA DT. DECDT. RDT...

Rubley	Roy R.	680922	670131		
Ruhlmann	Charles F.	680922	680922		
Lawrence	Gregory P.		681005		
LeFever	Douglas P.	691105	780629		
Lindstrom	Ronnie G.	700102	780607		
Lint	Donald M.	700422	780911		
Lucki	Albin E.	700423	731108		
Luna	Carter P.	690110	750820		
Luna	Donald A.	690201	781129		
Lyon	Donavan L.	680322	740526		
Macko	Charles	690222	780621		
Madison	William L.	660515	780124		
Mahan	Douglas F.	700420	700420	720705	
Martin	Russell D.	660603	790113		
Mascari	Phillip L.	690502	790402		
Mason	William H.	680522	801009		
Masterson	Michael J.	681013	781120		
Matthes	Peter R.	691124	780728		
Mauterer	Oscar	660215	771201		
Mayercik	Ronald M.	671124	770728		
Maywey	Larry W.	671109	671109		
McGouldrick, Jr	Francis J.	681213	780710		
McKenney	Kenneth D.	660515	750702		
McPhail	William T.	680522	780629	820301	
Manges	George B.	670102	781106		
Maroney III	Virgil K.	690301	690301		
Killer	Robert C.		680828		
Kitchell	Thomas B.	680522	750227		
Miyazaki	Ronald K.		670131		
Morgan	Burke H.	670822	670822		
Morley	Charles F.	700218	790724		
Mulhassan	Harvey		670131		
Mullins	Harold E.	660603	740528		
Mundt II	Henry G.	690508	790417		
Newberry	Wayne E.	680929	680929		
O'Brien	John L.		661110		
Palmer, Jr	Gilbert S.	680227	770428		
Pata	Gary	680522	750109		
Paxton	Donald E.	690222	730924		
Pearson	Wayne E.	690222	690222	680828	
Phillips	Elbert A.	680430	780608		
Pietsch	Robert E.	661116	780404		
Pittmann	Alan D.	690712	740528		
Pike	Peter K.	681208	681208		
Pisarcello, Jr	Joseph S.	690715	790417		
Polster	Harmon	680205	751204		
Potter	William T.	671229	780428		
Potter, Jr	William J.				

USAF PERSONNEL LOSSES IN LAOS BETWEEN 15 MAY 1965 AND 27 JUNE 1970
 LNAME..... FNAME..... MIADT. KIA DT. DECDT. RDT...

Preston	James A.	660515	780125		
Price	David S.		680311		
Pugh	Dennis G.	700319	820128		
Rash	Melvin D.	680522	780629		
Rauch	Robert E.	700416	731009		
Reese III	G. David	700424	700424		
Reilly	Lavern G.	660515	790103		
Renelt	Walter A.	691120	691120		
Rex	Robert A.	681208	681208		
Rex	Robert F.		690309		
Robbins	Richard J.	660419	650419		
Robinson	Lewis M.		670604		
Rogers	Charles E.	670504	670504		
Rose	Luther L.	660603	780306		
Rowley	Charles S.	700422	781103		
Russell	Donald H.	671205	671205		
Scott, Jr	Vincent C.		690422		
Shannon	Patrick L.		680311		
Sljan	Lance P.	671109	680122		
Singleton	Daniel E.	690126	780509	740313	
Sitemore	James E.	690708	690708		
Smith	Harry W.	691112	790125		
Smith	Victor A.	690117	690117		
Smith II	Lewis P.	680530	780621		
Smith, Jr	Warren P.	660622	740108		
Smith, Sr	Harding E.	660603	740906		
Spinler	Darrell J.		670621		
Springstead	Donald E.		680311		
Stearns	Roger H.	690911	690911	900522	
Stewart	Virgil G.		690517		
Stowers, Jr	Aubrey E.	680321	731004		
Swords III	Smith	671230	790817		
Tapp	Marshall L.	660515	780118		
Taria	Lothar G. T.	700309	700309		
Thompson	George W.	660515	780125		
Thornton	Larry C.	651224	740122		
Towle	John C.	700422	780911		
Tucci	Robert L.	691112	691112		
Utley	Russell K.	690126	780509		
Van Cleave	Walter S.		690422		
Nagener	David R.		651020		
Walker	Lloyd F.		670131		
Walker	Michael S.	690715	731005		
Walker	Thomas T.		660407		
Walker, Jr	Samuel P.	681213	780621		
Walsh III	Richard A.	690215	791004		
Ward	Neal C.	690613	780620		
Warren	Ervin	660603	780502		

USAF PERSONNEL LOSSES IN LAOS BETWEEN 15 MAY 1965 AND 27 JUNE 1970

LN	NAME	MIADT	MIADT	DECDT	RRDT
Warren	Gray D.	691026	691026		
Weismueller	Courtney E.	670212	670212		
West	John T.	700102	740106		
Westbrook	Donald E.	680313	780427		
Westar	Albert D.		681005		
White	James S.	691124	740124		
Whitford, Jr	Lawrence W.	691102	790522		
Widdis, Jr	James W.	690323	780808		
Wiggins	Wallace L.	680203	680203		780824
Willatt, Jr	Robert V.	690417	790625		
Williams	David R.	670401	770301		
Williams	James S.	660513	780125		
Wolfe	Thomas R.	660628	660628		
Wolfkeil	Wayne B.	680809	680809		
Wood	Don C.	660116	800303		
Worley	Don F.		680311		
Worst	Karl E.		660302		
Worham	Murray L.	671230	770118		
Wright	Donald L.	691124	751106		
Wright	Thomas T.	680227	790724		
Zukowski	Robert J.	690211	790115		

RESPONSE TO A QUESTION POSED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
SUBMITTED BY ROGER E. SHIELDS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the specific question which you have asked that I address. You asked that I express my opinion of the ten POWs whom I believe are the most compelling "discrepancy cases."

I must say at the outset of my answer that the question, as you have posed it, is impossible for me to answer. In considering my response, I have considered the circumstances of loss of many of our missing, and all of the subsequent specific information of which I am aware that has become available concerning these individuals since the initial incidents which resulted in their entry into a prisoner or missing status. I should emphasize at this point that additional information concerning our missing may have become available to the U.S. government since my official connection with this issue ended, and which is consequently unknown to me.

Based on my own knowledge, however, I am convinced that a number of our men who did not return in Operation Homecoming were at one time alive as prisoners of the forces we opposed in Southeast Asia. For a number of men I consider the evidence of captivity as incontrovertible. For others, the evidence strongly suggests that the likelihood of capture was great.

During a press conference which I held April 12, 1973, after the repatriation phase of Operation Homecoming had been completed, I stated that as of that time, the U.S. Government had no indications that any of our missing were still alive and in captivity. I further stated, clearly and unambiguously, that some men whom we carried as prisoner did not return in Operation Homecoming, and that if any of our men were still alive, implementation of Article 8(b) of the Peace Agreement was the surest way to secure their return.

That statement indicated in an honest and forthright way the extent of our knowledge concerning men who remained missing after Operation Homecoming; some of our men clearly had been captured and had not returned, while we had good, although less certain, reason to believe others had also been captured. We further knew that the official lists we received from the Communist governments did not indicate the extent of their knowledge of what happened to our men, and I also made that clear in the press conference.

The information regarding what many have come to describe as discrepancy cases was, at the time of my April press conference, compelling in some cases in establishing the fact that a man had, to repeat again a point that I made publicly many times after that press conference, been captured, or strong enough in other cases to lead us to believe that a man should have been captured. But in all of these cases that information had not been confirmed and updated with subsequent reports that would have allowed us to say that we had indications that the man was alive and in captivity after Homecoming. It was especially discouraging with regard to those individuals to learn that none of those who returned was aware of anyone having been left behind. I personally find it discouraging as well that none of the thousands of reports that have been received in recent years, including information being received currently, can be correlated with specific individuals who did not return but might have remained behind as prisoners after Operation Homecoming.

For these reasons I find it impossible in my own mind to consider, for example, the case of an individual who was beyond any doubt captured in 1969, but who never entered the prison system with any of the men who returned, and about whom nothing beyond the initial event of capture was ever heard, as less compelling than similar circumstances for an individual who was captured in 1969. In some cases information received after the initial incident of capture or presumed capture, and in some cases the last information which could be correlated with a particular individual, was negative, indicating a man did not survive in captivity. But I view much of this information as an inadequate substitute for hard information from those who held those men captive.

For all of these reasons, and especially in light of the history surrounding attempts to achieve an accounting for those who are missing, I want to emphasize again that I cannot honestly in many cases, and certainly in many more than ten cases, describe one case as more compelling than another. The individuals that I list below therefore comprise what I would describe as representative cases. There are other names which could be legitimately added to the list. The list is not, and I repeat not, all inclusive. I should also add that although your request was couched in terms of POWs, I am sure that you did not mean to exclude MIAs about whose cases there are informed and honest views which differ from those of the Service Secretaries who made the status determinations.

My list, which is illustrative of the cases of many other missing men, is as follows:

Charles Dean and Neil Sharman

These two individuals were captured at a time after Homecoming when their Communist captors knew beyond doubt of the priority placed at the highest level by the U.S. and Australian governments on their release. They were alive and in captivity when numerous government initiatives were made on their behalf.

Walter Alan Cichon, David Demmon and Donald Sparks

I am convinced that there was a high probability that Cichon was captured. There is no question that Demmon and Sparks were captured.

David Hrdlicka and Charles Shelton

These individuals were captured and held in captivity in Laos.

John Martin Brucher

The available evidence indicates that he may have been captured, and in any case an accounting for him should be expected.

San D. Francisco and Joseph C. Morrison

These individuals were crew members of the same aircraft at the time of their incident of loss. The circumstances of loss indicate that there was a good likelihood of capture. A precise accounting for these individuals should be expected.

Finally, I would like to include on this list four individuals from the eight man crew of an EC47Q which was shot down February 4-5, 1973. As you know, there were valid questions about whether any of the crew survived the incident. I will omit their names because of the crew of eight, the remains of four men were seen by U.S. personnel who inspected the wreckage briefly a few days after the aircraft was lost. Only one set of remains could be associated positively with an individual name, although the location of the remains in the aircraft suggested with whom the other remains might be identified.

I include this incident not because the circumstances strongly suggest men survived the crash and were captured, but because this case illustrates very graphically point that I have been trying to make for many years, although I fear with little success; many individual cases associated with our missing involve elements concerning the possibility of capture or survival in captivity which point in totally different directions. I also include this case because it has been cited as a reason, apparently by some as the single most important reason, which caused me to question in late May 1973, my April press conference statement that the U.S. Government had no indications at that time that American prisoners remained in captivity after the return of our men in Operation Homecoming.

An internal memorandum dated May 24, 1973, which discusses the EC47Q incident is cited as the proof that I recognized my April statement was incorrect. That memo was shown to me in the course of my deposition by the staff of this Committee. They were kind enough to provide a copy of the memorandum to me and a representative of the Department of Defense. Because of its relevance to the question which you have asked that one address here, and because it has been cited in a prior public session of this Committee, I ask that it be placed in the public record along with this statement. The memorandum is also important because of several key points which it makes that are relevant to the question of what the Department of Defense knew about missing Americans in the critical 1973 period, and what policy was and how it was implemented regarding the missing, their families and the American public.

First, I want to emphasize that this memorandum was in no way self-serving. Perhaps this point hardly needs to be made, since the memorandum has been cited as evidence that I knew that my April 12 statement was inaccurate. Nevertheless, I want to specify for the record that this memorandum was not intended for public use. It was an internal communication from me to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). The Assistant Secretary (ISA) had newly assumed that position, and the memorandum was intended to be part of the process of acquainting him with key elements of the prisoner/missing issue as it stood at the time of the memorandum. That was its sole purpose, and to the best of my knowledge, the memorandum was never in the public domain until it was cited by this Committee. As I have already noted, I did not possess a copy of this memorandum until one was provided by the Committee Staff. I confess that I was unaware of its apparent importance even then, and I did not recognize the memorandum from the partial quote cited by Chairman Kerry in the June 25 hearings in which I testified. That session motivated me to review the material furnished me by the Committee, and it was then that I examined the memorandum in detail.

In keeping with my long held view that there is very little pertaining to the substantive issues surrounding the subject of our missing which needs to be classified, and in keeping with the firm belief which I held when I was an official part of this issue, and which I still hold today, the memorandum was unclassified, and thus can be discussed in its entirety here. The record of the Department of Defense regarding its policies and actions relative to our missing and their families had no need to be hidden from public scrutiny during my tenure there, and I welcome the scrutiny of its actions by this Committee today just as I did with prior Congressional investigative efforts. The key points which the memorandum makes, and which I believe the public needs to understand, are the following:

(1) It states directly that my April 12 press conference statement that the DOD had no indications as of that moment that Americans remained in captivity in Southeast Asia after the termination of the repatriation phase of Operation Homecoming was factual and accurate when it was made.

(2) It indicates my belief that two incidents, whose events had not been clarified at the time the memorandum was written, had occurred which might, depending on their resolution, make the April 12 statement and the DOD guidance to questions from the public which had been taken from that statement no longer valid. One of the incidents was the loss of the EC47Q.

The incident occurred February 4-5, 1973, and the initial investigation proved to be very negative concerning the chances of survival for any of the crew. Despite the fact that the Air Force had placed all of the crew members in a killed in action status, there was a question in my mind about the correctness of that status because of certain unusual aspects of the incident that suggested the possibility that some of the crew might have survived and been taken prisoner. Accordingly, I asked for a continuing detailed investigation of all aspects of this incident. Most of the information which had been compiled as of my April 12 press conference did not support the idea that Americans had been taken prisoner as a result of the EC47Q loss. I have stated publicly my belief that a missing in action status would have been more appropriate than the determination of killed in action for several of the crew, but this in no way indicates a belief on my part that four of the men had been taken prisoner. It was an open question in my mind on April 12, and nothing further that we had learned by May 24, when I wrote the memorandum to the Assistant Secretary (ISA) changed my views. The EC470 incident was not, and I emphasize this point, the reason that the April 12 statement became invalid soon after the May 24 memorandum was written.

The reason it became invalid is simple and clear. Emmet Kay, an Air America pilot, was downed in Laos on May 5, 1973. My memorandum stated that we had good reason to believe that he had been captured. Further investigation confirmed this soon after the memorandum was written, and Emmet Kay became the first American since the repatriation of the last man during Homecoming for whom current information indicated a captivity status. Kay's capture was subsequently acknowledged by the Pathet Lao, and he was released in 1974. Kay's confirmed capture, which occurred almost 1 month after my April 12 press conference, made my remarks at that time about our knowledge of Americans held prisoner no longer correct.

(3) The memorandum illustrates that there was no mind set within the DOD to debunk intelligence reports of prisoners, or any lack of will to follow up information concerning those men, regardless of where it may have led. Intensive analytical efforts were undertaken in the case of the EC47Q to determine as precisely as possible what happened to men listed as killed in action.

(4) The memorandum illustrates the willingness of DOD to change position as information supported those changes. When the information indicated Emmet Kay's capture, it was acknowledged by the DOD, and efforts to obtain his release were pursued vigorously.

(5) I stated in this internal memorandum which was not, I emphasize again, written for public consumption, that DOD policy had always been to be forthright, honest and candid with the families of our prisoners and missing, and that in line with this policy Mrs. Kay was being given all of the substantive information regarding her husband's status. The same treatment was accorded civilians and military alike.

(6) The memorandum also pointed out in clear and specific terms that the DOD position with regard to the men for whom no accounting had been obtained was not that all of these men were dead, but rather that we did not know the fate of many of those carried as prisoner and missing who did not return in Operation Homecoming.

ing. I confess to being exasperated when I hear repeatedly the statement that the DOD position after the return of the men was that all those who did not return were dead. In this memorandum, written less than 2 months after the return of the last man repatriated in Homecoming, I recounted how a Congressman told me that it was his impression that DOD believed all those who did not return were dead, and how I told him that view was incorrect. The DOD view, I wrote, was that we did not know whether those men were living or dead. This internal memorandum thus made clear to the newly arrived Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), that no such belief existed as policy. I never made that statement, and to my knowledge no responsible DOD official, including Deputy Secretary Clements, ever made such a statement after becoming familiar with the prisoner and missing issue. To the contrary, I stated repeatedly over a period of years, including many times in congressional testimony, that we did not know in many individual cases whether the man was living or dead.

Questions still remain in my mind about the fate of the crew of the EC47Q. Subsequent analysis of that incident indicates that the status determinations by the Air Force of killed in action were not based on a callous disregard of the circumstances of this case. I recognize full well that there are many aspects of this case which do not support the notion that any of the crew survived the crash and were captured. Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding the loss of these men indicate that an investigation of the crash site should be a high priority for those now involved in field activities directed at obtaining an accounting for those still unaccounted for.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I apologize for the length of this statement, but I know that you recognize the complexity of the issues we are discussing, and the need for accuracy and completeness as we deal with them. I, especially, in the wake of the apparent confusion caused by my April 1973 press conference, appreciate the need to make full and detailed explanations of my views of these sensitive issues. For the record, I am attaching a copy of the memorandum of May 27, 1973, to which I have referred in my testimony. I thank you again for the opportunity of expressing my views.

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR HILL

May 24, 1973.

Subject: Current PW/MIA Issues

In DOD sponsored press conference held April 12, 1973, I made the statement that DOD had no specific knowledge indicating that any U.S. personnel were still alive and held prisoner in Southeast Asia. This statement has been the basis for all subsequent answers from DOD to questions concerning the possibility that Americans may still be held prisoner in Southeast Asia. It was a totally accurate and factual statement at the time it was made.

In light of more recent events, I believe that answer is no longer fully satisfactory. Specifically, there is reason to believe that the American pilot of an Air America aircraft downed in Laos on May 7 may have been captured along with six ± Meo passengers, by North Vietnamese forces. The last communication received from the pilot indicated he was landing on a hostile airstrip. A short time after, a sensitive intercept of communication traffic between North Vietnam and Laos indicated that the U.S. pilot and the Meo passengers had been captured. Embassy Vientiane now reports that Pathet Lao radio also reported the capture of the American and his passengers. The wife of Emmett Kay, the pilot, has been informed of the Pathet Lao broadcast as has the Royal Lao Government. The possibility of Kay's capture is therefore no longer closely held information.

Although this incident may be termed an exception from the general rule, it should be noted that only 10 persons, 9 of whom were U.S., were released by the other side as Laos prisoners. Over 300 U.S. personnel remain unaccounted for in Laos.

On February 4-5, 1973, a USAF EC-47 carrying a crew of 8 U.S. personnel was downed in Laos. The search and rescue team succeeded in locating and inspecting the wreckage of the aircraft. Because the area was a hostile one, the inspection was not completed. Nevertheless, parts of four bodies were recovered, only one of which was identified. A short time after the shootdown of the EC-47, a sensitive intercept of communication between North Vietnamese Army Commands in Laos and the DRV indicated that four Americans had been captured in an area some 40 miles from the EC-47 crash site.

DIA feels that the Air America pilot is now held prisoner, but is less sure about the fate of the four EC-47 crewmembers whose remains were not recovered. DIA is

continuing its investigation, but feels there is some reason to believe that the four may actually have been captured. The Air Force carries all eight in a KIA status, based on the nature of the incident and on the recovery of four remains.

Given these circumstances, I believe that the DOD position regarding the possibility of men still being held prisoner in SEA should be altered slightly. The amended position should not be one which raises false hopes among the families of our men not yet accounted for. We have been very careful at all levels of DOD, in OSD and in the Military Services, not give false hopes to the families, but to present the case honestly and forthrightly. Accordingly, I believe that the DOD position should simply be one which discourages speculation and points to implementation of the accounting procedures contained in the Cease Fire document as the procedure which promises to provide the quickest and most certain answers about our missing men. I have discussed this with OSAD/PA. PA concurs and has prepared representative questions and answers which follow this line.

In conjunction with this issue, there is a great deal of Congressional interest in the MIA problem. One Congressman indicated to me that it was his impression that DOD believes that there are no more Americans alive and prisoner in SEA. I replied that we had over 1300 Americans who were unaccounted for, and that this meant that we had no information to show conclusively that a man was either alive or dead.

I am scheduled to testify on the MIA issue before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. With your concurrence, I will maintain the position that we do not know whether those now unaccounted for are alive or dead.

ROGER E. SHIELDS,
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary.

RESPONSES TO SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS SUBMITTED BY EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR., LT. GEN. USAF RET.

Question 1a. Did you believe that the DIA special office for POW/MIA had adequate administrative, logistical, and personnel resources during your tenure as DIA director? (September 1, 1977-September 1, 1981)

Answer 1a. During the year before assuming the directorship of DIA I had spent 6 months as the deputy chief of staff, Intelligence, Headquarters Strategic Air Command in Omaha and 6 months as the assistant chief of staff, Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force in the Pentagon. My return as director after a year's absence and having served a previous 2 years in DIA as Deputy director and acting director was somewhat of a triumph for me, I'll have to admit, and I was determined to do everything better than I or anyone else had ever done at managing Military Intelligence for the Defense Department. My daily appointment records don't help me in answering this question, but I do remember giving significant additional attention to the special office for POW/MIA affairs. I visited and was briefed by personnel there shortly after my assumption of command and recall, early on, approving more working space for the shop, additional personnel allocations, budgetary support for computerization, additional travel allowances and the approval of Commander Trowbridge's transfer from military to civilian status as head of the POW/MIA office. I went with commander Trowbridge to the house Sub-committee hearings on POW/MIA affairs—was regularly offered by the house members all the personnel and other resources necessary to do the proper job of research and analysis. I remember that I regularly gave Commander Trowbridge the opportunity to also respond to this offer and our regular response that we were adding additional people and space and other resources to the effort as required. I remember that I spent one, 7-hour session with Congressman Dornan discussing POW/MIA matters, in the Pentagon, shortly after I became director in a one on one, mutual learning session. Dornan was always very well informed on POW matters and intensely interested in anything related to the subject, in summary, I would have to answer that we could never do enough or have enough resources and were always trying to do more to get to the bottom of every bit of data we were acquiring on sightings etc.

Question 1b. Was the office adequately manned and resourced when you reviewed it in 1980?

Answer 1b. No. I felt that the personnel there were under siege, burned out and worked beyond human endurance by a humanitarian effort that had been turned into a major political issue. I felt that the Defense Intelligence Agency should be relieved of the responsibility for the effort and that a permanent Presidential com-

mission should be established, that the entire governmental file be transferred to it so that a permanent, high-quality record of the history of the subject be guaranteed for the missing from World War II and the Korean War as well as an challengeable record of the Vietnam conflict as it related to the missing. I recommended that each of the personnel assigned be promoted and assigned elsewhere in DIA.

I was shocked that the files were in such disarray and that the computerization of them I expected to have been completed long before had pretty much gone nowhere and recommended that a major effort was essential to assure a computer-manipulatable data base be available to all working the problem.

Question 2a. Did you review the determinations or resolutions that DIA made on live-sighting reports while you were at DIA?

Answer 2a. Regularly via interaction on daily reports to my office and in personal meetings with Mr. Trowbridge and his staff.

Question 2b. Did you ever disagree with the resolution DIA made of the live sighting?

Answer 2b. Yes, and demanded further cross-checking, travel to question the source and requests that certain sources be allowed to come to the United States to be questioned further and in much greater detail about their alleged knowledge on the subject. Some requests were passed by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, in writing—some orally. Toward the end of my tenure as director, the persistence of live sighting reports that continued to be received, the testimony of the gentleman who had prepared the remains of U.S. dead for the Hanoi Government and other intelligence convinced me that the evidence that there were still live Americans, held against their will in Southeast Asia was strong. Persistent challenges from questioners for proof did nothing to dispel my support of the evidence despite the fact that there was little leverage the United States could wield, short of renewed military combat to convince Hanoi they had to account for our missing. The other alternative? Resume diplomatic relations with the Hanoi regime as soon as possible in the hope that we could negotiate with the North Vietnamese the return of those still held, and indeed of all American military and civilian personnel held by the Hanoi or other Southeast Asia Governments. I regularly recommended this action to Members of the Congress. And in written and oral presentations and correspondence after I retired. We've waited far too long to take this positive action.

ATTACHMENT FOR MR. FRANK SIEVERTS

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

Question 1. What was the procedure for determination of death for U.S. civilians lost in Southeast Asia? Did the U.S. State Department play any role in that process or was it strictly a matter for the families of missing civilians?

Answer 1. As I indicated in my statement to the Committee on June 25, the files kept for U.S. civilians lost in Southeast Asia contained all available information on each individual, from every possible source, but did not draw conclusions as to whether the individual was a prisoner, missing, or dead.

At the time of Homecoming in 1973, information was received from Vietnam and Laos about the fate of some civilians. Additional information was received after 1975 when foreigners had to leave Vietnam, and all but a few departed from Laos. All this information was provided the families as well as to concerned agencies, including the office of Worker's Compensation Programs in the Department of Labor.

After April 1975, the State Department was not in a position to provide the standard "Report on the Death (or the Presumptive Death) of an American Citizen Abroad" for those private American citizens lost in Vietnam. Generally, such documents are issued by a U.S. consular official in the district where the death occurred, and there was no much official in Vietnam after April 1975. In order to be of assistance to the next of kin, however, I or another State Department officer wrote letters setting forth the circumstances and our conclusion of the presumptive death of a specific private citizen. This was done in response to requests from families seeking to settle insurance, estates, or other legal matters.

Other government agencies such as the Worker's Compensation Office and agencies that employed missing Americans had their own procedures concerning death benefits, insurance, etc. In many cases, determinations of death were handled under state and local law by individual families of the persons concerned. Upon their request, the State Department would provide information from the records that we continued to maintain.

LETTER FROM MICHAEL OKSENBURG, PRESIDENT, EAST-WEST CENTER

AUGUST 4, 1992.

BOB SMITH & JOHN F. KERRY,
United States Senate,
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
Washington, DC 20510-6500.

DEAR SENATORS KERRY AND SMITH: Regarding yours of July 24, my answer to the two additional questions are:

1. Impetus for creation of the Woodcock Commission: As I stated in my testimony, President Carter had promised during his campaign for the presidency to pursue the range of issues raised by the League of Families with respect to possible live Americans remaining in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and to the return of remains. As I recall, in addition to President Carter, different proponents of a mission to Vietnam had different objectives in mind. But everyone had one overriding consideration: to ascertain whether the Vietnamese might be holding Americans against their will, to indicate that this issue was of deep concern to the administration, and to make the Vietnamese understand that their cooperation on this matter would be a major factor in our policy toward them.

I do not recall that the reclassification issue was central in the dispatch of the Woodcock Commission. That is, no matter what the formal status of a soldier might be, our primary interest was in finding out the actual fate of those who were or had been listed missing-in-action. Naturally, if the Commission concluded that the Vietnamese held no live Americans, this conclusion would affect the status review process. But as I recall, no one believed this mission would be able conclusively to nail down that issue. After all even if the leaders in Hanoi said they were not holding Americans against their will, their statements could not be fully believed. So the Commission was, as I recall, envisioned as the first step in a process.

2. I do not recall how and where the decision was made to resume the process of status reviews. I am sufficiently hazy about this matter that I do not remember the term of art you use, i.e. "presumptive findings of death." I was in favor of a "resumption of status reviews," that is the term I recall. I did not think there was anything "presumptive" about the procedure. Rather, as I recall, each case would be carefully reviewed to reach a best judgment, on the basis of the known facts, as to whether that serviceman was alive or dead. Was there reason for hope? As I said in my testimony, my meetings with several wives of MIAs convinced me that careful process of evaluation should automatically go forward, unless the next-of-kin wished her or his serviceman not to be reviewed.

I believe the Pentagon favored resumption of status reviews and many in the League were opposed. But I do not remember whether the final decision was made in the Pentagon or the White House.

Thank you again for inviting me to participate in these hearings.

Sincerely,

MICHEL OKSENBURG,
President.

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY GENERAL ROBERT C. KINGSTON, USA (RET), REQUESTED BY SENATORS KERRY AND SMITH

Question 1. Had corrections to loss locations for individuals lost on covert operations in Laos and Cambodia been made in the JCRC files used to attempt to resolve the fates of MIAs in Southeast Asia in 1973?

Answer 1. To the best of my recollection the JCRC files contained information on our missing personnel as to source of report, location of incident, circumstances pertinent to the loss or missing. If a plane shot down or crash was observed we would be given as much information as was available, such as: members organization, location, date/time, weather conditions, type of mission if available, type of aircraft, number of crew, were parachutes observed, did all open, type of terrain, was there any movement observed after personnel landed, was any communications made with crew members on the ground, were there any enemies observed on the ground, if so, what actions were observed and proximity to our downed crew. Was a search and rescue operation conducted—time initiated, unit and location, were other aircraft in the vicinity of shoot down/crash, etc.

Information on ground losses contained similar information: source of report, unit missing men belonged to, date/time, location(s), type action and mission if available, information on enemy action.

I do not believe that JCRC records would indicate if corrections or changes had been made as our files contained reports that were submitted to us from the Services and various intelligence organizations including from the United States and from the South Vietnamese.

I make two recommendations.

1. Request that the JCRC send the Select Committee some typical records that they received in 1978 or send a Committee representative to Hawaii to inspect the JCRC records of that time.

2. That the Select Committee interview the commanders of such organizations as the MACV Special Operations Group, name later changed to MACV Studies and Observation Group.

I realize that the Committee may have already acted upon these recommendations.

Question 2. Did the Vietnamese link cooperation on the resolution of the MIA issue to Article 21 of the Paris Peace Agreement calling for U.S. war reconstruction aid? Please describe how this linkage was made?

Answer 2. I have no knowledge to answer these questions. I suggest that the Committee question the former United States members of the Four-Party Joint Military Team—the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. I had no contact with the North Vietnamese in 1973.

Question 3. Did the Vietnamese ever indicate that they were holding several hundred U.S. remains which could be turned over if the U.S. would provide financial reconstruction aid?

Answer 3. I have no knowledge to answer these questions. I suggest that the Committee question the former United States members of the Four-Party Joint Military Team—the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. I had no contact with the North Vietnamese in 1973.

ROBERT C. KINGSTON,
General, U.S. Army (Retired).

APPENDIX

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YSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

SUBJ: JOINT INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0313, SUMMARY REPORT

1. IN LIGHT OF THE MAGNITUDE OF DATA BEING ACCUMULATED AS A RESULT OF THE JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY TO FURNISH THE INFORMATION IN A FORM WHICH CAN BE READILY RELEASED TO THE NEXT OF KIN, THE FOLLOWING REPORT SUMMARIZES ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO REFERENCE NUMBER 0313. REQUEST JAC CONCURRENCE AND ADD APPROVAL TO RELEASE THIS REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE SERVICE CASUALTY OFFICE.

2. THE REPORT PROVIDED BELOW IS BASED ON INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY JOINT US/VIETNAMESE TEAMS. SOME OF THE DATA CORRELATE WITH U.S. SERVICE RECORDS; OTHER INFORMATION IS NOT INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIABLE AND IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION OR JOINT US/VIETNAMESE EFFORTS. THE VIEW THESE INVESTIGATIONS AS IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES WHICH WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE FATE OF YOUR MISSING RELATIVE. UNDER OUR DISCLOSURE POLICY YOU WILL BE INFORMED AS FURTHER INFORMATION IS RECEIVED, DEVELOPED, AND EVALUATED.

3. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: 27 SEPTEMBER 1988. THE JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM VISITED THE VIET BAC MUSEUM WHICH IS

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SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF UNOFFICIAL VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTS

REF: A. JCRC LIAISON 150720Z FEB 89

B. JCRC LIAISON 060943Z MAR 89

C. JCRC LIAISON 100945Z MAR 89

D. JCRC LIAISON 181240Z MAR 89

1. REFS ARE DETAILED REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED DURING THE FOURTH JOINT SEARCH EFFORT, 14-26 JAN

89. THE DOCUMENT EXTRACTS TO BE TRANSLATED RELUN ARE CITED IN EACH OF THESE REFS.

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION REPORTED IN REF B, THE JOINT TEAM LEARNED OF THE EXISTENCE IN NHAN TRACH VILLAGE OF WRITTEN RECORDS OF THE WARTIME ACTIVITIES OF THE VILLAGE. AMERICAN TEAM MEMBERS ASKED TO SEE THESE RECORDS, AND WERE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED WHEN ON 20 JAN 89 VIETNAMESE TEAM MEMBERS BROUGHT TWO DOCUMENTS TO THE GUEST HOUSE FOR EXAMINATION. THE TEAM PHOTOGRAPHED THE DOCUMENTS THEN TRANSCRIBED THOSE PARTS RELEVANT TO THE TEAM'S INTERESTS. THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE NOW AT JCRC AND CILMI. THE TWO DOCUMENTS ARE DESCRIBED, AND THE EXTRACTS TRANSLATED, IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

3. THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED "LNUOCJ SUNH TRUYENF THUONG 40 NAMN LUNGJ LNUOCJ VUX TRANG XAX NHAAM TRACHJ" OR "BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 40-YEAR TRADITION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NHAN TRACH VILLAGE" CITED AS "LUOC SU" IN

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:000

561737/5469/075 1 OF 4

M1 0378

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160516Z MAR 89

CSN:BPX0298 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

REFS. IT IS A HANDWRITTEN MANUSCRIPT OF 67 PAGES, COMPILED BY A GROUP OF 15 PRESENT AND FORMER CADRE, WHICH WAS COMPLETED ON 16 JAN 87.

A. THE BOTTOM OF P. 11 READS: "ON 7-2-65 AN F 105 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN FLAMES ABOUT 2 KM FROM THE SEACOST OF THE VILLAGE. THE DEPTH WAS 10 'SAIR,' WHICH IS 16 METERS". IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND, THE VILLAGE MILITARY COMMAND DIRECTLY LED A SQUAD TO THE CRASH SITE IN ORDER TO DIVE AND BRING UP THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE ONTO THE BEACH. EXPLANARS SUCH AS COMRADE MOOF DOUNG QUOCOS, COMRADE PHANJ 'ILLEGIBLE' DDAHNG, COMRADE NGUYENX THIEPJ, AND MANY OTHER MILITIA COMRADES STROVE DIVING AND SWIMMING THROUGHOUT THE DAY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION COMPLETELY. "P. 12" THE PILOT "DICH XON," BEARING THE RANK OF 1LT AND CARRYING A MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND MANY OTHER DOCUMENTS TO PROTECT HIMSELF "DAAAYF DOUR MOOF SON MOOJ THAAM", AND WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE WAR IN SOUTH KOREA, FELL INTO THE SEA AND WAS DESTROYED BY OUR ARMY AND PEOPLE. THE BODY OF "DICH XON," STILL WEARING ITS PARACHUTE, WAS PICKED UP BY THE NHAN TRACH MILITIA; IT LAY LIKE A DROWNED CAT ON THE BEACH OF OUR HOMELAND."

B. FROM P. 15: "ON 24-4-68 SHOT DOWN AN F-4H, 16-8-68, IN THAT SAME YEAR SHOT DOWN ANOTHER F-4A." NOTE: "28-4-68" IS INKED OVER THE ORIGINAL DATE, WHICH IS 19-5-

68. "F-4H" AND "F-4A" ARE BOTH WRITTEN OVER THE TERM F-105. THE GRAMMAR OF THE ENTRY WAS NOT ALTERED TO REFLECT THE CHANGES, HENCE THE WORD "ANOTHER".

C. "ORGANIZING THE CAPTURE OF AN AMERICAN AIR PILOT: ON 28-5-68, IN THE RECLAMATION AREA, THE BROWNHELY TRUNG GIANG ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNIT WAS COOPERATING IN SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING. THIS ELLIPSIS IS IN THE TEXT. A CRAZY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CAME TO ATTACK THE ARTILLERY AREA; BEFORE IT COULD GET AWAY THE UNIT SPIT BULLETS AT THE FOOL. ONE PILOT EJECTED AND DESCENDED FAR BEHIND THE FIGHTING UNIT IN ORDER TO BE PICKED UP. DESPITE THE INTIMIDATING BOMBS AND BULLETS THE BOYS MOOF TIAF AND PHANJ DDOO: "WHO AT THAT TIME WAS ONLY 12 YEARS OLD" COURAGEOUSLY CRANLED FORWARD AND, USING A BAMBOO POLE, FORCED THE AIR PIRATE TO KNEEL IN SURRENDER. "THAT AIR PIRATE WAS A MAJOR".

D. "ALSO, ON 29-5-68: AN AIR PIRATE PARACHUTED INTO THE SEA ABOUT 6 KM FROM THE SHORE; IN THE SKIES AIRCRAFT MOARED TO DEFEND HIM. BUT, WITH DARING AND COURAGEOUS HEARTS COMRADES LEE KHANG, NGUYENX TRUNG, PHANJ VEDF, AND MANY OTHER COMRADES ROWED A BOAT ACROSS THE

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160516Z MAR 89

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

AVES TO MAN THAT AIR PIRATE RIGHT AWAY. TWO AIR PIRATES
WERE CAPTURED ALIVE; WITH THE CLEMENT POLICY OF OUR PARTY
AND GOVERNMENT THE FORCES PROTECTED THEM AND TURNED THEM
IN.

DOUCED AT GOVERNMENT LAYENDE

561737/5969/075 3 OF 4 MI 0378 075/07:102 160516Z MAR 89
CSN:BPX0298 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 13020

0168 MAR 89

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF UNOFFICIAL VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTS
OVER TO THE RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATIONS (TURNED THEM OVER TO
THE 90-TRACH DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND)."

4. THE SECOND DOCUMENT, ENTITLED "SUOR VANGH GHI
COONG," OR "DOUGEN REGISTER OF MERIT" (CITED AS "SVCC" IN
REFS), IS A HANDWRITTEN, HARDBOUND MANUSCRIPT 86 PAGES IN
LENGTH. ITS COMPILER(S) AND DATE OF COMPILATION ARE
UNKNOWN, BUT AT LEAST PART OF IT DATES FROM THE 1964-1968
PERIOD, AS THE SIGNED AND DATED TESTIMONIALS OF VARIOUS
FOREIGN VISITORS AND VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS OF THAT TIME
APPEAR IN THE LATTER PAGES OF THE BOOK.

A. (P.5) "WITH A COURAGEOUS AND DETERMINED
SPIRIT ON 19-5-68, OUR ARMY AND PEOPLE KNOCKED DOWN AN
AMERICAN THUNDERCHIEF. THE AIR PIRATE PARACHUTED OUT TO
SEA, LOOKING FOR A WAY TO ESCAPE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS ABOUT 6
M FROM THE SHORE, AND AIRCRAFT RESTLESSLY ROVED THE SKIES,
WITH A DETERMINATION NOT TO ALLOW HIM TO ESCAPE, AND
WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST HESITATION, COMRADES KHANG, YEOP,
LONG, AND MANY OTHER COMRADES GOT INTO A BOAT AND QUICKLY
ROWED TOWARD THE ENEMY, HABBING THAT AIR PIRATE RIGHT AWAY.
NOT ONLY AT SEA, BUT EVEN IN THE FOREST EVACUATION AREA ON
28-5-68 TIAF, 16 YEARS OLD, AND ODAU, 12 YEARS OLD,
CAPTURED A MAJOR, FORCING HIM TO KNEEL IN SURRENDER."

B. (P.7) "WITH THE SPIRIT OF SACRIFICING ONE'S
LIFE TO SAVE THE COUNTRY, WITH A FIRM AND COURAGEOUS WILL,
DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS WE HAVE DESTROYED TWO AMERICAN
THUNDERCHIEFS, CAPTURED TWO AIR PIRATES ALIVE, DESTROYED
ONE GROUP OF COMMANDO SPIES, AND TRANSPORTED MORE THAN
9,000 TONS OF MATERIEL, THUS CONTRIBUTING OUR PART TO THE
COMMON VICTORY OF THE ENTIRE COUNTRY."

5. COMMENTS:

A. THE CHANGES NOTED IN THE "LUOC SU" (SEE PAR 38
ABOVE) HAVE NOT BEEN MADE IN THE "SVCC," THUS REFERENCES TO
"19-5-68" AND "TWO AMERICAN THUNDERCHIEFS" REMAIN IN THE
LATTER TEXT.

B. THE "LUOC SU" SUFFERS FROM POOR PENMANSHIP,
FREQUENT GRAMMAR AND SPELLING MISTAKES, AND HEAVY USE OF
DIALECT. THE "SVCC," WHILE BOTH NEATER AND MORE LITERATE,
IS ALSO LESS INFORMATIVE.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

561609/5969/075 4 OF 4 MI 0377 075/07:102 160516Z MAR 89
CSN:BPX0298 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CORRECTED COPY

PRIORITY

P 212000Z MAR 89 PSN 591318P27

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO HQ AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPHCH//

INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PN-MIA//
 SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC// DIA WASHINGTON DC//PN-MIA//
 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J56// JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//OCJCS-PN-MIA/J5//
 CORUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//DAPC-PED-M//

BT

//H03460//

SUBJ: JOINT INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0213, SUMMARY REPORT

1. IN LIGHT OF THE MAGNITUDE OF DATA BEING ACCUMULATED AS A RESULT OF THE JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY TO FURNISH ALL INFORMATION TO THE NEXT OF KIN, THE FOLLOWING REPORT SUMMARIZES ALL INFORMATION GATHERED DURING JOINT EFFORTS CONDUCTED FROM 25 SEP TO 5 OCT 88 WHICH PERTAINS TO REFNO 0213. THIS REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY DSD FOR FORWARDING TO THE NOK.

2. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS BASED ON INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY JOINT TEAMS. SOME OF THE DATA CORRELATES WITH U.S. SERVICE RECORDS; OTHER INFORMATION IS NOT INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIABLE AND IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS OR JOINT EFFORT. WE VIEW THESE INVESTIGATIONS AS IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES WHICH WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE FATE OF YOUR MISSING RELATIVE. YOU WILL BE INFORMED AS FURTHER INFORMATION IS RECEIVED, DEVELOPED, AND EVALUATED.

3. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: THE TEAM TRAVELLED TO HA BAC PROVINCE AND INTERVIEWED NUMEROUS RESIDENTS OF LUC NEAN DISTRICT. THE RESIDENTS PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING MANY INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN THE DISTRICT THROUGHOUT THE WAR, SEVERAL OF WHICH CORRELATE TO RESOLVED CASES. NONE OF THE ACCOUNTS PROVIDED CORRELATE WITH THIS INCIDENT. THE ONLY INFORMATION THE TEAM DISCOVERED WHICH MAY CORRELATE WITH THIS INCIDENT IS AN ENTRY IN AN

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI (3)...ORIG

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591318/0730/001 1 OF 2 MI 0031 001/21:12Z 212000Z MAR 89
 CSH:BPX0607 BARBERS PT HI

UNOFFICIAL DIARY TITLED "COMBAT CHRONOLOGY". THIS DIARY CONTAINS AN ENTRY ON PAGE 2, DATED "20-12-65", WHICH REFERS TO THE CRASH OF A "PILOTLESS" AIRCRAFT. THIS IS THE DATE ON WHICH THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED. THE TEAM ALSO VISITED A CRASH SITE NEAR SON MAI VILLAGE. THIS VILLAGE IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 10 KILOMETERS NORTH OF CHU, IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES XJ610740. AT THE VILLAGE THE TEAM INTERVIEWED A 75 YEAR OLD ETHNIC HUNG WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE CAPTURED THREE AMERICAN PILOTS. HE SHOWED THE TEAM AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAME FROM ONE OF THEIR AIRPLANES. THE WRECKAGE, AN AIRCRAFT ENGINE, LIES AT THE EDGE OF A SMALL LAKE WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR ON ANY MAP SHEETS. THE TEAM WAS TOLD THAT THIS LAKE WAS DEFINITELY NOT PART OF CAN SON LAKE (XJ505725) WHICH LAY SEVERAL KILOMETERS TO THE WEST. THE TEAM PHOTOGRAPHED THE WRECKAGE AND EXTRACTED SERIAL AND PART NUMBERS.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE:

- AN ENTRY IN AN UNOFFICIAL DOCUMENT TITLED "COMBAT CHRONOLOGY" READ AS FOLLOWS: "20-12-65" "PILOTLESS" AIRCRAFT CRASHED.
- A CERTIFICATE OF CAPTURE INDICATING THE DATE OF CAPTURE AS 5 OCTOBER 1965. THIS CERTIFICATE MAY PERTAIN TO EITHER REFNO 0100 OR 0101.
- AN ENGINE DISCOVERED IN THE VICINITY OF XJ610740 HAD THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS:
 GE 10(6) 3320 - (6) (1)
 07402 - 88Y - SER - NO - 89
 GE 4395405 - G - 5
 GE 07402 SER - NO - 49
 GE 10 3320 - 6
 SER - NU - 20

NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS WERE OBSCURE AND WERE THE TEAM'S BEST ESTIMATE.

5. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE.

6. JCRC ANALYSIS OF WRECKAGE: THE PART NUMBERS INDICATED THE WRECKAGE WAS AN ENGINE COMBUSTION LIVER MANUFACTURED BY GENERAL ELECTRIC. THIS PART WAS USED ON NAVY F-4J AND B-52 AND U.S. AIR FORCE F-4E AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH WE ARE UNABLE TO CORRELATE THE PART NUMBERS WITH ANY SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT, THIS WRECKAGE IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0213 WHICH INVOLVED AN F-4C AIRCRAFT.

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 CSH:BPX0607 CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

R 200938Z AUG 90 PSY 032363P17

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS WASHDC//JCJCS-PH-MIA/J5//

SECDEF WASHDC//DASD-ISA/PH-MIA//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PH-MIA//

NSC WASHDC

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-YLC//

CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PED-M//

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 45159

1577 AUG 90

SUBJ: JCRC RPT 190-413 EXHIBITS IN THE MILITARY REGION 4 MUSEUM, VINH CITY

REF: JCRC LIAISON 160448Z AUG 90 (JCRC RPT 190-412, BY SAME SOURCE)

1. SOURCE/ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

- A. NAME: [REDACTED]
- B. STATUS: [REDACTED]
- C. DATE OF INFORMATION: 13 JUL 90
- D. PERMANENT ADDRESS: [REDACTED]

- E. INTERVIEW DATA: SOURCE WAS INTERVIEWED AT JCRC LIAISON OFFICE ON 13 AUG 90 BY [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: SOURCE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON EXHIBITS HE VIEWED AT THE MILITARY REGION 4 MUSEUM IN VINH CITY. A NUMBER OF THESE EXHIBITS APPEAR TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ACTIVE CASES.

3. INFORMATION: SOURCE IS A PROFESSIONAL ORNITHOLOGIST WHO VISITED VIETNAM FROM LATE JUNE TO EARLY AUGUST 1979, TO CARRY OUT SURVEY OF BIRD POPULATIONS AND TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT DURING THE VIETCONH WAR. IN PURSUIT OF THE LATTER OBJECTIVE, ON 13 JUL 90 HE SOUGHT AND WAS

DLVN:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

032363/7093/232 1 OF 4 MI 0150 252/11:10Z 200938Z AUG 90
CSN:RABP0154 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

Encl 5

GRANTED PERMISSION TO VISIT THE MUSEUM OF MILITARY REGION 4. THE MUSEUM IS LOCATED IN THE NR-4 HEADQUARTERS ON NGUYEN DU STREET, VINH CITY, WHICH SOURCE DESCRIBED AS BEING LOCATED JUST NORTH OF THE EASTERN END OF THE BEN THUY BRIDGE PROJECT.

4. SOURCE WAS SHOWN THROUGH THE MUSEUM BY ITS DIRECTOR OF EXHIBITIONS AND DESIGN, RETIRED MAJOR LE VAN MINH. HE FIRST EXAMINED AND PHOTOGRAPHED A PILE OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE OUTSIDE THE MUSEUM BUILDING. THE WRECKAGE INCLUDED PARTS OF AN A-4, AN OV-10, AN A-1 (AD-6), AN AD-5 (R-5), TWO F-4, A DRONE, AND ANOTHER UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT. PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE WRECKAGE WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ, JCRC FOR ANALYSIS.

5. WITHIN THE MUSEUM ITSELF SOURCE RECORDED IN HIS NOTEBOOK AND PHOTOGRAPHED EXHIBITS ASSOCIATED WITH EIGHT SEPARATE AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS:

- A. EXHIBIT NUMBER 200: AN UNDATED SAR HANDBOOK WITH THE NAME CLANNVILLE, THIS WHICH ON [REDACTED]
- B. A "SILK FLAG WITH SEVERAL LANGUAGES" ATTRIBUTED TO "WHITNEY KALLACE GOURRY" (SIC)
- C. A BURNT MANUAL ATTRIBUTED TO "CAREY, CUNNINGHAM, 10 TBS, CAPTAIN, HOME AFB"
- D. AN ID CARD AND HELMET ASSOCIATED WITH "AUBREY A. NICHOLS," SHOT DOWN IN CAN CAT, HA TINH, 19-5-72
- E. EXHIBIT NUMBER 422: AN RF-4C FLIGHT MANUAL FROM AN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ON 28-5-65 IN THACH NUONG (V), THACH HA (C), HA TINH (P).
- F. PARTS FROM AN A-6A AIRCRAFT SUPPOSEDLY SHOT DOWN IN A PLACE CALLED "YON THANH," ON 10-1-73
- G. THE BOOTS OF THE PILOT OF AN A-4 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN HOA LOC, THANH HOA, ON 16-6-67
- H. PARTS OF AN A-6A AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY DOWNED BY A KITE IN LE THUY (C), QUANG BINH (P), ON 28-7-68.

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SOURCE OFFERED TO SEND COPIES OF THESE SLIDES TO JCRC-LHO AFTER HE HAS THEM DEVELOPED IN THE NETHERLANDS. WHEN RECEIVED, THESE WILL BE FORWARDED HQ, JCRC.

6. COMMENT: THE FIRST FOUR EXHIBITS LISTED
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CSN:RXSP0154 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

NOJTIME

R 161139Z NOV 90 PSN 469222P25

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-PH-MIA/J5//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//

NSC WASHDC

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

CORUSACILMI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PED-H//

SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA-PH-MIA//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PH-MIA//

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLC//

BT

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 0210Z

0752 NOV 90

SUBJ: SRV PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH

1. DURING THE 15 TO 25 OCTOBER VISIT TO HO CHI MINH CITY BY JCRC CASUALTY RESOLUTION SPECIALIST (CRS) MR. G. E. BELL, SOME SRV PUBLICATIONS WERE OBTAINED. ONE PUBLICATION, A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER TITLED "PHU NU," DATED 24 OCTOBER 1990, CONTAINED AN ARTICLE WRITTEN BY JOURNALIST MR. TRAN CONG TAN. THE ARTICLE RELATED MR. TAN'S WARTIME EXPERIENCES AS A JOURNALIST IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE AND INCLUDED SOME INFORMATION CONCERNING INCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. PERSONNEL.

2. MR. TAN BEGINS HIS ARTICLE BY SAYING THAT NOW THAT PEACE IS RESTORED HE OCCASIONALLY REVIEWS HIS NOTES TAKEN DURING WARTIME. MR. TAN INDICATES THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS ARTICLE IS TO PROVIDE SOME OF HIS ACCOUNTS CONCERNING HOW POWS WERE TREATED BY THEIR SOLDIERS AND FAMILY MEMBERS.

3. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, THE FIRST U.S. POW CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH WAS NAME BORN DATA. SERIAL NUMBER DATA ON 8 FEBRUARY 1965 HE AND 12 OTHER PILOTS FLEW F-105 AIRCRAFT TO BOMB DONG HUI. THEY KILLED SCORES OF RESIDENTS BUT HAD FIVE AIRCRAFT HIT BY FIRE. NAME AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY A 37MM GUN, WHICH SHOT THE TAIL OFF

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

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THE AIRCRAFT CAUSING IT TO CRASH 700 METERS FROM THE SATLE AREA. THE POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE COMPANY, HO XUAN CAN (CAAN) PROTECTED HIM FROM ANGRY VILLAGERS.

4. A FEW DAYS AFTER *NAME* INCIDENT ANOTHER AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE OCEAN. THE PEOPLE OF SHAN TRACH VILLAGE SAW THE BODY OF THE PILOT FLOAT UP ON THE BEACH. ALSO RECOVERED WERE SOME U.S. DOLLARS, A PICTURE OF HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN, A PHOTO OF A NUDE FEMALE, A WATCH, SCARF, A MILITARY OFFICERS IDENTIFICATION CARD AND A PISTOL. THE PILOT ALSO HAD A SMALL AMERICAN FLAG WITH 14 LANGUAGES INDICATING ANYONE HELPING THE PILOT WOULD BE REIMBURSED BY THE U.S. THE AUTHOR COMMENTS THAT THE FLAG DID NOT APPLY TO SITUATIONS WHERE THE PILOT WAS DEAD. THE AUTHOR SAYS HE OBSERVED THAT THE IDENTIFICATION CARD WAS NUMBERED *DATA* AND CONTAINED THE NAME *NAME*. *NAME* 1LT, US NAVY, BORN *DATA*, BROWN HAIR, BLOOD TYPE "A". PAVN AND LOCAL SECURITY FORCES BURIED THE BODY ON THE WINDWARD SHORE. A SECTION OF COCONUT PALM TREE WAS PLACED AT THE HEAD OF THE GRAVE. A LADY-NAMED HAY (HAAY), WHOSE HUSBAND DIED IN THE SOUTH, PLACED BURNING INCENSE ON THE GRAVE AND PRAYED THE MAN'S SOUL WOULD RETURN TO HIS WIFE AND CHILD IN THE U.S.

5. AT 1100 ON 3 MARCH 1965 A FLIGHT OF JET AIRCRAFT FLEW ALONG THE HO CAI MINH TRAIL IN WESTERN LE THUY DISTRICT AND THE CAN LY DAM. MANY PEOPLE WERE KILLED BY THE ADVSTG. ONE JET WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITIA AND PAVN AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN THAC CUC (THACS COCS). TWO PILOTS PARACHUTED FROM THE AIRCRAFT. ONE CHUTE WAS RED (THE COMMAND CHUTE). TWO DAYS LATER THE MILITIA FOUND A RED CHUTE STAINED WITH BLOOD AND SOME SCATTERED FLESH. THEY KNEW THAT THE PILOT HAD BEEN WOUNDED AND HIS FLESH WAS EATEN BY TIGERS. THE PILOT REMAINING WAS HUNGRY AND EATING BERRIES IN THE FOREST. SOME FORMER PAVN SOLDIERS IN TRUNG LIEU (TRUNG LIEUX) CAPTURED HIM. THEY GAVE THE PILOT A COOKIE AND SOME BOILED MANIOC. WHEN THE JOURNALIST ARRIVED ON THE SCENE, THE PILOT WAS SURROUNDED BY THE PEOPLE OF LY NINH (LYS NINH) WHO WERE SCOLDING HIM. THE PILOT SAID HIS NAME WAS *NAME* (NOTE: PROBABLY REFNO 0058, *NAME*) AND HE WAS A 1LT FROM DMID. HE SAID HIS COMMANDER WAS *NAME*, AND HE DIED WHEN HIS CHUTE

BECAME TANGLED IN A TREE. (NOTE: THIS PART OF THE ARTICLE CONTAINS A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE AUTHOR HOLDING A NOTEBOOK WHILE STANDING BESIDE *NAME*)

6. AT THE END OF THE ARTICLE THE AUTHOR DESCRIBES HIM AS A YOUNG MEMBER OF THE LIAISON ELEMENT OF THE BT

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SECTION 02 OF 03 BANOK TH 02142

0752 NOV 90
SUBJ: SRY PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH
35TH REGIMENT HE GAVE ROASTED POTATOES AND SUGAR TO
A FRENCH POW CALLED POW (POD) WHO WAS HELD BY THE
REGIMENT. MR. TAN SAYS HE WAS ALMOST KILLED DUE TO
HIS KINDNESS WHILE IN SOUTHERN LAOS. DURING THE
BATTLE OF NAKHOM, HIS UNIT CAPTURED SOME
"WESTERNERS" AND HIGHER HQ INSTRUCTED TAN AND THREE
COMBATANTS TO ESCORT THE PRISONERS TO REGIMENT. HE
ORDERED THE PRISONERS TO TAKE OFF THEIR SHOES TO
PREVENT THEM FROM RUNNING, BUT THEIR FEET HURT SO HE
ALLOWED THEM TO KEEP THEIR SHOES. WHILE PASSING BY
A FRENCH POST THE PRISONERS ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE
DURING A FIREFIGHT BUT WERE RECAPTURED. 49. TAN
ENDS THE ARTICLE BY INDICATING HE BELIEVES THE
VIETNAMESE TREATED POWS HUMANELY.

7. THE FULL TEXT OF THE ARTICLE, WHICH IS PRINTED
IN VIETNAMESE, WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.
BT

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CSV:RXBP0395

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JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

ROUTINE

R 271032Z MAR 91 PSY 158360P31

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS WASHDC//JCJCS-PH-MIA/J5//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//

NSC WASHDC

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PEO-M//

SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PM-MIA//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PH-MIA//

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLC//

SECTION 01 OF 03 BANOK TH 13692

MARCH 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF LE MINH DISTRICT DOCUMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF FOUR PAGES
OF A DOCUMENT, ENTITLED "TRADITION RECORD OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF LE MINH DISTRICT" (SOOR TRUYEENF THOONGS LACJ
LAONGJ VUX TRANG HUYEENJ LEE MINH), SHOWN TO THE JOINT
TEAM BY LE MINH DISTRICT OFFICIALS DURING THE TENTH
SERIES OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS (APR-MAY 90). THE TEAM
WAS ALLOWED TO EXAMINE AND PHOTOGRAPH ONLY THE COVER
AND THE FOUR PAGES LISTING AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER THE
DISTRICT. PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DOCUMENT ARE HELD AT
JCRC-LMU, H3 JCRC, AND USACILHI.

2. TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS ARE ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE
PARENTHESES.

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

((PAGE 1)) RECORD OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

1965

NIGHT OF 10-11-1965 CAM LY SELF-DEFENSE FORCES SHOT
DOWN ONE A6

27-4-1965 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF VINH MINH, VO
VINH, AND LUONG MINH VILLAGES SHOT DOWN 1 F-105

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

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CSV:RXBP0312

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086/13:05Z

271032Z MAR 91

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH



RECEIVED
27 MAR 91

29-9-65 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF VINH NINH AND QUAN
NINH VILLAGES SHOT DOWN 1 F-105

30-10-65 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF LUONG NINH, VINH
NINH, AND VO NINH VILLAGES SHOT DOWN ONE F-105

13-11-65 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF THANH THUY
VILLAGE SHOT DOWN ONE UH-34 (ARMED HELICOPTER)

11-12-65 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF VO NINH VILLAGE
SHOT DOWN ONE F-105

6-8-65 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF DUY NINH VILLAGE
SHOT DOWN ONE AIRCRAFT (THE 100TH)

1966

10-5-1966 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF SON THUY
VILLAGE SHOT DOWN ONE F-105

14-5-66 GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF PHU THUY
VILLAGE SHOT DOWN ONE A36

27-7-66 THE HUNG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA
SHOT DOWN ONE RF-3C

28-8-66 THE DUC NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F-105

NIGHT OF 11-12-66 THE NGU THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA
MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE ((AIRCRAFT TYPE NOT SPECIFIED))

((PAGE 27))

1967

15-2-1967 THE VO NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE OH-50C

20-5-67 CAN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT DOWN
ONE F4H

29-5-67 THE DUC NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H

30-7-67 THE THAI THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H

31-7-67 THE DUONG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H (THE 300TH)

NIGHT OF 20-8-67 THE HUNG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA
MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE F4H
BT

158368/2968/086
CSN:RXBP0312

3 OF 7

M1 0380

086/13:05Z

271032Z MAR 91

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

158368/2968/086 2 OF 7 M1 0380 086/13:05Z 271032Z MAR 91
CSN:RXBP0312 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

INDUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

SECTION 02 OF 03 BANGKOK TH 13862

ARCH 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF LE NINH DISTRICT DOCUMENT

NIGHT OF 5-9-67 THE PHONG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA
MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE F4H26-9-67 THE THANH THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H3-10-67 THE GIA NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H12-10-67 THE TAN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H10-11-67 A 20 NINH VILLAGE FEMALE UNIT AND THE
GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE F4H10-11-67 THE PHONG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA
FEMALE SECTION SHOT DOWN ONE F4H16-11-67 THE HOVE THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H24-11-67 THE VO NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F-10526-11-67 THE TAN NINH GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE
F4HNIGHT OF 17-12-67 THE DUC NINH VILLAGE VETERAN
MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE F4H

1968

13-1-68 THE NAI THUY VILLAGE VETERAN MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H27-1-68 THE LOC NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE ADB

6-3-68 THE LIEN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

158369/2769/086 4 OF 5 41 0381 086/13:06Z 271052Z MAR 91
CSN:RXBP313 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

DOWN ONE F4H

31-3-68 THE XUAN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H6-4-68 A XUAN NINH VILLAGE FEMALE UNIT SHOT DOWN ONE
F4H6-4-68 THE LOC NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H (THE 000TH)10-4-68 THE LIEN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4HNIGHT OF 22-4-68 A XUAN NINH VILLAGE FEMALE UNIT SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H16-5-68 THE THANH THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F-10520-5-68 THE AN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F-1056-5-68 THE MY THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H11-5-68 THE LOC THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H

(PAGE 5)

27-6-68 SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF THE TIEN GIANG TEAM OF
THE LE NINH STATE FARM SHOT DOWN ONE TWO-JDDIED
RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT6-7-68 THE DUONG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H1-9-68 THE AN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H
BT158369/2769/086 5 OF 7 41 0381 086/13:06Z 271052Z MAR 91
CSN:RXBP313 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 03 OF 03 BANGKOK TH 15062

MARCH 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF LE NINH DISTRICT DOCUMENT

19-9-68 THE LE NINH STATE FARM SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

SHOT DOWN ONE F4H
19-9-68 THE HOA THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H

((PAGE 4)) 1972

23-5-72 THE HAI THUY AND PHU THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA
MILITIAS SHOT DOWN ONE F4H3-6-72 THE LOC NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H8-8-72 THE LY NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H15-9-72 THE DUC NINH VILLAGE VETERAN MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE A21-9-72 THE PHU THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H23-10-72 THE SEN THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H18-10-72 THE QUY NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H26-10-72 THE VO NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H27-10-72 THE PHONG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA
SHOT DOWN ONE F4H31-10-72 THE TRUONG THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA
SHOT DOWN ONE F4H8-11-72 THE NAM NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE F4H

OLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

150531/2906/086 6 OF 7 41 0398 046/13:57Z 271032Z MAR 91
CSM:RXBP0326 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH16-11-72 THE GUERRILLA MILITIA OF A HAMLET IN THE
NEST OF HOA THUY VILLAGE SHOT DOWN ONE F4H

1973

17-1-73 THE HOA THUY VILLAGE GUERRILLA MILITIA SHOT
DOWN ONE PILOTLESS AIRCRAFTTOTAL NUMBER 57 AIRCRAFT
OF THAT NUMBER ((TWO ILLEGIBLE WORDS)) = 100

((END TRANSLATION)) = 300

BT = 400

150531/2906/086 7 OF 7 41 0398 046/13:57Z 271032Z MAR 91
CSM:RXBP0326 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CDR PS
ASIS RP PD
CSD
CRD JHC
INV
ADP

PRIORITY

P 200727Z MAR 91 PS 1 162100P10

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY

INFO JCS WASHDC//JCS-PW-MIA//J5// PRIORITY
 WHTENHUSE WASHDC//NSC// PRIORITY SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLC// PRIORITY
 ANEMASST VIENTIANE PRIORITY
 SECDEF WASHDC//JASD-ISA/PW-MIA// PRIORITY
 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3// PRIORITY
 DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA// PRIORITY
 CDUSACILH FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PCO-M// PRIORITY

CH 111
 CH 111

SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGKOK TH 14031

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENT AND PILOT
 CAPTURE LISTS FROM 33 TRACH DISTRICT DOCUMENT
 REF: A. JCRC LIAISON 051023Z FEB 91
 B. JCRC LIAISON 051022Z OCT 89
 C. JCRC LIAISON 220911Z FEB 91
 D. JCRC LIAISON 261016Z FEB 91
 E. JCRC LIAISON 050713Z MAR 91

1. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT US/SEV
 ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 13TH SERIES OF JOINT
 INVESTIGATIONS, 21 JAN - 7 FEB 91. REF B PROVIDED A
 TRANSLATION OF A TRANSCRIPTION MADE BY LOU VAN THU OF
 WNDSPH OF A PORTION OF THE DOCUMENT TO BE TRANSLATED IN
 FULL BELOW. REFS C-E ARE DETAILED REPORTS OF
 INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED DURING THE 13TH SERIES WHICH
 CITE THE DOCUMENT THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. ON 22 JAN 91, A JOINT US/SEV TEAM MET WITH
 OFFICIALS OF 89 TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE, TO
 DISCUSS THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATIONS OF CASES 1329 AND
 1386. DURING THAT MEETING DISTRICT OFFICIALS ALLOWED
 THE TEAM TO EXAMINE PHOTOGRAPH, AND TRANSCRIPTION
 PORTIONS OF A NOTEBOOK OF WARTIME STATISTICAL DATA.
 THIS MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE A TRANSLATION OF FOUR PAGES

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

162100/3589/067
 CSN:RXAP01AS

1 OF 14 HI 0271

067/07:26Z 200723Z MAR 91
 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

OF THAT NOTEBOOK. THE FIRST THREE PAGES TO BE
 TRANSLATED ARE LISTS OF AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE
 DISTRICT. THE FOURTH PAGE IS A LIST OF AIRCRAFT CAPTURED
 IN THE DISTRICT, A VERSION OF WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED AS
 REF B.

3. THE DOCUMENT IS A NOTEBOOK, BOUND IN A PLAIN
 BLUE PAPER COVER, CONTAINING 40 PAGES OF LINED PAPER.
 IT IS VERY SIMILAR TO AN ORDINARY SCHOOL COMPOSITION
 BOOK. THE COVER BEARS NO TITLE. THE FIRST THREE PAGES
 OF THE NOTEBOOK CONTAIN THE LIST OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS.
 PAGE 7 IS THE LIST OF CAPTURED PILOTS. OTHER TABLES IN
 THE NOTEBOOK INCLUDE SUCH LISTS AS NUMBER OF ADULTS AND
 CHILDREN KILLED AND MOUNDED, NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK KILLED
 AND INJURED, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FIGURES, AND LIVE
 FIRE TRAINING BY LOCAL MILITARY FORCES. ALL ENTRIES
 ARE HANDWRITTEN IN SCRIPT. THE DOCUMENT APPEARS TO BE
 OF WARTIME VENTAGE. INTERNAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT
 THE BASIC LIST OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS WAS COMPILED IN
 EARLY 1960, AND THAT A LIST FOR THE PERIOD FEB-SEP 68
 WAS ADDED LATER THAT YEAR. TWO ENTRIES FOR 1972 ARE
 APPENDED TO THE LIST IN A DIFFERENT HAND AND WITH
 DIFFERENT-COLORED INK FROM THE BASIC LIST. PHOTOGRAPHS
 OF THE DOCUMENT HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO HQ JCRC.

4. NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION: THE TRANSLATION WAS
 MADE BY PERSONNEL OF HQ JCRC AND JCRC-LNO. THE JOINT
 TEAM WAS ABLE TO TRANSCRIBE ONLY PAGE THREE OF THE
 NOTEBOOK. THE REMAINDER OF THE TRANSLATION HAS BEEN
 MADE FROM PHOTOGRAPHS, THE QUALITY OF WHICH VARIES
 CONSIDERABLY. SOME PARTS OF THE DOCUMENT REMAIN
 OBSCURE, EITHER BECAUSE THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE UNCLEAR OR
 THE HANDWRITING IS POOR. COPIES OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE
 HELD AT JCRC-LNO, HQ JCRC, AND USACILH.

5. THE LIST ON PAGE 1 IS DIVIDED INTO SEVEN
 COLUMNS: DATE, UNIT SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRCRAFT,
 NUMBER, TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, DEAD "AIR PIRATES," "AIR
 PIRATES" CAPTURED ALIVE, AND A COLUMN LABELED "RIENG
 DU THJ VEEJ," OR "THE SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA SEPARATELY."
 THE LATTER COLUMN, WHICH IS SIMPLY MARKED WITH AN "X"
 OR LEFT BLANK, MAY INDICATE WHICH AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT
 DOWN SOLELY BY THE MILITIA, WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF
 AIR DEFENSE OR OTHER PAWN FORCES.

162100/3589/067
 CSN:RXAP01AS

162100/3589/067
 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 JF 96 BANGKOK TH 12031

MAR 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENT AND PILOT
CAPTURE LISTS FROM JO TRACH DISTRICT DOCUMENT
7 FEB 65; THANH HUY, THANH HUY; 12 F-86; 12 F-105

2 MAR 65; COLLECTIVELY, 91 SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE; 6; F-105; 12 F-105

31 MAR 65; SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF BAC ((TRACH)), SON ((TRACH)), AND HOA ((TRACH)); 12 AD-6; 12 F-105

31 MAR 65; SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF DONG ((TRACH)), LY ((TRACH)), AND HOA ((TRACH)); 12 AD-6; 12 F-105

7 APR 65; DONG ((ILLEG.)) TRACH MILITIA; 12 AD-6; 12 F-105
((TJALS)) 12 ((AIRCRAFT)) 3 ((DEAD PILOTS))

1966

26 JAN 66; SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE SUN TRACH AREA;
12 A-6; 12 F-105

26 JAN 66; SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE SUN TRACH AREA;
12 F-105; 12 F-105

28 MAR 66; SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE BAC TRACH AREA;
12 F-105; 12 F-105

25 MAR 66; SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE THANH TRACH AREA;
12 F-105; 12 F-105
16 APR 66; SON TRACH SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA; 12 F-105; 12 F-105
25 X

6 APR 66; HOAN TRACH MILITIA; 12 F-105; 12 F-105

18 APR 66; SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE NAM TRACH AREA;
12 F-105; 12 F-105

19 APR 66; CU NAM MILITIA; 12 F-105; 12 F-105

11 MAY 66; HOAN TRACH SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA; 12 F-105; 12 F-105

DLVN:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

162105/1591/CR7
CSN:RAMP185

RTD:000-000/001/000

17/07:377 2607236
JCRC 21-100/04/000

LU 31 OVERSIGHT LAFENSE

TRANSLATION COMMENTS ARE ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE
PARENTHESES.

((TRANSLATION FOLLOWS))

AIRCRAFT 5-01 DMM
1968 3 1965

5 AUG 65; THANH ANE LI GNA; 2; F-100; 12 F-105

BT

162100/1587/047 3 OF 14 41 0271 067/07:26Z 2807232 MAR 91
CSN:RAMP185 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 03 OF 06 BANGKOK TH 14051

F-105; 1; 2
 10 MAY 66: ((ILLEG)) BUI ((TRACH)), JUNG ((TRACH)), AND PHU ((TRACH)) MILITIA; 1; F-105; 1; 2
 11 MAY 66: ((ILLEG)) MY TRACH MILITIA; 1; F-105; 1; 2
 2 JUN 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE SON TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2
 2 JUN 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE XUAN SON AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2. ((THIS ENTRY COULD ALSO BE TRANSLATED "OF THE XUAN ((TRACH)) AND SON ((TRACH)) AREAS," BUT, BASED ON THE FORMS USED IN THIS PJINT IN THE DOCUMENT, IT PROBABLY REFERS TO THE AREA OF THE XUAN SON FERRY, IN THE NORTHWESTERN PART OF HO TRACH DISTRICT.))
 2 JUN 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHU TRACH AREA; 1; AD-01; 1; 2
 2 JUN 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHU TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2
 15 JUN 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE CU NIM AREA; 1; F-04; 2; 2
 26 JUN 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE NHAN TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2
 27 JUL 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE HUNG ((TRACH)) AND RAC TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2 PLATE ((ILLEG)); 2
 22 JUL 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE HUNG TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2
 24 AUG 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE DAT TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2. ((THE QUESTION MARK IN THE ENTRY, IT IS NOT A COMMENT.))
 30 AUG 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE SON TRACH AREA; 1; F-04; 2; 2
 91

AR #1
 SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENT AND PILOT CAPTURE LISTS FROM 30 TRACH DISTRICT DOCUMENT
 24 MAR 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE DUC TRACH AREA; 1; A-01; 1; 2
 ((PAGE 2. THE AIRCRAFT NUMBER AND TYPE COLUMNS ARE COMBINED ON PAGE 2, LEAVING A TOTAL OF 6 COLUMNS.))
 10 SEP 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE SON TRACH AREA; 1; F-01; 1; 2
 1 SEP 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE VAN TRACH AREA; 1; AD-01; 1; 2
 5 SEP 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE VIET TRUNG STATE FARM AREA; 1; F-105; 1; ((ILLEG.)); 2 X
 1 SEP 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE ((ILLEG)) NHAN TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; ((ILLEG.)); 2
 10 OCT 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE HUNG TRACH AREA; 1; F-100; 1; 2
 21 OCT 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE VAN TRACH AREA; 1; F-105; 1; 2
 27 OCT 66: VAN TRACH SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA; 1; F-105; 1; 2 X
 1 SEP 66: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE VAN TRACH AREA; 1; AD-01; 1; 2
 1966 TOTALS: 39 AIRCRAFT; 24 ((DEAD PILOTS)); 7 ((PILOTS CAPTURED))
 1967
 8 FEB 67: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE AREA OF LY HOA ((HAILET)), MAI TRACH; 1; F-01; 1; 2 X
 16 FEB 67: PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF DUC TRACH ((ILLEG.)); 1; AD-01; 1; 2 X

DLVR:CDR JCRC PARSE45 MI M(1)...ACT

MIN:03-000/COPIES:

162219/3626/001 V: IF 14 01 0302 007/07:007 2007236 000 000
 CSY:PAW0200 JCRC 111504 000000

162105/3591/007 6 OF 13 01 0275 007/07:277 2007232 000 000
 CSY:PAW0185 JCRC 111504 000000

CEG AT GOVERNMENT LICENSE
 162105/3591/007 6 OF 13 01 0275 007/07:277 2007232 000 000
 CSY:PAW0185 JCRC 111504 000000

10 FEB 67: 141 TRACH MILITIA: 1 F-105: 12 1.
 2 APR 67: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE THUY TRACH AREA: 1 F-105: 1 1.
 3 JUN 67: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF CU NAM: 2 F-4H: 21 1.
 ((ILLEG.))
 12 JUL 67: PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF XUAN SON: 2 F-4H: 21 1.
 9 AUG 67: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE CU NAM AREA ((ILLEG.)): 1 F-4H: 7 21.
 10 SEP 67: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE NAM TRACH AREA: 1 F-4H: 12 12.
 11 SEP 67: TRUNG TRACH MILITIA: 1 F-4H: 1 1.
 15 OCT 67: PHU TRACH MILITIA: 1 AIRCRAFT: 1 1.
 6 NOV 67: PEOPLE AND SOLDIERS OF THE VIET TRUNG STATE FARM AREA: 1 1.
 3 NOV 67: SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF THE VIET TRUNG STATE FARM AREA: 1 F-105: ((ILLEG.)): ((ILLEG.)) 1.
 28 OCT 67: JUIT-361 SHOT DOWN: 1 F-4H: 1 1.
 TOTAL 1967: 13 AIRCRAFT: 7 ((PILOTS DEAD)): 8 ((PILOTS CAPTURED ALIVE)).

((THERE ARE TWO WATER-STAINED, ILLEGIBLE ENTRIES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE, WHICH APPARENTLY LISTED THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN TO THAT DATE. THE ENTRIES, AS SHOWN IN A.3 A.5 PHOTOGRAPH, ARE INDECIPHERABLE.))

((PAGE 3. THIS PAGE IS HEADED BY PHRASE "AIRCRAFT SHOT, 1968." THE COLUMN HEADINGS ARE THE SAME AS ON THE PREVIOUS PAGE, EXCEPT THAT A FIRST COLUMN IS ADDED, 31

162217/3026/087 7 OF 14 01 0302 007/07:56Z 200723Z NAM 01
 CSJ:RASP206 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 94 OF DB BANGKOK TH 30031

91
 SUBJ: TRANSCATIVITY OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENT AND PILOT CAPTURE LISTS FROM 30 TRACH DISTRICT DOCUMENT. LISTING THE NUMBER OF THE ENTRY, AND THE FINAL COLUMN IS UNTITLED BUT CONTAINS COMMENTS.))

1. 0700 HRS, 15 FEB 68: 30 TRACH MILITARY SHOT ((IT)) DOWN ON THE SPOT: 1 F-4H: 1 2; MILITIA OF LY TRACH AND TRAI CA.

2. 1020 HRS, 16 MAR 68: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF 33 TRACH SHOT ((IT)) DOWN AT KILOMETER 26 AND 267 1 F100; 1 MAN KILLED: 1 ALIVE: THEY TOOK HIM AND HE WAS LOST.

3. 1140 HRS, 27 MAR 68: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF 80 TRACH SHOT ((IT)) DOWN AT KILOMETER 54: 1 F-4C: 1 KILLED: 1 KILLED: TWO TAKEN.

4. 1500 HRS, 15 APR 68: THE PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF PHU ((TRACH)), VAN ((TRACH)), AND HOAN ((TRACH)) SHOT DOWN A 105: 1 105: 1 KILLED: 1 CAPTURED ALIVE AFTER THE CRASH AND THEN DIED.

5. 2300 HRS, 24 APR 68: PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF DAI TRACH: 1 F-4: 2 KILLED: 1 CRASHED IN VAN TRACH.

6. 2000 HRS, 25 APRIL 68: PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF NAM TRACH AND A GROUP FROM LY TRACH AND DAI TRACH: 1 F-4: 2 KILLED: 1 CRASHED IN ROUTE 22, SON TRACH.

7. 0425 HRS, 3 MAY 68: PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF LY TRACH, NHAN TRACH AND DAI TRACH: 404: 2 KILLED: 1 CRASHED IN NORTHERN LY TRACH AND NHAN TRACH.

8. 0245 HRS, 4 MAY: A GROUP FROM HOAN TRACH, VAN TRACH.

OLVN:CDR JCRC 4-ASERS OF 41(1)...ACT

162111/3592/057 8
 CSJ:RASP206

RTD:000-000/CUP:15:00.

1707:117 200723Z NAM 01
 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

2. 0117 HRS: 11 JUL 68: CRASHED AT SEA NEAR CT
HUA ((TRACH)).

3. 1525 HRS: 15 JUL 68: TIT TRUNG ((STATE FARM)), DAT
((TRACH)), 1 ((TRACH)) AND HUA ((TRACH)) SELF-
DEFENSE FORCES AND ARTILLERY SHOT ((IT DOWN)): 1 FHM: 1
KILLED: 1 CAPTURED ALIVE: CRASHED AT SEA NEAR HUA
TRACH.

10. 0330 HRS: 14 MAY 68: THANH TRACH MILITIA SHOT 11
FHM: 2 KILLED: 1 CRASHED AT THE JUYET THANG LAND
RECLAMATION SITE

11. 0909 HRS: 24 MAY 68: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE SA
ODC AREA SHOT ((IT)): 10F: 1 CAPTURED ALIVE: CRASHED
AT THE HUA TRACH LAND RECLAMATION SITE

12. 1645 HRS: 5 JUL 68: PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF SON ((TRACH))
((HUA)) HAD ARTILLERY TO SHOT ((IT DOWN)): 1 FHM: 1
CAPTURED ALIVE: 14 ((TRACH)) AND TRUNG ((TRACH))
MILITIAS CAPTURED ((TRACH)).

13. 1000 HRS: 25 JUN 68: THE PEOPLE OF DUC ((TRACH)),
THANH TRACH, AND ((COMPANY)) C-46 SHOT DOWN A PILOTLESS
AIRCRAFT: CRASHED IN THE OCEAN 4 KM FROM SHORE.

14. 1130 HRS: 10 JUL 68: MILITIA OF HAI TRACH, DUC
((TRACH)), AND DONG THACH SHOT DOWN 1 FHM: 1 FHM: 2
KILLED: 1 CRASHED IN THE SEA 14 KILOMETERS
OFF ((SHORE)).

15. 1500 HRS: 14 JUL 68: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHUC TRACH AREA SHOT ((IT DOWN)): 1 CAPTURED
ALIVE: MILITIA OF NAM TRACH CAPTURED ((HIM)).

16. 1000 HRS: 15 JUL 68: SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF THE SA
HAI AREA SHOT 1 FHM: 1 DEAD: 1 CRASHED AT SEA.

17. 17 JUN 68: A GROUP OF BAC TRACH AND ((COMPANY))
C40 SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE: FHM: 1 CRASHED IN THE SEA.

162111/3592/047 9 JUL 68 01 0274 007/07:11Z 280723Z MAR 91
CSN:PAMP0100 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

18. 0800 HRS: 17 AUG 68: PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF CU HAY
SHOT ((IT DOWN)): 1 FHM: 1 CRASHED IN MY ((440)) SJN
((TRACH)).

19. 0815 HRS: 16 AUG 68: HUA TRACH MILITIA SHOT ((IT
DOWN)): 1 FHM: 1 CRASHED OUT IN THE SEA.

20. 1100 HRS: 11 SEP 68: PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF SON
((TRACH)) AND HUNG ((TRACH)) WITH ((UNIT)) 214 SHOT
BY

END AT GOVERNMENT LICENSE

162111/3592/047 10 JUL 68 01 0274 007/07:11Z 280723Z MAR 91
CSN:PAMP0100 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 05 OF 00 BANGKOK 14 10031

MEMO 81

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENT AND PILOT CAPTURE LISTS FROM 30 TRACH DISTRICT DOCUMENT ((IT)) DOWN 1 FEB 72. CRASHED JET IN THE OCEAN. ((THE FOLLOWING TWO ENTRIES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ADDED AT A DATE LATER THAN THOSE PREVIOUS. THE ENTRIES WERE WRITTEN IN BLUE VICE BLACK INK AND IN AN EVIDENTLY DIFFERENT HAND.))

21. 19 JUL 72: PEOPLE'S MILITIA (12.7 MM) OF THANH ((THACH)) IN COOPERATION WITH ((REGIMENT)) E 2207 AFRC; 22. CRASHED IN CHUA LAKE, NA TRACH.

22. 21 NOV 72: PHU THACH MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE VARIABLING ((TYP-04PT)) 1 F117. ((A VERSION OF PAGE 7 OF THE NOTEBOOK HAS TRANSMITTED AS REF U. THE FOLLOWING IS A DIRECT TRANSLATION MADE FROM A PHOTOGRAPH OF PAGE 7. THE PAGE IS ARRANGED IN 5 COLUMNS. THE FIRST COLUMN, WHICH HAS NO HEADINGS, GIVES THE NUMBER OF THE ENTRY. THE SECOND COLUMN PROVIDES THE DATE; THE THIRD, THE NAME OF THE UNIT EFFECTING CAPTURE; THE FOURTH, THE NAME OF THE CAPTURED PERSON; THE FIFTH, HIS NAME GIVEN IN ENGLISH AND THEN IN VIETNAMESE. THE ENTIRE PAGE IS HEADED BY THE PHRASE "CAPTURING ALIVE PILOTS ALIVE" (BAMIS SOONGS GIANG) LAYS SOONGS.))

1. 20 JAN 66: SON TRACH MILITIA; WILMER NEUHL GRUPP ((SIC)); CAPTAIN ((SIC)).

2. 25 MAR 66: THANH TRACH MILITIA; BRADLEY SURTIN; LT MAULAN ((SIC)).

3. 10 FEB 66: SON TRACH MILITIA; SAMUEL JONSON; MAJOR.

4. 10 APR 66: SON TRACH MILITIA; CESLEY LARRY; LT MAULAN.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

162113/3599/001 11 OF 14 41 0276 067/0732Z 280723Z MAR 71
JCR L14150M BANGKOK 14

5. 29 AUG 66: VIET TRUNG SELF-DEFENSE ((FORCES)); HELLS NOFAM; LOUROSSE; CAPTAIN.

6. 2 SEP 66: DAI PHONG PEOPLE ((CAPTURING UNIT)) NOT VERY CLEAR IN PHOTOGRAPH; SCHMIDT, NORMAN; MAJOR.

7. 1 OCT 66: HUNG TRACH MILITIA; MIXCOLERN CUMAL; CAPTAIN.

8. 2 APR 67: HUNG TRACH; SRAMESL GONSON; CAPTAIN.

9. 9 MAY 67: CU NAM MILITIA; LAUREL LENGUEL; CAPTAIN.

10. 9 MAY 67: ((CU)) NAM MILITIA; GLENN MYERS; LT MAW TO RAY.

11. 4 SEP 67: TRUNG TRACH MILITIA; OVERLY-NORRIS-NORRIS ((SIC)); MAJOR.

12. 15 FEB 68: LY TRACH MILITIA; JOE CARPENTER; CAPTAIN.

13. 15 FEB 68: LY TRACH MILITIA; WITDP; CAPTAIN.

14. 18 MAY 68: THANH TRACH MILITIA; GHS.T.TUM.MYE ((SIC)); CAPTAIN.

15. 28 MAY 68: THANH TRACH MILITIA; ((NO NAME GIVEN)); MAJOR.

16. 5 JUL 68: TAY TRACH MILITIA; CAPL. CRUM, REDU; LT COL.

17. 5 JUL 68: TAY TRACH MILITIA; MICHAEL BUDLS; 2LT ((IN VIETNAMESE ONLY)).

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JCR L14150M BANGKOK 14

18. 15 JUL 68: (A) (NAM MILITARY) GIBEL D. JAMES;
42 J U N.

19. 16 AUG 68: (A) (NAM MILITARY) SHANAHAN, FRZ2170;
CAPTAIN.

20. 17 AUG 68: ((LEG.)) (NAM) HOFFSUN, ARTHUR T. FV.
3152442; 1/LT.

21. 11 SEP 68: (A) (NAM MILITARY) RICHARD M. 1ST LT

BT

SECTION 05 OF 06 BANGKOK TH 10031

PAR: 01

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF AIRCRAFT INCIDENT AND PILOT
CAPTURE LISTS FROM 30 TRACH DISTRICT DOCUMENT

22. 24 NOV 68: VIET TRUNG STATE FARM; HUI LING HARRY;
1LT ((IN VIETNAMESE ONLY)).

((END TRANSLATION)).

BT

ED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

DLVN:CDN JCRC RANGE (N OF HIC) ... 401

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162112/3503/247
CSN:RABP0187

14 OF 11 IN THIS
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JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

162113/3504/047 15 OF 14 41 0270 007/07:322 2007232 MAR 91
CSN:RABP0186 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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10g AAS.

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT.

INFO JCS WASHDC//JCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
WHITEHOUSE-WASHDC//NSC// SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLC//
SECDEF WASHDC//JASD-ISA/PW-MIA// PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//
CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PED-H// PRIORITY

51

SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 18347

APR 91
SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY THE HOANG
LIEN SON PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND
REF: JCPC LIATSON 2011572 FEB 91

1. REF IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF REFNO 0349, CONDUCTED DURING THE 12TH SERIES OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS (2: VCV - 19 DEC 90). THE DOCUMENT TRANSLATED BELOW IS DISCUSSED IN PAR 3C OF REF.

2. THE DOCUMENT IS TITLED SIMPLY "BULLETIN"
(HUNTING RAOBS) 14 UPPER CASE LETTERS. TWO LINES BELOW
THIS TITLE APPEARS THE SUBTITLE "TO IMPROVE" THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF SHOOTING DOWN ENEMY AIRCRAFT BY THE
TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF OUR PROVINCE DURING THE 3 MONTHS
OF THE 3RD QUARTER OF 1966, AND SOME EXPERIENCE
ORGANIZING THE CAPTURE OF AMERICAN AIR PIRATES FOR THE
COMING DRY SEASON. THE DOCUMENT IS TYPEWRITTEN, AND
60 PAGES LONG. A SIGNATURE BLOCK APPEARS ON PAGE
60 WITH THE NAME BAI DUNG. THIS APPEARS TO BE THE
BOTTOM. THUAN IS IDENTIFIED AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
PROVINCE MILITARY COMMANDARY MAIN PAGE CHAPTER. THE DOCUMENT
IS DATED 1 NOV 66.

3. THE PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT IS TO ILLUSTRATE

DLVR:CDK JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)---ACV

267365/9125/112 1 OF 10 MI 0162 112/12:15Z 221124Z APR 91
CS4:RX5P0149 JCRB LIAISON HANOI/CMC TH

THE STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF LOCAL EFFORTS TO CAPTURE AMERICAN PILOTS, AND TO DISCUSS WAYS THE PARTY CAN DEVELOP THE STRENGTHS AND ELIMINATE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THESE EFFORTS. INDEED, PAGES 5-60 ARE SOLELY DEVOTED TO THIS LATTER DISCUSSION. IT IS THE FIRST SECTION OF THE DOCUMENT, HOWEVER, THAT IS OF PRIMARY PRA-MIA INTEREST. THIS SECTION, WHICH RUNS FROM PAGE 1 TO THE MIDDLE OF PAGE 4, WILL BE TRANSLATED BELOW.

9. NOTE IN THE TRANSLATION: THE TRANSLATION IS MADE FROM PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DOCUMENT TAKEN IN YEN BAI ON 1 DEC 90. THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE OF POOR QUALITY. THE TEAM TRANSCRIBED SUBSECTION C OF PART 1 (PAGES 3-4), BECAUSE THAT SUBSECTION APPEARS TO CORRELATE TO THE PARTICULAR CASE THAT HAS UNDER INVESTIGATION AT THE TIME: REFNO 0199. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TRANSCRIBE OTHER PAGES OF INTEREST. THE ONLY DIACRITICAL MARK THAT PROBABLY THE TYPESCRIPT IS THE CIRCUMFLEX (ZAAAS MOXI), CONSEQUENTLY, PARTS OF THE TRANSLATION MAY BE IMPRECISE, AS THE MEANINGS OF THE VARIOUS WORDS WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN FROM CONTEXT. TRANSLATION IS RENDERED EVEN MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF OBVIOUS TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS, THE PRESENCE OF WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THERE MAY BE OTHERS WHICH ARE LESS OBVIOUS. TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS OR INTERPOLATIONS WILL BE INDICATED WITHIN THE TEXT OF THE TRANSLATION BY DOUBLE PARENTHESES.

5. ((TRANSLATION FOLLOWS))

NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION
NGHIA LO PROVINCE UNIT

- NUMBER: 232-B1
(TO THE RIGHT OF THE ABOVE APPEARS: 1)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
INDEPENDENCE FREEDOM HAPPINESS

1 NOVEMBER 1966

BULLETIN
TO IMPROVE THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SHOOTING DOWN
ENEMY AIRCRAFT BY THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF OUR

267365/9128/112 2 OF 10 41 0162 112/12:15Z 221124Z APR 91
CSN:RXBP0149 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

Mar 2 '99

- PROVINCE DURING THE 3 MONTHS OF THE 3RD QUARTER OF 1966, AND SOME EXPERIENCE
- ORGANIZING THE CAPTURE OF AMERICAN AIR PIRATES FOR THE COMING DRY SEASON

-- THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF OUR PROVINCE WHO USED INFANTRY WEAPONS TO SHOOT DOWN MANY BANDIT AIRCRAFT DURING THE 3 MONTHS OF QUARTER III, AND THE REASONS, STRENGTHS, AND SHORTCOMINGS.

BT

FILED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

SECTION 02 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 18347

APR 91
SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY THE HANG LIEN SON PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND.

- SOME EXPERIENCE IN PURSUING AND CAPTURING AMERICAN AIR PIRATES

CONCLUSION

- 1.- ACHIEVEMENTS AND THEIR CAUSES, STRENGTHS, AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 3RD QUARTER FIGHTING

- ACHIEVEMENTS IN SHOOTING DOWN AIRCRAFT WITH INFANTRY WEAPONS

- ACHIEVEMENTS IN SHOOTING DOWN AIRCRAFT OF THE LOCALITIES OF OUR PROVINCE

AT 1515 HOURS ON 17 AUG 66 THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF QUANG HUY VILLAGE, PHUYEN (DISTRICT), USING A MACHINE GUN AND 3 RIFLES, AND EXPENDING A TOTAL OF 56 ROUNDS BROUGHT DOWN AN IMPROVED F-105F JET AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT. BOTH THE AIR PIRATES WERE CAPTURED AND DIED BECAUSE OF THE PRECISE LINES OF FIRE OF THE QUANG HUY GUERRILLA MILITIA AIR DEFENSE GROUP. AFTER TWO POINTS FIRED THE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES AND NOSED STRAIGHT DOWN INTO THE RAOJVO ABOUT 800 M FROM THE AIR DEFENSE BATTLE POSITION. AS A RESULT THE TWO AIR PIRATES EJECTED AT TOO LOW AN ALTITUDE FOR THEIR PARACHUTES TO OPEN IN TIME, SO ONE OF THE 4 DIED IMMEDIATELY AND THE OTHER BROKE BOTH HIS ARMS AND LEGS. AFTER HE CAPTURED (HIN) HE LIVED FOR MORE THAN 140 HOURS (BUT) ALSO ENDED UP DYING. THIS WAS AN OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT, FIRING JUST A FEW ROUNDS BUT STILL KIPPING OUT THE ENEMY.

AT 1330 HOURS ON 12 SEP 66, A BATTLE POSITION OF PHIENG BAN VILLAGE BAC UYEN (ISIC SHOULD BE BAC YEN DISTRICT), ALSO USING A MACHINE GUN AND 3 RIFLES, SHOOTING A TOTAL OF 9 ROUNDS, ALSO DOWNED AN AD-6 AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT. THE AIR PIRATE EJECTED TOO LOW, HIS PARACHUTE COULD NOT OPEN IN TIME, SO HE, TOO, DIED ON THE SPOT. THIS ALSO IS AN OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT.

OLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

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267363/9129/112 3 OF 10 01 0162 112/12:15Z 221120Z APR 91
CSY:RXBP0150 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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CSY:RXBP0149 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 03 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 16347

0179 APR 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY THE HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND.

-- STRENGTHS: THE BATTLE CAPTURING AN AIR PIRATE ON 17 JUN 66 IN SUOI QUYEN VILLAGE, VAN CHAN ((DISTRICT)) HAS: YEN BAI PROVINCE SHOT AND SET AFIRE AN ENEMY JET AIRCRAFT; IT REACHED SUOI QUYEN AND CRASHED; THE AIR PIRATE EJECTED AND LANDED IN VIRGIN FOREST ON A FAIRLY DANGEROUS HIGH PLACE, BUT: DUE TO HIGH SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE AND READINESS TO FIGHT, THE AIR PIRATE HAD LAUGHED LESS THAN AN HOUR WHEN HE WAS VASSED BY THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF SUOI QUYEN AND IMMEDIATELY TAKEN TO ANOTHER PLACE; JUST THEN THE GROUP OF ((SAR)) AIRCRAFT JUST ARRIVED, BUT THE BATTLEFIELD HAD BEEN CLEARED UP QUICKLY, NEATLY, AND SAFELY.

-- NEAROUS: CONSCIOUSNESS, VIGILANCE, AND PREPAREDNESS TO FIGHT WERE HIGH. THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND WAS TIGHT, AND THE SPIRIT OF FIGHTING INITIATIVE OF THE INDIVIDUAL GUERRILLA MILITIAMEN WAS HIGH.

-- THE PARTY ECHELONS ((POSSIBLY "COMPANY-GRADE OFFICERS.")) AND COMMANDING CADRE WERE ALWAYS CONCERNED WITH BUILDING THE ARMED FORCES AND WERE DETERMINED TO FIGHT WELL.

-- TO CONTINUE, IN THE BATTLE TO CAPTURE AN AIR PIRATE ON 17 AUG 66 AT QUANG HUY VILLAGE, PHU YEN ((DISTRICT)), THE PIRATE HAD JUST PARACHUTED DOWN TO THE GROUND, AND HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO TAKE OFF HIS PARACHUTE HARNESS, WHEN THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE RUSHED IN AND HARBED HIM RIGHT AWAY, SO IN ONLY 15 MINUTES THE BATTLEFIELD HAD BEEN CLEARED IN A SUCCESSFUL AND SAFE MANNER; ALTHOUGH THIS BANDIT DID NOT LIVE LONG, WHEN THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE HAD CLEARED THE BATTLEFIELD AND HAD TAKEN THE BANDIT TO ANOTHER POSITION, THEIR ((DISRESPECTFUL)) AIRCRAFT HAD JUST ARRIVED AND ATTACKED THE FORMER BATTLE POSITION.

-- THIS ALSO SHOWS THE HIGH SPIRIT OF PREPAREDNESS AND FIGHTING COURAGE OF OUR TROOPS AND PEOPLE.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

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CSY:RXBP0108 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE WHO SAY THAT ((IF THEY)) HAD SHOT AN AD-6 IT COULDN'T HAVE COME DOWN ((THE NEXT NINE WORDS ARE "AI VO CO THEP MAY CAO XU TU BAN, WITHOUT DIACRITICAL MARKS, THE MEANING OF THIS PHRASE IS NOT CLEAR. THE MOST LIKELY MEANING, WHICH ASSUMES TWO TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS, IS "BECAUSE IT IS PROTECTED BY STEEL AND RUBBER.")) BUT: THE AIR DEFENSE GROUP OF PHIENG BAN KHEM HAD TO SELECT THE CRITICAL POINTS OF THE AD-6, SUCH AS: WHEN IT BANGED TO OBSERVE BELOW, THIS AIR DEFENSE GROUP UNIFORMLY HAD THEIR BULLETS ENTER THE TOP OF THE COCKPIT AND UNDER THE WINGS ((WHICH)) ARE ITS CRITICAL POINTS; THUS AFTER ONE BURST OF MACHINE GUN AND RIFLE FIRE, THE AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATELY BURST INTO FLAMES AND CRASHED RIGHT DOWN INTO THE GROUND VERY CLOSE TO THE BATTLE POSITION,

((PAGE 2))

THIS SHOWS THE STEELY FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE FIGHTING GROUP OF PHIENG BAN, ((TWO UNCLEAR WORDS, POSSIBLY "GIAM NGAM," THE MEANING OF WHICH IS OBSCURE)) SHOOTING STRAIGHT-A-VOLLEY OF BULLETS VERY PRECISELY. AMONG THEM IS A "RIFLE-MAN" WHO IS A 17-YEAR-OLD FEMALE GUERRILLA, SO THE ENEMY, ((EVEN THOUGH)) HE USED AN ENGINE OF CARBON STEEL ALLOY ((NOTE: THE ACTUAL PHRASE IS "DA DUNG CA MAY HAY BANG GANG, BANG THEP CA"), STILL WAS TORN APART ON A STRIP OF THE SACRED SOIL OF THE NORTH OF OUR COUNTRY.

-- IN ADDITION: ON 5 OCT 66 THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF BAC YEN AND TRAN TUU COOPERATED WITH OUR AIR FORCE TO BRING DOWN AN AMERICAN F4H PHANTOM, ((AND)) PURSUE AND CAPTURE THE PILOT AND THE WRECKAGE OF THIS AIRCRAFT.

-- THESE ARE THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN SHOOTING DOWN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OF THE TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF OUR PROVINCE DURING THE 3 MONTHS OF THE 3RD QUARTER OF 1966.

-- B - STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS IN ORGANIZING THE CAPTURE OF AIR PIRATES:
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CSY:RXBP0150 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

- The COMPANY-GRADE OFFICERS AND CADRE HAD THE DETERMINATION TO FIGHT WELL. HERE ABOVE ARE THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL STRONG POINTS OF THE TWO BATTLES TO CAPTURE AMERICAN AIR PIRATES OF OUR TROOPS AND PEOPLE ALONGSIDE ((THESE)) THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF SHORTCOMINGS, AS FOLLOWS:

- SUDI DUYEN VILLAGE CAPTURED THE BANDIT QUICKLY, BUT TRANSFERRED HIM TO THE PROVINCE SLOWLY, SO IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO EXPLOIT HIS DOCUMENTS.

- ((AS FOR)) QUANG HUY VILLAGE, WHILE THE BANDIT WAS CAPTURED QUICKLY, THE AIR DEFENSE TEAM RUSHED OUT HEADLONG, WITHOUT ORGANIZATION AND IN TOO GREAT NUMBERS; NO ONE COMMANDED ANYONE ELSE, SO THE ENEMY HAD TIME TO ATTACK, CAUSING NEEDLESS CASUALTIES.

((PAGE 33))

- THE VILLAGE CADRES WERE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE TROOPS TO COMBAY A SUCCESSIVE BATTLE, SO WHEN THE HELICOPTERS AND VARIOUS TYPES OF JETS ARRIVED, FLYING LOW AND BOMBING, ((THE CADRES)) WERE COMPLETELY AT A LOSS TO FIGHT THE ENEMY. THOSE ARE THE WEAK POINTS OF THE ABOVE VICTORIES.

- 3 - SOME SHORTCOMINGS IN ORGANIZING THE RECENT CAPTURES OF AMERICAN AIR PIRATES IN A SMALL NUMBER OF LOCALITIES AS FOLLOWS:

- AT 1100 HOURS ON 31 JUL 60 AN AMERICAN BANDIT JET AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY TEN 841 ((PROVINCE)) AND CRASHED IN SUDI BU VILLAGE, VAN CHAN ((DISTRICT)); THE AIR PIRATE EJECTED AND REACHED HIGH POINT 1100, 1700 METERS FROM BAN GIA CHE ((HAMLET)), 2300 METERS FROM BAN NGOI LUONG ((HAMLET)), AND 2200 METERS FROM BAN NGI ((HAMLET)); ESPECIALLY IN THE TWO HAMLETS OF NGOI LUONG AND GIA CHE, IN THEIR HOUSES ((THEY)) SAW THE PIRATE EJECT; THE ROAD WAS NEARBY AND EASY, BUT THE PIRATE LANDED ON THE ABOVE HIGH POINT FROM 1100 TO 1700 WHEN THEY ((DISRESPECTFUL)) WERE FINALLY ABLE TO BRING IN A BT

267750/9167/112 9 OF 10 41 0201 112/141002 221124Z APR 91
CSN:RXBP0189 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 94 OF 95 BANGKOK 14 19307

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SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY THE HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND
HELICOPTER TO TAKE ((HIM)) AWAY FOR A PERIOD OF 5 HOURS, THE BANDIT WAS RIGHT NEXT TO THE THREE ABOVE HAMLETS, ALL POPULATED, ALL WITH GUERRILLA MILITIA; NEVERTHELESS, NOT A SINGLE PERSON PURSUED AND CAPTURED THE BANDIT FOR A FULL FIVE HOURS, WHEN THEIR ((DISRESPECTFUL)) AIRCRAFT FINALLY ARRIVED TO RESCUE THIS BANDIT; THIS CLEARLY IS AN EXAMPLE OF DEFEATISM AND LACK OF DETERMINATION TO FIGHT THE ENEMY.

- CASE NUMBER 2: AT THE SAME DATE AND TIME AS ABOVE, AN F-105 WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE CAY THINH VILLAGE MILITIA; THE AIR PIRATE ALSO PARACHUTED DOWN INTO A WOODED AREA OF SUDI BU VILLAGE, VAN CHAN ((DISTRICT)), COORDINATES 64-58; WHEN THIS PIRATE EJECTED THE VILLAGE CADRE SAW HIM, BUT BECAUSE ((THE AREA)) BELONGED TO ANOTHER VILLAGE THEY DID NOT ORGANIZE A FORCE TO PURSUE ((HIM)); WHEN THE VILLAGE WIT LEARNED ABOUT IT THEY SENT ONE GROUP OF MILITIA; WHEN THEY GOT WITHIN 500 METERS OF THE ENEMY PARACHUTE AND SAW THE ENEMY PARACHUTE STUCK IN A TREE, THE MILITIA ASKED AT A FEW PEOPLE'S HOUSES AND ((HEARD THAT)) THEIR ((DISRESPECTFUL)) HELICOPTER HAD TAKEN ((THE PILOT)) AWAY ALREADY, SO, ALTHOUGH THEY SAW THE PARACHUTE THEY ((DID)) NOTHING ELSE, ((JUST)) ATE AND SLEPT RIGHT AWAY, UNTIL THE MORNING, WHEN THEY WENT IN AND TOOK THE PARACHUTE BACK.

- ACTUALLY, THEY ((DISRESPECTFUL)) HAD COME FOR TWO HOURS TO TAKE ((THE PILOT)) AWAY, BUT THIS BANDIT WAS STUCK HIGH UP IN A TREE WITH HIS LEGS DANGLING IN THE AIR OVER A VERY HIGH ROCK, SO THEIR HELICOPTER COULD NOT GO DOWN TO PICK HIM UP WITHOUT GETTING STUCK IN THE TALL TREES, SO WHEN NIGHT CAME THIS BANDIT CUT HIS PARACHUTE LINES, FELL DOWN A STONY WATERFALL AND DIED; THAT NIGHT THE PROVINCE ARRIVED AND CLEARED UP THE BATTLEFIELD.

- THIS ALSO SHOWS A LACK OF A SPIRIT OF DETERMINATION TO FIGHT THE ENEMY IN THE UPPER LEVELS OF THIS AREA; WHEN THE BANDIT WAS DESCENDING

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W/LOSHRODANGLING ABOVE THEIR HEADS; THE HUSBAND
INTENDED TO TAKE HIS WIFE AND SHOOT THIS BANDIT WHILE
HE WAS AT A HEIGHT OF 4 OR 500 M ABOVE THEIR HEADS.
BECAUSE THE WIFE AND MOTHER WOULD NOT LET HIM, THEY
URGED HIM TO GO BACK HOME, AND CALLED TO THEIR FRIENDS
TO FLEE INTO THE FOREST; THIS CLEARLY IS A SPECIAL
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE UPPER LEVELS.

CASE NUMBER 3: AT 1100 HOURS ON 7 AUG 66, AT NAM
PUNG VILLAGE, VAN CHAN ((DISTRICT)) AN F-101 WAS SHOT
DOWN BY YEM BAI ((PROVINCE)), FROM 1330 HOURS WHEN THE
BANDIT LANDED 800 M FROM NAM PUNG ((HAMLET)) AND 700 M
FROM WHERE THE HAMLET UNIT WAS ASSEMBLED, FROM THE TIME
HE LANDED TO THE TIME THEIR ((DISRESPECTFUL))
HELICOPTER TOOK HIM AWAY, WITH A TOTAL TIME THAT HE WAS
IN THIS AREA OF 31 HOURS, ((THEY)) WERE STILL ABLE TO
CARRY HIM ((DISRESPECTFUL)) OFF.
((PAGE 4))

THE JETS ATTACKED MANY AREAS, ((AND)) TWO
HELICOPTERS IN TURN DISTRACTED THE TROOPS OVER THE HIGH
POINTS, UNTIL NEAR NIGHTFALL THEY ((DISRESPECTFUL)) HAD
ONE HELICOPTER CONTINUE TO DISTRACT THE TROOPS ON THE
HIGH POINTS AROUND THAT AREA, WHILE ANOTHER ONE SNEAKED
ALONG A WATERCOURSE AND TOOK THIS BANDIT AWAY AT AN
UNKNOWN TIME.

BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ORGANIZATION AND NO
LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH THE TROOPS WERE NUMEROUS AND THERE
WAS A LOT OF FIREPOWER SHOOTING OVER 2000 POUNDS, IN
THE END THE ENEMY WERE ABLE TOGETHER TO TAKE ((TIME
PILOT)) AWAY EASILY; BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ORGANIZED
OCCUPATION OF THE HIGH POINTS TO SHOOT AT THEIR
((DISRESPECTFUL)) AIRPLANES AND HELICOPTERS, ((THEY))
ALSO COULD NOT PURSUE ((THEM)) AND OBSERVE THE
SITUATION.

ON THE OTHER HAND THERE WERE NO UNITS FOR HIDE
AND CLOSE ENCIRCLEMENT, LIKEWISE NO UNIT OR
ORGANIZATION TO PURSUE ALONG THE WATERCOURSE, SO THIS
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CSN:RXBP0189 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 05 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 18307

APR 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY THE NANG
LIEN SON PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND
BANDIT HAD RIGID UNDER THE WATER SO THE HELICOPTER
COULD COME TO TAKE HIM AWAY WITHOUT ((OUR)) KNOWING; SO
HE THREW AWAY A CHANCE TO WIPE OUT THE ENEMY, A
REGRETTABLE ((THING)) ABOUT THIS BATTLE.

((END TRANSLATION))

6. THE NEXT PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 4 BEGINS A NEW
SECTION OF THE DOCUMENT. NO OTHER INCIDENTS ARE
MENTIONED IN THE REMAINING 56 PAGES, AND NO OTHER
DETAILS ABOUT THE INCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE TRANSLATED
SECTIONS ARE PROVIDED ON THOSE PAGES. DECL: OADR
BT

DLVR:COM JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

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TO COR JCRC BARBERS PT

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NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECDEF 14540C//OASD-T3/P4-414//

USEINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//J5-414//

CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TADCPED-4//

SECSTATL 14540C//J5-414-VLZ//

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

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31
SECTION 31 OF 07 RANOKJX TH 37490

0731 3 JN 01

DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOUR

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF A VIETNAMESE BURIAL REPORT

REF: 4, JCRC LIAISON 130736Z AUG 91

1. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM, 17 JUL - 12 AUG

91. THE DOCUMENT TO BE TRANSLATED BELOW IS DISCUSSED IN PAR 3(1).

2. ON 21 JUL 91 AT THE MILITARY REGION IV MUSEUM, NSO HOANG AND LUU VAN THO OF VJ45HP PRESENTED INVESTIGATION TEAM TWO WITH PHOTO COPIES OF A NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS RELEVANT TO J50742 INVESTIGATIONS. AMONG THESE DOCUMENTS WAS A TWO-PAGE BURIAL REPORT THAT CORRELATES TO REFNO 0727-072 (PUSH). THE TEAM WAS ALLOWED TO EXAMINE THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT. THERE IS NOTHING IN ITS APPEARANCE TO SUGGEST ITS 1965 DATE IS INACCURATE. THE PHOTOGRAPH WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC FOR ANALYSIS.

3. THE DOCUMENT IS TRANSLATED IN FULL BELOW. TRANSLATION'S COMMENTS ARE IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES.

DLVX:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HIC3//...ACT

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227/03:002 150342Z AUG 91

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

Encl 10

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)
(PAGE ONE)DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE FREEDOM HAPPINESS

REPORT OF THE BURIAL OF A BANDIT PILOT

THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN AT 1510 ON 8 JUN 1967

PLACE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED: HOANG LAD THUNG TRACH.

TYPE OF AIRCRAFT CRASHED: F4 SHOT DOWN BY: E214
(C.I.E., 214TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT) AREA SHOT DOWN:
9005 TRACHON THE SPOT OR FROM ANOTHER PLACE: ON THE SPOT
SURNAME AND NAME OF BANDIT PILOT: NAME (ABOVE
AND TO THE RIGHT IS WRITTEN: NAME NAME
3 (UNDERWRITING, I.E., 1LT) + 1 FELLOW (DISRESPECTFUL)
TORN APART.SERVICE NUMBER: 574324 DATE OF BIRTH: 7-5-1941 IN
WHICH STATE: (LEFT BLANK)

SKIN COLOR: WHITE DIED: 1510 HOURS 8 JUN 1967

PERSONAL EFFECTS INCLUDE WHICH ITEMS: ONE MILITARY
IDENTIFICATION CARD, ONE SUNGLASSES (THE SUNGLASSES
WERE KEPT BY THE VILLAGE), AND A NUMBER OF ITEMSWHO IS KEEPING THESE PERSONAL EFFECTS: NAME,
OCCUPATION, AND ADDRESS: 80 TRACH DISTRICT MILITARY
COMMAND.II-
CONDITION WHEN DIED: LEG (PROBABLY SHIN) BONE
BROKEN, WAS BREATHING, THEY DIED. BODY WAS INTACT.III-
WHO BURIED (SURNAME, NAME, OCCUPATION, D7 WHAT WHERE):
DEPUTY MILITIA COMMANDER NGUYEN VAN HUYNH, NGUYEN
ZIECH, NGUYEN CHAMP, MILITARY AND FARMERS OF TAY
TRACH, 80 TRACH.731214/0730/227
CSY:RX3P134

41 0150

227/03:002 150342Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

NO. BURIED: BURIED WITH 2 BASKETS OF STRAW
 PLACE BURIED: 170 METERS EAST OF THE RAILROAD BRIDGE
 IN TRY TRACH, RJ PACH

GRAVE MARKED BY: ((LEFT BLANK))

VI- ORGANIZATION MANAGING AND VERIFYING/ASSURING: ((LEFT
 BT

UCED AT GOVERNMENT EXTEND

SECTION UP OF 00 RANGKON TH 17170

0151 1JR 91
 DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOUR
 SURJ: TRANSLATION OF A VIETNAMESE BURIAL REPORT
 (BLANK))

V-
 SPIRIT OF THE PERSON VERIFYING: SENT RIGHT TO THE
 SPOT AND CHECKED THAT IT INDEED WAS THE GRAVE OF THE
 AIR PLATEL NAME) 133VE.

IN DEC 1964 19 DEC 1968
 VERIFYING ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION PREPARING
 REPORT AND MANAGING
 SIGNED AND SEALED
 ((ILLEGIBLE MARK))
 NG THIS AGUYEEV

((PAGE TWO IS A SKETCH MAP OF THE BURIAL SITE, WHICH
 IN CONTRAST TO THE ENTRY IN PART III OF THE
 TRANSLATION, SHOWS THE GRAVE TO BE LOCATED 70 METERS
 WEST OF THE RAILROAD.))

((END TRANSLATION))

2. THE DOCUMENT IS UNSTAMPED, AND THERE IS NO
 INDICATION WHICH UNIT OR ORGANIZATION PREPARED AND
 ISSUED THE REPORT, OR FOR WHOM IT WAS INTENDED. BASED
 ON OTHER, SIMILAR DOCUMENTS SEEN BY TEAM TWO MEMBERS,
 IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE REPORT WAS ISSUED BY THE 03
 TRACH DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND TO THE QUANG BINH
 PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND, OR POSSIBLY TO THE MR IV
 COMMAND.

BT

OLVRECOR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

731217/0132/221
 CSY:RX3P013

A OF 4

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003
 227/03:012 1503422 AUG 91
 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

731210/0739/221 3 4 0150 227/03:00Z 1503422 AUG 91
 CSY:PX000154 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

1 200622Z AUG 91 04 152101P22

FM JCRC LIAISON 152101P22

TO COM JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCRC BARBERS PT HI 152101P22

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PA-XIA//

JSC/CPAC WASHINGTON//J3/J33//

DIA WASHINGTON//J3/J33//

CORUSACILHI PT HI 152101P22

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLCZ//

BT
SECTION 01 OF 11 BANGKOK TH 00567

AUG 91

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE DRV MILITARY

REGION 6 MUSEUM (U)

REF: JCRC LIAISON 150736Z AUG 91

1. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT US/SPV ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, 17 JUL - 12 AUG 91.

2. ON 20 AND 23 JUL 91, A JOINT US/SPV TEAM MET WITH OFFICIALS OF THE MILITARY REGION 6 (MRR) MUSEUM IN VINH CITY, NONG TINH PROVINCE. THERE THE MUSEUM DIRECTOR, PHAM LTC PHAM DUY WANG (PHAMJ ZUY VANG), AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MUSEUM STAFF ALLOWED THE JOINT TEAM TO EXAMINE AND PHOTOGRAPH ARTIFACTS IN THE MUSEUM COLLECTION. TEAM ANALYSTS CONDUCTED PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE ITEMS AS THEY WERE PRESENTED, AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED AS TIME ALLOWED. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE TEAM WAS ALLOWED TO EXAMINE THE MUSEUM'S EXHIBIT REGISTER, WHICH INCLUDED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND ACQUISITION OF MANY OF THE ITEMS EXAMINED. BASED ON ANALYSIS OF THE ITEMS AND THE ACCOMPANYING INFORMATION, A NUMBER OF ITEMS WERE DETERMINED TO BE RELATED TO BOTH ACTIVE AND INACTIVE CASES IN JCRC FILES. INDIVIDUAL CORRELATIONS OF THESE ITEMS WILL BE PROVIDED IN SEPARATE MESSAGES.

DLFP:COM JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT 152101P22

RTS:000-000/COPIES:0003

752191/409/232
CSN:RSP02731 200622Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

3. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE ITEMS EXAMINED IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE PRESENTED. THE CONDITION OF THE ITEMS APPEARS IN PARENTHESES AFTER THE ITEM DESCRIPTION.

ITEM	DESCRIPTION
1	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF PVT JOHN RUSSETO (GOOD CONDITION).
2	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF CPL JOSE A. GONZALES (GOOD CONDITION).
3	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF MAJ ROBERT M. BROWN (GOOD CONDITION).
4	GENEVA CONVENTION CARD AND MICHIGAN DRIVER'S LICENSE OF WILLIAM E. SPENS JR. (GOOD CONDITION).
5	SOCIAL SECURITY CARD AND WISCONSIN STATE IDENTIFICATION CARD OF WILLIAM J. ROHAN (GOOD CONDITION).
6	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF LT GUY D. GRUTERS (GOOD CONDITION).
7	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND SOCIAL SECURITY CARD OF MAJ WILLIAM A. KANSEY (GOOD CONDITION). THESE ITEMS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A HANDWRITTEN NOTE IN VIETNAMESE THAT TRANSLATED AS "THIS PERSON WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE VINH LINH SPECIAL ZONE ON 21-1-1968 (ALONG WITH A SECOND PERSON RAMSEY). BOTH DIED - IT IS POSSIBLE THEIR REMAINS HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED." THIS NOTE WAS WRITTEN BY VNCSWP REPRESENTATIVE LUU VAN THO.
8	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD, GENEVA CONVENTION CARD, SOCIAL SECURITY CARD, MISCELLANEOUS CIVILIAN IDENTIFICATION CARDS, AND THREE MILITARY PAY STUBS OF PVT CURTIS E. SANDY (GOOD CONDITION).
9	GENEVA CONVENTION CARD, SOCIAL SECURITY CARD, AND MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL PAPERS OF JOHN ROSEY (GOOD CONDITION).
10	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF LT CHARLES C. PARISH (GOOD CONDITION).
11	MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF 1LT BRUCE C.

752191/409/232
CSN:RSP02731 200622Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 OF 14 0474504 14 00567

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE SAJ MILITARY MUSEUM

11 WALKER (GOOD CONDITION).

12 MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD, SOCIAL SECURITY CARD, AND PERSONAL LETTER OF EVERETT ROSE ROBINSON JR. (GOOD CONDITION).

13 MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD, NEW JERSEY DRIVER'S LICENSE, SOCIAL SECURITY CARD, AND IMMUNIZATION RECORD OF LT WILLIAM A. KIRBALL.

14 PERSONAL LETTER ADDRESSED TO CPL JERRY L. FULLERTON.

15 LEATHER WALLET CONTAINING A ST. JOSEPH'S PRAYER CARD AND GENEVA CONVENTION CARD OF CPT ARTHUR A. BURER (GOOD CONDITION).

16 LEATHER WALLET (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 512) CONTAINING THE MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF MAJ LOUIS F. MANDOSKI (GOOD CONDITION).

17 MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND A SLIP OF PAPER WITH A HANDWRITTEN MATHEMATICAL FORMULA OF COL WALLACE G. HYND JR. (GOOD CONDITION).

18 MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND GENEVA CONVENTION CARD OF CAREY CUMMINGHAM (SOIN BURNED).

19 SLIP OF PAPER (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 697) WITH THE NAME "STALECKI, STALEY P" WRITTEN ON OYE SIDE AND "ROMAN DUAN Y. (DUAN) Y" ON THE OTHER.

20 MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF HUBREY A. NICHOLS (GOOD CONDITION).

21 NEW TESTAMENT BIBLE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 151) BELONGING TO KENNETH B. ADMEYER.

22 NEW TESTAMENT BIBLE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 565) BELONGING TO CPL W.P. CELSO.

23 PARACHUTE SURVIVAL MANUAL (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 625).

24 TWO PARACHUTE LOGS (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 1066 FOR SOIN).

25 PERSONAL LETTER ADDRESSED TO "EV" (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 695) WRAPPED AROUND AN ARVN

DLWH:CDL JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

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752401/4210/232 3 OF 4 0337 232/08:207 200822Z AUG 91
CS:RAMP0274 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

IDENTIFICATION CARD, PAY CARD, AND MISCELLANEOUS PHOTOGRAPHS.

20 MISCELLANEOUS PHOTOGRAPHS OF UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS.

27 PHOTOGRAPH OF CHERYL BARRY.

28 MINIATURE HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OF ROBERT JAY BROWN.

29 MINNESOTA PROVISIONAL DRIVER'S LICENSE OF KEVIN RALPH REVER.

30 GENEVA CONVENTION CARD OF DALE HUSSELL EATON.

31 SELECTIVE SERVICE CARD OF DAVID L. WRIGHT.

32 WISCONSIN DRIVER'S LICENSE AND SWIMMING QUALIFICATION CARD OF WILLIAM J. NIMAN.

33 MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF WILLIAM WESLEY ALBERT.

34 GENEVA CONVENTION CARD OF JOHN HUGH KELLY IV.

35 USAA AUTO INSURANCE CARD OF JAMES G. SHAW.

36 VACY RATION CARD OF R.A. CARMAN.

37 U.S. ARMY EQUIPMENT LOG 8076, AIRPLANE 035

752401/4210/232 4 OF 4 0337 232/08:207 200822Z AUG 91
CS:RAMP0274 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

-31-

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WFO: 620-0000/COPIES-0003

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CS:RX40.0275 JEC CJ41504 041600X 1M

50 MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL LETTERS AND PAPERS,
NONE OF WHICH INCLUDED NAMES RELATED TO CASES
IN JCRC FILES.
51 AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE REPORT IDENTIFYING
PROBABLE TARGET.
52 AIRSTRIKE "MISSION" REPORTS, INCLUDING A
"SPECIAL" REQUEST FOR JCRRS 20139959,
IDENTIFIED AS "ARCHAGE" OF US AIRCRAFT #42
DEAD AMERICANS (POSS H-34).
53 PERSONAL LETTERS, MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS,
PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS, AND MILITARY DOCUMENTS,
NONE OF WHICH RELATED TO ANY CASES IN JCRC
FILES.
54 PERSONAL CLOTHING RECORD FOR DAVID L. SINGHMAN
(GOOD CONDITION).
55 MISCELLANEOUS PREFLIGHT INSTRUCTION CARDS,
56 IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATE AND TWO ONE DASH OF
FREDERICK A. BRIGT III (ONE ATTACHED TO AN
AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE) (GOOD CONDITION).
57 JOB SHEET OF VINNANA VINN AREA MARKED WITH
FLIGHT INGRESS/EGRESS ROUTES (MUSEUM

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

752400/4212/232 2 1 2 41 0533 242/05:25Z 200822Z 206 41
CSV:RXHF0275 JCRC LT:ISDH HAUGS 20 14

SECTION 04 OF 11 URGENT 0408 05067

0330 AUG 91

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE SRV MILITARY REGION - MUSEUM

REFERENCE NUMBER 251).

1:50,000 MAP SHEET 63421 WITH ANNOTATION IN VIETNAMESE INDICATING THAT THE MAP WAS PICKED UP DURING A BATTLE WHICH INVOLVED THE SHOOTDOWN OF AN U-19 AIRCRAFT IN THE VIAM TAO-VIAM THI VILLAGE AREA ON 20 FEB 68.

UNMARKED AIR NAVIGATIONAL CHART (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 1039).

PLASTIC ESCAPE AND EVASION MAP EVC250-2 CHINA/VIETNAM (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 489) (TURNED IN SEVERAL SPOTS, NOT MARKED).

PLASTIC ESCAPE AND EVASION MAP (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 723) (BAGGAGE BURNED).

SURVIVAL KIT IN CANVAS BAG (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 693) INCLUDING FISHING EQUIPMENT, PEN FLARES, DISCETTE LIGHTER, WIRE SAW, AND A SWITCHBLADE PARACHUTE KNIFE (BURNED).

PEN FLARE LAUNCHER (ALSO FOUND WITHIN ITEM 62, NOT IDENTIFIED BY THE SEPARATE MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 029).

PIPE WOODPIECE (ALSO FOUND WITHIN ITEM 62, NOT IDENTIFIED BY THE SEPARATE MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 1192).

LEATHER BELLET (ALSO FOUND WITHIN ITEM 62, MARKED BY THE OUTSIDE WITH MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 253 AND ON THE INSIDE WITH EITHER 079 OR 560).

MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF J.T. GLANVILLE JR. (FOUND WITHIN ITEM 65) (GOOD CONDITION).

UNMARKED PHOTOGRAPHS OF A CAUCASIAN FEMALE AND THREE CAUCASIAN CHILDREN (FOUND WITHIN ITEM 65).

GENEVA CONVENTION CARD OF MAJ SAMUEL R. JOHNSON (GOOD CONDITION).

.38 CALIBER SMITH AND WESSON REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER 421500, MARKED "PROPERTY OF U.S. NAVY" (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 325 OR 323 (LAST DIGIT UNCLEAR)).

IV INFUSION SET IN PLASTIC BAG (MUSEUM

DLVR:JCR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:034-000/COPIES:0003

752420/0213/232 7 JF 2 01 0300 212/001262 200822Z AUG 91
 CSY:PA5P0277 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

REFERENCE NUMBER 570).

PLASTIC MISSILE WITH LANTANA (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 786).

SIGNAL STROBE LIGHT (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 1172) (DATA PLATE TRANSCRIBED BELT).

MODEL NO. SERIAL NO.

N-F. 300-3/E 84131

TYPE LIGHT MARKER DISTRESS

CNT. NO. DSA-000-72-C-9956

FSH 0230-067-5299

NEO-FLASHER NO. HOLLYWOOD, CAL.

U.S.

SIGNAL STROBE LIGHT (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 499) (VISIBLE PORTION OF DATA PLATE TRANSCRIBED BELOW/LEFT EDGE COVERED BY LEATHER STRAP).

LIGHT, MARKER, DISTRESS

MODEL NO. SERIAL NO.

85306

NO. (FADED)

ELECTRONIC CORP.

NEW YORK, N.Y.

SIGNAL STROBE LIGHT (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 574) (DATA PLATE TRANSCRIBED BELT).

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752420/0213/232 7 JF 2 01 0300 212/001262 200822Z AUG 91
 CSY:PA5P0277 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 0510101110400001-00507

75 PLASTIC WATER BOTTLE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 606). PLACED INSIDE WAS AN UNUSED FIELD COMPRESS BANDAGE, A PIECE OF CORAL, AND A PLATE WITH SIX FALSE TEETH AFFIXED TO IT.

76 HEADPHONE EARPIECES (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 677).

77 ROLL OF PLASTIC TAPE ABOUT SIX INCHES WIDE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 360).

78 MILITARY JACK (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 659).

79 PLASTER KIT

80 TROPICAL FIRST AID KIT (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 259).

81 PERSONAL SURVIVAL KIT IN PLASTIC BOX.

82 SURVIVAL ENTRENCHING TOOL BLADE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 264).

83 SIGNAL STRIKE LIGHT (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 263) (UNMARKED).

84 TROJAN HORSE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER TAG BURNED AND ILLEGIBLE).

85 PLASTIC BOX.

86 RUBBERIZED POUCH (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 709) (THIS POUCH PROBABLY ORIGINALLY CONTAINED MANY OF THE ABOVE LISTED SURVIVAL ITEMS).

87 COVERALLS, ANTI-G, WITH NAME TAG OF "LT. SMITH" (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 708).

88 MARKINGS ON COVERALLS APPEARED AS FOLLOWS: "COVERALLS, ANTI-G, TYPE HK 114, LARGE LONG. DATE OF MFR. APR 1964, SMILIX PARACHUTE CO."

89 CANVAS SURVIVAL VEST MARKED "BUREN" (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 514).

90 FLIGHT SUIT HARNESS (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 613). MARKINGS APPEARED AS FOLLOWS:

DLVR:CDR JCRC PARASERS PT HI(3)...ACT

R10:000-000/EUP155:0003

752511/0255/032 9 OF 22 HI 0383 252/39:05Z 2004022 AND 91
CSN:RXAP0313 JCRC 111304 040600K 14

91 SUIT, INTEGRATED TORSO HARNESS #4-2 STOCK #01570-000-1347-LENS, SMILIX PARACHUTE CO., DATE OF MFR. OCT 1961

92 ONE MAN LIFE RAFT, ORANGE AND BLACK COLOR. SERIAL NUMBER 4608A (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 791).

93 ONE-MAN LIFE RAFT WITH CO2 TANK, YELLOW WITH BLACK BOTTOM (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 600). MARKED "RAFT #4-B DIG OF MFG: MAY 62, SERIAL (ONE DIGIT ILLEGIBLE) 3452" INSPECTION DATES LISTED AS FOLLOWS: "90 DAY INSP. DATE: 26 DEC 65, 24 FEB 66, 12 JUL 66"

94 ONE-MAN LIFE RAFT, YELLOW WITH BLACK BOTTOM (VERY DRY AND BRITTLE) MARKED WITH INSPECTION DATES OF 9 OCT 64 AND 23 DEC (YEAR UNREADABLE).

95 ONE-MAN LIFE RAFT, YELLOW, ORANGE, AND BLACK. MARKED "TYPE LRU-3/P SPEC. MIL-L-6460A AER RUBBER FABRICATORS INC. CONT. #303(416)336364, DTS MFG. NOV. 65, SERIAL 60903" INSPECTION DATES: "140 DAY INSP. 9 OCT 66, 6 M35. INSP. 11 DEC 67, 31 DEC 67, 120 DAY INSP. 9 JAN 67, 10 APR 67, 10 AUG 67, 31

752511/0255/232 12 OF 22 HI 0383 252/39:05Z 2004022 AND 91
CSN:RXAP0313 JCRC 111304 040600K 14

REF ID: A6 3P 11 01-00000 14 00567

VTC 71

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE SAN MILITARY REGION 4 MUSEUM

- DEC 67, 1300 HRS. INSP. 19 JULY 68

94 - FRANGE PARACHUTE, APPROXIMATELY TWO METERS IN DIAMETER (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 613).

95 - ONE PANEL OF A SMALL YELLOW PARACHUTE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 513).

96 - PORTION OF A WHITE PARACHUTE (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 485).

97 - AIRCRAFT TYPE AND DIM (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 367). TYPE MARKINGS: "R.F. GOODRICH"

- SILVERCOT FIBERS MADE IN USA 1-309 92907-3.

- TYPE VII 54-A-114 P461C TAGNO 217 KNOTS

- ICE SHIP 1840 H. FS 26207202090 (JGITS)

- UNREADABLE 65155 SEP 67 22"

- RIM MARKINGS: "SERIAL 0220 PART 10 053"

- CMG E SUSASTY 300 1501 CMG E

- ASSY NO 1-1080 CMG E ALCON

- TURN TO 35-230

- LBS IN MIL 1-55400 GREASE B.F. GOODRICH CO.

- THOY DMO MADE IN USA DIE NO 10959 CMG

- LOT NO 765900 INSP. NO. 4323 DATE MFO. 566

98 - EJECTION SEAT (MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 1103).

- DATA PLATE ON BACK OF HEADREST:

- PARACHUTE

- "JOLL PS 123

- PART NO. 365007-133

- SERIAL NO. 1164

- CONTRACT NO. F00006-71-C-0654

- STANLEY AVIATION CORP.

- DENVER, COLO.

- (THE ADDR STANLEY APPEARED AS A LUMJ)

- MARKINGS ON UNDERSIDE OF SEAT:

- U.S. AIR FORCE PARACHUTE

- "S-5 SEAT TYPE-20 FL. RHP STOP CAMPY

- A.F. SERIAL NO. (BLANK)

- CONT. NO. F00006-71-C-0654

- STANLEY AVIATION CORP-DENVER, COLORADO-365304

- MFR. BY PIONEER PARACHUTE CO. INC.

- DATE FEB 72

- (THE 7 IN THE YEAR 72 IS UNCLEAR)

- MARKINGS ON BACK OF METAL SEAT FRAME:

DLVR:CDR JCRC 8APERS PT HI(3)...AC1

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

752576/0207/232 11 OF 12 41 0367 212/00012 200422 AUG 91

CSY:RABP0299 JCRC 141504 DANGKAK TH

369230-7 (51440) (ON LEFT SUPPORT OF HEADREST)

369230-9 (51440) (ON RIGHT SUPPORT OF HEADREST)

REV E R 160149-17 (ON LEFT SIDE OF SEAT FRAME)

369389-13 (51440) REV E (ON RIGHT SIDE OF SEAT FRAME)

MARKINGS ON THE POCKET ON THE SEAT BACK:

RACK PAD ASSY

STANLEY AVIATION CORP.

PART NO. 369507-17

DATE OF MFR. SEP 71

CONTRACT NO. F00006-71-C-0390-0654

MFR. BY U.S. PARACHUTE CO.

DATA PLATE BEVEATH HEADREST ON FRONT OF SEAT:

PENNANT:

JISC. ACTIVATOR

PART NO. MFR. DATE

3650217 FEB 72

SERIAL NO. LOT NO.

1173 501-23

CARTRIDGE CARTRIDGE

2310 2258

LOAD DATE CONTRACT NO. STANLEY

(BLANK) F0006 71-C 0654 AVIATION CORP.

DENVER, COLO.

752576/0207/232 12 OF 12 41 0367 212/00012 200422 AUG 91

CSY:RABP0299 JCRC 141504 DANGKAK TH

C0000000

SEC113

DX 1-40507

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE SRV MILITARY
RELIGION MUSEUM
A LARGE PLATE WHICH WAS MARKED AS FOLLOWS:
- DOUGLAS ARRESTING HOOD SNUBBER
- MFG. BY ALDOUD WACH MKS
FOR DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO., INC. EL SEGUNDO, CALIF
- IN ARRIVING
RELEASE AIR IN RESERVOIR BEFORE DISASSEMBLY.
SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS:

1. WITH ARRESTING HOOD UP, FILL RESERVOIR TO
OVERFLOW WITH MIL-H-8605 (RED) HYD. FLUID
RESERVOIR CAPACITY APPROX. 1 U.S. PINT

2. EXTEND AND RETRACT HOOD TO REMOVE AIR
BUBBLES FROM REDWICK FLUID LEVEL

3. WITH ARREST HOOD UP, INFLATE RESERVOIR
TO BETWEEN 250 AND 270 P.S.I. AIR PRESS.

4. CAP AIR VALVE. CHECK AIR AND FLUID FILLER
TUBE SEATS FOR LEAKS.

5. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 356

AIRCRAFT MOD F3U-2VE

PART NO. CV15-800002-25

COMT NO. 43(19)62-3370R

SERIAL NO. 44-44-317

CONTR (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST

INSP. INSP.

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

A.S.C.

T.D.

T.M.

O.A. & D.

O.A. & D.

O.A. & D.

(THE ABOVE DATA PLATE WAS ATTACHED TO A PIECE OF
AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS WRECKAGE
WAS MARKED WITH A MATHEMATICAL FORMULA.)

H. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 670

AIRCRAFT MOD. 40

PART NO. 55.623-15

DLVR:CDN JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACI

910:500-000/COPIES:0003

752505/4250/232 16 OF 31 0370 252/09:03Z 200422Z AUG 91
CS1:RAN0302 JCRC LIT-1577: BARBERS PT

COMT NO. 43(19)62-3370R
SERIAL NO. 44-44-317
CONTR (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST
INSP. INSP.
MODIFICATION INCORPORATED
ITEM REFLECTION IN THE PART NUMBER LINE INDICATE
UNRECOVERABLE DIGITS
1. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 779
AIRCRAFT MOD F3U-2
PART NO. 590FSCV15110050-2
COMT NO. 43(19)62-3370R
SERIAL NO. 852
CONTR (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST
INSP. INSP.
MODIFICATION INCORPORATED
A.S.C.

T.J.

T.M.

O.A. & D.

O.A. & D.

O.A. & D.

J. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 316

AIRCRAFT MOD. (BLANK)

PART NO. 55-09720-3

COMT NO. (BLANK)

SERIAL NO. (BLANK)

CONTR. (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST.

INSP. INSP.

MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED

A.S.C. F-4-0-0

IF-4-0-725

IS-45-32-501

IF-4-157

T.J. 33-02-34-0-593

T.M.

O.A. & D.

31

752505/4250/232 16 OF 31 0370 252/09:03Z 200422Z AUG 91
CS1:RAN0302 JCRC LIT-1577: BARBERS PT

SECTION 107 JP-11 BANGKOK TH 10567

INC 91

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE SRV MILITARY

MUSEUM

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

P. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 1253

AIRCRAFT MOD. 1-74

PART NO. 215-200-1-216

CONT NO. 4000-0505-F

SERIAL NO. 116-23

CONTR (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST

INSP IVSP

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

A.S.C.

2. MU MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER

AIRCRAFT MOD. 1-74

PART NO. 325P 4000-0505-F

CONT NO. (BLANK)

SERIAL NO. (BLANK)

CONTR (BLANK) (BLANK) CUST

INSP IVSP

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

R. MU MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER

WINCC BY MOTOR

NO. 00050 PART NO. 53392

TEMP. RISE 05 C. 204 0500

INPUT VOLTS 27.5 400 12

DUTY CYCLE 10 MINUTES AT LOAD A

OUTPUT VOLTS 050 400 035

OUTPUT VOLTS 220 400 28

DUTY CYCLE 5 MINUTES AT LOAD B

OUTPUT VOLTS 400 400 28

OUTPUT VOLTS 210 400 28

0504. ACTIVITY IDENT. NO. 13499

PHG. NO. 251-0047 MP. IDENT. NO. 66099

CONTRACT NO. 000383-04-051

WINCHARGER CORPORATION

US

(WINCC BY MOTOR APPEARED AS A LOGO)

S. MU MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER

AIRCRAFT MOD. (BLANK)

PART NO. 3262103-5

CONT NO. (BLANK)

DLVR:COR JCRC 54PERS.#1 H(13)...ACT

R10:700-000/COPIES:0003

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CSM:PA0P0306 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SERIAL NO. 4003-11

CONTR (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST

INSP IVSP

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

INC 364

A.P.C. 213

3. AFTER EXAMINING ALL THE ITEMS OFFERED BY THE MUSEUM STAFF, THE JOINT TEAM WAS ALLOWED TO VIEW THE EXHIBITS IN THE MUSEUM AND EXAMINE, RECORD, AND PHOTOGRAPH PERTINENT EXHIBIT ITEMS. THE ADDITIONAL ITEMS EXAMINED CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING:

- PILOT'S FLIGHT HELMET (NO IDENTIFYING MARKS OR LABELS).
- PILOT'S FLIGHT HELMET. ITEM LABEL INDICATED THAT THIS HELMET BELONGED TO CPT AUBREY A. NICHOLS WHO FLEW AN A-7 THAT WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE 23RD REGT AT CAU CAI, HA TINH AT 0605 ON 19 MAY 72.
- BLACK PILOT'S FLIGHT HELMET WITH THE LETTERS "90H" PAINTED IN RED ON THE BACK.
- LABEL FOR PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED SURVIVAL MANUAL (ITEM 02. PARAGRAPH 3. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 268). THIS LABEL DESCRIBED IT AS "A GUIDEBOOK OF THE AMERICAN AIR PIRATE BLANKVILLE J.J.P. THIS TYPE OF BOOK WAS USED BY PILOT'S WHO WERE SHOT DOWN TO SCAVENGE FOR FOOD."
- BLOOD CHIT NUMBER 026005. THE ITEM LABEL DESCRIBED IT AS "A FLAG USED TO REQUEST FOOD USED BY THE AMERICAN COLONEL PILOT WYNDS, WALLACE G. AND WAS CAPTURED IN HA TINH."

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752592/4256/232 11 10 375 212/071992 200822Z 400 91
CSM:PA0P0306 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 11, JP IT BUREAU TM 00567

0314 AUG 91

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE SRV MILITARY
MUSEUM

- F. PILOT'S BOOTS. THE ITEM LABEL DESCRIBED THEM AS
- "THE BOOTS OF AN A-1 PILOT SHOT DOWN BY A FEMALE
- MILITIA UNIT ON 16 JUL 67 AT 904 LOC IN HAY LOC
- DISTRICT, THANH HOA PROVINCE."
- G. MISCELLANEOUS PIECES OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE,
- INCLUDING ONE DATA PLATE. THE ITEM LABEL DESCRIBED
- IT AS "AIRCRAFT PARTS BELONGING TO AN A-1 AIRCRAFT
- SHOT DOWN BY THE THANH DISTRICT ON 10 JAN 73." THE
- DATA PLATE APPEARED AS FOLLOWS:
- 1. ITT AEROSPACE CONTROLS
- 2. CORN LOEWI 737308
- 3. VALVE SHUT OFF GATE
- 4. ELECTRIC MOTOR OPERATED
- 5. PAVLL 60 23
- 6. FLUID MAX P.S. VALVE D.C.
- 7. A100154402 D-33153
- H. SERIAL NO.
- (THIS LINE BLANK)
- STOCK NO.
- (THIS LINE BLANK)
- CONTRACT NO.
- 128SC-130-3
- CUSTOMER PART NO.
- I. KITE WITH NYLON CONG. ITEM LABEL READ, "AN A-64
- AIRCRAFT WAS BROUGHT DOWN BY A KITE ON 24 JUL 68
- OFF THE COAST OF LE THUY DISTRICT."
- J. RIFLE. ITEM LABEL READ, "ON 18 OCT 65, THIS GUN
- FIRED TWO ROUNDS THAT BROUGHT DOWN AN F-4 AIRCRAFT
- IN PHU LE VILLAGE, HUONG KHE DISTRICT, HA TINH
- PROVINCE."
- K. KKK RIFLE. ITEM LABEL READ, "A KKK RIFLE OF THE
- MILITIA OF NAM SIANG VILLAGE, NAM DAN DISTRICT,
- NGHE TINH USED TO SHOOT DOWN AN F-4 AIRCRAFT AT
- THE MUON LOC BRIDGE AT 1405, 20 APR 68."
- L. PHOTOGRAPH. THE CAPTION READ, "THE MILITIA FORCES
- OF DIEN HUNG VILLAGE, DIEN CHAU DISTRICT, NGHE AN
- PROVINCE SHOT DOWN AN A-1 AIRCRAFT ON 15 MAR 65.
- THIS WAS THE FIRST UNIT IN NORTH VIETNAM TO USE
- INFANTRY WEAPONS TO SHOOT DOWN A U.S. AIRCRAFT."

OLVR:CDH JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:700-000/COPIES:0003

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CS:RX50307 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SKETCH MAP. THE ITEM LABEL READ, "THE FIGHT
AGAINST THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OF THE AV PHUONG
WOMEN. ON 14 MAY 68 THE FEMALE MILITIA UNIT OF
KY PHUONG VILLAGE, KY AN DISTRICT, NGHE TINH PROVINCE
SHOT DOWN AN F-4 AIRCRAFT."

12.7MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN SIGHT LENS. ITEM LABEL
READ, "THE 12.7MM SIGHT LENS OF THE FEMALE MILITIA
OF VO VINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH
WHO SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AN F-4 AIRCRAFT ON 10 NOV
67."

DECL:OADR
BT752594/0257/232 22 OF 22 41 NSTD 242/09:05Z 200422Z AUG 91
CS:RX50307 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

91 AUG 22 12:41

220925Z AUG-91 PS 7400125

CO	
NO	
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FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS HASHDC//JCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5//

NSC HASHDC

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PED-M//

SECDEF HASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//

SECSTATE HASHDC//EAP-VLC//

89

RECEIVED
21 AUG 91

BT

SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK TH 40927

AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF MILITARY REGION 4 MUSEUM EXHIBIT
REGISTRY

REF: A. JCRC LIAISON 130736Z AUG 91

B. JCRC LIAISON 200822Z AUG 91

1. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT US/SRV ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, 17 JUL - 12 AUG 91. REF B IS THE REPORT OF THE JOINT TEAM'S VISIT TO THE MILITARY REGION 4 (MR4) MUSEUM AND A SUMMARY OF THE ITEMS EXAMINED THERE.

2. ON 20 AND 23 JUL 91, TEAM TWO (COYLE, JANICH, JOHN, WHITE, HAKELL, RIVERA, WANNING, KEITH, LUU VAN THO, AND HA CONG PHIEU) VISITED THE MR4 MUSEUM IN VINH CITY, NGHE TINH PROVINCE. THE TEAM WAS FIRST SHOWN A NUMBER OF EXHIBIT ITEMS FROM THE MUSEUM COLLECTION (SEE REF A) AND GIVEN A TWO-PAGE EXCERPT FROM THE MUSEUM'S EXHIBIT REGISTER (TRANSLATION TO BE FORWARDED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE). THE TEAM WAS THEN ALLOWED TO EXAMINE THE MUSEUM'S EXHIBIT REGISTER. THIS DOCUMENT INCLUDED DESCRIPTIONS OF MANY OF THE ITEMS EXAMINED BY THE TEAM AND NOTES CONCERNING THEIR ORIGIN AND ACQUISITION. WHILE EXAMINING THE REGISTER, THE TEAM INITIALLY CONCENTRATED ON RECORDING INFORMATION PERTAINING TO SIGNIFICANT EXHIBIT ITEMS THEY HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO EXAMINE. THE ENTIRE REGISTER WAS THEN

DLVR: CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

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CSN:RXSP0305 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

REVIEWED FOR ENTITIES CONCERNING ADDITIONAL ITEMS OF INTEREST. DURING THIS PROCESS, IT WAS NOTED THAT A NUMBER OF THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN THE REGISTER EXCERPT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE REGISTER. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE NUMEROUS GAPS IN THE REGISTER WHERE ITEMS THAT HAD BEEN EXAMINED BY THE TEAM WERE NOT INCLUDED. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE REGISTER VIEWED BY THE TEAM WAS NOT ORIGINAL, AS CLAIMED BY THE MUSEUM STAFF, BUT HAD IN FACT BEEN SELECTIVELY REPRODUCED FROM AN ORIGINAL AT SOME TIME IN THE PAST. THE TEAM ALSO NOTED THAT CERTAIN ITEMS OF HIGH INTEREST THAT APPEARED IN THE REGISTER WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. MUSEUM OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THESE ITEMS WERE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN LOST, DESTROYED, OR LENT TO OTHER MUSEUMS. THE TEAM WAS NOT ALLOWED TO PHOTOCOPY THE EXHIBIT REGISTER; THEREFORE SIGNIFICANT ENTRIES WERE TRANSCRIBED IN VIETNAMESE.

3. A TRANSLATION OF THE TRANSCRIBED PORTIONS OF THE REGISTER FOLLOWS. ENTRIES IN SINGLE PARENTHESES AFTER THE REGISTER ENTRY INDICATE THE CORRESPONDING PARAGRAPH AND ITEM NUMBER OF THE EXHIBIT ITEM IN REF A. TRANSLATOR'S AND ANALYST'S COMMENTS APPEAR IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES. THE COLUMN HEADINGS IN THE REGISTER APPEARED IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: SERIAL NUMBER/PROPERTY BOOK SERIAL NUMBER/ARTIFACT NAME/SUMMARY OF ARTIFACT HISTORY. THE ENTRIES ARE PRESENTED HERE IN THE SAME ORDER, WITH A PERIOD USED TO INDICATE BLANK FIELDS. THE PROPERTY BOOK SERIAL NUMBERS CORRESPOND TO THE MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBERS CITED IN REF B. ((TRANSLATION FOLLOWS)) ((COVER)) EVACUATED ARTIFACTS 26-12-1970 ((TITLE PAGE)) ARTIFACTS OF BOKKS EVACUATED ARTIFACTS TURNED IN TO THE DEPARTMENT 6/929/ROLL OF FISHING LINE/JF INFANTRY CO 1, 270TH REGT AND ON THE NIGHT OF 29-7-68 RELEASED 5 KITES, DOARING ONE AKA IN THE SEA OFF LE THUY, QUANG BINH. ((PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 53)) ((THE DESCRIPTION OF THIS ITEM DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE ITEM BEARING THIS MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER THAT WAS EXAMINED BY THE JOINT TEAM.)) 59/263/BANDIT PILOT IDENTIFICATION CARD/NUMBER FR 15792 OF MYHDS, WALLACE SJOLEY AND WAS CAPTURED ALIVE IN NG TINH ON 28-5-1965.

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CSN:RXSP0305 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 JF 03 BANGKOK TH 00927

40 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF MILITARY REGISTRY MUSEUM EXHIBIT
REGISTRY(PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 17) (THIS ITEM WAS NOT MARKED WITH
A MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER.)100/281/MAP OF BANDIT PILOT SHOT DOWN BY THE PEOPLE OF
HUNG DUNG VILLAGE AND CAPTURED BY THE PEOPLE OF NGHI
FU.

(PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 37)

101/262/BANDIT PILOT IDENTIFICATION CARD/OF THE BANDIT
PILOT CHARLES C. PARISH WHO WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE PEOPLE
OF HUNG DUNG AND CAPTURED BY NGHI FU.(PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 10) (THIS ITEM WAS NOT MARKED WITH
A MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER.)111/292/F100 AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/OF THE AMERICAN
IMPERIALISTS, SHOT DOWN BY CO 2 OF THE NGUYEN VIET XUAN
BATTALION IN HESTERY QUANG BINH ON 18-11-1960. IN THIS
BATTLE NGUYEN VIET XUAN EMERGED AS A HERO.

(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 4)

112/293/AD AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY THE QUANG
BINH MILITIA ON 7-3-1965.

(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 3)

113/294/F100 AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY THE VAN
TRACH (QUANG TRACH QUANG BINH) MILITIA AT 9 O'CLOCK ON
27-10-60.

(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 3)

114/295/F8U AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/.

(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 0)

115/296/A6A AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY THE HUNG
THAI (HUNG NGUYEN NGHE AN) MILITIA.

(ITEM NOT PROVIDED FOR EXAMINATION)

116/297/A06 AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/.

(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 3)

117/298/F100 AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY THE 10TH
BR 82ND RGT ON 20-12-1957 CAPTURING ALIVE TWO BANDIT
PILOTS IN KY-LAC VILLAGE KY AN HA TINH (THE 100TH
AIRCRAFT OF MILITARY REGION 4).(ENTRY FOR THIS ITEM WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE MUSEUM
REGISTER, BUT APPEARED IN THE EXCERPT SUPPOSEDLY TAKEN
FROM IT.)134/324/HELMET OF BANDIT PILOT NUMBER 9/FROM THE BANDIT
PILOT OF AN F8U AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY CO 2 82ND RGT ON
17-5-67 AT THE QU DO LUONG BRIDGE NGHE AN, THE 1900TH

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RID:000-090/COPIES:0003

764261/5918/234 3 OF 6 HI 0372 234/09:54Z 220925Z AUG 91
CSV:PA9P0298 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK THAMERICAN BANDIT TO BE SHOT DOWN IN THE NORTH.
(AN ENTRY FOR THIS ITEM WAS NOT NOTED IN THE MUSEUM
REGISTER AND THE ITEM WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR EXAMINATION,
BUT IT DID APPEAR IN THE MUSEUM REGISTER EXCERPT.)135/325/BANDIT PILOT'S PISTOL 21500/SAME AS ABOVE.
(PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 69)156/355/F4 AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/OF AN F4 SHOT DOWN BY
THE HUNG DUNG VILLAGE (VTNH) MILITIA ON 25-7-68 AFTER
CHAIRMAN HO'S APPEAL OF 20-7-68.

(THIS ITEM WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR EXAMINATION.)

157/356/F8U AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY THE VINH
LINH 270TH RGT ON 19-5-57 AND SENT AS A GIFT TO UNCLE'S
(CLEANING UNCLE HO'S FOR HO CHI MINH) ANCESTRAL HOME.

(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 5)

229/513/PAPACHUTE AND WIND GUIDANCE PANEL OF A BANDIT
PILOT/FROM THE BATTLE OF KY LAC KY ANH HA TINH, THE
MILITARY EXCERPT OF (THE SHOOTING DOWN OF) (THE 100TH
AIRCRAFT BY MILITARY REGION 4).

(PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 3)

229/514/CLOTHING (S) OF THE BANDIT PILOT RL
SHUMAKER/HAMETAG FROM THE CLOTHING OF THE PILOT BANDIT
MAJOR RL SHUMAKER, PILOT OF AN F8U AIRCRAFT, WHO WAS
SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURED ALIVE BY THEMILITARY AND PEOPLE OF QUANG NOT (Q BINH) WHILE
COMMITTING CRIMES ON 11-3-1965.(THIS ITEM DID NOT APPEAR IN THE EXHIBIT REGISTER OR
ITS EXCERPT.)

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764261/5918/234 4 OF 6 HI 0372 234/09:54Z 220925Z AUG 91
CSV:PA9P0306 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 03 OF 03 BANGKOK TM 00927

445/957/FW AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY THE 12TH
ARTILLERY BATTALION IN NGHE AN AND CRASHED IN LAOS ON
5-6-67.
(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 1)
((END TRANSLATION))
DECL: UJDR
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0310 AUG 91
SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF MILITARY REGION 4 MUSEUM EXHIBIT
REGISTRY
250/575/GUORLEY IDENTIFICATION CARD/EVIDENCE FROM COL
MYNOS WALLACE GUORLEY WHO WAS CAPTURED IN HA TINH
(AIRCRAFT PILOT).
(PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 20)
272/604/REINFORCEMENT DOCUMENT BOOK/LETTERS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATION DATED 7 AND
8/2/65 OF NGHE AN, QUANG BINH, AND VINH LINE FOR
SHOOTING DOWN 22 AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.
((THIS DESCRIPTION DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE ITEM
MARKED WITH THIS MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER.))
305/721/SKETCH OF VINH LINH/BATTLE AT 1630 HOURS ON 20-
12-67 ((QUESTION MARK WRITTEN IN A DIFFERENT HAND)) AT
VINH LINH WHICH DESTROYED 2 B52S, ONE OF WHICH WAS THE
100TH ((AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN)) BY MILITARY REGION 4.
((THIS ITEM WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR EXAMINATION.))
326/786/US PLASTIC MISSILE/FROM A BANDIT PILOT OF AN
F4C SHOT DOWN BY CO 10 2ND BN 214TH RGT ON 7-8-67 AT
THE LONG DAI FERRY JUNG BINH. 2 COMRADE COMPANY
COMMANDERS OF CO 10 2ND BN 214TH RGT JUNG THAM KHUE
AND THAM SA USED THIS MISSILE TO COMMAND THEIR UNIT IN
COMBAT TO DEFEND THE LONG DAI FERRY FROM 8/67-11/68,
SHOOTING DOWN 6 BANDIT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.
(PARAGRAPH 3, ITEM 11)
338/808/FW AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT BY
THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF VINH LINH DURING A BATTLE ON
11-11-68 SOUTHWEST OF KILL TO VINH THUY.
((THIS ITEM WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR EXAMINATION.))
349/815/P57 DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY CO 3 19TH BN 214TH
RGT ALONG WITH AN ARTILLERY GROUP OF THE 214TH RGT AT
0020 HOURS ON THE NIGHT OF 11-9-67 WITH 37MM AND 57MM
GUNS, 1 BANDIT PILOT WAS KILLED, 1 BANDIT PILOT WAS
CAPTURED, CO 3 WAS AWARDED A MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL
THIRD CLASS.
((THIS ITEM WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR EXAMINATION.))
350/816/F4C DATA PLATE/IN THE BATTLE ON 11/9/68 THE
15TH BN OF THE 214TH RGT IN 55 (55 MINUTES) NEATLY
DESTROYED A FLIGHT OF F4C ((AIRCRAFT)) IN 80 TRACK.
(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 1)
351/818/F100 DATA PLATE/
(PARAGRAPH 4, ITEM 1)

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R10:000-000/COPIES:0003

5/5922/234 6 OF 6 41 0374 234/10:072 220925Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TM

764345/5922/234 6 OF 6 41 0374 234/10:072 220925Z AUG 91
CSN:RXRP0300 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TM

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J 231137Z AUG 61 25 770371125

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC//JCS-PM-11A//JS// IMMEDIATE

NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC//JCS-ISA/PN-VIA// IMMEDIATE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//JS// IMMEDIATE

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PP-VIA// IMMEDIATE

CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PEG-H// IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLC// IMMEDIATE

#4 [Signature]

SECTION 01 OF 08 BANGKOK TH 01247

AUG 91

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE QUANG BINH
PROVINCIAL MUSEUM

REF: JCRC LIAISON 130736Z AUG 91

1. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT US/SRV
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT
INVESTIGATIONS, 17 JUL - 12 AUG 91.

2. ON 25 AND 26 JUL 91, TEAM TWO (COYLE, JANICH,
JOHN, WHITE, HENELL, RIVERA, MANNING, ALITH, LUU VAN
THO, AND HA CUONG PHIEU) VISITED THE QUANG BINH
PROVINCIAL MUSEUM (NAM BAK TANG THAM QUANG BINH).
THERE THEY MET WITH THE MUSEUM DIRECTOR PHAM VAN CHUYET
(PHAM VAN CHUYET). MR. CHUYET EXPLAINED THAT THE
MUSEUM STAFF HAD BEEN ASKED TO ASSEMBLE A NUMBER OF
ITEMS TO BE EXAMINED BY THE TEAM. HOWEVER, HE CLAIMED
THEY WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH THEIR FINDINGS AND
REGRETTED THAT MANY DISPLAY ITEMS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
OF INTEREST TO THE TEAM HAD BEEN LOST OVER TIME AND
DURING TRANSFERS FROM ONE MUSEUM TO ANOTHER.

3. THE ITEMS PRESENTED TO THE TEAM CONSISTED OF
35 CAPTIONED PHOTOGRAPHS AND 17 ARTIFACTS. THE
PHOTOGRAPHS WERE MOUNTED TO PAPER CARDS WHICH CONTAINED
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PHOTOGRAPHS, THEIR

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

770371/6677/235 1 OF 10 0370 215/11:39Z 231137Z AUG 91
CSY:PAFJ300 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

ACQUISITION, AND THE TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH
THEY WERE TAKEN. MOST OF THE ARTIFACTS PRESENTED WERE
ACCOMPANIED BY MUSEUM REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS FROM THE
QUANG BINH MUSEUM AND THE FORMER BINH TRI MUSEUM.
THE PROVINCIAL MUSEUM, FROM WHICH A NUMBER OF ITEMS WERE
OBTAINED, THESE DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED THE ITEMS AND
PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR HISTORY AND
ACQUISITION. THE TEAM WAS ALLOWED TO EXAMINE
PHOTOGRAPHS, AND RECORD ALL ITEMS AND DOCUMENTS
PRESENTED. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE MATERIALS EXAMINED
INDICATES THAT MANY OF THEM CORRESPOND TO BOTH ACTIVE
AND INACTIVE CASES IN JCRC FILES. INFORMATION
CONCERNING SPECIFIC CORRELATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED IN
SEPARATE MESSAGES.

THE PHOTOGRAPHS EXAMINED BY THE JOINT TEAM
WERE IDENTIFIED BY MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBERS BEGINNING
WITH THE LETTERS "PA" (PHICH, AMR/PHOTO CARD). FOR
EASE OF REFERENCE, THEY ARE ALSO IDENTIFIED BY THESE
NUMBERS HERE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH 35
PHOTOGRAPHS WERE DESIGNED FOR EXAMINATION, FOUR WERE
JUDGED NOT TO BE PERTINENT AND WERE NOT RECORDED.

PA 31- A PHOTOGRAPH THREE PERSONS STANDING NEAR
AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. THE PHOTO CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS
THE WRECKAGE OF AN F105 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN AT PHU THUY
(V), LE THUY (D), QUANG BINH (P) IN 1966. THE
PHOTOGRAPHER WAS THINH THUY (THANH THUY).

PA 18- A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE RIVER MOUTH OF THE BINH
RIVER (QUANG BINH); NO TRACK (D), QUANG BINH DATED 7
FEB 65. THE PHOTO CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE PLACE
WHERE THE AMERICAN AIR PILOT DICKSON, THE FIRST AIR
PILOT SHOT DOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM, WAS BURIED ON 7
FEB 65. THE PHOTOGRAPHER WAS HUU THUAN (HUU THUAN).

PA 16- A PHOTOGRAPH OF A BURNER. THE CAPTION
DESCRIBED IT AS A BURNER OF BURNER NGUYEN BUIH (NGUYEN
BUIH) OF PHUC TRACH (V), 53 TRACH (D), QUANG BINH
(P) AND SHOT DOWN 4 FEB 1972.

PA 122- A PHOTOGRAPH OF SEVERAL FEMALES SETTING THE
SIGHTS ON AN AAA GUN. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED AS A SQUAD
OF FEMALE MILITIA OF TIEN HOA (V), TUYEN HOA (D), QUANG
BINH (P) PREPARING A AAA SITE AT LEY BANG (LENG BANG).
THEY SHOT DOWN ONE AIRCRAFT ON 29 AUG 68.

PA 116- A PHOTOGRAPH OF SEVERAL FEMALES SETTING THE
SIGHTS ON A AAA GUN. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE
FEMALE MILITIA SQUAD OF LE HOA (V), TUYEN HOA (D),
QUANG BINH (P) AND SHOT DOWN TWO U.S. AIRCRAFT IN
BATTLES ON 18 MAY 68 AND 24 JUL 68.

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CSY:PAFJ300 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

PA 114- A PHOTOGRAPH OF TWO MEN FIRING RIFLES. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE MILITIA OF QUANG PHUC (V), BT

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8 AUG 31
SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSEUM.
QUANG TRACH (D), QUANG BINH (P), THE UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR SHOOTING DOWN THE 200TH AIRCRAFT IN THE PROVINCE.
PA 150- A PHOTOGRAPH OF A DEAD CAUCASIAN MALE. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE BODY OF A PILOT OF AN F-105 SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF QUANG BINH AT PHU HUY (V), LE THUY (D), QUANG BINH IN 1968. THE PHOTOGRAPHER WAS THINH THUY.
PA 23- A PHOTOGRAPH OF A PERSON STANDING NEAR A GRAVE MARKED "AIR PIRATE JACKSON 7-2-65" (GIANG LAM DICH SON 7-2-65). THIS PHOTO WAS NOTED AS HAVING BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED FROM THE ORIGINAL. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE GRAVE OF U.S. PILOT JACKSON SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF QUANG BINH AT NHA TRACH (V), BO TRACH (D), QUANG BINH ON 7-2-1965.
PA 36- A REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH OF A DATA PLATE AND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AN F-4 FROM AN ORIGINAL PHOTOGRAPH BY MUU VU (HUU NGUYEN). THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE DATA PLATE OF A U.S. F-4 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF QUANG BINH AND THE FIRST AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN 1972.
PA 27- A PHOTOGRAPH OF TWO PEOPLE STANDING LOOKING AT AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE WRECKAGE OF THE 300TH U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF QUANG BINH. IT WAS SHOT DOWN IN TUYEN HOA (D), QUANG BINH (P) IN 1968.
PA 26- A PHOTOGRAPH OF A CAPTURED CAUCASIAN U.S. PILOT UNDER ARMED GUARD. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS THE MILITIA OF LY NINH (V), DONG HOI (D), QUANG BINH (P) CAPTURING THE U.S. AIR PIRATE "SU-11-CO" (SMITHAKER).
PA 10- A PHOTOGRAPH OF THREE FEMALES FIRING A 144 GUN. THIS PHOTOGRAPH HAS NOTED AS HAVING BEEN REPRODUCED IN 1975. THE CAPTION DESCRIBED IT AS A UNIT OF 12.7 MM MILITIA FORCES OF LY NINH (V), QUANG BINH (D), RESPONSIBLE FOR SHOOTING DOWN THE 100TH U.S. AIRCRAFT.
PA 24- A PHOTOGRAPH OF A CAUCASIAN U.S. PILOT UNDER ARMED GUARD TAKEN IN MAR 1965 BY CUOC THINH (CUOC THINH). THE CAPTION READS: "ON 11-3-65 THE AIRCRAFT PILOTED BY 'HAN DON LOC MAT' (HAN DON LOC MATS) CAME TO ATTACK AND WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE

PLVN:CON JCRC BARBERS PT HI (S)...ACT

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CSN:RXSP9309

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

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JCRC TAISSON BANGKOK TH

UCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

770371/6677/235 3 OF 16 41 0370 235/11:37Z 231137Z AUG 91
CSN:RXSP9309 JCRC TAISSON BANGKOK TH

37

5^{2F} 16

35- A PHOTOGRAPH OF A MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD

LEW H. WILKINSON, JR.

$$\varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 11\varphi$$

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235/11:01Z 251137Z AUG 91
JCRG LIAISON BANGKOK TH

AND AN FL17A HANDGUN TAKEN BY OUR AG. THE CAPTION READS: "THE IDENTIFICATION CARD OF THE AMERICAN AIR PILOT BEING EXAMINED, FLIGHT OF AN FL17A SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE IN 1973."

PA 22- A PHOTOGRAPH OF FOUR VIETNAMESE LOOKING AT AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, TAKEN BY DUOC THINH. THE CAPTION READS: "THE 300TH U.S. SPECIALIST AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY OUR MILITARY AND PEOPLE ON 27-12-72 AT AN THUY, LE THUY, QUANG TRACH." (SIC)

PA 23- A PHOTOGRAPH OF A CRATER AND AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE TAKEN ON 11-3-65 BY DUOC THINH. THE CAPTION READS: "THE WRECKAGE OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF QUANG BINH AT PHU CUONG HILL, LE THUY STATE FARM ON 11-3-65."

PA 11- A PHOTOGRAPH RECEIVED IN 1973 OF AN AAA GUN ORIGINALLY TAKEN BY DUOC THINH (DINH LUONG). THE CAPTION READS: "THE 12.7 MM UNIT OF COMRADE LUONG SI VINH AT HOAN SITE 859 IN QUANG BINH SHOT DOWN AN F4 AIRCRAFT NEAR NATIONAL HIGHWAY 124 IN 1965."

PA 61- A PHOTOGRAPH OF AN AAA GUN TAKEN IN 1967 BY DUONG BINH PROVINCIAL FORCES. THE CAPTION READS: "THE MILITIA OF DUONG THUY, LE THUY, QUANG BINH SHOT DOWN THE 300TH AIRCRAFT IN THE PROVINCE ON 30-7-67."

5. THE FOLLOWING EXHIBIT ITEMS WERE EXAMINED BY THE JOINT TEAM, ALONG WITH ACCOMPANYING MUSEUM REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS. PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM THE DOCUMENTS WAS TRANSCRIBED IN VIETNAMESE AND IS TRANSLATED HERE FOLLOWING EACH ITEM DESCRIPTION. FOR THE AIRCRAFT DATA PLATES EXAMINED, THE DATA PLATE INFORMATION IS TRANSCRIBED AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO IT.

SECTION 24 OF 08 SANGKOK 14 01247

G 71

SUBJECT: JOURNALISM ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSEUM
THE MANNER IN WHICH IT APPEARS ON THE PLATE, AND
FOLLOWS THE DOCUMENT TRANSLATION.

A. FLIGHT HELMET WITH THE WORDS "MAC" PAINTED ON THE VISOR. MUSEUM REFERENCE NO. BT08 874/KL-75 (RECORDED IN DOCUMENT AS 874/KL-75).
HISTORY: THE PEOPLE OF QUAN THUY VILLAGE, LE THUY, QUANG BINH SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT ON 31-3-1968 AND RECOVERED THIS.

ACQUIRED BY: NGUYEN TRUNG PHU CADRE OF THE LE THUY PROVINCIAL FORCES.

B. FLIGHT HELMET WITH NAME TAPE "DICKSON." THIS ITEM DID NOT BEAR ANY MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER AND HAD NO MUSEUM REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS.

C. FLIGHT HELMET. THIS ITEM DID NOT BEAR ANY MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER, AND HAD NO MUSEUM REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS, BUT MUSEUM OFFICIALS IDENTIFIED IT AS HAVING BELONGED TO SHUMAKER.

D. LEATHER NAME TAG OF "JIM SHEA, UNITED STATES NAVY," APPARENTLY CUT FROM A UNIFORM. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER BT08 654/DD 74 (NOTE: THE SECOND "D" OF "DD" HAS A SOFT VIETNAMESE "O").

E. REPORT OF RECEIPT: NAME TAG OF PILOT JIM SHEA AT 0130 ON THE NIGHT OF 20-4-1965 AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CAME TO ATTACK THE

AND MANY WERE SHOT DOWN BY OUR MILITARY AND PEOPLE."

ITEM RECORD

ITEM HISTORY:

ORIGIN: NAME TAG OF AMERICAN PILOT JIM SHEA.
HISTORY: AT 0130 ON THE NIGHT OF 19-20.4.1965 THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR LACKEYS FROM THE SOUTH SENT AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK THE

OUR MILITARY AND PEOPLE HEROICALLY FOUGHT AND SHOT DOWN MANY AIRCRAFT. THIS IS THE NAME TAG OF AN ADG PILOT SHOT DOWN AT

ACQUISITION: PHAM THANH XUAN AND TRUONG MINH PHUONG CADRE OF THE QUANG BINH CULTURE BUREAU.
ACQUISITION TIME: 6-5-1965.
DOCUMENT PREPARED BY DUONG HOI ON 10/5/1965."

DLVH:EDP JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

773382/6691/235
CSY:QXAP0304

8 016

VI 0374

255/11:012

251172 AUG 91

JCRC LIAISON SANGKOK TH

776179/6690/235
CSY:RXAN 0303

7 016

VI 0373

255/11:012

251172 AUG 91

JCRC LIAISON SANGKOK TH

E. DATA PLATE FROM AN A-1 AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM REFERENCE
NO. 875/KL.87.

ITEM RECORD.

II. ITEM HISTORY:

ORIGIN: AMERICAN AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE.

HISTORY: AT 1500 ON 22/4/65 THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS
AND THEIR LACKEYS IN THE SOUTH SENT AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK
THE MY DUC AREA OF SON THUY VILLAGE LE THUY, OUR
MILITARY AND PEOPLE FOUGHT BRAVELY AND SHOT DOWN MANY
AIRCRAFT. THESE ARE DATA PLATES FROM AN A-1 AIRCRAFT
SHOT DOWN AT HANG TRUNG LOC HAMLET, SON THUY VILLAGE.

ACQUISITION: FROM TACHU XUAN AND TRUONG MINH PHUONG

CADRE OF THE QUANG BINH CULTURE BUREAU.

ACQUISITION TIME: 6-5-1965.

PREPARED IN DDMS HQ ON 10 MAR 1965

AIRCRAFT MOD. A-1

DWG OR PART NO. SP5070-AL

CONTR. NO. HQA(5151)-230

SER. NO. 446-2029

DATE ACCEPTED 7-53

CO (STAMP) CUST.

INSP INSP.

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

(NOTE: THE QUANTITY INDICATED IN THE DOCUMENT SHOWED
TWO DATA PLATES, BUT ONLY ONE WAS PRESENTED FOR
EXAMINATION. MUSEUM OFFICIALS EXPLAINED THAT ONE WAS
LOST WHEN THE ITEMS WERE TRANSFERRED FROM ANOTHER
MUSEUM.)

F. FOUR DATA PLATES FROM AN AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM

REFERENCE NOS. FOR ALL ST-8 876/KL.86.

THE NARRATIVE, ACQUISITION, AND OTHER DATA FOR THESE

BT

770302/6681/235
CSN:PXSP0310

Q of 130

VI 0374 215/11:01Z 231137Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

ON 35 OF 10 040000X TH 01247.

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE QUANG BINH
PROVINCIAL MUSEUM

ITEMS WERE IDENTICAL TO THOSE FOR ITEM 3.

AIRCRAFT MODEL A-1

DWG OR PART NO. SP5145-50SR

CONTR. NO. HQA(5152)-980

SER. NO. J-74-1450

DATE ACCEPTED (ELANK)

CO (STAMP) CUST. (STAMP)

INSP INSP.

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

DP 6 61

DP 7 50

DP 11 58

DP 2-50 58

AIRCRAFT MOD A-1

DWG OR PART NO. SP5070-AL

CONTR. NO. HQA(5152)-980

SER. NO. 445-2000

DATE ACCEPTED 3-54

CO (STAMP) CUST. (STAMP)

INSP INSP.

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

AIRCRAFT MOD. A-1

DWG OR PART NO. SP51205

CONTR. NO. HQA 5-51-630

SER. NO. 815-704

DATE ACCEPTED 7-64

CO (STAMP) CUST. (STAMP)

INSP INSP.

MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

BU.C. 353

DP 6 61

DP 7 54

DP 6 61

DP 11-58

AIRCRAFT MOD. A-1

DWG OR PART NO. SP5070-SR

CONTR. NO. HQA(51 5-760

SER. NO. 446-2 23

DATE ACCEPTED 2-64

CO A-227 CUST (STAMP)

OLVR:CDH JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

UCLD BY GOVERNMENT LAFENJA

770417/6687/235
CSN:PXSP0310

10 of 130

VI 0380 215/11:51Z 231137Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

INSP 1-59
 MODIFICATION INCORPORATED
 (NOTE: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF DATA PLATE NUMBERS
 INDICATES THAT THESE FOUR, AND POSSIBLY THE FIFTH FROM
 THE PREVIOUS ENTRY, ARE FROM THE SAME AIRCRAFT.)
 6. SIGNAL BIRDIE LIGHT. MUSEUM REFERENCE NO. 8709
 87/KL 93.
 *ITEM RECORD:
 ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: (BLANK)
 HISTORY: ON 13-6-1966 THE MILITIA OF QUANG PHUC
 VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH, QUANG BINH SHOT DOWN THE 200TH
 AMERICAN PIRATE AIRCRAFT. THIS IS A SIGNAL LIGHT OF THE
 PILOT OF THAT AIRCRAFT.
 4. DATA PLATE FROM AN F100 FUEL TANK. MUSEUM REFERENCE
 NO. 8709 882/KL 90.
 *ITEM RECORD:
 ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: (BLANK)
 HISTORY: FUEL TANK DATA PLATE FROM AN F100 AIRCRAFT
 SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF QUANG BINH ON
 17-8-1966.
 5. AMERICAN AVIATION, INC.
 PART NAME
 EXTERNAL AUXILIARY FUEL TANK
 TYPE III CLASS (BLANK)
 CAPACITY:
 U.S. GALS POUNDS ORDER NO.
 335 2175 54-65-1351A
 MATERIAL MODEL
 ALUMINUM F-100
 PART NO. DATE
 91

779817/0657/235 11 0389 245/11:512 231137Z AUG 91
 54:RAFP0310 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

76 JF 08 BANGKOK TH 21247

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE QUANG BINH
 PROVINCIAL MUSEUM
 180-08502-401 11-65
 HEIGHT EMPTY SPEC. VO.
 = 261 MIL-1777A
 CONTRACT NO. SERIAL NO.
 AF04(607)10495 2-1834
 INSPECTORS WFG. BY
 (STAMP) YAK

(NOTE: THE UPPER LEFT CORNER OF THIS DATA PLATE WAS
 MISSING.)
 I. STARTER-GENERATOR ENGINE DATA PLATE FROM F4
 AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM REFERENCE NO. 8703 881/KL 93.
 *ITEM RECORD:
 II. ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: (BLANK)
 HISTORY: THE DATA PLATE OF AN F4 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY
 THE PEOPLE'S MILITIA OF QUANG BINH VILLAGE AT 0515 ON 10 NOV
 1967.
 ACQUISITION:
 ACQUIRED FROM: (BLANK)
 CHARACTERISTICS: ADDITION TO THE MUSEUM COLLECTION.
 ACQUISITION TIME: 13 DEC 1967
 PREPARED IN: QUANG BINH ON 1 FEB 1968
 EXMCD STARTER-GENERATOR ENGINE
 = FUP 24 VOLTS D.C. SYSTEM
 STOCK NO. (BLANK) NET. 15.75
 CUSTOMER'S PART 13-0051-1
 CONTRACT NO. AF 54(657)12135
 WFG. TYPE D1435 SERIAL 59491
 GEN. MAX. RPM. 30 MIN. GEN. R.P.M. 7,100
 INSPECTOR (BLANK) DTE 7-50 U.S.
 (NOTE: "BLANK" APPEARED AS A LOGO.)
 3. TWO DATA PLATES FROM A06 AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM
 REFERENCE NO. 8703 877/KL 89.
 *ITEM RECORD:
 ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: (BLANK)
 HISTORY: AN A06 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY US AT 534 THUY,
 LE THUY, QUANG BINH ON 22-6-1965.
 JOB NO. 5254129-4520

OLVR:EDN JCRC HANDERS OF H(13)...ACT

770385/0685/233 12 0376 245/11:022 231137Z AUG 91
 54:RAFP0310 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

PTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

SHOP ORDER 2195
 JLT NO. 135396
 INSP. (STAMP) A36-1 (STAMP)
 JDB NO. 5254053-4005
 SHOP ORDER 1102
 JLT NO. 135402
 INSP. (STAMP) (STAMP)
 K. DATA PLATE FROM AN AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM REFERENCE
 NO. BTGB 679/KL.95.
 ITEM RECORD
 ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: DATA PLATE FROM AN AMERICAN-MADE AIRCRAFT
 HISTORY: AT 0830 ON 13-11-1965 MANY FLIGHTS OF AMERICAN
 AIRCRAFT CAME TO ATTACK A NUMBER OF AREAS IN QUANG
 NAM, LE THUY, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE MILITIA OF
 QUANG NAM, LE THUY SHOT DOWN 1 AMERICAN JET AIRCRAFT IN A
 FIELD 2
 DISTRICT AND CAPTURED ITS PILOT MAJOR HARRY FARLEIGH
 ZEMKINS.
 AIRCRAFT NO. A-36
 PART NO. 5817510-3,
 CONT. NO. MDA-63-0030
 SERIAL NO. 2-13-181
 CONTR. (STAMP) (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST
 INSP. INSP.
 MODIFICATION INCORPORATED
 L. DATA PLATE FROM AN AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM REFERENCE NO.
 BTGB 679/KL.91.
 BT

770545/6695/235 13 OF 14 VI 0376 235/11:02Z 231137Z AUG 91
 CSY:RXSP0318 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

07 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 41247

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE DULVO 814
 PROVINCIAL MUSEUM
 ITEM RECORD:
 ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: DATA PLATE OF AN AMERICAN IMPERIALIST AIRCRAFT
 HISTORY: ON 11-2-1965 THE AMERICAN PIRATES SENT MANY
 FLIGHTS OF AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK DATA AND THE
 ADJACENT AREAS. THEY WERE COUNTERED BY FIREFIRE FROM
 OUR MILITARY AND PEOPLE WHO SHOT DOWN AN F4U-2 AT
 SHUMAKER. THIS IS ONE OF THE DATA PLATES FROM THAT
 AIRCRAFT.
 AIRCRAFT NO. F4U-2
 PART NO. CV15-163032-2
 CONT. NO. MDA-S-58-115
 SERIAL NO. J48-721
 CONTR. (STAMP) (STAMP) CUST.
 INSP. INSP.
 MODIFICATION INCORPORATED

15C.
 1.5.
 T.3.
 T.4.
 J.A. & D.
 J.A. & D.
 J.A. & D.
 K. DATA PLATE FROM AN F100 AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM REFERENCE
 NO. BTGB 683/KL.95.
 ITEM RECORD:
 ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: DATA PLATE FROM THE PILOT'S SEAT OF AN AMERICAN
 AIRCRAFT.
 HISTORY: THE SEAT OF AN AMERICAN AIR PIRATE SHOT DOWN
 ON THE SPOT BY OUR TROOPS AT 0830 18.3.1965.
 NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION INC
 PART NAME
 SEAT ASSEMBLY
 PART NO. MODEL
 245-53909-21 FLOOF
 ORDER NO. SERIAL NO.
 AF33(606)31863 33A 143
 INSPECT. DATE

DLVR:GDH JCRC BARBERS PT HI(13)...ACT

770545/6695/235 14 OF 14 VI 0368 235/12:20Z 231137Z AUG 91
 CSY:RXSP0318 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RTD:000-000/COPIES:003

(STAMP) 9-20-57
 IF 140-728 (BLANK)
 1015 (BLANK)
 (BLANK) (BLANK)
 PROPERTY OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
 (NOTE: THE NUMBER 1015 WAS WRITTEN IN GREEN PAINT AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN AN ORIGINAL MARKING.)
 V. ELECTRONIC COMPONENT FROM A U/I JET AIRCRAFT. MUSEUM REFERENCE NO. 8709 870/KL.92.
 *ITEM RECORD:
 ORIGIN: 7, 8 AND 11 FEB 1965 AND 2 MAR 65.
 HISTORY: AIRCRAFT CAME TO ATTACK QUANG BINH. MANY WERE SHOT DOWN BY OUR MILITARY AND PEOPLE. THIS IS A PIECE OF AN AMERICAN JET SHOT DOWN IN TAY PHU HOA, LE THUY.
 (NOTE: THE ORIGINAL MUSEUM REGISTER DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED ON 5 MAR 65. THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THE ABOVE EXCERPTS WERE TAKEN WAS PREPARED LATER, BUT COPIED DIRECTLY FROM THE ORIGINAL.)
 D. FUEL LINE FROM U/I JET AIRCRAFT WITH ATTACHED DATA PLATE. MUSEUM REFERENCE NO. 8709 870/KL.82.
 *ITEM RECORD:
 ITEM HISTORY:
 ORIGIN: A FUEL LINE OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURE SUPPLIED TO HISTORY: THE U.S. AIR FORCE, ON 7, 8 AND 11/2/1965 AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CAME TO ATTACK QUANG BINH. OUR MILITARY AND PEOPLE SHOT DOWN MANY AIRCRAFT. THIS FUEL LINE IS ONE OF THE EXHIBITS BEARING A DATA PLATE INDICATING AMERICAN MANUFACTURE (U.S.).
 (NOTE: THE ORIGINAL MUSEUM REGISTER DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED ON 5 MAR 65. THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THE ABOVE

770549/6095/235 15 OF 16 41 0398 215/12:24Z 231137Z AUG 91
 CS4:RXHP0310 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

1 08 OF 08 317640K TH 01247

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSEUM
 EXCERPTS WERE TAKEN WAS PREPARED LATER, BUT COPIED DIRECTLY FROM THE ORIGINAL.)
 APCD ACCESSORY PRODUCTS CO. CALIF.
 VALVE, MANUALLY OVER-RIDDEN CMK
 PART NO. 308709-1 SERIAL NO. 1558
 STUCK (BLANK) INSP
 CONTR. (BLANK)
 CUST. DATE 2063 U.S. PROPERTY
 453Y. MAC-7547554
 (NOTE: "APCD" APPEARED AS A LOGO WITH "ACCESSORY PRODUCTS CO." WRITTEN THROUGH IT. THESE TWO ENTRIES APPEARED SIDE-BY-SIDE ON THE DATA PLATE.
 P. PIECE OF METAL FROM AN AD-5 AIRCRAFT WITH DATA PLATE AFFIXED TO UPPER RIGHT HAND CORNER. BIRTH OF THIEF PROVINCE MUSEUM REFERENCE NO. 937043.
 (NOTE: MUSEUM OFFICIALS EXPLAINED THAT THIS ITEM WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSEUM FROM THE BINH TRI THIEF MUSEUM AND DURING THE TRANSFER THE MUSEUM REGISTER DOCUMENT WAS LOST.)
 AIRPLANE MOD. AD-5
 OAG OR PART NO. 525 1212-69
 CONTR. NO. 4045-52247
 SER. NO. 8-16-724
 DATE ACCEPTED 10-57
 CO. (STAMP) CUST (STAMP)
 INSP. INSP.
 MODIFICATION INCORPORATED
 BUC 363
 Q.P. 9-58
 2. BLUDD CHIT NUMBER 112858. MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER 871 1060/530.
 THIS ITEM HAD NO MUSEUM REGISTRATION DOCUMENT.

BT

OLVHICOR JCRC BARBERS PT HI (3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003.

770549/6094/235 16 OF 16 41 0377 215/11:42Z 231137Z AUG 91
 CS4:RXHP0307 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

((THE MUSEUM CURATOR STATED THAT THESE ITEMS WERE RECOVERED FROM THE ALLEGED 0727 CRASH SITE BY TRAN NAM HUNG (CITE REF B.), AND DONATED THEM TO THE TRADITION HOUSE IN EARLY 1984.))

31

780556/9374/239 3 OF 4 41 0016 249/00:00Z 270843Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP013 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 41624

1 AUG 91

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ITEMS EXAMINED AT THE 80 TRACH TRADITION HOUSE

E. PIECE OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE (OVAL PLASTIC WITH DIAL) - MUSEUM CONTROL NO. ATT 775/M5. THE EXHIBIT LABEL FOR THIS ITEM READ: "THE 3500TH AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN AT SA REN ON THE MORNING OF 20-9-1972." ((THE MUSEUM CURATOR STATED THAT THIS WRECKAGE WAS RECOVERED IN LYS TRACHJ (V), 8005 TRACHJ (D)).

F. BLOOD CHIT NUMBER 365975. THE EXHIBIT LABEL FOR THIS ITEM READ: "FLAG TO ASK FOR FOOD: OF AN AMERICAN PARACHUTE PILOT OF AN F4C THAT WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITIA DEFENSE FORCES OF TAY TRACH VILLAGE IN COOPERATION WITH THE 40TH BATTALION OF MILITARY RESERV 4 (6-1971)).

G. COMMEMORATION FLAG AWARDED FOR SHOOTING DOWN A U.S. AIRCRAFT. THIS FLAG READ: "THE CENTRAL UNITED WOMEN'S COMMITTEE AWARDS THIS TO THE FEMALE MILITIA COMRADES OF T. VILLAGE 80 TRACH QUANG BINH FOR THE OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT OF SHOOTING DOWN AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON 17-9-1972."

((THE MUSEUM CURATOR EXPLAINED THAT "T." WAS AN ABBREVIATION FOR TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE)).
H. PAGE FROM PRINTED DOCUMENT (POSSIBLY FROM THE TEXT OF A PROPAGANDA BROADCAST). AN EXCERPT FROM THIS DOCUMENT READ: "18 AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN, MANY WERE HIT AND DISABLED, ONE AMERICAN PILOT WAS CAPTURED ALIVE, TWO NAVAL VESSELS WERE HIT AND BURNED... (PROPAGANDA STATEMENTS)... ON 7, 9, 11, AND 10 FEBRUARY 65."

I. WHEN THE MUSEUM CURATOR EXPLAINED THE ACQUISITION OF THE ITEMS DESCRIBED IN PAR 3D, THE JOINT TEAM QUESTIONED HIM FURTHER IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF ANY OTHER PIECES OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAD BEEN RECOVERED FROM THAT SITE. THE CURATOR STATED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PILOT CHUTE AND PACK, HUNG HAD DONATED A NUMBER OF FLIGHT MANUALS AND MAPS TO THE MUSEUM IN EARLY 1985, BUT THESE WERE ALMOST COMPLETELY DETERIORATED AND WERE ULTIMATELY DISCARDED. HUNG HAD ALSO REPORTEDLY RECOVERED A COMPLETE PILOT'S PARACHUTE FROM THE SITE, BUT REFUSED TO DONATE IT TO THE MUSEUM SINCE HE COULD SELL IT FOR PROFIT. BECAUSE OF THE

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

785592/0915/239 4 OF 4 41 0270 279/00:00Z 270843Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0237 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

ADDITIONAL VALUE OF THE DISPLAY ITEMS IN DETERMINING THE
FATES OF THE CREW MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT.
MSGT JOHN REQUESTED PERMISSION TO BORROW THE DISPLAY
ITEMS SO THAT THEY COULD BE TAKEN BACK TO JCRC HQ FOR
ANALYSIS. VNCSMP REPRESENTATIVE MR. THO AGREED IN
PRINCIPLE TO THIS REQUEST, BUT EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD
HAVE TO BE PRESENTED FORMALLY THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS
BEFORE IT COULD BE APPROVED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS
TOPIC BE PURSUED FURTHER THE NEXT TIME A JOINT TEAM
WORKS IN THE QUANG BINH AREA.

BT

ROUTINE

R 271400Z AUG 91 PSN 780625P34

91 AUG 27 05:00

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS WASHDC//JCJCS-PH-MIA/J5//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//

NSC WASHDC

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

CDRUSCINCPAC FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PED-H//

SECDEF WASHDC//DASD-ISA/PH-MIA//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PH-MIA//

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLC//

CDR	✓
ASST	✓
CDR	✓
CHS	✓
NAV	✓
AFM	✓

100-000

1295-12
1307-02

BT

BANGKOK TH 41756

0352 AJG 91

SUBJ: AMERICAN-MANUFACTURED PISTOLS EXAMINED BY A
JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM IN VINH CITY.

REF: 1. JCRC LIAISON 130736Z AUG 91

11. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 14TH SERIES OF
JOINT ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 17 JUL - 12
AUG 91.

2. ON 21 JUL 91, TEAM TWO (COYLE, JANICH, JOHN,
WHITE, REWELL, RIVERA, YANNING, KEITH, NGO DOANG, LUU
VAN THO, AND HA CONG PHIEU) MET WITH TWO
REPRESENTATIVES OF SRV MILITARY REGION 4 (MR4) AT THE
MR4 MUSEUM IN VINH CITY, NGHE TINH PROVINCE. PAVN MAJ
NGO XUAN TAO (MOOF XUAAN TAO), DEPUTY COMMANDER AND
STAFF OFFICER OF THE 203RD AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT, AND
PAVN MAJ TRUONG HUU THANH (TRONG HUU THANH),
POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE 203RD REGIMENT, SHOWED THE
TEAM THE ORIGINAL TACTICAL DIARY OF THE 14TH AIR
DEFENSE BATTALION, EXTRACTS FROM THIS DOCUMENT, AND
THREE PISTOLS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM CAPTURED AMERICAN
PILOTS. THE TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENTS EXAMINED AND
PERTINENT ANALYTICAL COMMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED IN
SEPARATE MESSAGES.

3. THE HANDGUNS EXAMINED WERE TWO .36-CALIBER
REVOLVERS AND ONE .45-CALIBER AUTOMATIC. NO DOCUMENTS
OR RECORDS OF ACQUISITION WERE PROVIDED WITH ANY OF THE

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

780625/9013/237 1 OF 2 41 0024
CSN:RXBP0356271400Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

Encl 15

785592/8915/237 9 OF 9 41 0270 27090902Z 270843Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0237 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

PISTOLS, WHICH ARE KEPT AS HISTORICAL HOLDINGS BY THE
 WRA HEADQUARTERS. THE SERIAL NUMBERS OF ALL THREE
 PISTOLS WERE COMPARED WITH JCRC FILES IN AN EFFORT TO
 CORRELATE THEM TO SPECIFIC LOSS INCIDENTS. THE TWO .38
 REVOLVERS WERE SUCCESSFULLY CORRELATED, BUT NO
 CORRELATION COULD BE MADE FOR THE .45-CALIBER PISTOL.
 THE SPECIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING THESE PISTOLS, THEIR
 CONDITION, AND THEIR CORRELATION TO JCRC FILES FOLLOWS:
 .38-CALIBER SMITH AND WESSON REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER 4-
 599062, RUSTED, BUT IN GOOD MECHANICAL CONDITION. THIS
 PISTOL WAS DETERMINED CORRELATE TO REFNO 1295-0-02;
 HOWARD HORTON SMITH, STATUS: UNRESOLVED (8).
 .38-CALIBER SMITH AND WESSON REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER 4-
 653517, CYLINDER RUSTED SHUT AND NON-FUNCTIONAL. THIS
 PISTOL WAS DETERMINED TO CORRELATE TO REFNO 1327-1-02;
 ARK JOHN RUMLING, STATUS: RESOLVED (7).
 .45-CALIBER COLT M1911A1 PISTOL, SERIAL NUMBER 2011058,
 SLIGHTLY RUSTED AND IN GOOD MECHANICAL CONDITION. THIS
 SERIAL NUMBER CANNOT BE CORRELATED TO INFORMATION IN
 JCRC FILES.
 BT

756625/9013/239 2 OF 2 MI 0424 239/14:17Z 271404Z AUG 91
 CSN:RXBP0356 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

ROUTINE

R 271430Z AUG 91 PSN 786690P36

BT 11 27 1-1

CDR	✓
ASST	✓
CDR	✓
CDR	✓
ASST	✓
ASST	✓

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
 USCMCPC HONOLULU HI//J3//
 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC//
 AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 CDUSACILH: FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PED-H//

SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//
 SECSTATE WASHDC//EAR-MIC/A

104-600

104-600

104-600

BT

SECTION 01 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

REPRODUCTION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MIA RECORD

RE: AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSS

REF A: JCRC LIAISON 130736Z AUG 91

REF B: JCRC LIAISON 200822Z AUG 91

1. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT US/SRV
 ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT
 INVESTIGATIONS, 17 JUL - 12 AUG 91. REF B REPORTS
 MATERIAL EVIDENCE EXAMINED AT THE SRV MILITARY REGION 4
 MUSEUM.

2. ON 21 JUL 91, AT THE MILITARY REGION IV MUSEUM IN
 VINH, THE VIETNAMESE PRESENTED TWELVE PAGES OF A
 DOCUMENT TO JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM TWO (COYLE,
 JANICH, JOHN, WHITE, NEEL, RIVERA, MANNING, KEITH,
 NGO HUANG, LUU VAN THO, AND HA CONG PHU) FOR
 ANALYSIS. THIS DOCUMENT IS ACTUALLY AN APPENDIX OF A
 DOCUMENT TITLED "SACS CAOS TONKOR HONKJ YINH TRANG
 PHI COUNG MYX RDM: CHEEIS TREEN DIAJ BANH QUAN KHU IV"
 (GENERAL SITUATION REPORT ON AMERICAN PILOTS SHOT DOWN
 AND KILLED IN MILITARY REGION IV). THE APPENDIX WAS
 WRITTEN BY THE ENEMY PROSELYTIZING OFFICE FOR THE
 LEADERS OF MILITARY REGION IV. THE TOP LEFT-HAND
 CORNER OF THE COVER PAGE IS LABELLED "FONGC CAO XAJ
 QUAN KHU 4" (444 OFFICE, MILITARY REGION 4) AND THE
 APPENDIX IS TITLED "SOOR THEO ZOIX MAYS BAY OAX DMOGJ
 BOJJ COUNG NHAAN" (RECORD OF AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0005

786690/9021/239 1 OF 2 MI 0431 239/14:30Z 271430Z AUG 91
 CSN:RXBP0362 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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CONFIRMED BY THE MINISTRY). BELOW THE TITLE ON THE COVER PAGE READS "THOONG NHAATS VOHIS SOOS GOOS OAR CUCJ TUYEEN NHAANS TOUHR CUCJ CHINHS TXIU NGAYE 1 - 4 - 1969" (UNITED WITH A NUMBER OF PRINCIPALS FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF INSTRUCTION, GENERAL POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, 1 APRIL 1969), BELOW THAT SENTENCE, WRITTEN IN RED INK, IS "SOOS LAUJ 301-9" (REMAINING NUMBER: 301-9). THIS APPENDIX WAS COMPILED IN 1973 FROM THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WHICH RECORDED 1,811 AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN MILITARY REGION IV FROM 1964 THROUGH 1972. THE VIETNAMESE ALLOWED THE TEAM TO EXAMINE AND RETAIN COPIES OF ONLY THOSE TWELVE PAGES CONTAINING INFORMATION WHICH MAY CORRELATE TO DISCREPANCY CASES IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. LUU VAN THO RETAINS A PHOTOCOPY OF THE ENTIRE 84-PAGE DOCUMENT. INFORMAL REQUESTS HAVING FAILED, JCRC-LNO INTENDS TO REQUEST FORMALLY, THROUGH THE U.S. OFFICE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS IN HANOI, THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT.

3. THE FORMAT OF THE DOCUMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: THERE ARE TEN COLUMNS, NINE OF WHICH WILL BE TRANSLATED FOR EACH ENTRY. THE FIRST COLUMN IS THE NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THE AIRCRAFT AS IT WAS SHOT DOWN IN MILITARY REGION IV; THE SECOND COLUMN IS THE TIME OF THE SHOOTDOWN; THE THIRD COLUMN IS THE DAY OF THE MONTH THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN; THE FOURTH COLUMN TELLS IF THE AIRCRAFT WAS CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE, WAS IN LEVEL FLIGHT, DIVING, CLIMBING OR FLYING AT A LOW ALTITUDE WHEN IT WAS SHOT DOWN; THE FIFTH COLUMN IS THE LOCATION THE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT; THE SIXTH COLUMN IS THE AIRCRAFT TYPE; THE SEVENTH COLUMN TELLS WHETHER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED ON THE SPOT OR TRAVELLED SOME DISTANCE BEFORE CRASHING (IN SOME ENTRIES THIS COLUMN ALSO RECORDS THE AREA IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT AND/OR PILOT LANDED); THE EIGHTH COLUMN INDICATES WHETHER THE PILOT WAS CAPTURED OR DEAD; AND THE NINTH COLUMN IS THE UNIT THAT SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT. A TENTH COLUMN, LABELLED "NUMERATOR," WITH FIVE SUB-COLUMNS MARKED O, A, V, UPSIDE DOWN V AND R, WILL BE OMITTED FROM THE TRANSLATION. THE VIETNAMESE SIDE EXPLAINED THAT THESE WERE FIRING PARAMETERS FOR THE ARTILLERY UNIT'S USE AND HE DID NOT NEED TO KNOW THE MEANING OF THESE SUB-COLUMNS.

4. IN THE FOLLOWING TRANSLATION THE NINE COLUMNS ARE SEPARATED BY SEMICOLONS AND TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS ARE SET OFF BY DOUBLE PARENTHESES. THE DOCUMENT IS HANDWRITTEN, AND A NUMBER OF TEXT ENTRIES ARE UNCLEAR.

THESE ENTRIES ARE RENDERED AS FAITHFULLY AS POSSIBLE.
(TEXT STARTS HERE)
PAGE 39, APRIL 1967
BT

786690/9021/239 2 OF 28 MI 0431 239/14:38Z 271430Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0362 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

786690/9021/239 3 OF 28 MI 0431 239/14:38Z 271430Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0362 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 OF 14 BANGKOK TM 41760

0351 AUG 91
 SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AM MRA RECORD
 OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
 723: 1415: 2 APR: DIVING: NGAN BUNG: F-105: SHOT DOWN
 ON THE SPOT: CAPTURED CAPTAIN DRANS: 2ND BATTALION
 (04N)/214TH REGIMENT (REG).
 724: 1737: 2 APR: LEVEL FLIGHT: VINH: A-40: TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 202 REG (49TH BN).
 725: 1620: 9 APR: DIVING: DONG HOI: F-80: TRAVELLED FAR
 BEFORE CRASHING: 9TH BN.
 726: 1530: 10 APR: DIVING: DO DAD: A-40: TRAVELLED FAR
 BEFORE CRASHING: 21ST BN.
 727: 1540: 10 APR: DIVING: HAI DINH: F-4C: SHOT DOWN BY
 THE SPOT: AIRCRAFT RESCUED: 1ST BN/MILITARY REGION.
 728: 1540: 10 APR: DIVING: LA TRONG: F-105: SHOT DOWN
 ON THE SPOT: PILOT CAPTURED - MAJOR JOHN: 15TH 94/260TH
 REG.
 729: 1730: 10 APR: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: CAU DONG:
 F-4C: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 8TH BN AND AN
 ELEMENT OF THE 244TH REG.
 730: 0730: 12 APR: DIVING: CAU KHE KY: A-40: TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 271ST INFANTRY COMPANY (CO).
 731: 1330: 12 APR: LOW ALTITUDE: KY PHU: UN-1A:
 TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 23RD INFANTRY BN.
 732: 1400: 10 APR: CLIMBING: KY PHU: F-4H: TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 4 VILLAGE MILITIAS: PHU, DANG,
 HOI, (LAST VILLAGE NAME CUT OFF BY THE END OF THE
 PAGE)).
 733: 0320: 19 APR: LEVEL FLIGHT: VINH: A-40: TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 202ND REG (ILLEGIBLE ELEMENT
 DESIGNATOR)).
 734: 0630: 19 APR: DIVING: HA TINH MUNICIPALITY: F-8U:
 TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 8TH BN AND MILITIA.
 735: 1414: 21 APR: DIVING: VINH: F-4H: TRAVELLED FAR
 BEFORE CRASHING: 202ND REG (49TH BN).
 736: 1800: 29 APR: LEVEL FLIGHT: VINH: F-4H: TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING: AIRCRAFT RESCUED: 202ND REG (49TH
 BN).
 737: 1340: 22 APR: DIVING: QUYEN LUU: F-4H: TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 14TH BN.
 738: 1514: 22 APR: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: VINH: RF-
 54: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 202ND REG AND 12TH
 BN.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

784493/9022/239 41 0432 239/141392 2714302 AUG 91
 CSN:RXBP0363 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

739: 1550: 22 APR: LEVEL FLIGHT: DONG HOI: F-4H:
 TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 9TH BN.
 740: 0720: 22 APR: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: VINH LINH:
 RF-4C: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: (POSSIBLY VINH
 LAN LONG HOI MILITIA)).
 741: 0045: 25 APR: LEVEL FLIGHT: DONG HOI: F-4H:
 TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 9TH BN.
 742: 0800: 26 APR: LOW ALTITUDE: THACH HAI: AD-6:
 TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: LOCAL FORCES COMPANY
 441 AND 442.
 743: 0805: 27 APR: LOW ALTITUDE: KY KHANG: AD-6:
 TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: KY KHANG MILITIA.
 744: 1220: 27 APR: DIVING: KY LOI: AD-6: TRAVELLED FAR
 BEFORE CRASHING: LOCAL FORCES 44TH BN.
 745: 1315: 28 APR: DIVING: VINH LINH: F-4H: TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 3RD CO, 4TH REG.
 PAGE 41, JUNE 1967
 790: 0640: 1 JUN: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: QUAN BACH:
 RF-8A: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 202ND REG.
 BT

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 CSN:RXBP0363 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 03 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AMNH RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES791: 1145: 1 JUN: DIVING: CAN LY: F-4C: TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING: 1 9TH BN.792: 2105: 2 JUN: LOW ALTITUDE: PHA RUM: F-4C: SHOT
DOWN ON THE SPOT: 2 CREW MEN KILLED: 80N SELF-DEFENSE
FORCES.793: 0645: 4 JUN: DIVING: YEN LY: F-105: SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT: 1 14TH BN.794: 1310: 6 JUN: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: MINH THANH:
RF-101: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 82ND BW/230
REG.795: 1850: 6 JUN: LEVEL FLIGHT: MINH THANH - DO DAD: F-
5U: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: PILOT KILLED;
ELEMENTS OF 2235 AND 14 BN.796: 0640: 9 JUN: DIVING: HO ((HOOF)): XD: F-4H:
TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 64TH BN, 276TH
INFANTRY UNIT.797: 1045: 9 JUN: DIVING: CAO NGHIA: F-4C: TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 21ST BN/214 REG.798: 1950: 9 JUN: LEVEL FLIGHT: THUAN LY: F-4C:
TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 ELEMENTS OF THE 216TH
REG.799: 1230: 8 JUN: DIVING: XUAN SON: F-4C: SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT: 2 CREW MEN KILLED: 3RD BN/280TH REG.800: 0750: 15 JUN: DIVING: YEN LY: F-105: TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING: 1 14TH BN.801: 1700: 11 JUN: LOW ALTITUDE: KY SON: AD-6: SHOT
DOWN ON THE SPOT: 1 12-THN FIRING COMPANY OF KY SON
ARMY ENGINEERS.802: 1715: 12 JUN: CLIMBING: PHU DINH: F-4C: TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 19TH BN/210TH REG.803: 1515: 17 JUN: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: VINH CHAI:
F-8A: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 1ST INFANTRY CO.
OF THE 270TH804: 0840: 20 JUN: DIVING: VINH QUANG: F-4H: TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 VINH QUANG MILITIA.805: 11 JUN: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: VINH LINH: RF-
8A: TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1 2ND CO, 6TH BN.806: 0840: 22 JUN: DIVING: VINH LINH: F-4H: TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING: 1807: 1030: 30 JUN: DIVING: LA KHE: F-105: SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT: 1 1ST BN.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-800/COPIES:0003

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CSY:RXPH 0364 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

THE SPOT: PILOT CAPTURED: 1ST BN.

808: 0920: 30 JUN: DIVING: VINH: A-4D: SHOT DOWN ON THE
SPOT: PILOT CAPTURED: 12 BN, AND THE 262ND REG.

PAGE 42, JULY 1967

809: 1205: 2 JUL: DIVING: VINH LINH: F-4H: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER AT THE MOUTH OF VIET
RIVER: 1 6TH BN.810: 1345: 2 JUL: DIVING: VINH LINH: F-4H: CRASHED
OVERWATER AT THE MOUTH OF THE VIET RIVER: 1 6TH BN.811: 1350: 2 JUL: DIVING: CATANG: F-105: SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT AND CRASHED AT CHUC: 1 11TH BN/280TH REG.812: 1625: 2 JUL: LOW ALTITUDE: NG TRI 20/4: F-105:
SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT NG TRI 20/4: 16TH BN/559TH
REG.813: 1445: 6 JUL: LEVEL FLIGHT: TAN DINH: F-4C:
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF VANG
RIVER: 1 ELEMENT OF THE 216TH REG.814: 1638: 6 JUL: LEVEL FLIGHT: TAN DINH: F-4C:
TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING AT THE MOUTH OF THE VANG
RIVER

SECTION 04 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MR RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
RIVERS; ELEMENTS OF THE 218TH REG.
9151 2000: 4 JUL: LEVEL FLIGHT; VINH LINH; F-105;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT CON KEN; 61ST
BN/230TH REG.
9161 2000: 6 JUL: LEVEL FLIGHT; VINH LINH; F-105;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT CAM LO; 61ST
BN/230TH REG.
9171 1400: 17 JUL: LOW ALTITUDE; VINH LINH; UN-14;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED EAST OF DOC VIEN; 6TH BN.
9181 1400: 17 JUL: LOW ALTITUDE; VINH LINH; UN-14;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED EAST OF DOC VIEN; 6TH BN.
9191 1400: 17 JUL: CLIMBING; VINH LINH; F-105; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF VIET RIVER; 6TH BN.
9201 1330: 9 JUL: LEVEL FLIGHT; VINH LINH; AD-6;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF THE
VIET RIVER; 6TH BN.
9211 1620: 10 JUL: DIVING; VINH LINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF THE VIET RIVER; 6TH BN.
9221 2040: 12 JUL: DIVING; ROUTE 20; F-105; SHOT DOWN
ON THE SPOT AT KILOMETER 54, ROUTE 20; 12TH CO AND
MILITARY STATION 14.
9231 1025: 13 JUL: DIVING; HUONG KHE; A-40; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER, CAM XUYEN; 1ST BN,
SUBORDINATE TO MILITARY REGION IV.
9241 0700: 17 JUL: DIVING; VINH LINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF TUNG RIVER; 6TH
BN.
9251 1930: 17 JUL: DIVING; CAU CAN; A-40; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER IN HON MAT AREA; 16TH
BN, 262ND REG.
9261 0820: 18 JUL: DIVING; CATANG; F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT AT KILOMETER 12 OF BAR DINH; 3RD AND 11TH BN
OF THE 260TH REG.
9271 1920: 21 JUL: LEVEL FLIGHT; CAN; A-30; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER IN THE HON MAT AREA; 16TH
BN, 262ND REG.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

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CSN:RXBP0365 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

9281 0823: 22 JUL: DIVING; DO DAO; A-40; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF THE TRAY RIVER; 15TH
BN/262ND REG.
9291 1535: 22 JUL: DIVING; DO DAO; A-40; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF THE TRAY RIVER; 15TH
BN/262ND REG.
9301 0730: 24 JUL: DIVING; NE TRE; F-4H; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER IN THE AREA OF VINH
THAI; 3RD BN/204TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT.
9311 0630: 25 JUL: CLIMBING; CAM XUYEN; F-4H; TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 5 KILOMETERS OVERWATER FROM LE
THUY; 10TH BN/204TH REG.
9321 2200: 25 JUL: CLIMBING; CATANG; F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT AND CRASHED ON ROUTE 017; 3RD BN/260TH REG.
9331 2025: 25 JUL: CLIMBING; VINH LINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 5KM FROM CON CO; 2ND VINH LINH
ARMY ENGINEER CO.
(NOTE ON BOTTOM OF THE PAGE STATES ENTRIES FOR JULY
ARE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE.)
PAGE 40, AUGUST 1967
9421 1500: 1 AUG: DIVING; LE THUY; F-105; SHOT DOWN ON
BY

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CSN:RXBP0365 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 05 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MIA RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
THE SPOT AT TRUNG CHINH HAMLET, NGU THUY VILLAGE; PILOT
KILLED; 12.7 (MM) LOCAL FORCES COMPANY/45TH BN.
843: 0700; 2 AUG; CLIMBING; VINH LY; F-4C; TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED SOUTH OF CO4 CO; LOCAL FORCES
COMPANY 1 OF THE 270TH REG.
844: 0700; 2 AUG; DIVING; HIENT; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED IN THE WATERS OF CHANH HOA; 1
ELEMENTS OF THE 214TH REG.
845: 1230; 2 AUG; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; HUONG KHE;
F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AND CRASHED IN SAN GUANG
HAMLET; 1 PILOT WITH RANK OF CAPTAIN CAPTURED; HUONG
THUY MILITIA.
846: 1625; 2 AUG; DIVING; YEN LY; A-4D; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; 1 15TH BN.
847: 1830; 4 AUG; DIVING; GUANH; A-4D; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; 1 10TH BN.
848: 0600; 5 AUG; LOW ALTITUDE; HA VANG; A-4D;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; TIEN LOC
MILITIA.
849: 1825; 5 AUG; DIVING; YEN LY; A-4D; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; 1 15TH BN.
850: 0810; 6 AUG; DIVING; THAI THUY; F-4M; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; 1 4TH BN.
851: 0910; 7 AUG; DIVING; CAM XUYEN; A-4D; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; 1 6TH BN.
852: 1440; 7 AUG; DIVING; LONG DAI; F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT; 2 CAPTURED - 1 CAPTAIN AND 1 LIEUTENANT; 2ND
BN/214TH REG.
853: 1445; 7 AUG; DIVING; LA TRONG; F-105; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT; PILOT KILLED; 3RD BN/280TH REG.
854: 1500; 7 AUG; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; LE KY; RF-
101; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED EAST OF LAM BUN;
1 2ND BN/214TH REG.
855: 1430; 8 AUG - RECORDED ON 12 AUG; LOW ALTITUDE;
HUONG KHE; A-4D; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT; PILOT KILLED
12.7 (MM); ARMY ENGINEERS CO.
856: 1445; 9 AUG; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; CUU NGHIA;
RF-4C; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT; 2 PILOTS CAPTURED -
CAPTAIN LAUREN LENDYEL AND LIEUTENANT GLEEN LES MYERS;

DLVR:COR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

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CSN:RABP0367 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

19TH BN/214TH REG.

857: 0810; 11 AUG; LEVEL FLIGHT; PHU THUY; F-4C;
TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 ELEMENTS OF THE 218TH
REG.
858: 0530; 12 AUG; DIVING; KA TANG; F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT ((72-74 WRITTEN IN MARGINS)); 3RD BN, 280TH
REG.
859: 1100; 12 AUG; DIVING; NGHIA DAN; F-4C; SHOT DOWN
ON THE SPOT; 2 CREW MEN KILLED; NGHE 1.5 MILITIA.
860: 1315; 12 AUG; CLIMBING; ROUTE 22; F-4C; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 2 COMPANIES OF THE 7TH BN.
861: 0605; 13 AUG; DIVING; YEN LY; A-4D; TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING; 2 COMPANIES OF THE 15TH BN.
862: 1455; 13 AUG; DIVING; GIANG; F-4C; TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING; 1 1ST CO, 10TH BN.
863: 0618; 17 AUG; DIVING; HOANG HAI; A-4D; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 17TH BN.
864: 0150; 17 AUG; LOW ALTITUDE; PHU THUY; F-4C;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF LE THUY;
1 2ND CO/218TH REG.
865: 0900; 17 AUG; CLIMBING; LAI BINH; F-105; TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF OF VINE LINE;
BT

786704/9027/239 H OF 2 41 0437 239/14:42Z 271430Z AUG 91
CSN:RABP0367 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 06 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 01760

0551 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN AMRC RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES

RESCUED BY THE ENEMY: 5TH BN, 202ND REG.

866: 1040: 17 AUG; DIVING; VINH HOA; F-4C; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 6TH BN.867: 1500: 17 AUG; DIVING; VINH NAM; F-4C; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 6TH BN.868: 1500: 18 AUG; DIVING; DO TRAI; A-4D; TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING; 20TH CO, 8TH BN.869: 1020: 19 AUG; DIVING; CAU DONG; A-4D; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 2 ELEMENTS OF THE 204TH REG.870: 1835: 19 AUG; DIVING; XUAN SON; F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT; 13BN/200TH REG.871: 1100: 20 AUG; DIVING; YEN LY; A-4D; TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING; 15TH BN.

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892: 0610: 1 SEP; DIVING; VINH A-4D; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 15 KM FROM NGH XUAN; 1

12 BN AND 222B (4934).

893: 1810: 1 SEP; DIVING; XUAN SON; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 8 KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF PHONG

NHAI; 10 TH CO, 13 BN/200TH REG.

894: 0510: 2 SEP; DIVING; ROM; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 15 KILOMETERS FROM CANH

DUONG; 1 ROM 12.7 (MM) LOCAL FORCES PLATOON.

895: 0800: 2 SEP; DIVING; CATANG; F-105; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT ((70-08 MARKED IN THE MARGIN)); 11TH

BN/200TH REG.

896: 1420: 2 SEP; LEVEL FLIGHT; VINH LINH; A-4D; 6
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 10

KILOMETERS FROM V THAI; 6TH BN.

897: 1400: 3 SEP; DIVING; VINH LINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 15 KILOMETERS FROM THE MOUTH OF

THE VIET RIVER; 6TH BN.

898: 1420: 3 SEP; DIVING; CATANG; F-105; SHOT DOWN 6
KILOMETERS EAST OF THANH BANG; PILOT LISTED AS RESCUED

AND AS A DEAD CAPTAIN; 11TH BN/200TH REG.

899: 1400: 3 SEP; LOW ALTITUDE LA TRUNG; UN-1A;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 10 KILOMETERS WEST OF

KE VE; 3RD BN/200TH REG.

900: 1500: 3 SEP; DIVING; CATANG; F-105; SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT IN THANH BANG; PILOT, A MAJOR, KILLED; 11

BN/200TH REG.

DLVR:CDN JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)....ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

787641/9165/239

CSN:RABP0480

13 OF 18

MI 0568

239/10432

271430Z AUG 91

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

BN/200TH REG.

901: 1400: 3 SEP; CLIMBING; CATANG; A-4D; TRAVELLED
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 14 KILOMETERS WEST OF KE VE; 11TH

BN/200TH REG.

902: 0200: 3 SEP; DIVING; THUONG PHONG HANLEY; F-4C;
SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT IN THUONG PHONG HANLEY; 2 PILOTS

KILLED; PHONG THUY MILITIA.

903: 1720: 5 SEP; DIVING; GIANG; F-105; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 10 KILOMETERS FROM GIANG

OVERWATER; 10TH BN.

904: 0705: 7 SEP; LEVEL FLIGHT; VINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 20 KILOMETERS OVERWATER FROM NGH

XUAN; 12TH BN AND 222B BN (49TH BN).

905: 1407: 8 SEP; DIVING; CAM; A-4D; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 20 KILOMETERS FROM NA

TINH; 16TH BN.

906: 0020: 11 SEP; LEVEL FLIGHT; SEN BANG; B-57; SHOT
DOWN ON THE SPOT AND CRASHED IN CHANH HOA; 1 MAJORCAPTURED, 1 CAPTAIN KILLED; 3 COMPANIES OF THE 214TH
REGIMENT.

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787641/9165/239

CSN:RABP0480

13 OF 18

MI 0568

239/10432

271430Z AUG 91

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 07 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MMR RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES907: 1400: 11 SEP: DIVING: GIANNI F-4C: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 6 KILOMETERS EAST OF PHU TRACH; ;
(10TH BN/280TH REG) MILITIA.908: 1755: 11 SEP: DIVING: TRODE F-4C: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 7 KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF PHONG
NHA; ; 113TH BN/280TH REG.909: 1703: 17 SEP: LEVEL FLIGHT: VINH LINH: A-52:
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED SOUTH OF ROUTE 9
(MARGIN NOTE WITH NUMBER 31 AND AN ARROW POINTING TO
NUMBER 24); ; 8TH BN/238TH REG.910: 1734: 17 SEP: LEVEL FLIGHT: VINH LINH: A-52:
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER FROM QUANG
TRI (MARGIN NOTE WITH NUMBER 21 AND AN ARROW POINTING
TO 32); ; 8TH BN/238TH REG.911: 1630: 21 SEP: DIVING: XUAN SON: F-4C: SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT SOUTH OF TIEN BOA; ; 13TH BN/280TH REG.912: 0300: 23 SEP: LOW ALTITUDE: VINH LINH: F-4C:
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 10 KILOMETERS
OVERWATER FROM THE MOUTH OF THE TUNG RIVER; 6TH BN.
913: 1415: 25 SEP: LOW ALTITUDE: DONG THANH: A-50C:
SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT IN BAO NINH; ; DONG THANH AND BAO
VINH MILITIA.914: 1450: 25 SEP: CLIMBING: VINH LINH: F-4C: TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 15 KILOMETERS OVERWATER FROM THE
MOUTH OF THE TUNG RIVER; ; 6TH BN.915: 1240: 26 SEP: DIVING: VINH THANH: F-4C: TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 15 KILOMETERS OVERWATER FROM THE
MOUTH OF THE TUNG RIVER; ; VINH THANH MILITIA.916: 1050: 27 SEP: DIVING: VINH LINH: F-4C: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 20 KILOMETERS OVERWATER FROM THE
MOUTH OF THE VIET RIVER; ; 6TH BN (IC28).917: 1535: 27 SEP: CLIMBING: AT ANH: F-4C: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER IN THE DEO NGANG AREA; ;
7TH BN/280TH REG.918: 1500: 28 SEP: DIVING: THANH THUY: F-4C: TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 10 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF
THANH THUY; THANH THUY MILITIA.919: 29 SEP: DIVING: VINH LINH: F-4C: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 20 KILOMETERS OVERWATER FROM THE
MOUTH OF THE TUNG RIVER; ; 28TH CD/6TH BN.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

787583/9159/239 14 OF 28 NI 0562 239/18:32Z 271430Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0475 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH920: 29 SEP: DIVING: VINH LINH: F-4C: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 5 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF CON LIEN; ;
28TH CD/6TH BN.

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921: 1340: 2 OCT: DIVING: QUYNH LAP: A-40: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 10 KILOMETERS FROM QUYNH
LAP; ; 17TH BN.922: 0615: 3 OCT: DIVING: GIA NINH: A-40: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 11 KILOMETERS FROM GIA
NINH; ; GIA NINH AND TAY NINH MILITIA.923: 0700: 5 OCT: DIVING: DEO MU GIA: BUI MON: A-40:
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 20
KILOMETERS FROM NGI LOC; ; 12.7 (14M) CD: 318TH DIV.924: 1600: 6 OCT: DIVING: VINH HOA: F-4H: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER AT THE MOUTH OF THE TUNG
RIVER; ; 6TH BN (28TH CD).925: 1154: 7 OCT: DIVING: HOANG MAI: A-40: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF QUYNH
LAP; ; 17TH BN.926: 1730: 7 OCT: LOW ALTITUDE: MUONG XEU: A-6: SHOT
DOWN ON THE SPOT IN PHU PET (LAOS); PILOT KILLED; ARMY
ENGINEERS AND LOCAL FORCES.927: 1455: 10 OCT: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: VINH LINH:
BT787583/9159/239 15 OF 28 NI 0562 239/18:32Z 271430Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0475 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 08 OF 10 BANGKOK TH 91760

0351 AUG 91
 SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MRR RECORD
 OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSS
 RF-101 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED SOUTH OF CON
 THAM; 1 82 AAA UNIT/238 REG.
 928; 1400; 12 OCT; LOW ALTITUDE; MAI TRACH; OH-50C;
 SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT 14 LY HOA; 1 LOCAL FORCES OF 63
 TRACH.
 929; 1900; 12 OCT; DIVING; TAY THUY; F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON
 THE SPOT IN LOC XA HAMLET - CON THUY; 2 PILOTS KILLED;
 LOCAL FORCES OF 12 THUY.
 930; 0930; 13 OCT; DIVING; CON CO; AD-6; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED 25 KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST (OF CON
 CO); 1 ISLAND'S 14.5 (MM); CO.
 931; 1014; 13 OCT; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; TROCC; F-
 100; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT THE MOUTH OF THE RUNG
 RIVER; 2 PILOTS KILLED; 13 BN/280TH REG.
 932; 1530; 13 OCT; DIVING; 1 F-4C; SHOT DOWN
 ON THE SPOT IN 04 TH; 2 PILOTS CAPTURED - LTCOL
 EDIGNAT, KILLER AND 2ND LT. JAMES HOWIE WARRER; 218TH
 REG-AND 82-AAA-UNIT.
 933; 1125; 14 OCT; DIVING; VINH LINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 2 KILOMETERS FROM CON
 CO; 1 ELEMENTS OF THE 218TH REG.
 934; 1015; 15 OCT; CLIMBING; GIA MINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED
 A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 3 KILOMETERS FROM TAY
 DINH HAMLET; 1 362ND CO-AND LOCAL FORCES OF ((PLACENAME
 ILLEGIBLE)).
 935; 2055; 18 OCT; CLIMBING; XUAN SON; F-4C; SHOT DOWN
 ON THE SPOT 16 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF XUAN SON; 2 PILOTS
 KILLED; 13 BN/280TH REG.
 936; 1625; 22 OCT; DIVING; CON CO; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED 30 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE ISLAND;
 1 ISLAND'S 14.5 (MM); COMPANY.
 937; 1015; 23 OCT; DIVING; CUU HOAI; A-4G; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF CHANH
 HOAI; 1 19TH BN/214TH REG.
 938; 0800; 25 OCT; DIVING; BUNG; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF LY NHAN
 HAY; 1 19TH BN/214TH REG.
 939; 1115; 28 OCT; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; VINH LINH;
 OH-50C; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT IN BOC VINH THACH HAMLET;
 1 MILITIA OF VINH THACH.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/CUPIES:0003

786742/9031/239 11 OF 28 NI 0441 239/14:46Z 271430Z AUG 91
 CSN:RXBP0370 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

940; 0950; 29 OCT; LEVEL FLIGHT; VINH LINH; B-52;
 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE
 COAST OF QUANG NAM; 1 84TH BN/248TH REG.
 941; 0950; 30 OCT; DIVING; KATANG; F-4C; SHOT DOWN ON
 THE SPOT AND CRASHED 7 KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF KATANG;
 1 10TH AND 11TH CO OF THE 11TH BN/280TH REG.
 942; 1625; 30 OCT; DIVING; VINH LINH; A-4G; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER AT THE MOUTH OF THE VIET
 RIVER; 1 6TH BN.
 943; 0900; 31 OCT; DIVING; LACH VAN; A-4G; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 8 KILOMETERS FROM DIEN
 THINH; 1 THE DIEN YEN, DIEN THINH AND DIEN NGOC VILLAGE
 MILITIA.
 944; 0920; 31 OCT; LOW ALTITUDE; LACH VAN; AD-6;
 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 5 KILOMETERS
 FROM DIEN THINH; 1 THE DIEN YEN, DIEN THINH AND DIEN
 NGOC VILLAGE MILITIA.
 PAGE 48, NOVEMBER 1967
 945; 1120; 1 NOV; DIVING; GA SI; A-4G; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF DIEN
 CHAN; 1 4TH BN.
 946; 0700; 2 NOV; DIVING; DIEN YEN; A-4G; TRAVELLED A
 DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF DIEN
 YEN.

786742/9031/239 11 OF 28 NI 0441 239/14:46Z 271430Z AUG 91
 CSN:RXBP0370 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 09 OF 14 BANGKOK TH A1760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MR4 RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
MAI: 1 14TH BN AND DIEN YEN MILITIA.
947: 0830: 2 NOV: DIVING: LACH VAN: A-40: SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT AT THE GANG: 1 PILOT KILLED: 14TH BN AND QUYNH
LONG MILITIA.
948: 1255: 2 NOV: DIVING: DO DAO: A-40: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 4 KILOMETERS OFF THE
COAST OF DIEN THANH: 1 4TH BN.
949: 0835: 2 NOV: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: LOC DAI: F-
100: SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT THANH BAREU: 2 PILOTS
KILLED: 9TH BN AND MILITIA.
950: 0910: 2 NOV: CLIMBING: LOC DAI: F-105: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER AT LY HANH NAM: 1 9TH BN
AND THE 210TH REG.
951: 1025: 3 NOV: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: VINH TRUNG:
09-10: SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT 400 METERS FROM THE COAST:
2 PILOTS RESCUED: INFANTRY AND MILITIA OF VINH TRUNG.
952: 1335: 3 NOV: DIVING: PHA XUAN SON: F-105: SHOT
DOWN ON THE SPOT 20 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF XUAN SON: 1
11TH COMPANY OF THE 13TH BN/280TH REG.
953: 1250: 3 NOV: DIVING: PHA XUAN SON: F-4C: SHOT DOWN
ON THE SPOT 25 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF XUAN SON: 1 11TH
CO OF THE 13TH BN/280TH REG.
954: 1345: 4 NOV: DIVING: VINH TRUNG: A-40: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 10 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF
VINE TRUNG: 1 VINH TRUNG MILITIA.
955: 1530: 6 NOV: DIVING: CON CO: F-4H: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 40 KILOMETERS FROM THE ISLAND: 1
ISLAND 18.5 (M4) CO.
956: 1605: 6 NOV: DIVING: CON CO: F-4H: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 5 KILOMETERS FROM THE ISLAND: 1
ISLAND 18.5 (M4) CO.
957: 1610: 6 NOV: DIVING: SAO SA: F-4B: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF WHAT
LEI: 1 ELEMENTS OF THE 210TH REG.
958: 1600: 7 NOV: DIVING: 0: F-4B: SHOT DOWN ON THE
SPOT AT 107A: 2 PILOTS CAPTURED - CAPTAIN
KENNETH FISHER AND A 1ST LIEUTENANT: 10TH BN/280TH REG.
959: 1620: 7 NOV: CLIMBING: GIANG: F-4B: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 8 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF
QUANG THO: 1 10TH BN/280TH REG.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

787506/9160/239 18 DF 28 MI 0563 259/10:32Z 271430Z AUG 91
CS4:RXBP0476 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

960: 2040: 7 NOV: LOW ALTITUDE: DIEN THANH: A-4E: TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 3 KILOMETERS FROM DIEN YEN: 1 DIEN THANH MILITIA AND 4TH BN.
961: 0735: 8 NOV: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: PHU THUY: F-100: TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 9 KILOMETERS EAST OF GIA NINH: 1 SELF DEFENSE FORCES OF VIET TRUNG STATE FARM.
962: 0607: 9 NOV: DIVING: HOANG MAI: A-40: TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF QUYNH LONG: 1 17TH BN.
963: 1945: 9 NOV: LOW ALTITUDE: SA MAI: A-4E: TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 10 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF DIEN THANH: 1 HOANG MAI SELF DEFENSE FORCES.
964: 1945: 9 NOV: CLIMBING: MAI HOAI: F-4C: SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT DUC HOA VILLAGE: 1 MAI HAD MILITIA.
965: 1540: 10 NOV: CLIMBING: SEN THUY: F-4B: TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 2 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF LE THUY: 2 PILOTS KILLED: 45TH LOCAL FORCES BATTALION/LE THUY.
966: 1600: 10 NOV: DIVING: VO XAI: F-4B: SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT MY TRUNG HAMLET (GIA NINH): 1 PILOT CAPTURED, 1 PILOT KILLED: VO XAI FEMALE MILITIA.
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787506/9160/239 18 DF 28 MI 0563 259/10:32Z 271430Z AUG 91
CS4:RXBP0476 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 10 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AMM RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES967: 1715; 10 NOV; LOW ALTITUDE; PHONG THUY; F-4B SHOT
DOWN ON THE SPOT AT X THACH XO (HONG THUY); 2 PILOTS
KILLED; PHONG THUY MILITIA.968: 0645; 13 NOV; DIVING; VEN LY; A-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OFF THE COAST OF DIEN THAM; 18TH
BN.969: 1305; 13 NOV; LOW ALTITUDE; QUYNN THUAN; A-4C;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE
COAST NEAR NUI KIEN ((KIEN MOUNTAIN)); 1 QUYNN THUAN
MILITIA.970: 1500; 14 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; CON CO; F-4
101; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 10
KILOMETERS ((FROM CON CO)); 7 ISLANDERS (14.5 ((44)) CO.971: 1620; 16 NOV; LOW ALTITUDE; HONG THUY; F-4B;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 8 KILOMETERS
OFF THE COAST OF THAM THUY; 1 HONG THUY MILITIA.972: 1600; 17 NOV; CLIMBING; HIEU; F-4C; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED 20 KILOMETERS WEST OF DA MAR; 19TH
BN/218TH REG.973: 1315; 18 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; QUAN HAN;
A-4C; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 2
KILOMETERS FROM QUAN HAN; 362ND LOCAL FORCES COMPANY
OF QUANG BINH.974: 1500; 20 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; VINH LINH;
A-4C; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT NORTH OF THE BEN HAI
SHORE; PILOT RESCUED; HUONG LAP MILITIA.

PAGE 40, NOVEMBER 1967 ((CONTINUED))

975: 0925; 20 NOV; DIVING; GAI HA; F-4M; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER IN THE AREA OF V THAI;
84TH CO - 5TH BN - AM/218TH REG.976: 1515; 20 NOV; DIVING; HOAI LAD; F-4M; TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 11 KILOMETERS OFF THE
COAST OF LY NHAN BAC; 11TH CO AND BAN/19TH BN.977: 1655; 20 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; F-100; XUAN
SON; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT TUYEN HOAI; 1 PILOT
KILLED; 13 BN/200TH REG.978: 0730; 26 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; QUANG HUNG;
A-4C; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT QUANG HUNG; 1 QUANG
HUNG MILITIA.

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

786749/9032/239 21 OF 28 41 0442 239/14:50Z 271430Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0371 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH979: 0840; 26 NOV; DIVING; VINH TRUNG; F-4B; SHOT DOWN
ON THE SPOT AT BEN TRIEN; PILOT RESCUED; HIEU AND HOANG
NINH MILITIA.980: 0900; 26 NOV; DIVING; ROUTE 20; F-4C SHOT DOWN ON
THE SPOT AT KILOMETER 41 OF ROUTE 20; 2 PILOTS KILLED;

12.7 ((MM)) CO AND MILITARY STATION 14.

981: 1450; 29 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; QUYNN
THUAN; A-4C; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER
13 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF QUYNN THUAN; 17TH BN
AND QUYNN THUAN AND QUYNN LONG MILITIA.982: 1500; 29 NOV; DIVING; HUONG XEU; F-4C; SHOT DOWN
ON THE SPOT AT MU DAN ((POSSIBLY ROUTE 2)); PILOT
RESCUED; HUONG XEU SELF DEFENSE FORCES.

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1014: 1135; 1 JAN; DIVING; THUYEN CUA HOI; A-4C;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER NEAR NGU; 1
1ST CO/15TH BN.1015: 1520; 1 JAN; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; DIEN THINH;
A-4C; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF OF
DIEN THINH; 1 1ST CO/4TH BN.1016: 0605; 2 JAN; DIVING; HOANG HAI BRIDGE; A-4C;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; 1 COMPANIES
OF THE 17TH BN.

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786749/9032/239 21 OF 28 41 0442 239/14:50Z 271430Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0371 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 11 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AMMUN RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES1017: 0615: 2 JAN: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: HOANG MAI
BRIDGE: F-4C TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED
OVERWATER: 1 2 COMPANIES OF THE 14TH BN, 2 COMPANIES OF
THE 17TH BN.1018: 0500: 5 JAN: CLIMBING: THUYEN QUYNH LAP: A-4D;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER: 1 QUYNH LAM
LOCAL FORCES AND MILITIA.1019: 0830: 11 JAN: LEVEL FLIGHT: VINH LINH: B-52;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED WEST OF CON THAN: 1
8240 CO/238TH BN.1020: 0655: 13 JAN: 1 MAI THUY: F-4H: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF HOA LUAT: 1 MAI THUY
MILITIA.1021: 1510: 13 JAN: LOW ALTITUDE: KEMH RIVER DIEN TUNG;
A-6A: TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 3
KILOMETERS FROM DIEN TUNG: 1 10TH CO/4TH BN.1022: 0630: 14 JAN: DIVING: CHAN HANG GIANG: F-4C;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER: 1 QUANG THO
MILITIA.1023: 1545: 16 JAN: LOW ALTITUDE: HUONG TRACH: F-4C;
SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT THANH LONG: ONE PILOT
CAPTURED, ONE PILOT KILLED: HUONG TRACH MILITIA AND 3RD
CO.1024: 1017: 17 JAN: DIVING: KHE UET BRIDGE: A-6A: SHOT
DOWN ON THE SPOT AND CRASHED AT KHE UET: PILOT KILLED;
11TH CO/11TH BN AND 73RD BN.1025: 0740: 17 JAN: DIVING: BAO MINH: F-4B: TRAVELLED A
DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 4 KILOMETERS FROM BAO
MINH: 1 CAVY HA THOY.1026: 1330: 17 JAN: DIVING: TWO DON (THUYEN): F-4B;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 8 KILOMETERS
FROM GIANG: 1 9TH COASTAL ARTILLERY CO.1027: 1515: 18 JAN: DIVING: KHE UET BRIDGE: F-4C;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED IN TRUONG SON: 1 11TH
CO/11TH AND 73RD BN.1028: 1330: 18 JAN: DIVING: KHE UET BRIDGE: F-4C;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED IN TRUONG SON: 1 11TH
CO/11TH AND 73RD BN.1029: 1530: 19 JAN: DIVING: DIEN KIM (THUYEN): A-4D;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER: DIEN KIM

OLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

786766/9039/239
CSN:RX9P0376

28 OF 28

239/15:04Z 271430Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

MILITIA.

1030: 1030: 21 JAN: RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT: AREA EAST
OF VINH LINH: L-19: SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT: 2 PILOTS
KILLED: 6TH BN.1031: 0243: 21 JAN: LEVEL FLIGHT: VINH: A-6A: TRAVELLED
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER: 166TH BN/275TH REG.
1032: 0500: 22 JAN: LOW ALTITUDE: HAT LE RIVER, DONG
HOI: F-4C: TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 8
KILOMETERS FROM SHORE: 1 MUNICIPALITY LOCAL FORCES
360TH PLATOON.1033: 1230: 22 JAN: CLIMBING: CAM BRIDGE: A-6A;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF THE
SOT RIVER: 1 16TH BN.1034: 1420: 22 JAN: DIVING: THUYEN QUYNH LAP: A-4D;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF NGHI
XUAN: 1 17TH BN.1035: 1313: 24 JAN: CLIMBING: HOANG MAI BRIDGE: A-7A;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF QUYNH
LOU: 1 17TH BN.1036: 1120: 25 JAN: DIVING: DO DAO BRIDGE: A-4D;
TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER 15
KILOMETERS FROM DIA CHAM: 1 2ND CO/4TH BN.1037: 1712: 25 JAN: 1 HA TINH MUNICIPALITY: A-6A;
BT786766/9039/239
CSN:RX9P0376

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239/15:04Z 271430Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 12 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MR4 RECORD
 OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE
 COAST OF HA TINH; 1 6TH BN/275TH REG.
 1038: 1712: 25 JAN; HA TINH MUNICIPALITY; A-6A;
 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE
 COAST OF HA TINH; 1 6TH BN/275TH REG.
 1039: 1845: 26 JAN; CLIMBING; SONG CAU CAM; A-6A;
 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER AT THE MOUTH
 OF THE LO RIVER; 1 16TH BN.
 1040: 1350: 27 JAN; LOW ALTITUDE; CHAN HANG KIEH
 (ILLEGIBLE); F-4C; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED
 OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF QUAN HAU; 1 LOC NINH
 MILITIA.
 1041: 0630: 28 JAN; LOW ALTITUDE; KENH QUYNH LONG; A-6;
 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 10 KILOMETERS OFF
 THE COAST OF QUYNH LONG; 1 QUYNH LONG MILITIA.
 1042: 0645: 28 JAN; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; DO DAO
 BRIDGE; RF-8A; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 8
 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF DIEN CHAN; 1 8TH BN.
 1043: 0910: 28 JAN; LOW ALTITUDE; DIEN PHAC; A-4D;
 TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 10 KILOMETERS OFF THE
 COAST OF DIEN CHAN; 1 FEMALE MILITIA OF DIEN PHAC.
 1044: 1710: 30 JAN; CLIMBING; PHU THACH NA BRIDGE; A-
 4D; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OFF THE COAST OF
 HA TINH; 1 2ND CO/6TH BN.
 PAGE 02, JULY 1965
 1250: 0905: 1 JUL; DIVING; DA SON; A-4D; TRAVELLED FAR
 BEFORE CRASHING; 1 224TH (49TH BN).
 1251: 0915: 1 JUL; DIVING; PHUONG TACH; A-4D; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 91ST AAA UNIT/228TH.
 1252: 1510: 1 JUL; DIVING; VINH LINH; F-105; SHOT DOWN
 ON THE SPOT; PILOTS RESCUED AT BEN THANH; 5TH BN - 6TH
 BN AND 238TH.
 1253: 1510: 1 JUL; DIVING; VINH LINH; F-105; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; SELF DEFENSE FORCES OF NGUYEN O
 THUY.
 1254: 1300: 2 JUL; DIVING; CUU NGHIA; F-4C; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 19TH BN/214TH REG.
 1255: 1700: 3 JUL; DIVING; NAM DAN; A-4D; TRAVELLED FAR
 BEFORE CRASHING; 1 250TH REG.
 1256: 1140: 4 JUL; DIVING; CAU CAM; A-4D; TRAVELLED FAR

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RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

786761/9034/239 24 OF 28 X1 0444 239/14:53Z 271430Z AUG 91
 CSN:RABP0373 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

BEFORE CRASHING; 1 250TH REG (11TH BN).
 1257: 0853: 5 JUL; LEVEL FLIGHT; DOG SI; A-4D; SHOT
 DOWN ON THE SPOT; DYE PILOT CAPTURED; 224TH REG.
 1258: 1806: 5 JUL; DIVING; QUAN SON; F-4C; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 280TH REG (13TH BN).
 1259: 1255: 5 JUL; DIVING; CAU DUOC; A-6A; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 12TH BN AND THE 233RD CO (24TH
 BN).
 1260: 1045: 7 JUL; DIVING; QUAN SON; F-4C; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 200TH REG (13TH BN) AND THE
 249TH REG.
 1261: 1040: 7 JUL; DIVING; LA KHE; F-4C; TRAVELLED FAR
 BEFORE CRASHING; 1 230TH REG.
 1262: 0905: 8 JUL; DIVING; QUANG BINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 DUONG THUY MILITIA AND 14TH BN.
 1263: 1823: 8 JUL; CLIMBING; KHE KINH; A-6A; TRAVELLED
 FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 42ND CO/80TH REG AND 12TH
 MILITARY STATION.
 1264: 0834: 9 JUL; LEVEL FLIGHT; VINH; F-4D; TRAVELLED
 BT

786761/9034/239 25 OF 28 X1 0444 239/14:53Z 271430Z AUG 91
 CSN:RABP0373 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 13 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 91760

0351 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MR9 RECORD
OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER OFF THE COAST OF HA
TINH; PEOPLE'S AIR FORCE.
1265: 1005: 9 JUL; DIVING; DA NUI; F-4C; TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING; 14TH BN/280TH REG.
1266: 1130: 10 JUL; DIVING; BA DON; F-4C; TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING; 15TH BN/210TH REG.
1267: 1415: 12 JUL; LOW ALTITUDE; KY ANH; F-4C;
TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 45TH LOCAL FORCES CO.
1268: 1434: 12 JUL; DIVING; OONG LOC; F-4C; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 21ST BN (210TH).
1269: 1723: 12 JUL; DIVING; KILOMETER 6 OF ROUTE 20; F-
4C; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE; 73RD BN/280TH REG.
1270: 1145: 13 JUL; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; CATANG; F-
105; TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 11TH BN/280TH
REG.
1271: 1532: 14 JUL; DIVING; XUAN SON; F-105; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 13TH BN/280TH REG.
1272: 0945: 15 JUL; DIVING; MUU NGHI; F-105F; SHOT DOWN
ON THE SPOT AT BAN SEN BA DON; 1 PILOT CAPTURED, 1
PILOT KILLED; 14TH BN, 84TH AAA UNIT AND THE 210TH REG.
1273: 0630: 16 JUL; DIVING; LINH CAN; A-7A; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 22ND BN/210TH.
1274: 0745: 16 JUL; DIVING; TRUONG SON; F-8D; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 9TH BN/256TH REG.
1275: 1130: 17 JUL; DIVING; HA TINH; F-4C; TRAVELLED
FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 18TH BN.
1276: 1054: 17 JUL; DIVING; MY LOC; A-6A; TRAVELLED FAR
BEFORE CRASHING; 13TH BN/210TH REG.
1277: 1054: 20 JUL; LOW ALTITUDE; ROUTE 20; F-105;
TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 1 COMPANY OF THE 73RD
BN/280TH REG.
1278: 0830: 19 JUL; DIVING; MUOU BRIDGE; A-7A;
TRAVELLED FAR BEFORE CRASHING; 14TH BN.
1279: 0955: 20 JUL; DIVING; HA TRACH; F-4C; 84TH
AAA UNIT.
PAGE 70: NOVEMBER 1968
1459: 0800: 1 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; VINH LINH;
RF-4C; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED OVERWATER; 4
TH BN.
1460: 1317: 23 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; DA NUI;

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RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

766763/9035/239
CSN:RXBP037427 OF 28 41 0445 219/14:50Z 271430Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RF-4C; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT VANGUARD; 1 PILOT
CAPTURED AND 1 PILOT KILLED; 2 COMPANIES OF THE 14TH
BN.
1461: 1030: 25 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; DO LUONG;
A-3J; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AT YEN THANH; 1 PILOT
CAPTURED; 7 COMPANIES AND ELEMENTS OF THE 22ND.
1462: 1 25 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; CONGUNG ROUTE
20; RF-4C; SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT AND CRASHED AT NGAM
CONGUNG; 73RD BN/280TH REG.
1463: 1015: 9 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; NGHI LOC;
RF-8; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 15 KILOMETERS
WEST OF THE MOUTH OF THE LO RIVER; 1 67TH BN/275TH REG.
1464: 1120: 9 NOV; RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; KHE SAT
ROUTE 15; F-105; TRAVELLED A DISTANCE AND CRASHED 8
KILOMETERS EAST OF SIAMH; 29TH BN/280TH REG.
(END TRANSLATION)

5. A SEPARATE MESSAGE CONTAINING CORRELATIONS OF
INDIVIDUAL ENTRIES IN THIS DOCUMENT TO SPECIFIC CASES
BT

766763/9035/239
CSN:RXBP037427 OF 28 41 0445 219/14:50Z 271430Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 14 OF 14 BANGKOK TH 41760

0351 AUG 91
 SUSJ: TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PAGES OF AN MRA RECORD
 OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
 IN JCRC FILES IS IN PREPARATION, AND WILL BE ISSUED AS
 SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE ACTUAL PHOTOCOPIED PAGES FROM
 WHICH THE ABOVE TRANSLATION WAS MADE WILL BE FORWARDED
 TO HQ JCRC FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS.
 BT

LCDR W
ASD W
CDR
CDR
INR
ADP

ROUTINE

R: 240051Z AUG 91 PS: 704547P36 91 INF 28 1 36

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO: CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO: JCS WASHDC//DCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//

SECDEF WASHDC//DASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//

VSC WASHDC

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLC//

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

*****APC-MED-H//

ON 01 OF 03 BANGKOK TH 42042

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM THE MILITARY REGION

R. MUSEUM REGISTER

REF: A. JCRC LIAISON 130735Z AUG 91

B. JCRC LIAISON 200622Z AUG 91

C. JCRC LIAISON 220925Z AUG 91

1. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 14TH SERIES
 OF JOINT ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 17 JUL -
 12 AUG 91. REF B IS THE REPORT OF THE MATERIAL
 EVIDENCE EXAMINED AT THE SRV MILITARY REGION 4 (MRA)
 MUSEUM. REF C IS THE TRANSLATION OF PORTIONS OF THE
 ORIGINAL MRA MUSEUM EXHIBIT REGISTER FROM WHICH THE
 EXCERPTS TRANSLATED HERE WERE ALLEGEDLY TAKEN.

2. ON 20 JUL 91, TEAM

VISITED THE
 MRA MUSEUM IN VINH CITY AND EXAMINED A NUMBER OF ITEMS
 IN ITS HOLDINGS (SEE REF B). DURING THEIR EXAMINATION
 OF THESE ITEMS, MUSEUM STAFF GAVE THE TEAM TWO
 DOCUMENTS, CONTAINING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ORIGIN
 AND ACQUISITION OF MANY OF THE ITEMS EXAMINED BY THE
 TEAM. THESE DOCUMENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN EXCERPTED
 FROM THE MUSEUM'S ORIGINAL EXHIBIT REGISTER, WHICH THE
 TEAM WAS ALLOWED TO EXAMINE LATER. HOWEVER, AS CITED
 IN REF C, A NUMBER OF INCONSISTENCIES WERE NOTED
 BETWEEN THE ALLEGED ORIGINAL REGISTER, THE EXCERPTS,
 AND THE ACTUAL ITEMS EXAMINED, SUGGESTING THAT THE

DLVR: CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

706547/0242/241

1 OF 5

41 0080

241/01:31Z

290051Z AUG 91

CSY: RANP0072

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 211

Encl 17

RELATED TO THE TEAM'S MISSION. TEAM MEMBERS WERE
ALLIANCE TO EXAMINE, PHOTOGRAPH, AND RECORD ALL OF THESE
ITEMS. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS WAS CONDUCTED ON ALL
ITEMS. THE RESULTS OF THIS ANALYSIS AND ANY
CORRELATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED IN SEPARATE MESSAGES.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ITEMS
EXAMINED BY THE JJOVI TEAM AND TRANSLATIONS OF
CORRESPONDING EXHIBIT LABELS. TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS
AND THE COMMENTS OF THE TRADITION HOUSE CURATOR APPEAR
IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES.

A. ENTRENCHING TOOL SHADE- THE EXHIBIT LABEL FOR
THIS ITEM READS: "A SHOVEL TAKEN FROM FIRST LIEUTENANT
RYA- (HOLE IN THE LABEL) THE PILOT OF AN F4 AIRCRAFT
SHOT DOWN BY THE SON TRACH VILLAGE MILITIA IN 1967."
((THE MUSEUM CURATOR CLAIMED THAT THE MISSING PORTION
OF THE PILOT'S NAME WAS "REX" MAKING THE COMPLETE
NAME OF THE PILOT'S NAME "RYA-REX."))

B. RECOVERED REMAINS OF THE PILOT'S MANUAL- THE EXHIBIT
LABEL READS: "RECOVERED REMAINS OF THE PILOT'S MANUAL-
((THE MUSEUM CURATOR EXPLAINED THAT THIS ITEM WAS
RECOVERED ALONG WITH ITEM A FROM THE SAME AIRCRAFT
INCIDENT. THERE WAS NO EXHIBIT LABEL FOR THIS ITEM.))

C. PAIR OF LEATHER PILOT'S BOOTS, SIZE 11-
BINH TRI THIEN MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER HTY 200/V79.
QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSEUM NUMBER 837.
((THE MUSEUM CURATOR CLAIMED THAT THESE BOOTS WERE
RECOVERED FROM THE VIET TRUNG STATE FARM, BUT COULD
PROVIDE NO FURTHER DETAILS. THERE WAS NO EXHIBIT LABEL
FOR THIS ITEM.))

D. PARACHUTE PILOT CHUTE AND PACK- POSSIBLE
MUSEUM REFERENCE NUMBER VS 165. THE EXHIBIT LABEL FOR
THIS ITEM READS: "PARACHUTE AND PACK OF THE AMERICAN
BANDIT PILOT WHOSE F4 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN 1967
BY THE MILITIA DEFENSE FORCES OF SON TRACH VILLAGE AND
THE UNIT OF SOLDIERS DEFENDING THE QUAN SON FERRY."
PILOT CHUTE

PART NO. 64221125-1
CONT. NO. AF81(005)-40002
FSV 1070-524-1712
4FD. SLPT. 1996
N. STEINTHAL & CO., INC. N.Y. C.

J.S.
THE ONLY LEGIBLE DATA ON THE PARACHUTE BACK READ AS
FOLLOWING:
NO. 6045970244
NO. AF 4066137575

780956/0176/241 2 OF 3 41 0010 200/00:40Z 270843Z AUG 91
CSV:RXNP0034 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

N 02 3F 03 84HKKOK TH 02092

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM THE MILITARY REGION
4 MUSEUM REGISTRY
20-0-04

11/1250-1255/BANDIT PILOT'S ITEMS/SHOT DOWN BY THE
MILITARY AND PEOPLE OF VINH LINH ON 10-11-72 (QUANTITY
33 SHEETS)
12/786/US PLASTIC WHISTLE/OF A BANDIT PILOT WHO FLEW AN
F4C AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN BY CO-10 2ND BN 21ST
REGT DN (7-8-67) AT THE LONG DAT FERRY QUANG BINH
13/292/100 AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE/SHOT DOWN BY CO 2 OF
THE NGUYEN VIET XAY BATTALION ON 18-11-1964 IN QUANG
BINH
14/1172/SIGNAL LIGHT/FRON AN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN DN (28-
12-1972) AT VA HA XAY (L439)
15/004/SIGNAL LIGHT/M43ER 553A6 (NO RECORD)
16/SIGNAL LIGHT/M43ER 51297 (NO RECORD)
17/307/AIRCRAFT WHEEL/SHOT DOWN DN 20-12-67
((END TRANSLATION))

4. THE SECOND EXCERPT WAS TITLED "A NUMBER OF
AMERICAN AIR FORCE ARTICLES SHOT DOWN IN MILITARY
REGION 4 (64-75)." THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINED FOUR
COLUMNS WITH THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS: ORDER/ARTICLE
NUMBER/ARTICLE NAME/BRIEF HISTORY. THE TRANSLATED
ENTRIES APPEAR IN THE SAME ORDER. TRANSLATOR'S
COMMENTS APPEAR IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES.
((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

1/206/AN AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN BY THE MUNG THAT VILLAGE
MILITIA NGUYEN HUE AN
2/1067/VLA (51C)/SHOT DOWN BY LOCAL TROOPS IN QUANG
BINH ON 1-7-72 (223) THE PILOT'S NAME WAS RO BJT,
MAJOR, SERVICE NUMBER RS 29956 (DEAD)
3/670/AN AIRCRAFT/RECEIVED AT THE SECOND CONGRESS IN
VINH LINH
4/1313/AN AIRCRAFT/A MISSILE UNIT OF THE 363RD DIVISION
SHOT DOWN AT 0925 20-0-72 IN QUANG BINH
5/226/HELICOPTER/THE COURAGEOUS SOLDIER NGUYEN VIET
LUONG DOWNED AT HIGH POINT A EAST DN 27-8-67 NORTHERN
KHE SANH
6/808/F4 AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT BY THE VINH
LINH MILITIA ON 11-11-66 AT MILL 78 VINH LINH
7/356/F8U AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN BY THE 270TH REGT ON 19-5-

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

780354/0176/241 3 OF 5 41 0036 201/00:50Z 290051Z AUG 91
CSV:RXNP0034 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

IN 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 01620

SUBJ: SUNGHI OF ITEMS RECOVERED AT THE BO TRACH
TRADITION HOUSE

E. PIECE OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE (OVAL PLASTIC WITH
DIAL)- MUSEUM CONTROL NO. RTT 775/46. THE EXHIBIT
LABEL FOR THIS ITEM READS: "THE 1500TH AMERICAN AIRCRAFT
SHOT DOWN, AT SA REV ON THE MORNING OF 20-9-1972."
((THE MUSEUM CURATOR STATED THAT THIS WRECKAGE WAS
RECOVERED IN LYS TRACH (V), BOUS TRACH (D)).

F. BLOOD CHIT NUMBER 165975. THE EXHIBIT LABEL
FOR THIS ITEM READS: "FLAG TO ASK FOR FOOD: OF AN
AMERICAN BANDIT PILOT OF AN F4C THAT WAS SHOT DOWN BY
THE MILITIA DEFENSE FORCES OF TAY TRACH VILLAGE IN
COOPERATION WITH THE 40TH BATTALION OF MILITARY RESERV
(6-1971).

G. COMMENDATION FLAG AWARDED FOR SHOOTING DOWN A
U.S. AIRCRAFT. THIS FLAG READS: "THE CENTRAL UNITED
WOMEN'S COMMITTEE AWARDS THIS TO THE FEMALE MILITIA
COMRADES OF T. VILLAGE 40 TRACH QUANG BINH FOR THE
OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT OF SHOOTING DOWN AN AMERICAN
AIRCRAFT ON 17-9-1972."

((THE MUSEUM CURATOR EXPLAINED THAT "T." WAS AN
ABBREVIATION FOR TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE)).

H. PAGE FROM PRINTED DOCUMENT (POSSIBLY FROM THE
TEXT OF A PROPAGANDA BROADCAST). AN EXCERPT FROM THIS
DOCUMENT READS: "IN AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN, MANY WERE
KILLED, ONE AMERICAN PILOT WAS CAPTURED
ALIVE, TWO NAVAL VESSELS WERE HIT AND
BURNED... (PROPAGANDA STATEMENTS)... ON 7, 11, AND 18
FEBRUARY 65."

R. ((1)) WHEN THE MUSEUM CURATOR EXPLAINED THE
ACQUISITION OF THE ITEMS DESCRIBED IN PAR 3H, THE
JOINT TEAM QUESTIONED HIM FURTHER IN AN ATTEMPT TO
DETERMINE IF ANY OTHER PIECES OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAD
BEEN RECOVERED FROM THAT SITE. THE CURATOR STATED THAT
IN ADDITION TO THE PILOT CHUTE AND PACK, HUNG HAD
DONATED A NUMBER OF FLIGHT MANUALS AND MAPS TO THE
MUSEUM IN EARLY 1983, BUT THESE WERE ALMOST COMPLETELY
DETERIORATED AND WERE ULTIMATELY DISCARDED. HUNG HAD
ALSO REPORTEDLY RECOVERED A COMPLETE PILOT'S PARACHUTE
FROM THE SITE, BUT REFUSED TO DONATE IT TO THE MUSEUM
SINCE HE COULD SELL IT FOR PROFIT, BECAUSE OF THE

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

745592/0915/239 4 OF 5 01 0270 219/09:02Z 270003Z AUG 91
CSV:RXBP0237 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

1134 03 OF 03 BANGKOK TH 02042

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM THE MILITARY RESERV
MUSEUM-RELISTRY

16/230/11000 AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN BY THE 10TH BN 28TH REGT
AT KY LAC KY ANH HA TUNG ON 20-12-67

17/615/657 AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN BY CO 3 19TH BN 210TH REGT
AT 0020 ON 11-9-67 IN OJANG BINH

18/616/74C AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN BY THE 15TH BN 214TH REGT
ON 11-9-68 IN BO TRACH QUANG BINH

19/297/1006 AIRCRAFT/NO RECORD
20/292/11050 AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN BY THE 14TH BN NGUYEN

VIET XUAN ON 18-11-1968 IN QUANG BINH

21/125/17A AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY AND
PEOPLE OF VINH LINH ON 10-11-1972

22/328/74U BANDIT PILOT'S HELMET/SHOT DOWN BY CO 2 22ND
REGT ON 12-5-67 AT CAU ON DO LUONG NEHE AN

23/1174/EARPHONES T200/SHOT DOWN BY CO 8 25TH BN AT HA
HA XAY ON 25-12-72

24/1617/BANDIT PILOT'S HELMET/SHOT DOWN BY THE MILITARY
AND PEOPLE OF DO LEY THANH HOA ON 16-7-1965

((END TRANSLATION))
BT

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

744908/0207/231 5 OF 5 01 0307 201/01:00Z 290051Z AUG 91
CSV:RABF0005 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

COO	
ASIS	
CSO	
CSB	
CSY	
ADP	

ROUTINE

R 291214Z AUG 91 PS. 7068799A

91 25 29 0519

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS HASHOC//DCJCS-04//MIA//J5// SECDEF HASHOC//OASD-ISA//PH-HIA//
 USCINCPAC HNMULULU HI//J5// DIA WASHINGTON DC//PR-NIR//
 WHITEHOUSE HASHOC//JSC// SECSTATE HASHOC//EAP-VLC//
 AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PEG-H//

BT

SECTION 01 OF 05 WASHINGTON 42334

0357 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE

FATES OF AMERICAN PILOTS

REF A: JCRC LTAT37: 130736Z AUG 91

REF B: JCRC LTAT37V 200422Z AUG 91

1. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT US/SRV ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, 17 JUL - 19 AUG 91. REF B REPORTS MATERIAL EVIDENCE EXAMINED AT THE SRV MILITARY REGION 9 MUSEUM.

2. ON 21 JUL 91, AT THE MILITARY REGION IV MUSEUM IN VINH, THE VIETNAMESE PRESENTED SIX PAGES OF A DOCUMENT TO JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM TWO (COYLE, JAVICH, KONG, WHITE, HERRELL, RIVERA, NAVING, KEIM, HOD MOANG, LOU VAN THO, AND MA COM PHU) FOR ANALYSIS. THE DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE EVAM PROSELYTIZING OFFICE (PHONG DINH VANG) AS A REPORT TO THE LEADERSHIP MILITARY REGION 9. THE SIX PAGES CONCERN THE REMAINS OF AMERICANS WHO WERE SHOTEN, WHOSE BOODIES WERE TORN APART IN THEIR LOSS INCIDENTS, OR WHOSE BURNED REMAINS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY LOST IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, MILITARY REGION 9, HA TINH PROVINCE, AND THE VINH LINH SPECIAL ZONE. TWO OF THE SIX PAGES WERE DUPLICATES OF THE VINH LINH AND HA TINH PAGES. ACCORDING TO LTC NGUYEN DUOC HUY (NGUYEN HUY), CHIEF OF THE PEOPLE AND ENEMY PROSELYTIZING OFFICE, THE DOCUMENT WAS FOUND IN APRIL,

DLVR:CDR JCRC 010500Z 01 41(3)...ACT

RT:000-000/COPIES:0003

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 CSN:RXBP0389 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

901, DURING VIETNAMESE MILITARY DOCUMENT RESEARCH. CD 401 IS INDICATED IN THE DOCUMENT AND IS LOCATED IN THE CD 401 1981 0121 OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND RESEARCH 545.

THE FIRST PAGE OF THE DOCUMENT IS TITLED "530R TACH LAIS MYX CHEETS 035 AND 0413 DOR QUANG BINH". RECORD OF DEAD AMERICAN AIR PILOTS GRAVES IN QUANG BINH. THIS DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF AMERICAN PILOTS WHO ALLEGEDLY WERE BURIED IN QUANG BINH. EACH ENTRY HAS 12 COLUMNS OF INFORMATION. IN THIS TRANSLATION THE COLUMNS ARE SEPARATED BY SEMICOLONS. TRANSLATIONS COMMENTS ARE SET OFF BY DOUBLE PARENTHESES. COLUMN ONE IS THE ENTRY NUMBER; COLUMN TWO IS THE FULL NAME; COLUMN THREE IS THE BIRTH DATE (ALL DATES GIVEN ARE AS YAT-1900+YEAR); COLUMN FOUR IS THE RANK; COLUMN FIVE IS THE AIRCRAFT TYPE; COLUMN SIX IS THE BRANCH OF SERVICE; COLUMN SEVEN IS THE PILOT'S SERVICE NUMBER; COLUMN EIGHT IS THE DATE SHOT DOWN; COLUMN NINE IS THE DEATH AND BURIAL DATE; COLUMN TEN IS THE GRAVE LOCATION (MANY ENTRIES IN THIS COLUMN ALSO HAVE, AFTER THE LOCATION, AN ALPHABETIC DESIGNATOR, WHICH APPEARS TO BE AN ACCOUNTING NUMBER); COLUMN ELEVEN IS THE CONDITION OF THE REMAINS AT THE TIME OF BURIAL; COLUMN TWELVE IS THE MODE OF TRANSPORTATION TO THE GRAVE LOCATION.

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

1. 35-9-28: LIEUTENANT COLONEL; F-4E
 2. 3-7-67: 3-7-67: QUANG XUAN VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH, QUANG BINH 35-91 000-81, 02: FRAGMENTS AND LIND PARTS, A NUMBER OF PIECES ARE MISSING BECAUSE A ROUND OF AMERICAN AMMUNITION EXPLODED; AUTOMOBILE, HELICOPTER.
 3. 3-5-67: 4-3-67: QUANG XUAN VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH, QUANG BINH 05-91 040-91, 02: THE HEAD AND A NUMBER OF OTHER BODY PARTS ARE MISSING BECAUSE A BOMB ON THE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED, DESTROYING THE REMAINS.
 4. 2-6-67: 2-6-67: QUANG XUAN VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH, QUANG BINH 74-52 040-51, 02: BROKEN AND CRUSHED SKULL, RIGHT LEG, RIGHT ARM WAS LOST BECAUSE AMERICAN BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPLODED AND DESTROYED THE REMAINS; AUTOMOBILE AND HELICOPTER.
 5. NAME NOT CLEAR - HEAT WITH NAME 1, 1, F-4C; 1, 2-6-67: 2-6-67, QUANG XUAN VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH, QUANG BINH 74-52 040-91, 02: ONLY A LITTLE FLESH AND BONE REMAINED AFTER THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED DUE TO

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796862/0717/241 2 OF 3 01 0490 20121214Z 201214Z AUG 91
 CSN:RXBP0389 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 77 09 040604K TH 02330

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF A HAI DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE
FATE OF AMERICAN PILOTS.

EXPLODING ORDNANCE; AUTOMOBILE; HELICOPTER.

57 NAME : 20-7-271 MAJOR; F-105; : 0

12-10-68; 13-10-68; QUANG HUNG VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH,
QUANG BINH 74-52 0-9 31, 52; CRUSHED SKULL AND JAW,
RIGHT LEG WAS LOST BECAUSE A BOMB EXPLODED WHEN IT WAS
STRUCK BY A BULLET; AUTOMOBILE, HELICOPTER.

57 NAME : 7-5-11; 1ST LIEUTENANT; F-4; : 0-5-6-67; 8-5-67; DUNG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH.

28-01 048-94; THE SKULL, A NUMBER OF RIBS AND
VERTEBRAE; AUTOMOBILE, HELICOPTER.

77 NAME : 1-10-56; CAPTAIN; F-4; : 0

17-5-67; 17-5-67; QUANG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH, QUANG
BINH 048-94; 300; INTACT; AUTOMOBILE,
HELICOPTER.

87 NAME : 20-1-400; 1ST LIEUTENANT; F-4; : 0

11-COLLEAGUE - POSSIBLY 8 OR 9; 11-68; 11-9-68; DUNG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH; BODY
INTACT; AUTOMOBILE, HELICOPTER.

97 NAME : 20-2-311; MAJOR; F-105; : 15-4-67

15-4-67; 50-2 TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH; ONLY
SKULL REMAINING; BODY RIPPED TO PIECES.

107 NAME : 30-6-35; CAPTAIN; F-4; : 0

30-6-65; 30-6-65; QUANG TRACH, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH; JAW
WITH LOWER JELTH REMAINING, MISSING HEAD AND ENTIRE
BODY.

117 NAME : 20-12-411; F-4; : 0 : 30-5-66

30-5-66; DUNG TRACH, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH; ONLY THE
HEAD REMAINING, THE BODY WAS RIPPED TO PIECES.

127 NAME : 15-4-72; 15-4-72; CHANH HOA, NAM
TRACH, BO TRACH 048-94; MISSING RIGHT ARM,
ENTIRE RIGHT LEG, LEFT FOOT AND A NUMBER OF VERTEBRAE
FROM THE NECK DOWN THE BACK.

137 NAME : 20-6-431; 1ST LIEUTENANT; F-4; : 0

11-11-57; 11-11-57; GIA HINH, QUANG BINH,
QUANG BINH; LACKING THE RIGHT FOOT, ONE RIGHT LEG BONE,
1 LEFT LEG, 2 ARMS AND HANDS.

147 NAME : 9-12-38; MAJOR; F-4; : 0

17-2-72; 17-2-72; THANH THUY VILLAGE, LE
THUY, QUANG BINH 048-94, 048-106; MISSING ONE RIGHT

DLVR:CDR JCRC REQUEST OF AT(3)...ACT

RTD:900-900/COPIES:0003

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ARM DUVE, SHATTERED HEAD, MISSING HALF OF THE LOWER
JAW.

157 NAME : 15-3-471; 1-4-67; : 0

27-12-72; 27-12-72; THANH THUY, LE THUY, QUANG BINH
048-94, 048-106; A PORTION OF THE REAR MOUTH AND
SKULL REMAINING, THE RIGHT ARM, A PORTION OF MEAT FROM
THE LEFT SIDE OF THE BODY.

167 NAME : 7-5-30; CAPTAIN; F-4; : 0

10-8-69; 10-8-69; THANH THUY, LE THUY, QUANG BINH; HEAD
AND A PIECE OF RIGHT ARM.

((FOLLOWING IS A NOTE HANDWRITTEN AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
DOCUMENT))

ATTENTION: ADD NUMBERS: 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 AND
NAME NOT CLEAR: OF THE ROSTER OF PIPPED TO PIECES IN
QUANG BINH.

((END TRANSLATION))

4. THE SECOND PAGE OF THE DOCUMENT IS TITLED "500R
GIARCU LAIS NYX CHETS 144 XACS OAR QUANG KHU IV"
(RECORD OF AMERICAN AIR PILOTS KILLED AND TORN APART
IN MILITARY REGION IV). THIS DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF 25
AMERICAN PILOTS WHO ALLEGEDLY WERE KILLED IN MILITARY
REGION IV. THERE ARE NINE COLUMNS. THE FORMAT IS AS
FOLLOWS: COLUMN ONE IS THE ENTRY NUMBER; COLUMN TWO IS
THE FULL NAME; COLUMN THREE IS THE DATE OF BIRTH;
COLUMN FOUR IS THE RANK; COLUMN FIVE IS AIRCRAFT TYPE;
COLUMN SIX IS THE SERVICE NUMBER; COLUMN SEVEN IS THE
BT

790605/0718/201 4 OF 4 41 0091 201/12/15Z 201210Z AUG 91
CSX:34410300 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 03: 05 044600M TH 02334

0137 00C 01

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF 14-494 DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE
FATES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS.DATE SHOT DOWN: JULY EIGHT IS THE PLACE WHERE THE
AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND THE PILOT WAS TORN APART; COLUMN
NINE IS A NUMBER FOR THAT ENTRY.

(TEXT STAYS HERE)

17 NAME : CAPTAIN: RF-002 : 12-5-66: 30-
TRACH, QUANG BINH, LEY WITH UYUYAMA.
27 NAME : FIRST LIEUTENANT: F-002 : 19-5-66: CU-
NAM, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH.
37 NAME : FIRST LIEUTENANT COLONEL: F-002 : 10-11-67:
VIET TRUNG STATE FARM, QUANG BINH.
47 NAME : 19-5-66: CAPTAIN: F-002 : 1-
3-66: QUANG DINH VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH, QUANG BINH.
57 NAME : FIRST LIEUTENANT: A-002 : 19-5-66: VIET
TRUNG STATE FARM, QUANG BINH.

67 NAME : 25-1-41: FIRST LIEUTENANT: RF-002:
20-9-66: MAT HOA, TUYEN HOA, QUANG BINH.
77 NAME : 25-5-36: FIRST LIEUTENANT: A-002:
19-2-66: DAN LY, LE THUY, QUANG BINH. HAVE
IDENTIFICATION CARD.

87 NAME : F-100 : 10-5-66: HOA THUY, LE
THUY, QUANG BINH.

97 NAME : CAPTAIN: RF-100:
12-1-66: MYEN BOA, QUANG BINH.

107 NAME : 12-1-37: MAJOR:
QUANG BINH HAVE IDENTIFICATION CARD.

117 NAME : 16-12-81: CAPTAIN: F-100 : 15-0-
66: LE MY, QUANG BINH.

127 NAME : 11-1-61: FIRST LIEUTENANT: F-002 : 12-10-
67: LUC XA, SON THUY, LE THUY, QUANG BINH.

137 NAME : 11-11- (POSSIBLY 30):
MAJOR: RF-002 : 25-11-67: ROUTE 20, QUANG BINH.

147 NAME : FIRST LIEUTENANT:
QUANG BINH.

157 NAME : 14-6-75: SECOND LIEUTENANT: MARINE
(ACCOMPLISHED PERSONALLY THUR QUANG LUC CHIEFS -

MARINE (AMERICAN) 127 : 12-1-37: CAPTAIN:
167 NAME : 12-1-37: CAPTAIN:

177 NAME : 11-1-66: (SECOND LIEUTENANT OR MAJOR):
US: A-002 : 10-1-75: PHUC TRACH, SON THUY, QUANG BINH.

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187 NAME : 17-9-29: MAJOR: F-100: 0 : 27-
10-06: VAN TRACH, 30 TRACH, QUANG BINH. HAVE
IDENTIFICATION CARD.

197 NAME : 13-10-28: CAPTAIN: A-002 :
23-3-66: LUC TRACH, 30 TRACH, QUANG BINH.

207 NAME : FIRST LIEUTENANT: A-002 :
(PERIOD INDICATES ILLEGIBLE NUMBER): 7-4-65: DUC
TRACH, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH.

217 NAME : 16-1-37: CAPTAIN: D-37:
11-9-67: TRUNG TRACH, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH.

227 NAME : 11-2-40: FIRST LIEUTENANT: F-175:
15-7-63: VAN TRACH, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH.

(THE FOLLOWING ENTRY WAS SCRATCHED OUT BUT STILL
LEGIBLE)

237 NAME : 1-10-36: CAPTAIN: F-002 :
17-8-68: PHUC TRACH, BO TRACH, QUANG BINH.

((END SCRATCHED OUT ENTRY))

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CSN:RXBP0391 JRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 31 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 42334

0357 AUF 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF AN AMERICAN DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE
FATES OF AMERICAN PILOTS21: *Name* ; 26-1-63; CAPTAIN; RF-01
; 12-7-72; MA TRACH, BJ TRACH, QUANG BINH;
HAVE IDENTIFICATION CARD.24: *Name* ; 17-3-66; FIRST LIEUTENANT;
RF-01 ; 12-7-72; MA TRACH, HO TRACH, QUANG
BINH; HAVE IDENTIFICATION CARD.25: *Name* ; 08-01; CAPTAIN; F-01; 3-5-72; TAY
TRACH, HO TRACH, QUANG BINH;
(END TRANSLATION)

5. THE THIRD PAGE OF THE DOCUMENT IS TITLED "SOOR
BIAO" LAYS OUT CHECKS FOR THE DEAD AND THE LIVING.
(RECORD OF DEAD AMERICAN AIR PILOTS WITH GRAVES IN VIETNAM).
THIS DOCUMENT HAS THREE ENTRIES FOR PILOTS
THAT WERE KILLED AND BURIED IN VIETNAM. THE COLUMN
FORMAT FOR THIS DOCUMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: COLUMN ONE IS
THE ENTRY NUMBER; COLUMN TWO IS THE FULL NAME; COLUMN
THREE IS THE DATE OF BIRTH; COLUMN FOUR IS THE RANK;
COLUMN FIVE IS AIRCRAFT TYPE; COLUMN SIX IS BRANCH OF
SERVICE; COLUMN SEVEN IS SERVICE NUMBER; COLUMN EIGHT
IS THE DATE THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN; COLUMN NINE IS
THE DATE THE PILOT DIED AND WAS BURIED; COLUMN TEN IS
THE PLACE OF BURIAL AND ALPHANUMERIC DESIGNATORS
(POSSIBLY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTING PURPOSES);
COLUMN ELEVEN IS THE CONDITION OF THE REMAINS WHEN
BURIED; COLUMN TWELVE IS THE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO
THE BURIAL SITE.

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

1: *Name* ; MAJOR; 1-4; ; 22-12-67; 22-12-67;
TAY LUC, CAM LUC, MA LINH NG-09 210 56, 57; MISSING
TWO ARMS, TWO LEG BONES, ONE SHOULDER, ONE BUTTCK, A
JAW, THE SKULL WAS CRUSHED; AUTOMOBILE AND HELICOPTER.
2: *Name* ; 5-25; COLONEL; RF-01; ; 2-8-
67; 2-8-67; SUY GIANG, HUONG 574, MA LINH NG-02 249-
55; SKULL BROKEN INTO FOUR PIECES, ONE SECTION OF LEG,
TWO PIECES OF HAND WITH TWO FINGERS AND ONE SECTION OF
SPINE; HELICOPTER.
3: *Name* ; CAPTAIN; F-01; ; 3-7-72; 5-7-72;
HUONG BINH, HUONG XAC, MA LINH 15-09 245-03; CORPSE
INTACT.

DLVH:COR JCRC 0409ERS PI HT(3)...ACT

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796596/0721/211 7 OF 7 41 0494 211/12:212 241210Z AUG 91
CS:RXPF393 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

(END TRANSLATION)

6. PAGE FOUR OF THE DOCUMENT IS TITLED "SOOR
BIAO" LAYS OUT CHECKS FOR THE DEAD AND THE LIVING (RECORD OF
DEAD AMERICAN AIR PILOTS WITH GRAVES IN VIETNAM).
THIS DOCUMENT HAS SIX ENTRIES AND THE FORMAT IS AS
FOLLOWS: COLUMN ONE IS THE ENTRY NUMBER; COLUMN TWO IS
THE FULL NAME OF THE PILOT; COLUMN THREE IS THE DATE OF
BIRTH; COLUMN FOUR IS THE RANK; COLUMN FIVE IS THE
AIRCRAFT TYPE; COLUMN SIX IS THE BRANCH OF SERVICE;
COLUMN SEVEN IS THE SERVICE NUMBER; COLUMN EIGHT IS THE
DATE THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN; COLUMN NINE IS THE
DATE THE PILOT DIED AND WAS BURIED; COLUMN TEN IS THE
PLACE OF BURIAL (SOME ENTRIES ALSO HAVE ALPHANUMERIC
DESIGNATORS POSSIBLY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTING
PURPOSES); COLUMN ELEVEN IS THE CONDITION OF THE
REMAINS WHEN BURIED; COLUMN TWELVE IS THE METHOD OF
TRANSPORTATION TO THE GRAVE SITE.

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

1: ; ; L-19; ; 20-1-68; 20-1-68; VINH CHAP VILLAGE,
VINH LINH ZONE; ONLY A BIT OF FLESH AND SOME NOT
INTACT; AUTOMOBILE, HELICOPTER.

2: ; ; L-19; ; 27-1-68; 20-1-68; VINH CHAP VILLAGE,
VINH LINH ZONE; ONLY A BIT OF FLESH AND SOME NOT
INTACT;

3: *Name* ; MAJOR; F-105; AIR FORCE; ;
19-9-68; 19-9-68; VINH CHAP, VINH LINH 95-0A 245-106;
BODY INTACT.

4: ; ; F-4H; ; 11-11-66; 11-11-66; VINH CHAP, VINH
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CS:RXPF393 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 05 OF 09 HANGKOK TH 42634

357 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE
FATES OF AMERICAN PILOTS
LHNS: BODI INTACT;
5: P: CAPTAIN 1-71 1-1-72; 3-5-72; VINH CHAP;
VINE LHM 2316 95-03 148-1001 BODI INTACT;
6: P: 1-1-72; 1-11-72; 12-11-72; VINH CHAP, VINH
LHM 2316 95-03 148-1001 MISSING A TIGHT, 3F AR 400 A
LEO;
(END TRANSLATION)

2. THE FOUR PHOTOCOPIED PAGES FROM WHICH THE ABOVE
TRANSLATIONS WERE MADE WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ, JCRC.
BT

DLVH:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RT:000-000/COPIES:0003

790907/0722/271 1 0493 241212Z 241214Z AUG 91
CSN:RAXH030 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

COPIES	11
AGS	11
CSO	11
CBS	11
INR	11
ADP	11

PRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

ROUTINE

91 AUG 30 15:39

R 301507Z AUG 91 PR 00275000

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS WASHDC//DCJCS-2-11A/J5//

SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PN-01A//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PA-MIA//

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC//

SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-VLCY//

EMBASSY VIENTIANE

CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//IARC-PEO-M//

BT

SECTION 01 OF 03 HANGKOK TH 42693

0350 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT CONCERNING

SHOOTING DOWN BY THE 14TH BATTALION

REF A: JCRC LIAISON 130730Z AUG 91

REF B: JCRC LIAISON 200423Z AUG 91

1. REF A IS THE SURVIVOR REPORT OF JOINT US/ARV
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT
INVESTIGATIONS, 17 JUL - 17 AUG 91. REF B REPORTS
MATERIAL EVIDENCE EXAMINED AT THE SHV MILITARY REGISTRY &
MUSEUM.

2. ON 21 JUL 91, 1) THE MILITARY REGION IV MUSEUM IN
VINH, THE VIETNAMESE PRESENTED A DOCUMENT TO JOINT
INVESTIGATION TEAM TWO (COJLES, JANSEN, JOHN, WHITE,
NEVELL, RIVERA, MAYNARD, KEITH, NGUYEN, LUU VAN THO,
AND MI CONG PHIEU) FOR ANALYSIS. THE DOCUMENT WAS
WRITTEN BY MEMBERS OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT
CONCERNING AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE 14TH BATTALION,
ALSO KNOWN AS THE NGUYEN VIET XUAN BATTALION.

3. THIS IS A TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENT TITLED
"NHAKHAK THANH DANGS CUAP TIEUK DANG 10 NGUYEN
VIETS XUAN DANGS 201 HAYS BAY MYA" (THE BATTLES OF
THE 14TH, NGUYEN VIET XUAN, BATTALION SHOOTING DOWN
AMERICAN AIRCRAFT). ANALYST COMMENTS ARE ENCLOSED IN
DOUBLE PARENTHESES.
((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

DLVH:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(3)...ACT

RT:000-000/COPIES:0003

012775/1599/202 1 0575 242161Z 241501Z AUG 91
CSN:RAXH9442 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

(MATERIAL TAKEN FROM THE TACTICAL JOURNAL OF THE 16TH BATTALION, 375 - 325 DIVISION.)

1964:

-- 15 NOVEMBER 1964, SHOT DOWN THREE A-40'S (770 OF THOSE SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT; ONE PILOT DEAD; ONE STILL ALIVE) IN BANG PHENG, LAOS.

-- 21 NOVEMBER 1964, SHOT DOWN ONE AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT, 1955.

-- 1 FEBRUARY 1965, SHOT DOWN TWO F-28'S IN THE SOUTHERN LAOS ROUTE 7 CAMPAIGN. (ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED ON THE SPOT 200 METERS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, PILOT DEAD; ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED 20 KILOWETERS AWAY).

-- 8 FEBRUARY 1965, IN DANG HAI, QUANG BINH, SHOT DOWN SIX A-40'S (THO OF THOSE CRASHED ON THE SPOT AND THE PILOTS DIED, ONE CRASHED OVER WATER).

-- 10 MARCH 1965, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 ON THE SPOT AT HIGH POINT 75, QUAN TRACH, GO TRACH, QUANG BINH.

-- 3 MARCH 1965, AT CHANH HAI, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 AND ONE F-100 (PROBABLE F-100).

-- 21 APRIL 1965, SHOT DOWN TWO F-4'S (ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED ON THE SPOT; ON THE SALT FIELDS OF DANG HAI MUNICIPALITY).

-- 22 APRIL 1965, SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S, (ONE CRASHED ON THE SPOT).

-- 25 APRIL 1965, THE BATTALION SHOT DOWN TWO F-8'S AND ONE A-40 AT DAI RAO.

-- 25 MAY 1965, SHOT DOWN ONE F-101 (CRASHED IN VANH XUAN WATERS).

-- 2 JUNE 1965, SHOT DOWN ONE F-8 (CRASHED AT THE MOUTH OF THE LO RIVER).

((PAGE 23))

-- 4 JUNE 1965, SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S AT LA KHE BRIDGE, MUONG KHE.

-- 6 JUNE 1965, SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S AT LUC YEN, MUONG LOC, VINH CITY (ONE CRASHED AT HOANG AN, ONE CRASHED AT CAN XUYEN, CONFISCATED ALL OF THE PERSONAL EFFECTS).

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802775/1599/202 2 OF 6 41 0533 202/16:17Z 3015012 AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0402 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 02 77 03 HAYCHON TH 12693

0358 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF 14 COPY DOCUMENT CONCERNING AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE 16TH BATTALION AND CAPTURED THE PILOT.

-- 13 JUNE 1965, THE BATTALION SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S AT DIA LOT BRIDGE, MUONG KHE, ONE CRASHED AT CAN XUYEN, ONE CRASHED OVER WATER.

-- 11 JUNE 1965, SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 ON THE SPOT AT MUONG THAM, MUONG KHE, CONFISCATED MATERIAL EVIDENCE AND TWO FUEL TANKS, THE PILOT DIED ON THE SPOT.

-- 17 AND 18 JUNE 1965, SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S AT THAM LUEN, MUONG KHE.

-- 19 JUNE 1965, SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 AT LUC YEN, MUONG LOC, VINH.

-- 10 JULY 1965, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 AT QUANG TRACH, QUANG BINH.

-- 17 JULY 1965, SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 AT ANH TRUONG, QUANG TRUONG, DAI RAO TRACH.

-- 7 AUGUST 1965, SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S, ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE LAKE AT LA RAO AND ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE LAKE, TWO PILOTS DIED ON THE SPOT.

1966:

-- 3 JANUARY 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE F-4 AT RUNG BRIDGE.

-- 1 FEBRUARY 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 ON THE SPOT 7 KILOWETERS FROM THE DANG HAI SHORE.

-- (DAY ILLEGIBLE) APRIL 1966, THE BATTALION SHOT DOWN SIX AIRCRAFT AT GO LUONG.

-- 13 APRIL 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE F-8 ON THE SPOT, THE AIRCRAFT PILOTS AND PILOT FELL IN THE THAM LUEN FOREST AREA, THAM LUEN, MUONG KHE.

((PAGE 31))

PILOT BURIED IN THAT FOREST AREA.

-- 18 APRIL 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 AT GO LUONG.

-- 20 APRIL 1966, SHOT DOWN THREE A-40'S AT GO LUONG, ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED ON THE SPOT AND THE PILOT, WHOSE NAME WAS NOT KNOWN, WAS CAPTURED ALIVE.

(WRITTEN IN THE LEFT MARGIN NEXT TO THE NEXT FIVE ENTRIES IS THE PLACE NAME YEN LY, THAM LUEN, DIEN CHAU, MUONG KHE).

-- 23 APRIL 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE F-105.

-- 1 MAY 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE F-8 ON THE SPOT.

-- 20 MAY 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 AT THE YEN LY RAIL

DLV:COR JCRC BARBERS PT HTX...ACI

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802762/1601/202 3 OF 6 41 0537 202/16:19Z 3015012 AUG 91
CSN:PA310444 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

STATION BATTLEFIELD.

-- 17 JUNE 1966, SHOT DOWN TWO A-40'S, ONE CRASHED AT HOANG VANG, ONE CRASHED AT QUYEN LAP, QUYEN LINH. THE PILOT, WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN, WAS MUNG.
 -- ((DATE ILLIGIBLE)) SHOT DOWN ONE PECUNNAIR-SAYCE F-8E.
 -- 9 JULY 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 AT KY MUNG.
 -- 7 JULY 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE A-33 AT KY MUNG.
 -- 17 JULY 1966, SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S, ONE SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT, ONE CRASHED 16 KILOMETERS OFF THE COAST OF KY THU, THE PILOT WAS RESCUED.
 -- 25 JULY 1966, SHOT DOWN AN F-105 AT KY THINH.
 -- 28 AUGUST 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40 AT KY ANH.
 -- 1 SEPTEMBER 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE AD-6 AT KY NAM.
 -- 2 SEPTEMBER 1966, SHOT DOWN ONE AD-6 ON THE SPOT 3 BT

SECTION 03 OF 03 BANGKOK TH 42693

0358 AUG 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF A TWO DOCUMENT CONCERNING AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE 14TH BATTALION KILOMETERS FROM THE COAST OF KY PHUONG, 1967:

-- 1 NOVEMBER 1967 TO 15 DECEMBER 1967, SHOT DOWN 3 AD-6'S IN THE YEN LY AREA, OF THOSE 2 WERE SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT.
 -- 15 DECEMBER AND 23 DECEMBER SHOT DOWN TWO F-4'S AT YEN LY, THUOC HUYEN, DIEN CHAU.
 ((PAGE 4))
 -- 2 APRIL 1967, THE BATTALION SHOT DOWN ONE A-7 AT THE VINH RAIL STATION.
 -- 22 APRIL 1967, SHOT DOWN ONE A-40, PILOT LANDED IN QUYEN LUNG, QUYEN LINH, AND THE PEOPLE OF QUYEN BAI CAPTURED HIM.
 -- 28 APRIL 1967, THE BATTALION SHOT DOWN ONE F-8E AT QUYEN HAI, QUYEN LINH.
 -- 9 JUNE 1967, SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 AT THE CAN BUI BRIDGE, DIEN CHAU.
 -- 6 JUNE 1967, SHOT DOWN ONE F-8 ON THE SPOT AT DIEN KY VILLAGE.
 -- 15 JUNE 1967, SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 ON THE SPOT 3 KILOMETERS FROM THE DIEN CHAU SEASIDE.
 1968:
 ((THE BATTLE INFORMATION WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY RECORDED))
 1971:
 -- 29 JANUARY 1971, SHOT DOWN ONE F-8 AT HIGH POINT 85 IN QUANG TRI.
 1972:
 -- 6 MAY 1972, SHOT DOWN ONE A-7 AT HOANG MAT.
 -- 2 OCTOBER 1972, SHOT DOWN ONE A-7 ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURED THE PILOT ALIVE ON THE SALT FIELDS OF QUYEN THUAN, QUYEN LINH, NAME TANH.
 ((SIGNATURE))
 PERSON THAT PUT THE MATERIAL TOGETHER
 CAPTAIN LU VAN GI
 ((END TRANSLATION))

B. A SEPARATE MESSAGE CONTAINING CORRELATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ENTRIES IN THIS DOCUMENT TO SPECIFIC CASES IN JCRC FILES IS IN PREPARATION, AND WILL BE ISSUED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE ACTUAL PHOTOCOPIED PAGES FROM

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4 OF 6

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JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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1. CASUALTY RESOLUTION SPECIALISTS FROM THE U.S. ARMY JMWTC CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) AND THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEARCHING FOR MISSING PERSONS (VUSMP) INVESTIGATED CASE 0801 DURING JANUARY 1991. IN THE COURSE OF THEIR RESEARCH, CASUALTY SPECIALISTS DETERMINED THAT IDENTIFICATION CARRELATED TO THE CASE WAS IN THE THRUOID; THE 20TH AIRBORNE DIVISION (ADIV) (VUSMP); OF THE 20TH AIRBORNE DIVISION (ADIV); PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN). U.S. SPECIALISTS REQUESTED THAT THE VUSMP SEEK ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE 0801 FROM PERSONNEL AND RECORDS OF THE 20TH ADF.

2. ON 27 JULY 1991 AND 14 AUGUST 1991, THE DIA RESEARCH SPECIALIST ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. OFFICE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN HANOI AND TWO VNMSPR RESEARCH SPECIALISTS (SECTOR CHIEF LIEBHART STEIN, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, AND MSG. NGUYEN THI TAN, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR) VISITED THE HEADQUARTERS AND TRADITION HOUSE OF THE VNMSPR IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, DISTRICT NINH, THE PROVINCE WAS TO PERMIT THE U.S. RESEARCH SPECIALIST TO EXAMINE THE BARRELS, ARTIFACTS IN THE ZONE, RESEARCH TRADITION HOUSE, THE INTERVIEW UNIT PERSONNEL, AND RECEIVE RESULTS OF THE VNMSPR'S SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING

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DEPT. 34 SON BANGKOK TH

CASE 0641. DURING THE 29 JULY 1991 VISIT, THE DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE 280TH ADP, MAJOR GUY-DINH THUYET (C3UIF DINH THUYET), REVIEWED THE U.S. SPECIALIST IN THE HISTORY OF THE REGIMENT, ITS PERSONNEL AND TRADITION HOUSE, AND THE STATE OF THE REGIMENT'S RECORDS, AND HELPED THE TEAM IN ITS RESEARCH. DURING THE 10 AUGUST 1991 VISIT, THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL LE HOAT (LEE HOAT), RECEIVED THE TEAM AND ASSISTED THE TEAM IN ITS RESEARCH. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, SENIOR COLONEL TRAN HIEU ENCOURAGED THE REGIMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES TO CONSIDER NOTHING SECRET, TO PERMIT THE U.S. SPECIALIST TO EXAMINE ANY AND ALL ARTIFACTS IN THE REGIMENT'S TRADITION HOUSE, AND TO ANSWER ALL THE U.S. SPECIALIST'S QUESTIONS. THE REGIMENT STAFF APPEARED TO HAVE COMPLIED FULLY WITH THAT GUIDANCE.

3. CASE 0641.

THE U.S. SPECIALIST DISCOVERED AND PHOTOGRAPHED THREE ARTIFACTS IN THE 280TH ADP'S MUSEUM THAT WERE RELATED TO THE PILOT INVOLVED IN CASE 0641--A MILITARY IDENTITY CARD, A GENEVA CONVENTION CARD, AND A RESTRICTED AREA BADGE FOR FAKHRI ROYAL THAT AIR BASE. SEE APPENDIX A.

IN RESPONSE TO THE EARLIER U.S. REQUEST, VNDSMP RESEARCHERS SEARCHED THE 280TH ADP'S RECORDS AND DISCOVERED A TACTICAL OPERATIONS REPORT, DATED 2 OCTOBER 1967, THAT RECORDED THE FATE OF THE PILOT INVOLVED IN CASE 0641. DURING THE 29 JULY 1991 VISIT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE VNDSMP SPECIALIST, THE REGIMENT STAFF PERMITTED THE U.S. SPECIALIST TO EXAMINE THE COMPLETE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT. THE DOCUMENT BORE A PAVN CLASSIFICATION MARKING OF TOP SECRET. THE U.S. SPECIALIST CONFIRMED THAT SECTION 17 OF THE DOCUMENT WAS THE JULY SEQUENCE THAT CONTAINED INFORMATION ABOUT AN UNRESOLVED ROMVIA CASE (CASE 0631). THE INFORMATION INDICATED THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED SOUTH OF BA LUC MARKET ((C44)), APPROXIMATELY 9 KM FROM I-LUNG ((C44)). THE DOCUMENT ALSO INDICATED THE PILOT WAS A MAJOR HE PARACHUTED FROM HIS AIRCRAFT WAS

CAPTURED ALIVE; AND DIED FOUR HOURS LATER FROM SEVERE INJURIES.

THE REGIMENT PERMITTED THE VNDSMP AND U.S. RESEARCH SPECIALISTS TO TAKE THE DOCUMENT TO THE U.S. OFFICE IN HANOI AND JOINTLY PREPARE A PHOTOCOPY OF THE PORTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT THAT WERE RELATED TO THE UNRESOLVED CASE (LEFT TRANSLATION AT APPENDIX B). THE

SECTION 02 OF 24 040603C IN 02765

DELIVER DURING FIRST JULY VISIT. SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT PAVN 280TH ADP DEF REGT RECORDS PHOTOCOPY ALSO INCLUDED THE READING OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH PROVIDED THE DATE, TITLE, AND CLASSIFICATION (TOP SECRET) OF THE DOCUMENT, AND THE FIRST FEW LINES OF SECTION 17. SECTION 17 CONTAINED INFORMATION ABOUT ONE UNRESOLVED INCIDENT (SEE FOOTNOTE 2 OF THE TRANSLATION). HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) STILL CONSIDERS MUCH OF THE DOCUMENT TO BE CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION, THE PHOTOCOPY DOES NOT CONTAIN THE REMAINDER OF SECTION 17 OR OTHER TEXT NOT RELATED TO THE UNRESOLVED CASE.

OTHER CASES: LTC HUI AND MAJOR THUYET SAID ALL OF THE REGIMENT'S ARTIFACTS THAT ARE RELATED TO AMERICANS ARE ON DISPLAY IN THE TRADITION HOUSE. THE U.S. RESEARCH SPECIALIST EXAMINED ALL ARTIFACTS ON DISPLAY. IN ADDITION TO THE IDENTIFICATION CARDS FOR CASE 0641, FORTY-SEVEN ARTIFACTS WERE OF POTENTIAL INTEREST (SEE APPENDIX C).

THE FORTY-SEVEN ARTIFACTS AND ASSOCIATED EXHIBIT TAGS YIELDED INFORMATION THAT 16 EITHER CONFIRMED OR POTENTIALLY ASSOCIATED WITH 13 CASES: 0034, 0070, 0181, 0450, 0850, 1107, 1181, 1243, 1269, 1329, 1942, 2004. DETAILED ANALYSIS MAY IDENTIFY OTHER CORRELATIONS.

THE INFORMATION ON CASE 1107 APPEARS TO CONFIRM THAT THIS AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN IN THE VICINITY OF ITS TARGET IN NORTH VIETNAM RATHER THAN IN THAILAND, AS WAS SPECULATED PREVIOUSLY. SEE ITEMS 15 AND 16, APPENDIX C.

5. FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH:

THE U.S. OFFICE HAS SUBMITTED AN INFORMAL WRITTEN REQUEST TO HEADQUARTERS JOINT CASUALTY

RESOLUTION CENTER FOR TECHNICAL RESEARCH ASSISTANCE CONCERNING 11 ITEMS LISTED IN APPENDIX C. A COPY OF THAT REQUEST IS AT APPENDIX D.

THE U.S. OFFICE HAS SUBMITTED AN INFORMAL WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE VNDSMP FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH CONCERNING TEN SEPARATE ITEMS LISTED IN APPENDIX C. 4

053600/1720/202 3 OF 48 01 0640 262/19:472 301914Z AUG 91
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053600/1720/202 3 OF 48 01 0640 262/20:002 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RXNP0508 JCRG LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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COPY OF THAT REMAINS IS AT APPENDIX E.

6. 260TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT HISTORY, PERSONNEL, AND RECORDS.

A. DURING THE 1960's THE 260TH ADR SERVED IN PAVN MILITARY REGION 4 (VRA); PRIMARILY IN THE VICINITY OF VINH CITY, NGHE AN PROVINCE. IN EARLY 1971, THE REGIMENT SERVED IN SOUTHERN LAOS DURING THE PAVN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TO US/RVN OPERATION LAM SON 719. ((FIELD COMMENT: THE US/RVN INCURSION INTO LAOS)). LATER, DURING THE 1972 SPRING OFFENSIVE, THE REGIMENT WAS AMONG THE PAVN FORCES THAT SWIFT ACROSS THE DEVIANTIZED ZONE INTO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (RVN) AND OCCUPIED NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE REGIMENT ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE 1975 FINAL ASSAULT ON THE RVN CAPITOL OF SAIGON AND THE 1979 BORDER WAR WITH CHINA. DISPLAYS IN THE MUSEUM AND REGIMENTAL COMPOUND RECORD THAT THE REGIMENT OWNED ITS FIRST AIRCRAFT IN THE VIETNAM WAR ON 5 AUGUST 1969 AND ITS LAST AIRCRAFT ON 26 APRIL 1975.

B. LTC ADAT AND MAJOR THUYET SAID THAT NONE OF THE PERSONNEL PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE REGIMENT SERVED WITH THE REGIMENT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR. THEY SAID THE REGIMENT'S HIGH CASUALTY RATE DURING THE WAR AND THE POOR STATE OF THE REGIMENT'S AND THE PAVN'S RECORDS WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO LOCATE ANY FORMER MEMBER OF THE REGIMENT WHO MIGHT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF A SPECIFIC INCIDENT INVOLVING AN UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICAN. ((FIELD COMMENT: IN FACT, A CENTRALLY-LOCATED STEEL IN THE TRADITION HOUSE RECORDS THE NAMES OF 683 MEMBERS OF THE REGIMENT WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES DURING THE WAR.))

C. LTC ADAT AND MAJOR THUYET EXPLAINED THAT ALL RECORDS THAT WERE SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO THE BT

SECTION 35 OF 24 OCTOBER 1975

REF: 0001

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 260TH AIR DEF REG RECORDS

INDIVIDUAL ARTIFACT, IN THE TRADITION HOUSE HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED BY ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES--CHIEFLY HUMIDITY AND INSECTS. THEY NOTED THEY BELIEVED SOME DISPLAY TAGS FOR INDIVIDUAL ARTIFACTS PROBABLY CONTAINED INACCURATE DATA CONCERNING DATES, LOCATIONS, TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, ETC. THEREFORE, BECAUSE ALL THE REGIMENT'S WARTIME PERSONNEL AND MUCH OF ITS WARTIME DOCUMENTS WERE GONE, THEY DID NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO CONFIRM THE DATA ON THE DISPLAY TAGS. THEY APOLOGIZED THAT THEIR DATA WOULD PROVE INADEQUATE FOR HISTORICAL PURPOSES, BUT NOTED THE DISPLAYS STILL ADEQUATELY SERVE THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE, WHICH IS TO INSTILL THE REGIMENT'S TROOPS WITH A SENSE OF UNIT PRIDE.

D. LTC ADAT AND MAJOR THUYET EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESENT DISPLAY TAGS WERE REPRODUCTIONS OF THE ORIGINALS. THEY DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY TIMES A GIVEN DISPLAY TAG MIGHT HAVE BEEN REPRODUCED. THEY NOTED THAT IN SOME INSTANCES A REPRODUCTION MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE BY TRANSCRIBING DATA FROM AN ILLEGIBLE OR PARTIALLY DESTROYED EARLIER TAG. IN OTHER CASES, A LOST OR DESTROYED TAG MIGHT HAVE BEEN REPRODUCED FROM MEMORY. EACH TIME THE DATA WAS REPRODUCED THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY FOR ERROR. THEY ALSO NOTED THAT FREQUENT MOVES, OFTEN UNDER BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS, CAUSED SOME INFORMATION AND ARTIFACTS TO BE LOST. ((FIELD COMMENT: THE DIA RESEARCH SPECIALIST NOTED SEVERAL TAGS THAT CONTAINED INACCURATE DATA AND ONE ONE MISSING EXHIBIT. SEE APPENDIX C.))

6. REPORTING OFFICER'S COMMENTS:

A. THE PAVN SPECIALISTS AND THE 260TH ADR COMMANDER AND HIS DEPUTY APPEARED DETERMINED TO MAKE THIS A SUCCESSFUL RESEARCH PROJECT. THEY ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHT FORWARD PROFESSIONAL MANNER, INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT TECHNICAL TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS UNIQUE TO PAVN AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS THAT WERE RECORDED IN THE 2 OCTOBER 1967 DOCUMENT AND MUSEUM DISPLAY TAGS.

B. THE 2 OCTOBER 1967 DOCUMENT TRANSLATED AT

803601/1724/242 4 OF 48 VI 0052 242/201/02 301914Z AUG 91
CSY:RASP0504 JCPC LIATSON HANGKOK TH

803677/1724/242 5 OF 48 VI 0050 242/19/59Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSY:RASP0504 JCPC LIATSON HANGKOK TH

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APPENDIX H APPEARED TO BE AUTHENTIC. IT PROVIDES A WRITTEN ACCOUNT, CONTEMPORARY TO THE PERIOD WHEN THE

INCIDENT OCCURRED, THAT DESCRIBES THE FATE OF THE PILOT INVOLVED IN CASE 0691.

C. THE U.S. SPECIALIST TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS OF MOST ITEMS DESCRIBED IN APPENDICES A AND C. THE PHOTOS WILL BE TRANSMITTED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

D. THIS RESEARCH PROJECT HAS YIELDED LESSONS THAT COULD PROVE USEFUL IN THE FUTURE ABOUT THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION IN THE FILES OF PAVN FIELD UNITS.

(1) AS PREDICTED, PAVN COMBAT UNITS DID NOT MAINTAIN RECORDS THAT WERE INDEXED TO SPECIFIC INCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. AIRCRAFT OR PERSONNEL. RECORDS IN THESE UNITS WERE KEYED TO THE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITS. FOR EXAMPLE, ASSESSMENTS OF SELECTED COMBAT ACTIONS DURING A SPECIFIC PERIOD. THIS KNOWLEDGE SHOULD HELP U.S. AND VNOSRP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS TO CONSTRUCT REALISTIC INQUIRIES FOR INFORMATION FROM FIELD UNITS.

(2) AS PREDICTED, CAREFUL RESEARCH IN THOSE TYPES OF WARTIME DOCUMENTS THAT PAVN COMBAT UNITS DID CREATE AND RETAIN CAN YIELD USEFUL INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS, AND PROVIDE LEADS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND FIELD INVESTIGATION.

(3) MEMORABILIA AND DOCUMENTS MAINTAINED BY PAVN COMBAT UNITS HAVE SUFFERED SOME DEGRADATION DUE TO AGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AS WELL AS A SHORTAGE OF MODERN EQUIPMENT AND SKILLED FILES MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL.

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CSY:RAGP1546 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 94 OF 24 BANGKOK TH 02765

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SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN PHOTO AIR DEF REGT RECORDS

(1) PATIENCE WILL BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. AFTER NINE MONTHS SINCE U.S. COMBAT FORCES WITHDREW WE CAN EXPECT TO FIND FEW, IF ANY, PERSONS IN THE PAVN COMBAT UNITS THAT HAVE ANY DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENT OF THEIR UNITS' WARTIME RECORDS.

(2) PROBABLY THE CONDITIONS WILL CAUSE RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND PRODUCTION OF REPORTS SUCH AS THIS TO BE MORE DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING THAN MIGHT BE THE

CASE FOR SIMILAR ACTIVITIES AT HOME. THESE CONDITIONS WILL PREVAIL FOR THE SHORT TERM, BUT HOPEFULLY WE WILL EVENTUALLY OVERCOME THEM. THE U.S. OFFICE IS IN ONE OF THE MOST MODERN BUILDINGS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE IN HANOI. HOWEVER, HIGH ELECTRICITY POWER HAS BEEN UNSTABLE TO THE POINT THAT THE CONDITIONERS DO NOT RUN EFFICIENTLY ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE EXTREMELY HIGH HUMIDITY FROM CAUSING KEYS ON COMMUNICATION KEYBOARDS FROM STICKING AND FORCING PERIODIC SHUT DOWNS. SINCE THE FIRST VISIT TO THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT, THE RESEARCH ANALYST HAS HAD TO DEVOTE MUCH TIME, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, USUALLY FROM BEFORE SUNRISE AND OFTEN WELL PAST MIDNIGHT, ACCOMPLISHING A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT TASKS NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING. SOME EXAMPLES: HELPING TO LOCATE, PURCHASE, AND INSTALL ESSENTIAL OFFICE EQUIPMENT (E.G., HEAVY DUTY VOLTAGE REGULATORS); COORDINATING COMMUNICATIONS FOR MORE THAN THREE TEAMS BETWEEN THREE INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAMS IN THE FIELD, THE VNOSRP, AND SENIOR U.S. AUTHORITIES (ALL PAVN COMMUNICATIONS WITH LOCATIONS OUTSIDE OF HANOI MUST BE MADE FROM THE BUSINESS CENTER ON THE GROUND FLOOR--AIR OFFICES ARE ON THE THIRD FLOOR--OFTEN 1400-1600 HOURS); SCHEDULING OF OPERATIONS AND EACH PLACE YOUR REQUEST IN A QUEUE AND PROVIDE NO CALL BACK WHEN A LINE COMES OPEN; COORDINATING THE myriad DETAILS ASSOCIATED WITH VISITS BY JOURNALIST PRODS AND CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS (THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE HERE IN THE FIELD); IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, HIRING, TRAINING, TALKING, AND EDITING THE PRODUCTION OF A GROUP OF QUALIFIED TRANSLATORS AND TYPISTS. WE

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ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND ARE DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE LOCAL STAFF. ALSO JOINT COORDINATORS IN THE VIETNAM RESEARCH TEAM HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL. ALTHOUGH FORCED BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO PROCEED SOMEWHAT CAREFULLY, THE TEAM WILL BECOME AN INCREASINGLY PRODUCTIVE SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND EFFECTIVE MEANS TO ACCELERATE THE ACCOUNTING PROCESS IN VIETNAM.

7. THERE ARE FIVE APPENDICES TO THE ABOVE REPORT. APPENDIX A CONCERNS THE IDENTIFICATION MEDIA ASSOCIATED WITH REFUGEE DANH PHUON AT THE MUSEUM. APPENDIX B IS A TRANSLATION OF A PAVN DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE DEATH OF AN F-105 PILOT, WITH THE RANK OF MAJOR, ON THE DATE AND

IN THE LOCATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE 0601 INCIDENT. APPENDIX C IS A LIST OF ARTIFACTS EXAMINED AT THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT TRADITION HOUSE. APPENDIX D IS A REQUEST FOR A TECHNICAL RESEARCH ASSISTANT FROM THE JCRC. APPENDIX E IS A REQUEST TO THE VCSMP FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH INTO THE RECORDS OF THE 280TH REGIMENT.

8. APPENDIX A, PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS, CASE 0601. DURING VISITS ON 24 JULY AND 14 AUGUST 1991 TO THE TRADITION HOUSE (REGIMENTAL MUSEUM) OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT, PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN), LOCATED IN GIA LAN DISTRICT, HANOI, DRV, U.S. AND VIETNAMESE RESEARCH SPECIALISTS DISCOVERED THREE PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS BELONGING TO U.S. AIR FORCE NAME CASE 0601.

A. 1 U.S. MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD. THE LAMINATED PLASTIC COVER WAS PARTIALLY SEPARATED FROM THE CARD. THE ID PHOTOGRAPH WAS PARTIALLY FADED. THE CARD DID NOT SHOW OBVIOUS SIGNS OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE. THE CARD WAS MOUNTED ALONG WITH TWO OTHER

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CSY:RXSP0576 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 05: JP 24 BANGKOK TH 02765

0504 100 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REG RECORDS CARDS BELONGING TO NAME IN A SMALL PAPER COVERED PIECE OF 300. THIS CARD AND A GENEVA CONVENTION ID CARD WERE MOUNTED OVER A DISPLAY TAG THAT READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): NAME IDENTIFICATION CARD. THIS CARD CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

NAME ((IN THE PHOTO))
GRADE: 4100
EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFINITE
SERVICE NUMBER: DATA
DATE OF BIRTH: DATA
HEIGHT: 5'00
WEIGHT: 150
COLOR HAIR: BLACK
COLOR EYES: BROWN
BLOOD TYPE: A POS
DATE OF ISSUE: 6 JUL 67
CARD NUMBER: DATA

D. A RESTRICTED AREA ACCESS BADGE (AFFORD MAY

60 1199 ACCOUNTABLE, USAR RESTRICTED AREA RANGE). THE LAMINATED PLASTIC COVER WAS SEPARATED FROM THE CARD. THE ID PHOTOGRAPH WAS MISSING. THE ENTRIES THAT IDENTIFIED THE HOLDER OF THE BADGE HAD FADED AND WERE NO LONGER LEGIBLE. THE CARD DID NOT SHOW OBVIOUS SIGNS OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE. THE CARD WAS MOUNTED ALONG WITH TWO OTHER CARDS BELONGING TO NAME IN A SMALL PAPER COVERED PIECE OF 300. THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS CARD READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "AY IDENTIFICATION CARD FOR AN AMERICAN PILOT PILOT PHUO TANH ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE BASE." THE CARD CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING LEGIBLE ENTRIES:

ISSUING BASE: TANKHAI STATION
POSITION: 35105 ((TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON))

GRADE NUMBER: DATA
CARD NUMBER: DATA
C. AN ARMED FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES GENEVA CONVENTION IDENTIFICATION CARD. THE CARD WAS IN GOOD CONDITION AND DID NOT SHOW OBVIOUS SIGNS OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE. THE CARD WAS MOUNTED ALONG WITH

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TWO OTHER IDENTIFICATION CARDS BELONGING TO
NAME ON A SMALL PAPER-COVERED PIECE OF WOOD. THIS
CARD AND A U.S. MILITARY ID CARD WERE MOUNTED OVER A
DISPLAY-TAG THAT READ ((174 VIETNAMESE)). NAME
IDENTIFICATION CARD. THIS CARD CONTAINED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- NAME: NAME
- GRADE: MAJOR
- BRANCH OF SERVICE: USAF
- SERVICE NUMBER: DATA
- DATE OF BIRTH: DATA

9. APPENDIX 3. PAVN DOCUMENT NOTING THE DEATH OF A
U.S. PILOT, CASE 0681
((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

(3)
REPORT FOR THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1967 (FILE IN
CLASSIFIED FILES)

-- TACTICAL OPERATIONS --
2 OCTOBER 1967
A NUMBER OF COMBAT ACTIONS IN WHICH AIRCRAFT WERE
DOWNED
1/ COMBAT ACTION BY THE 10TH BATTALION AT CA TANG AT
1656 HOURS 2 APRIL 1967: BETWEEN 0500 AND 1900 THE
ENEMY SENT IN FIVE FLIGHTS OF RF101 AND F105 AIRCRAFT
TO CONDUCT NUMEROUS RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE CA-
TANG AREA. //IRRELEVANT TEXT OMITTED//
2/ COMBAT ACTION BY THE 10TH BATTALION IN THE LA-
TRUNG AREA AT 1527 HOURS 19 APRIL ((1967)).
BT

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DELIVER DURING FIRST DIVE WOUND
SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 20TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS
1/ ENEMY SITUATION: AT 0550 HOURS A FLIGHT WAS
ACTIVE AT BATHING ((BATH 7444)). C1-B5 ((1ST BATTERY,
85TH BATTALION)), FIRED 9 SALVOES IN SUPPORT. AT 0650
HOURS A FLIGHT OF UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT APPLIED FPM 3
KLP... ((SIC)) ((FIELD COMMENT: "3" IS SOUTH. THE
NUMBER AFTER "KLP" WHICH WOULD HAVE REPTED THE
DIRECTION TO SOUTHWEST OF SOUTHEAST, WAS EATEN BY
TERMINES)) AND FLEW AROUND. C1-B10, 85TH BN ALSO
FIRED TWO SALVOES AT THIS FLIGHT AND D13 ((13TH
BATTALION)) FIRED A LUCKY FIRE AT A TARGET CIRCLING IN
DIRECTION 34 ((FIELD COMMENT: "34" IS SOUTHWEST)). AT
0707 HOURS A FLIGHT APPEARED AND FLEW IN FROM 34
((THE SE)). C1-B10 FIRED INTERDICTING FIRE (BECAUSE
THEY DIDN'T HAVE A TARGET EQUIPMENT). AT 1-LENG A
AERIAL TARGET DISAPPEARED TOWARD 32 ((THE SW)).

2/ DURING HOURS 1-10 F105'S FLEW IN FROM 32 ((THE SW))
AND CIRLED THE LA-1000V STRATEGIC POSITION ((FOOTNOTE
3)) SEVERAL TIMES AND FROM 10 ((THE NE)) WENT UP HIGH
AND DROVE DOWN AND DROPPED 12 BOMBS ON THE FORD ((STREAM
CROSSING)), BUT MISSED. THE ENTIRE BATTALION FIRED
008-000, 1150 ((FIELD COMMENT: 0-000 MILS OFFSET
ANGLE, AT A TARGET WITHIN 1500/0000)). 30 DEGREE
DIVE. ALL ROUNDS EXPENDED IN 32 ((THE SW)) WITHOUT
RESULTS. 0925 HOURS, A FLIGHT OF 3 AIRCRAFT CAME IN.
1ST RTTY, 85TH BN, FIRED ONE VOLLEY AT 1-... ((FIELD
COMMENT: TERMINES WAS EATEN AWAY MUCH OF THE RIGHT
MARGIN OF THIS PARAGRAPH, INCLUDING THE REMAINDER OF
THIS PLACE NAME)). THE TARGETS PASSED OVER THE

10
STRATEGIC POINT AND DISAPPEARED TOWARD 12 ((THE NE)).
FROM 1000 TO 1500 ONE F101 RECONNOITERED THE STRATEGIC
POSITION. 1504 HOURS FOUR F105S CAME IN FROM 32 ((THE
SW)) AND PASSED OVER THE STRATEGIC POSITION TOWARDS
NUMBER "1 KLP 12 ((SIC))" ((THE N-W)). TWO F105S
CIRLED BACK AND MADE SEVERAL PASSES HIGH OVER THE
STRATEGIC POSITION. EACH AIRCRAFT SLEPT DOWN ONCE FROM
14 ((THE NE)) MAKING A FELICIOUS STRIKE TOWARD 32 ((THE
SW)), BUT HE DIDN'T FIRE ON THEM. AFTER THAT, ONE
AIRCRAFT CIRCLED BACK AND SLEPT DOWN FROM 32 NEP 2
((SIC)) ((THE S-W)) AND RELEASED TWO BOMBS ON THE

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CS4:RAB0547 JERE LTATSON BANGKOK TH

CONCEALED POSITION. HE STILL DIDN'T FINE.

0600Z 1527 HOURS THE ENEMY SUBSISTIVELY SENT IN TWO
 FIVE IN A STEPPED FORMATION (ONE ATOMHE [J] 0) FROM
 NUMBER "12-KEP 1 (XIC) (THE W) 0000". ONE AIRCRAFT
 SNEPT DOWN IN THE 10TH STEPS. BATTLE POSITION 120
 RELEASED TWO DRUMS; BUT THEY STUCK TO THEM FROM THE
 FOOT OF THE MOUNTAIN. THE AREA FOUR CANISTERS OF
 181 HOURS AROUND WERE FROM THERE ACHORS 2 0001
 ANOTHER FIVE SNEPT DOWN (A001) AS IT PREPARED
 TO GO UP TO ... (NUMBER/LETTER EATEN BY TERMITES). HE
 FIRED 2 HEAVY VOLLEYS. HIT, AND BURNING FURIOUSLY, THE
 AIRCRAFT WENT STRAIGHT DOWN IN THE DIRECTION OF ...
 (ONE LETTER/NUMBER EATEN BY TERMITES) ...
 THE PILOT PARACHUTED. HE WAS CAPTURED ALIVE. FIVE HOURS LATER
 (LATER THAN THE PILOT WAS CAPTURED ALIVE). FIVE HOURS LATER
 HE DIED FROM SERIOUS INJURIES). THE AIRCRAFT LANDED IN
 ... (SEVERAL LETTERS EATEN BY TERMITES) SOUTH OF BA
 TWO HAMLET (A005 A 1005), APPROX 5 KM FROM 4-ENG
 (FOOTNOTE 61). TWO ADDS CIRCLED SEVERAL TIMES LOOKING
 FOR THE PILOT, AND FOUR FIVE WERE ACTIVE. (SEVERAL
 DIXH AND 1-ENG, FIRING SOME ROCKETS). SEVERAL
 LETTERS EATEN BY TERMITES) WERE PASSES. 1ST STRY,
 95TH-BN, FIRED SEVERAL VOLLEYS AT THE TWO CIRCLED
 ADDS. 2ND STRY, 95TH BN, AT THE VE ALSO FIRED IN
 COORDINATION.
 (END OF TRANSLATION)

10. APPENDIX C, MISCELLANEOUS ARTIFACTS, POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. POWS AND MIAs, SEEN AT THE BAYB BROTH AND DEFENSE REGIMENT

ON 29 JULY AND 18 AUGUST 1991, THE DIA RESEARCH
SPECIALIST ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. OFFICE FOR POW/MIA
AFFAIRS IN HANOI AND TWO SPECIALISTS FROM THE VIETNAM
OFFICE FOR SEARCH FOR MISSING PERSONS EXAMINED AIRLINE
ARTIFACTS AND MEMORABILIA ON DISPLAY IN THE TRADITION
37

9501101 17 24 28.0000 14 02765

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR REG REGT RECORDS
MUUSE (REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS) OF THE PAVN 280TH AIR
DEFENSE PERIMENT, LOCATED IN THANH LAM DISTRICT OF HANOI,
SVN. THE FOLLOWING ARE DESCRIPTIONS OF EACH EXHIBIT
THAT WAS POSSIBLY RELATED TO AN INCIDENT THAT INVOLVED
A U.S. POW ON 14, AND TRANSLATIONS OF INFORMATION ON
THE DISPLAY LA ASSOCIATED WITH EACH EXHIBIT. FIELD
ANALYSTS OF EACH EXHIBIT IN EACH DESCRIPTION ARE INTERVIEWED AS
INFORMANT OBSERVATIONS THAT ANALYSTS MIGHT FIND USEFUL
WHEN ASSESSING THE REPORTED DATA, NOT FINAL ANALYTIC
JUDGEMENTS.

4- (1) A DISPLAY OF MEMORABILIA CONSISTING OF PAINT AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY EQUIPMENT TAGS, FILING TAGS, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS COMMEMORATING THE FIRST INCIDENT IN WHICH THE 239TH AFWGN DOWNED A U.S. AIRCRAFT, 5 JULY AUGUST 1960. THE DISPLAY INCLUDED A PHOTOGRAPH OF A LARGE GUN THAT THE DISPLAY CAPTION DESCRIBED AS THE 90MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA) GUN THAT HIT THE AIRCRAFT. THE DISPLAY DID NOT INCLUDE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE IDENTITY OR DATE OF THE CREW OF THE AIRCRAFT. (FIELD COMMENT: THE DATE AND APPROXIMATE LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES CORRESPOND TO CASE 0034, WHICH IS A RESOLVED CASE. ANALYSTS WENT ON TO NOTE THAT THE DISPLAY TAGS AND RESEARCHERS DISCOVERED DISPLAY TAGS FOR SEVERAL AIRCRAFT FROM DIFFERENT CASES THAT INACCURATELY ASSOCIATED THE ITEMS WITH CASE 0034. FOR EXAMPLE, SEE FIELD COMMENTS FOR ITEMS 5, 6, AND 10, BELOW.)

(2) A GLASS-COVERED PICTURE FRAME CONTAINING TWO PHOTOGRAPHS. THE PHOTOGRAPH DEPICTS A MALE APPEARING TO BE A BURNING AIRPERSON FALLING VERTICALLY FROM THE SKY AND THE OTHER PHOTOGRAPH DEPICTS A U.S. MILITARY PERSON BELONGING TO NAME , U.S. AIR FORCE. THE CAPTION FOR THE PHOTOGRAPH OF THE ID CARD READS: "THE IDENTIFICATION CARD OF LTC NAME . A PIRATE PILOT WHO WAS SHOT DOWN (CHUNG MIEN THU WA TEN TRUNG TA GIAC LAI MAT YI (STC) RI BAN ROU CHUNG MIEN THU HAF TEY TRUNG SA GIAC LAI MAT YI BAN RI BAN)

12
RONI)). (FIELD COMMENT: THE PHOTOGRAPH HAS A POOR
QUALITY REPRODUCTION OF THE ID CARD; HOWEVER, CAPTAIN

12-7PM (SIC) MACHINE GUN TAKEN FROM THE REARCASE OF A
HELICOPTER THE CITY COMMANDANT SAID 9004 AT VIET CITY ON 1
MAY 1968. THIS HELICOPTER WAS IN THE AREA OF THE
CORRESPOND TO THE HELICOPTER LOSS LISTED IN RECORDS
AVAILABLE IN THE FIELD THE 25TH SOF'S DEPUTY
COMMANDER SAID THE UNIT DOES NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL
RECORDS RELATED SPECIFICALLY TO THIS MACHINE GUN.
BT

0352-316-21

TWO DISPLAY TAGS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS GROUP OF ARTIFACTS. THE CAPTION ON ONE, WHICH WAS LYING LOOSE WITH THE ARTIFACTS, READ (IN VIETNAMESE): "THE FLIGHT HELMET AND LIGHT OF AN AMERICAN PILOT (NAME) DIED (SIC) SHOT DOWN BY THE REGIMENT ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1965." THE CAPTION ON THE OTHER DISPLAY TAG, WHICH WAS SLIGHTLY FADED AND PARTIALLY DESTROYED BY INSECTS, WAS LOCATED INSIDE THE TRANSPARENT PLASTIC ENVELOPE THAT ENCASED THE PHOTOGRAPH. - THE CAPTION ON THIS DISPLAY TAG READ (IN VIETNAMESE): "A MAN WHOSE CHIEF (PIRASE) DESTROYED BY INSECTS)" PIRATE PILOT (ILLEGIBLE) SHOT DOWN BY VIETNAM ON 5 AUGUST 1965." (FIELD COMMENT: THE FLIGHT HELMET SHELL CONTAINED NO MARKINGS THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE PILOT. THE PHOTOGRAPHIC COLLAGE DOES NOT DEPICT THE POSITION OF THE BLOOD CHIT THAT CONTAINS ITS SERIAL NUMBER. THE INFORMATION IN THE DISPLAY TAG THAT REFERRED TO A FLIGHT-NAVEN "PILOT" WHO WAS SHOT DOWN ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1965 APPARENTLY CORRESPONDS TO CASE 011-- RETURNED FOR NAME, U.S. NAVY, WHOSE AREA

14 JF 48

003693/1729/242 15 OF 48 41 0657 242/24:02Z 301914Z AUG 93
CS: P230452 JCR: TALSON HANOI TH

003693/1770/243
CS:1:02370552

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SENT DOWN ABOUT 10-15 KM SOUTHWEST OF VINH 94 10 SEPTEMBER 1965. THE INFORMATION IN THE PHOTO DISPLAY TAG APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT. THE ONLY INCIDENT IN THE 280TH ADR'S AREA OF OPERATIONS ON 5 AUGUST 1964 WAS CASE 0034; A RESOLVED CASE THAT INVOLVED AN F-4E

14

AIRCRAFT. THE INFORMATION IN THE DATA PLATE DEPICTED IN THE PHOTOGRAPH IS FROM AN AIRCRAFT, AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO CORRESPOND TO CASE 0034. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 280TH ADR SAID HE BELIEVED THE CORRECT INCIDENT DATE FOR THIS PHOTOGRAPH SHOULD BE 10 SEPTEMBER 1965 AND THAT THE ITEMS DEPICTED IN THE PHOTOGRAPH WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PILOT NAMED "R1-VO." ANALYSTS WISH TO CONFIRM WHAT AIRCRAFT WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INFORMATION ON THE DATA PLATE DEPICTED IN THIS PHOTOGRAPH BEFORE MAKING A FINAL JUDGMENT. SEE ALSO RELATED ITEMS 4, ABOVE, AND 5, BELOW.)

(6) A DATA PLATE MOUNTED ON A SMALL PAPER-COVERED PIECE WOOD. THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AIRCRAFT NO.: 407-5
PART NO.: NON 63-0395
SERIAL NO.: 418-1358
MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED:
45C-1579
45C-15-42
45C-15-42 (??)

THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ITEM READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "DATA PLATE FROM AN A-1H THAT CRASHED ON CAT'S (PHAN DANG CAT'S) GUN CREW SHOT DOWN ON 5 AUGUST 1964." THE ONLY INCIDENT IN THE 280TH ADR'S AREA OF OPERATIONS ON 5 AUGUST 1964 WAS CASE 0034; A RESOLVED CASE THAT INVOLVED AN A1E AIRCRAFT. THE 280TH

003693/1729/202 10 OF 48 41 0657 202/20:012 301910Z AUG 91
CSM:RX9P0552 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

REF ID: A9 24 011000 14 02755

045 100 01

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT; PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REG RECORDS ADR STAFF COULD NOT SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE INCIDENT THAT MIGHT BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS AIRCRAFT. SEE ALSO RELATED ITEMS 4 AND 5, ABOVE.)

(7) A PIECE OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, APPROXIMATELY RECTANGULAR IN SHAPE, SIZE ABOUT 5 X 8 INCHES; COLOR GREEN WITH BLACK AND INFORMATION ORANGE PRINTING. THE DATA PLATE (45C) FROM THIS WAS HAS BEEN SCRATCHED INTO THE PAINT. THE DISPLAY TAG READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A DATA PLATE FROM A F-4E SHOT DOWN AT PHAN DANG ON 10 (15C) JUNE 1964." ((FIELD COMMENT): THIS ITEM HAS A DATA PLATE. IT APPEARED TO BE A PORTION OF THE OUTER

SPRUE OF AN AIRCRAFT, WHICH ROUTINE MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THE 280TH ADR STAFF COULD NOT SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS AIRCRAFT.)

(8) FIVE SMALL PIECES OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE MOUNTED ON A SMALL PAPER-COVERED WOOD PLATE. THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "PIECES OF VINH CITY'S 100TH AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE REGIMENT." ((FIELD COMMENT): THE 280TH ADR STAFF COULD NOT SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS AIRCRAFT.)

(9) A SMALL, APPROXIMATELY 4 X 5 INCHES, RECTANGULAR SHAPED PIECE OF AIRCRAFT METAL WHICH CONTAINED THE STAMPED INSCRIPTION "F105". THIS INSCRIPTION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN STAMPED IN THE METAL BY THE MANUFACTURER. THE PIECE OF METAL WAS MOUNTED ON A SMALL PAPER-COVERED PIECE OF WOOD. THE FOLLOWING INSCRIPTION ((IN VIETNAMESE)) WAS HAND ENGRAVED INTO THE METAL:

CJMBAT SUCCESS ON 10 NOVEMBER 1960

11TH BATTALION
WESTERN QUANG BINH PROVINCE
DETERMINED TO REPEAT THE AMERICAN INVADERS
THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG MOUNTED WITH THIS ITEM READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A PIECE OF AN AIRCRAFT OIL (BATTALION) SHOT DOWN ON 16 NOVEMBER 1960." ((FIELD

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CSM:RX9P0552 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

COMMENT: THE 280TH AIR STAFF COULD NOT SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ARTIFACT.)

(10) A U.S. 119 FORCE ISSUE REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER 617410. THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG ASSOCIATED WITH THIS WEAPON READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "SIDE ARM OF AN AMERICAN PILOT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ON 5 AUGUST 1964." ((FIELD NOTE: THE SERIAL NUMBER OF THIS WEAPON CORRESPONDS TO THE WEAPON CARRIED BY NAME, U.S. AIR FORCE, CASE 1269, WHOSE F4D AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, VICINITY 173103N/106130E, ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1968. CASE 1269 IS UNRESOLVED. THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS SIGN OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE TO THE WEAPON. THIS IS ONE OF SEVERAL ARTIFACTS THE MUSEUM APPARENTLY HAS MISTAKENLY IDENTIFIED WITH CASE 0034. THE U.S. OFFICE WAS PREPARED A REQUEST FOR THE VNJSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS TO SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR ANY COMBAT ACTION REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS THAT CONTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS INCIDENT.))

(11) A GUINERT'S CHAIR THAT, ACCORDING TO THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG, BELONGED TO "THE 57TH AAA GUN USED TO SHOOT DOWN A RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT ON THE NOTORIZED ROUTE AT HUONG PHO (HUONG KHE) (CHUONG PHOOS; HUONG KHEE) AND ONE F105 AIRCRAFT DURING THE NIGHT OF 4 JUNE 1965." ((FIELD COMMENT: HUONG KHE DISTRICT TOWN IS LOCATED VIC 1818N/10542E, REF 7416. HUONG PHO IS UNLOCATED. THE FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT COINCIDES WITH THE DATE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES RECORDED FOR THIS ARTIFACT.))

BT

803804/1775/202 18 JF 48 41 0693 242/200012 501910Z AUG 91
CS410XRP9579 JCRG LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 10 JF 24 BANGKOK TH 02765

3507 105 01

SUBJECT: PLEASED REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REG RECORDS
- (12) A DISPLAY TAG FOR AN M1 ASSAULT RIFLE ((NOI ON DISPLAY)). THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG RECORDED THIS WAS THE ASSAULT RIFLE "SERGEANT HOANG VAN DUNG ((HUANG VAN DUNG)) USED TO SHOOT DOWN A B57 AIRCRAFT WHEN IT FLEW LOW OVER THE FOREST AREA OF PHUC SON ((PHUC SUAN)) VILLAGE WHILE DUNG WAS GUARDING HIS FIELDS DURING THE NIGHT OF THE 15TH DAY OF THE LUNAR MONTH." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE DISPLAY TAG DID NOT SUPPLY A MONTH OR YEAR FOR THIS INCIDENT. THE LOCATION OF PHUC SON IS UNKNOWN. THE FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT COINCIDES WITH THE LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES RECORDED FOR THIS ARTIFACT.))

(13) A SMALL HAND-WHEEL FOR TURNING A 57MM AAA GUN, ONE OF SEVERAL GUINERT'S CHAIRS CARRIED BY COMPANY COMMANDER NGUYEN, 1ST BATTALION ((BUYEEN NGUYEN)) AT NGAI KHE TANG ((NGAI KHE TANG)) FORD ACROSS THE KHE TANG STREAM)) THAT SHOT DOWN AN F4D ON 28 MARCH 1968. ((FIELD COMMENT: THE INFORMATION IN THIS DISPLAY TAG APPARENTLY REFERS TO CASE 1107, AN F4D LOST WHILE ON A STRIKE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 28 MARCH 1968. NGAI KHE

17

TANG REMAINS UNLOCATED. SEE ITEM 14, BELOW. DURING TWO DIFFERENT JOINT INVESTIGATIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1988, JCRG AND VNJSMP TEAMS INVESTIGATED A REPORTED CRASH SITE FOR AN F4D AIRCRAFT OF THE COAST OF QUANG BINH PROVINCE. ANALYSIS CAN FIND DETAILS IN EITHER THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS OR THE DETAILED INVESTIGATION REPORTS SUBMITTED BY THE JCRG TEAMS.))

(14) A KNIFE ALIGNED STAKE WITH THE NUMBER 36 ((SOUTHEAST)) THAT, ACCORDING TO THE DISPLAY TAG, PLAYED A ROLE IN THE SHOOTING DOWN OF AN AMERICAN F4D AIRCRAFT ON 20 MARCH 1968. ((FIELD COMMENT: SAME AS 15, ABOVE.))

(15) A HAND-MADE SHADE FOR A SMALL FUEL OIL LANTERN. THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ITEM READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "ONE OF SEVERAL LANTERN SHADES HAND-CRAFTED BY THE GUINERTS OF C1 ((COMPANY)), 3103 ((BATTALION)), 2207 ((REGIMENT)), AND USED BY PLATOON

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803804/1775/202 18 JF 48 41 0693 242/200007 301910Z AUG 91
CS410XRP0534 JCRG LIAISON BANGKOK TH

LEADER COMPANY UNIT ((LUA41J)) IN THE COMPANY POST ON 21 APRIL 1969 TO 3100 ((PRIME CHARTS)) AND ISSUE ORDERS TO THE UNIT TO SHOOT DOWN A F105 AIRCRAFT. ((FIELD COMMENT: THE 280TH AIR SQUAD COULD NOT SUPPLY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THIS INCIDENT. THE FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT COINCIDED WITH THE DATE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES RECORDED FOR THIS ARTIFACT.))

- ((16)) A NOTEBOOK USED AS A DIARY BY PHAM HOA NAM ((PHAM HOA NAM)), BATTALION COMMANDER FOR TROOP SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ((ASSIGNED TO)) C20 ((COMPANY)), D29 ((BATTALION)). ((FIELD COMMENT: THE DIA RESEARCHER EXAMINED THE COMPLETE NOTEBOOK AND VERIFIED IT CONTAINED ONLY TEXTS OF RINGS.))

- ((17)) A LENGTH OF HEAVY ROPE. THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ROPE INDICATED IT WAS A "TOM ROPE USED BY C6 ((COMPANY)), 9102 ((BATTALION)) TO PULL ARTILLERY PIECES SET-UP ON MARCH AND 20 JUNE 1969. FOUR U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN IN WESTERN QUANG BINH PROVINCE." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT COINCIDED WITH THE DATES AND GENERAL LOCATION CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAGS FOR THIS ROPE.))

- ((18)) A BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH WITH A CAPTION THAT DESCRIBED IT AS A PHOTOGRAPH OF "GUY CHEN 3, C4 ((COMPANY)), D102 ((BATTALION)), ON 21 MARCH 1971, WHICH PARTICIPATED WITH THE ENTIRE UNIT IN SHOOTING DOWN 11 U.S. AIRCRAFT." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE DATE COINCIDES WITH THE DATES OF JAPVY OPERATION LAN SON 719 (I.E., THE INCURSION INTO LAOS). ALTHOUGH PAVN FORCES OPPOSING THE OPERATION INFLECTED HEAVY DAMAGE ON U.S. AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING THE OPERATION, THIS

91

003007/1770/202 20 JF48 11 0090 202/20:00Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSNIRXBP056 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 11 OF 20 BANGKOK TH 42765

0307 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR REF REG RECORDS. DISPLAY TAG DOES NOT SUPPLY ENOUGH INFORMATION TO IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT DOWNED BY ELEMENTS OF THE D102 BATTALION.))

- ((19)) A SKETCH MAP TITLED ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A SKETCH OF THE BATTLE AT 1819 HOURS, 4 MAY 1969, IN WHICH C6 & C5 ((COMPANIES)) SHOT DOWN AN RF-4C. THE SKETCH DEPICTS A SOUTHWEST-NORTHEAST FLIGHT PATH THAT PASSES OVER "A-KY" AND THEN CIRCLES WEST AND SOUTH OVER A HIGH POINT SOUTH OF "CA ROONG" ((CAF. ROONG)). THE SKETCH INDICATED THE AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN WEST OF A-KY. ((FIELD COMMENT: FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT CORRESPONDS TO THE DATE AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT IDENTIFIED IN THIS SKETCH. CA ROONG MAY BE CO ROONG, 1711W/1043NE, YE41R1. A-KY IS UNLOCATED. BASED ON TYPE OF AIRCRAFT CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAGS FOR THIS ITEM AND ITEM 20, BELOW, ANALYSTS MAY ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY THE INCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THIS SKETCH IS CASE 1101.))

- ((20)) AN INFLATABLE LIFE BOAT BEARING THE SERIAL NUMBER 66317. HAND-LETTERED ENTRIES ON THE BOAT REVEALED THAT U.S. TECHNICIANS HAD INSPECTED THE BOAT FOR SERVICEABILITY ON THE FOLLOWING DATES:

- 18 AUGUST 1967
- 19 OCTOBER 1967
- 22 DECEMBER 1967
- 15 FEBRUARY 1968
- 14 APRIL 1968 ((THE LAST RECORDED INSPECTION))

ALTHOUGH THE BOAT WAS SEVERELY DETERIORATED, IT DID NOT

SHOW OBVIOUS SIGNS OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE. THE DISPLAY TAG READS ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A BOAT THAT BELONGED TO THE AMERICAN PILOT OF AN RF-4C THAT D105 ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN ON 25 JANUARY 1968." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE INCIDENT DATE CITED ON THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ARTIFACT APPEARS TO BE INACCURATE, SINCE THE LAST TIME U.S. PERSONNEL INSPECTED THE RAFT WAS NEARLY THREE MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF SHOOTDOWN CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG. THE RECORD OF INSPECTIONS INDICATES THE RAFT RECEIVED AN INSPECTION AT TWO-MONTH INTERVALS)

PROTECT FOR RUMJ8PS

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CSNIRXBP0296 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

THEREFORE, THE NEXT SCHEDULED INSPECTION WOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT MID-JUNE 1968. CASE 1181 IS THE ONLY RFAC AIRCRAFT LOST IN THE 290TH ADR'S AREA OF OPERATION DURING THE 3 1/2 MONTHS PERIOD BETWEEN 14 APRIL AND 1 AUGUST 1968. THE CASE 1181 AIRCRAFT WAS LOST ON 18 MAY 1968 IN THE VICINITY OF 1713N/10635E. ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS, U.S. AIR FORCE, NAME IS A RETURNED POW. THE OTHER CREWMEMBER, U.S. AIR FORCE CAPTAIN, NAME, IS STILL UNACCOUNTED-FOR. SEE ALSO FIELD COMMENTS FOR ITEM 19, ABOVE.)

(21) A LONG-RECTANGULAR PIECE OF RED CLOTH, ABOUT 324 X 4 INCHES, WITH THE WORDS REMOVED BEFORE FLIGHT STENCILED IN WHITE BLOCK LETTERS ON ONE SIDE. THE TRADITION HOUSE DISPLAY TAG READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "THE PARACHUTE RELEASE STRAP OF AN AMERICAN GIRL PILOT THAT C3 ((COMPANY)) SHOT DOWN ON 24 APRIL 1967." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE ARTIFACT AND TAG DID NOT YIELD ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT.))

(22) AN INFLATABLE PERSONAL SURVIVAL VEST THAT BORE THE FOLLOWING INSCRIPTION:

- 5803558
- AIR CRUISE, CO.
- DIVISION OF GIBNETT CORP.
- DOL 700-67-C-6874.
- DATE OF MANUFACTURE: MAR 1966
- SERIAL NUMBER: 951248

THE 290TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)):

"THE INFLATABLE SURVIVAL VEST OF THE AMERICAN PILOT PILOT OF AN F4H AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ON THE 20

SONG GIANG ((RIVER)) ON 3 JUNE 1966." ((FIELD COMMENT: BT

REF ID: A12-07 24 0416035 14 22755

DELIVERED DURING F1551 JULY 4/68
SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: DATA PLATE 290TH AIR DEF REG RECORDS
THE INCIDENT DATE CITED ON THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ARTIFACT APPEARS TO BE INACCURATE, SINCE THE ITEM WAS MANUFACTURED APPROXIMATELY 22 MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT DATE CITED ON THE DISPLAY TAG. THE VEST DID NOT HAVE A RECORD OF INSPECTION, OR OTHER INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH IT. THE VEST WAS IN MODERATELY GOOD CONDITION AND DID NOT SHOW OBVIOUS SIGNS OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE.)

(23) AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT DATA PLATE MOUNTED LOOSE WITH TWO OTHER DATA PLATES ON A PAPER-COVERED PIECE OF WOOD. THE DISPLAY TAG REVEALS THIS DATA PLATE READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A DATA PLATE FROM AN F105 AIRCRAFT, TAIL NUMBER 1519, WHICH THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ON 4 JUNE 1968 AT 4100N 106E ((4030N 106E))." THE DATA PLATE CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- AIRCRAFT NO.: F1050
- PART NO.: 57M 27-1003-5-2
- COAT. NO.: AF 33-400-54752
- SERIAL NO.: DIP SP#3 SRM989164L
((FIELD COMMENT: THIS DISPLAY TAG APPEARS ORIGINALLY TO HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE DATA PLATE DESCRIBED IN ITEM 24, BELONGING TO PART NO. 79F 75021, SERIAL NO. 15099. THE NUMBER "15099" APPEARS TO BE THE SERIAL NUMBER OF PART NO. 79F 75021, DESCRIBED IN ITEM 24, BELONGING TO AN AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER. FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS DATA PLATE AND THE DATA PLATE DESCRIBED IN ITEM 24, BELONG, ARE RELATED TO THE SAME OR DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT. HUNG KHE DISTRICT TOWN IS LOCATED VIC 1610N/10542E, WF7416. FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT COINCIDED WITH THE DATE, LOCATION, TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, AND CIRCUMSTANCES CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ARTIFACT.))

(24) AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT DATA PLATE MOUNTED LOOSE WITH TWO OTHER DATA PLATES ON A PAPER-COVERED PIECE OF WOOD. THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- AIRCRAFT NO.: F105
- PART NO.: 79F 75021
- SERIAL NO.: 15199

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000069/2310/202 070F 48 MI 0350 263/09:222 301914Z AUG 91
CSM:RHP0296 JERC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

003709/1734/212 070F 48 01 0001 262/20:10Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSM:RHP0594 JERC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CONTRACT NO.: AF 36-608-20754

SERIAL NO.: 1349

(FIELD COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THIS DATA PLATE HAS NOT OBVIOUSLY LINKED TO EITHER OF THE TWO DISPLAY TAGS MOUNTED ON THE PIECE OF WOOD, IT APPEARS UNUSUALLY TO HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A TAG THAT READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A DATA PLATE FROM AN F105 AIRCRAFT, TAIL NUMBER 1509, WHICH THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ON 4 JUNE 1966 AT HUONG KHE ((VIETNAM KHE))." THE NUMBER "1509" APPEARS TO BE THE SERIAL NUMBER OF PART NO. 79F 75021 1--NOT AN AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER. HUONG KHE DISTRICT TOWN IS LOCATED VIC 1814N/10542E, #67016. FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT COINCIDED WITH THE DATE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ARTIFACT.))

(25) AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT DATA PLATE MOUNTED LOOSE WITH TWO OTHER DATA PLATES ON A WOOD-COVERED PIECE OF WOOD. THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS DATA PLATE READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A DATA PLATE FROM AN F4 THAT DROD ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN ON 25.11.1968 ((SIC)) IN WESTERN QUANG BINH ((PROVINCE))." THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AIRCRAFT NO.: F4
PART NO.: 53-13091-0621
CONTRACT NO.: (NO ENTRY)
SERIAL NO.: R37-1101

(FIELD COMMENT: THE INFORMATION IN THIS DISPLAY TAG AND DATA PLATE APPEAR TO BE RELATED TO CASE 1329. CASE 1329 WAS AN F4D LOST IN WESTERN QUANG BINH, VIC 172060N/1061144E, YE 270185, ON 25 NOVEMBER 1968. THE TWO CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED IN CASE 1329 ARE STILL

91

SECTION 13 OF 24 BANGKOK TM 02765

0300 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS UNACCOUNTED-FOR. SEE ALSO ITEM 26 (AIRCREW'S CHECKLIST) AND ITEM 27 (REVOLVER, SERIAL NO. K597312), BELOW.))

(26) A TWO-VOLUME AIRCREW'S CHECKLIST FOR THE U.S. F4D AND F4C AIRCRAFT, PUBLISHED IN JANUARY 1969. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER WAS FOUND INSIDE THE BOOK:

091655. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS NUMBER WAS NOT CLEAR. THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS INCIDENT AS: "HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE F4C F4D AIRCRAFT TAKEN FROM AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT THAT C02 ((COMPANY)), 0105 ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN ON 23.10.1968 ((SIC)), AT KILOMETER 32 ON ROUTE 20." (FIELD COMMENT: ALL PAGES HAD A REDDISH HUE THAT APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY HAVING BEEN SOAKED IN AVIATION FUEL. ALL PAGES FELT AND SMELLED AS IF THEY HAD BEEN SATURATED IN AVIATION FUEL. THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS SIGN OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE. ALTHOUGH FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT COINCIDED PRECISELY WITH THE INFORMATION CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ARTIFACT, ANALYSTS SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THESE AIRCREW'S CHECKLIST COULD BE RELATED TO CASE 1329. THE DISPLAY TAG FOR PART NO. 53-13091-0621, SERIAL NO. R37-1101, DESCRIBED IN ITEM 25 ABOVE, INDICATED THE 105TH BATTALION SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN CASE 1329. CASE 1329 INVOLVED AN F4D LOST IN WESTERN QUANG BINH, VIC 172060N/1061144E, YE 270185, ON 25 NOVEMBER 1968. BASED ON EXAMINATION OF U.S. AND SRV MAPS, THE U.S. OFFICE ESTIMATES THAT KILOMETER 32, ROUTE 20, IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY AT 172100N/1061230E, WHICH IS VERY NEAR THE LOCATION WHERE THE CASE 1329 AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN. THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THE AIRCREW'S CHECKLIST EXHIBITED IN THE 280TH ADR'S TRADITION HOUSE CITED THE WRONG INCIDENT DATE. SEE ALSO ITEM 25 (DATA PLATE FOR PART NO. 53-13091-0621, SERIAL NO. R37-1101), ABOVE, AND ITEM 27 (REVOLVER, SERIAL NO. K597312), BELOW.))

(27) A U.S. AIR FORCE ISSUE REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER K597312, AND A LEATHER HOLSTER. A USAF UNIT ACCOUNTING NUMBER, "58", WAS HAND-PAINTED IN WHITE

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0000

060670/2347/202 25 OF 48 41 0359 243/08:23Z 301910Z AUG 91
CS4:RXBP0295 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

803709/1754/202 24 OF 48 41 0661 242/20:06Z 301910Z AUG 91
CS4:RXBP0554 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

PAINT ON THE BASE OF THE PISTOL GRIP. THE DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS WEAPON ((IN VIETNAMESE)) AS: "SIDE ARM OF ((MISSING TEXT)) AMERICAN ((NAMED)) ASSELY ((SIC)), WHO THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN IN QUANG TRI ((PROVINCE))." ((FIELD NOTE: THIS SERIAL NUMBER BELONGED TO THE WEAPON CARRIED BY U.S. AIR FORCE, CASE 1329, WHOSE F4D AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, VICINITY 172000N/1061140E, XE 270185, ON 25 NOVEMBER 1968. THERE WERE NO OBVIOUS SIGNS OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE TO EITHER THE

REVOLVER OR HOLSTER. THE TWO CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED IN CASE 1329 ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED-FOR. THE INFORMATION IN 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS REVOLVER AND HOLSTER APPEARS TO BE INACCURATE OR ORIGINALLY WAS RELATED TO A DIFFERENT ARTIFACT. THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE REVOLVER, THE HOLSTER, OR THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE AMERICAN NAMED "ASSELY" ((SIC)) OR ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT IN QUANG TRI THAT COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN AMERICAN NAMED "ASSELY". SEE ALSO ITEM 25 (DATA PLATE FOR PART NO. 53-13401-0621, SERIAL NO. R37-1(41) AND ITEM 24 (AIRCREW'S CHECKLIST), ABOVE.))

((28)) A 16MM FILM MAGAZINE FOR AN AIRCRAFT GUN CAMERA MOUNT. THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS ITEM ((IN VIETNAMESE)) AS: "THE CASE FROM A COMMUNICATION DEVICE OF ONE OF THE F105 AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN IN THE WESTERN REGION." THE DATA PLATE ON THE ITEM CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- MAGAZINE, FILM
- 16MM 50-FOOT CAPACITY, LB-49
- ORDER NO. 4P04(506)15079-AS-66-1
- MFP'S PART NO. 331215 STUCK NO.:

6760NC220968G

- SERIAL NO. ((?)) 0 ((OBSCURED EXCEPT FOR LAST DIGIT))
BT

806870/2319/202 74 OF 48 41 0359 263/08:232 301914Z AUG 91
CS4:RX9P0295 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RECIPIENT 14 OF 24 BANGKOK TH 2705

03:4 13K 01

SUBJECT: RELAYED 14-0001: PAVN 280TH ADR DEF REGT RECORDS
MFP'S: SUS DATA SYSTEMS, PANJNA,

CALIF.
((FIELD COMMENT: THIS FILM MAGAZINE APPEARS ORIGINALLY TO HAVE BEEN A PART OF THE U.S. NAVY AIRCRAFT GUN CAMERA MOUNT DESCRIBED IN ITEM 29, ABOVE. FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT THE FILM MAGAZINE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH.))

((29)) A U.S. NAVY GUN CAMERA MOUNT. THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS ITEM ((IN VIETNAMESE)) AS: "AN ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FROM AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE ASSISTANT COMPANY COMMANDER OF ((COMPANY)) 31, COMPANDE DAUNG XUAN NGHIEP ((NAMES)) AIRMAN ((SIC))". THE DATA PLATE ON THE GUN CAMERA MOUNT CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- J.S. NAVY
- GUN CAMERA MOUNT
- TYPE 1203

((FIELD COMMENT: THE FILM MAGAZINE DESCRIBED IN ITEM 27, ABOVE, APPEARS ORIGINALLY TO HAVE BEEN A PART OF THIS AIRCRAFT GUN CAMERA MOUNT. FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT THIS ARTIFACT WAS ASSOCIATED WITH.))

((30)) A SIGNAL MIRROR FROM AN AVIATOR'S SURVIVAL BEAR. THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ITEM READS ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A SIGNAL MIRROR FROM AN F4 ((SIC)) AIRCRAFT THE ((MISSING TEXT)) BATTALION SHOT DOWN AT DO YANG ((IN)) VANGP 1 ON 10.3.67 ((SIC--10 MARCH 1967))." ((FIELD COMMENT: DO YANG IS UNLOCATED. THE MIRROR AND DISPLAY TAG DID NOT YIELD ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT THE MIRROR WAS ASSOCIATED WITH.))

((31)) THE SHEL OF AN OLIVE DRAB COLORED FLIGHT HELMET WITH A WHITE VISOR. THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG READS ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "THE HELMET OF AN AMERICAN PILOT THAT CO2 ((COMPANY)), 873 ((BATTALION)) DOWNED AT THE NET ((NAME)) NETS)) ON

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003712/1735/272
CS4:RX9P0295

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41 0662 262/20:062 301914Z AUG 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

2-5-1967 ((SIC--2 MAY 1967)). ((FIELD COMMENT: THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE HELMET OR THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ARTIFACT. THE HELMET POSSIBLY IS LOCATED VIC 1537/10556, 43698 (REF. INDEX TO PLACE NAMES ON 1:50,000 MAPS OF VIETNAM, VOL. II, MAY 1967).))

- ((32)) AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT COMPONENT MADE OF CANVAS AND METAL. THE DISPLAY TAG IN 280TH ADR'S TRADITION HOUSE DESCRIBED THE ITEM AS FOLLOWING ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A PART OF THE PARACHUTE OF AN AMERICAN PRIVATE PILOT THAT DIED IN THE 280TH ADR'S PLATOON SHOT DOWN." THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS HAND-LETTERED IN BLACK INK ON THE CANVAS PORTION OF THE ITEM:

146T. 7-7-67

25

EXP. 7-7-73

((FIELD COMMENT: THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE ITEM OR THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ARTIFACT.))

- ((33)) A PAIR OF SHOES ON U.S. MILITARY JUNGLE BOOTS. THE CAPTION ON THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG READS ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "THE SHOES OF AN AMERICAN PILOT SHOT DOWN BY THE REGIMENT." A MANUFACTURE'S STAMP IN THE BOOTS INDICATED THEY WERE MANUFACTURED IN MARCH 1967. ((FIELD COMMENT: THE BOOTS SHOWED NO OBVIOUS SIGNS OF KICK IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE. THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE BOOTS OR THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE BOOTS.))

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803712/1735/202 2X OF 48 41 0662 252/201032 301010Z AUG 91
CSY:R4P0585 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 13 OF 24 BANGKOK 14 02705

036 106 01

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR REG REGT RECORDS
- ((34)) A FLASH SUPPRESSOR FOR THE MUZZLE OF AN AAA GUN. THE CAPTION ON THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG READS ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "Muzzle flash suppressor for the 3102 ((BATTALION)) 57TH AAA REGT THAT DOWNED AN A7 ((SIC)) AIRCRAFT AT 54 30 ((17 37-3)) ON 24.10.72." ((FIELD COMMENT: "A 57" IS UNIDENTIFIED. THE DATE AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT ((UNRECORDED)) TO CASE 1992. CASE 1992 IS A RESOLVED CASE.))

- ((35)) AN UNIDENTIFIED CLIP WITH A DISPLAY TAG THAT READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A 44 AMMUNITION CLIP WHICH THE 3102 ((BATTALION)) USED TO SHOOT DOWN AN F-1 WHICH CRASHED AND WAS TORN TO PIECES AT 94 60 04 ((16)) 14.72." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE DAY CITED IN THE INCIDENT DATE WAS PLOD AND NOT CLEARLY LEGIBLE, BUT APPEARED TO BE THE NUMBER 13. A 63 IS UNLOCATED. FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS AMMUNITION CLIP.))

- ((36)) A U.S.-ISSUED MAP, ENCASED IN PLASTIC, COVERING THE AREA BETWEEN 14 AND 19 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE AND 104.45 AND 107.15 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE. A TYPEWRITTEN LIST OF POINTS NUMBERED 1-85 WITH ASSOCIATED COORDINATES WAS GLUED TO ONE SIDE OF THE MAP. ((FIELD COMMENT: THE MAP APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN

DESIGNED FOR USE IN AIR OPERATIONS. THERE WAS NO DISPLAY TAG OR OTHER INFORMATION DESCRIBING THE ORIGIN OF THE MAP. AN EXAMINATION OF THE MAP FAILED TO YIELD ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MAP.))

- ((37)) A U.S. M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHER, SERIAL NUMBER 177124. THE NAME TAG WAS CARVED INTO THE STOCK. THE CAPTION IN 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG INDICATED THIS ITEM WAS CAPTURED DURING FIGHTING WITH INFANTRY TROOPS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. ((FIELD COMMENT: THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 280TH ADR SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THIS M-79 WAS CAPTURED FROM REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES DURING OR AFTER THE 1972 SPRING OFFENSIVE IN WHICH PAVN FORCES CROSSED THE DEVIANTIZED ZONE TO OCCUPY NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, IN SOUTHERN

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803542/1775/202 2X OF 49 41 0699 252/201032 301010Z AUG 91
CSY:R4P0585 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

VIETNAM. FIELD ANALYSTS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE RECORDS OF THE DISPLAY TAG THAT MIGHT HELP CONFIRM THE ORIGIN OF THIS ARTIFACT.)

(38) A FULL BLUDGE. THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ITEM READ ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "A CLOCK FROM AN ADR AIRCRAFT, WHICH GUMCHEN 2, D18 ((COMPANY)), D108 ((BATTALION)), SHOT DOWN ON 01-06-72 ((SIC--6 APRIL 1972))." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE FUEL GAGE DID NOT HAVE A SERIAL NUMBER OR OTHER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION. FIELD ANALYSTS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FUEL GAGE.))

(39) A U.S. MILITARY EMERGENCY RADIO. THE DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS ITEM ((IN VIETNAMESE)) AS: "A CASE FOR A RADIO ON AN F4H ((SIC) AIRCRAFT, WHICH C1 ((COMPANY)), D0216 ((BATTALION)) DOWNED ON 31-3-72." THE DATA PLATE FOR THE RADIO CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- AN/((MISSING DATA))
- PART NO.: 7(S)6937-001
- MFR-SERIAL NO.: 37695
- SERIAL NO.: 1432

((FIELD COMMENT: THE DATA PLATE WAS HEAVILY CORRODED

27
MAKING SOME DATA UNREADABLE. FIELD ANALYSTS WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY AIRCRAFT LOSSES ON 31 MARCH 1972, NOR ANY F4 AIRCRAFT DOWN WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS OF THAT DATE. FIELD ANALYSTS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT THIS RADIO WAS ASSOCIATED WITH.))
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803892/1774/242 30 OF 48 41 0599 243/201582 3019102 AUG 91
CSN:RXRP0585 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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0360 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS

(40) A RED AND WHITE FLIGHT HELMET. THE RANK AND NAME "WRE" WAS SPELLED OUT WITH REFLECTIVE TAPE ON THE BACK OF THE HELMET. A STYLIZED SILHOUETTE OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A FIGHTING ROOSTER HAD BEEN PLACED ON EACH SIDE OF THE HELMET. THE CAPTION ON THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THE HELMET AS "A PIRATE PILOT'S HELMET-BELOWING TO THE PILOT OF AN F4 THAT D195 ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN AT CA LU ON 13-4-72 ((SIC--13 APRIL 1972))." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE INFORMATION IN THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DOES NOT ACCURATELY DESCRIBE THE ORIGIN OF THIS HELMET. THE HELMET BELONGED TO USN NAME CASE 0076. HE IS A

RETURNED POW. HIS ARC WENT DOWN ON 20 APRIL 1965, IN THE VICINITY OF NGHIA DAN DISTRICT, NGHE TINH PROVINCE, NORTHERN VIETNAM. CA LU, THE LOCATION CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG IN THE 280TH ADR TRADITION HOUSE, IS LOCATED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, SOUTHERN VIETNAM, VICINITY OF 1601N/10652E, X09945. FIELD ANALYSTS WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN INCIDENT THAT COINCIDES PRECISELY WITH THE DATE, LOCATION, AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG. FIELD ANALYSTS NOTED THAT CASE 2004 INVOLVED AN F4 THAT WENT DOWN ONE DAY LATER, ON 14 APRIL 1972, ABOUT 15-20 KM NORTHEAST OF THE LOCATION CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG. SEE ALSO ITEM 41, BELOW.))

(41) THE METAL BLADE OF AN ENTRENCHING SHOVEL. THE CAPTION IN THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY DESCRIBED THIS ITEM AS "A SHOVEL BELONGING TO THE AMERICAN PILOT OF AN AIRCRAFT THAT D103 ((BATTALION)) DOWNED AT HAI LOI ((SIC--HAI LOOI)) ON 14-4-72." ((FIELD COMMENT: THE SPELLING CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THE INCIDENT LOCATION IS UNLOCATED. THE INCIDENT LOCATION COULD BE A MISSPELLING FOR WAR LOC ((HAI LOOC)), IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, SOUTHERN VIETNAM. MEMBERS OF THE 280TH ADR AND VARIOUS DISPLAYS IN THE 280TH ADR'S TRADITION HOUSE INDICATE THE 280TH ADR WAS OPERATING IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DURING 1972. ANALYSTS SHOULD CONSIDER THE

20
POSSIBILITY THAT THE INFORMATION IN THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS SHOVEL IS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 2004. CASE 2004 INVOLVED AN F4 AIRCRAFT THAT WENT DOWN ON THE DATE

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CSN:RXRP0026 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG AND AT A LOCATION ABOUT 9-10 KM NORTH OF NAI LOC ((NAI LOC)), QUANG TRI PROVINCE. LOCAL RESIDENTS REFER TO NAI LOC AN VUNG CUA ((THE CUA AREA)). ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED IN CASE 2044 IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR; THE REMAINS OF THE OTHER CREWMEMBER WERE RETURNED TO THE U.S. IN 1985. THOSE REMAINS WERE RETURNED WITH A CAPTION INDICATING THIS PERSON HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN CUA VIET, WHICH IS LOCATED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, VIC 1654N/10711E, YD3569. THE SHOVEL BLADE WAS RUSTED, BUT IN GOOD CONDITION. THERE WERE NO OBVIOUS SIGNS OF HIGH IMPACT OR FIRE DAMAGE. SEE ALSO ITEM NO. ABOVE.)

(42) A DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT. THIS EXHIBIT DID NOT HAVE A DISPLAY TAG. THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- WFR BY SARGENT-FLETCHER CO.
- EL MONTE, CALIF.
- TANK AND INTEGRAL PYLON, FUEL, AIRCRAFT, EXTERNAL, JETTISONABLE
- CLASS: I CAPACITY: 370 GAL.
- HEIGHT EMPTY: 289 LBS
- WFR PART NO: 26-370-4845
- GOVERNMENT ORDER NO.: BJA AF OR (607)

9979-00-65-1

SERIAL NUMBER: 6091
((FIELD COMMENTS: FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS DATA PLATE.))

(43) A DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT. THE CAPTION IN THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS AS "A DATA PLATE FROM AN F8U-24 AIRCRAFT THAT D105 ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN DURING THE ROUTE 9-SOUTHERN LAOS CAMPAIGN IN THE NEWLY LIBERATED REAR AREA." THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- AIRCRAFT NO.: F8U-24 ((SIC))

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CSN:RXBP0026 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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0360 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS
PART NO.: C-((7)) 420185-6

- 29
- CONT. NO.: N (3) 59-0-0154
- SERIAL NO.: 153-82
- MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED:
- 150

((FIELD COMMENT: THE F8U-24 IS ALSO KNOWN AS THE F8D. FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INCIDENT THAT CORRESPONDS TO THE TYPE AIRCRAFT AND GENERAL LOCATION AND DATES CITED OR IMPLIED IN THIS DATA PLATE AND ASSOCIATED DISPLAY TAG. THE CAPTION IN THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DID NOT CITE A SPECIFIC LOCATION AND DATE; HOWEVER, PAVN USES THE TERM "ROUTE 9-SOUTHERN LAOS CAMPAIGN" CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG TO REFER TO ITS COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TO THE US/GVN INCURSION INTO LAOS (US/GVN OPERATION RAINBOW-719), ALONG ROUTE 9, BETWEEN THE VIETNAM-LAOS BORDER AND KHEPONE, LAOS, IN EARLY 1971. THE PAVN HIGH COMMAND ANTICIPATED THE US/GVN OPERATION AND BEGAN DEPLOYING 170 FORCES FOR THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN LATE 1970. 870 FRONT, WHICH WAS THE HEADQUARTERS FOR PAVN FORCES, WAS IN PLACE IN LAOS, NEAR THE WEST END OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AT LEAST AS EARLY AS OCTOBER 1970 AND REMAINED IN PLACE THROUGH ABOUT MID-1971.))

(44) A DISPLAY TAG CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING CAPTION ((IN VIETNAMESE)): "PILOT'S IDENTIFICATION CARD BELONGING TO PILOT NAME"

((FIELD COMMENT: THE INFORMATION IN THE DISPLAY TAG IS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1253, WHICH IS A RESOLVED CASE.

NAME REMAINS WERE RETURNED IN 1985. THE OTHER CREWMEMBER IS A RETURNED POW. NAME IDENTIFICATION CARD WAS NOT ON DISPLAY AT THE 280TH ADR'S TRADITION HOUSE. THE MEMBERS OF THE 280TH ADR STAFF WHO ASSISTED WITH THE RESEARCH ON 29 JULY AND 14 AUGUST 1991, SAID THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE CARD.))

(45) A DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT. THE CAPTION ON THE 280TH ADR'S DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS ITEM AS "A DATA PLATE FROM AN A4E AIRCRAFT THAT D102 ((BATTALION)) DOWNED AT BEN THAN ((BEENS THAN)) (QUANG

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

804979/1957/242 37 OF 48 41 0029 2a3/00:59Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0027 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TRI), IN APRIL 1972. THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

30
AIRCRAFT MOD.: A6E
PART NO.: 5672169-3
CONT. NO.: N04 (A) 660045-F
SERIAL NO.: ALD-830
((FIELD COMMENTS: BEEN THAN IS LOCATED VICINITY 1650N/10650E, YD1077. FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY INCIDENT THE CORRESPONDED TO THE TYPE AIRCRAFT, LOCATION, AND DATE CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS DATA PLATE.))
((46) A GROUP OF FOUR U.S. MANUFACTURED SIGNAL FLARES, APPARENTLY FROM AN AIRCRAFT SURVIVAL KIT. ((FIELD COMMENTS: INSECTS HAVE EATEN MUCH OF THE DISPLAY TAG ASSOCIATED WITH THE FLARES. THE ONLY DETAILS THAT COULD BE GLEANED FROM THE DISPLAY TAG INDICATED THAT THE FLARES CAME FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT THAT WAS TORN APART AT AN UNSPECIFIED LOCATION AND DATE.

11. APPENDIX D. (REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE)

ON 29 JULY AND 14 AUGUST 1991, THE DIA RESEARCH SPECIALIST ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. OFFICE FOR PDA/MIA AFFAIRS IN HANOI AND TWO SPECIALISTS FROM THE VIETNAM OFFICE FOR SEARCH FOR MISSING PERSONS EXAMINED ALL WARTIME ARTIFACTS AND MEMORABILIA ON DISPLAY IN THE TRADITION HOUSE ((REGIMENTAL MUSEUM)) OF THE PAVN 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT, LOCATED IN GIA LAN DISTRICT OF HANOI, SVN. THE FOLLOWING ARE DESCRIPTIONS OF SEVERAL ITEMS THAT REQUIRE FURTHER RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT COMPONENT NUMBERS AND SERIAL NUMBERS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE RELATED TO AN INCIDENT THAT

004970/1957/202 34/48 MI 0029 263/00:59Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RX0P0027 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION: 15 OF 24 BANGKOK TH 02705

0354-105-01

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REAR RECORDS INVOLVED A U.S. P347K MIA. REQUEST THAT HEADQUARTERS JCRC ACCOMPLISH THE APPROPRIATE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS FOR EACH ITEM AND PASS THE RESULTS TO THE U.S. OFFICE IN HANOI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THEY MIGHT BE INCORPORATED, AS APPROPRIATE, INTO THE PLANNING FOR THE NEXT ITERATION OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS. FIELD COMMENTS ACCOMPANYING EACH DESCRIPTION ARE INTENDED AN INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS THAT ANALYSTS MIGHT FIND USEFUL WHEN ASSESSING THE REPORTED DATA, NOT FINAL ANALYTIC JUDGEMENTS.

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(1) A U.S. MACHINE GUN, APPARENTLY .50 CALIBER, SERIAL NUMBER 1173933, MANUFACTURED BY P&H (POSSIBLY REMUE ISLANDS POSSIBLE). THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S TRADITION HOUSE INDICATED THIS MACHINE GUN WAS TAKEN FROM THE CREWAGE OF A HELICOPTER THE C11 COMPANY SHOT DOWN AT VINH CITY ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1965. THE DATE AND LOCATION CITED IN THE VIETNAMESE RECORD COULD BE INACCURATE.

(2) A DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT THAT CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AIRCRAFT MOD.: F105
PART NO.: 574 27 1003-5-2
CONT. NO.: AF 36-600-50752
SERIAL NO.: DIR SP03 30N190104L
THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THE ABOVE DATA PLATE READS: "A DATA PLATE FROM AN F105 AIRCRAFT, TAIL NUMBER 1509, WHICH THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ON 6 JUNE 1966 AT MUONG KHE ((MUONG KHE))." THIS DISPLAY TAG APPEARS ORIGINALLY TO HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A DIFFERENT DATA PLATE THAT CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
AIRCRAFT MOD.: F105
PART NO.: 79F 75021 1
CONTRACT NO.: AF 36-600-20786
SERIAL NO.: 1509
THE NUMBER "1509" APPEARS TO BE THE SERIAL NUMBER OF PART NO. 79F 75021 1, NOT AN AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER. FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THESE TWO DATA PLATES ARE RELATED TO THE SAME OR DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT. MUONG KHE DISTRICT TOWN IS LOCATED VIC

RFD:000-000/COPIES:0003

003732/1791/202 34/48 MI 0029 262/24:11Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RX0P0027 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

18104/10542, 47715.
(3) A DATA PLATE CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AIRCRAFT NO.: F8
PART NO.: 55-13091-0621
CONTRACT NO.: (UNIDENTIFIED)
SERIAL NO.: PJ7-1191

38

THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THE INFORMATION IN THIS DISPLAY TAG AND DATA PLATE COULD BE RELATED TO CASE 1529. CASE 1529 WAS AN F8 LOST IN WESTERN QUANG BINH, VIC 172060N/1061110E, ON 25 NOVEMBER 1963. THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS DATA PLATE ON EXHIBIT IV-THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S TRADITION HOUSE CONTAINED A CAPTION THAT DESCRIBED IT AS "A DATA PLATE FROM AN F8 THAT DIED ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN ON 25.11.1963 ((SIC)) IN WESTERN QUANG BINH ((PROVINCE))."

(4) A 16MM FILM MAGAZINE FOR AN AIRCRAFT GUN CAMERA MOUNT. THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS ITEM AS: "THE CASE FROM A COMMUNICATION DEVICE OF ONE OF THE F105 AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN IN THE NORTHERN REGION." THE DATA PLATE ON THE ITEM CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

MAGAZINE, FILM

16MM 50 FOOT CAPACITY, L8-88

ORDER NO.: AF01606/15079-AS-66-1

MFR'S PART NO.: 351215 STOCK NO.:

6760HC0200685

SERIAL NO.: ((?)) 0 ((DISCOURAGED EXCEPT FOR LAST VICTORY))

MFG BY: SPS DATA SYSTEMS, PAMONA, CALIF.

BT

803732/1741/202 47 of 48 41 0666 212/29/11Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RXAP0550 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 19 OF 24 BANGKOK TH 02765

0360 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS THIS FILM MAGAZINE APPEARS ORIGINALLY TO HAVE BEEN A COMPONENT OF THE U.S. NAVY GUN CAMERA MOUNT DESCRIBED BELOW. THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S DISPLAY TAG FOR THE GUN CAMERA MOUNT DESCRIBED IT AS "AN ELECTRONIC COMPONENT FROM AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN UNDER THE COMMAND OF ASSISTANT COMPANY COMMANDER OF ((COMPANY)) 31, COMRADE DAU XUAY NGHIEP ((DANGJ. XUAAN NGHIEP))." THE DATA PLATE ON THE GUN CAMERA MOUNT CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

U.S. NAVY
GUN CAMERA MOUNT
TYPE M203

FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT THESE TWO ARTIFACTS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH.

(5) A U.S. M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHER, SERIAL NUMBER 177124. THE NAME PHIL WAS CARVED INTO THE STOCK. THE CAPTION IN 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS ITEM INDICATED IT WAS CAPTURED DURING FIGHTING WITH INFANTRY TROOPS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THIS M-79 WAS CAPTURED FROM REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES DURING OR AFTER THE 1972 SPRING OFFENSIVE.

(6) A U.S. MILITARY EMERGENCY RADIO. THE DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS ITEM AS: "A CASE FOR A RADIO ON AN F8 ((SIC)) AIRCRAFT, WHICH C1 ((COMPANY)), 0216 ((BATTALION)) OWNED ON 31.3.72." THE DATA PLATE FOR THE RADIO CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AM/((MISSING DATA))
PART NO.: 7(S)6932-801
MFR SERIAL NO.: 37695
SERIAL NO.: 1432

THE DATA PLATE WAS BADLY CORRODED MAKING SOME DATA UNREADABLE. FIELD ANALYSIS WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY AIRCRAFT LOSSES ON 31 MARCH 1972, NOR ANY F8 AIRCRAFT DOWN WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS OF THAT DATE.

(7) A DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT. THERE WAS NO DISPLAY TAG ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ITEM. THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

804973/1950/202 37 of 48 41 0030 243/01/00Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RXAP0026 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

MFR BY SARGENT-FLETCHER CO.
ELMONT, CALIF
TANK AND INTEGRAL PYLON, FUEL, AIRCRAFT, EXTERNAL,
JETTISONABLE

CLASS: 1 CAPACITY: 370 GAL.
WEIGHT EMPTY: 285 LBS
MFR PART NO.: 24-370-4803
GOVERNMENT ORDER NO.: 80A AF 04 (607)

9979-00-65-1

SERIAL NUMBER: 6091

(8) A DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT. THE
DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED IT AS "A DATA PLATE FROM AN F8U-
2N AIRCRAFT THAT DIED ((ATTENTION)) SHOT DOWN DURING

38

THE ROUTE 9-SOUTHERN LAOS CAMPAIGN IN THE NEWLY
LIBERATED REAR AREA. - THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AIRCRAFT MOD.: F8U-2N ((SIC))
PART NO.: C-((?)) 420185-0
CONT. NO.: N ((?)) 59-0-0154
SERIAL NO.: 453-82
MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED:

453

THE F8U-2N IS ALSO KNOWN AS THE F8D. THE CAPTION IN
THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S DISPLAY TAG DID NOT
CITE A SPECIFIC LOCATION AND DATE; HOWEVER, THE PAVN
USED THE TERM "ROUTE 9-SOUTHERN LAOS CAMPAIGN" CITED IN
THE DISPLAY TAG TO REFER TO ITS COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TO
THE US/GVN INCUSSION INTO LAOS (US/GVN OPERATION-LA
BT

SECTION 20 OF 24 BANGKOK TH 42755

1300 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 250TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS
SOV 717, ALONG ROUTE 9, NEARBY THE VIETNAM-LAOS
BORDER AND AROUND LAOS, IN EARLY 1971. THE PAVN HIGH
COMMAND ANTICIPATED THE US/GVN OPERATION AND BEGAN
DEPLOYING ITS FORCES FOR THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN LATE
1970. THE FRONT, WHICH WAS THE HEADQUARTERS FOR PAVN
FORCES, WAS IN PLACE IN LAOS, NEAR THE WEST END OF THE
DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AT LEAST AS EARLY AS OCTOBER 1970
AND REMAINED IN PLACE THROUGH ABOUT MID-1971.

(9) A DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT. THE
DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED IT AS "A DATA PLATE FROM AN AGE
AIRCRAFT THAT WAS ((BATTLED)) DOWNED AT BAY THAN
(BUELS THIN) (DURING FATE), 1 APRIL 1972. THE DATA
PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
AIRCRAFT MOD.: AGE
PART NO.: 420185-0
CONT. NO.: N ((?)) 59-0-0154
SERIAL NO.: 453-82
MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED:

453

BE4-THAN IS LOCATED VICINITY 1658N/10658E, YN1977.
FIELD ANALYSIS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY INCIDENT THAT
CORRESPONDED TO THE TYPE AIRCRAFT, LOCATION, AND DATE
CITED IN THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS DATA PLATE.
((10)) A BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH THAT DEPICTS A
COLLAGE OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT, A U.S.-ISSUED MAP, A

33

U.S.-ISSUED SURVIVAL PAMPHLET, AND A DATA PLATE FROM A
U.S. A-1H AIRCRAFT. THE DATA PLATE DEPICTED IN THE
PHOTOGRAPH CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AIRCRAFT MOD.: A-1H
PART NO.: 420185-0
CONT. NO.: 59-0-0154
SERIAL NO.: 453-82
MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED:
453-82-0

TWO DISPLAY TAGS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS GROUP OF
ARTIFACTS. THE CAPTION ON ONE DESCRIBED THE EXHIBIT AS
"THE FLIGHT HELMET AND FLIGHT MAP OF AN AMERICAN PRIVATE
PILOT ((NAME)) PI-73 ((SIC)) SHOT DOWN BY THE REGIMENT
ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1965." THE OTHER CAPTION, WHICH WAS
BADLY FADDED AND PARTIALLY DESTROYED BY INSECTS,
DESCRIBED THE EXHIBIT AS "A MAP AND BLOWN CHIT

970:000-000/CUIFS:0003

804973/1958/202 38 of 48 41 0030 243/01:002 301918Z AUG 91
CSN:RX8P0028 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

0057/77/1735/21 39 of 48 41 0064 242/20:12Z 301918Z AUG 91
CSN:RX8P1560 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

(PASSAGE DESTROYED BY INSECTS) PRIVATE PILOT
(ILLEGIBLE) THAT DAWN AT 0700 ON 5 AUGUST 1965. THE
FLIGHT HELMET SHELL CONTAINED NO MARKINGS THAT MIGHT
HELP IDENTIFY THE PILOT. THE PHOTOGRAPHIC COLLAGE DID
NOT DEPICT THE SERIAL NUMBER ON THE PLATE. THE
INFORMATION THAT REFERRED TO A PILOT NAMED "RI-VU" AND
WAS SHOT DOWN ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1965 APPARENTLY
CORRESPONDS TO CASE 0141--RETURNED POW.

NAME U.S. NAVY, WMOSE AGE WENT DOWN ABOUT 10-15KM
SOUTHWEST OF VINH ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1965. THE DEPUTY
COMMANDER OF THE 240TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT SAID HE
BELIEVED THE DATE IS THE CAPTION FOR THE PHOTOGRAPH
SHOULD BE 10 SEPTEMBER 1965 AND THAT THE ITEMS DEPICTED
IN THE PHOTOGRAPH WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PILOT NAMED
"RI-VU." THE ONLY INCIDENT IN THE 240TH AIR DEFENSE
REGIMENT'S AREA OF OPERATIONS ON 5 AUGUST 1965 WAS CASE
0034; A RESOLVED CASE THAT INVOLVED AN AIR AIRCRAFT.
THE INFORMATION ON THE DATA PLATE DEPICTED IN THE
PHOTOGRAPH IS FROM AN AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH THE DATA
PLATE DOES NOT APPEAR TO CORRESPOND TO CASE 0034, IT
COULD CORRESPOND TO CASE 0141.

(11) A DATA PLATE MOUNTED ON A SMALL PAPER-
COVERED PIECE OF WOOD. THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

30
AIRCRAFT NO.: 140-5
PART NO.: NOA 02-0395
SERIAL NO.: 418-1359
MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED:
ASC-1570
ACSEC 15-62
ASC 15C1 ((?))

31

803737/1745/242 40 48 41 0069 222/20:12Z 301910Z AUG 91
CSN:RXRPO560 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

REF ID: A1 21 24 044000 TH 02755

253 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REQUEST: PAVN 240TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS
THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS AS "A
DATA PLATE FROM AN AIRCRAFT THAT PHAN DANG CAT'S (PHAN DANG
CATS'S) GUN CREW SAID DAWN ON 5 AUGUST 1965." THE
ONLY INCIDENT IN THE 240TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S AREA
OF OPERATIONS ON 5 AUGUST 1965 WAS CASE 0034; A
RESOLVED CASE THAT INVOLVED AN AIRCRAFT. THE 240TH
AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT STAFF COULD NOT SUPPLY ANY
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY THE
INCIDENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ARTIFACT. BASED ON
INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER ARTIFACTS ON DISPLAY
IN THE 240TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S TRADITION HOUSE,
THIS DATA PLATE MIGHT CORRESPOND TO CASE 0141--RETURNED
POW LTCDR M. B. RIVERA, U.S. NAVY, WMOSE AGE WENT DOWN
ABOUT 10-15KM SOUTHWEST OF VINH ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1965.

12. APPARENTLY, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, 240TH
REGIMENT
THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF REQUEST SENT TO VJCSHQ
THIS DATE FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AT THE 240TH AIR
DEFENSE REGIMENT:
ON 29 JULY 1991 AND 10 AUGUST 1991, THE RESEARCH
SPECIALISTS FROM THE U.S. OFFICE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS IN
HANOI AND THE VJCSHQ (GENHAI) COLONEL TRAM HIEP,
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, AND 402. NGUYEN THI TAN, MINISTRY
OF INTERIOR, VISITED THE HEADQUARTERS AND TRADITION
HOUSE OF THE 240TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT, PEOPLE'S ARMY
OF VIETNAM, IN ST. LAM DISTRICT, HANOI. DURING THE
VISIT THE RESEARCH SPECIALISTS EXAMINED THE AIRTIME
ARTIFACTS IN THE 240TH REGIMENT'S TRADITION HOUSE.
NEARLY FIFTY ARTIFACTS AND EXHIBIT TAGS YIELDED
POTENTIALLY USEFUL INFORMATION. THE U.S. OFFICE
REQUESTS THAT VJCSHQ RESEARCH SPECIALISTS HELP SEARCH
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS:

1. REQUEST VJCSHQ RESEARCH SPECIALISTS
IDENTIFY THE DATE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
240TH U.S. AIRCRAFT DOWNED OVER NORTH VIETNAM. THE
CAPTION ON A PHOTOGRAPH IN THE TRADITION HOUSE
INDICATED THE 240TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT OWNED THE

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

803737/1745/242 41 0700 222/20:50Z 301910Z AUG 91
CSN:RXRPO560 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF VINH CITY, NGHE AN PROVINCE.

B. REQUEST VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS IDENTIFY THE DATE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 100TH U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN VINH CITY, NGHE AN PROVINCE. THE CAPTION FOR FIVE SMALL PIECES OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE IN THE TRADITION HOUSE MEANS: "PIECES OF VINH CITY'S 100TH AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE (2280TH AIR DEFENSE) REGIMENT."

C. REQUEST VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR ANY TACTICAL REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS THAT CONTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT CASE 1269, AN F4D AIRCRAFT THAT WENT DOWN IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, VICINITY 173103N/1061309E, XC 294303, ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1968. A U.S. AIR FORCE REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER K617814, THAT IS DISPLAYED IN THE TRADITION HOUSE BELONGED TO THE PILOT OF THAT AIRCRAFT. THE CAPTION ON THE DISPLAY TAG FOR THIS WEAPON DESCRIBED IT AS THE "SIDE ARM OF AN AMERICAN PILOT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ON 5 AUGUST 1968." U.S. RECORDS SHOW THAT THE SERIAL NUMBER BELONGED TO THE WEAPON CARRIED BY A/1 ME U.S. AIR FORCE, CASE 1269, WHOSE F4D AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, VICINITY 173103N/1061309E, XC 294303, ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1968. CASE 1269 IS UNRESOLVED.

D. AN F4A AIRCRAFT DOWN IN VICINITY OF NGAM KHE TANG, 28 MARCH 1968.

(1) REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR ANY TACTICAL REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS THAT CONTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT AN INCIDENT IN WHICH AN F4A AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN IN THE VICINITY OF NGAM KHE TANG ((NGAM KHE TANG: (THE TANG STREAM CROSSING)) ON 28 MARCH 1968. ONE OF THE DISPLAY TAGS IN THE TRADITION

803900/1703/202 42 OF 48 41 0700 262/20:50Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RX9P0506 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 22 OF 24 BANGKOK TH 42755

0364 AUG 91

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: PAVN 280TH AIR DEF REGT RECORDS HOUSE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING CAPTION: "HAND WHEEL FOR

TURNING A 57MM AAA GUN) ONE OF SEVERAL (USED BY) GUNBERRY TEAMS COMMANDED BY COMPANY COMMANDER NGUYEN NGOC DUAH ((NGUYEN NGOC DUAH)) AT NGAM KHE TANG ((NGAM KHE TANG)) THAT SHOT DOWN AN F4A ON 28 MARCH 1968." ADDITIONALLY, THE DISPLAY TAG FOR A WOODEN AIMING STAKE WITH THE NUMBER 30 ((SOUTHEAST)) CONTAINED A CAPTION INDICATING THE AIMING STAKE PLAYED A ROLE IN THE SHOOTING DOWN OF AN AMERICAN F4A AIRCRAFT ON 28 MARCH 1968. THIS INFORMATION APPARENTLY REFERS TO CASE 1107, AN F4A AIRCRAFT LOST WHILE ON A STRIKE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 28 MARCH 1968.

(2) REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS ALSO INFORM THE U.S. OFFICE OF THE MAP COORDINATES FOR NGAM KHE TANG, WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR ON U.S. MAPS.

(3) REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS ALSO PROVIDE THE U.S. OFFICE ANY INFORMATION THAT COULD DETERMINE WHETHER CASE 1107 IS LINKED WITH THE REPORTED CRASH SITE OF AN F4A AIRCRAFT THAT JCRC AND VNOSMP TEAMS INVESTIGATED IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE DURING TWO DIFFERENT JOINT INVESTIGATIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1968.

E. REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR ANY TACTICAL REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS THAT CONTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN DURING THE ROUTE 9-SOUTHERN LAOS CAMPAIGN. THE DISPLAY TAG FOR A PHOTOGRAPH IN THE TRADITION HOUSE CONTAINED A CAPTION THAT DESCRIBED IT AS A PHOTOGRAPH OF "GUN CREW 3, C4 ((COMPANY)), 3102 ((BATTALION)), ON 21 MARCH 1971, WHICH PARTICIPATED WITH THE ENTIRE UNIT IN SHOOTING DOWN 11 U.S. AIRCRAFT." THE DATE WAS DURING THE USGVN OPERATION LAM SON 719. PAVN FORCES INFLICTED HEAVY DAMAGE ON U.S. AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING THE OPERATION. THE CREW AND PASSENGERS OF SOME OF THOSE AIRCRAFT STILL ARE UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

F. A-KY AND C4 ROOMS AND CASE 1107.

(1) REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR

803931/1707/202 43 OF 48 41 0707 262/20:50Z 301914Z AUG 91
CSN:RX9P0500 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

ANY TACTICAL REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS THAT CONTAIN

INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN DURING MAY 1969. THE DISPLAY TAG FOR A SKETCH IN THE TRADITION HOUSE CONTAINED A CAPTION THAT DESCRIBED IT AS "A SKETCH OF THE BATTLE AT 1819 HOURS, 6 MAY 1969, IN WHICH C4 & C5 ((COMPANIES)) SHOT DOWN AN RF4C. THE SKETCH DEPICTED A U.S. AIRCRAFT PASSING OVER "A-KY" AND THEN CIRCLING WEST AND SOUTH OVER A HIGH POINT SOUTH OF "CA ROONG" ((CAF ROONG)). THE SKETCH INDICATED THE AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN WEST OF A-KY. THE U.S. OFFICE COULD NOT IDENTIFY AN INCIDENT THAT CORRESPONDED PRECISELY TO THE DATE AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT CITED IN THIS SKETCH. VNOSMP RESEARCHERS MIGHT EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY THE SKETCH DEPICTED CASE 1181, BUT CITED THE WRONG DATE.

(2) REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCHERS PROVIDE THE MAP COORDINATES FOR "A-KY" AND "CA ROONG". NEITHER OF THESE PLACE NAMES ARE IDENTIFIED ON U.S. MAPS. CA ROONG MAY BE CO ROONG, 1711N/10620E, XE4101.

(3) REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR ANY TACTICAL REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS FOR INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN BETWEEN 14 APRIL AND 1 JULY 1968. THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THAT AN INFLATABLE LIFE BOAT BEARING THE SERIAL NUMBER 66317 ON DISPLAY IN THE TRADITION HOUSE COULD BE RELATED TO AN AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN BETWEEN 16 APRIL AND 1 JULY 1968; POSSIBLY CASE 1181. HAND-LETTERED ENTRIES ON THE BOAT REVEALED THAT U.S. TECHNICIANS HAD INSPECTED IT ON THE FOLLOWING DATES:

16 AUGUST 1967
10 OCTOBER 1967

BT

803931/1787/242 44 JF 458 41 0707 262/20:54Z 301910Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0500 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 23 OF 24 BANGKOK TH 02765

SUBJECT: RESEARCH REPORT: BOAT BEARING LIFE BOAT RECORDS
-- DECEMBER 1967
-- 15 FEBRUARY 1968
-- 14 APRIL 1968 ((THE LAST RECORDED INSPECTION))

THE DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THE BOAT AS "A BOAT THAT BELONGED TO THE AMERICAN PILOT OF AN RF4C THAT DIED ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN ON 25 JANUARY 1968." THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THE DISPLAY TAG CITED THE WRONG DATE, BECAUSE U.S. TECHNICIANS INSPECTED THE BOAT NEARLY THREE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT DATE CITED IN THE

DISPLAY TAG. U.S. TECHNICIANS INSPECTED THE BOAT EVERY TWO MONTHS. THE NEXT INSPECTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT 120 JULY 1968. AT THIS REASON, THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THE BOAT BELONGED TO AN AIRCRAFT THAT DIED DURING OPERATION STREETS IN APRIL AND MAY-JUNE 1968. THE AIRCRAFT FOR CASE 1181 WAS LOST ON 16 MAY 1968 IN THE VICINITY OF 1733N/10635E. CASE 1181 IS THE ONLY RF4C AIRCRAFT LOST IN THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S AREA OF OPERATION BETWEEN 10 APRIL AND 1 JULY 1968. ONE OF THE CREWMEN, U.S. AIR FORCE NAME IS A RETURNED POW. THE OTHER CREWMEMBER, U.S. AIR FORCE NAME IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR.

(3) REQUEST THAT VNOSMP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR ANY TACTICAL REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS THAT CONTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE U.S. AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ON 25 JANUARY 1968, AND THE FATE OF THE CREWMEN.

(4) THE DATA PLATE FOR AN AIRCRAFT COMPONENT IN THE TRADITION HOUSE CONTAINED A CAPTION THAT DESCRIBED IT AS "A DATA PLATE FROM AN RF4C THAT DIED ((BATTALION)) SHOT DOWN ON 25 JULY 1968 ((SIC)) IN WESTERN QUANG BINH ((PROVINCE)). THE DATA PLATE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AIRCRAFT NO.: 74
PART NO.: 53-12731-2621
CONTRACT NO.: ((NO ENTRY))
SERIAL NO.: 177-1141

THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THIS INFORMATION COULD BE

803931-000/COPIES:0003

803931/1751/242 45 JF 48 41 0674 262/20:14Z 301910Z AUG 91
CSN:RXBP0500 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RELATED TO CASE 1329. CASE 1329 WAS AN F4D LOST IN
WESTERN GUANG PROVINCE, VIC 172000N/1051100E, 25 NOVEMBER 1969. THE TWO CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED IN CASE
1329 ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR.

(3) AN AIRCRAFT'S CHECKLIST FOR THE U.S. F4D AND
F4C AIRCRAFT, PUBLISHED IN JANUARY 1968, UNFAMILIAR IN
THE TRADITION HOUSE, ALSO COULD BE RELATED TO CASE
1329. THE DISPLAY TAG DESCRIBED THIS ITEM AS "HANDLING
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE F4C F4D AIRCRAFT TAKEN FROM AN
AMERICAN AIRCRAFT THAT COE (COMPANY), 0105

11
(BATTALION) SHOT DOWN ON 23.10.1968. (SIC), AT
KILOMETER 32 ON ROUTE 20. THE DISPLAY TAG FOR PART
NO. 53-13001-0621, SERIAL NO. 937-1181, MENTIONED
ABOVE, INDICATED THE 1185 BATTALION SHOT DOWN THE
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN CASE 1329. CASE 1329 INVOLVED AN
F4 AIRCRAFT. THE U.S. OFFICE ESTIMATES KILOMETER 32,
ROUTE 20, IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY AT 172100N/1051350E,
WHICH IS VERY NEAR THE LOCATION WHERE THE CASE 1329
AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN. THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THE
DISPLAY TAG FOR THE AIRCRAFT'S CHECKLIST CITED THE ABOVE
INCIDENT DATE.

(3) A U.S. AIR FORCE REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER
K597312, AND A LEATHER HOLSTER. THE DISPLAY TAG
DESCRIBED THIS WEAPON AS THE "SIDE ARM OF (MISSING
TEXT) AMERICAN (NAMED) ASSEMBLY (SIC), WHO THE
REGIMENT SHOT DOWN IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE". THIS
SERIAL NUMBER BELONGED TO THE WEAPON CARRIED BY
NAME

1. REQUEST THAT VNOSUP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS
SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR
ANY TACTICAL REPORTS OR OTHER RECORDS THAT CONTAIN
BT

003747/1751/202 46 48 41 0679 262/20:102 3019102 AUG 91
CSN:RXAP0564 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 24 OF 24 BANGKOK 14 02765

DISPATCH

SUBJECT: "MISSING" REPORT; DATA 280TH AIR DEFENSE RECORDS
INFORMATION ABOUT ANY U.S. AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT
DOWN IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DURING 1972 AND 1973.
ESPECIALLY ANY INFORMATION ABOUT AN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN
ON 14 APRIL 1972. DISPLAY TAGS FOR SOME ARTIFACTS IN
THE TRADITION HOUSE INDICATE THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ONE
OR MORE U.S. AIRCRAFT IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE; HOWEVER,
THE DISPLAY TAGS DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO
IDENTIFY SPECIFIC INCIDENTS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH
ARTIFACT. FOR EXAMPLE:

(1) A U.S. AIR FORCE REVOLVER, SERIAL NUMBER
K597312, AND A LEATHER HOLSTER EXHIBITED IN THE
TRADITION HOUSE WERE DESCRIBED AS: "THE SIDE ARM OF AN
AMERICAN (MISSING TEXT) (NAMED) ASSEMBLY (SIC), AND
THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN IN QUANG TRI (PROVINCE)".
VNOSUP RESEARCHERS, HOWEVER, DO NOT EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY THIS DISPLAY TAG ORIGINALLY WAS ASSOCIATED
WITH A DIFFERENT REVOLVER. THE SERIAL NUMBER BELONGS
TO A REVOLVER CARRIED BY NAME

U.S. AIR FORCE, CASE 1329, WHOSE F4D AIRCRAFT
WENT DOWN IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, VICINITY

172060N/1051100E, 25 270100N, 25 NOVEMBER 1968.

(2) ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE METAL BLADE OF A
SHOVEL, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS: "A SHOVEL BELONGING TO
THE AMERICAN PILOT OF AN AIRCRAFT THAT WENT
(BATTALION) DOWN AT 141 LUT (SIC--141 LUT) ON

14.4.72." THE U.S. OFFICE BELIEVES THIS EXHIBIT COULD
BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 2004, WHICH INVOLVED AN F4 THAT
WENT DOWN ON 14 APRIL 1972, ABOUT 8-10 KM NORTH OF XAI
LOC (141 LUT). QUANG TRI PROVINCE. LOCAL RESIDENTS
FREQUENTLY REFER TO XAI LUT AS XAI CUA (THE CUA
AREA). ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED IN CASE 2004
IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR; THE REMAINS OF THE OTHER
CREWMEMBER WERE RETURNED TO THE U.S. IN 1945. THOSE
REMAINS WERE RETURNED WITH A CAPTION INDICATING THIS
PERSON HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN CUA VIET, WHICH IS LOCATED
IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, VIC 1654/10711E, 103500N.

1. REQUEST THAT VNOSUP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS
INFORM THE U.S. OFFICE OF THE MAP COORDINATOR FOR CU

RID:000-000/CUPLIES:0003

003777/1757/202 47 48 41 0679 262/20:102 3019102 AUG 91
CSN:RXAP0564

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

NAME (DDOF VANGF)). THIS REQUEST IS RELATED TO A SIGNAL HINDUP EXHIBITED IN THE 200TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT'S TRADITION HOUSE. THE DISPLAY WAS DESCRIBED THE ITEM AS "A SIGNAL HINDUP FROM U.S. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT THE ((MISSING-TEXT)) BATTLEFIELD SHOT DOWN AT DUANG ((DDOF VANGF)) ON 14.3.67."

J. REQUEST THE HUSHP RESEARCH SPECIALISTS SEARCH THE FILES OF THE 200TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. AIRCRAFT THE REGIMENT SHOT DOWN IN AUGUST 1968, ESPECIALLY CASE 1208. CASE 1208 INVOLVED NAME, U.S. AIR FORCE, CAPTAIN NAME WAS LISTED IN AUGUST 1968, VIC 174858N/1062459E. NAME, U.S. AIR FORCE, CASE 1253, WAS LOST TWO DAYS LATER, VIC 173457N/1061657E, ABOUT 25 KM NW SOUTHWEST OF NAME, LOSS LOCATION. A DISPLAY CARD IN THE TRADITION HOUSE SUGGESTS THAT THE REGIMENT USED TO HAVE NAME MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD. NAME HUSHP OFFICIALS RETURNED NAME REMAINS IN 1996. THEY SUGGESTED THE REMAINS WERE THOSE OF NAME AND IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR. SINCE CASES 1208 AND 1253 ARE CLOSELY RELATED, THE U.S. OFFICE RELIEVES THE 200TH REGIMENT MIGHT HAVE SOME RECORD OF NAME INCIDENT.

BT

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JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

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FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS HNSMDC//JCJCS-PW-HIA/J5//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5//
NSC HNSMDC
EMBASSY VIENTIANE
CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PEO-H//

SECDEF HNSMDC//JASD-ISA/PW-HIA//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-HIA//
SECSTATE HNSMDC//EAP-VLC//

BT

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 49501

0422 OCT 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF PERSONAL DIARY OF SOURCE DATA VILLAGE WITNESS

REF: A. JCRC LIAISON 150736Z AUG 91
9. JCRC LIAISON 031907Z OCT 91

1. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF US/SRY ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE 14TH SERIES OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, 17 JUL - 12 AUG 91. PAR 3C(2)(3) OF THAT REPORT REFERS TO THE INVESTIGATION OF A REPORTED AIRCRAFT CRASH IN DUONG THUY (V), LE THUY (D), QUANG BINH (P). REF B IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF THAT INCIDENT.

2. PAR 3C(5) OF REF B PROVIDED A TRANSLATION OF ONE ENTRY IN THE PERSONAL DIARY OF SOURCE. SOURCE, COMMANDER OF THE SOURCE DATA VILLAGE WITNESS FROM 1968 TO 1975. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A TRANSLATION OF THOSE PAGES OF SOURCE DIARY WHICH MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSS INCIDENTS IN DUANG BINH PROVINCE.

3. (U) THE DIARY SHOWS SIGNS OF AGE CONSISTENT WITH DOCUMENTS OF THE WAR ERA. THE TITLE PAGE READS "HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS (MUST KEEP)" (TAIF LIEUJ LICHJ SOR (PHAIK SIK)). THE CONTENTS CONSIST OF NOTES CONCERNING SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. THE TEAM WAS ALLOWED TO EXAMINE THE ENTIRE

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SEC1134 02 OF 02 BANGKOK 14 09501

0022 OCT 91

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF PERSONAL DIARY OF SD

VILLAGE WITNESS

(NOTE: THE 76 IN THE YEAR 1976 APPEARED WITH TWO CROSSING ARROWS, INDICATING THAT THE NUMBERS WERE TRANSPOSED AND SHOULD HAVE APPEARED 1967. HEAVY MACHINE GUN IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE TRANSLATION FOR BOTH TYPES OF WEAPONS CITED IN THE FIRST LINE OF "WEAPONS USED." THE ORIGINAL VIETNAMESE, WHICH IS MORE PRECISE, WAS "DAI LIEEN" AND "TRUNG LIEEN," RESPECTIVELY. LUONG THIEY (LUONG THIEEN) WAS A LOCAL PLACENAME IN DUONG THUY VILLAGE.))

AT 0000 8.7.1968

INDEPENDENTLY SHOT DOWN 1 U.S. AIRCRAFT 1 F4
WEAPONS USED: 2 HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AS V, 2 MEDIUM MACHINE GUNS 25 V

PARTICIPATING FORCES: DUTY COMBAT GROUP 10 COMRADES

- NGUYEN LUAN HAI
- NGUYEN LUAN VINH
- NGUYEN PHUC
- TRAN DUANG
- TRAN VUI
- LE TRI
- PHAM THUDY
- LE THI HUONG
- VO THI THUAT
- TRAN THI LIEN
- (AWARDED)

COMBAT MEDAL THIRD CLASS

((THE LETTER "V" THAT APPEARS TWICE IN THE "WEAPONS USED" LINE REPRESENTS THE VIETNAMESE WORD "VIEN" (VIEN) INDICATING THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS OF AMMO FIRED.))

((END TRANSLATION)).

BT

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CSY:RXSP004141 0001 240/04:05Z 070405Z OCT 91
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

R 152302Z NOV 91 ZYB PSV 112100P05

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PM-MIA//

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JS/PM-MIA//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PM-MIA//

WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

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SECTION 01 OF 05

PART ONE OF THREE-PART TWO IDENT IS 152312Z NOV 91-PART THREE IDENT IS 152322Z NOV 91

MSGID/STG:PM/CDR JCRC//

AMPM/SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTS//

REF://RMC/JCRC LNO ONE TH/150736Z AUG 91//

AMPM/REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE JOINT ACTIVITIES

CONDUCTED DURING THE 18TH ITERATION FROM 17 JULY - 12 AUGUST 1991//

RMC/1. DURING ITERATION 18, FROM 17 JUL THROUGH 12 AUG 1991, JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM TWO ACQUIRED FIVE UNOFFICIAL DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM CONTAINING REFERENCES TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. THE TEAM PHOTOCOPIED 56 PAGES SELECTED FROM FOUR OF THESE DOCUMENTS. THE FOLLOWING IS A VERBATIM TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE DOCUMENTS. NOTES: THE ORIGIN OF THIS DOCUMENT IS UNKNOWN, BUT IT APPEARS TO BE A COMPILATION OF WARTIME EVENTS RECORDED IN THE DIARY OF A STATISTICIAN OF UNKNOWN AFFILIATION. ANALYST COMMENTS WITHIN THE TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT ARE INCLUDED WITHIN DOUBLE PARENS.

2. /ROUTE/ ((DOCUMENT TITLE)) PEOPLES'S ARMY OF VIETNAM

SAFEGUARD SECRECY

QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL FORCES

MISSION RECORD

ACCOMPLISHMENTS FIRING ON AMERICAN AIRCRAFT AND WARSHIPS AND

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CSY:RXSP030941 0355 309/07:16Z 152302Z NOV 91
CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

STATISTICS ON MARTIAL DECORATIONS,

USERS: TUAN DUOC THAM

UNIT: QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL OFFICE

PERMANENT AAA FORCES

(CREDIT: DATE: TIME (GLP)) UNIT(S) ROUNDS EXPENDED-TYPE OF WEAPON-RESULTS-AWARD-RECOMMENDATION)

A. 23 APR 72: 1320: 2ND, 3RD, 4TH AAA MILITIA COMPANIES: 372 ROUNDS-37MM; 2 LEFT SHOT DOWN COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS.

B. 23 MAY 72: 0623: 3RD, 4TH AAA MILITIA COMPANIES: 56 ROUNDS-12-37MM; 1 RF-4 SHOT DOWN, COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

C. 14 APR 72: 0945: 300TH TOWNSHIP PLATOON: 6 SALVOES, 70 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 JS ACFT SHOT DOWN, COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

D. 21 APR 72: 1130: 13TH RECON COMPANY, ---: JVC JS PILOT CAPTURED; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS.

E. 18 JUN 72: 1625: VIET TRUNG STATE FARM: 68 ROUNDS-

14.5MM, 4 ROUNDS-21FLE; 1 F-4 SHOT DOWN, COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

F. 20 JUN 72: 1210: 2ND, 4TH AAA MILITIA COMPANIES: 50 ROUNDS-37MM; 1 F-4 SHOT DOWN, COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

G. 8 JUL 72: 1410: 2ND, 4TH AAA MILITIA COMPANIES: 92 ROUNDS-37MM; 1 F-4 SHOT DOWN, COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

H. 10 AUG 72: 1730: 365TH COMPANY: 90 ROUNDS-MACHINE GUN; 1 HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN, COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS.

I. 17 AUG 72: ---: RADAR PLATOON, 4TH COMPANY, 97TH REGIMENT, 351ST DISTRICT, ---: SUPPORT; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

J. 22 SEP 72: 1635: 5TH AAA MILITIA COMPANY: 103 ROUNDS-14.5MM; 1 F-4 SHOT DOWN, COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

K. 25 SEP 72: 0635: 3RD AAA MILITIA COMPANY: 45 ROUNDS-37MM; 1 A-7 SHOT DOWN - 40N CIO ISLAND ((XE758101)); COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT-MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

L. 17 OCT 72: 0930: 3RD AAA MILITIA COMPANY: 15 ROUNDS-37MM; 1 A-7 - 40V - 4 ISLAND ((XE625832)); COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

M. 25 OCT 72: 1010: 29TH AAA BATTALION: 153 ROUNDS-37MM; 1 US F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

N. 7 NOV 72: 2230: 359TH PROVINCIAL LOCAL FORCES COMPANY: 94 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 F-111A; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 1ST CLASS.

O. 24 NOV 72: 1305: 48TH LOCAL FORCES COMPANY: 120 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

P. 31 DEC 72: 1025: 29TH AAA BATTALION: 55 ROUNDS-37MM; 1 A-3; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

Q. 4 JAN 73: 0830: 1ST, 3RD MILITIA COMPANIES, 234TH

MILITIA REGIMENT: 150 ROUNDS-37MM AND 65 ROUNDS-23MM; 1 F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

R. 16 FEB 72: 1440: MAI THUY VILLAGE, LE THUY DISTRICT: ---: CAPTURED 2 US PILOTS; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS.

S. 17 FEB 72: 1200: LIEU THUY VILLAGE, LE THUY DISTRICT: ---: CAPTURED 2 US PILOTS; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

T. 17 FEB 72: 1200: AREA 22 AND WESTERN QUANG THUY; ---: CAPTURED 1 US PILOT; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDALS 3RD CLASS.

U. 20 MAY 72: 1615: DONG PHU VILLAGE, PROVINCIAL CAPITAL DISTRICT: 155 ROUNDS: 1 F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

V. 23 MAY 72: 1930: MAI THUY AND PHU THUY VILLAGES: ---: 1 F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

W. 19 MAY 72: 1812: VAN NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT: 12 ROUNDS-37MM AND 55 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

X. 3 JUN 72: 1120: LOC NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT: 60 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

Y. 6 JUN 72: 1930: QUANG PHU VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT: 20 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 A-7; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

Z. 6 JUL 72: 1620: LOC NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT: 40 ROUNDS-12.7 AND 37MM; 1 F-4; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

AA. 2 AUG 72: 0940: MAI HOA VILLAGE, THUYEN HOA DISTRICT: ---: 1 RF-4C SHOT DOWN; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

BB. 8 AUG 72: ---: LY NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT: 90 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 F-4 SHOT DOWN; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

CC. 24 AUG 72: 1500: QUANG PHUC VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT: 21 ROUNDS-12.7MM; 1 F-4 SHOT DOWN; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

DD. 26 AUG 72: ---: 233RD REGIMENT, MILITARY REGION (MR) 4, QUANG HUNG: 14.5MM; 1 F-4 SHOT DOWN; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT-MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

EE. 6 SEP 72: 0900: DANG DONG VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT: 25 ROUNDS: 1 RF-4 SHOT DOWN; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.

FF. 15 SEP 72: 0737: DUC NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT: 75 ROUNDS: 1 A-7 SHOT DOWN; COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS.

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GG. 17 SEP 72: 17501 TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE: 07 RJJNDS-12.7MM
1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
HH. 21 SEP 72: 21477 PHUC THUY: 263 ROUNDS-12.7MM AND 65
II. 26 SEP 72: 11221 45TH BATTALION, 2ND, 6TH, 5TH MILITIA
COMPANIES: 89 RJJNDS-12.5MM, 318 ROUNDS-12.7MM, 56 RJJNDS-37MM: 1
P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
JJ. 5 OCT 72: 14801 DONG HOI VEHICLE REPAIR FACILITY SELF-
DEFENSE: 50 RJJNDS-12.5MM, 1 RF-4D SHOT DOWN BY THE SPOT, 2 US
PILOTS CAPTURED: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 1ST CLASS.
KK. 23 OCT 72: 15001 LEN THUY MALE MILITIA: 175 ROUNDS-
12.7MM: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
LL. 18 OCT 72: 17151 DUY NINH MILITIA: 190 RJJNDS-12.7 AND
14.5MM: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
MM. 18 OCT 72: 15151 CANH DONG MILITIA: 17 RJJNDS-12.7MM:
1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
NN. 26 OCT 72: 03151 VU NINH MILITIA: 85 RJJNDS-12.7MM: 1
P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
OO. 27 OCT 72: 09321 PHONG THUY MILITIA: 245 RJJNDS-12.7
AND 14.5MM: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
PP. 31 OCT 72: 15001 TRUNG THUY MILITIA: 225 RJJNDS-12.7
AND 14.5MM: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
QQ. 23 JUL 72: 13301 QUANG LONG GUERRILLA UNIT AND QUANG
PHONG MILITIA: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD
CLASS.
RR. 8 NOV 72: 15201 NAM NINH VILLAGE GUERRILLA UNIT: 55
ROUNDS-12.7MM: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD
CLASS.
SS. 16 NOV 72: 08051 NGU THUY MILITIA: 132 RJJNDS-HEAVY
MACHINE GUN: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS.
TT. 21 NOV 72: 01801 PHU TRACH VILLAGE, 30 TRACH DISTRICT:
15 ROUNDS-12.7MM: 1 P-8 SHOT DOWN: COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 1ST CLASS.
UU. 17 JAN 73: 13101 NGU THUY VILLAGE, LE THUY DISTRICT:
150 ROUNDS-HEAVY MACHINE GUN: 1 DROPE SHOT DOWN: COMBAT
ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS.
COMMUNIQUE PRATISVE THE 9TH COMPANY
MESSAGE DATED 14 JUN 72
AT 2015 HOURS ON THE NIGHT OF 11 JUN 1972, THREE US WARSHIPS
APPROACHED THE SOUTHERN COAST OF QUANG BINH AND EFFECTED
IRRESPONSIBLE ARTILLERY SHELLING OF COASTAL VILLAGES. WITH A
SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE AND HIGH COMBAT READINESS, THE FIGHTING CADRE
COUNTER-ATTACKED PIERCELY SETTING THREE ENEMY VESSELS ABLAZE. AT
2240 HOURS THE SECOND COUNTER-ATTACK SET ADDITIONAL FIRES ON ONE

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ENEMY WARSHIP. AN EXTREMELY OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT.
THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES AND
CONGRATULATES THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EVERY COMRADE. EVERY
COMRADE CONTINUES TO DEVELOP THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AT THE SAME
TIME DRAWING FROM EXPERIENCE, WHILE SUCCESSFULLY CARRYING OUT THE
TASK OF MAINTAINING THE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. TAKE
VERY GOOD CARE OF YOURSELVES, TROOPS.
SIGNED, PHAM BA DONG

COMMUNIQUE PRATISVE QUANG PHU VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT
MESSAGE RECEIVED BY THE QUANG TRACH DISTRICT FORCES ON 14 JUN 72
AT 0830 HOURS ON 6 JUN 1972, AN AMERICAN A-7 ATTACKED THE
FERRY NORTH OF RVN. A 12.7MM DETACHMENT AT QUANG PHU, WITH A
HEIGHTENED SENSE OF VIGILANCE, COURAGEOUSLY ENTERED THE FIGHT,
LOOKED DIRECTLY AT THE AIRCRAFT AND OPENED FIRE WITH A SALVO OF
20 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION. THE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES AND
CRASHED 1900 METERS FROM THE BATTLE FIELD - AN OUTSTANDING
ACCOMPLISHMENT.

THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES THE
COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EVERY COMRADE. HOPE AS EACH COMRADE
CONTINUES TO DEVELOP AND ATTAIN THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS, THEY DRAW
FROM THEIR EXPERIENCES IN A TIMELY MANNER, RESOLVED TO BETTER
THEIR AIM, AND WIN VICTORY IN THE FUTURE.
SIGNED, PHAM BA DONG
COMMUNIQUE SENT TO MILITARY RESERV HEADQUARTERS AND THE POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE

MESSAGE SENT TO THE MR ON 12 JUN 1972
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS TO
QUANG PHU VILLAGE
AT 0830 HOURS ON 6 JUN 1972, AN AMERICAN A-7 ATTACKED AND
DESTROYED THE FERRY NORTH OF RVN. A 12.7MM DETACHMENT AT QUANG
PHU DEPLOYED 400 METERS AWAY, WITH A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF
VIGILANCE, COURAGEOUSLY LOOKED DIRECTLY AT THE AIRCRAFT, AS IT
DROVE STRAIGHT ON TARGET, AND WITH 20 ROUNDS FROM THE SAME SALVO,
THE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES AND WENT DOWN IN TWO PIECES, EACH
PIECE WEIGHING 50 KILOGRAMS WITH LETTERS AND NUMBERS ON THE
PIECES, 1900 METERS FROM THE BATTLE FIELD.

THE OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS DETACHMENT HAS
BEEN RECOGNIZED BY HEADQUARTERS AND THE MR, PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT ARE SAFE - RECOMMEND THE MR HEADQUARTERS CONSIDER
AWARDING THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS TO QUANG PHU
VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT.
SIGNED, NGAN

COMMUNIQUE SENT TO THE MR ON 15 JUN 1972
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO:
1. NGU THUY VILLAGE FEMALE ARTILLERY COMPANY
AT 2300 HOURS ON 9 JUN, FIVE ENEMY VESSELS IRRESPONSIBLY SHELLED
COASTAL VILLAGES IN SOUTHERN QUANG BINH, WITH A HEIGHTENED SENSE

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OF VIGILANCE AND A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, THE UNIT PROMPTLY OPENED FIRE IN A FERVENT COUNTER-ATTACK CAUSING THE NUMBER THREE VESSEL TO BURST INTO FLAMES - OF 30 ROUNDS FIRED, FOUR HIT THE SHIP. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

2. 8TH ARTILLERY COMPANY

AT 1700 HOURS ON 13 JUN, AN ENEMY WARSHIP IRRESPONSIBLY SHELLED COASTAL VILLAGES IN NORTHERN QUANG BINH. WITH A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, THE UNIT PROMPTLY OPENED FIRE IN A FERVENT COUNTER-ATTACK CAUSING THE VESSEL, NUMBER 845, TO BURST INTO FLAMES - OF 27 ROUNDS FIRED, THREE HIT THE SHIP. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

SIGNED: PHAM BA DUONG

COMMUNIQUE PRAISING THE FIRST COMMUNIST-LIAISON STATION, MR 4 MESSAGE RECEIVED BY THE QUANG BINH DISTRICT FORCES ON 15 JUN 1972

DURING THE FIRST PART OF JUNE, MILITIA FORCES IN LOC BINH VILLAGE, QUANG BINH DISTRICT, A UNIT THAT FOR SIX CONSECUTIVE YEARS HAS BEEN DEDICATED TO VICTORY, HELD A CLEAR PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION, ELEVATED THEIR VIGILANCE, AND HAS MADE ARDENT PREPARATIONS IN EVERY RESPECT TO STRIKE THE ENEMY UNDER ALL

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SECTION 03 OF 05

CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOT DOWN 4 US AIRCRAFT ON 3 JUN 1972.

MR HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF EACH COMRADE - MANIFESTING VICTORY, PROMPTING THE EFFORT TO FIRE ON LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT, TO SINK AND SET FIRE TO ENEMY WARSHIPS, ACHIEVING HIGH LEVELS OF EXCELLENCE, SUCCESSFULLY HANDLING EVERY TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM, INTENSELY PREPARED AND READY TO SMASH ENEMY SCHEMES, ESTABLISHING NUMEROUS COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS - EXCEPTIONALLY BUILDING UP LOC BINH OVERALL.

SIGNED: MAJOR GENERAL LE QUANG HOA
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

MESSAGE SENT ON 17 JUN 1972

1. 9TH ARTILLERY COMPANY

AT 2015 AND 2230 HOURS ON 11 JUN, NUMEROUS JS WARSHIPS APPROACHED THE SOUTHERN COAST OF QUANG BINH AND EFFECTED IRRESPONSIBLE ARTILLERY SHELING OF THE PEOPLE. WITH SINCERE VIGILANCE AND HIGH COMBAT READINESS, THE 9TH COMPANY OPENED FIRE WITH A FIERCE COUNTER-ATTACK, BOTH ATTACK WAVES SET FIRE TO THE US WARSHIPS. OF 164 ROUNDS FIRED, 30 HIT THE SHIPS. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SAFE.

2. 8TH ARTILLERY COMPANY

AT 1130 HOURS ON 12 JUN, A US WARSHIP IRRESPONSIBLY SHELLED VILLAGES IN NORTHERN QUANG BINH. WITH HEIGHTENED VIGILANCE AND COMBAT READINESS, THE 8TH COMPANY OPENED FIRE WITH A FIERCE COUNTER-ATTACK FIRING 134 ROUNDS, 18 OF WHICH STRUCK WARSHIP NUMBER 866 CAUSING IT TO BURST INTO FLAMES. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. PERSONNEL ARE SAFE.

SIGNED, DUONG

MILITARY REGION COMMUNIQUE 0800 HOURS 10 JUN - DOCUMENT 903
ON 9 JUN THE FEMALE MILITIA OF NGU THUY VILLAGE BECAME ONLY THE SECOND VILLAGE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR RECOGNIZED FOR COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT BY FIRING ON AND SETTING ABLAZE AN AMERICAN WARSHIP. MR HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES AND RECOGNIZES THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE FEMALE MILITIA UNIT OF NGU THUY. LONG LIVE THE PARTY OFFICIALS, AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR THEIR HELP IN CREATING CONDITIONS FOR UNITS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION.

EACH COMRADE HAS DEMONSTRATED HEROIC TRADITION BY MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN THEIR DETERMINATION AND COMBAT SKILLS, TO ESTABLISH THE UNIT'S STABILITY AND DURABILITY WITH OUTSTANDING TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING COMMAND AND CONTROL, STRIVING FOR EVEN GREATER ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN ORDER TO

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TRULY COMMEMORATE THE DATE THE ARTILLERY WAS ESTABLISHED (29 JUN).

SIGNED - LE QUANG HOA

THE QUANG PHU VILLAGE MILITIA HAS STEADFASTLY EXECUTED THE MR HEADQUARTERS' DIRECTIVE ON COMBAT READINESS AND FIRING ON LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT, BY PROMPTLY RETURNING FIRE AND DOWNING AN ENEMY PLANE ON 6 JUN. MR HEADQUARTERS SALUTES AND RECOGNIZES THE PREMIER COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE QUANG PHU VILLAGE MILITIA EXTOLLING PARTY OFFICIALS, AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR THEIR HELP IN CREATING CONDITIONS FOR THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE MILITIA TO REALIZE THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SYMBOLIZING SUCCESS. EACH COMRADE MUST STUDY HARD AND DRAW FROM EXPERIENCE TO SOLIDLY AND BRAVELY ESTABLISH A UNIVERSAL LIFE STYLE IN WHICH THE VET IS CAPABLE TO COPE WITH THE UNEXPECTED AND TO SHOOT DOWN NUMEROUS AMERICAN PLANES ON THE SPOT, CAPTURE ALIVE NUMEROUS PIRATE AVIATORS, AND ESPECIALLY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE RON RIVER INLET AND FERRY, INSURING THE CONTINUOUS LINES OF COMMUNICATION/TRANSPORTATION - THE KEY TO VICTORY.

SIGNED, LE QUANG HOA

MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS CONGRATULATORY COMMUNIQUE

NUMBER 3 - 20 JUN 72

DEDICATED TO THE HATRED FOR AMERICAN AGGRESSION, AND COMBAT DETERMINATION TO SAFEGUARD LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND THE CIVILIAN POPULACE DURING THE FIRST 14 DAYS OF JUNE, OUR ARTILLERYMEN, THROUGH VALIANT COMBAT, ACHIEVED OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE, 14 TIMES FIRING ON AND SETTING ABLAZE ENEMY WARSHIPS. SPECIFICALLY, DURING A FOUR DAY PERIOD FROM 11 (SIC) THROUGH 11 JUN, THE 9TH COMPANY-QUANG BINH MILITIA ALONG WITH THE ALLIED UNITS FIRED ON AND SET ABLAZE SIX AMERICAN WARSHIPS.

MR HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF EACH COMRADE - A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE AMERICAN PIRATES - EACH COMRADE CONSISTENTLY EXHIBITS THE SUCCESS OF THIS RECENT VICTORY - EVER VIGILANT, VIOLENTLY ATTACKING THE ENEMY - STRUGGLING TO BOTH FIGHT AND STUDY, RAISING THE LEVEL OF TACTICS, TECHNIQUE, AND COMMAND STRUCTURE - REACHING EVEN GREATER ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN COMMEMORATION OF 20 JUN - AN ARTILLERY UNIT WORTHY OF THE TRADITION OF A HEROIC PEOPLE.

MESSAGE TO COMMO-CAISOY STATION 1 AND THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF MR4.

VIET TRUNG - MESSAGE DATED 24 JUN 1972
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

1. AT 1820 HOURS ON 19 JUN 1972, NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED A COMMUNICATIONS AXIS AND AN ARTILLERY POSITION IN THE VIET TRUNG STATE FARM AREA. AIR DEFENSE FORCES ON DUTY AT THE STATE FARM FIERCELY COUNTER-ATTACKED AND SHOT DOWN 14 PLANES AND F-4 WHICH CRASHED WEST OF CAO KHE. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER

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AUTHORITY - 64 ROUNDS OF 14.5MM AMMUNITION USED. THE UNIT IS SAFE.

2. 9TH 37MM AAA BATTALION

AT 1210 HOURS ON 20 JUN 1972, A NUMBER OF AMERICAN F-4 AIRCRAFT ATTACKED SEVERAL TARGETS IN THE DONG HOI AREA. COMPANIES 2, 4 AND THE AAA MILITIA, IN A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER-ATTACK WHICH DOWNED ONE AMERICAN F-4 WHICH CRASHED WEST OF CAO KHE. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY - 30 ROUNDS OF 37MM AMMUNITION EXPENDED. WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL SECURE.

MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS COMMENDATION

ON THE 20TH, AN ALERT ELEMENT AT THE VIET TRUNG STATE FARM, HIGHLY VIGILANT AND EXCELLENT FIGHTERS, EFFECTED APPROPRIATE RETRIBUTION SHOOTING DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4.

MR4 HEADQUARTERS COMMENDS AND CONGRATULATES THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EACH COMRADE.

EACH COMRADE REMAINS HIGHLY DEDICATED TO THE HATRED FOR THE ENEMY, DETERMINED TO FIGHT AND WIN. THE ENTIRE LOCAL MILITIA FORCE SUSTAINS FULL FIRE COVERAGE TO SHOOT DOWN NUMEROUS AMERICAN ST.

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 AIRCRAFT, APPREHEND NUMEROUS PIRATE AVIATORS, PROVIDE OUTSTANDING
 PROTECTION AND STABILITY TO THE VILLAGE, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE
 PRESERVATION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION.
 SIGNED: LE QUANG HOA
 MESSAGE NUMBER 20 - 14 JUL 1972

MRQ MESSAGE TO ALL UNITS

AS EACH COMRADE CONTINUES TO DISPLAY THE STRENGTH, EXCELLENT
 FIGHTING SKILL, AND MARKSMANSHIP WHICH EXEMPLIFY THE TRULY
 GLORIOUS TRADITION OF THE ARTILLERY FORCES, EFFECTIVE APPROPRIATE
 RETRIBUTION ON THE AMERICAN PIRATES FOR THEIR CRIMES AGAINST THE
 LOCAL POPULACE, THEY REALIZED A SERIES OF NEW ACCOMPLISHMENTS
 FROM 26 JUNE THROUGH 7 JULY BY FIRING ON AND SETTING ABLAZE SIX
 AMERICAN WARSHIPS.

MR HEADQUARTERS SALUTES AND CONGRATULATES EVERY UNIT FOR THE
 ABOVE MENTIONED ACHIEVEMENT - EACH COMRADE REMAINS HIGHLY
 DEDICATED TO THE HATRED FOR THE AMERICAN PIRATES, AND TO THE LIVE
 CAPTURE OF PIRATE AVIATORS - THE CAPTURED AMERICAN PIRATE
 AVIATORS MUST PAY A DEBT OF BLOOD - THE COMRADES HAVE HEIGHTENED
 THEIR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT AND WIN AND HAVE BLENDED IN WELL
 WITH ALL OF THE ALLIED AND MILITIA UNITS, STRESSING IMPROVED
 TACTICS, TECHNIQUE, AND QUICKENED SKILLS, PRESERVED CASSEDS,
 CONSERVED AMMUNITION, STRENGTHENED FORTIFICATIONS, USED CLEVER
 CAMOUFLAGE, AND HAVE SUCCESSFULLY FIRED ON AMERICAN WARSHIPS AND
 ENEMY AIRCRAFT, ESTABLISHING A NUMBER OF NEW COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS.
 SIGNED: NGA

MRQ MESSAGE TO HEADQUARTERS / CONTINUED

MR HEADQUARTERS IS VERY GLAD TO SALUTE THE LOC VINH MILITIA
 FOR AN OUTSTANDING COMBAT EFFORT SHOOTING DOWN AN AMERICAN
 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ON 6 JUL - THIS WAS THE SECOND AIRCRAFT SHOT
 DOWN BY THIS VILLAGE DURING THE PAST MONTH.

THE LOC VINH MILITIA ARE CONSISTENTLY ENTHUSIASTIC IN THEIR
 HATRED FOR THE PIRATES AND DETERMINED TO CAPTURE THE AMERICAN
 PIRATES WHO MUST PAY A DEBT OF BLOOD, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TOWARD
 TRAINING, MAINTAIN EXCELLENT COMBAT SKILLS, AND ARE EDUCATED
 THROUGH EXPERIENCE TO BECOME EVEN MORE OUTSTANDING. QUANG BINH
 ALWAYS EMPHASIZES COMPETITIVENESS AMONG THE SELF DEFENSE MILITIA
 FORCES TO DEVELOP THE STRENGTH TO SHOOT DOWN AIRCRAFT, ESPECIALLY
 THOSE AIRCRAFT THAT ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTACKS ALONG
 THE COAST, CONTRIBUTING TO THE COUNTRY'S OVERALL COMPLETE DEFEAT
 OF THE AMERICAN PIRATE'S NEW WAR OF DESTRUCTION AND ALL OF THEIR
 FOULHARDY SCHEMES.

SIGNED: LE QUANG HOA

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RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL FIRST CLASS TO
 THE ARTILLERY MILITIA

WITH VIGILANT AWARENESS AND A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS
 OCCASIONS OPENED FIRE AND SET ABLAZE THREE US WARSHIPS. AT 1630
 HOURS ON 29 JUN 153 ROUNDS WERE FIRED WITH 10 HITTING A SHIP,
 FROM 1220 TO 1247 HOURS ON 3 JUL 340 ROUNDS WERE FIRED WITH 25
 HITTING A SHIP, AND AT 0930 HOURS ON 7 JUL 91 ROUNDS WERE FIRED
 WITH 12 HITTING A SHIP. THE OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT HAS BEEN
 ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AT
 THE THREE BATTLE STATIONS ARE SECURE.

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL THIRD CLASS TO
 THE FOLLOWING UNITS

1. THE 130TH ARTILLERY COMPANY
 THE 130TH ARTILLERY COMPANY, RECENTLY FOUNDED IN JUNE 1972,
 DISPLAYED A HATRED FOR THE ENEMY AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE
 CADRE AND WARRIORS AT 2055 HOURS ON 5 JUL AS AN AMERICAN WARSHIP
 FIRED INTO THE PORT JALONG FROM OFF THE COAST OF NORTHERN QUANG BINH
 - THE 130TH COMPANY QUICKLY OPENED FIRE, COUNTER ATTACKING AND
 SETTING ABLAZE THE AMERICAN WARSHIP - THE SHIP WAS SEVERELY
 DAMAGED AND WAS UNABLE TO SET UNDERWAY FOR ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN
 MINUTES - 70 ROUNDS WERE FIRED, ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER
 HEADQUARTERS - PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ON THE BATTLE FIELD ARE
 SECURE.

2. THE MILITIA OF LOC VINH VILLAGE - QUANG BINH DISTRICT
 AT 1620 HOURS ON 5 JUL, A SORTIE OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED AN
 AXIS OF NATIONAL ROUTE 1 AND AN AREA IN THE CAPITAL OF DONG HOI -
 THE COMBAT UNIT ON DUTY AT LOC VINH, WITH VIGILANT AWARENESS AND
 A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, QUICKLY OPENED FIRE IN A
 COUNTER ATTACK WHICH CAUSED ONE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT TO BURST INTO
 FLAMES, ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. 40 37 AND 12.7MM
 ROUNDS WERE FIRED, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ON THE BATTLEFIELD ARE
 SECURE.

3. THE 9TH 37MM AAA BATTALION
 AT 1010 HOURS ON 3 JUL, NUMEROUS SORTIES OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT
 ATTACKED AN AXIS ALONG NATIONAL HIGHWAY ONE AND AN AREA IN THE
 CAPITAL OF DONG HOI. WITH VIGILANT AWARENESS AND A HIGH STATE OF
 COMBAT READINESS, THE 2ND AND 8TH COMPANIES, 9TH BATTALION,
 OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK CAUSING ONE F-4 TO BURST INTO
 FLAMES. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, THE TWO COMBAT
 STATIONS FIRED 92 ROUNDS, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE.

MR HEADQUARTERS MESSAGE TO QUANG BINH MILITARY HEADQUARTERS
 23 JUL 72 - THE MILITIA OF QUANG LONG VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH
 DOWN ON THE SPOT ONE 4.6.

MR HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES AND CONGRATULATES THE QUANG
 LONG MILITIA FOR THEIR HEIGHTENED VIGILANCE AND EXCELLENT COMBAT
 SKILLS IN ACCOMPLISHING THIS OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT AND
 SENDS ITS WARM REGARDS TO THE PARTY COMMITTEE AND THE LOCAL

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AUTHORITIES FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN VENTURING THE CONDITIONS
NEEDED FOR THE LOCAL ARMED FORCES TO FIGHT AND WIN.

DURING THE DIFFICULT DAYS WHEN THE AMERICAN PIRATES HAVE
CARRIED OUT NUMEROUS BOLDLY DECEITFUL AND FOOLHARDY ACTS, THE
QUANG BINH ARMED FORCES HAVE HAD TO SHARPEN THEIR VIGILANCE IN
UNIFIED COORDINATION, RESOLVED TO FIGHT AND WIN IN AN ALL OUT
EFFORT TO SHOOT DOWN NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT, CAPTURE ALIVE
THE PIRATE AVIATORS, AND BE PREPARED TO SMASH EVERY DESTRUCTIVE
ACT, AND EVERY OTHER FOOLHARDY MILITARY INITIATIVE OF THE
AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS.

SIGNED, HQA
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE
1ST ARTILLERY COMPANY, 13TH BATTALION
MESSAGE DATED 2 AUG 72

WITH VIGILANT AWARENESS AND A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS
THE CADRE AND WARRIORS OF THE 1ST COMPANY AT 1950 HOURS ON 25 JUL
OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK WHICH SET ABLAZE ONE AMERICAN
WARSHIP, COMPLETING THE INITIAL COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE UNIT
ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, OF 32 ROUNDS FIRED, 10 HIT

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THE TARGET, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ON THE BATTLE FIELD ARE
SECURE.

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

TO THE CADRE AND MILITIA OF MAI HOA VILLAGE
AT 0900 HOURS ON 2 AUG 72, THE AMERICAN PIRATES SENT
AIRCRAFT TO RECONNOITER AND ATTACK THE VILLAGE, WITH RAGING
HATRED AND A SPIRIT OF HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, A 12.7MM
DETACHMENT IN MAI HOA VILLAGE QUICKLY OPENED FIRE IN OUTSTANDING
COMBAT FASHION, PULVERIZING AN RF-8C, AN OUTSTANDING
ACCOMPLISHMENT.

THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT OF EACH COMRADE HAS INITIATED THE
MOVEMENT TO SHOOT DOWN LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE NATIVE
AND DEDICATION OF THE LOCAL FORCES EXEMPLIFIES A VILLAGE-HAVING
BOTH EXCELLENT PROJECTILITY AND COMBAT SKILLS.

THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES AND
CONGRATULATES THE OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EVERY
COMRADE, ALL UNITS CONSISTENTLY DRAW FROM EXPERIENCE IN A TIMELY
FASHION, STRIVE TO STUDY, UPLIFT THE COLLECTIVE COMBAT EFFORT,
FIGHT WELL, SHOOT DOWN MANY AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURE
PIRATE AVIATORS, ESTABLISHING EVEN MORE GLORIOUS COMBAT
ACHIEVEMENTS.

THE 365TH COMPANY OF QUANG TRACH

AT 1730 HOURS ON 10 AUG AN AMERICAN HELICOPTER CONDUCTED AN
ATTACK TO BLOCK LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION AND AN
IRRESPONSIBLE ATTACK ON THE COASTAL CIVILIAN POPULACE, WITH A
SPIRIT OF OVERCOMING ADVERSITY, AND A DETERMINATION TO ATTACK
WITH BRAVE RESOLVE BY MEANS OF PROJECTILE TRAJECTORY FILLED WITH
HATRED, COMBAT SKILL AND ACCURACY SHOT DOWN THE AMERICAN
HELICOPTER, AN OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT, //

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RMKS//1. THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS EARLY
CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EACH
COMRADE. EACH COMRADE CONTINUES TO DEVELOP A REPUTATION
FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT, MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO TRAIN AND
UPHOLD THEIR TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES TO FIGHT WELL AND HIT THE
TARGET, SHOOTING DOWN NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT,
CAPTURING PIRATE AVIATORS - THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EACH
COMRADE HAVE EFFECTED THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN
HELICOPTER'S SCHEME OF INTERFERENCE AND DOMINANCE OF THE SEA, AT
THE SAME TIME THE JVIT IS THE FIRST IN THE PROVINCE TO SHOOT
DOWN AN AMERICAN HELICOPTER, A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE
COMPETITIVE PHASE OF DOWNING 1700 AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN THE
HERDIE MHO REGION.

130TH AND 100TH ARTILLERY COMPANIES
EACH COMRADE IN TRULY GLORIOUS TRADITION HAS SHOWN THE
STRENGTH, EXCELLENT FIGHTING SKILL AND MARCHMANSHIP IN EFFECTING
APPROPRIATE RETRIBUTION ON THE AMERICAN PIRATES FOR THEIR CRIMES
AGAINST THE LOCAL POPULACE - AT 2250 HOURS ON 8 AUG 72, THE 130TH
AND 100TH ARTILLERY COMPANIES IN CLOSE COORDINATION, FOUGHT WELL
AND FIRED TRUE, SHOOTING AND SETTING ABLAZE ONE AMERICAN WARSHIP.
THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES
THE TWO UNITS FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT ABOVE, EACH COMRADE REMAINS
HIGHLY DEDICATED TO THE HATRED FOR THE ENEMY, DEDICATED TO THE

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CAPTURE OF AMERICAN PIRATE AVIATORS AND MUST PAY A DEBT OF
BLOOD - THE COMRADES HAVE HEIGHTENED THEIR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT
AND WIN, UNITED ALL OF THE ALLIED AND MILITIA JVITS, STRESSING
IMPROVED TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND OUTSTANDING SKILLS, SAFEGUARDING
CAISSONS AND CONSERVING AMMUNITION TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE
MISSION, TO RESPOND, OUTSTANDINGLY, BY SHOOTING AND SETTING
AMERICAN WARSHIPS AND ESTABLISHING EVEN GREATER COMBAT
ACHIEVEMENTS.

MESSAGE TO HEADQUARTERS - POLITICAL DIRECTORATE MHO
RECOMMEND THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 2ND CLASS TO COMPANY
365. AT 1730 HOURS ON 10 AUG, AN AMERICAN HELICOPTER OPERATING
IN THE MHO LA AREA CARRIED OUT AN ATTACK TO BLOCK LINES OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION AND HIT THE COASTAL CIVILIAN
POPULACE. A 12.7MM DETACHMENT, 365TH COMPANY, WITH A SPIRIT OF
OVERCOMING ADVERSITY, AGGRESSIVE DETERMINATION, VIGILANCE AND A
HIGH SENSE OF COMBAT READINESS, UNIFORMLY OPENED FIRE AND SHOT
AND SET FIRE TO THE AMERICAN HELICOPTER WHICH WENT DOWN SOUTH
WEST OF MHO GID. THE BATTLE INVOLVED SIX HEAVY MACHINE GUNS
FIRED A TOTAL OF 90 ROUNDS. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE.
THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE FOLLOWING UNITS
- 130TH COMPANY AND THE 2ND ARTILLERY COMPANY, QUANG BINH

AT 2250 HOURS ON 8 AUG, AN AMERICAN DESTROYER OPERATING IN
THE MHO LA AREA FIRED ARTILLERY TO BLOCK LINES OF COMMUNICATION
AND TRANSPORTATION AND ON THE COASTAL CIVILIAN POPULACE OF QUANG
TRACH. THE TWO UNITS WERE VIGILANT AND HIGHLY COMBAT READY AND
UNIFORMLY OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK WHICH SHOT AND SET FIRE
TO ONE AMERICAN WARSHIP. THE 130TH COMPANY FIRED 60 ROUNDS WITH
SIX HITTING THE TARGET. THE 100TH COMPANY FIRED 30 ROUNDS WITH
TWO HITTING THE TARGET. ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS,
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ON THE BATTLEFIELD ARE SECURE. THE
PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND RECOMMENDS THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT
MEDAL 3RD CLASS FOR THE TWO UNITS.

- GUERRILLA FORCES OF NAI HOA VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA DISTRICT
AT 0400 HOURS ON 2 AUGUST, AN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE
VILLAGE & A 12.7MM DETACHMENT WITH A HEIGHTENED SPIRIT OF
VIGILANCE AND COMBAT READINESS, QUICKLY OPENED FIRE AND
PULVERIZED ONE F-4C AIRCRAFT, A FIRST FOR THE VILLAGE.
ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. DURING THE BATTLE, TWO
12.7MM WEAPONS FIRED 37 ROUNDS. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE
SECURE.

- GUERRILLA FORCES OF LONG MINH VILLAGE - QUANG MINH DISTRICT
AT 1610 HOURS ON 4 AUG A NUMBER OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SORTIES
ATTACKED A TRANSPORTATION AXIS AND THE CAPITAL AREA, COMMITTING
NUMEROUS CRIMES. A 12.7MM DETACHMENT IN LONG MINH, WITH
INTENSIFIED HATRED FOR THE ENEMY, OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER-ATTACK
WHICH PULVERIZED ONE AMERICAN F-4, AN OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT.
ACKNOWLEDGED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. THE BATTLE INVOLVED TWO

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12.7MM WEAPONS FIRING 30 ROUNDS. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE.

-RAVAN PLATOON, 8TH COMPANY, 94TH REGIMENT, 351ST DIVISION
IN ORDER TO MOBILIZE THE CADRE AND WARRIORS, THE UNIT
EXAMINED THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COMBAT PROCESS, TO SUPPORT
THE WAR IN QUANG BINH. THE UNIT RAISED ITS SPIRIT TO OVERCOME
ADVERSITY, FIRMLY GRASPING THE ENEMY SITUATION DAY AND NIGHT,
QUICKLY ACQUIRING TARGETS WITH ACCURACY, CREATING CONDITIONS FOR
ALL COMBAT ARTILLERY UNITS TO FIRE ON AND SET ABLAZE AMERICAN
WARSHIPS, SUCH AS DURING THE BATTLE FROM 5 TO 8 AUG 72.

THROUGHOUT EVERY BATTLE, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE.
19 AUG 72 - RECOMMEND THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS FOR
QUANG PHONG VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT.

AT 1330 ON 23 JUL QUANG PHONG VILLAGE ALONG WITH QUANG LONG
VILLAGE SHOT DOWN AN F-4 ON THE SPOT. FORMERLY, ONLY TWO COMBAT
ACHIEVEMENT MEDALS 2ND CLASS WERE RECOMMENDED ACCORDING TO
MESSAGE NUMBER 19 DATED 29 JUL.

NOW, RESUBMIT A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT
MEDAL 3RD CLASS FOR THE TWO VILLAGES QUANG LONG AND QUANG PHONG.
TWO COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDALS 3.

MR HEADQUARTERS MESSAGE TO QUANG BINH MILITARY COMMAND
17 AUG 1972.

ON 11 AUG, THE 365TH COMPANY OF QUANG TRACH MADE APPROPRIATE
PREPARATIONS, HEIGHTENED VIGILANCE, FOUGHT WITH EXCELLENT
MARKSMANSHIP AND DELIVERED THE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT TO THE
AMERICAN PIRATES FOR CRIMES IN THE LOCAL AREA, BY SHOOTING DOWN
ONE OF THEIR HELICOPTERS. THIS WAS THE FIRST ARMED AMERICAN
HELICOPTER TO BE SHOT DOWN IN THE MILITARY REGION DURING THE NEW
WAR OF DESTRUCTION.

MR HEADQUARTERS ENTHUSIASTICALLY AND WARMLY RECOGNIZES THIS
ACHIEVEMENT BY THE 365TH COMPANY.

EACH COMRADE CONTINUES TO INCREASE THEIR FERVENT HATRED FOR
THE PIRATES, URGENTLY DRAW FROM EXPERIENCE, EMPLOY ADEQUATE
CAMOUFLAGE, STRENGTHEN FORTIFICATIONS, SUSTAIN EXCELLENT
MOBILITY, USE STRONG DIVERSIONARY TACTICS, ARE BOLD, SKILLFUL,
AND AGILE IN METHODOLOGY, CREATIVE IN THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE,

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SHOOT DOWN NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT, CAPTURE PIRATE
AVIATORS, AND HELP CRUSH THE ENEMY SCHEME TO USE HELICOPTERS TO
STRIKE NATIVE HOMES ALONG THE COAST, MAINTAINING CONSTANT LINES
OF COMMUNICATIONS TO SUPPORT THE MARCH TOWARD VICTORY.

SIGNED, LE QUANG - 40A

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND
TO: THE CADRE, MILITIA, AND 12.7MM DETACHMENT OF QUANG PHUC
VILLAGE

MESSAGE RECEIVED BY COMRADE DUyet ON 28 AUG

AT 1500 HOURS ON 28 AUG 72, AMERICAN PIRATES DISPATCHED
AIRCRAFT TO RECONVOITE AND BOMBARD THE LOCAL VILLAGE. COMPETING
FOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN RECOGNITION OF THE AUGUST REVOLUTION AND
THE 2 SEP NATIONAL RESISTANCE, A 12.7MM DETACHMENT, WITH A
HEIGHTENED SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE AND COMBAT READINESS, COURAGEOUSLY
LOOKED DIRECTLY AT THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT AND, WITH A SIMULTANEOUS
VOLLEY, OPENED FIRE AND SHOT DOWN ONE AMERICAN "PIRATE" F-4, AN
OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT WHICH AROUSED A SENSE OF PRIDE AMONG
THE LOCAL POPULACE.

THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS WARMLY SALUTES AND
CONGRATULATES THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EVERY COMRADE.

EACH COMRADE CONTINUES TO DRAW FROM EXPERIENCE IN A TIMELY
MANNER, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INCREASE PRECISE TACTICAL TRAINING,
CLOSELY COORDINATE, FIGHT WELL AND HIT THE TARGET, SHOOT DOWN
AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT WITH THE FIRST SALVO, CAPTURE
PIRATE AVIATORS, AND RAISE THE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE TO ATTAIN
NUMEROUS FUTURE VICTORIES.

28 AUG 72

SIGNED, NGUEN

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO
QUANG PHUC VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT

AT 1500 HOURS ON 28 AUG 72, A 12.7MM DETACHMENT IN QUANG
PHUC VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4 WITH
25 ROUNDS FROM TWO 12.7MM WEAPONS AS THE AIRCRAFT RECONVOITED
AND STRAFED THE LOCAL AREA. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE.
MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS ACCLAMATION

ON 24 AUG THE QUANG PHUC MILITIA, SKILLFULLY ATTACKED,
STRIKING THE TARGET IN A TIMELY FASHION DURING A COUNTER ATTACK
ON AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AND SHOT
DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4, FULFILLING AN APPROPRIATE TRIBUTE TO THE 14
AUG TO 2 SEP COMMEMORATION AND THREE YEARS OF SUCCESS DEDICATED
TO THE SACRED VISIONS OF CHAIRMAN HO'S LOVE AND RESPECT.

MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH

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CONRADE FOR THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACCOMPLISHMENT - THE HUANG PHUC MILITIA CONTINUOUSLY MANIFESTS VICTORY, PROMOTING THE TRADITIONS OF A HEROIC UNIT, WITH INTENSE HAIR FOR THE AMERICAN PIRATES AND A DETERMINATION TO REPAY, FOR COUNTRYMEN AND CONRADES, THE PIRATE AMERICAN MURDERERS, SHOOTING DOWN NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN THE SPOT, CAPTURING PIRATE AVIATORS, AND CLOSELY COORDINATING WITH OTHER FORCES, MAINTAINING CONSTANT LINES OF TRANSPORTATION AND RESPONDING TO EVERY FRONT LINE REQUIREMENT FOR VICTORY. AT THE SAME TIME, URGENT PREPARATIONS MUST BE MADE TO REALISTICALLY SUPPORT THE PROVINCE IN EVERY RESPECT TO DEFEAT EVERY OTHER MILITARY ADVENTURISM BY THE NIXON CLIQUE.

SIGNED, LE QUANG HOA

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE DUC NINH SENIOR CITIZEN FORCES

21 SEP 72 - DISPLAYING TRADITION THROUGH FOUR YEARS OF DESTRUCTIVE WARFARE. AT 0757 HOURS ON 15 SEP, THE SENIOR CITIZEN DETACHMENT ON DUTY IN DUC NINH, WITH VIGILANCE AND A HEIGHTENED STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN A-7, WHICH CRASHED OFF THE COAST, EAST OF BAD NINH. IN ALL, 75 ROUNDS WERE FIRED. THE BATTLEFIELD ENCOMPASSED A DEPLOYMENT AT THE BINH PHUC MARKET, DUC NINH. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ON THE BATTLEFIELD ARE SECURE.

PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

AT 0757 HOURS ON 15 SEP, THE SENIOR CITIZEN DETACHMENT ON DUTY IN DUC NINH SKILLFULLY ATTACKED, AND QUICKLY STRUCK THE TARGET, AS THEY OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK ON AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, DOWNING AN AMERICAN A-7, AN OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT.

THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND WARMLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES THE PATRIARCHS FOR THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACCOMPLISHMENT. EVERY SENIOR CITIZEN HAS CONTINUED TO DISPLAY TRADITION THROUGH FOUR YEARS OF DESTRUCTIVE WARFARE, COMPETITIVELY SHOOTING DOWN, AND SETTING ABLAZE NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS

28 SEP

-THE TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE FEMALE PLATOON, 80 TRACH DISTRICT 17 AUG AT 4750 HOURS A NUMBER OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SORTIES ATTACKED THE LOCAL AREA - WITH VIGILANCE AND A TYPICALLY HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS - THE TRUNG TRACH FEMALE PLATOON OPENED FIRE IN A TIMELY COUNTER ATTACK AND SHOT DOWN AN F-4 SOME DISTANCE EAST OF LY HOA. 47 ROUNDS EXPENDED. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT SECURE.

-THE PHONG THUY VILLAGE COMBAT PLATOON, LE THUY DISTRICT

AT 0712 HOURS ON 22 SEP, WITH VIGILANCE AND A HEIGHTENED STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, THE 12,7MM PHONG THUY VILLAGE COMBAT PLATOON OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK WHICH SHOT AND SET ABLAZE AN F-4 THAT CRASHED AT SEA. THE PIRATE AVIATOR WAS SEEN PARACHUTING FROM THE AIRCRAFT. 65 ROUNDS FROM THREE 12,7MM

WEAPONS WERE EXPENDED. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE. -THE MAI THUY AND PHU THUY VILLAGE DETACHMENTS - LE THUY DISTRICT AT 2147 HOURS ON 21 SEP, A NUMBER OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SORTIES ATTACKED THE LOCAL AREA. THE MAI THUY AND PHU THUY VILLAGE COMBAT DETACHMENTS WITH VIGILANCE AND A HEIGHTENED STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, CLOSELY COORDINATED IN A SIMULTANEOUS SALVO, OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK THAT SHOT DOWN AN F-4. 263 ROUNDS FROM 12,7MM WEAPONS AND 65 ROUNDS FROM TWO 57MM WEAPONS WERE EXPENDED. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE.

RECOMMEND MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS CONSIDER AWARDING THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO MAI THUY AND PHU THUY VILLAGES.

SIGNED, COMMANDER VGOAY

PERSONNEL ROSTER OF THE DUC NINH SENIOR CITIZEN MILITIA		
NGUYEN NGOC BAY	OVER 59	PARTY MEMBER COMMANDER
DANG DIU A	OVER 55	PARTY MEMBER VICE COMMANDER
DANG THON	55	PARTY MEMBER POLITICAL OFFICER
TRAN THOM	61	SOLDIER
DANG OI	55	SOLDIER
BT		

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DOAN CHNG 75 SOLDIER
 TRAN DNG 70 SOLDIER
 DANG DIEU 70 SOLDIER
 DANG CHONG 65 SOLDIER
 NGUYEN LY 65 SOLDIER
 NGUYEN LO 55 SOLDIER

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE 5TH MILITIA COMPANY

AT 1835 HOURS ON 22 SEP, THE 5TH AAA MILITIA COMPANY SHOT DOWN AN F-4. 183 ROUNDS FROM SIX 14.5MM WEAPONS WERE EXPENDED. REPORTED - SECURE.

RECOMMEND THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE 3RD AAA MILITIA COMPANY

AT 0635 HOURS ON 26 SEP, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE HOA LA AREA. WITH A SENSE OF HEIGHTENED COMBAT-READINESS AND UNYIELDING COURAGE, THE 3RD COMPANY, 9TH BATTALION, OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK THAT SHOT DOWN AN A-7 WHICH CRASHED ONE KILOMETER EAST OF HOA GIO. REPORTED. 45 ROUNDS EXPENDED. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT SECURE.

RECOMMEND THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE DONG HOI DETACHMENT

AT 1122 HOURS ON 26 SEP, THE COMBAT DETACHMENT ON DUTY IN DONG HOI, WITH CLOSE COORDINATION, SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4. ROUNDS EXPENDED: 59 14.5MM, 118 12.7MM, 56 57MM. (REPORTED VIA RADIO AT 2300 HOURS ON 28 SEP). PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT SECURE. PERSONNEL ROSTER OF THE NGU THUY FEMALE MILITIA (FORMER)

1. TRAN THI THANH NAM - POLITICAL OFFICER
2. NGO THI KIM THE - POLITICAL MEMBER
3. NGO THI KIM HAI - POLITICAL MEMBER
4. NGUYEN THI THANH THOI - POLITICAL OFFICER
5. NGO THI CAT - SECRETARY
6. NGO THI NGU - SECRETARY
7. NGUYEN THI VE - STAFF TECHNICIAN
8. NGUYEN THI CHAU - 2ND CREW LEADER
9. NGUYEN THI BANG - SECRETARY
10. NGUYEN THI DIEM - SECRETARY
11. TRAN THI YAT - MANAGEMENT
12. PHU THI DA - SECRETARY
13. TRAN THI KIEN - OPERATIONS
14. TRAN THI TRAM - OPERATIONS
15. NGUYEN THI XIEU - INTEL
16. NGUYEN THI GIAO - SECRETARY

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17. TRAN THI XU - OPERATIONS
18. NGUYEN THI DAO - MANAGEMENT
19. NGUYEN THI THAI - COMMS SQUAD LEADER
20. NGO THI TAN - NGUYEN SQUAD LEADER
21. TRAN THI KIM DINH - SECRETARY
22. TRAN THI KIM LO - SECRETARY
23. NGUYEN THI HAI - SECRETARY
24. NGUYEN THI CHAU - 2ND CREW LEADER
25. NGUYEN THI KE - LOGISTICS
26. NGO THI TAN - COMMS

27. NGUYEN THI XIEU - COMMS
28. NGUYEN THI LAM - LOGISTICS
29. NGO THI THAI - LOGISTICS
30. NGUYEN THI KIM THU - STAFF
31. NGO THI BIEU - STAFF
32. TRAN THU LY - LOGISTICS
33. NGUYEN THI THAI - COMMS SQUAD LEADER
34. NGUYEN THI THUY - COMMS
35. TRAN THI TRUNG - COMMS
36. TRAN THI LIEU - INTEL
37. TRAN THI THIEU - OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 1ST CLASS TO THE DONG HOI AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR FACTORY SELF DEFENSE FORCE 5 OCT 72

AT 1800 HOURS ON 5 OCT, ONE SQUAD OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE DONG HOI AREA BUT DID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO COMMIT ANY CRIMES. THE DONG HOI AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR FACTORY'S SELF DEFENSE UNIT, WITH VIGILANCE AND A HEIGHTENED STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, USED THREE 14.5MM WEAPONS AND OPENED FIRE IN A SIMULTANEOUS SALVO WHICH SHOT DOWN ONE F-4 ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURED ALIVE TWO AMERICAN PILOT AVIATORS - 50 ROUNDS EXPENDED. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE. SIGNED, COMMANDER NGUON COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE 9TH 85MM ARTILLERY COMPANY

AT 2330 HOURS ON 28 SEP, ARRIVED OFF THE COAST OF SOUTHERN GUANG BINH AND FIRED ARTILLERY ON THE CIVILIAN POPULACE. THE 9TH ARTILLERY COMPANY OPENED FIRE IN A COUNTER ATTACK THAT LEFT ONE AMERICAN WARSHIP IN FLAMES. OF 30 ROUNDS FIRED, FOUR HIT THE TARGET. REPORTED VIA RADIO. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE. MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS MESSAGE TO QUANG BINH MILITARY COMMAND

DURING BOMBING, DIFFICULTY, AND HARDSHIP THE AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR FACTORY'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES HAVE ACCOMPLISHED A RESOUNDING VICTORY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMPAIGN TO SHOOT DOWN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT INITIATED BY THE MILITARY REGION. ON 5 OCT, THEY SKILLFULLY ATTACKED, FIRING WITH EXTREME MARKSMANSHIP.

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INFLECTING JUST PUNISHMENT ON THE AMERICAN PIRATES WHO CAME TO COMMIT CRIMES IN THE LOCAL AREA, AND DOWNED ONE OF THEIR FIGHTERS IN THE SPOT. THIS IS THE MOST OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT SINCE THE REGION REOPENED THIS CAMPAIGN AND DELIVERS A PAINFUL AND PERILOUS MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN AIR FORCE.

MR HEADQUARTERS WARMLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THE ABOVE MENTIONED COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT.

THE AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR FACTORY'S SELF-DEFENSE UNIT, LIKE ALL OF THE QUANG BINH ARMED FORCES, CONTINUOUSLY EXHIBIT ACCOMPLISHMENTS, URGENTLY DRAW FROM EXPERIENCE, ACTIVELY CONDUCT INTENSE RESEARCH TO IMPROVE METHODS OF FIGHTING, ELEVATING THEIR COMBAT EFFICIENCY TO GREATER LEVELS, ARE DEDICATED TO SELF-IMPROVEMENT TO SHOOT DOWN ENEMY AIRCRAFT ANY TIME, ANY PLACE, CAPTURE PIRATE AVIATORS, AND RAPIDLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN TO OVER 1000 IN NORTHERN VIETNAM AND 700 IN THE PROVINCE.

SIGNED, LE QUANG HOA
MILITARY REGION MESSAGE 81 -
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SENT TO THE AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR FACTORY'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. A MONUMENT, THE LIKES OF WHICH HAS NEVER EXISTED.

SIGNED, QUANG
RECOMMEND THE POSTHUMOUS AWARD OF THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE FOLLOWING DECEASED HEROES DEPLOYED TO NON LA, QUANG TRACH

- (READ: NAME, DOB, RANK, POSITION, DGE, UNIT, HOME TOWN)
1. PHAM VINH DAP, FEB 85, PLATOON DEPUTY COMMANDER, JULY 66, 45TH BN, QUANG HUNG, QUANG TRACH
 2. NGUYEN HONG LAM, JCT 52, PRIVATE 1ST CLASS, MAY 70, 45TH BN, THANH TRACH, BO TRACH
 3. NGUYEN CAN, JCT 40, PRIVATE 1ST CLASS, JAN 71, 45TH BN, NGHE THUY, LE THUY
 4. NGUYEN VAN LUOT, -, PRIVATE 2ND CLASS, JAN 72, 45TH BN, QUANG XUAN, QUANG TRACH
 5. NGUYEN XUAN HOA, NOV 52, PRIVATE 1ST CLASS, AUG 70, 45TH BN, QUANG PHUC, QUANG TRACH
 6. TRAN VAN TRI, DEC 53, PRIVATE 2ND CLASS, JAN 72, 45TH BN, QUANG DONG, QUANG TRACH
 7. PHAM CONG THAM, APR 50, PRIVATE 1ST CLASS, NOV 70, 363RD COMPANY 03 TRACH, HAI TRACH, BO TRACH
 8. PHAM NAM PHU, JAN 47, PRIVATE 1ST CLASS, JAN 70, 45TH INFANTRY COMPANY, DONG PHU, DONG HOI

SIGNED, COMMANDER NGUYEN
SENT ON 12 OCT 72

24 OCT 1972

1. RECOMMEND THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE MAIN 12.7MM UNIT OF 444 DUNG VILLAGE, QUANG TRACH DISTRICT FOR SHOOTING DOWN 44 F-4 AT 1315 HOURS ON 10 OCT 72 WITH 17 ROUNDS EXPENDED.

2. RECOMMEND THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO THE DONG TRUNG 14.5MM ARTILLERY (4 WEAPONS) AND THE DUY VINH VILLAGE QUANG VINH DISTRICT 12.7MM ARTILLERY (3 WEAPONS) FOR SHOOTING DOWN AN RF-4 (RECON) THREE KILOMETERS EAST OF DUY VINH AT 1745 HOURS ON 10 OCT 1972. 45 ROUNDS OF 14.5MM AND 52 ROUNDS OF 12.7MM AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
TO THE CADRE AND GUERRILLA FORCES OF DUY VINH VILLAGE
AT 1715 HOURS ON 10 OCT 72, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE LOCAL AREA, WITH A PERMANENT SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, THE 12.7MM DETACHMENT ON DUTY OPENED FIRE IN AN ACCURATE COUNTER ATTACK, SHOOTING DOWN AN AMERICAN

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F-4. THE MILITARY COMMAND WARMLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THEIR COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT. THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS CONTINUE TO BE STUBBORN - IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO THE GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL OF 26 OCT, TO COORDINATE THE ENTIRE COUNTRY'S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POPULACE'S RESOLVE TO FIGHT AND DEFEAT THE PIRATE AMERICAN INVASION AND THE LACKEY CLIQUE, EVERY COMRADE MUST HEIGHTEN THEIR SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE AND COMBAT READINESS TO EVEN GREATER LEVELS, DRAW FROM EXPERIENCE TO QUICKLY AND ACCURATELY SHOOT DOWN NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURE NUMEROUS AMERICAN PIRATE AVIATORS - DETERMINEDLY COMPETE TO SHOOT DOWN THE 700TH AIRCRAFT, PRESERVING THE HONOR OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. SIGNED, COMMANDER, QUANG BINH MILITARY COMMAND, NGDAN CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO THE CADRE AND SOLDIERS OF THE 2 SEP UNIT.

AT 1010 HOURS ON 26 OCT 72, NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SORTILS ATTACKED JCCA, RESIDENTS, WITH A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND COMBAT READINESS, EACH UNIT, WITH SKILL AND COURAGE, ACCURATELY AND VICIOUSLY COUNTER ATTACKED AND SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4, RESULTING IN A GLORIOUS ACCOMPLISHMENT.

MILITARY COMMAND WARMLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THIS OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT. THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS CONTINUE TO BE OBSTINATE AND SHREWD. IN ORDER TO CORRECTLY RESPOND TO THE GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL OF 26 OCT, TO COORDINATE THE ENTIRE COUNTRY'S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POPULACE'S RESOLVE TO FIGHT AND DEFEAT THE PIRATE AMERICAN INVASION AND THE LACKEY CLIQUE, EVERY COMRADE MUST HEIGHTEN THEIR SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE AND COMBAT READINESS TO EVEN GREATER LEVELS, TO ACCURATELY SHOOT DOWN NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURE NUMEROUS AMERICAN PIRATE AVIATORS - DETERMINEDLY COMPETE TO SHOOT DOWN THE 700TH AIRCRAFT, PRESERVING THE INDIVIDUAL UNIT'S HONOR. SIGNED, NGDAN

TO: THE CADRE AND SOLDIERS OF THE 10TH 85MM ARTILLERY COMPANY

AT 1320 HOURS ON 26 OCT, THREE AMERICAN WARSHIPS, MANEUVERING NORTH TO SOUTH, INITIATED AN IRRESPONSIBLE ATTACK ON COASTAL CIVILIANS - WITH A CONSTANT SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, THEY OPENED FIRE IN JUSTIFIED RETRIBUTION, SHOOTING AND SETTING ABLAZE ONE AMERICAN WARSHIP, AN OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL OF 26 OCT.

MILITARY COMMAND WARMLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THIS OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT, COORDINATING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY'S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POPULACE'S RESOLVE TO FIGHT AND DEFEAT THE PIRATE AMERICAN INVASION AND THEIR LACKEY CLIQUE, EVERY COMRADE MUST HEIGHTEN THEIR SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE AND COMBAT READINESS TO EVEN GREATER LEVELS, TO SET ABLAZE AND SINK NUMEROUS AMERICAN WARSHIPS, AND REGULARLY SUPPORT THE COMPETITIVE

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PHASE AIMED AT SETTING ABLAZE AND SINKING THE 100TH AMERICAN WARSHIP BY THE PROVINCE.

TO: THE CADRE AND MILITIA OF VO NINH VILLAGE

THE CHALLENGE TO QUICKLY ADVANCE THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE PROVINCE TO 700 AND SEIZE THE HONOR OF SHOOTING DOWN THE 700TH PLANE - AT 0815 HOURS ON 26 OCT, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE QUAN HAU FERRY TERMINAL AND HAMLET - WITH A SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, THE VICIOUSLY COUNTER ATTACKED AND SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4, RESULTING IN A OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT.

MILITARY COMMAND WARMLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THIS OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT. THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS CONTINUE TO BE OBSTINATE AND SHREWD. EVERY COMRADE CONTINUES TO BE EVEN MORE VIGILANT AND COMBAT READY AT ALL TIMES TO PRECISELY EXECUTE THE GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL OF 26 OCT, TO COORDINATE THE ENTIRE COUNTRY'S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POPULACE'S RESOLVE TO FIGHT AND DEFEAT THE PIRATE AMERICAN INVASION AND THE LACKEY CLIQUE.

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EACH COMRADE DRAWS FROM EXPERIENCE WITH SKILLFUL AND ACCURATE MARKSMANSHIP TO SHOOT DOWN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURE AMERICAN PIRATE AVIATORS.

STRIVING FORTH IN THE COMPETITION TO SHOOT DOWN THE PROVINCE'S 700TH AIRCRAFT AND BESTOW THIS HONOR ON THEIR LOCALITY.

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

TO: THE CADRE AND GUERRILLA FORCES OF THE PHONG THUY VILLAGE MILITIA

AT 0932 HOURS ON 27 OCT, AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE LOCAL AREA. WITH A SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS THE 12.7MM DETACHMENT ON DUTY JUSTIFIABLY PUNISHED AND SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4 COMPLETING AN OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT.

MILITARY COMMAND HARMFULLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THIS OUTSTANDING COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT. THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS CONTINUE TO BE OBSTINATE AND SHREWD. EVERY COMRADE CONTINUES TO BE EVEN MORE VIGILANT AND COMBAT READY AT ALL TIMES, COORDINATING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY'S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POPULACE'S RESOLVE TO FIGHT AND DEFEAT THE PIRATE AMERICAN INVASION AND THEIR LACKEY CLIQUE. EACH COMRADE, QUICKLY DRAWING FROM EXPERIENCE, WITH BRAVERY, SKILL, AND CAPABLE FIGHTING, HAVE HIT THE TARGET WITH ACCURACY TO SHOOT DOWN NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURE PIRATE AVIATORS. STRIVING FORTH IN THE COMPETITION TO SHOOT DOWN THE PROVINCE'S 700TH AIRCRAFT AND BESTOW THIS HONOR ON THEIR LOCALITY.

TO: THE CADRE AND GUERRILLA FORCES OF THE LEU THUY VI-LAGE MILITIA

AT 1500 HOURS ON 23 OCT, A NUMBER OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE LOCAL AREA. WITH A SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, THE 12.7MM DETACHMENT, WITH SKILL AND COURAGE, SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4.

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JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/PA-MIA//

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RKMSJ. THE MILITARY COMMAND HARMFULLY CONGRATULATES AND SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THEIR COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT. EVERY COMRADE IS AT ALL TIMES, EVEN MORE VIGILANT AND COMBAT READY. THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS ARE EXTREMELY OBSTINATE AND SHREWD. IN RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL OF 26 OCT, TO COORDINATE THE ENTIRE COUNTRY'S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POPULACE'S RESOLVE TO FIGHT AND DEFEAT THE PIRATE AMERICAN INVASION AND THE LACKEY CLIQUE, EACH COMRADE HAS ORGANIZED AND DRAWN FROM EXPERIENCE TO CAPABLY FIGHT, HIT THE TARGET, AND SHOT DOWN NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT AND CAPTURE MANY AMERICAN PIRATE AVIATORS. TO QUICKLY BRING THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE PROVINCE UP TO 700.

FROM THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND

MESSAGE DATED 2 OCT

RECOMMEND THE COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL 3RD CLASS TO TWO UNITS

1. 8TH 85MM ARTILLERY COMPANY

AT 0107 HOURS ON 13 OCT, SHOT AND SET ABLAZE AN AMERICAN WARSHIP. 38 ROUNDS EXPENDED, FIVE HIT THE SHIP, ALL IS SECURE.

2. 10TH 85MM ARTILLERY COMPANY

AT 0900 HOURS ON 24 OCT, SHOT AND SET ABLAZE AN AMERICAN WARSHIP. 39 ROUNDS EXPENDED, FOUR HIT THE SHIP, ALL IS SECURE.

SIGNED, NGCAN

MESSAGE DATED 4 OCT

3. AT 2300 HOURS ON 31 OCT, THE TRUONG THUY VILLAGE MILITIA SHOT

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AND SET ABLAZE AT 7-04 WHICH CRASHED AT KILOMETER MARKER 20. 225
ROUNDS EXPENDED. SECURE.
CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

TO: THE CADRE AND GUERRILLA FORCES OF THE HAN VUON
AT 1500 HOURS ON 3 NOV, THE AMERICAN PIRATES DISPATCHED AN
AIRCRAFT TO RECONVOITER AND ATTACK, IN A CRIMINAL ACT, THE LOCAL
AREA.

TO PRECISELY EXECUTE THE GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF 26 OCT,
THE 127TH DETACHMENT ON DUTY, WITH A SENSE OF VIGILANCE AND
HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, CALMLY AND BRAVELY OPENED FIRE WITH
A SIMULTANEOUS SALVO OF 55 ROUNDS AND SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN F-4.

THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND HEARILY SALUTES AND
CONGRATULATES EACH COMRADE FOR THIS INITIAL COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT.
THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS HAVE SUFFERED A GREAT DEFEAT BUT
CONTINUE TO BE STUBBORN AND UNDERHANDED, PERPETUATING THIS WAR OF
INVASION.

EACH COMRADE CONTINUES TO QUICKLY DRAW FROM EXPERIENCE,
MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO CAREFULLY TRAIN AND BETTER THEIR
TECHNIQUE. SHARPENING THEIR SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE, UNITING AND
STRENGTHENING THEIR COORDINATION, TO CAPABLY FIGHT, HIT THE
TARGET AND DOWN NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT WITH THE
INITIAL VOLLEY AND CAPTURE PIRATE AVIATORS. TO ATTAIN THE HONOR
OF SHOOTING DOWN, ON THE SPOT, THE PROVINCE'S 700TH AIRCRAFT FOR
THEIR LOCALS.

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
TO: THE CADRE AND GUERRILLA FORCES OF THE NGU THUY VILLAGE
VILLITA

AT 1330 ON 17 JAN 1973, A PIRATE AMERICAN DRONE INTRUDED ON
THE AIRSPACE OVER LE THUY. WITH A SPIRIT OF VIGILANCE AND
HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, THE UNIT ON DUTY QUICKLY OPENED FIRE
AND SHOT IT DOWN ON THE SPOT - AN OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT.

THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND HEARILY CONGRATULATES AND
SALUTES EACH COMRADE FOR THIS COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT. EACH COMRADE
CONTINUES TO BE EVEN MORE VIGILANT AND HIGHLY COMBAT READY, TO
CAPABLY FIGHT, HIT, AND CRUSH THE PROVOCATIVE SCHEMES OF THE
ENEMY, MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO CAREFULLY TRAIN TO ACHIEVE EXPERT
TACTICS IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY IN EVERY SITUATION.

SIGNED: MILITARY HEADQUARTERS COMMANDER, TRAY JIYH V234V, /END
QUOTE //

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AIRCRAFT
ON 4 NOV 73, SHOT DOWN THE SEVENTH AIRCRAFT OVER
NORTHERN VIETNAM.

ON 26 NOV 73, SHOT DOWN THE SEVEN 1-10 2240 FOUR
THIS NUMBER WAS PROBABLY FORMERLY - I.E. SOUTH OF THE PROVINCE'S
AIRCRAFT RECONVOITER (DRONE TYPE).

ON 16 DEC 73, SHOT DOWN THE FIRST F-411
NORTHERN SHEEP PINE AIRCRAFT.

ON 23 DEC 73, SHOT DOWN A B-52 DRONE: THE
NORTH AIRCRAFT IN THE SOUTHERN REGION.

ON 26 DEC 73, SHOT DOWN 2 B-52 DRONE AIRCRAFT.

TITLE: RECORDS OF NO PIRATE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY
SELF DEFENSE MILITARY FORCES: HEAD- INTERMITTENT REGISTRATION/NUMBER
AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

ON 20 NOV 67/THUY VUON VILLITA/NO-4.

ON 17 JAN 67/THUY VUON VILLITA/NO-4.

ON 17 JAN 67/THUY VUON VILLITA/NO-4.

ON 17 JAN 67/THUY VUON VILLITA/NO-4.

ON 17 JAN 67/THUY VUON VILLITA/NO-4.

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TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PA-MIA// JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PA-MIA/J5//
 SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC// USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5//
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PA-MIA//
 WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//OASD-ED-4//

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SECTION 01/02 OF
 LNO PASS TO HANOI PA-MIA OFFICE
 MSGID/SYS.PRM/CDR JCRC//

AMPH/SUBJ: [REDACTED] DOCUMENT RECEIVED DURING
 OPERATION IN QUANG BINH//

CRK871. DURING ITERATION 14, FROM 17 JUL THROUGH 12 AUG 1991,
 JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM TWO EXAMINED FIVE UNOFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
 PROVIDED BY THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM CONTAINING REFERENCES TO
 INCIDENTS INVOLVING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. THE TEAM PHOTOCOPIED 56
 PAGES SELECTED FROM FOUR OF THESE DOCUMENTS. THE FOLLOWING IS A
 VERBATIM TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE DOCUMENTS. NOTES: THE
 ORIGIN OF THIS DOCUMENT IS UNKNOWN, BUT IT APPEARS TO BE A
 COMPILATION OF AIRTIME EVENTS RECORDED IN THE DIARY OF A
 STATISTICIAN OF UNKNOWN AFFILIATION. ANALYST COMMENTS WITHIN THE
 TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT ARE INCLUDED WITHIN DOUBLE PARENS.

2. /QUOTE/ (DOCUMENT TITLE) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ASSISTANCE

(VIETNAMESE NAME) REVIEWED AND COPIED ON 6 APR 1989
 14 COPIES OF THE AMERICAN MATERIALISTS OVER EIGHT YEARS IN REGARD
 TO QUANG BINH

RECONNAISSANCE (STATISTICS ONLY FROM 1960-1972)

12,656 SHOTS

20,720 AIRCRAFT

INCLUDING EVERY TYPE OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OF THE AIR FORCE,
 NAVY, DRONES, ELECTRONIC, PROP DRIVEN, HELICOPTER, AND HIGH

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- ALTITUDE (SR-71)
 AIR STRIKES

TOTAL : 72,501
 DAY : 37,452
 NIGHT : 35,049

AMONG THESE THERE WERE 736 B-52 STRIKES WITH 310 SORTIES, 2,927
 AIRCRAFT.

SUBSISTANCE ATTACKS:

TOTAL : 2,504
 DAY : 1,020
 NIGHT : 1,524

ENEMY BOMBS DROPPED:

-TOTAL BOMBS OF EVERY CATEGORY: 1,384,753

INCLUDING:

GENERAL PURPOSE BOMBS : 1,329,325
 INCENDIARY BOMBS : 4,096
 SMART BOMBS : 14,210
 LASER GUIDED BOMBS : 949
 DELAYED FUSE BOMBS : 14,903
 CLUSTER BOMBS (J41) : 20,730

-ROCKETS

23,534

-20 MM

2,349

-MISSILES

344

-Mortar Shells

747

-TOXIC CHEMICAL

5

-GUNBOAT SHELLS

177,360

TOTAL ORDNANCE OF EVERY TYPE: 1,557,417

TAKING THE 1968 POPULATION OF QUANG BINH AT 400,000 THEY

CALCULATE:

-FOR EVERY PERSON THERE WERE 3.5 BOMBS (576 KILOGRAMS) EXPENDED

-FOR EVERY 10 PERSONS THERE WERE 3.5 SHELLS EXPENDED

-FOR EVERY 100 PERSONS THERE WERE NEARLY NINE ROCKETS, 20 MM

SHELLS EXPENDED

-ON AVERAGE EACH KILOMETER WAS HIT WITH

-158 BOMBS

-3 ROCKETS

-1 20 MM GUNBOAT

-16 SHELLS

TOTAL PERSONS KILLED: 13,725

-AMONG THESE FROM 65-99 THERE WERE: 2,405 CHILDREN

TOTAL PERSONS INJURED: 22,156

AMONG THESE FROM 65-99 THERE WERE: 2,532 CHILDREN

CIVILIAN HOUSES DESTROYED: 93,712

WATER BUFFALO KILLED: 14,774

PIGS KILLED: 20,230

RICE LOST: 4,311.2 TONS

CULTIVATION ACREAGE LOST (HECTARES): 5,390

POOR BRIDGES DESTROYED: 254

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FOOT PATHS DESTROYED: 294.2 KILOMETERS
 MOTOR BOATS DAMAGED: 35
 FORTS DAMAGED: 57
 SAMPLING DAMAGED: 1,532
 VEHICLES DAMAGED, BURNED: 1,246
 SPECIAL FORCES ESPIONAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES:
 -SPECIAL FORCES INFILTRATION BY AIR: 27 INCIDENTS
 -SPECIAL FORCES INFILTRATION BY FOOT: 2 INCIDENTS
 TOTAL PERSONNEL: 106
 CAPTURED: 66
 KILLED: 16
 TOTAL: 82
 SPECIAL FORCES ACTIVITIES BY BOAT:
 TOTAL: 537
 DAY: 67
 NIGHT: 468
 -SABOTAGE OPERATIONS:
 INCIDENTS INVOLVING CAPTURED FISHERMEN: 34
 NUMBER OF PERSONS CAPTURED BY THE ENEMY: 87 (THESE PERSONS WERE RETURNED)
 NUMBER OF VESSELS ATTACKED: 11
 NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED: 9
 -PROGRAM SPECIAL OPERATIONS:
 TOTAL PERSONNEL INVOLVED: 10
 CAPTURED BY THE VIETNAMESE: 2
 KILLED BY THE VIETNAMESE: 2
 TOTAL: 4
 -PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
 LEAFLETS DROPPED BY AIRCRAFT: 97 OCCURRENCES
 PSYCHOLOGICAL TRANSMISSIONS DROPPED: 1,327 UNITS
 FALSE DEFEAT INFORMATION DROPPED: 6 OCCASIONS
 LOUD SPEAKER USAGE: 1 OCCASION
 133 VILLAGES AND 839 HAMLETS WERE ATTACKED
 AMONG THESE THERE WERE: ONE CITY AND ONE DISTRICT SEAT WHICH WERE RAZED ALONG WITH 31 VILLAGES AND 252 HAMLETS WHICH WERE ATTACKED WITH THE INTENT TO ERADICATE.
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SECTION 82-JF 04
 THE INCIDENTS OF DESTRUCTION PERPETRATED BY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS:
 1 APR 67: THE CAN OAI BRIDGE: 88 KILLED
 14 FEB 67: ONE SALVO HIT A POINT IN QUY HAU, HIEU THUY VILLAGE: 40 KILLED, 50 WOUNDED, 100 HOUSES DAMAGED
 27 SEP 67: BURNING IN VINH PHAM, VINH PHAM VILLAGE HIT A NURSERY SCHOOL KILLING 17 CHILDREN AND INJURING 5
 29 SEP 67: SIX BOMBS ALONG THE GIA HINH SECTION OF NATIONAL ROUTE 1 STRUCK A VEHICLE BELONGING TO KG (VINH LINH) KILLING 42 AND INJURING 2
 2 JAN 68: 35 BOMBS FELL ON AMUDONG BUN KILLING 33 INJURING 56 AND DAMAGING 58 HOUSES
 1 MAY 70: 119 FRAGMENTATION BOMBS AND 30 CLUSTER BOMBS FELL ON NGHE THUY, LE VINH KILLING 22 (12 CHILDREN), INJURING 14 (8 CHILDREN), DESTROYING 53 HOUSES, ONE DAY CARE CENTER, ONE NURSERY, A HATCH SCHOOL, AND A VILLAGE CLINIC
 2 JAN 73: AT 1310 HOURS (GOLF) THREE B-57'S BOMBED HUANG DON KILLING 102 (14 OLD MEN, 21 WOMEN, AND 41 CHILDREN), INJURING 109 (19 OLD MEN, 28 WOMEN, AND 43 CHILDREN), DAMAGING 150 HOUSES, AND DESTROYING 20 TONS OF FOODSTUFF, 20 HECTARES OF RICE, AND KILLING 50 WATER BUFFALO
 13 JAN 73: THREE AIR ATTACKS ON THE THANH TRACH GIUYET THANG VILLAGE COOPERATIVE KILLED 80 (30 CIVILIANS, 50 WORKERS) AND INJURED 76
 2/ELTRIOUS VICTORIES
 STRIKES ON ENEMY AIRCRAFT:
 -TOTAL AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE PROVINCE: 709
 -INCLUDING 31 TYPES OF AIRCRAFT WITH 3 B-57'S, 3 F-111'S
 -THE INITIAL AIRCRAFT MODELS SHOT DOWN WERE THE F-105, F-84, F-28, RF-101, F-105, F-100D, A-1J, A-1J, RF-4C, JN-50A,
 -SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT: 185 PLUS 7 EQUALS 192
 ((ANALYST COMMENT: THE NO. PLUS NO. EQUALS NO. FORMAT EQUATES TO DAY PLUS NIGHT TOTAL))
 -SHOT DOWN AT RIGHT: 52 PLUS ((NOT VISIBLE)) EQUALS ((NOT VISIBLE))
 -SHOT DOWN IN THE YEAR
 1964: ((NOT VISIBLE))
 1965: ((NOT VISIBLE))
 1966: ((NOT VISIBLE))
 1967: ((NOT VISIBLE))
 1968: ((NOT VISIBLE))
 1969: ((NOT VISIBLE))
 1970: ((NOT VISIBLE))

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1971: ((NOT VISIBLE))

1972: ((NOT VISIBLE))

INCLUDED IN THE 730 TOTAL
 - SHOT DOWN BY REGULAR FORCES: 412
 - SHOT DOWN BY LOCAL FORCES: 165
 - SHOT DOWN BY CIVIL DEFENSE: 127

MILESTONES OF THE 5 MONTHS VICTORIES:

14 JUL 65: GIANG RIVER NAVAL FORCES SHOT DOWN THE 100TH ACFT
 13 JUN 66: QUANG PHUC CIVIL DEFENSE SHOT DOWN THE 200TH ACFT
 30 JUL 67: DUCSUY THUY CIVIL DEFENSE SHOT DOWN THE 300TH ACFT
 6 APR 68: LUC VINH FORCES SHOT DOWN THE 400TH ACFT
 8 AUG 68: 218TH AAA REGIMENT SHOT DOWN THE 500TH ACFT
 30 JUL 71: REGULAR FORCES SHOT DOWN THE 600TH ACFT
 1 DEC 72: THE 217TH, 218TH OUTPOSTS, AND QUANG VINH CIVIL
 DEFENSE FORCES OF 16 THUY SHOT DOWN THE 700TH ACFT
 25 JUN 68: 8357 UNIT OF VINH HOA SHOT DOWN THE 3,000TH ACFT
 OVER NORTHERN VIETNAM
 20 JUN 72: SAM FORCES SHOT DOWN THE 3,500TH ACFT OVER NORTH
 VIETNAM
 12 JAN 73: QUANG BINH FORCES SHOT DOWN THE 700TH ACFT OVER
 THE PROVINCE, THE 4,131ST ACFT OVER NORTH VIETNAM
 A THUS CONCLUDING THE AMERICAN IMPERIALIST WAR OF
 DESTRUCTION

20 OCT 68: THE DUY VINH SELF DEFENSE FORCES SHOT DOWN THE
 100TH ACFT DOWNED BY THE PROVINCIAL CIVIL DEFENSE
 PROVINCIAL ARMED FORCES ALONG SHOT DOWN: 292 ACFT (INCLUDING 2
 F-111'S)

YEARLY SHOOT DOWN TOTALS:

1965:	50
1966:	65
1967:	56
1968:	81
1972:	40
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	292

DAY/NIGHT SHOOT DOWNS:

1965: TOTAL:	54	DAY:	40	NIGHT:	14
1966: TOTAL:	65	DAY:	50	NIGHT:	15
1967: TOTAL:	56	DAY:	45	NIGHT:	11
1968: TOTAL:	91	DAY:	65	NIGHT:	26
---	---	---	---	---	---
1972: TOTAL:	252	DAY:	212	NIGHT:	40
---	---	---	35	---	4
---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL:	292	DAY:	288	NIGHT:	4

UNITS WHICH SHOT DOWN AIRCRAFT:

LOCAL AAA FORCES : 97
 INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FORCES : 64
 LOCAL MILITIA FORCES : 91

CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES : 11
 LOCAL FARMER / ARMED CIVILIANS : 25

292

WEAPON TYPES USED: 1. 5400T DOWN:
 37MM AAA (SINGLE BARREL) : 8
 REGULAR 14.5MM : 5
 12.7MM : 138
 HEAVY/MEDIUM MACHINE GUN : 48
 RIFLE : 7

292

SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT: 58
 SPECIFIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY LOCAL FORCES:
 TOTAL SHOOT DOWNS : 148 PLUS 17 EQUALS 165 (INCLUDING 1 F-111)
 ON THE SPOT SHOT DOWNS: 13
 NIGHT TIME SHOT DOWNS: 10
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10: PLJ9:17 EQU4LS:105

SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BY CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES:

TOTAL SHOT DOWNS : 144 PLUS 24 EQUALS 177 (INCLUDING F-111)

ON THE SPOT SHOT DOWNS : 55

NIGHT TIME SHOT DOWNS : 20

THERE WERE 77/133 VILLAGE AND 10 INDEPENDENT CIVIL DEFENSE UNITS INVOLVED IN SPOT DOWNS.

WEAPON TYPES USED BY CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES SHOT DOWNS:

RIFLES : 7

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1965:	12
1966:	10
1967:	22
1968:	31
1972:	23

LOCALITY	SHOOT	DOORS
LE THUY	:	32
QUANG VINH	:	23
QUY TRACH	:	23
TUYEN HOA	:	13
VINH HOA	:	5
PROVINCIAL CAPITAL	:	5
QUANG TRACH	:	25

31X VILLAGE AND ONE INDEPENDENT CIVIL DEFENSE UNIT SHOT DOWN FOUR

AIRCRAFT			
DUC MINH	:	3 PLUS 1	EQUALS 4
YO NINH	:	1 PLUS 1	EQUALS 2
LUC NINH	:	2 PLUS 2	EQUALS 4
CAYN D'ONG	:	1 PLUS 1	EQUALS 2
QUANG DONG	:	3 PLUS 1	EQUALS 4
QUANG PHUC	:	3 PLUS 1	EQUALS 4
VIET TRUNG STATE FARM	:	3 PLUS 1	EQUALS 4

VIET TRUNG STATE FARM : 1 PLUS 1 EQUALS 2
 10 VILLAGE INDEPENDENT UNITS SHOT DOWN
 QUANG THUY : 3
 THANH THUY : 3
 PHONG THUY : 2 PLUS 1 EQUALS 3
 347 NVM : 1
 CAT TRACH : 1
 QUANG THO : 1
 NGU THUY : 1 PLUS 2 EQUALS 3
 TRUNG TRACH : 2 PLUS 1 EQUALS 3
 TIEP HOA : 1
 LE HOA : 3
 VINH FEMALE UNITS SHOT DOWN 15 AIRCRAFT
 TIEP HOA : 2
 LE HOA : 2
 VO TIEN : 1 PLUS 1
 QUAN NINH : 2
 THANH THUY : 1

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QUANG PHUC : 1 (40JYEM THI XUAN) (FEMALE'S NAME)
 CANH DUONG : 2
 TRUNG TRAM : 1 PLUS 1
 PHONG THUY : 1

- TWO SEVIER CITIZEN UNITS SHOT DOWN THREE AIRCRAFT.

17 DEC 67 - DUE NINH : 1 F-4 (NIGHT)

0957 (GOLF) 16 SEP 72 - DUE NINH : 1 A-7

13 JAN 68 - NAI THUY : 1 F-4

QUANG DUNG YOUTH UNIT SHOT DOWN TWO AIRCRAFT

13 MAY 68: 1 A-7

1 AUG 68: 3 F-4 (NIGHT)

GOOD EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATING THE HEROISM DISPLAYED BY THE

PROVINCIAL ARMED FORCES WHILE SHOOTING DOWN AIRCRAFT

5 AUG 64 NAVAL, MILITIA, AND CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES ALONG THE

BANKS OF THE DIAM RIVER SHOT DOWN TWO US AIRCRAFT (THE THIRD

AIRCRAFT IN THE MILITARY REGION AND THE 1TH IN NORTHERN VIETNAM)

OPENING THE WAY FOR VICTORY IN OPPOSITION TO FIRST OF THE

AMERICAN IMPERIALIST'S WAR OF DESTRUCTION.

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FINAL SECTION OF 11

7 JAN 1973 AT 1120 HOURS (GOLF) THE NGU THUY MILITIA SHOT DOWN

AN AMERICAN DRONE. THIS WAS THE THIRD AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN

QUANG BINH AND MARKED THE VICTORIOUS CONCLUSION TO THE SECOND

PHASE OF OPPOSITION TO THE AMERICAN IMPERIALIST WAR OF

DESTRUCTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

THE NUMBER OF RUAN NINH DURING A 17 JAN PERIOD SHOT DOWN 2

AIRCRAFT (6 APR 68 ONE F-4 ON THE SPOT, AND 32 APR 68 ONE F-4 ON

THE SPOT).

THE TIEN HOA MILITIA ASCENDED A 907 METER HILL AND SET UP A QUOTE

SUN BARRER UNQUOTE POSITION, OVER 60 JAYS, ALONG WITH A FEMALE

BATTY BATTERY, SHOT DOWN 3 F-4S.

NGUYEN THI XUAN, FEMALE, QUANG PHUC VILLAGE, ON 6 FEB 67 SINGLE

HANDFULLY SHOT DOWN AN F-4 WITH 23 70JMS FROM A HEAVY MACHINE

GUN.

LE VAN, WOMAN FROM THE THUY ON (NATE NOT KNOWN), SINGLE-

HANDFULLY SHOT DOWN AN F-4 WITH ONE 40JMS FROM A RIFLE.

NGUYEN THI TRIEN, LONG THUY VILLAGE UNIT VICE COMMANDER,

CONDUCTED RESEARCH TO PREDICT ENEMY AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PATHS,

COMMANDED A FEMALE UNIT WHICH SHOT DOWN ON THE SPOT A NIGHT TIME

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, THE FIRST IN NORTH VIETNAM (26 AUG

67).

THE NUMBER OF VO NINH, THE FIRST FEMALE UNIT IN THE MILITARY

REGION TO SHOOT DOWN AN F-4, CAPTURING THE PILOT (10 APR 68).

ELDERLY OF DUC NINH, THE FIRST ELDERLY UNIT IN THE MILITARY

REGION TO SHOOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT (AN F-4 ON THE NIGHT OF 17 DEC

68).

DURING FOUR YEARS IN OPPOSITION TO THE AMERICAN IMPERIALIST WAR

OF DESTRUCTION THE PROVINCE HAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING FIVE

RECORDS:

- SHOT DOWN THE MOST AIRCRAFT (560)

- SHOT DOWN THE MOST MODELS OF AIRCRAFT (25 TYPES)

(10 TYPES WERE THE FIRST OF THEIR KIND DOWNED)

- THE MOST NIGHT TIME SHOT DOWNS (52)

- THE MOST SHOOT DOWNS BY CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES USING INFANTRY

WEAPONS (104)

- 3144 AND/OR SET ON FIRE THE MOST GUN 90A77 (45)

- JULY 1972:

- 5 JUN - 6 JUL 72: LOC NINH - IN 33 DAYS TWO AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT

DOWN

- PHU TRACH: 21 NOV 72: THE NIGHT TIME ON THE SPOT SHOT DOWN OF

AN F-11 BY 15 12.7MM 20JMS

- 2359 HOURS (GOLF): THE NIGHT TIME ON THE SPOT SHOT DOWN OF AN

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F-111 ON 7 AUG 72 BY AN INFANTRY UNIT.
 -MOBILE CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE IN QUANG BINH (A) USED 50 14.5MM
 ROUNDS TO SHOOT DOWN THE SPOT AV F-4E, CAPTURING TWO
 CREWMEMBERS ON 5 OCT 72.
 -350TH LOCAL FORCES COMPANY OF QUANG TRACH USED SIX HEAVY MACHINE
 GUNS TO SHOOT DOWN A HELICOPTER IN THE VICINITY OF HOA LA ISLAND
 ON 10 AUG 72 WHILE THE ENEMY INTERDICTION SUPPLY LINES.
 ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE DECEITFUL TRICKERY OF THE US GOVERNMENT, ONE
 RF-4 HAS SHOT DOWN BY THE SAME DAY (26 OCT 72). THE SAME DAY A
 NEWLY FORMED QUANG BINH MILITIA FORCE SHOT DOWN AN F-4.
 -AN ELDEPLY UNIT FROM DUC NINH VILLAGE, REVDON FOR SIGNIFICANT
 DEFENSE AGAINST THE WAR OF DESTRUCTION, PUT FORTH A PROPOSAL TO
 THE PARTY COMMITTEE REQUESTING TO SEND YOUNG PERSONNEL GOING TO
 THE FRONT LINES WITH TO SHOOT DOWN AIRCRAFT AND ON 17 DEC 68, THEY
 SHOT DOWN AN F-4 AT 910-4. IN 1972, WHEN THE AMERICANS
 IMPERIALISTS ONCE AGAIN ATTACKED THE NORTH, THE ELDERS AGAIN
 REQUESTED TO RETURN TO DUTY. A TOTAL OF 11 OLD FOLKS, FOUR OF
 WHICH HAD TAKEN PART IN THE SHOOT DOWN FOUR YEARS EARLIER, ALONG
 WITH SOME NEW SEMI-CITIZENS RETURNED TO DUTY. THESE ELDERLY
 PERSONS TRAINED IN AROUND THE CLOCK COMBAT READINESS. AT 0957
 HOURS (GOLF) ON 14 SEP 72, THEY USED 75 12.7MM ROUNDS TO SHOOT
 DOWN AN F-4.
 -PHUOC THUY VILLAGE: A VILLAGE WITH HIGH MORAL, WITH AGGRESSIVE
 METHODS OF SHOOTING DOWN ENEMY AIRCRAFT. UNDER THE DIRECT
 SUPERVISION OF THE PARTY COMMITTEE, THE VILLAGE SET UP 37MM,
 12.7MM, AND HEAVY MACHINE GUN FORCES TO STAND WATCH NIGHT AND
 DAY. THROUGHOUT NUMEROUS ENEMY ATTACKS THE VILLAGE STOOD FIRM. ON
 21 SEP 72, THE VILLAGE UNIT SHOT DOWN AN F-4
 US PILOTS CAPTURED

RESCUED BY THE ENEMY

YEAR	CAPTURED	RESCUED BY THE ENEMY
1964	8	
1965	1	
1966	11	4
1967	12	2
1968	21	1
1971	3	1
1972	3	5
TOTAL	62	13

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 CSY:RXBP472

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FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PA-MIA/DAN//

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR. TIM CARNEY//
 SECDEF WASHDC//JASO-ISA//PA-MIA// JCS WASHDC//J5/JCS-PW-MIA//
 JICPAC HONOLULU HI//JTC/DOU// CTA WASHDC//DDJ/PCS/LCU/NIL//
 COR JTF-PA BARBERS PT HI USDAO KUALA LUMPUR JP//56//
 JSDLO HUNG KONG//PA-MIA//
 JSCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/J5/J5/J56//

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SECTION 01 7F OF 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01

THIS IS A

MESSAGE

SERIAL: ITR 6 024 0127 92.
 COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VNM).
 SUBJECT: ITR 6 024 0127 92/SRV AIRDEFENSE AND
 U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES
 WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
 FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REF:301

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DDI: 08030-72000.
 REGD: D-VP-2430-01-90; D-VP-2430-30-90;
 D-VP-2430-05-90.
 SOURCE: //JTS DATA //SRV OPEN SOURCE
 PUBLICATION TITLES: AIR DEFENSE SOURCE
 RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A DATA REPORT. IT PROVIDES
 HISTORICAL INFORMATION REGARDING AIRCRAFT SHOOTDOWNS,
 PILOT DEATHS AND PILOT CAPTURES IN AND SRV ADA JNITS
 WHO ARE CREDITED WITH THE KILLS.

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 CSY:RXBP472 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

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TEXT:

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS EXTRACTED FROM A PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM PUBLISHING HOUSE BOOK ENTITLED "HAU VE'BAU TROI" (AIR DEFENSE). THE BOOK WAS PUBLISHED IN VIETNAMESE IN 1962 AND WAS AUTHORED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KUAN MAU (NGUYEN KUAN MAU). THE BOOK CONSISTS OF 372 PAGES AND WAS PRINTED BY THE MILITARY PRINTING HOUSE: 22,500 COPIES PRINTED. IT IS UNCLASSIFIED AND WAS PURCHASED OPENLY IN HANOI.

2. BACKGROUND. PRIOR TO 1955, NORTH VIETNAM DID NOT HAVE ANY RADAR CAPABILITY AND USED ONLY LINE OF SIGHT SPOTTING FOR AIR DEFENSE TARGETS. IN EARLY 1957, THEY RECEIVED THE 90MM GUN, AND IN FEBRUARY 1957, VARIOUS AIR DEFENSE COMPANIES WERE CREATED AND DEPLOYED FROM HANOI TO THEIR ASSIGNED POSTS: THE 21ST AND 23RD COMPANIES MOVING TO NORTHEASTERN VIETNAM AND TO HAI PHONG; THE 15TH, 19TH, AND 24TH GOING TO THE HA NAM NINH AND THANH HOA COAST; THE 36TH GOING TO SON LA, AND THE 36TH TO DUYEN BIEN PHU. IN ACCORDANCE WITH A THREE YEAR PLAN (1955-1960) FOR DEVELOPING AN AIR DEFENSE FORCE, ON 21 MAR 1958, A COMPLETE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND WAS SET UP WITH ITS STAFF, POLITICAL AND LOGISTICS DEPARTMENTS, AND A COMMAND POST EQUIPPED WITH FACILITIES CAPABLE TO ASSUME THE COMMAND OF THE FORCES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. FROM 1 MARCH 1959 ONWARD, THERE WAS A NATION-WIDE RADAR NETWORK (INCLUDING ISLANDS ON THE COAST) CAPABLE OF DETECTING ENEMY INTRUSION. EACH TIME A NEW INDUSTRIAL ZONE WAS BUILT, AN AIR DEFENSE PLAN WAS IMPLEMENTED. FOR INSTANCE, THE 210TH REGT WAS ASSIGNED TO DEFEND THE THAI NGUYEN INDY AND STEEL COMPLEX, AND THE 280TH REGT PROTECTED VINH CITY. IN 1962 A NEW RADAR REGIMENT WAS FOUNDED, THE 202ND. IN 1963, ANOTHER TWO RADAR UNITS WERE FOUNDED AND THEY STATIONED IN VIET TRI (VINH PHU PROVINCE) AND HAI CHAY, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. BY 5 AUGUST 1963, THERE WERE ALMOST TEN AAA REGIMENTS AND TWO AAA BATTALIONS WITH A VARIETY OF WEAPONS WHICH WERE POSTED IN HANOI, HAI PHONG, NAM DINH, THAI NGUYEN, VINH, VIET TRI AND HAI CHAY INCIDENTS.

3. ON 5 AUGUST 1963, FROM 1430 AND 1530 HOURS, THE ENEMY SENT IN SIX F3U, TWO A6A AND TWO A2U AIRCRAFT TO BT

522446/9804/051 3 OF 15 41 0122 051/14012 201118Z FFB 92
CSN:RXBP0472 USJAG SAYSKOK TH//PH-MIA//

SECTION 07 OF 08 RANGE: 1M 04001

THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: ITR 5 024 0127 92.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN).
SUBJECT: ITR 5 024 0127 92/SPV AIR DEFENSE AND JCS AIRCRAFT LOSSES

STRIKE DOWN NAVAL FORCES AT LACH TRUONG (LACH TRUONG), THANH HOA PROVINCE. THEY USED THE TACTICS OF FLYING LOW, FLITING NORTH ALONG THE SEA COAST, USING THE BAN SUN (SAFETY STAND) HILL AS A SCREEN TO GET ACCESS TO THE TARGET. OUR 15TH NAVAL BATTALION WHICH WAS POSITIONED HERE DETECTED THEM FROM A GOOD DISTANCE. THE 14.5 MM AAA BATTERY OF THE BATTALION CUT THEIR PATH AND BROUGHT DOWN ONE OF THEIR AIRCRAFT. AFTERWARDS, OUR NAVY TROOPS TOGETHER WITH THE POPULATION AND THE MILITIA OF LACH TRUONG SHOT DOWN TWO MORE ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

4. THE BATTLE IN 4TH 211 (HONG GAI), HAI CHAY (HAI CHAY), ON 5 AUGUST 1963. AT 1440 HOURS, EIGHT ENEMY AIRCRAFT STRUCK HAI GAI AND HAI CHAY. HERE, OUR 217TH BATTALION HAD RECEIVED THE ORDER TO BE IN ALERT STATUS ONE AND WAS READY MUCH IN ADVANCE. ENEMY AIRCRAFT CAME IN TWO GROUPS. THE FIRST GROUP BROKE IN FROM THE DIRECTION OF HAI STAN (CHAU STAN) AND IMMEDIATELY ATTACKED OUR VESSELS ANCHORED AT THE MILITARY PORT. OUR 102ND 86MM AAA COMPANY FAILED TO TIMELY SHOOT AT THE FIRST ENEMY AIRCRAFT, HAD TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT AT THE SECOND ONE. THE 101ST AND 103RD COMPANIES WERE POSITIONED TOO FAR AWAY AND THEREFORE COULD NOT FIRE. THE FIRE POWER OF THE 103RD COMPANY WAS PIERCE BUT NOT ACCURATE AND IT MISSED ITS TARGET. THE ENEMY FIRST FLIGHT, AFTER ATTACKING OUR VESSELS, TURNED TO ATTACK OUR 101ST COMPANY POSITION, AND THE SECOND PLANE IN THIS FLIGHT WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE 101ST COMPANY WHICH USED 14.5MM AAA GUNS. THIS PLANE WAS SET AFIRE AND CRASHED INTO THE SEA. THE PILOT, NAME, AN AMERICAN OF MEXICAN ANCESTRY, WAS TAKEN PRISONER BY THE LOCAL SELF-DEFENSE AND MILITIA FORCES, BEING HIMSELF THE FIRST PILOT TO BE TAKEN PRISONER IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE SECOND ENEMY FLIGHT CHANGED ITS DIRECTION OF ATTACK, BROADENED ITS TURNING CIRCLE AND TURNED TO APPROACH THEIR TARGETS FROM THE NORTHEASTERN

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CSN:RXBP0473 USJAG SAYSKOK TH//PH-MIA//

DIRECTION. OUR VESSELS HAD MANAGED TO GET AWAY FROM THE BAI CHAY FERRY AND WENT OUT TO SEA AND WERE THEREFORE WERE ABLE TO SHOOT AT ENEMY PLANES IN THE FLANK FROM A DISTANCE OF 6500 - 4000 METERS. THE SECOND PLANE IN THIS FLIGHT WAS HIT AND SET AFIRE AT 1450 HOURS. THE BATTLE IN HCM GAI - BAI CHAY CAME TO AN END AT 1500 HOURS.

5. ON 25 APRIL 1967, FIVE ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN AT 0815 HOURS. A FLIGHT OF F105'S TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE TAM DAO (TAM DAO) MOUNTAIN RANGE (DO NOT: THUD RIDGE) TO BREAK IN FROM THE NORTHEASTERN DIRECTION AND PLANNED TO ATTACK THE DUONG BRIDGE. THE 72ND COMPANY OF THE 212ND REGIMENT FIRED TWO SHORT VOLLEYS WITH PARAMETERS PROVIDED BY DISTANT MEASURING DEVICES. ONE F105 AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES. A RED PARACHUTE APPEARED IN THE SKY OVER YEN VICH (YEN VICH). AFTERWARDS, FOUR MORE ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE BROUGHT DOWN BY THE MILITIA FORCES OF THE BIA LAY (BIA LAY) RAILWAY PLANT, THE THONG VAI (THONG VAI) KATCH FACTORY, AND OF THE CAU DUONG (CAU DUONG) WOOD PRODUCTS FACTORY. IN COORDINATION WITH THE MISSILE TROOPS WHICH WERE POSITIONED ON THE OUTER PERIMETER. ON THE SAME DAY, HAI PHONG REPORTED TO HAVE BROUGHT DOWN 12 ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

6. AT 1530 HOURS OF THE NEXT DAY (26 APRIL 1967), 12 F105'S CAME FROM THE SOUTHWESTERN DIRECTION AND FLEW ALONG HIGHWAY NGR-6 FLYING NORTHWEST OF HANOI AND AGAIN TRIED TO STRIKE THE DUONG BRIDGE. THE 64TH AND 63RD MISSILE BATTALIONS OF THE 236TH REGIMENT CONCENTRATED THEIR FIRE AND BROUGHT DOWN ONE F105 RIGHT OVER THE HANOI CITY. THE PILOT WAS TAKEN PRISONER. AFTERWARDS, THE 57TH AAA COMPANIES OF THE 212ND REGIMENT WHICH HAD THE DUTY OF DEFENDING THE BRIDGE SHOT DOWN ANOTHER F105 AIRCRAFT WHEN THE ACFT WAS DIVING. THE PILOT WAS ALSO TAKEN PRISONER.

7. AT 1614 HOURS ON 5 MAY 1967, AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT INCLUDING F105'S AND F4'S CONCENTRATED THEIR ATTACKS IN TWO MAIN AREAS: THE DUONG BRIDGE AND TRUONG DINH (TRUONG DINH). FROM THE FIRST MINUTE THEIR FORMATIONS WERE UNDER THE FIRE OF THE 236TH, 257TH AND 274TH MISSILE REGIMENTS. SOME OF THE AIRCRAFT CAUGHT

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CSN:RX9P0473 JSDJ DAVGK TH//PH-14//

SECTION 03 12 04-BAUJUN TH 00001

THIS IS A MESSAGE

SERIAL: 114 5 024 072 92
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (V4)
SUBJECT: 114 5 024 013 92/SRV AIRDEFENSE AND
U.S. AIRCRAFT LOST

FIRE, SOME CRASHED, WHILE THE REST FLEW LOWER AND CONTINUED THE ATTACK. GROUP 4.61 IN COORDINATION WITH THE LOCAL MILITIA SHOT AT THEM AND BROUGHT DOWN TWO ENEMY AIRCRAFT. IN GROUP 4.67'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, THE 210TH AND 230TH REGIMENTS SHOT DOWN TWO F105 AIRCRAFT. TWO PILOTS, ONE MAJOR AND ONE LIEUTENANT COLONEL, WERE TAKEN PRISONER BY THE HANOI POPULATION. WITHIN NINE MINUTES, EIGHT ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN BY THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POPULATION OF HANOI AND FOUR US PILOTS WERE TAKEN PRISONER. NAMELY TWO LIEUTENANT COLONELS, ONE MAJOR, AND ONE LIEUTENANT.

8. AT 1601 HOURS ON 19 MAY, THE BATTALIONS OF THE 236TH REGIMENT STARTED TO LAUNCH THEIR MISSILES. THE 61ST BATTALION IN THE VAN DIEH (VAN DIEH) BATTLEGROUND AND THE 64TH BATTALION IN THE YEN NGHIA (YEN NGHIA) BATTLEGROUND LAUNCHED FOUR MISSILES ON AN ENEMY FLIGHT. AN F4 AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT THANH DAT (THANH DAT), IN HA LAY (HA LAY) PROVINCE.

9. ALSO ON 19 MAY 67, 16 ENEMY AIRCRAFT CONSISTING OF F4 AND F8 AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE VAN DIEH (VAN DIEH) WAREHOUSE COMPOUND. THE 26TH BATTALION, GROUP 4.67, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THIS COMPOUND SHOT DOWN ONE F8 AIRCRAFT AND SUCCESSFULLY PROTECTED THE WAREHOUSES. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIVER, WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF DEFENDING HANOI TO THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST, THE 257TH AND 274TH REGIMENTS REPEATEDLY LAUNCHED MISSILES AT ENEMY AIRCRAFT WHICH CAME FROM THE TAN DAO (TAN DAO) MOUNT, AND SHOT DOWN THREE OF THEM DISRUPTING THEIR FORMATIONS.

10. ON 19 MAY 67, JS PLANES ATTACKED THE YEN PHU POWER STATION. THEY RESORTED TO HIT AND RUN TACTICS. WHILE THEIR F8 AIRCRAFT TURNED TO THE SOUTHWEST FOR DIVERSION, ONE F4 AIRCRAFT CAME UP FLYING LOW ALONG

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

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CSN:RX9P0474 JSDJ DAVGK TH//PH-14//

THE AXIS OF THE RED RIVER. THE 1ST COMPANY OPENED FIRE ON IT, BADLY HIT. THE 1ST CRASHED ON LE TRUC (LEE TRUNG) STREET, HANOI. THIS WAS THE FIRST US JET BOMBER TO CRASH IN HANOI CITY PROPER. TWO ENEMY PILOTS WERE CAPTURED. ONE CAME DOWN DOWNTOWN THE HOUSE OF A CHICKEN COOP AT NO. 71 THUY KHUE (THUY KHUUE) STREET, AND THE OTHER LANDED IN FRONT OF THE GATE OF NO. 124 OF THE SAME STREET.

11. THERE WAS A MAJOR BATTLE ON 26 OCTOBER 1967. THE OFFENSIVE WAS UNDERTAKEN BY US NAVY AIRCRAFT AND WAS DIRECTED AGAINST THE YEN PHU POWER STATION AND THE SOUTHERN AREA OF HANOI CITY. OUR MISSILE AND ARTILLERY FORCES COORDINATED WELL AND BROUGHT DOWN 12 US AIRCRAFT. FIVE OF THEM CRASHED AND FOUR PILOTS WERE CAPTURED. PARTICULARLY, RIGHT OVER THE POWER STATION THE 61ST MISSILE BATTALION SHOT DOWN ONE AIRCRAFT WHILE IT WAS DIVING AND ABOUT TO DELIVER BOMBS. MAJOR (SIC) NAME -- THE PILOT, WAS CAPTURED ON THE TRUC BACH (TRUC BACH) LAKE CLOSE TO THE POWER STATION.

12. IN NOVEMBER 1967, 95 ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN. THE ENEMY FLEW 582 AIR SORTIES. THEIR CASUALTIES WERE THUS AT A RATE OF 9.2 PERCENT. ON 19 NOV 67, HE BROKE AN ATTACK UNDERTAKEN BY 40 AIRCRAFT. HE PUT UP A CONCERTED ATTACK WITH THE STRENGTH OF SIX MISSILE BATTALIONS AND SHOT DOWN FIVE OF THEIR AIRCRAFT, INFLECTING A 12.5 PERCENT RATE OF LOSS ON THE ENEMY. A US LIEUTENANT COLONEL WAS CAPTURED. THEY HAD TO ABANDON THEIR PLANNED ATTACKS AGAINST THE AIRPORT OF THE CAPITAL CITY SCHEDULED FOR THAT MORNING AND AGAINST THE RAILWAY STATION IN THE AFTERNOON ON THE SAME DAY.

13. DAILY JHDDOTJH TOTALS WERE AS FOLLOWS: ON 20 OCT 67 EIGHT AIRCRAFT, ON 25 OCT 67 TEN AIRCRAFT, ON 26 OCT 67 TWELVE AIRCRAFT, ON 17 NOV 67 TEN AIRCRAFT, ON 18 NOV 67 EIGHT AIRCRAFT, AND ON 19 NOV 67, TWELVE AIRCRAFT.

14. THE FIERCEST FIGHTING IN WAR WAS FROM 1 JULY TO 15 SEP 1968. HE SHOT DOWN 69 ENEMY AIRCRAFT (FIVE AT NIGHT) AND CAPTURED EIGHT PILOTS.

15. THE 10TH COMPANY (37MM AAA), 26TH REGIMENT WAS

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CSN:RXBP0474 JSD40 BAY50DA TH//PW-414//

SECTION 00 OF 04 PAVOKJX TH 00401

THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: 119 5 024 0127 92
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (V4)
SUBJECT: 119 5 024 0127 92/59 AIRDEFENSE AND
U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES
FOUNDED IN JAN 65 AND WAS CONFIGURED TO BE A MOBILE
UNIT TO DEFEND LIVES OF COMMUNISM. THE COMPANY
SHOT DOWN 34 ENEMY AIRCRAFT, AND
ASSISTED IN SHOOTING DOWN 37 OTHER AIRCRAFT.

16. THE 7TH BATTALION, 280TH REGIMENT, WAS GIVEN THE
MISSION TO DEFEND THE KEY POINT OF LANG KHANG (LANG KHANG
KHANG), DEEP INSIDE THE KHAN MUON (KHAN MUON) (RJ
NOTE: KHAN MUON PROVINCE, LAOS) PROVINCE. ITS PAST
HISTORY: IT WAS ONE OF THE SIX 37MM AAA BATTALIONS
FIRST FOUNDED IN VIET NAM, BEING KNOWN THEN UNDER THE
DESIGNATION OF 34TH BATTALION, 30TH REGIMENT. IN
THE WAR AGAINST THE AMERICANS, IT WAS RENAMED THE 7TH
BATTALION. IT WAS BROUGHT DOWN BY US AIRCRAFT. AS
EARLY AS THE BEGINNING OF 1966, IT OPERATED IN LAOS,
AND ON 10 APRIL 1966, IT FOUGHT AN OUTSTANDING BATTLE,
BRINGING DOWN THREE US ENEMY AIRCRAFT, ONE B57 AND ONE
F105 AIRCRAFT. IT CAPTURED FIVE ENEMY PILOTS. AFTER
THAT, THIS BATTALION WAS DEPLOYED TO FIGHT ALONG
HIGHWAY 16, FROM LAO-KHANG TO THE ENTRY POINT TO
CORRIDORS. ON 1 MAY 1969, THE 2ND PLATOON, 11TH
COMPANY, WHILE DEPLOYED AT THE 0.50 KILOMETER MARKER
OF THE ENTRY POINT, BROUGHT DOWN ONE F4 WITH ONLY 12
ROUNDS. ON 3 MAY 69, THIS PLATOON AGAIN SHOT DOWN ONE
F4 WITH 14 BULLETS WHEN THE ENEMY MADE A FIERCE ATTACK
AGAINST THE ENTRY POINT.

17. THE 123RD BATTALION, 220TH REGIMENT, BETWEEN 3RD
AND 5TH OF FEBRUARY 1971, BROUGHT DOWN 5 ENEMY
AIRCRAFT, SHOT DEAD ONE ENEMY LIEUTENANT COLONEL, AND
CAPTURED ONE MAJOR, WHO WERE ALL PILOTS. ON 6 FEB 71,
THIS UNIT FOUGHT A REMARKABLE BATTLE, BROUGHT DOWN ONE
ENEMY F4 AIRCRAFT, AND CAPTURED THE PILOT WHO WAS A
CAPTAIN.

18. ON 4 MAR 71, THE 83RD BATTALION WHICH WAS
COMMANDED BY NGUYEN (NGUYEN) HUYNH, SHOT DOWN ONE

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

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CSN:RXBP0475 JSD40 BAY50DA TH//PW-414//

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AC130 WHICH WAS VERY GRATIFYING FOR ALL THE TROOPS OF THE HU CHI MINH TRAIL. THIS AIRCRAFT WAS A TYPE OF VERY PRETENTIOUS AIRCRAFT THAT WOULD HANG ABOUT ALL DAY AND NIGHT, SAVING ON ITS BIG RESERVE OF GASOLINE.

19. ON 16 FEB 72, THE ENEMY ATTACKED THE REAR AREA OF THE CAMPAIGN. THE 270TH REGIMENT, GROUP HAS FOUGHT A CONCENTRATED BATTLE AND BROUGHT DOWN FOUR ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND CAPTURED SOME PILOTS.

20. AT 1700 HOURS OF 17 SEP 67, THE OBSERVATION POST ON HILLTOP 74 REPORTED THAT THEY HEARD THE RUMBLE OF F105 AIRCRAFT, THE 300TH GUARD OF B52 AIRCRAFT, OPERATING TO THE EAST AND NORTHEAST. AT 1702 HOURS, THE RADAR OF THE BATTALION CAUGHT SIGHT OF A FORMATION OF THREE B52'S AT A ZENITH 180. BATTALION COMMANDER NGUYEN DINH PHUEN (NGUYEN DINH PHUEN) SAW THIS FORMATION VERY CLEARLY ON HIS RADARSCOPE AND ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO STRIKE. THE REGIMENT COMMAND POST APPROVED IT. THE OPERATOR LE HY (LEE HY) SWITCHED ON THE RADAR AND CAUGHT SIGHT OF THREE B52'S MOVING IN A STAIRSTEP FORMATION AT A DISTANCE OF 80 KM, AZIMUTH 180 AT AN ALTITUDE OF 11 KM. THE ANGLE OPERATOR TRAN VAN NGOAN (PHAM VAN NGOAN), AZIMUTH OPERATOR TRAN HONG THINH (TRAN HONG THINH), DISTANCE OPERATOR NGUYEN VAN NGAN (NGUYEN VAN NGAN) AND WERE THEN ALREADY IN THE VEHICLE (BUT THEY ARE HAVING A DRILL) CALMLY SHIFTED OVER TO ACTUAL COMBAT IN FULL SELF-CONFIDENCE. AT 1708 HOURS, TWO MISSILES WERE LAUNCHED BY THE 80TH BATTALION, FROM THE 15 BATTLEGROUND (PERTAINING TO THE QUET THANG STATE FARM) AT THE ADVANCING FORMATION OF B52 AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST MISSILE WAS LAUNCHED AT A DISTANCE OF 31 KM, REACHING THE TARGET AT THE DISTANCE OF 25 KM, AND EXPLODED 39 SECONDS LATER. THE SECOND MISSILE WAS LAUNCHED AT THE DISTANCE OF 29 KM, REACHED THE TARGET AT THE DISTANCE OF 23 KM, AND EXPLODED 36 SECONDS LATER. AFTER TWO EXPLOSIONS, THE TARGETS DISAPPEARED FROM THE RADAR SCREEN. AT 1727 HOURS, THE OBSERVATION POST ON HILLTOP 74 REPORTED HAVING HEARD THE RUMBLE OF B52 AIRCRAFT. HE HAD ONLY ONE MISSILE LEFT. THE BATTALION REPORTED TO THE REGIMENT COMMAND POST THAT IT WAS DETERMINED TO FIGHT. COMRADE HOANG VAN KHANH ORDERED US TO GO ON FIGHTING. AT 1734 HOURS, THE THIRD B52 BT

THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: ITR 6 024 0127 92
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (V).
SUBJECT: ITR 6 024 0127 92/SPV AIRDEFENSE AND U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES

AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO ADVANCE. THE 80TH BATTALION CAUGHT SIGHT OF IT WITH ITS RADAR WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS TURNING AWAY. THE BATTALION COMMANDER GAVE THE ORDER TO SHOOT AT THE DEPARTING AIRCRAFT. THE FRONT ANNOUNCED THAT TWO B52 AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN.

21. ON 25 JULY 1966 IN 46HE AN, THE 80TH BATTALION, 238TH REGIMENT, LAUNCHED TWO MISSILES, AND BROUGHT DOWN TWO AN AIRCRAFT, AND CAPTURED PILOT(S).

22. ON 22 MAY 67, THE 81ST BATTALION LAUNCHED MISSILES AND SHOT DOWN ONE F105 AIRCRAFT.

23. ON 16 JULY 67, IN COORDINATION WITH THE HIGHWAY 9 FRONT, THE 81ST BATTALION FOUGHT A BRILLIANT BATTLE AND WITH TWO MISSILES THEY BROUGHT DOWN ON THE SPOT OVER 610 AN (610 AN) TWO ENEMY AIRCRAFT WHILE OUR GROUND TROOPS WERE ATTACKING FIERCELY CON TIENT (CON TIENT) AND DOC HIEU (DOC HIEUS).

24. AT 0232 HOURS ON 16 APRIL 1972, IN HAI PHONG THERE WERE REPORTS OF THE PRESENCE OF B52 AIRCRAFT FLYING AT THE ALTITUDE OF 9-10 KM. IN THE COURSE OF HALF AN HOUR, THE 245TH AND 238TH REGIMENTS LAUNCHED 10 MISSILES BUT COULD ONLY DOWN ONE B52 AIRCRAFT WHICH DID NOT CRASH IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY.

25. AT 2144 HOURS ON 22 NOV 72 AND AT 2148 HOURS ON THE SAME DAY, THE 83TH AND 43RD BATTALIONS, 263RD MISSILE REGIMENT, LAUNCHED FOUR MISSILES AT A FORMATION OF B52 AIRCRAFT WHEN IT WAS ATTACKING DO LUONG (DOO LUONG) AND THANH CHUONG (THANH CHUONG). WE SHOT DOWN TWO B52 AIRCRAFT. ONE OF THEM CRASHED 64 KM FROM UTAPAD AIR BASE. THE PENTAGON CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION AND CONCLUDED THAT THIS B52 CRASHED SOME 200 KM AWAY FROM THE SITE WHERE IT WAS HIT. THE MISSILE EXPLODED AT A DISTANCE 45M FROM THE CRAFT,

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CSN:RXBP0476 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PHU-1A//

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CSN:RXBP0475 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PHU-1A//

DAMAGING INJURY TO ITS ENGINES.

26. AT 1830 HOURS ON 18 DEC 72, JIN HADAM DETECTED THE PRESENCE OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT. THE WHOLE OF OUR AIR DEFENSE WAS GIVEN ALERT STATUS ONE. FROM 1900 HOURS ON 18 DEC 72 TO 0330 HOURS ON 19 DEC 72, THE ENEMY MOBILIZED 90 SORTIES OF B52 AIRCRAFT AND 255 SORTIES OF TACTICAL PLANES IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST HANGI AND HAT PHONG. IN HANGI, 90 SORTIES OF B52'S WERE DIVIDED INTO THREE WAVES, APPROACHING FROM THE NORTHWESTERN TO STRIKE GIA LAN, HAT, KEP AND HOA LAC (HAF LAC). AIRFIELDS AND THE ME TRI (MEK TRIP) RADIO STATION. ALTERNATING WITH THE WAVES OF B52 ATTACKS WERE F111 AIRCRAFT FLYING LOW IN SEPARATE SINGLE-CRAFT OPERATIONS TO STRIKE SCATTERED TARGETS. ACCORDING TO PRELIMINARY REPORTS, EIGHT ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN, OF WHICH THREE B52'S, AND CAPTURED SEVEN PILOTS.

27. IN A MEETING OF THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, A COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED IN WHICH IT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED THE FOLLOWING ACHIEVEMENTS: THE 59TH BATTALION, 261ST REGIMENT, BROUGHT DOWN ONE B52 WHICH CRASHED AT PHU LO (PHU LUOI) AT 2013 HOURS; THE 32ND BATTALION, 267TH REGIMENT, SHOT DOWN ONE B52 WHICH CRASHED IN THE LAOS-THAILAND BORDER AREA AT 2016 HOURS; AND THE 77TH, 257TH REGIMENT SHOT DOWN ONE B52 AT THAM HAI (THAM HAT), HA TAY (HAF TAY) PROVINCE AT 0839 HOURS.

28. ON 20 DEC 72 IN HANGI, ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER WAS BAD, OUR AIR FORCES ENGAGED IN THE FIGHT, DASHED INTO AND STRUCK DIRECTLY AT B52 FORMATIONS, ATTACKED BY SURPRISE, THE ENEMY FORMATION WAS THROWN INTO DISARRAY. THE MISSILE TROOPS SUDDENLY NOTICED ON THEIR RADARSCOPE A SIGNIFICANT FALL-OFF IN THE JAMMING INTENSITY. IT MEANT THAT SUCH A PEAKING OFF OF FIGHTER PLANES WOULD CERTAINLY HELP OUR MISSILES TO SCORE. CAPITALIZING ON THE OPPORTUNITY, THE 32ND BATTALION IN PHU THUY (PHU THUY) CAUGHT SIGHT OF THE B52 FLEET WHICH WAS ATTACKING GIA LAN (GIA LAN). IT WAITED TILL THE RANGE WAS REDUCED TO 32 KM. IT USED THE METHOD OF "3-POINT STRIKE" AND MET THE TARGET AT AN ANGLE AT AN APPROPRIATE RANGE AND IT STRUCK HOME. THE ENEMY B52 ALTHO ITS DOWN LAD FELL DOWN ALMOST VERTICALLY ON 31

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THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: 112 6 024 0127 92.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VNM)
SUBJECT: 112 6 024 0127 92/SP/ ATDEFENSE AND
J.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSER
THE FRINGE OF THE YEN THUONG (YEN THUONG) COMMUNE, CLOSE TO THE YEN VIEU (YEN VIEU) RAILWAY STATION. IT WAS 2000 HRS. TWENTY MINUTES LATER, THE 77TH BATTALION ALSO USED THE SAME FIGHTING METHOD BUT AT AN EVEN SLIGHTLY CLOSER RANGE. ITS MISSILE STRUCK HOME, FROM 2027 HOURS TO 2030 HOURS, THE 78TH, 79TH AND 90TH BATTALIONS, ONE AFTER ANOTHER, LAUNCHED MISSILES AT SIX B52'S WHICH WERE FLYING TOWARDS THE YEN VIEU (YEN VIEU) RAILWAY STATION. WHEN THEY NOTED THAT THE SIGNAL REFLECTING FROM THE TARGET SUDDENLY DISAPPEARED, THE 90TH BATTALION LAUNCHED THEIR LAST MISSILE, AND CONTRIBUTED TO PUTTING OUT OF ACTION ONE B52 AT 2034 HOURS, SPINNING INTO PLAY ITS TRADITION OF EMISSION RADAR, WAVES SKILLFULLY AND TRYING TO STRIKE THE ENEMY AT CLOSE RANGE, THE 77TH BATTALION WAS FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE "FALL JAMMING SIGNAL" AND WAITED TILL THE MOMENT THEY GOT AT AN APPROPRIATE RANGE TO INTENSIFY THE RADAR EMISSION. ONLY FOUR MINUTES LATER, THIS BATTALION SHOT DOWN THE B52 IN QUESTION WHICH CRASHED AT VAN THANG (VAN THANG), BA VI (BA VI), HA TAY (HAF TAY). SO, WITHIN LESS THAN 20 MINUTES, WITH AN ACTIVE COORDINATION OF THE AIR FORCES AND THE MISSILE FORCES, HANGI SHOT DOWN FOUR B52'S, OF WHICH TWO WERE SHOT DOWN IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITIES.

29. AT 0430 HOURS OF 20 DEC 72, 45 SORTIES OF B52'S AGAIN, MOVING IN A COLUMN FLYING ALONGSIDE THE SLOPE OF THE TAM DAO (TAM DAO) MOUNTAIN RANGE TO COME IN AND STRIKE THE GIA LAN (GIA LAN) AND YEN VIEU (YEN VIEU) AREAS. AT 0509 HOURS, THE 57TH BATTALION LAUNCHED ONE MISSILE AT THE FORMATION WHICH CARRIED THE NUMBER CODE 318. THEN, THE 77TH BATTALION WHICH WAS LEFT WITH TWO MISSILES, LAUNCHED THEM ALL AT THE SAME FORMATION, THIS PUT TWO B52 AIRCRAFT OUT OF ACTION. THREE MINUTES LATER, AT 0511 HOURS, THE 57TH BATTALION LAUNCHED ITS LAST MISSILE AT THE B52 FORMATION WHICH CARRIED THE NUMBER CODE OF 532. ONE

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CSN:RXBP0477 USDAO BANGKOK TH/PH-41A//

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CSN:RXBP0476 USDAO BANGKOK TH/PH-41A//

MISSILES AT THE FIRST 552 AIRCRAFT FLIGHT WHICH CAME FROM VAN TEN (VANJ YEEN), THANH-THUT (THANH THUY), AND DA PHUC (DA PHUCS). THEY PASSED PHU LO (PHUF LOOK), TURNED SOUTH, AND REACHED DONG ANH (DOONG ANH). ONE B52 WAS SHOT DOWN.

35. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT 30 MINUTES, THE AIR DEFENSE ARMY COMMAND POST REPEATEDLY RECEIVED REPORTS FROM GROUP 461 SAYING THAT THE 78TH, 79TH, 80TH, 87TH, 89TH AND 90TH BATTALIONS HAD REPEATEDLY LAUNCHED MISSILES AT THE B52 FLIGHTS AND HAD SHOT DOWN FIVE B52 AIRCRAFT, OF WHICH FOUR CRASHED IMMEDIATELY. THEN THE 59TH, 73RD, 94TH, 75TH, AND 70TH SHOT DOWN TWO MORE B52 AIRCRAFT, ONE OF WHICH EXPLODED OVER PHU LUONG (PHUS LUONG) AND IMMEDIATELY CRASHED. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN IN SPITE OF THE FACT THE ENEMY MODIFIED THE DIRECTION OF ACCESS AND THE TIMING (ACCESS FROM THE SOUTHWEST, WEST NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST TO STRIKE HANOI). STILL, EIGHT OF THEIR B52 AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN, OF WHICH FIVE IMMEDIATELY CRASHED. 441 PHONG REPORTED THAT THEY HAD SHOT DOWN TWO B52 AIRCRAFT. AFTERWARDS, REPORTS FROM NEWS AGENCIES IN THE WEST SAID THAT ON THE NIGHT OF 26 DEC 72, NINE B52 AIRCRAFT DID NOT COME BACK TO THEIR BASES.

36. IN THE NIGHT OF 27 DEC 72, THE HANOI MISSILE FORCES SHOT DOWN FOUR B52 AIRCRAFT, OF WHICH TWO CRASHED IMMEDIATELY. MOST OUTSTANDING WAS THE MILITARY FEAT OF THE 72ND BATTALION, 285TH REGIMENT WHICH HAD JUST MARCHED FROM HAI PHONG AND OCCUPIED THE BATTLEGROUND IN DAI CHU (DAI CHU). THIS BATTALION SHOT DOWN ONE B52 AIRCRAFT OVER HANG HOA THAI (HANG HOA THAM) STREET IN HANOI.

37. ON THE NIGHT OF 28 DEC 72, THERE WERE ONLY LIMITED ACTIVITIES OF B52 AIRCRAFT WHICH MADE 30 SORTIES IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI. THE MISSILE AND AIR FORCES JOINED FORCES AND SHOT DOWN TWO B52 AIRCRAFT.

38. IN THE NIGHT OF 29 DEC 72, THE ENEMY STAYED AWAY FROM HANOI. THE 734 BATTALION AT THE VEN NGHIA (YEN NGHIA) BATTLEGROUND, FIGHTING THE LAST BATTLE, BY ANNILATING ONE B52 AIRCRAFT, BRINGING THE HISTORIC 12 DAY AND NIGHT CAMPAIGN TO A CLOSE. IT WAS THEN 2315 BT

522454/0010/051 24 OF 45 41 0127 051/10/042 2011102 FEB 92
CSW:RXSP0478 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PH-0111//

SECTION 0A OF DA BANGKOK TH 0000

THIS IS A

MESSAGE

SERIAL: ITR 5 024 0127 92.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN).
SUBJECT: ITR 5 024 0127 92/SPW AIRDEFENSE AND
U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES
HOURS, 20TH OF DECEMBER 1972.
COMMENTS: UNIT DESIGNATORS AND HISTORIES ARE INCLUDED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE RESEARCH TEAMS WHO PERFORM RESEARCH IN VIETNAM AS A PART OF THE JOINT OFFICE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS. THESE UNIT FACTS SHOULD BE USEFUL IN FINDING RECORDS HELD BY THESE UNITS.
HANOI OFFICE CHIEF COMMENTS: THIS BOMB WAS TRANSLATED BY A PART-TIME LOCAL MTR. RESEARCHER/TRANSLATOR UNDER CONTRACT TO THE HANOI OFFICE WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DIA MEMBERS OF THE U.S. OFFICE. FIELD ANALYSIS INDICATES CORRELATIONS TO NUMEROUS INCIDENTS, BOTH RESOLVED AND UNRESOLVED. SOME OF THE INCIDENTS REPORTED HEREIN HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF BOTH INVESTIGATION AND EXCAVATIONS PREVIOUSLY CONDUCTED IN THE SRV.

//IPSP: PG 263011.
//COMSBJ: 52111.
PROJ: 0990-15.
COLL: AC.
INSTR: US: NO.
PREP: 0-0150.
ENCL: TO FOL 74 TO DIA/PH-41A: 02 ENCLOSURES.
1. BOOK ENTITLED "9AM VE 34U TRU", 372 PGS, 1 CY.
2. TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM ENCL 1, 33 PGS, 1 CY.
ACQ: VIETNAM, HANOI CITY (920205).
DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMR, DCN, PDL, 34, DAILO, EAFA, CJTFPA).
WARNING: THIS REPORT
BT

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

522454/0011/051 15 OF 45 41 0126 051/10/042 2011102 FEB 92
CSW:RXSP0479 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PH-0111//

N.I.F.
RETRANSMISSION

R 201130Z FEB 92 PSN 522010P18

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PM-11A//

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PA-41A/DAH//

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR. TIM CARNEY//
SECDEF WASHDC//JASD-TS//PA-41A//
JICPAC HONOLULU HI//OTC/OSU//
CDR JTF-FA BARBERS PT HI
JCSLH HUNG KONG//PM-11A//
JSCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J253/J3/J366//

BT

SECTION 01-1F 05 BANGKOK TH 08003

THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0129 92.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN).
SUBJECT: IIR 6 024 0129 92/TRANSLATION OF SRV
BOOK "AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE".
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOT: 750000
REFS: D-VDP-2430-01-001; D-VDP-2430-38-201;
D-VDP-2430-05-00.
SOURCE: //DIS 6-024-501-72//SRV OPEN SOURCE
PUBLICATION TITLED: AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE. SOURCE
RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A REPORT. IT PROVIDES
HISTORICAL INFORMATION REGARDING AIRCRAFT SHOOTDOWNS,
PILOT DEATHS AND PILOT CAPTURES AND SRV UNITS WHO ARE
CREDITED WITH THE KILLS.

DLVR:CDR JTF-FA BARBERS PT HI(3)...INFO

019:000-000/COPIES:0002

522010/0793/051 1 JF 10 MI 0111
CSN:RXBP0462

051/13:56Z 107 201130Z FEB 92
JSDAU BANGKOK TH//PM-11A//

2/10

Encl 28

TEXT:

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS EXTRACTED FROM A
PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM PUBLISHING HOUSE BOOK ENTITLED
"PHONG KHUNG KHUNG QUAN" (AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE). THE
BOOK WAS PUBLISHED IN VIETNAMESE IN 1978 AND WAS
AUTHORED BY NGUYEN DUONG (NGUYENX ZHONG), VU THANH
(VUX THANH), HA BINH NGUONG (HAF BINH NHUNG), TRAN
KY (TRANF KYF), DOVC NIEU (DOONGF NIEENJ), AND XUAN
HAI (XUAAN HAI). THE BOOK CONSISTS OF 510 PAGES AND
WAS PRINTED BY THE MILITARY PRINTING HOUSE; 21,200
COPIES PRINTED. IT IS UNCLASSIFIED AND WAS PURCHASED
OPENLY IN HANOI. IT WAS TRANSLATED BY A PART-TIME
LOCAL HIRE RESEARCHER/TRANSLATOR UNDER CONTRACT TO THE
US OFFICE FOR PM-11A AFFAIRS IN HANOI.

2. ON 5 AUGUST 1964, A FLIGHT OF SIX AIRCRAFT WAS
FLYING IN COLUMB FORMATION ALONG THE COAST AS A
DIVERSIONARY TACTIC FOR TWO OTHER FLIGHTS WHICH WERE
ATTACKING THE AREA OF LACH TRUONG. AFTER 10 MINUTES
OF FIGHTING (APPROX 1400 HOURS), LACH TRUONG FORCES
SHOT DOWN TWO US ACFT, KILLING TWO PILOTS. VILLAGERS
OF HUU LOC (HUU LOC) VILLAGE FISHED ONE OUT OF THE
WATER WITH FISHING NETS. THE PILOT, WHO WAS FROM
CALIFORNIA, WAS NAMED "R1-9A SE-THO" (RJ COMMENT:
NAME REFNO 0034-0-01) AND HAD BEEN FLYING
AT 2000 FT ALTITUDE.

3. ON 5 AUGUST 1964, TWO AIRCRAFT PILOTTED BY ALVAREZ
(RJ COMMENT: REFNO 0035) AND ALEXANDER, ATTACKED THE
AREA OF BAI CHAY (BAI CHAY). ALEXANDER, FLYING A
SKYHAWK, TOOK THE LEAD. THE LEAD AIRCRAFT DROVE FROM
3000M ALTITUDE, DROPPED ALL THE 70MM ROCKETS, AND
THEN TURNED BACK TO THE SEA. ALVAREZ OBSERVED SOME
SPARKS UP FIRE ON THE GROUND AND SOME SMOKE COLUMNS IN
THE AIR. HE TOOK A 30 DEGREE ANGLE, DROVE AND DROPPED
ALL THE ROCKETS AND THEN FLEW TO HA TU TO EVADE. WHEN
HE REALIZED THAT HIS PLANE WAS HIT, HE EJECTED. HIS
SKYHAWK, COVERED WITH BLACK SMOKE, PLUNGED INTO THE
SEA. ALVAREZ, WHO WAS 26 YOA AND HAD BEEN MARRIED FOR
ONLY SIX MONTHS, WAS CAPTURED BY FISHERMAN AND HANDED
OVER TO A NEARBY NAVAL VESSEL.

4. THE BATTLE AT VINH ENDED AT 1705 HRS ON 5 AUG 64.
GENERAL HU ANNOUNCED THAT ON THAT DAY, THE VIETNAMESE
SHOT DOWN EIGHT AIRCRAFT, DAMAGED THREE OTHERS, AND
CAPTURED ONE PILOT (ALVAREZ). THE EIGHT THAT WERE

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CSN:RXBP0462 JSDAU BANGKOK TH//PM-11A//

SHOT DOWN INCLUDED: ONE F-4 TO THE NORTHEAST OF CUA
81

SECTION 02 OF 05 HANGKOK TH 08003

THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: ITR 6 024 0124 92.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VNM).
SUBJECT: ITR 6 024 0124 92/TRANSLATION OF SRV
HOCK "AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE".
MOI (CUAR MOOI); ONE IN THE MA TU (MAF TU) AREA OF
QUANG NINH; ONE AT CUA BUA (CUAR BUWAY) IN QUANG
NINH; TWO AT LACH TRUNG (LACH TRUNG) IN THAM HOA;
ONE IN THE AREA OF HONG SON (HONG SON), HA TINH;
ONE 30 KM NORTHEAST OF LY HUA (LYS HUA) IN QUANG BINH;
AND ONE AT THE MOUTH OF THE DAY (DAYS) RIVER IN VINH
BINH.

5. AT 1355 HRS ON 7 FEB 65, AN A-1H AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT
DOWN BY THE 14.5MM GUN OF THE 12TH BATTAL COMPANY ALONG
WITH ASSISTANCE FROM GUNNERS OF 400 NINH (BAO NINH)
AND NGU THUY (NGU THUY) COMPANIES. THIS OCCURRED
NEAR THE MOUTH OF THE HAT LE (HAT LE) RIVER IN
THE AREA OF DONG HOI (DONG HOI). THE AIRCRAFT
BURNED AND PLUNGED HEADFIRST INTO THE SEA.

6. ON THE MORNING OF 11 FEB 65, COMPANY 2 OF THE
TRUNG SON GROUP SHOT DOWN AN F-4 ACFT AS IT FLEW
INLAND FROM THE SEA IN THE AREA OF DONG HOI. THE
PLANE WAS MARKED 301 AND WAS THE AIRCRAFT FLOWN BY
MAJOR SHREKAR AND PARACHUTED OUT AND WAS CAPTURED BY
RESIDENTS OF THE LY NINH (LYS NINH) AND THUAN TRANG
(THUAN TRANG) VILLAGES, AND BY WORKERS AT THE SAC
NAM (SAC NAM) RICE FACTORY.

7. AT 0422 HRS ON 23 FEB 65, THE 37TH AAA BATTALION LEFT VINH
FOR HA TINH. AT 1400 HRS ON 23 FEB, THE 03RD
COMPANY WAS FIRST TO CROSS THE BOM FERRY. THE COMPANY
COMMANDER AND TWO SQUADS BEGAN WORKING THEIR WAY ALONG
THE BEACH WHEN THEY WERE ATTACKED BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT
WHICH WERE APPROACHING FROM THE SEA. THE UNIT FIRED
ON THE AIRCRAFT AND ONE F-4 WAS CAUGHT FIRE AND CRASHED
INTO THE SEA. DURING THE NIGHT OF 23 FEB 65, THE 03RD
COMPANY REACHED MY 4MM. THE NEXT DAY, COMPANY 02 AND
THE 14.5MM GUN PLATOON SHOT DOWN AN F-105 AS THEY
CROSSED THE GIANG RIVER.

DLVR:CDR JTF-FA BARBERS PT HI(3)...INFO

RTY:000-000/COPIES:0003

522419/974/051 4 OF 10 051/13:57Z 201130Z FEB 92
CSN:RXSP0464

051/13:57Z 201130Z FEB 92
USDAO BANGKOK TH//PMWIA//

522419/974/051 3 OF 10 051/13:57Z 201130Z FEB 92
CSN:RXSP0462 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PMWIA//

8. AT 1316 HOURS ON 26 MAR 65, ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE ONLY 10 KM AWAY FROM THE RU NAI (RUS NAIF) HILL IN THE AREA OF MA TINH. THE LEADING F-105 DIVED TO AN ALTITUDE OF 1500M WHICH WAS FLOWN BY LTC ROBINSON RISKER, THE COMMANDER OF 27TH SQUADRON OF THE 18TH TACTICAL GROUP. HE ORDERED THE AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK FALSE RADAR POSITIONS SET UP ON RU NAI HILL. MINUTES LATER, REPORTS STATED THAT TWO ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN, ONE BY COMPANY 82 AND THE OTHER BY COMPANY

93. COMPANY 27'S POSITION WAS UNDER ATTACK, AND THE 82D AND 83RD COMPANIES SUPPORTED THE 27TH COMPANY. ONE F-105 WAS HIT AND IT CRASHED INTO THE SEA. THE PILOT, RISKER EJECTED, CALLED FOR HELP, AND WAS RESCUED.

9. ON 2 APRIL 65. (NO COMMENT: REFNO 0066) FLEW A RECON SORTIE ON THE HAN RONG BRIDGE. IN THE MORNING OF 3 APRIL, HE AGAIN FLEW INTO THE HAN RONG BRIDGE AREA TO RECONNOITER AT FIRE. AT 0930 HOURS, AIRCRAFT A "FOODPOD" (NO COMMENT: REFNO 1211), WAS HIT BY THE 37TH AAA COMPANY AND BURST INTO FLAME AND CRASHED THREE KILOMETERS FROM TAO (TAD) BRIDGE. WAS CAPTURED ALIVE. THE ENEMY FORCE CONSISTED OF 50 AIRCRAFT. FLIGHT OF 16 AIRCRAFT FLEW TO HAN RONG, BUT WERE REPELLED BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. THE LEAD AND AIRCRAFT WAS HIT AND CRASHED. THE PILOT, MAJOR VONDEV, WAS CAPTURED IMMEDIATELY (NO COMMENT: REFNO 0066).

10. AT 1250 HOURS ON 3 APRIL, PERSONALLY LED A FLIGHT TO ATTACK THE HAN RONG BRIDGE. FLYING NORTHEAST OF THANH HUA, THE LEAD AIRCRAFT IN THE FLIGHT WAS SHOT DOWN. THE PILOT HAD NO TIME TO EJECT AND WAS FOUND DEAD IN THE COCKPIT. FOUR MINUTES LATER, A SECOND AIRCRAFT WAS HIT AND BURST INTO FLAMES.

11. ON 3 APRIL, SECTION A OF THE TAN DAO AIR DEFENSE GROUP WAS DISPATCHED FROM NGHE AN TO REINFORCE THE DEFENSE OF THE HAN RONG BRIDGE. AT 0820 HOURS ON 4 APRIL, WHILE CROSSING AT THE SHEP FERRY, FOUR AAA AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE FERRY LANDING. THE ATTACKERS JETTISONED THEIR BOMBS AND FLEW OFF. ANOTHER FLIGHT ATTACKED FROM THE SOUTH. AFTER 30 MINUTES OF FIGHTING, HE SHOT DOWN THREE AIRCRAFT AND CAPTURED ONE BY

522419/9795/051 5 OF 10 01 0113 051/13:57Z 201130Z FEB 92
CSN:RXSP0664 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PM-1117

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 04003

THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0129 92
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN)
SUBJECT: IIR 6 024 0129 92/TRANSLATION OF SRV
- BORN "AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE"
AMERICAN PILOT. BY AFTERNOON, THE TROOPS OF COMPANY 5 AND AN ELEMENT OF COMPANY 3 OF THE TAN DAO AAA GROUP, AND THE PEOPLE FROM THE BANKS OF THE YEN (YEN) RIVER TO THE TINH GIA (TINH GIA) DISTRICT SEAT, SHOT DOWN SEVEN ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND CAPTURED THE ONE AMERICAN PILOT.

12. WHILE THE TAN DAO GROUP WAS FIGHTING AT SHEP FERRY (4 APRIL), THE AAA UNIT OF THE AIR DEFENSE OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOL ARRIVED AT HOANG MAI. THEY TOOK UP POSITIONS ON HAN XOI (HANG XOI) HILL AND WERE ATTACKED. THE 18TH COMPANY SHOT DOWN THREE AAA AIRCRAFT.

13. AT 0930 HOURS ON 4 APRIL, THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO ATTACK THE HAN RONG BRIDGE. AN F-105D, NUMBER 152, DIVED FROM 5000M ALTITUDE AND AT 1500M ALTITUDE, WAS HIT AND CHASED TWO KM FROM THE BRIDGE. CAPTAIN SHARP, FLYING AN F-105D, NBR 81, DIVED FROM 6000M ALTITUDE, DELIVERED HIS BOMBS AND FLEW. CAPTAIN HARRIS (NO COMMENT: REFNO 0068) FOLLOWED HIM TO THE TARGET. HARRIS' AIRCRAFT WAS HIT AND HE HAD TO BALE OUT AND WAS CAPTURED AT 1130 HOURS.

14. IN THE SKIES OF THE NORTHEASTERN AREA OF HAN RONG, MAJOR FRANK BECKSTEAD (PHON-NAME RECS-ANETS) (NO COMMENT: NO REFNO) LED A FLIGHT OF FOUR AIRCRAFT. HIS PILOT THANH HANH (TRANH HANH) OPENED FIRE AND SHOT DOWN MAJOR BECKSTEAD AND BOTH THE MAJOR AND HIS AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE SEA. TWO OTHER SIB PILOTS, HUAN AND NGUYEN, SHOT DOWN JAMES MAGUISSON (NO COMMENT: 0069).

15. ON 24 JULY 1965, A FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT CROSSED THE VIETNAM - LAO BORDER. WHEN THEY REACHED MOC CHAU, MOST OF THEM FLEW TOWARDS VIET TRI AND SOME FOLLOWED THE DA RIVER. THEY FLEW INTO THE RANGE OF THE 63RD

DLVR:CDR JTF-FA BARBERS PT. 41(3)...INFO

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

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CSN:RXSP0665 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PM-1117

AND 60TH BATTALIONS AND AN F-4C WAS SHOT DOWN.
REGIMENT 236. COMMANDER TRAM HAN (THANH PHAM) SENT
A MESSAGE TO THE HEADQUARTERS WHICH STATED, MAY 1955
HOURS ON 24 JULY 1965, THE 63RD AND 64TH BATTALIONS
EACH FIRED TWO MISSILES. ONE F-4C WAS SHOT DOWN. THE
AMERICAN PILOT WAS CAPTURED AND WAS KILLED.
FRIENDLY FORCES: PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS ALL SAFE.
SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE SHOT DOWN, A COMMAND CAR OF
THE 236 REGIMENT WAS GATHERED PART OF A LINE AND
FUSELAGE OF THE DOWNED PLANE AND THE CAPTURED PILOT.
THE PILOT WAS RICHARD PAUL KEIRN (RD COMMENT: REFNO
0112-1-02) AND WAS THE COMMANDER OF A FLIGHT OF FOUR
F-4C AIRCRAFT. (RD COMMENT: KEIRN WAS RELEASED FROM
CAPTIVITY IN 1973. HIS FELLOW PILOT, ROSCOE HEWAT
FOB AIR, REFNO 0112-3-01, IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR.)

16. AT 1130 HOURS ON 26 JULY 1965, ONE BQM-38A DRONE
AND ONE RF-101 CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY OVER
THE SON TAY AREA. AT 1200 HOURS, THE DRONE WAS SHOT
DOWN. THE 60TH AV FIRED ON AND HIT THE RF-101. THE
PILOT WAS FROM THE 13TH AIR RECONNAISSANCE GROUP AND
HE AND HIS AIRCRAFT IMPACTED WEST OF THE DA VI
MOUNTAIN BEFORE HE WAS ABLE TO TAKE ANY RECONNAISSANCE
PHOTOS. (RD COMMENT: POSSIBLY REFNO 0116.)

17. AT 1410 HOURS ON 27 JULY 1965, AN ATTACK WAS LED
BY MAJOR GIOELE (G10-DOH-LON) INVOLVING TWO FLIGHTS OF
F-105 AIRCRAFT (EIGHT PLANES). FLIGHT ONE, FROM
FAULT, ATTACKED FIRST AND CONSISTED OF CAPTAIN CONNELL
(CONN-4EN) IN ACFT ONE, CPT BURGER (BURGER-50N) IN
ACFT TWO, CPT SPENCER (SPAC-10N) IN ACFT THREE, AND
CPT KOSKOV (KEE-50N) IN ACFT FOUR. AS THEY APPROACHED
THE TARGET, GIOELE ORDERED THE PILOTS TO MAINTAIN AN
ALTITUDE OF 10 METERS AND FLY AT 900KM/HOUR. CAPTAIN
CONNELL'S PLANE WAS HIT BY AA GUNS. HE DROPPED TWO
WAPALM BOMBS ON THE TARGET AND FLEW AWAY. CPT
BURGER'S PLANE FOLLOWED, AND WAS DOWNED NEAR XAN
(XAN) HAMLET AND HE WAS CAPTURED TEN MINUTES LATER.
(RD COMMENT: POSSIBLY REFNO 0115). WHEN THEY
ATTACKED RADAR POSITIONS ON TU KHUY (VUD KHUY) AND TEN
KY (YEEH KY) HILLS, AN A-1E FROM THE ENEMY RESCUE
TEAM WAS DOWNED NEAR THE DA RIVER.

18. AT 1450 HOURS ON 27 JUL 65 (SAME BATTLE AS PARA
BT

522425/9796/051 7 OF 10 41 0110 051/13:57Z 201130Z FEB 92
CS4:RXBP0465 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PR-111//

SECTION 04 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 0403

THIS IS A MESSAGE
SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0129 92.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VNM).
SUBJECT: IIR 6 024 0129 92/TRANSLATION OF SRV
BOMBS AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE.
16 ABOVE), OUR UNITS TO THE SOUTH SHOT DOWN AN F-105
DOWN BY MAJOR DECKERT (DECK-50N) WHICH CRASHED NEAR
THANH SON. THE SECOND FLIGHT COMMANDER BY MAJOR PAUL
CLEMENTZ (PJON COM-1-NEW) TRIED TO KNOCK OUT THE
FALSE RADAR SITE ON HILL 35. CAPTAIN PARKSON?
(PONDMS-4EN) FLEW FROM HA VI AT AN ALTITUDE OF 20
METERS AND HIS F-105 WAS HIT BY AA GUNS AND CRASHED IN
THE PHU SON (PHJS SON) AREA. PARKSON MADE IT OUT OF
THE ACFT AND WAS CAPTURED BY THE LOCAL MILITIA.

19. ON 1 AUG 65, ROBERT DAUGHTREY (RD COMMENT: REFNO
0119) OF THE 12TH COMPANY, USAF GROUP 18, (LOCATED AT
KORAT) WAS CAPTURED AT THE NAM RONG BRIDGE.

20. ON 13 AUG 65, TWO A-1E ACFT WERE SHOT DOWN IN THE
AREA OF Y-NA - KICH TWO AREA OF VINH BINH PROVINCE.
ONE F-4 ACFT WAS SHOT DOWN AS IT ATTACKED FROM CHU ME.
MILITIA UNITS OF THE SALT FLATS OF NAM MA SHOT DOWN AN
A-1E WITH SMALL ARMS, AND ONE A-1E WAS SHOT DOWN WHILE
ENROUTE TO RESCUE ANOTHER. IT CRASHED INTO THE SEA.
ALSO, A RECONNAISSANCE ACFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE
FRONTLINE 2 GROUP.

21. ON 24 AUG 65, MISSILES OF THE 063 BATTALION SHOT
DOWN TWO F-4 ACFT. LTC PHAM AND MAJ DOREMUS (RD
COMMENT: BOTH OF REFNO 1126) PARACHUTED BUT WERE
CAPTURED.

22. ON 25 AUG 65, THE 60TH AV SHOT DOWN THREE F-105S.

23. ON 15 SEP 65, 37TH LTC ROBINSON, RUSHER AND MAJOR
MORRIS RAYMOND WERE CAPTURED AFTER THEIR F-105 WAS
SHOT DOWN.

24. ON 20 SEP 65, MISSILE REGIMENT 238 SHOT DOWN AN
A-1E NEAR HUU LUNG, PHAN NGOC LAN'S RED STAR AIR FORCE
GROUP DOWN SHOT DOWN ONE F-4 IN HA BAC. A MILITIA

DLVR:CON JTF-FA BARBERS PT HI(13)...INFO

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0003

522431/9798/051 8 OF 10 41 0116 051/13:58Z 201130Z FEB 92
CS4:RXBP0467 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PR-111//

UNIT AT DUONG HUU VILLAGE SHOT DOWN ONE A6 NEAR HUANH
30.

25. ON 5 OCT 65, THE 81ST MISSILE BN SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S. THE 81ST BN SHOT DOWN ONE F-105. THE 81ST BN SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 AT CUA JUNG, THE 81ST BN SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 IN THE BAI TU LONG AREA, WHILE ARMY UNITS SHOT DOWN TWO F-105'S. THE 83D MISSILE BN SHOT DOWN ONE F-105 IN THE LUC NGAY AREA, AND IN LANG SON PROVINCE, THREE ACFT WERE SHOT DOWN AND THREE PILOTS WERE CAPTURED.

26. ON 17 OCT 65, THE 87D MISSILE BN SHOT DOWN ONE F-4B, AND THE RADAR OPERATOR. (NO COMMENT: REFNO 0169) WAS CAPTURED. THE 82D BN ALSO SHOT DOWN TWO OTHER F-4'S AND CAPTURED ANOTHER PILOT. PROVINCIAL 3 GROUP SHOT DOWN ONE A6-E, AND THE 4A GUNS AT HA BAC AND LANG SON PROVINCES SHOT DOWN FIVE ACFT, INCLUDING TWO ADDITIONAL ACFT WHICH WERE DISPATCHED TO RESCUE TWO WHICH HAD BEEN DOWNED.

27. ON 20 OCT 65, TWO JET INTERCEPTORS WERE SHOT DOWN.

28. ON 22 OCT 65, ONE F-105 WAS SHOT DOWN.

29. ON 23 OCT 65, TWO ACFT WERE SHOT DOWN BY MISSILES.

30. ON 31 OCT 65, 10 ACFT WERE SHOT DOWN.

31. THE BOOK CONTAINS PHOTOS WHICH DEPICT THE FOLLOWING:

- A. ACFT WRECKAGE AT HON DAI, DATED 5 AUG 64.
- B. AN IN-FLIGHT PHOTO TAKEN FROM ABOVE BY MIG PILOT TRAN HANH OF AN F-105 BEING SHOT DOWN ON 6 APR

65.
- C. ACFT WRECKAGE OF THE 400TH ACFT WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN BY MISSILES ON 24 JUL 65.
- D. GI-DON UY-LAC (GI-DON UY-LOACS) (NO COMMENT: WILLARD GIDEON, REFNO 0430) RIDING IN AN OX CART AFTER CAPTURE ENROUTE TO THE HANOI MILITARY. CAPTIONED AS "SUPERMAN OF THE US AIR FORCE".
- E. IN-FLIGHT PHOTO OF A PHANTOM WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN.

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 BANGKOK TH 05403

THIS IS A MESSAGE

SERIAL: IIR 5 024 0129 92.
COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VNM).
SUBJECT: IIR 5 024 0129 92/TRANSLATION OF SRV BOOK "AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE".

DOWN ON 20 SEP 65.

- F. IN-FLIGHT PHOTO OF AN F-105 CRASHING NEAR THE DA RIVER.

- G. IN-CAPTIVITY PHOTO OF ROBINSON RISNER, "HERD OF THE US AIR FORCE FROM TWO WARS, CAPTURED 16 SEP 65." COMMENTS: UNIT DESIGNATORS AND HISTORIES ARE INCLUDED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE RESEARCH TEAMS WHO PERFORM RESEARCH IN VIETNAM AS A PART OF THE US OFFICE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS. THESE UNIT FACTS SHOULD BE USEFUL IN FINDING RECORDS HELD BY THESE UNITS.

HANOI OFFICE CHIEF COMMENTS: NONE.

//IPSP: PG 2450//.

//COMSOBJ: 521//.

PROJ: 6999-15.

COLL: AC.

INSTR: USI-N5.

PREP: 6-01590.

ENCL: TO FOLLOW TO DIA/PW-MIA: 02 ENCLOSURES.

- 1. BOOK ENTITLED "PHONG KHOANG KHONG QUAN", 516 PGS, 1 CT.

- 2. TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM ENCL 1, 25 PGS, 1 CT.

ACFI: VIETNAM, HANOI CITY (929221).

DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCN, PDL,

SA, DAYLO, EX/4, CJFFA).

ST

DLVRICOM JTF-FA BARBERS PT HI(3)...1470

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522436/9799/051 10 JF IQ 41 1117 051/13:592 2011302 FEB 92
CSY:RXBP0468 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

522431/9798/051 9 OF 10 41 0116 051/13:582 2011302 FEB 92
CSY:RXBP0467 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

QPR 2. Major General Christmas promised to provide for the record the names included in the following lists:

A. 119 discrepancy cases with breakdown of investigation results (i.e., 22 remains recovered, 39 fate resolved but body not recovered, 58 fate still unresolved).

B. 130 last known alive cases with a breakdown of investigation results including the names of 64 individuals last known alive whose cases have not yet been investigated.

C. List of 135 still unresolved cases are derived from (1) the 119 Vessey discrepancy list, (2) the 130 "last known alive" list and, (3) the 13 other POWs who did not return at Operation Homecoming, who make up JTF-FA's current operational investigative focus.

Tab A shows the breakdown of investigation results of 119 discrepancy cases. Tab B lists the names of the 130 last known alive individuals and shows the 64 whose cases have not yet been investigated. Tab C lists the 135 priority discrepancy cases which provide the focus for JTF-FA operations.

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JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
119 Discrepancy Cases

Name	Remains Recovered	Fate Still Unresolved	Fate Resolved Body Not Recovered
ANDERSON, ROBERT D.			X
APDACA, VICTOR J.			X
ASHLOCK, CARLOS		X	
BISZ, RALPH C.			X
BLACKWOOD, GORDON B.	X		
BORAH, DANIEL V.		X	
BOWERS, RICHARD L.			X
BRENNAN, HERBERT O.		X	
BROWN, WAYNE G.			X
BRUCH, DONALD W.			X
BRUCHER, JOHN N.		X	
BUSCH, JON T.	X		
CAPPELLI, CHARLES E.	X		
CICHON, WALTER A.		X	
CLARK, RICHARD C.			X
COCHED, RICHARD N.			X
CONDIT, DOUGLAS C.		X	
COOK, KELLY F.		X	
CORNTHWAITE, THOMAS G.			X
CREV, JAMES A.		X	
CUTHBERT, BRADLEY G.		X	
DAHILL, DOUGLAS E.		X	
DALE, CHARLES A.		X	
DARDEAU, OSCAR N.	X		
DEMMON, DAVID S.		X	
DERRICKSON, THOMAS G.			X
DEXTER, BENNIE L.		X	
DOVE, JACK P.			X
EGAN, JAMES T.		X	
ENTRICAN, DANNY D.		X	
ERSKINE, JACK D.		X	
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL J.		X	
FRANCISCO, SAN D.		X	
FULLAM, WAYNE E.	X		
GERBER, DANIEL A.		X	
GOODWIN, SOLOMON H.			X
GRAF, JOHN G.			X
GREER, ROBERT L.	X		
GREGORY, ROBERT R.	X		
GREILING, DAVID S.			X
HALL, HARLEY H.		X	
HAMILTON, ROGER D.		X	
HAMM, JAMES E.		X	
HANSON, ROBERT T.	X		
HARDY, JOHN K.			X
HARRIS, GREGORY J.			X

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
119 Discrepancy Cases

Name	Remains Recovered	Fate Still Unresolved	Fate Resolved Body Not Recovered
HORNE, STANLEY H.	X		
HUNEYCUTT, CHARLES J.	X		
JEFFERSON, JAMES M.			X
JEFFS, CLIVE G.		X	
JOHNS, VERNON Z.	X		
KARINS, JOSEPH J.	X		
KOSKO, WALTER			X
00 LANE, CHARLES J.		X	
LEINHOFF, EDWARD W.	X		
LINDSEY, MARVIN H.			X
## MASSUCCI, MARTIN J.		X	
MAYER, RODERICK L.			X
MCCARTY, JAMES L.			X
MCDONNELL, JOHN T.		X	
MCLEAN, JAMES H.		X	
MELLOR, FREDRIC H.			X
MINS, GEORGE I.		X	
MITCHELL, ARCHIE E.		X	
MOORE, HERBERT W.			X
MORGAN, JAMES S.		X	
MORRIS, GEORGE W.		X	
MORRISON, JOSEPH C.		X	
MORROW, LARRY K.		X	
NETHERLAND, ROGER M.		X	
NEWTON, CHARLES V.		X	
NEWTON, DONALD S.		X	
OGRADY, JOHN F.			X
PATTERSON, JAMES K.			X
PEARCE, DALE A.			X
PEDERSON, JOE P.			X
PETERSON, MARK A.		X	
PHILLIPS, ROBERT P.		X	
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD H.		X	
PLATT, ROBERT L.		X	
POLLIN, GEORGE J.	X		
POTTS, LARRY F.		X	
POWERS, TRENT R.	X		
PREVEDEL, CHARLES F.		X	
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS R.		X	
PUTNAM, CHARLES L.	X		
REHE, RICHARD R.			X
REITLY, EDWARD D.	X		
ROBERTSON, JOHN L.		X	
ROZO, JAMES W.		X	
SALLEY, JAMES J.			X
## SCHARF, CHARLES J.		X	

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
119 Discrepancy Cases

Name	Remains Recovered	Fate Still Unresolved	Fate Resolved Body Not Recovered
SCHIELE, JAMES F.			X
SCHMIDT, WALTER R.			X
SCHRECKENGOST, FRED T.	X		
SCULL, GARY B.		X	
SIMPSON, JAMES E.			X
00 SITTNER, RONALD N.		X	
SMALL, BURT C.		X	
SOYLAND, DAVID P.		X	
SPARKS, DONALD L.		X	
SQUIRE, BOYD E.			X
STEEN, MARTIN W.			X
STROHLEIN, MADISON A.		X	
SYKES, DERRI			X
TATUM, LAWRENCE B.		X	
TERRILL, PHILIP B.			X
TOLBERT, CLARENCE O.	X		
TROMP, WILLIAM L.		X	
TUCKER, EDWIN B.	X		
VAN BENDEGOM, JAMES L.		X	
VIETTI, ELEANOR A.		X	
WALKER, BRUCE C.		X	
WHEELER, EUGENE L.		X	
WILES, MARVIN B.			X
WILLIAMSON, DON I.	X		
WILLS, FRANCIS D.			X
WROBLESKI, WALTER F.		X	
YONAH, KENNETH J.	X		

Note 1:

Fate has been determined for one of the two individuals in case 0158.
Identity of individual unknown.

00 Note 2:

Fate has been determined for one of the individuals in case 0804 or 0805.
Identity of individual unknown.

Total Remains Recovered: 22 Individuals in 20 Cases

Total Fate Resolved Body Not Recovered: 39 Individuals in 33 Cases

Total Fate Still Unresolved: 58 Individuals in 47 Cases

Total: 119 Individuals in 94 Cases

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
130 Last Known Alive Cases

Name	Not Yet Investigated
ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO	X
ASHLOCK, CARLOS	
BABULA, ROBERT L.	X
BACUS, KENNETH F.	X
BADOLATTI, FRANK N.	X
BAKER, ARTHUR D.	
BODENSCHATZ, JOHN E.	X
BORAH, DANIEL V.	
BORTON, ROBERT C.	X
BRAM, RICHARD C.	X
BRENNAN, HERBERT O.	
BROWN, HARRY W.	X
BRUCHER, JOHN M.	
BUCKLEY, LOUIS J.	X
CARLOCK, RALPH L.	
CARTER, DENNIS R.	X
CICHON, WALTER A.	
CLARK, GEORGE W.	X
COLLINS, WILLARD M.	X
COMPA, JOSEPH J.	X
CONDIT, DOUGLAS C.	
COOK, KELLY F.	
CREV, JAMES A.	
CURLEE, ROBERT L.	X
CUTHBERT, BRADLEY G.	
DAHILL, DOUGLAS E.	
DALE, CHARLES A.	
DEAN, CHARLES M.	
DEMON, DAVID S.	
DEXTER, BENNIE L.	
DINGWALL, JOHN F.	X
DODGE, EDWARD R.	X
DUNLOP, THOMAS E.	X
DUNN, MICHAEL E.	X
EGAN, JAMES T.	
EIDSMOE, NORMAN E.	X
ELLIS, WILLIAM J.	X
ENTRICAN, DAHMY D.	
ERSKINE, JACK D.	
ESTOCH, MICHAEL J.	
FINLEY, DICKIE W.	X
FISCHER, RICHARD W.	X
FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E.	X
FITZGERALD, PAUL L.	X

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
130 Last Known Alive Cases

Name	Not Yet Investigated
FOSTER, ROBERT E.	X
FOWLER, DONALD R.	X
FRANCISCO, SAN D.	
GAGE, ROBERT H.	X
GALLANT, HENRY J.	X
GERBER, DANIEL A.	
GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G.	X
GROTH, WADE L.	X
GUNN, ALAN W.	X
HAGEN, CRAIG L.	X
HALL, HARLEY H.	
HALL, WALTER L.	X
HAMILTON, JOHN S.	X
HAMILTON, ROGER D.	
HAMM, JAMES E.	
HARGROVE, OLIN J.	X
HASENBECK, PAUL A.	X
HASTINGS, STEVEN M.	X
HELD, JOHN W.	X
HESFORD, PETER D.	
HESTLE, ROOSEVELT J.	X
HODGSON, CECIL J.	X
HUNT, ROBERT W.	X
IBANEZ, DI R.	X
INNES, ROGER B.	X
JAKOVAC, JOHN A.	X
JEFFS, CLIVE G.	
JOHNSON, BRUCE G.	X
JOHNSON, WILLIAM D.	X
LAKE, CHARLES J.	
LEE, LEONARD M.	X
LEWIS, JAMES W.	
MALONE, JIMMY M.	X
MANGINO, THOMAS A.	X
MASSUCCI, MARTIN J.	
MCDONALD, KURT C.	X
MCDONNELL, JOHN T.	
MCGAR, BRIAN K.	X
MCLEAN, JAMES H.	
MILLNER, MICHAEL	X
MINS, GEORGE J.	
MITCHELL, ARCHIE E.	
MORGAN, JAMES S.	
MORRIS, GEORGE V.	

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
130 Last Known Alive Cases

Name	Not Yet Investigated
MORRISON, JOSEPH C.	
MORROW, LARRY K.	
NETHERLAND, ROGER M.	
NEWTON, CHARLES V.	
NEWTON, DONALD S.	
NIDDS, DANIEL R.	X
OWENS, FRED M.	X
PERRINE, ELTON L.	X
PETERSON, DELBERT R.	X
PETERSON, MARK A.	
PHILLIPS, ROBERT P.	
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD H.	
PLATT, ROBERT L.	
PLUMADORE, KENNETH L.	X
POTTS, LARRY F.	
PREVEDEL, CHARLES F.	
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS R.	
ROBERTSON, JOHN L.	
ROE, JERRY L.	X
ROZO, JAMES M.	
RUSSELL, PETER J.	X
SAEGAERT, DONALD R.	X
## SCHARF, CHARLES J.	
SCHMIDT, WALTER R.	
SCULL, GARY B.	
## SITTNER, RONALD N.	
SMALL, BURT C.	
SOYLAND, DAVID P.	
SPARKS, DONALD L.	
STRAIT, DOUGLAS F.	X
STROHLEIN, MADISON A.	
TATUM, LAWRENCE B.	
TAYLOR, FRED	X
TERRY, RONALD T.	X
TROMP, WILLIAM L.	
VAN BENDEGOM, JAMES L.	
VIETTI, ELEANOR A.	
WALKER, BRUCE C.	
WHEELER, EUGENE L.	
WINTERS, DAVID M.	X
WOOD, DON C.	
WORTH, JAMES F.	X
WRIGHT, THOMAS T.	
WROBLESKI, WALTER F.	

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
130 Last Known Alive Cases

Note 1:
Fate has been determined for one of the two individuals in case 0158.
Identity of individual unknown.

Note 2:
Fate has been determined for one of the individuals in case 0804 or 0805.
Identity of individual unknown.

Total Cases Not Investigated: 64 Individuals in 34 Cases

Total: 130 Individuals in 88 Cases

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
135 Discrepancy Cases

Name

ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO
ADAMS, SAMUEL
ASHLOCK, CARLOS
BABULA, ROBERT L.
BACKUS, KENNETH F.
BADOGLATI, FRANK N.
BLOOD, HENRY F.
BODENSCHATZ, JOHN E.
BORAH, DANIEL V.
BORTON, ROBERT C.
BRAM, RICHARD C.
BRENNAN, HERBERT D.
BROWN, HARRY W.
BRUCHER, JOHN M.
BUCKLEY, LOUIS J.
CARTER, DENNIS R.
CICHON, WALTER A.
COLLINS, WILLARD M.
COMPA, JOSEPH J.
CONDIT, DOUGLAS C.
COOK, DONALD G.
COOK, KELLY F.
CREW, JAMES A.
CURLER, ROBERT L.
CUTHBERT, BRADLEY G.
DAHILL, DOUGLAS E.
DALE, CHARLES A.
DELONG, JOE L.
DEMMON, DAVID S.
DEXTER, BENNIE L.
DINGWALL, JOHN F.
DODGE, EDWARD R.
DUNLOP, THOMAS E.
DUNN, MICHAEL E.
DUSING, CHARLES G.
EGAN, JAMES T.
EIDSMOE, NORMAN E.
ELLIS, WILLIAM J.
ENTRICAN, DANNY D.
ERSKINE, JACK D.
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL J.
FERGUSON, WALTER J.
FINLEY, DICKIE W.
FISCHER, RICHARD W.
FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E.
FITZGERALD, PAUL L.

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
135 Discrepancy Cases

Name

FOSTER, ROBERT E.
FOWLER, DONALD R.
FRANCISCO, SAM D.
GAGE, ROBERT H.
GALLANT, HENRY J.
GERBER, DANIEL A.
GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G.
GROTH, MADE L.
GRZYB, ROBERT H.
GUNN, ALAN W.
HAGEN, CRAIG L.
HALL, HARLEY H.
HALL, WALTER L.
HAMILTON, JOHN S.
HAMILTON, ROGER D.
HARR, JAMES E.
HAMMOND, DENNIS W.
HARGROVE, OLIN J.
HASENBECK, PAUL A.
HASTINGS, STEVEN M.
HELD, JOHN W.
HESTLE, ROOSEVELT J.
HODGSON, CECIL J.
HUNT, ROBERT W.
IBANEZ, DI R.
INNES, ROGER B.
JAKOVAC, JOHN A.
JEFFS, CLIVE G.
JOHNSON, BRUCE G.
JOHNSON, WILLIAM D.
KALIL, TANOS E.
LANE, CHARLES J.
LEE, LEONARD M.
MALONE, JIMMY M.
MANGINO, THOMAS A.
MASSUCCI, MARTIN J.
MCDONALD, KURT C.
MCDONNELL, JOHN T.
MCGAR, BRIAN K.
MCLEAN, JAMES H.
MILLNER, MICHAEL
MINS, GEORGE I.
MITCHELL, ARCHIE E.
MOORE, THOMAS
MORGAN, JAMES S.
MORRIS, GEORGE W.

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
135 Discrepancy Cases

Name

MORRISON, JOSEPH C.
MORROW, LARRY K.
NETHERLAND, ROGER M.
NEWTON, CHARLES V.
NEWTON, DONALD S.
NIDOS, DANIEL R.
NIEHOUSE, DANIEL L.
OLSEN, BETTY A.
OWENS, FRED M.
PERRINE, ELTON L.
PETERSON, DELBERT R.
PETERSON, MARK A.
PHILLIPS, ROBERT P.
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD H.
PLATT, ROBERT L.
PLUMADORE, KENNETH L.
POTTS, LARRY F.
PREVEDEL, CHARLES F.
PRIDENORE, DALLAS R.
RAY, JAMES M.
ROBERTSON, JOHN L.
ROE, JERRY L.
ROZD, JAMES M.
RUSSELL, PETER J.
SAEGAERT, DONALD R.
SCHARF, CHARLES J.
SCHRIOT, WALTER R.
SCULL, GARY B.
SITTNER, RONALD N.
SHALL, BURT C.
SOYLARD, DAVID P.
SPARKS, DONALD L.
STRAIT, DOUGLAS F.
STROHLEIN, MADISON A.
TATUM, LAWRENCE B.
TAYLOR, FRED
TERRY, RONALD T.
TROMP, WILLIAM L.
VAN BENDEGOM, JAMES L.
VIETTI, ELEANOR A.
WALKER, BRUCE C.
WHEELER, EUGENE L.
WINTERS, DAVID M.
WORTH, JAMES F.
WROBLESKY, WALTER F.

JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING
DATA PROCESSING BRANCH
135 Discrepancy Cases

Note 1:

Fate has been determined for one of the two individuals in case 0158.
Identity of individual unknown.

Note 2:

Fate has been determined for one of the individuals in case 0804 or 0805.
Identity of individual unknown.

Total: 135 Individuals in 92 Cases

CFR 3. Major General Christmas promised to provide a complete breakout by country of the names of all Southeast Asia unaccounted for which the JTF-FA maintains in their database.

Tab A lists the current 2266 Southeast Asia unaccounted for individuals maintained in JTF-FA database sorted by country.

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(North Vietnam)

Name

ABRAMS, LEWIS HERBERT
ADAMS, LEE AARON
ADAMS, STEVE HAROLD
ALBERTON, BOBBY JOE
ALFRED, GERALD OAK JR
ALGAARD, HAROLD LOWELL
ALLARD, MICHAEL JOHN
ALLEN, THOMAS RAY
ALLINSON, DAVID JAY
ALM, RICHARD ANDREW
ANDERSON, GREGORY LEE
ANDERSON, ROBERT DALE
ANDERSON, WARREN LEROY
ANGSTADT, RALPH HAROLD
APODACA, VICTOR JOE JR
APPLEBY, IVAN DALE
ARNOLD, WILLIAM TAMM
ASHALL, ALAN FREDERICK
AUSTIN, CARL BENJAMIN
AUSTIN, CHARLES DAVID
AUSTIN, ELLIS ERNEST
AUSTIN, JOSEPH CLAIR
AVERY, ROBERT DOUGLAS
BACIK, VLADIMIR HENRY
BACUS, KENNETH FRANK
BADLEY, JAMES LINDSAY
BAILEY, JOHN EDWARD
BALCOM, RALPH CAROL
BANCROFT, WILLIAM WARNER JR
BARBER, ROBERT FRANKLIN
BARBER, THOMAS DAVID
BARE, WILLIAM ORLAN
BARR, JOHN FREDERICK
BAUDER, JAMES REGINALD
BECK, TERRY LEE
BEENE, JAMES ALVIN
BEGLEY, BURRIS NELSON
BELKNAP, HARRY JOHN
BELL, RICHARD WILLIAM
BENNETT, THOMAS WARING JR
BENNETT, WILLIAM GEORGE
BENSON, LEE DAVID
BERESIK, EUGENE PAUL
BERGEVIN, CHARLES LESLIE
BEROLD, STEVEN NEIL
BIDWELL, BARRY ALAN
BISZ, RALPH CAMPION
BOGGS, PASCHAL GLENN
BOIS, CLAUDE RONALD ALAN

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(North Vietnam)

Name

BOLES, WARREN WILLIAM
BOOTH, JAMES ERVIN
BORDEN, MURRAY LYMAN
BOSSIO, GALILEO FRED
BOSTON, LEO SIDNEY
BOWER, JOSEPH EDWARD
BOWLES, DWIGHT POLLARD
BOWMAN, MICHAEL LEE
BRANCH, JAMES ALVIN
BRASHER, JIMMY MAC
BRAZIL, RICHARD
BRENNAN, HERBERT OWEN
BRENNING, RICHARD DAVID
BRETT, ROBERT ARTHUR JR
BRICE, ERIC PARKER
BROMS, EDWARD JAMES JR
BROWN, FRANK MONROE JR
BROWN, ROBERT MACK
BROWN, THOMAS EDWARD
BRUCH, DONALD WILLIAM JR
BRUCHER, JOHN MARTIN
BUCKLEY, VICTOR PATRICK
BUELL, KENNETH RICHARD
BULLARD, WILLIAM HARRY
BUNDY, NORMAN LEE
BUSH, JOHN ROBERT
BUSH, ROBERT IRA
BUSHNELL, BRIAN LEE
CALLAHAN, DAVID FRANCIS JR
CAMERON, VIRGIL KING
CARLSON, PAUL VICTOR
CARLTON, JAMES EDMUND JR
CARTER, GERALD LYNN
CARTER, WILLIAM THOMAS
CARTWRIGHT, BILLIE JACK
CARTWRIGHT, PATRICK GREGORY
CASEY, DONALD FRANCIS
CASSELL, ROBIN BERN
CAUSEY, JOHN BERNARD
CAYCE, JOHN DAVID
CHAN, PETER MUN
CHAPMAN, RODNEY MAX
CHARVET, PAUL CLAUDE
CHERRY, ALLEN SHELTON
CHIPMAN, RALPH JIM
CHRISTENSEN, JOHN MICHAEL
CHRISTENSEN, WILLIAM MURREY
CHRISTOPHERSEN, KEITH ALLEN
CLAFLIN, RICHARD AMES

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(North Vietnam)

Name

CLAPPER, GEAN PRESTON
CLARK, LAWRENCE (NMN)
CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP
CLARK, ROBERT ALAN
CLAYTON, CHARLES PETER
CLEARY, PETER MCARTHUR
CLEM, THOMAS DEAN
CLYDESDALE, CHARLES FREDRICK
COATES, DONALD L
COLLAMORE, ALLAN PHILLIP JR
COLTMAN, WILLIAM CLARE
COMPTON, FRANK RAY
CONDIT, DOUGLAS CRAIG
CONFER, MICHAEL STEELE
CONLEY, EUGENE OGDEN
CONNER, LORENZA (NMN)
COOK, DENNIS PHILLIP
COOK, KELLY FRANCIS
COOLEY, DAVID LEO
COOLEY, ORVILLE DALE
COONS, HENRY ALBERT
COOPER, RICHARD WALLER JR.
COOPER, WILLIAM EARL
CORBITT, GILLAND WALES
CORNELIUS, JOHNNIE CLAYTON
CRAIN, CARROLL OWEN JR
CREW, JAMES ALLEN
CREWS, JOHN HUNTER III
CROPPER, CURTIS HENRY
CROSBY, FREDERICK PETER
CROSSMAN, GREGORY JOHN
CROSSON, GERALD JOSEPH JR.
CUNNINGHAM, CAREY ALLEN
CURRY, KEITH ROYAL WILSON
CUSHMAN, CLIFTON EMMET
CUTBERT, BRADLEY GENE
DARCY, EDWARD JOSEPH
DAVIES, JOSEPH EDWIN
DAVIS, BRENT EDEN
DAVIS, DONALD VANCE
DAVIS, FRANCIS JOHN
DAYAO, ROLANDO CUEVAS
DEAN, DONALD CHESTER
DEBLASIO, RAYMOND VINCENT JR
DENNISON, JAMES RICHARD
DERRICKSON, THOMAS GARDNER II
DEUSO, CARROLL JOSEPH
DI TOMMASO, ROBERT JOSEPH
DICKSON, EDWARD ANDREW

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(North Vietnam)

Name

DILGER, HERBERT HUGH
DION, LAURENT NORBERT
DOOLEY, JAMES EDWARD
DOUGHTIE, CARL LOUIS
DOVE, JACK PARIS SR
DOWNING, DONALD WILLIAM
DRAEGER, WALTER FRANK JR
DUENSING, JAMES ALLYN
DUNCAN, ROBERT RAY
DUNLOP, THOMAS EARL
DUNN, MICHAEL EDWARD
DYCKOWSKI, ROBERT RAYMOND
EARLL, DAVID JOHN
EARNEST, CHARLES "M"
EATON, CURTIS ABBOT
ECKLEY, WAYNE ALVIN
EDMONDSON, WILLIAM ROTHEROCK
EDWARDS, HARRY SANFORD JR
EGGER, JOHN CULBERTSON JR
EIDSMOE, NORMAN EDWARD
ELLERD, CARL JOSEPH
ELLIOT, ROBERT MALCOM
ELLISON, JOHN COOLEY
EMRICH, ROGER GENE
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL JOHN
EVERT, LAWRENCE GERARD
FELDBAUS, JOHN ANTHONY
FENELEY, FRANCIS JAMES
FIESHEL, CLIFFORD WAYNE
FISHER, DONALD ELLIS
FLANIGAN, JOHN MORLEE
FOBAIR, ROSCOE HENRY
FORMAN, WILLIAM STANNARD
FORRESTER, RONALD WAYNE
FOULKS, RALPH EUGENE JR
FOWLER, JAMES ALAN
FOWLER, JAMES JEWEL
FOWLER, ROY GILLMAN
FRANCISCO, SAN DEWAYNE
FRANLEY, WILLIAM DAVID
FREDERICK, PETER JOSEPH
FRENVEA, EDMUND HENRY
FROSIO, ROBERT CLARENCE
FRYER, CHARLES WIGGER
FULLER, WILLIAM OTIS
FULLERTON, FRANK EUGENE
GALVIN, RONALD EDMOND
GAN, LEONARDO MEDINA
GERSTEL, DONALD ARTHUR

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Bright-Light Active Cases
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Name

GIERAK, GEORGE GREGORY JR
GILCHRIST, ROBERT MICHAEL
GIST, TOMMY EMERSON
GLANVILLE, JOHN TURNER JR
GOEDEN, GENE WILLIAM
GOETSCH, THOMAS AUGUST
GOLD, EDWARD FRANK
GOLLANON, GENE RAYMOND
GOODMAN, RUSSELL CLEMENSEN
GOODWIN, CHARLES BERNARD
GORE, PAUL EDWIN
GORSUCH, WILLIAM DALE
GOSEN, LAWRENCE DEAN
GRAHAM, DENNIS LEE
GRAUERT, HANS HERBERT
GRAVES, RICHARD CAMPBELL
GRAY, HAROLD EDWIN JR
GRAYSON, WILLIAM RONALD
GREEN, DONALD GEORGE
GREEN, FRANK CLIFFORD JR
GREGORY, PAUL ANTHONY
GREILING, DAVID SCOTT
GRENEBRACH, EARL WILFRED JR
GRIFFITH, JOHN GARY
GRUBB, PETER ARTHUR
HAAS, LEON FREDERICK
HACKETT, HARLEY BENJAMIN III
HALL, DONALD JOE
HALL, JAMES WAYNE
HAMILTON, EUGENE DAVID
HAMILTON, JOHN SMITH
HANLEY, TERENCE HIGGINS
HANSON, THOMAS PATTERSON
HARDY, JOHN KAY JR
HARRIS, JEFFREY LYNDOL
HARRISON, DONALD LEE
HAYLAND, ROY ELBERT
HAWKINS, EDGAR LEE
HEEP, WILLIAM ARTHUR
HEISKELL, LUCIUS LAMAR
HELLBACH, HAROLD JAMES
HENRY, DAVID ALAN
HENTS, RICHARD JAY
HERRIN, HENRY HOWARD JR
HERROLD, NED RAYMOND
HESSON, ROBERT CHARLES
HESTLE, ROOSEVELT JR
HICKS, TERRAIN DINSMORE
HILL, RAYFORD JEROME

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Name

HILL, ROBERT LAVERNE
HILTON, ROBERT LARIE
HODGES, DAVID LAWTON
HOGAN, JERRY FRANKS
HOLDEN, ROBERT EUGENE
HOLLEY, TILDEN STEWART
HOLMAN, GERALD ALLAN
HOLMES, FREDERICK LEE
HOLMES, LESTER EVAN
HOLT, ROBERT ALAN
HOM, CHARLES DAVID
HOMUTH, RICHARD WENDAL
HOOPER, EARL PEARSON JR.
HOPE, GARY DOUGLAS
HORCHAR, ANDREW ANTHONY JR
HOSKINSON, ROBERT EUGENE
HUARD, JAMES LINTON
HUBBS, DONALD RICHARD
HUIE, LITCHFIELD PATTERSON
HUME, KENNETH EDWARD
HUMPHREY, GALEN F
HUNT, JAMES 'D'
HYNDS, WALLACE GOURLEY JR.
IHNES, ROGER BURNS
JACOBS, EDWARD JAMES JR
JARVIS, JEREMY MICHAEL
JEFFERSON, JAMES HILTON
JEROME, STANLEY HILTON
JEWELL, EUGENE WILLARD
JOHNSON, DALE ALONZO
JONES, JAMES GRADEY
JONES, ORVIN CLARENCE JR
KARGER, BARRY EDWIN
KEARNS, JOSEPH THOMAS JR
KELLER, JACK ELMER
KENNEDY, DONALD RICHARD
KEMP, CLAYTON CHARLES JR
KETTERER, JAMES ALAN
KIBBEY, RICHARD ABBOTT
KILCULLEN, THOMAS MICHAEL
KILPATRICK, LARRY RONALD
KINSEY, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR
KING, DONALD LEWIS
KING, RONALD RUYAN
KINKADE, WILLIAM LOUIS
KLEMM, DONALD MARTIN
KLEND, DEAN ALBERT
KLINE, ROBERT EARL
KLUGG, JOSEPH RUSSELL

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Name

KHABB, KENNETH KEITH JR
KNAPP, FREDRIC WOODROW
KNAPP, HERMAN LUDWIG
KNIGHT, LARRY COLEMAN
KNOCH, CHARLES ALLEN
KOENIG, EDWIN LEE
KOHLER, DELVIN LEE
KOLLMAN, GLENN EDWARD
KOSKO, WALTER (NON)
KOSLOSKY, HOWARD MARK
KRAHER, DAVID STANLEY
KRECH, MELVIN THOMAS
KROCHENHOEK, JEFFREY MARTIN
KRUSY, PETER HERMAN
LADENWIG, MELVIN EARL
LAKAYE, JAMES DAVID
LANSTON, BENNIE RICHARD
LANE, CHARLES (NON) JR
LANNON, RICHARD CLIVE
LAVOO, JOHN ALLEN
LAWRENCE, BRUCE EDWARD
LAWS, RICHARD LEE
LEAVER, JOHN MURRAY JR
LEE, LEONARD MURRAY
LEESER, LEONARD CHARLES
LEET, DAVID LEVERETT
LESTON, DAREL DEAN
LEONARD, ROBERT BRUCE
LEONOR, LEONARDO CAPISTRANO
LENNER, IRVIN STEWART
LESTER, RODERICK BARNUM
LEITCHWORTH, EDWARD NORMAN
LEWIS, LARRY GENE
LILLUND, WILLIAM ALLAN
LINDAHL, JOHN CARL
LINDSEY, MARVIN NELSON
LIVINGSTON, RICHARD ALLEN
LOGAN, JACOB DRUMMOND
LOHREY, HUBERT BRADFORD
LONG, JOHN HENRY SOTHORON
LUKENBACH, MAX DUANE
LUXER, RUSSELL BURE
LUNSFORD, HERBERT LAMAR
LYNN, DOYLE WILMER
MACCANN, HENRY ELMER
MADDOX, MOTLEY GWYN
MADSEN, MARLOW ERLING
MAGNUSSON, JAMES A JR
MAPE, JOHN CLEMENT

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Name

MARTIN, CHARLES WELDON
MARKER, MICHAEL WAYNE
MARTIN, DAVID EARL
MARTIN, DUANE WHITNEY
MARTIN, JOHN BERNARD II
MARTIN, JOHN MURRAY
MARTIN, SAMMY ARTHUR
MARVIN, ROBERT CLARENCE
MASSUCCI, MARTIN JOHN
MATEJA, ALAN PAUL
MAYER, RODERICK LEWIS
MCATTEE, THOMAS JOSEPH
MCBRIDE, EARL PAUL
MC CARTY, JAMES LOW
MC CORMICK, MICHAEL TIMOTHY
MCCOY, MERIL OLEN JR
MC CARY, JACK (WOM)
MCCUBBIN, GLENN DEWAYNE
MCDANIEL, MORRIS LAROSCO JR
MCDONALD, EMMETT RAYMOND
MCDONALD, JOSEPH WILLIAM
MCDONOUGH, JOHN RICHARD
MCELHARON, MICHAEL OWEN
MCELVAINE, JAMES RICHARD
MCGARVEY, JAMES MAURICE
MCKINLEY, GERALD WAYNE
MCLAUGHLIN, ARTHUR VINCENT
MCPHERSON, EVERETT ALVIN
MCRAE, DAVID EDWARD
MEADOWS, EUGENE THOMAS
MELLOR, FREDRIC MOORE
METTLER, CHARLES DAVID
MEYERS, ROGER ALLEN
MICHALSEN, WILLIAM EMIL JR
MIDNIGHT, FRANCIS BARNES
MILKIN, RICHARD MERSHON III
MILLER, CARL DEAN
MILLER, CARLETON PIERCE JR
MILLER, ROBERT LESTER
MILLS, JAMES BURTON
MIMS, GEORGE IVISON JR
MITCHELL, ALBERT COOK
MITCHELL, GILBERT LOUIS
MONGILARDI, PETER NORM JR
MONTGOMERY, RONALD WAYNE
MOORE, HERBERT WILLIAM JR
MOORE, WILLIAM RAY
MORAN, RICHARD ALLAN
MORGAN, JAMES SHEPPARD

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Bright-Light Active Cases
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Name

MORRISON, JOSEPH CASTLEMAN
MORRISSEY, ROBERT DAVID
MOSER, PAUL KIERSTEAD
MOSSMAN, HARRY SEEBER
MOSSMAN, JOE RUSSELL
MOWREY, RICHARD LYNN
MUREN, THOMAS RICHARD
MURRAY, JOSEPH VAUGHN
NEISLAR, DAVID PHILLIP
NELLANS, WILLIAM LEE
NETHERLAND, ROGER MORTON
NEWELL, MICHAEL THOMAS
NICHOLS, HUBERT CAMPBELL JR
NICKERSON, WILLIAM BREWSTER
NIGHTINGALE, RANDALL JOHN
NOBERT, CRAIG ROLAND
NORDAHL, LEE EDWARD
NYMAN, LAWRENCE FREDERICK
NYSTROM, BRUCE AUGUST
ODONNELL, SAMUEL JR
OGRADY, JOHN FRANCIS
OLDS, ERNEST ARTHUR JR.
OLMSTEAD, STANLEY EDWARD
ORELL, QUINLAN ROBERTS
OSBORNE, EDWIN NELMS JR.
OSBORNE, RODNEY DEE
OVERLOCK, JOHN FRANCIS
OWEN, CLYDE CHILTON
OWENS, JOY LEONARD
PABST, EUGENE MATTHEW
PACKARD, RONALD LYLE
PAGE, ALBERT LINWOOD JR
PAGE, GORDON LEE
PAINTER, JOHN ROBERT JR
PALENSCAR, ALEXANDER JOHN III
PALMGREN, EDWIN DAVID
PARCELS, REX LEWIS JR
PARISH, CHARLES CARROLL
PARKER, CHARLES LESLIE JR
PARKER, FRANK CLAVELUX III
PARKER, JOHN JACKSON
PARKER, WOODROW WILSON II
PARSONS, DON BROWN JR
PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY
PAWLISH, GEORGE FRANCIS
PEACE, JOHN DARLINGTON III
PEACOCK, JOHN ROBERT II
PENDER, ORLAND JAMES JR
PERISHO, GORDON SAMUEL

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by Country
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Name

PERRINE, ELTON LAWRENCE
PERRY, RANDOLPH ALLEN JR
PETERSON, DENNIS WILLIAM
PETTIS, THOMAS EDWIN
PPAFFMANN, CHARLES BROOKS
PIERSANTI, ANTHONY JULIUS JR
PILKINGTON, THOMAS HOLT
PITMAN, PETER POTTER
PITMAN, ROBERT EDWARD
PITZEN, JOHN RUSSELL
FLOWMAN, JAMES EDWIN
POGREBA, DEAN ANDREW
POOLE, CHARLIE SHERMAN
POOR, RUSSEL ARDEN
PRENTICE, KENNETH MORTON
PREVOST, ALBERT MICHAEL
PRICE, WILLIAM MARSHALL
PRUDHOMME, JOHN DOUGLAS
FRUETT, WILLIAM DAVID
RACKLEY, INEAR WILLIAM JR
RAGLAND, DAYTON W
RALSTON, FRANK DELZELL III
RAMSAY, CHARLES JAMES
RAMSDEN, GERALD LEE
RAYMOND, PAUL DARWIN
READ, CHARLES H W JR
REEDY, WILLIAM HENRY JR
REINECKE, WAYNE CONRAD
REITMANN, THOMAS EDWARD
REKROAD, RONALD REVEL
RICH, RICHARD NIM
RICKEL, DAVID J (IO)
RIORDAN, JOHN MICHAEL
ROARK, JAMES DAVID
ROBERTS, GERALD RAY
ROBERTSON, JOHN LEIGHTON
ROCKETT, ALTON CRAIG JR
ROENRICH, RONALD 'L'
ROGERS, BILLY LEE
ROSS, JOSEPH SHAW
RUPINSKI, BERNARD FRANCIS
SAAVEDRA, ROBERT (NMN)
SALAZAR, FIDEL GARCIA
SALE, HAROLD REEVES JR
SANSONE, JAMES JOSEPH
SAUSE, BERNARD JACOB JR
SCHANF, CHARLES JOSEPH
SCHEURICH, THOMAS EDWIN
SCHIMMELS, EDDIE RAY

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
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Name

SCHMITTOW, EUREKA LAVERN
SCHRODERER, ERIC JOHN
SCHROEFFNER, LEONARD JOHN
SCHROEFFEL, THOMAS ANTHONY
SCHULER, ROBERT HARRY JR.
SCOTT, MARTIN RONALD
SCUNCIO, VINCENT ANTHONY
SEAGRAVES, MELVIN DOUGLAS
SEARFUS, WILLIAM HENRY
SENNETT, ROBERT RUSSELL
SETTERQUIST, FRANCIS LESLIE
SEUELL, JOHN WAYNE
SHAW, EDWARD BRENDAN
SHEA, JAMES PATRICK
SHINE, ANTHONY CAMERON
SHINGLEDECKER, ARMON D
SHINN, WILLIAM CHARLES
SHONECK, JOHN REGINALD
SHORACK, THEODORE JAMES JR.
SHUMWAY, GEOFFREY RAYMOND
SILVA, CLAUDE ARNOLD
SILVER, EDWARD DEAN
SITEK, THOMAS WALTER
SITTNER, RONALD NICKOLIS
SMITH, DEAN (NMN) JR
SMITH, GEORGE CRAIG
SMITH, HAROLD VICTOR
SMITH, HOWARD HORTON
SMITH, ROBERT NORMAN
SOUCY, RONALD PHILIP SR
SPILMAN, DYKE AUGUSTUS
SPINELLI, DOMENICK ANTHONY
SPRINGSTON, THEODORE JR
SQUIRE, BOYD EDWIN
ST PIERRE, DEAN PAUL
STEEN, MARTIN WILLIAM
STEGMAN, THOMAS
STEIMER, THOMAS JACK
STEPHENSON, RICHARD CHARLES
STEWART, PETER JOSEPH
STEWART, ROBERT ALLAN
STICKNEY, PHILLIP JOSEPH
STINE, JOSEPH HILLARD
STODDARD, CLARENCE WILLIAM JR
STONEBRAKER, KENNETH ARNOLD
STRAWN, JOHN THOMAS
STRONG, HENRY BOOKER JR
STROVEN, WILLIAM HARRY
STUART, JOHN FRANKLIN

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(North Vietnam)

Name

SULLIVAN, MARTIN JOSEPH
SUTTON, WILLIAM CARL
SWANSON, JOHN WILLARD JR
SWIGART, PAUL EUGENE JR
SEYLLER, EDWARD PHILIP
TALKEN, GEORGE FRANCIS
TAPP, JOHN BETHEL
TATUM, LAWRENCE BYRON
TAYLOR, EDD DAVID
TAYLOR, EDMUND BATTELLE JR
TEMLIN, ERWIN BENARD 'SKIP'
TERRELL, KEVIN LEE
THOMAS, DARWIN JOEL
THOMAS, HARRY EUGENE
THOMPSON, DAVID MATHEN
THOMPSON, DONALD EARL
THOMPSON, WILLIAM JAMES
THOMPSON, WILLIAM JOSEPH
TIDENMAN, JOHN MARK
TIFFIN, RAINFORD (RNN)
TOWNSEND, FRANCIS WAYNE
TRITT, JAMES FRANCIS
TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE
TROWBRIDGE, DUSTIN COWLES
TUCKER, JAMES HALE
TUNNELL, JOHN WALLACE
TUROSE, MICHAEL STEPHEN
TYE, MICHAEL JAMES
TYLER, GEORGE EDWARD
UNDERWOOD, PAUL GERARD
VAN BUREN, GERALD GORDON
VAUGHAN, ROBERT REDDINGTON
VIADO, REYNALDO ROCILLO
VINSON, BOBBY GENE
VLAMKOS, PETER GEORGE
VOGT, LEONARD FREDERICK JR
WALLACE, CHARLES FRANKLIN
WALLACE, HOBART MCKINLEY JR
WARD, RONALD JACK
WEIMORTS, ROBERT FRANKLIN
WELCH, ROBERT JOHN
WENAS, GORDON JAMES
WESTWOOD, NORMAN PHILIP JR
WHITTEKER, RICHARD LEE
WICKHAM, DAVID WALLACE II
WIEHR, RICHARD DANIEL
WILES, MARVIN BENJAMIN CHRIST
WILKE, ROBERT FREDERICK
WILKINS, GEORGE HENRY

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
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Name

WILLIAMS, JAMES RANDALL
WILLIAMS, ROBERT CYRIL
WOLOSZYK, DONALD JOSEPH
WOOD, PATRICK HARDY
WOOD, REX STEWART
WOOD, WALTER SUTTON
WOODS, ROBERT FRANCIS
WOODWORTH, SAMUEL ALEXANDER
WORCESTER, JOHN BOWERS
WOZNIAK, FREDRICK JOSEPH
WRIGHT, DAVID IRVIN
WRIGHT, GARY GENE
ZAVOCKY, JAMES JOHN
ZENPEL, RONALD LEE
ZERBE, MICHAEL RICHARD
ZORN, THOMAS ONEAL JR

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(South Vietnam)

Name

ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO
ADAMS, JOHN ROBERT
ADAMS, OLEY NEAL
ADAMS, SAMUEL (NMN)
ADKINS, CHARLES LEROY
ADRIAN, JOSEPH DANIEL
AHLMEYER, HEINZ JR
ALDRICH, LAWRENCE LEE
ALFORD, TERRY LANIER
ALLARD, RICHARD MICHAEL
ALLEN, MERLIN RAYE
ALLEY, JAMES HAROLD
ALLGOOD, FRANKIE EUGENE
ALLOWAY, CLYDE DOUGLAS
ALTISER, ALBERT HAROLD
ALWAN, HAROLD JOSEPH
AMESBURY, HARRY ARLO JR
AMOS, THOMAS HUGH
ANDERSON, THOMAS EDWARD
ANDREWS, STUART MERRILL
ANGELL, MARSHALL JOSEPH
ANSELMO, WILLIAM FRANK
ANSPACH, ROBERT ALLEN
ARMOND, ROBERT LAURENCE
ASHBY, DONALD ROBERTS SR
ASHLOCK, CARLOS
ASHUSSEN, GLENN EDWARD
ASTON, JAY STEVEN
AUXIER, JERRY EDWARD
AVERY, ALLEN JONES
AVOLESE, PAUL ANDREW
AVORE, MALCOLM ARTHUR
AYERS, DARRELL EUGENE
AYRES, GERALD FRANCIS
BABULA, ROBERT LEO
BADOGLATI, FRANK NEIL
BAILEY, JOHN H
BAILON, RUBEN
BARNES, CHARLES RONALD
BARTOCCI, JOHN EUGENE
BATES, PAUL JENNINGS JR
BATT, MICHAEL LERO
BEACH, ARTHUR JAMES
BEALS, CHARLES ELBERT
BECK, EDWARD EUGENE JR
BECKWITH, HARRY MEDFORD III
BEECHER, QUENTIN RIPPETOE
BELCHER, ROBERT ARTHUR
BENNEFELD, STEVEN HENRY

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(South Vietnam)

Name

BENNETT, HAROLD GEORGE
BENNETT, ROBERT ELWOOD III
BENTON, GREGORY REA JR
BENTON, JAMES A
BERDAHL, DAVID DONALD
BERG, BRUCE ALLAN
BERG, GEORGE PHILLIP
BERRY, JOHN ALVIN
BERUBE, KENNETH ALLEN
BEYER, THOMAS JOHN
BIBBS, WAYNE (NMN)
BIFOLCHI, CHARLES LAWRENCE
BILLIFF, NORMAN KARL
BINGHAM, KLAUS YRURGAN
BIRCHIN, JAMES DOUGLAS
BIRD, LEONARD ADRIAN
BISCALUZ, ROBERT LYNN
BISHOP, EDWARD JAMES JR
BITTENBENDER, DAVID FRITZ
BIVENS, HERNDON ARRINGTON
BIXEL, MICHAEL SARGENT
BLACKMAN, THOMAS JOSEPH
BLANKENSHIP, CHARLES HERMAN
BLASSIE, MICHAEL JOSEPH
BLODGETT, DOUGLAS RANDOLPH
BLOOD, HENRY FLORENTINE
BLOOM, DARL RUSSELL
BLOOM, RICHARD MCAULIFFE
BOBE, RAYMOND EDWARD
BODENSCHATT, JOHN EUGENE JR
BOHLIG, JAMES RICHARD
BOHLSCHIED, CURTIS RICHARD
BOLTE, WAYNE LOUIS
BOLTZE, BRUCE EDWARD
BOND, RONALD DALE
BOOTH, GARY PRESTON
BOOZE, DELMAR GEORGE
BORAN, DANIEL VERNOR JR
BORS, JOSEPH CHESTER
BORTON, ROBERT CURTIS JR
BOSSMAN, PETER ROBERT
BOWER, IRVIN LESTER JR
BOWERS, RICHARD LEE
BOWMAN, FRANK (NMN)
BOYANOWSKI, JOHN GORDON
BRADSHAW, ROBERT SAMUEL III
BRAM, RICHARD CRAIG
BREEDING, MICHAEL HUGH
BREINER, STEPHEN E

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(South Vietnam)

Name

BREMNER, DWIGHT AMOS
BRIDGES, JERRY GLEN
BRIDGES, PHILIP WAYNE
BRIGGS, RONALD DANIEL
BRIGHAM, ALBERT
BROOKS, JOHN HENRY RALPH
BROWN, EDWARD DEAN JR
BROWN, HARRY WILLIS
BROWN, JAMES AUSTON
BROWN, JAMES WILLIAM
BROWN, WAYNE GORDEN II
BROWN, WILBUR RONALD
BROWNLEE, ROBERT WALLACE JR
BUCHER, BERNARD LUDWIG
BUCKLEY, LOUIS JR (NMN)
BUERK, WILLIAM CARL
BULLOCK, LARRY ALAN
BUND, DOUGLAS GLENN
BUNGESS, JOHN LAWRENCE
BURKE, MICHAEL JOHN
BURNETT, DONALD FREDERICK
BURNHAM, DONALD DAWSON
BURNHAM, MASON IRWIN
BURNS, FREDERICK JOHN
BURNIS, DONALD DEANE JR
BUSH, ELBERT WAYNE
BUTLER, DEWEY RENE
BUTLER, JAMES EDWARD
BYARS, EARNEST RAY
BYRD, HUGH MCNEIL JR
CADWELL, ANTHONY BLAKE
CAFFARELLI, CHARLES JOSEPH
CAIRNS, ROBERT ALEXANDER
CALDWELL, FLOYD DEAN
CALHOUN, JOHNNY C
CALL, JOHN HENRY III
CALLANAN, RICHARD JOSEPH
CALLIES, TOMMY LEON
CALLOWAY, PORTER EARL
CAMUP, FRANKLIN BARLEE JR
CARLSON, JOHN WERNER
CARTER, DENNIS RAY
CARTER, GEORGE WILLIAMS
CARTER, JAMES DEVRAIN
CARTER, JAMES LOUIS
CARVER, HARRY FRANKLIN
CASTRO, REINALDO A
CAVENDER, JIM RAY
CESTARE, JOSEPH A

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
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Name

CHAMPION, JAMES ALBERT
CHANDLER, ANTHONY GORDON
CHANNEY, ARTHUR FLETCHER
CHAPA, ARMANDO JR
CHAPMAN, PETER HAYDEN II
CHAVIRA, STEPHEN (NMN)
CHOMEL, CHARLES DENNIS
CHOMYK, WILLIAM (NMN)
CHRISTENSEN, ALLEN DUANE
CHRISTIANSEN, EUGENE FRANCIS
CHRISTIE, DENNIS RAY
CICHON, WALTER ALAN
CLACK, CECIL JAMES
CLARK, JERRY PROSPER
CLARK, STEPHEN WILLIAM
CLAY, WILLIAM CLIFTON III
CLINE, CURTIS ROY
CLINTON, DEAN EDDIE
COALSTON, ECHOL WAYNE JR
COBBS, RALPH BURTON
COCHEO, RICHARD H
COCHRAN, ISOM CARTER JR
CODY, HOWARD RUDOLPH
COEN, HARRY BOB
COLE, RICHARD MILTON JR
COLEMAN, JIMMY LEE
COLLAZO, RAPHAEL LORENZO
COLLETTE, CURTIS DAVID
COLLINS, ARNOLD
COLLINS, THEOTHIS
COLLINS, WILLARD MARION
COLOMBO, GARY LEWIS
COMER, HOWARD BRISBANE JR
COMPA, JOSEPH JAMES JR
CONDIT, WILLIAM HOWARD JR.
CONDREY, GEORGE THOMAS III
CONGER, JOHN EDWARD JR
CONLON, JOHN FRANCIS III
CONNER, EDWIN RAY
CONNOR, CHARLES RICHARD
CONSOLVO, JOHN WADSWORTH JR
CONWAY, JAMES BENNETT
COOK, DONALD GILBERT
COOK, GLENN RICHARD
COOK, JOSEPH FRANCIS
COOK, WILLIAM RICHARD
COOKE, CALVIN COOLIDGE JR.
COOPER, DANIEL DEAN
CORDOVA, ROBERT JAMES

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Name

CORFIELD, STAN LEROY
CORLE, JOHN THOMAS
CORONA, JOEL (NMN)
COTA, ERNEST KENO
CRAMER, DONALD MARTIN
CRAVEN, ANDREW JOHNSON
CREAKER, JAMES EDWARD JR
CROCKETT, WILLIAM JAMES
CRODY, KENNETH LLOYD
CROOK, ELLIOTT (NMN)
CROSBY, BRUCE ALLEN JR
CROSBY, HERBERT CHARLES
CROSBY, RICHARD ALEXANDER
CROSS, ARIEL LINDLEY
CROKDALE, JACK LEE II
CRUMH, WILLIAM JOSEPH
CRUZ, RAPHAEL (NMN)
CUDLIKE, CHARLES JOSEPH
CUNNINGHAM, KENNETH LEROY
CURLEE, ROBERT LEE JR
CUTLER, FRED CLAY JR.
CEERWIEC, RAYMOND GEORGE
CEERWONEA, PAUL STEVEN
DAHILL, DOUGLAS EDWARD
DALE, CHARLES ALVA
DALLAS, RICHARD HOWARD
DANIELSON, MARK GILES
DAVIS, GENE EDMOND
DAWES, JOHN JAMES
DAWSON, DANIEL GEORGE
DAWSON, JAMES VERNON
DAY, DENNIS IRVIN
DAYTON, JAMES LESLIE
DE HERRERA, BENJAMIN DAVID
DEANE, WILLIAM LAWRENCE
DECAIRE, JACK LEONARD
DEERE, DONALD THORPE
DEGHAN, JERRY LAWRENCE
DEICHELHANN, SAMUEL MACKALL
DEITSCH, CHARLES EDWARD
DELEIDI, RICHARD AUGUSTINE
DELONG, JOE LYNN
DEMOM, DAVID STANLEY
DEMPSEY, JACK ISHUM
DENSEY, WALTER EDWARD JR
DENNIS, WILLIAM ROY
DENTON, MANUEL REYES
DERBY, PAUL DAVID
DESOTO, ERNEST LEO

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Name

DEWBERRY, JERRY DON
DEKTER, BENNIE LEE
DIBBLE, MORRIS FREDERICK
DILLON, DAVID ANDREW
DINGWALL, JOHN FRANCIS
DIXON, DAVID LLOYD
DODGE, EDWARD RAY
DOLAN, EDWARD VINCENT
DOLAN, THOMAS ALBERT
DONOVAN, LEROY MELVIN
DORITT, RICHARD CLAIR
DOUGLAS, THOMAS EVAN
DRIVER, DALLAS ALAN
DUBBELD, ORIE JOHN JR
DUCAT, PHILLIP ALLEN
DUFFY, JOHN EVERETT
DUKE, CHARLES ROSS JR
DUNCAN, JAMES EDWARD
DUNN, RICHARD EDWARD
DUSING, CHARLES GALE
DUVALL, DEAN ARNOLD
DYER, BLENN COLBY
EADS, DENNIS KEITH
EARLE, JOHN STILES
EBY, ROBERT GINO
ECKLUND, ARTHUR GENE
EDWARDS, HARRY JEROME
EGAN, JAMES THOMAS JR
EHRlich, DENNIS MICHAEL
EISENBERGER, GEORGE JOE BUCKY
EISENBRAND, WILLIAM FORBES
ELLEN, WADE LYNN
ELLIOTT, ANDREW JOHN
ELLIOTT, JERRY WILLIAM
ELLIS, BILLY JOE
ELLIS, RANDALL SHELLEY
ELLIS, WILLIAM JR (NMN)
ENGLANDER, LAWRENCE JESSE
ENTRICHAN, DANNY DAY
ERICKSON, DAVID WAYNE
ERSKINE, JACK DOUGLAS
ESCOBEDO, JULIAN JR
EVANCHO, RICHARD
EVANS, BILLY KENNEDY JR
EVANS, CLEVELAND JR
EVELAND, MICKEY EUGENE
FARLOW, CRAIG LEE
FARRIS, WILLIAM FARRELL
FERGUSON, WALTER JR (NMN)

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Name

FICKLER, EDWIN JAMES
FINGER, SANFORD IRA
FINKLEY, DICKIE WAINE
FISCHER, JOHN RICHARD
FISCHER, RICHARD WILLIAM
FITZGERALD, JOSEPH EDWARD
FITZGERALD, PAUL LAWRENCE JR
FLANAGAN, SHERMAN EDWARD JR
FLEMING, HORACE HIGLEY III
FOLEY, JOHN JOSEPH III
FORD, EDWARD (NMN)
FOSTER, HARVIN LEE
FOSTER, ROBERT EUGENE
FOWLER, DONALD RANDALL
FRANKS, DWIGHT GLENN
FRANKS, IAN JACK
FRANSEN, ALBERT MERK JR
FRAIER, PAUL REID
FREDERICK, DAVID ADDISON
FRENG, STANLEY JON
FRINK, JOHN WESLEY
FRITSCH, THOMAS WILLIAM
GAGE, ROBERT HUGH
GALLAGHER, DONALD LOUIS
GALLANT, HENRY JOSEPH
GARRETT, JIMMY RAY
GARDNER, GLENN VIRGIL
GARNER, JOHN HENRY
GARRETT, MAURICE EDWIN JR
GATES, ALBERT HENRY JR
GATWOOD, CHARLES HUB
GATWOOD, ROBIN FREDERICK JR
GAUGHAN, ROGER CONRAD
GAUTHIER, DENNIS LEE
GEE, PAUL STUART
GEHRIG, JAMES MONROE JR
GEIST, STEPHEN JONATHAN
GEORGE, JAMES EDWARD JR
GERBER, DANIEL AMSTUTZ
GERVAIS, DONALD PETER
GIAMMARINO, VINCENT FRANK
GIANNANGELI, ANTHONY ROBERT
GILBERT, PAUL PARIS
GINN, DAVID LANDRELL
GLANDON, GARY ALVEN
GODFREY, JOHNNY HOWARD
GODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHES
GOFF, KENNETH BRADFORD JR
GONIALES, JESUS ARMANDO

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(South Vietnam)

Name

GONIALES, JOSE JESUS
GOPP, THOMAS ALAN
GORTON, THOMAS FREDERICK
GRAF, ALBERT STEPHEN
GRAF, JOHN GEORGE
GRAFFE, PAUL LEROY
GRAHAM, GILBERT JAMES
GRAINGER, JOSEPH W
GRANIOLA, JOSE ANTONIO JR.
GRANTHAM, ROBERT EUGENE
GRAVITTE, CONNIE MACK
GRAZIOSI, FRANCIS GEORGE
GREEN, GERALD (NMN)
GREEN, LARRY EDWARD
GREEN, THOMAS FREDERICK
GREENLEAF, JOSEPH GALES
GREENLEY, JON ALFRED
GRELLA, DONALD CARROLL
GRIFFEY, TERRANCE HASTINGS
GROSSE, CHRISTOPHER ANDREW JR
GROTH, WADE LAWRENCE
GRYB, ROBERT H
GUJARDO, HILARIO H
GUERRA, RAUL ANTONIO
GUILLORY, EDWARD JOSEPH
GUILLORY, HUBIA JUDE
GUMBERT, ROBERT WILLIAM JR.
GUNN, ALAN WENDELL
HACKETT, JAMES EDWARD
HAGAN, JOHN ROBERT
HAGEN, CRAIG LOUIS
HAIGHT, STEPHEN HAROLD
HAIL, WILLIAM WARREN
HALE, JOHN DOUGLAS
HALL, FREDERICK MERVYN
HALL, HARLEY HUBERT
HALL, WALTER LOUIS
HALLBERG, ROGER COBB
HALPIN, DAVID PAUL
HAMILTON, ROGER DALE
HAMM, JAMES EDWARD
HAMMOND, DENNIS WAYNE
HANDRAHAN, EUGENE ALLEN
HANNA, KENNETH (NMN)
HANRATTY, THOMAS MICHAEL
HANSEN, LESTER ALAN
HARBER, STEPHEN JAMES
HARDIE, CHARLES DAVID
HARGROVE, OLIN JR (NMN)

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Name

HARPER, RALPH LEWIS
HARPER, RICHARD K
HARRIS, GREGORY JOHN
HARRIS, HAROLD LEE
HARRIS, PAUL WINIFORD
HARRISON, ROBERT HEERMAN
HARVEY, JACK ROCKWOOD
HARWOOD, JAMES ARTHUR
HASENBECK, PAUL ALFRED
HASTINGS, STEVEN MORRIS
HATTORI, MASAKI (NMN)
HAUER, ROBERT DOUGLAS
HAVRANEK, MICHAEL WILLIAM
HAWTHORNE, RICHARD WILLIAM
HEITMAN, STEVEN WAYNE
HELSER, LAWRENCE NEAL
HELD, JOHN WAYNE
HEMMEL, CLARENCE JOSEPH
HEMPER, BARRY LEE
HENDRIX, JERRY WAYNE
HENN, JOHN ROBERT JR
HENNINGER, HOWARD WILLIAM
HEPLEY, FRANK MONROE
HERNANDEZ, FRANK SANCHEZ
HERREID, ROBERT DALE
HERRERA, FREDERICK DANIEL
HERTZ, GUSTAV GRANE
HESS, GENE KARL
HEWITT, SAMUEL EUGENE
HEYNE, RAYMOND THOMAS
HICKMAN, VINCENT JOSEPH
HICKS, PRENTICE WAYNE
HIERMER, JERRY ALLEN
HILBRICH, BARRY WAYNE
HILL, BILLY DAVID
HILL, CHARLES DALE
HILL, JOHN RICHARD
HILL, JOSEPH ARNOLD
HILL, RICHARD DALE
HINES, VAUGHN MAURICE
HISE, JAMES HAMILTON
HODGSON, CECIL JOE
HOEFFTS, JOHN HARVEY
HOFFMAN, TERRY ALAN
HOLDEN, ELMER LARRY
HOLQUIN, LUIS CALLEGOS
HOLLAND, LAWRENCE THOMAS
HOLLINGER, GREG NEYMAN
HOLLINGSWORTH, HAL 'T'

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Name

HOLM, ARNOLD EDWARD JR
HOLT, JAMES WILLIAM
HOLTMAN, RONALD LEE
HOSKINS, DONALD RUSSELL
HOUSE, JOHN ALEXANDER II
HOUSE, ANTHONY FRANK
HOWARD, LEWIS JR (NMN)
HOWARD, LUTHER HARRIS
HOWES, GEORGE ANDREWS
HUBLER, GEORGE LAWRENCE
HUDDLESTON, LYNN RAGLE
HUGGINS, BOBBY GENE
HULL, JAMES LARRY
HUMMEL, JOHN FLOYD
HUNSICKER, JAMES EDWARD
HUNT, LEON ANDREW
HUNT, ROBERT WILLIAM
HUNT, WILLIAM BALD
HUNTER, JAMES D
HURST, JOHN CLARK
HUSS, ROY ARTHUR
HYDE, JIMMY DON
IANDOLI, DONALD (NMN)
IBANEZ, DI REYES
JABLONSKI, MICHAEL JAMES
JACKSON, CARL EDWIN
JACKSON, JAMES WESLEY JR
JACOBSEN, TIMOTHY JOHN
JAKOVAC, JOHN ANDREW
JAMERSON, LARRY CARL
JEFFERSON, PERRY HENRY
JEFFS, CLIVE GARTH
JENNE, ROBERT EARL
JIMENEZ, JUAN MACIAS
JOHNSON, AUGUST DAVID
JOHNSON, BRUCE GARDNER
JOHNSON, FRANKIE BURNETTE JR
JOHNSON, GARY LEE
JOHNSON, JAMES REED
JOHNSON, RICHARD HERMAN
JOHNSON, ROBERT DENNISON
JOHNSON, STANLEY GARWOOD
JOHNSON, WILLIAM DARRELL
JONES, BOBBY HARVIN
JONES, GEORGE EMERSON
JONES, GRAYLAND (NMN)
JONES, JOHNNY MACK
JONES, JOHN ROBERT
JONES, THOMAS PAUL

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by Country
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Name

JOURDENATS, GEORGE HENRY
JUDD, MICHAEL BARRY
JURECKO, DANIEL EDWARD
KALIL, TANOS E
KANE, RICHARD RAYMOND
KARST, CARL FREDERICK
KASTER, LEONARD LEE
KEEFE, DOUGLAS O'NEIL
KRIPER, JOHN CHARLES
KELLEY, DANIEL MARTIN
KEMP, FREDDIE (NMN)
KENNEDY, JOHN WILLIAM
KENNEY, HARRY JOHN
KERNS, ARTHUR WILLIAM
KERR, ERNEST CLANEY JR
KIER, LARRY GENE
KILLEN, JOHN DEWEY III
KING, GERALD EUGENE
KINSMAN, GERALD FRANCIS
KIRKSEY, ROBERT LOUIS
KLIMO, JAMES ROBERT
KLINKE, DONALD HERMAN
KLUTE, KARL EDWIN
KMETYK, JONATHAN PETER
KNIGHT, HENRY CLAY
KNIGHT, LARRY DALE
KNUTSON, RICHARD ARTHUR
KOMMENDANT, AADO (NMN)
KONYU, WILLIAM MICHAEL
KOOI, JAMES WILLARD
KRAUSHAN, EDWARD L
KRUPA, FREDERICK (NMN)
KUELMAN, ROBERT JOHN JR
KULLAND, BYRON KENT
KUSTIGIAN, MICHAEL JOHN
KUYKENDALL, WILLIE CLYDE
LACEY, RICHARD JOSEPH
LAGRAND, WILLIAM JOHN
LAMP, ARNOLD WILLIAM JR
LANCASTER, KENNETH RAY
LANE, MITCHELL SIM
LAPHAM, ROBERT GRANTHAN
LAPLANT, KURT ELTON
LAPORTE, MICHAEL LOUIS
LATIMER, CLARENCE ALBERT
LAUREANO, LOPEZ ISMAEL
LAUTERIG, MANUEL ALONZO
LAUTZENHEISER, MICHAEL (NMN)
LAMSON, KARL WADE

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by Country
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Name

LEDBETTER, THOMAS ISAAC
LEE, ALBERT EUGENE
LEEFER, WALLACE WILSON
LEHRKE, STANLEY LAWRENCE
LEHCKE, DAVID EARL
LEHMONS, WILLIAM ELLSWORTH
LEVAN, ALVIN LEE
LEVIS, CHARLES ALLEN
LEWANDOWSKI, LEONARD JOHN JR
LEWIS, CHARLIE GRAY
LINDELOOM, CHARLES DAVID
LINDEWALD, CHARLES WESLEY JR
LINK, ROBERT CHARLES
LITTLE, DANNY LEONARD
LLOYD, ALLEN RICHARD
LOCKER, JAMES D
LOWAX, RICHARD EUGENE
LONG, CARL EDWIN
LONG, GEORGE WENDELL
LONGANECKER, RONALD LEE
LOPEZ, ROBERT (NMN)
LOPEZ, ROBERT CHARLES
LORD, ARTHUR JAMES
LOVEGREN, DAVID EUGENE
LOWERY, TYRRELL GORDON
LULL, HOWARD BURDETTE, JR.
LUH, DAVID ANTHONY
LUTTRELL, JAMES MARTIN
LYON, JAMES MICHAEL
MACKEDANZ, LYLE EVERETT
MACLAUGHLIN, DONALD CLAY JR
MAGEE, PATRICK JOSEPH
MAGERS, PAUL GERALD
MAHONEY, THOMAS PATRICK III
MAILHES, LAWRENCE SCOTT
MALONE, JIMMY McDONALD
MANGINO, THOMAS ANGELO
MANGUS, ARLIE ROBERT
MANN, ROBERT LEE
MANSKE, CHARLES JEROME
MARK, KIT THARP
MARSHALL, JAMES ALFRED
MARSHALL, RICHARD CARLTON
MARTIN, JERRY DEAN
MARTIN, RICHARD DARRYL
MARTINEZ-MERCADO, EDWIN JUAN
MASON, JAMES PHILIP
MASUDA, ROBERT SUSUMU
MATOCHA, DONALD JOHN

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(South Vietnam)

Name

MAXWELL, CALVIN WALTER
MCANDREWS, MICHAEL WILLIAM
MCCANTS, LELAND STANFORD III
MCCELLAN, PAUL TRUMAN JR
MCCONNAUGHY, DAN DAILY
MCCONNELL, JERRY (NMN)
MCCORMICK, CARL OTTIS
MCDANIEL, JOHN LEWIS
MCDONALD, KURT CASEY
MCDONELL, R D (MFM/NMN)
MCDONNELL, JOHN TERENCE
MCELROY, JOHN LEE
MCEWEH, JAMES ARTHUR
MCGAR, BRIAN KENT
MCCONIGLE, WILLIAM DEE
MCCRATH, JAMES PATRICK
MCINTOSH, IAN (NMN)
MCKAIN, BOBBY LYN
MCKAY, HOMER EUGENE
MCKINNEY, NEIL BERNARD
MCKITTRICK, JAMES CLIFFORD
MCLAUGHLIN, OLEN BURKE
MCLEAN, JAMES HENRY
MCLEOD, ARTHUR EDWARD
MCMAHUS, TRUMAN JOSEPH
MCMURRAY, FRED HOWELL JR
MCPHEE, RANDY NEAL
MCPHERSON, FRED LAMAR
MCQUADE, JAMES RUSSELL
MCVEY, LAVOY DON
MELDAHL, CHARLES HOWARD
MERCER, JACOB EDWARD
METOYER, BRIFORD GLENN
MIDGETT, DEWEY ALAN
MILLARD, CHARLES WORTH
MILLER, GEORGE C
MILLER, GLENN EDWIN
MILLER, MALCOLM THOMAS
MILLER, MICHAEL ANDREW
MILLER, RICHARD ARTHUR
MILLER, WYATT JR (NMN)
MILLNER, WILLIAM PATRICK
MILLNER, MICHAEL (NMN)
MILLS, JAMES DALE
MINOR, CARROL WILLIAM
MIRREN, ROBERT HENRY
MISHUK, RICHARD EDWARD
MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON
MITCHELL, CARL BERG

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by Country
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Name

MITCHELL, DONALD WAYNE
MITCHELL, HARRY F
MOE, HAROLD JOHN
MONTEZ, ANASTACIO (NMN)
MOORE, JAMES RODNEY
MOORE, JERRY LAWRENCE
MOORE, MAURICE HENRY
MOORE, RALPH EDWARD
MOORE, RAYMOND GREGORY
MOORE, SCOTT FERRIS JR
MOORE, THOMAS (NMN)
MOORE, WILLIAM JOHN
MORALES, FRANK ADRIAN
MOREIDA, MANUEL JESUS
MORELAND, JAMES LESLIE
MORELAND, STEPHAN CRAIG
MORELAND, WILLIAM DAVID
MORGAN, EDWIN EVERTON
MORGAN, THOMAS RAYMOND
MORGAN, WILLIAM J
MORRILL, DAVID WHITTIER
MORRIS, GEORGE WILLIAM JR
MORRISON, GLENN RAYMOND JR
MORRISSEY, RICHARD THOMAS
MORROW, LARRY KANE
MOSBURG, HENRY LEE
MOSHIER, JIM EDWIN
MOWREY, GLENN WILLIAM
MULLEAVEY, QUINTEN EMILE
MUNOZ, DAVID LOUIE
MURPHY, LARRON DAVID
MUSSETTI, JOSEPH TONY JR
MYERS, DAVID GEPHART
NAHAN, JOHN BENEDICT III
NEELD, BOBBY GENE
NELSON, JAMES RAYMOND
NELSON, JAN HUSTON
NETH, FRED ALBERT
NEVILLE, WILLIAM EDWARD
NEWBURN, LARRY STEPHEN
NEWMAN, JAMES CLIFFORD JR
NEWMAN, LARRY JEROME
NEWTON, CHARLES VERNON
NEWTON, DONALD STEPHEN
NEWTON, WARREN EMERY
NICKOL, ROBERT ALLEN
NIDDS, DANIEL RUSSELL
NIEHOUSE, DANIEL LESTILE
NIPPER, DAVID

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(South Vietnam)

Name

NOLAN, JOSEPH PAUL JR
MORRIS, CALVIN ANDREW
MORTON, MICHAEL ROBERT
MYHOF, RICHARD 'E'
MYSTUL, WILLIAM CRAIG
OAKLEY, LINUS LABIN
O'BRIEN, KEVIN (MMH)
OCHAB, ROBERT (MMH)
OFFUTT, GARY-PHELPS
OGDEN, HOWARD JR
OHARA, ROBERT CHARLES
OKERLUND, THOMAS RICHARD
OLDHAM, JOHN SANDERS
OLSEN, BETTY ANN
OLSEN, FLOYD WARREN
OLSON, BARRY ALLEN
OLSON, GERALD EVERETT
OMELIA, DENNIS WILLIAM
ONEILL, DOUGLAS LEE
ORR, WARREN ROBERT JR
OSBORN, GEOFFREY HOLMES
OSBORNE, SAMUEL WILLIAM JR
OTT, EDWARD LOUIS III
OTT, PATRICK LEWIS
OWEN, TIMOTHY SAMUEL
OWENS, FRED MONROE
PADGETT, DAVID EUGENE
PADGETT, SAMUEL JOSEPH
PADILLA, DAVID ESEQUIEL
PALACIOS, LUIS FERNANDO
PALEN, CARL ANTHONY
PANTALL, JAMES ROBERT
PARKER, DAVID WAYNE
PARKER, MAXIM CHARLES
PARKER, THOMAS AQUINAS
PARKER, UDON (MMH)
PARKS, JOE (MMH)
PARRA, LIONEL JR
PARSLEY, EDWARD MILTON
PARSONS, DONALD EUGENE
PARSONS, MICHAEL DUANE
PARTINGTON, ROGER DALE
PASCHALL, RONALD PAGE
PASEKOFF, ROBERT EDWARD
PASTVA, MICHAEL JAMES
PATTERSON, BRUCE MERLE
PATTON, KENNETH JAMES
PATTON, WARD KARL
PAUL, JAMES LEE

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(South Vietnam)

Name

PAULEY, MARSHALL IRVIN
PAYNE, KYLIS THEROD
PEARCE, DALE ALLEN
PEARSON, WILLIAM ROY
PEDERSON, JOE PALMER
PENNINGTON, RONALD KEITH
PEPPER, ANTHONY JOHN
PERKINS, CECIL CARRINGTON JR
FERRY, OTHA LEE
FERRY, THOMAS HEPBURN
PETERSON, DELBERT RAY
PETERSON, MARK ALLAN
PHARRIS, WILLIAM VALRIE
PHELPS, JESSE DONALD
PHILLIPS, DANIEL RAYMOND
PHILLIPS, DAVID JOSEPH JR
PHILLIPS, HARVIN FOSTER
PHILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL
PHIPPS, JAMES LARRY
PICK, DONALD WILLIAM
PIERSON, WILLIAM COOPER III
PIETRZAK, JOSEPH RAY
PINEAU, ROLAND ROBERT
PIRKER, VICTOR JOHN
PITT, ALBERT
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD HERBERT
PLATT, ROBERT LENWOOD JR
PLUMADORE, KENNETH LEO
POSEY, GEORGE RAY
POTTS, LARRY FLETCHER
POWERS, LOWELL STEPHEN
POWERS, VERNIE HOMER
PRATER, ROY DEWITT
PRATHER, MARTIN WILLIAM
PREVEDEL, CHARLES FRANCIS
PREWITT, WILLIAM ROLAND
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS REESE
PRINGLE, JOE HAROLD
PUENTES, MANUEL RAMERIZ
PUGOI, JOSEPH DAVID
PURCELL, HOWARD PHILIP
PYLES, HARLEY BOYD
RAMOS, RAINER SILVESTER
RANSBOTTOM, FREDERICK JOEL
RAVENNA, HARRY MANUEL III
RAWLINGS, JAMES 'A'
RAY, JAMES MICHAEL
REARDON, RICHARD JOHN
REED, TERRY MICHAEL

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by Country
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Name

REEVES, JOHN HOWARD
REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND
REHN, GARY LEE
REID, HAROLD ERICH
REITER, DEAN W
RENO, RALPH JOSEPH
REYNOLDS, DAVID RICHARD
RHODES, FERRIS ANSEL JR
RICE, THOMAS JR (NMN)
RICHARDSON, STEPHEN GOULD
RICKER, WILLIAM ERNEST
RICHMAN, DWIGHT GRAY
RIGGINS, ROBERT PAUL
RIGGS, THOMAS FREDERICK
RIOS, NOEL LUIS
RITCHIE, LUTHER EDMOND JR
RITTICHER, JACK COLUMBUS
ROBERSON, JOHN WILL
ROBERTS, HAROLD JAMES JR
ROBERTS, RICHARD DEAN
ROBERTSON, LEONARD
ROBERTSON, MARK JOHN
ROBINSON, EDWARD (NMN)
ROBINSON, FLOYD HENRY
ROE, JERRY LEE
ROGERS, EDWARD FRANCIS
ROGGON, NORMAN LEE
ROMERO, VICTOR (NMN)
ROMIG, EDWARD LEON
RORABACK, KENNETH HILLS
ROSATO, JOSEPH FRANK
ROSENBAUGH, ROBERT PAGE
ROSS, DOUGLAS ALAN
ROSS, JLYNN JR (NMN)
ROSSANO, RICHARD JOSEPH
ROTH, BILLIE LEROY
ROZO, JAMES MILAN
RUCKER, EMMETT JR
RUNNELS, GLYN LINAL JR
RUSSELL, PETER JOHN
RUSSELL, RICHARD LEE
RYDER, JOHN LESLIE
RYKOSKEY, EDWARD JAY
SABOG, MATZO NMN
SABGAERT, DONALD RUSSELL
SALLEY, JAMES JR (NMN)
SANCHEZ, JOSE RAMON
SANDS, RICHARD EUGENE
SARGENT, JAMES RAY

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by Country
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Name

SAVOY, M J
SAYRE, LESLIE BERKLEY
SCAIFE, KENNETH DOYLE
SCHELL, RICHARD JOHN
SCHIELE, JAMES FRANCIS
SCHIMBERG, JAMES PHILIP
SCHMIDT, WALTER ROY JR
SCHOONOVER, CHARLES DAVID
SCHOTT, RICHARD-SIMPSON
SCHULTZ, RONALD JAMES
SCHUMANN, JOHN ROBERT
SCHWORE, RONALD PAUL
SCOTT, DAVID LEE
SCULL, GARY BERNARD
SEABLOM, EARL FRANCIS
SEIDL, ROBERT
SEREX, HENRY MUIR
SEWARD, WILLIAM HENRY
SEXTON, DAVID MASON
SHAFFER, PHILIP RAYMOND
SHANKS, JAMES LEE
SHARK, EARL ERIC
SHARP, SAMUEL ARTHUR JR
SHAW, GARY FRANCIS
SHEA, MICHAEL JOHN
SHERMAN, JOHN BROOKS
SHEPHERD, JOHN DANIEL SR
SHIMKE, SAMUEL DALE
SHIMKIN, ALEXANDER
SIEGWARTH, DONALD EDWIN
SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD
SIMPSON, JOSEPH LOUIS
SIMPSON, MAX COLEMAN
SIMPSON, ROBERT LEWIS
SIMPSON, WALTER STEPHEN
SISSON, WINFIELD WADE
SKARMAN, ORVAL HARRY
SKEEN, RICHARD ROBERT
SKIBBE, DAVID WILLIAM
SKIVINGTON, WILLIAM EDWARD JR
SMALL, BURT CHAUNCEY JR
SMITH, CARL ARTHUR
SMITH, DAVID ROSCOE
SMITH, HALLIE WILLIAM
SMITH, RICHARD DEAN
SMITH, ROGER LEE
SMITH, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR
SMITH, WILLIAM MARK
SMITH, WILLIAM WARD

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Name

SNIDER, HUGHIE FRANKLIN
SOULIER, DUWAYNE
SOYLAND, DAVID PECOR
SPARENBERG, BENARD JOHN
SPARKS, DONALD LEE
SPENCER, DEAN CALVIN III
SPINDLER, JOHN GATES
SPRICK, DOYLE ROBERT
SPROTT, ARTHUR ROY JR
STAEHLI, BRUCE WAYNE
STAFFORD, RONALD DEAN
STANCIL, KENNETH LEON
STANLEY, CHARLES IRVIN
STANLEY, ROBERT WILLIAM
STANTON, RONALD (NMN)
STATON, ROBERT HILTON JR
STEWART, JACK THOMAS
STINSON, WILLIAM SHERRIL
STONE, JAMES MARVIN
STORY, JAMES CLELLON
STOVES, MERRITT III (NMN)
STON, LILBURN RAY
STRAIT, DOUGLAS FRANK
STRALEY, JOHN LEROY
STRANGE, FLOYD WAYNE
STRINGER, JOHN CURTIS II
STRINGHAM, WILLIAM STERLING
STROBRIDGE, RODNEY LYNN
STROHLEIN, MADISON ALEXANDER
STUCKEY, JOHN STEINER JR
STULLER, JOHN CHARLES
SUDDAM, JAMES LAWRENCE
SWANSON, ROGER WESLEY
SWITZER, JERROLD ALLEN
SYKES, DERRI (NMN)
TADIOS, LEONARD MASAYON
TALLEY, JAMES LANE
TAVARES, JOHN R
TAYLOR, DANNY GENE
TAYLOR, FRED (NMN)
TAYLOR, JAMES LAWRENCE
TAYLOR, NEIL BROOKS
TAYLOR, TED JAMES
TERAN, REFUGIO THOMAS
TERRILL, PHILIP BRADFORD
TERRY, ORAL RAY
TERRY, RONALD TERRANCE
TERWILLINGER, VIRGIL BYRON

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Name

THACKERSON, WALTER ANTHONY JR
THOMAS, JAMES CALVEN
THOMAS, JAMES RICHARD
THOMPSON, BENJAMIN ARTHUR JR
THOMPSON, MELVIN CARL
THORNE, LARRY ALAN
THORNTON, WILLIAM DEMPSEY JR
TICE, PAUL DOUGLAS
TIGNER, LEE MORROW
TIMMONS, BRUCE ALLAN
TIPPING, HENRY ALBERT
TODD, LARRY RICHARD
TODD, ROBERT JACY
TOMS, DENNIS LEROY
TRAMPSKI, DONALD JOSEPH
TRAVIS, LYNN MICHAEL
TREECE, JAMES ALLEN
TRIMBLE, JAMES MITCHELL
TRIVELPIECE, STEVE MAURICE
TRUDEAU, ALBERT RAYMOND
TRUJILLO, JOSEPH FELIX
TRUJILLO, ROBERT STEVEN
TUBBS, GLENN ERNEST
TURNER, FREDRICK RAY
TURNER, JAMES HENRY
TYCZ, JAMES NEIL
UHLANSIEK, RALPH EDWARD
UPMER, EDWARD CHARLES
URQUHART, PAUL DEAN
VADEN, WOODROW WILSON
VAN ARTSDALEN, CLIFFORD DALE
VAN BENDEGOM, JAMES LEE
VAN CAMPEN, THOMAS CHARLES
VENNIK, ROBERT NICHOLAS
VERSACE, HUMBERT ROQUE
VIETTI, ELEANOR ARDEL
VISCONTI, FRANCIS EDWARD
WADSWORTH, DEAN AMICK
WALKER, BRUCE CHARLES
WALKER, KENNETH EARL
WALKER, ORLEN JUDSON JR
WALKER, WILLIAM JOHN
WALL, JERRY MACK
WALLACE, ARNOLD BRIAN
WALLACE, MICHAEL JOHN
WALLER, THERMAN MORRIS
WALLING, CHARLES HILTON
WALTERS, WILLIAM (NMN)
WALTON, LEWIS CLARK

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Name

WALTON, WILBERT
WANN, DONALD LYNN
WARE, JOHN ALAN
WASHEBURN, LARRY EUGENE
WATERMAN, CRAIG ROUSTON
WATSON, FRANK PETER
WATSON, JIMMY LEE
WATSON, RONALD LEONARD
WAY, DAVID 'J'
WEAVERS, MELVIN LEE
WEAVER, GEORGE ROBERT JR
WEGER, JOHN (NMN) JR
WEISHER, FRANKLIN LEE
WEITZ, MONCK
WELLS, PHILLIP ROGERSON
WELLS, ROBERT JAMES
WELSH, LARRY DON
WELSHAM, JOHN THOMAS
WERDEHOFF, MICHAEL RAY
WESTCOTT, GARY PATRICK
WHEELER, EUGENE LACY
WHEELER, JAMES ATLEE
WHITESIDES, RICHARD LEBROU
WHITMIRE, WARREN TAYLOR JR
WHITTEMORE, FREDERICK HERBERT
WHITTLE, JUNIOR LEE
WIDDISON, JIMMY SCOTT
WIDENER, JAMES EDWARD
WIDNER, DANNY LEE
WIECHERT, ROBERT CHARLES
WILBRECHT, KURT MICHAEL
WILBURN, JOHN EDWARD
WILEY, RICHARD DENNIS
WILKINS, CALVIN WAYNE
WILKINSON, CLYDE DAVID
WILLIAMS, EDWARD WAYNE
WILLIAMS, LEROY CHRISTOPHER
WILLIAMS, ROBERT JOHN
WILLIAMS, ROY CHARLES
WILLIAMS, THADDEUS EDWARD JR
WILLING, EDWARD ARLO
WILLS, FRANCIS DESALES
WILSON, MARION EARL
WILSON, MICKEY ALLEN
WILSON, RICHARD JR (NMN)
WILSON, ROBERT ALLAN
WILSON, WAYNE VASTER
WINKLER, JOHN ANTHONY
WINTERS, DARRYL GORDON

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Name

WINTERS, DAVID MARSHALL
WISEMAN, BRIN WENDELL JR
WOGAN, WILLIAM MICHAEL
WOLFE, DONALD FINDLING
WOLPE, JACK
WONG, EDWARD PUCK KOW JR
WOODS, DAVID WALTER
WOODS, GERALD ERNEST
WOODS, LAWRENCE (NMN)
WORTH, JAMES FREDERICK
WORTHINGTON, RICHARD CHARLES JR
WRIGHT, ARTHUR (NMN)
WROBLESKI, WALTER FRANCIS
XAVIER, AUGUSTO MARIA
YEAKLEY, ROBIN RAY
YEEND, RICHARD CAROLINUS JR
YOUNG, CHARLES LUTHER
YOUNG, JEFFREY JEROME
ZICH, LARRY ALFRED
ZIMMER, JERRY ALLEN
ZISSU, ANDREW GILBERT
ZOLLIPOFFER, FRANKLIN
ZOOK, DAVID HARTZLER JR
ZUSKE, DELAND DWIGHT
ZUTTERMAN, JOSEPH ARTHUR JR

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by Country
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Name

ACALOTTO, ROBERT JOSEPH
ACKLEY, JAMES HOWARD
ADACHI, THOMAS YUJI
ADAM, JOHN QUINCY
ALBRIGHT, JOHN SCOTT II
ALDERN, DONALD DEANE
ALLEE, RICHARD KENNETH
ALLEN, HENRY LEWIS
ALMENDARIZ, SAMUEL (NMN)
ALTUS, ROBERT WAYNE
ANDERSON, DENIS LEON
ANDRE, HOWARD VINCIENT JR
APPELHANS, RICHARD DUANE
ARD, RANDOLPH JEFFERSON
ARMITSTEAD, STEVEN RAY
ARMSTRONG, FRANK ALTON III
ARMSTRONG, JOHN WILLIAM
ASHBY, CLAYBURN WILLIS JR.
AYERS, RICHARD LEE
AYRES, JAMES HENRY
BARCOCK, RONALD LESTER
BAKER, ARTHUR DALE
BALANOTTI, MICHAEL DIMITRI
BALDRIDGE, JOHN ROBERT JR
BANKOWSKI, ALFONS ALOYSE
BANNON, PAUL WEDLAKE
BARDEN, HOWARD LEROY
BARKER, JACK LAMAR
BARNETT, ROBERT RUSSELL
BARRAS, GREGORY INMAN
BAXTER, BRUCE RAYMOND
BECKER, JAMES CHRISTOP
BELCHER, GLENN ARTHUR
BELL, MARVIN EARL
BESSOR, BRUCE CARLTON
BEUTEL, ROBERT DONALD
BIBER, GERALD HACK
BISCHOFF, JOHN MALCOLM
BLANTON, CLARENCE FINLEY
BLEWETT, ALLAN L
BLOODWORTH, DONALD BRUCE
BODAHL, JON KEITH
BODDEN, TIMOTHY ROY
BOGARD, LONNIE PAT
BOGIAGES, CHRISTOS CONSTANTINE JR
BOLLINGER, ARTHUR RAY
BOND, RONALD LESLIE
BOOKOUT, CHARLES FRANKLIN
BOOTH, LAWRENCE RANDOLPH

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Name

BORJA, DOMINGO R S
BOTT, RUSSELL PETER
BOUGHARD, MICHAEL LORA
BOYER, ALAN LEE
BOYLE, WILLIAM (NMN)
BRANDENBURG, DALE (NMN)
BRASHEAR, WILLIAM JAMES
BRASSFIELD, ANDREW THOMAS
BRAUNER, HENRY PAUL
BREUER, DONALD CHARLES
BRIGGS, ERNEST FRANK JR
BROOKS, WILLIAM LESLIE
BROWER, RALPH WAYNE
BROWN, DONALD ALAN
BROWN, EARL CARLYLE
BROWN, GEORGE R
BROWN, JOSEPH ORVILLE
BROWN, WILLIAM THEODORE
BROWNLEE, CHARLES RICHARD
BRUNSON, JACK WALTER
BUCK, ARTHUR CHARLES
BUNKER, PARK GEORGE
BURKERT, CHARLES WILLIAM JR
BURNES, ROBERT WAYNE
BURNETT, SHELDON JOHN
BURNS, JOHN ROBERT
BURNS, MICHAEL PAUL
BYNUM, NEIL STANLEY
BYRNE, JOSEPH HENRY
CALFEE, JAMES HENRY
CAMPBELL, CLYDE WILLIAM
CAMPBELL, WILLIAM EDWARD
CANIFORD, JAMES KENNETH
CARLOCK, RALPH LAWRENCE
CARPENTER, HOWARD B
CARPENTER, RAMEY LEO
CARR, DONALD GENE
CARROLL, JOHN LEONARD
CARROLL, PATRICK HENRY
CARROLL, ROGER WILLIAM JR
CAVALLI, ANTHONY FRANK
CECIL, ALAN BRUCE
CHAMBERS, JERRY LEE
CHAVEZ, GARY ANTHONY
CHENEY, JOSEPH C
CHESTNUT, JOSEPH LYONS
CHORLINS, RICHARD DAVID
CHRISTIANO, JOSEPH
CRUBB, JOHN JACOBSEN

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Name

CHURCHILL, CARL RUSSELL
CLARK, JOHN CALVIN II
CLARK, STANLEY SCOTT
CLARK, THOMAS EDWARD
CLARKE, FRED LES
CLARKE, GEORGE WILLIAM JR
CLAY, EUGENE LUNSFORD
CLEVE, REGINALD DAVID
COADY, ROBERT FRANKLIN
COGDILL, WILLIAM KEITH
COHRON, JAMES DERWIN
COLLINS, GUY FLETCHER
COLLINS, RICHARD FRANK
COLWELL, WILLIAM KEVIN
CONAWAY, LAWRENCE YERGES
COOK, DWIGHT WILLIAM
COONS, CHESTER LEROY
COPLEY, WILLIAM MICHAEL
CORNWELL, LEROY JASON III
COTTEN, LARRY WILLIAM
CRANDALL, GREGORY STEPHEN
CREAR, WILLIS CALVIN
CREED, BARTON SHELDON
GRESSMAN, PETER RICHARD
CRISTMAN, FREDERICK LEWIS
CRONE, DONALD EVERRET
CROSS, JAMES EMORY
CROWLEY, JOHN EDWARD
CRUZ, CARLOS RAFAEL
CURRAN, PATRICK ROBERT
DAFFRON, THOMAS CARL
DAILEY, DOUGLAS VINCENT
DANIELSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
DAVIDSON, DAVID ARTHUR
DAVIS, CHARLIE BROWN JR
DAVIS, DANIEL RICHARD
DAVIS, EDGAR FELTON
DAVIS, JAMES WOODROW
DAVIS, RICARDO GONZALEZ
DAVIS, ROBERT CHARLES
DAWSON, FRANK ARTHUR
DE WISPELAERE, REXFORD JOHN
DEAN, CHARLES MAITLAND
DEAN, MICHAEL FRANK
DEBRUIN, EUGENE HENRY
DENHARY, JAMES EUGENE
DEUTER, RICHARD CARL
DEKTER, RONALD JAMES
DILLENDER, WILLIAM EDWARD

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Name

DINAN, DAVID THOMAS III
DONAHUE, MORGAN JEFFERSON
DONATO, PAUL NICHOLAS
DONOVAN, MICHAEL LEO
DOTSON, JEFFERSON SCOTT
DRIVER, CLARENCE NESSBIT
DUCKETT, THOMAS ALLEN
DUDLEY, CHARLES GLENDON
DUFFY, CHARLES J
DUGAN, JOHN FRANCIS
DUGAN, THOMAS WAYNE
DUGGAN, WILLIAM YOUNG
DYE, MELVIN CARRILLS
DYER, IRBY III (MGM)
EAST, JAMES BOYD JR
EATON, NORMAN DALE
ECHANIS, JOSEPH IGNACIO
ECHEVARRIA, RAYMOND LOUIS
EDGAR, ROBERT JOHN
EGAN, WILLIAM PATRICK
EILERS, DENNIS LEE
ELEINGA, RICHARD GENE
FALLON, PATRICK MARTIN
FANNING, JOSEPH PETER
FEATHERSTON, FIELDING WESLEY III
FELLENZ, CHARLES RICHARD
FELLOWS, ALLEN EUGENE
FERGUSON, DOUGLAS DAVID
FINN, WILLIAM ROBERT
FINNEY, CHARLES ELBERT
FISHER, DONALD GARTH
FIVELSON, BARRY FRANK
FOLEY, BRENDAN PATRICK
FORS, GARY HENRY
FOSTER, PAUL LEONARD
FRIYAR, BRUCE CARLTON
GALBRAITH, RUSSELL DALE
GALLAGHER, JOHN THEODORE
GANLEY, RICHARD OWEN
GARCIA, RICARDO MARTINEZ
GARDNER, JOHN GARRETT
GASSMAN, FRED ALLEN
GATES, JAMES WAYNE
GAULEY, JAMES PAUL
GETCHELL, PAUL EVERETT
GILLEN, THOMAS ELDON
GISH, HENRY GERALD
GLOVER, CALVIN CHARLES
GLOVER, DOUGLAS JOHN

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by Country
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Name

GOEGLEIN, JOHN WINFRED
GOLI, JOHN BRYAN
GOMEZ, ROBERT ARTHUR
GONIALES, DAVID
GOULD, FRANK ALTON
GOURLEY, LAURENT LEE
GOVAN, ROBERT ALLEN
GRACE, JAMES WILLIAM
GREEN, GEORGE CURTIS JR
GREEN, NORMAN MORGAN
GREEN, ROBERT BAILEY
GREENWOOD, ROBERT ROY JR
GREWELL, LARRY IRWIN
GRIFFITH, ROBERT SMITH
GUILLERMAN, LOUIS FULDA
GUILLET, ANDRE ROLAND
HALL, WALTER RAY
HALL, WILLIS ROSELLE
HAMILTON, DENNIS CLARK
HANLEY, LARRY JAMES
HANSON, STEPHEN PAUL
HARLEY, LEE DUFFORD
HARRIS, STEPHEN WARREN
HARROLD, PATRICK KENDAL
HART, JOSEPH LESLIE
HARTNESS, GREGG (NMN)
HARTZHEIM, JOHN FRANCIS
HASSENGER, ARDEN KEITH
HAYDEN, GLENN MILLER
HEIDEMAN, THOMAS EDWARD
HELMICH, GERALD ROBERT
HELMIG, ROGER DANNY
HENSLEY, RONNIE LEE
HENSLEY, THOMAS TRUETT
HEROLD, RICHARD WALTER
HERRICK, CHARLES
HERRICK, JAMES WAYNE JR
HESFORD, PETER DEAN
HESS, FREDERICK WILLIAM JR
HETRICK, RAYMOND HARRY
HILL, ARTHUR SINCLAIR JR
HILL, GORDON CLARK
HILLS, JOHN RUSSELL
HOFF, MICHAEL GEORGE
HOLLAND, MELVIN ARNOLD
HOLMES, DAVID HUGH
HOLTOM, ROBERT EDWIN
HOSKINS, CHARLES LEE
HOWELL, CARTER AVERY

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by Country
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Name

HRDLICKA, DAVID LOUIS
HUDGENS, EDWARD MONROE
HUNTER, RUSSEL PALMER JR
HUNTLEY, JOHN NORMAN
HUSTON, CHARLES GREGORY
IRELAND, ROBERT NEWELL
IRSCH, WAYNE CHARLES
IVAN, ANDREW JR
JACKSON, JAMES TERRY
JACKSON, PAUL VERNON III
JANOUSEK, RONALD JAMES
JEFFORDS, DERRELL BLACKBURN
JENKINS, PAUL LAVERNE
JENSEN, GEORGE WILLIAM
JOHNS, PAUL FREDERICK
JOHNSON, RANDOLPH LEROY
JOHNSTON, STEVEN BRYCE
JOHNSTONE, JAMES MONTGOMERY
JONES, JAMES E
JONES, LOUIS FARR
KAHLER, HAROLD (NMN)
KANE, BRUCE EDWARD
KELLER, WENDELL RICHARD
KENT, ROBERT DUANE
KERR, EVERETT OSCAR
KERR, JOHN CREIGHTON GILLE
KETCHIE, SCOTT DOUGLAS
KIEFEL, ERNST PHILIP JR
KIEFFER, WILLIAM L JR
KING, CHARLES DOUGLAS
KING, PAUL CHESTER JR
KIPINA, MARSHALL FREDERICK
KIRK, HERBERT ARTHUR
KLINGNER, MICHAEL LEE
KNEBEL, THOMAS EDWARD
KNIGHT, ROY ABNER JR
KNUTSEN, DONALD PAUL
KOONCE, TERRY TRELOAR
KRAVITZ, JAMES STEPHEN
KROGMAN, ALVA RAY
KRYSLAK, THEODORE EUGENE
KUBLEY, ROY ROBERT
KUHLMANN, CHARLES FREDERICK
KUSICK, JOSEPH GEORGE
LAFAYETTE, JOHN WAYNE
LANE, GLEN OLIVER
LANEY, BILLY RAY
LAWRENCE, GREGORY PAUL
LAWS, DELMER LEE

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Bright-Light Active Cases
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(Laos)

Name

LEFEVER, DOUGLAS PAUL
LEMON, JEFFREY CHARLES
LEONARD, MARVIN MADRICE
LEWIS, JAMES WINBERLEY
LILLY, CARROLL BAXTER
LINDSTROM, RONNIE GEORGE
LINT, DONALD MICHAEL
LONG, LUTHER ALBERT
LUCAS, LARRY FRANCIS
LUCI, ALBIN EARL
LUNA, CARTER PURVIS
LUNA, DONALD ALFRED
LUNDY, ALERO LYNN JR
LYON, DONAVAN LOREN
MACCO, CHARLES (NMN)
MADISON, WILLIAM LOUIS
MARCONI, RICHARD MICHAEL
MARTIN, JAMES EDWARD
MARTIN, RUSSELL DEAN
MASCARI, PHILLIP LOUIS
MASON, WILLIAM HENDERSON
MASTERSON, MICHAEL JOHN
MATEJOV, JOSEPH ANDREW
MATTHEWS, PETER RICHARD
MAUTERER, OSCAR (NMN)
MAY, DAVID MURRAY
MAYERCIE, RONALD MICHAEL
MAYSEY, LARRY WAYNE
MCELROY, GLENN DAVID
MCCOULDRICK, FRANCIS JAY JR
MCINTIRE, SCOTT WINSTON
MCKENNEY, KENNETH DENNEY
MCPHAIL, WILLIAM THOMAS
MELTON, TODD MICHAEL
MERONEY, VIRGIL KERSE III
MILIUS, PAUL LLOYD
MILLER, CURTIS DANIEL
MILLER, ROBERT CHARLES
MITCHELL, THOMAS BARRY
MIXTER, DAVID IVES
MIYAZAKI, RONALD KAZUO
MOON, WALTER HUGH
MOONEY, FRED (NMN)
MORGAN, BRYCE HENDERSON
MORIARTY, PETER GIGNEY
MORIN, RICHARD GILARD
MORLEY, CHARLES FRANK
MULHAUSER, HARVEY
MULLEN, WILLIAM FRANCIS

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
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Name

MULLINS, HAROLD EUGENE
MUNDT, HENRY GERALD II
MUSIL, CLINTON ALLAN SR
NASH, JOHN MICHEL
NEAL, DENNIS PAUL
NEWBERRY, WAYNE ELLSWORTH
NIEDECKEN, WILLIAM CLINTON
NOFF, ROBERT GRAHAM
O'BRIEN, JOHN LAWRENCE
OLSON, DELBERT AUSTIN
OSTERMEYER, WILLIAM HENRY
OTT, WILLIAM AUGUST
OWEN, ROBERT DUVAL
PALMER, GILBERT SWAIN JR.
PARKS, RAYMOND FRANCIS
PATE, GARY (NMN)
PATTILLO, RALPH NATHAN
PAITON, DONALD ELMER
PAYNE, NORMAN (NMN)
PEARSON, WAYNE EDWARD
PHELPS, WILLIAM (NMN)
PHILLIPS, ELBERT AUSTIN
PIETSCH, ROBERT EDWARD
PIKE, DENNIS STANLEY
PIKE, PETER XAVIER
PIRRUCCIELLO, JOSEPH SAMUEL JR
PITTMANN, ALLAN DALE
POLSTER, HARMON (NMN)
POTTER, WILLIAM JOSEPH JR
POTTER, WILLIAM TOO
POWERS, JOHN LYNN
POYNOR, DANIEL ROBERTS
PREISS, ROBERT FRANCIS JR
PRESTON, JAMES ARTHUR
PRICE, DAVID STANLEY
PRINN, SEVERO JAMES III
PUGH, DENNIS GERALD
QUINN, MICHAEL EDWARD
RASH, MELVIN DOUGLAS
RATTIN, DENNIS MICHAEL
RAUSCH, ROBERT ERNEST
RAWSTHORNE, EDGAR ARTHUR
RAY, RONALD EARL
REED, JAMES WILLIAM
REISE, GOMER DAVID III
REID, JON ERIC
REILLY, LAVERN GEORGE
RENELT, WALTER ALFRED
REX, ROBERT 'F'

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
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Name

REX, ROBERT ALAN
RITTER, GEORGE LYLE
ROBBINS, RICHARD JOSEPH
ROBERTS, MICHAEL LAND
ROBERTSON, JOHN BARTLEY
ROBINSON, LARRY WARREN
ROBINSON, LEWIS MERRITT
ROGERS, CHARLES EDWARD
ROSE, LUTHER LEE
ROWLEY, CHARLES STOODARD
RUSCH, STEPHEN ARTHUR
RUSSELL, DONALD MYRICK
RYAN, WILLIAM CORNELIUS JR
SADLER, MITCHELL OLEN JR
SAGE, LELAND CHARLES COOKE
SANDERS, WILLIAM STEPHEN
SCHANEBERG, LEROY CLYDE
SCHMIDT, PETER ALDEN
SCHULTZ, SHELDON DUANE
SCOTT, MIKE JOHN
SCOTT, VINCENT CALVIN JR
SCRIVENER, STEPHEN RUSSEL
SCURLOCK, LEE DELTON JR
SEELEY, DOUGLAS MILTON
SEYMOUR, LEO EARL
SHANNON, PATRICK LEE
SHAY, DONALD EMERSON JR
SHELTON, CHARLES ERVIN
SHUE, DONALD MONROE
SIGAFOOS, WALTER HARRISON III
SINGLETON, DANIEL EVERETT
SIOW, GALE ROBERT
SIZEMORE, JAMES ELMO
SKINNER, OWEN GEORGE
SMILEY, STANLEY KUTZ
SMITH, HARDING EUGENE SR
SMITH, HARRY WINFIELD
SMITH, LEWIS PHILIP II
SMITH, RONALD EUGENE
SMITH, VICTOR ARLOW
SMITH, WARREN PARKER JR
SPARKS, JON MICHAEL
SPINLER, DARRELL JOHN
SPITZ, GEORGE ROSS
SPRINGSTEADAH, DONALD KENNEBUNK
STANDERWICK, ROBERT LAURIN SR.
STARK, WILLIE ERNEST
STEADMAN, JAMES EUGENE
STEPHENSON, HOWARD DAVID

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Name

STEVENS, LARRY JAMES
STEVENS, PHILLIP PAUL
STEWART, PAUL CLARK
STEWART, VIRGIL GRANT
STOWERS, AUBREY EUGENE JR
STRATTON, CHARLES WAYNE
STRIDE, JAMES DANIEL JR
STUBBS, WILLIAM WENTWORTH
SUBER, RANDOLPH-BOTSWELL
SULANDER, DANIEL ARTHUR
SULLIVAN, ROBERT JOSEPH
SUTTER, FREDERICK JOHN
SWANSON, WILLIAM EDWARD
SWORDS, SMITH III
TAPP, MARSHALL LANDIS
TAYLOR, JAMES HARRY
TERLA, LOTHAR GUSTAV THOMAS
THOMAS, DANIEL WAYNE
THOMAS, LEO TARTLTON JR
THOMPSON, GEORGE WINTON
THORESEN, DONALD NELLIS
THORNTON, LARRY 'C'
THURMAN, CURTIS FRANK
TOWLE, JOHN CLINE
TOWNLEY, ROY F
TRAYER, JOHN GROVE III
TUCCI, ROBERT LEON
TUCKER, TIMOTHY MICHAEL
UNDERWOOD, THOMAS WAYNE
UTLEY, RUSSEL KEITH
VANGLEAVE, WALTER SHELBY
VILLEPONTEAUX, JAMES HENDERSON JR
WAGENER, DAVID RAYMOND
WALD, GUNTHER HERBERT
WALKER, LLOYD FRANCIS
WALKER, MICHAEL STEPHEN
WALKER, SAMUEL FRANKLIN JR
WALKER, THOMAS TAYLOR
WALSH, RICHARD AMBROSE III
WALTERS, TIM LEROY
WARD, NEAL CLINTON
WARREN, ERVIN (RMH)
WARREN, GRAY DAMSON
WATKINS, ROBERT JAMES JR
WEISSENBACK, EDWARD J
WEISSMUELLER, COURTNEY EDWARD
WEITKAMP, EDGAR WILKEN JR
WEST, JOHN THOMAS
WESTBROOK, DONALD ELLIOT

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Name

WESTER, ALBERT DWAYNE
WESTON, OSCAR BRANCH JR
WHITE, DANFORTH ELLITBORPE
WHITE, JAMES BLAIR
WHITED, JAMES LAFAYETTE
WHITFORD, LAWRENCE WILLIAM JR
WHITT, JAMES EDWARD
WIDDIS, JAMES WESLEY JR
WIDON, KENNETH HARRY
WILLETT, ROBERT VINCENT JR
WILLIAMS, DAVID RICHARD
WILLIAMS, EDDIE LEE
WILLIAMS, JAMES ELLIS
WILLIAMSON, JAMES DANIEL
WILSON, HARRY TRUMAN
WILSON, PETER JOE
WISTRAND, ROBERT CARL
WOLFE, THOMAS HUBERT
WOLFKEIL, WAYNE BENJAMIN
WORN, JAMES CHARLES
WOOD, DON CHARLES
WOOD, WILLIAM COMMODORE JR
WORLEY, DON FRANKLIN
WORST, KARL EDWARD
WORTHAM, MURRAY LAMAR
WRIGHT, DONALD LEE
WRIGHT, THOMAS THANSON
YOUNG, BARCLAY BINGHAM
ZUKOWSKI, ROBERT JOHN

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Name

ANTUNANO, GREGORY ALFRED
BAUMAN, RICHARD LEE
BECERRA, RUDY MORALES
BENEDETT, DANIEL ANDREW
BLACK, PAUL VERNON
BLESSING, LYNN
BOROWSKI, JOHN ARTHUR
BOYD, WALTER
COCHRANE, DEVERTON CARPENTER
COPENHAVER, GREGORY SCOTT
CORNELIUS, SAMUEL BLACKHAR
CROW, RAYMOND JACK JR.
DALTON, RANDALL DAVID
DIX, CRAIG MITCHELL
DRAKE, CARL WILSON
DREHER, RICHARD 'E'
EVANS, WILLIAM ANTHONY
FLYNN, SEAN LESLIE
FORAME, PETER CHARLES
GANOE, BERMAN JUNIOR
GARCIA, ANDRES
GAUSE, BERNARD JR
GREEN, JAMES ARVIL
GRIFFIN, RODNEY LYNN
HALL, GARY LEE
HANGEN, WELLES
HARGROVE, JOSEPH NELSON
HARNED, GARY ALAN
HARRIS, BOBBY GLENN
HARRISON, LARRY GENE
HOSKEN, JOHN CHARLES
HUBERTH, ERIC JAMES
JACQUES, JAMES JOSEPH
JAMES, SAMUEL LARRY
KENNEDY, JAMES EDWARD
KNUCKEY, THOMAS WILLIAM
KROSKE, HAROLD WILLIAM JR
LAKER, CARL JOHN
LEE, GLEN HUNG NIN
LILLY, LAWRENCE EUGENE
LINEBERGER, HAROLD BENTON
LONEY, ASHTON NATHANIEL
MANNING, RONALD JAMES
MANOR, JAMES (RON)
MARSHALL, DANNY GLEN
MARTIN, DOUGLAS KENT
MAXWELL, JAMES RICKY
MAY, MICHAEL FREDERICK
MCLAMB, HARRY LAWRENCE

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(Cambodia)

Name

MCLEOD, DAVID VANCE JR
MURPHY, BARRY DANIEL
COONHILL, MICHAEL DAVIS
PANHARECKER, DAVID ERIC
PIERCE, WALTER MELVIN (NI AKA
POOL, JERRY LYNN
PRICE, BUNYAN DURANT JR
RAMIREZ, ARMANDO (HON)
REYNOLDS, TERRY LEE
RICHARDSON, DALE WAYNE
RIVERSBURGH, RICHARD WILLIAM
RINBAUGH, ELWOOD EUGENE
SANDNER, ROBERT LOUIS
SANDOVAL, ANTONIO RAMOS
SCHERDIN, ROBERT FRANCIS
SERIVER, JERRY MICHAEL
SKILES, THOMAS WILLIAM
SMALLWOOD, JOHN JACKIE
SMITH, JOSEPH STANLEY
SMOOT, CURTIS RICHARD
STONE, DANA HASEN
STUIFBERGEN, GENE PAUL
SWANSON, JON EDWARD
TAYLOR, PHILLIP CHARLES
TRENT, ALAN ROBERT
TURNER, KELTON RENA
VANDEGEER, RICHARD
WAGNER, RAYMOND ANTHONY
WALSH, BRIAN
WHITE, CHARLES EDWARD
YIM, JOHN
YOUNG, ROBERT MILTON

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Bright-Light Active Cases
by Country
(China)

Name

DUNN, JOSEPH PATRICK
FEGAN, RONALD JAMES
GLASSON, WILLIAM ALBERT JR
HARRIS, REUBEN BEAUMONT
JORDAN, LARRY MICHAEL
MURPHY, TERENCE MEREDITH
SCOTT, DAIN VANDERLIN
TREMELLY, 'J' FORREST GEORGE

Additional Question 5. Please report to the Select Committee the results of the review of all KIA-BNR cases which we were told is ongoing at the JTF-PA. Are there any cases where the evidence of death is not sufficiently compelling?

On July 1992, JTF-PA analysts began a comprehensive review of case files for all 2266 unaccounted for individuals to determine which cases merit further investigation and which cases lack any compelling information upon which to plan follow on investigation. As of 6 August, JTF-PA analysts reviewed almost 1000 individual case files. Review to be completed by 1 October 1992. JTF-PA will report results of the review in official message via the chain of command in early October.

Additional Question 6. What all-source intelligence is JTF-PA receiving from DIA regarding specific North Vietnamese units and unit commanders responsible for the shootdown, death, and/or capture of missing servicemen?

DIA provides District Intelligence Plans (DIP) prior to each Joint Field Activity. The DIP includes general historical unit order of battle information and names of indigenous personnel when related to unaccounted for cases. DIA also provides correlated SIGINT, other HUMINT, and IMINT derived material where applicable, however, most of this is background information and not usually case specific. This information is supplemented by pertinent analysis of witness and refugee statements, to include wartime, post-war, and current reporting. The most complete and exhaustive intelligence on North Vietnamese units and respective commanders is through exploitation of Vietnamese archival records. Access to these archives has thus far been limited.

Additional Question 7. Has JTF-PA asked to interview Senior Colonel Nguyen Sang, wartime Director of North Vietnam's Prison Management Department and review his records?

JTF-PA has no record of previous requests to interview Senior Colonel Sang. JTF-PA research indicates Colonel Sang may also be known as Nguyen Thanh, or Nguyen Thanh, who was first introduced to JCRC in December 1982 as a representative of the Ministry of Interior and served as a public security representative on the WDSRP staff until 1986. Nguyen attended Dec 82, Jun 83, Aug 84, Oct 84, Feb 85, Apr 85, Nov 85, Feb 86, Aug 87, Oct 87, and Jan 88 technical meetings. Nguyen Thanh was last observed in early 1989 interviewing refugees being repatriated from Hong Kong at Noi Bai Airport. JTF-PA will make inquiries during August to determine status or location of Nguyen Thanh for possible follow up.

Additional Question 8. Has JTF-PA asked to interview Pathet Lao Colonel Kham La, whose duties included responsibility for U.S. POW/MIA matters?

During the 30 January 1989 consultative meeting JCRC requested permission from the Lao Government to conduct an interview with Colonel Kham La. At the 1 February 1990 consultative meeting, JCRC identified Colonel Kham La as an individual who, they believed, had personal knowledge regarding the circumstances of the losses of two specific individuals (REFNO 0005-Moon and REFNO 0690-Knight). During the consultative meeting of 4 May 1991, JCRC inquired if Colonel Kham La had responded to questions previously posed to Vice Foreign Minister Souberh by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford. All of these inquiries were made as a matter of continuing interest on the part of the U.S. Government. To date, neither the former JCRC or Joint Task Force-Full Accounting has received any positive response to the requests to interview Colonel Kham La.

VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTS

CATALOG NO.	TITLE
1.	JOINT INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0313 -- VIET HAC MUSEUM
2.	BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 40-YEAR TRADITION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NHAN TRACH VILLAGE
3.	GOLDEN REGISTER OF MERIT (NHAN TRACH VILLAGE RECORD)
4.	LUC NGAN PRIVATE DIARY ENTITLED COMBAT CHRONOLOGY
5.	EXHIBITS AT MR4 MILITARY MUSEUM
6.	PHU NU ARTICLE
7.	TRADITION RECORD OF ARMED FORCES OF LE NINH DISTRICT
8.	BO TRACH DISTRICT STATISTICAL DATA
9.	DOCUMENT FROM HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE
10.	TRANSLATION OF A VIETNAMESE BURIAL REPORT
11.	ITEMS AT MR4 MILITARY MUSEUM
12.	MR4 MUSEUM EXHIBIT REGISTRY
13.	ITEMS AT QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSEUM
14.	BO TRACH TRADITION HOUSE
15.	AMERICAN MANUFACTURED PISTOLS EXAMINED AT MR4 MUSEUM
16.	MR4 DOCUMENT OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES
17.	EXCERPTS FROM MR4 MUSEUM REGISTRY
18.	GRAVES IN VINH LINH
19.	GRAVES IN HA TINH
20.	GRAVES IN QUANG BINH
21.	KILLED AND TORN APART IN MR4
22.	AIRCRAFT DOWNED BY 14TH BN IN MR4
23.	PAVN 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT TRADITION HOUSE

Encl 1

24.	PERSONAL DIARY DUONG THUY VILLAGE
25.	FIRING ON AMERICAN AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS STATISTICIAN DIARY
26.	QUANG BINH RESISTANCE; STATISTICIAN DIARY
27.	BOOK: SRV AIR DEFENSE
28.	BOOK: AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE; A MEMOIR
29.	HAI PHONG MUSEUM EXHIBIT

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY 1 CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0011
0011-0-01 GERBER, DANIEL A.
0011-0-02 VIETTI, ELEANOR A.
0011-0-03 MITCHELL, ARCHIE E.

** Case: 0054
0054-1-01 MCLEAN, JAMES H.

** Case: 0094
0094-0-01 DALE, CHARLES A.
0094-1-02 DEMMON, DAVID S.

** Case: 0105
0105-0-01 LINDSEY, MARVIN H.

** Case: 0107
0107-1-01 WILLIAMSON, DON T.

** Case: 0114
0114-1-01 KOSKO, WALTER

** Case: 0168
0168-2-01 MAYER, RODERICK L.

** Case: 0179
0179-1-01 POWERS, TRENT R.

** Case: 0213
0213-2-01 HIMS, GEORGE I.

** Case: 0247
0247-1-01 HANSON, ROBERT T.

** Case: 0304
0304-0-01 TROMP, WILLIAM L.

** Case: 0318
0318-0-01 REILLY, EDWARD D.

** Case: 0322
0322-0-01 BRUCH, DONALD W.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY 1 CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0333
0333-0-01 DEXTER, BENNIE L.

** Case: 0459
0459-1-01 ROBERTSON, JOHN L.

** Case: 0531
0531-1-01 GREGORY, ROBERT R.

** Case: 0607
0607-0-01 SMALL, BURT C.

** Case: 0611
0611-1-01 PUTNAM, CHARLES L.

** Case: 0615
0615-1-01 KARINS, JOSEPH J.

** Case: 0650
0650-1-01 TUCKER, EDWIN B.

** Case: 0656
0656-0-01 ESTOCIN, MICHAEL J.

** Case: 0659
0659-0-01 POLLIN, GEORGE J.

** Case: 0677
0677-0-01 NETHERLAND, ROGER M.

** Case: 0680
0680-2-01 JEFFERSON, JAMES H.

** Case: 0691
0691-1-01 PATTERSON, JAMES K.

** Case: 0711
0711-1-01 BLACKHOOD, GORDON B.

** Case: 0727
0727-0-01 APODACA, VICTOR J.
0727-0-02 BUSCH, JON T.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY I CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0761
0761-0-01 DOVE, JACK P.
0761-0-02 SQUIRE, BOYD E.

** Case: 0762
0762-0-01 SCHIELE, JAMES F.
0762-0-02 VAN BENDERGOM, JAMES L.

** Case: 0785
0785-1-01 BLSZ, RALPH C.

** Case: 0855
0855-1-01 FULLAM, WAYNE E.

** Case: 0859
0859-0-01 DERRICKSON, THOMAS G.
0859-0-02 HARDY, JOHN K.

** Case: 0873
0873-0-01 CLARK, RICHARD C.

** Case: 0903
0903-1-01 MORGAN, JAMES S.
0903-2-02 HUNEYCUTT, CHARLES J.

** Case: 0904
0904-1-01 CREW, JAMES A.
0904-1-02 COOK, KELLY F.

** Case: 0909
0909-1-01 CAPPELLI, CHARLES E.

** Case: 0913
0913-0-01 DARDEAU, OSCAR M.
0913-0-02 LEHNHOFF, EDWARD V.

** Case: 0928
0928-0-01 BRENNAN, HERBERT O.
0928-0-02 CONDIT, DOUGLAS C.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY I CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0976
0976-2-01 REHE, RICHARD R.
0976-3-02 SYKES, DERRI

** Case: 1010
1010-0-01 COCHED, RICHARD N.

** Case: 1028
1028-0-01 JOHNS, VERNON Z.

** Case: 1035
1035-1-01 GODWIN, SOLOMON H.

** Case: 1205
1205-1-01 SCHMIDT, WALTER R.

** Case: 1234
1234-0-01 GREILING, DAVID S.

** Case: 1274
1274-1-01 PRIDEMORE, DALLAS R.

** Case: 1318
1318-0-01 CORINTHWAITE, THOMAS G.
1318-0-02 SIMPSON, JAMES E.

** Case: 1321
1321-1-01 ERSKINE, JACK D.

** Case: 1327
1327-1-01 CUTHBERT, BRADLEY G.

** Case: 1329
1329-1-01 FRANCISCO, SAN D.
1329-1-02 MORRISON, JOSEPH C.

** Case: 1388
1388-1-01 BRUCHER, JOHN H.

** Case: 1414
1414-1-01 BOWERS, RICHARD L.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY I CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 1456
1456-0-01 SPARKS, DONALD L.

** Case: 1523
1523-1-01 GRAF, JOHN G.

** Case: 1639
1639-0-01 PEDERSON, JOE P.
1639-0-02 ROZO, JAMES M.
1639-0-03 PHILLIPS, ROBERT P.

** Case: 1737
1737-0-02 TERRILL, PHILIP B.
1737-1-01 SALLEY, JAMES J.

** Case: 1747
1747-0-02 PEARCE, DALE A.
1747-1-01 SOYLAND, DAVID P.

** Case: 1835
1835-0-01 YONAN, KENNETH J.

** Case: 1843
1843-1-01 WILES, MARVIN B.

** Case: 1901
1901-1-01 BROWN, WAYNE G.

** Case: 1927
1927-1-01 BORAH, DANIEL V.

** Case: 1943
1943-0-01 TOLBERT, CLARENCE O.

** Case: 1982
1982-2-01 HALL, HARLEY H.

TOTALS: 80 INDIVIDUALS IN 62 CASES.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY II CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0031
0031-0-01 GREER, ROBERT L.
0031-0-02 SCHRECKENGOST, FRED T.

** Case: 0124
0124-1-01 MELLOR, FREDRIC M.

** Case: 0158
0158-0-01 MASSUCCI, MARTIN J.
0158-1-02 SCHARF, CHARLES J.

** Case: 0235
0235-0-01 EGAN, JAMES T.

** Case: 0258
0258-1-01 NEWTON, DONALD S.
0258-2-02 WILLS, FRANCIS D.

** Case: 0349
0349-1-01 STEEN, MARTIN W.

** Case: 0358
0358-0-01 HARRIS, GREGORY J.

** Case: 0453
0453-1-01 TATUM, LAWRENCE B.

** Case: 0641
0641-1-01 OGRADY, JOHN F.

** Case: 0647
0647-0-01 HAMILTON, ROGER D.

** Case: 0678
0678-0-01 ASHLOCK, CARLOS

** Case: 0703
0703-0-01 WROBLESKI, WALTER F.

** Case: 0728
0728-0-01 PLATT, ROBERT L.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY II CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0804
0804-2-01 SITTNER, RONALD N.

** Case: 0805
0805-2-01 LANE, CHARLES

** Case: 0826
0826-1-01 MOORE, HERBERT W.

** Case: 0986
0986-1-01 MORNE, STANLEY H.

** Case: 1086
1086-1-01 MAMM, JAMES E.

** Case: 1112
1112-0-01 CICHON, WALTER A.

** Case: 1402
1402-0-01 MCCONNELL, JOHN T.

** Case: 1428
1428-0-01 NEWTON, CHARLES V.
1428-0-02 PREVEDEL, CHARLES F.
1428-0-03 DAWHILL, DOUGLAS E.

** Case: 1572
1572-0-01 SCULL, GARY B.

** Case: 1598
1598-1-01 WHEELER, EUGENE L.

** Case: 1680
1680-0-01 PLASSMEYER, BERNARD H.

** Case: 1723
1723-1-01 JEFFS, CLIVE G.

** Case: 1748
1748-0-01 ENTRICAN, DANNY D.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
VESSEY II CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 1756
1756-0-01 STROHLEIN, MADISON A.

** Case: 1820
1820-0-01 POTTS, LARRY F.
1820-1-02 WALKER, BRUCE C.

** Case: 1868
1868-0-01 MORROW, LARRY K.

** Case: 1882
1882-0-01 MCCARTY, JAMES L.

** Case: 1934
1934-1-01 ANDERSON, ROBERT D.

** Case: 1981
1981-0-01 MORRIS, GEORGE W.
1981-0-02 PETERSON, MARK A.

TOTALS: 39 INDIVIDUALS IN 32 CASES.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0011
0011-0-01 GERBER, DANIEL A.
0011-0-02 VIETTI, ELEANOR A.
0011-0-03 MITCHELL, ARCHIE E.

** Case: 0050
0050-1-01 COOK, DONALD G.

** Case: 0051
0051-0-01 DODGE, EDWARD R.
0051-0-02 McDONALD, KURT C.

** Case: 0054
0054-1-01 McLEAN, JAMES H.

** Case: 0094
0094-0-01 DALE, CHARLES A.
0094-1-02 DEYMON, DAVID S.

** Case: 0096
0096-1-01 HAGEN, CRAIG L.
0096-1-02 HALL, WALTER L.
0096-1-03 CURLEE, ROBERT L.
0096-1-04 COMPA, JOSEPH J.
0096-1-05 OWENS, FRED H.
0096-1-06 SAEGAERT, DONALD R.
0096-1-07 JOHNSON, BRUCE G.

** Case: 0108
0108-0-01 BRAM, RICHARD C.
0108-0-02 DINGWALL, JOHN F.

** Case: 0109
0109-0-01 TAYLOR, FRED
0109-0-02 GALLANT, HENRY J.

** Case: 0158
0158-0-01 MASSUCCI, MARTIN J.
0158-1-02 SCHARF, CHARLES J.

** Case: 0180
0180-2-01 ADAMS, SAMUEL

Note 1:

Fate has been determined for one of the two individuals in case 0158.
Identity of individual unknown.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO Name

0180-2-02 DUSTING, CHARLES G.
0180-2-03 MOORE, THOMAS

** Case: 0213
0213-2-01 MIMS, GEORGE I.

** Case: 0235
0235-0-01 EGAN, JAMES T.

** Case: 0242
0242-0-01 HODGSON, CECIL J.
0242-0-02 TERRY, RONALD T.
0242-1-03 BADOLATI, FRANK N.

** Case: 0258
0258-1-01 NEWTON, DONALD S.

** Case: 0267
0267-0-01 PETERSON, DELBERT R.
0267-0-02 FOSTER, ROBERT E.
0267-0-03 COLLINS, WILLARD H.

** Case: 0304
0304-0-01 TROMP, WILLIAM L.

** Case: 0326
0326-0-01 MALONE, JIMMY H.

** Case: 0333
0333-0-01 DEXTER, BENNIE L.

** Case: 0344
0344-0-01 BUCKLEY, LOUIS J.

** Case: 0372
0372-0-01 ELLIS, WILLIAM J.

** Case: 0381
0381-0-01 GAGE, ROBERT H.

** Case: 0386
0386-0-01 NESTLE, ROOSEVELT J.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0439
0439-0-01 BABULA, ROBERT L.
0439-0-02 BORTON, ROBERT C.
0439-0-03 BODENSCHATZ, JOHN E.
0439-0-04 CARTER, DENNIS R.

** Case: 0453
0453-1-01 TATUM, LAWRENCE B.

** Case: 0529
0529-1-01 NIEHOUSE, DANIEL L.

** Case: 0607
0607-0-01 SMALL, BURT C.

** Case: 0641
0641-1-01 OGRADY, JOHN F.

** Case: 0644
0644-0-01 HAMILTON, JOHN S.

** Case: 0646
0646-0-01 HASENBECK, PAUL A.
0646-0-02 HANGINO, THOMAS A.
0646-0-03 WINTERS, DAVID H.
0646-0-04 HEDDS, DANIEL R.

** Case: 0647
0647-0-01 HAMILTON, ROGER D.

** Case: 0656
0656-0-01 ESTOCIN, MICHAEL J.

** Case: 0677
0677-0-01 NETHERLAND, ROGER M.

** Case: 0678
0678-0-01 ASHLOCK, CARLOS

** Case: 0689
0689-1-01 DELONG, JOE L.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0703
0703-0-01 WROBLESKI, WALTER F.

** Case: 0706
0706-0-01 BACKUS, KENNETH F.
0706-0-02 PERRINE, ELTON L.

** Case: 0715
0715-0-01 MCGAR, BRIAN K.
0715-0-02 FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E.
0715-0-03 JAKOVAC, JOHN A.

** Case: 0723
0723-0-01 IBANEZ, DI R.

** Case: 0728
0728-0-01 PLATT, ROBERT L.

** Case: 0762
0762-0-02 VAN BENDEGOM, JAMES L.

** Case: 0804
0804-2-01 SITTHNER, RONALD N.

** Case: 0805
0805-2-01 LANE, CHARLES

** Case: 0839
0839-0-01 PLUMADORE, KENNETH L.

** Case: 0867
0867-0-01 FITZGERALD, PAUL L.
0867-0-02 HARGROVE, OLIN J.

** Case: 0903
0903-1-01 MORGAN, JAMES S.

** Case: 0904
0904-1-01 CREW, JAMES A.
0904-1-02 COOK, KELLY F.

00 Note 2:

Fate has been determined for one of the individuals in case 0804 or 0905.
Identity of individual unknown.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 0928
0928-0-01 BRENNAN, HERBERT O.
0928-0-02 CONDIT, DOUGLAS C.

** Case: 0930
0930-0-01 MILLNER, MICHAEL

** Case: 0937
0937-1-01 GRZYB, ROBERT H.

** Case: 0952
0952-0-01 INNES, ROGER B.
0952-0-02 LEE, LEONARD M.

** Case: 0977
0977-1-01 FISCHER, RICHARD W.

** Case: 0997
0997-0-01 JOHNSON, WILLIAM D.

** Case: 1004
1004-0-01 DUNN, MICHAEL E.
1004-0-02 EIDSHOE, NORMAN E.

** Case: 1017
1017-1-01 BLOOD, HENRY F.

** Case: 1018
1018-1-01 OLSEN, BETTY A.

** Case: 1042
1042-1-01 HAMMOND, DENNIS W.

** Case: 1046
1046-0-01 BROWN, HARRY W.
1046-0-02 ROE, JERRY L.
1046-0-03 GUNN, ALAN W.
1046-0-04 GROTH, MADE L.

** Case: 1065
1065-0-01 HUNT, ROBERT W.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO Name

** Case: 1086
1086-1-01 HAMM, JAMES E.

** Case: 1093
1093-1-01 RAY, JAMES M.

** Case: 1112
1112-0-01 CICHON, WALTER A.

** Case: 1131
1131-1-01 HELD, JOHN W.

** Case: 1205
1205-1-01 SCHMIDT, WALTER R.

** Case: 1244
1244-0-01 FOWLER, DONALD R.
1244-0-02 HASTINGS, STEVEN M.
1244-0-03 RUSSELL, PETER J.

** Case: 1258
1258-0-01 ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO

** Case: 1260
1260-1-01 FERGUSON, WALTER J.

** Case: 1274
1274-1-01 PRIDEMORE, DALLAS R.

** Case: 1308
1308-0-01 FINLEY, DICKIE W.

** Case: 1321
1321-1-01 ERSKINE, JACK D.

** Case: 1327
1327-1-01 CUTHBERT, BRADLEY G.

** Case: 1329
1329-1-01 FRANCISCO, SAN D.
1329-1-02 MORRISON, JOSEPH C.

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JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO	Name
** Case: 1375	1375-2-01 KALIL, TANOS E.
** Case: 1388	1388-1-01 BRUCHER, JOHN M.
** Case: 1402	1402-0-01 McDONNELL, JOHN T.
** Case: 1428	1428-0-01 NEWTON, CHARLES V. 1428-0-02 PREVEDEL, CHARLES F. 1428-0-03 DAHILL, DOUGLAS E.
** Case: 1456	1456-0-01 SPARKS, DONALD L.
** Case: 1572	1572-0-01 SCULL, GARY B.
** Case: 1598	1598-1-01 WHEELER, EUGENE L.
** Case: 1639	1639-0-02 ROZO, JAMES M. 1639-0-03 PHILLIPS, ROBERT P.
** Case: 1660	1660-0-01 PLASSMEYER, BERNARD H.
** Case: 1668	1668-1-01 STRATT, DOUGLAS F.
** Case: 1723	1723-1-01 JEFFS, CLIVE G.
** Case: 1747	1747-1-01 SOYLAND, DAVID P.
** Case: 1748	1748-0-01 ENTRICAN, DANNY D.

Page No. 8
06/15/92

JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL ACCOUNTING
ADP Support Section
CURRENT FOCUS VESSEY CASES

REFNO	Name
** Case: 1756	1756-0-01 STROWLEIN, MADISON A.
** Case: 1810	1810-0-01 WORTH, JAMES F.
** Case: 1816	1816-0-01 DUNLOP, THOMAS E.
** Case: 1820	1820-0-01 POTTS, LARRY F. 1820-1-02 WALKER, BRUCE C.
** Case: 1868	1868-0-01 MORROW, LARRY K.
** Case: 1927	1927-1-01 BORAH, DANIEL V.
** Case: 1981	1981-0-01 MORRIS, GEORGE W. 1981-0-02 PETERSON, MARK A.
** Case: 1982	1982-2-01 HALL, HARLEY H.
** Case: 2044	2044-0-01 GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G.

TOTALS: 135 INDIVIDUALS IN 92 CASES.

HIA / BNR - A T I S T I C S
AS OF: 22 June 1992

762

	SOUTH VIETNAM	NORTH VIETNAM	LAOS	CAMBODIA	CHINA	TOTAL
ARMY	515	10	111	38	0	674
NAVY	95	303	40	2	8	448
AIR FORCE	202	260	335	21	0	818
MARINE CORPS	216	31	22	14	0	283
COAST GUARD	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	1029	604	508	75	8	2224
U.S. CIVILIAN	25	0	11	6	0	42
TOTAL	1054	604	519	81	8	2266

763

16 STONY BEACH CONFIDENTIALITY 37:

IT NUMBER 34 : CONTACTED 32:
CATEGORY: 6

BY LOCATED 23 : TH STATE/CITY 15 :
RY REPORTED 10 : LA
E SIGHTING 46 : POW-F/H CRS-M
SIGHTING 42 : VH190570 11 202440N 12 1041324E

SOURCES 27 :

IONS 51 :
871005 STONY IR#60240173-B7
871005 DADBK TH-03 0507727Z
871008 STONY 080427Z 810
881020 IAC REVIEW BOARD
890130 PMMIA SDR S-VOP05242
890405 STONY IR#60240142-B7
890410 STONY 100826Z CHANGE

RRENT ACT 45 : 881020IAC APP'D NAME CAPTIVITY 39:

MARKS 36 : EVLAPP 1PW F105 VIENGXAI HOSP ANALYST 13: H


TE RECEIVED 8: 871016 DATE OF INFO 35 7312


SOURCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:

IGIN CODE 17: 0

LYGRAPH CATEGORY 53:

LYGRAPH RESULTS 24:





Encl to IIR 6 024 0100 88



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY LAO REFUGEE

SUMMARY: Lao refugee 40 has reported seeing three Caucasians in August 1975 in an area in northeastern Laos.

DETAILS: In November 1987, 40 reported to U.S. interviewers in 40 that in August 1975 he had observed three Caucasians fishing in an area somewhere along the Lao-Vietnam border. At the time of the sighting, 40 was a prisoner and part of a work detail from the city of Viengsay. 40 stated that the guards told him and members of his work detail that the Caucasians were American prisoners. 50 claimed that the sighting lasted three or four minutes, from a distance of from 20 to 30 meters.

ANALYSIS: 40 has been the source of a number of reports relative the PW issue and one of his previous firsthand sighting reports was adjudged to be an accurate account of the sighting of an American at Viengsay, namely, American civilian pilot 1 NAME. With regard to this current claimed sighting, a number of discrepancies were noted during analysis of the report and U.S. interviewers in 50 were asked to reinterview 40 to resolve the discrepancies. On 28 March 1988, 40 was interviewed with regard to his claimed sighting of three Caucasians in Laos in 1975. At that time, 40 readily admitted that the claimed firsthand sighting was not true, but rather, hearsay information that he had obtained in the refugee camp in 40.

EVALUATION: 40 was reporting hearsay rather than firsthand information when he claimed to have observed three Caucasians in 1975. Efforts will continue in 40 to identify and interview the Lao refugee or refugees that can discuss the possible presence of three Caucasian prisoners in Laos in 1975.

DATE OF EVALUATION: 6 April 1989

PW-MIA CATEGORY: Fabrication

OJCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTERNO FURTHER DISSE
OR INFO. FOR
PER. DAM. ONLY

COPY NUMBER 16

ROUTINE
064372 OCT 87
FM CSND BANGKOK TH/PH-VIA//
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//NO-PH/DA//

ZNY RUEDBA4455 210445Z

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 4445Z

SEP 87

RELIED DURING DUTY HOURS

THIS IS A STORY BEACH MESSAGE

SUBJECT: STORY BEACH BIOGRAPHIC REPORT RE: SEA
0049-87

1. NAME: *SD*
2. INFO: SOURCE: PLACE OF BIRTH NOT OBTAINED.
3. CITIZENSHIP/ETHNIC GROUP:
LAOTIAN/LAO.
4. SEX: MALE.

5. RELIGION: NOT OBTAINED.
6. MARITAL STATUS: *SD*
7. CURRENT ADDRESS: *SD*

8. *SD*
9. EDUCATIONAL HISTORY: PATRON 1-8 AT HOANG
DAI STREET SCHOOL, GRADUATED IN 1972 OR
1973.

10. MILITARY SERVICE/EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
SD

11. RE-EDUCATION CAMP/PRISON/DETENTION:
A. AFTER CAPTURE, SOURCE WAS ONE OF A
GROUP OF 47 PRISONERS TAKEN TO VIENTIANE
/VIENTIANE IN 1973// UNDER THE CUSTODY OF
VIETNAMESE GUARDS. THERE HE WAS LOCATED AT
BANGKOK IN A LARGE THREE-BUILDING AT PROU ME
BAI MOUNTAIN. PRISONERS WORKED IN THE
BATHING. IN DEC 74, SOURCE WAS ON A DETAIL
SENT BY TRUCK TO VIENTIANE TO PICK UP
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. WHILE IN VIENTIANE,
SOURCE ESCAPED AND TRAVELED TO LOANG PHANG
IN AN ISSED TRUCK DRIVEN BY THAO SI (LNU//).
FROM LOANG PHANG, SOURCE RETURNED HOME AT
BAN PAI PHAN, REACHING HOME ON JAN 75 AND
REMAINING THERE UNTIL JAN 79. ON 3 JUN 79,
SOURCE SAW THE NEERING RIVER TO ENTER THAILAND
AT SAKOLABHAI DISTRICT ACROSS FROM VIENTIANE.

- B. SOURCE ENTERED HONG THAI REFUGEE CAMP
ON 23 JUL 79. SOURCE BEGAN TO WORK FOR THE

ACTION DIA/SPC/181

(4)

MCH=87281/01230 TOR=87281/04382 TAD=87281/0527Z CDSN=MIAG28

PAGE 1
064372Z OCT 87
02 SECT MSG

LAO RESISTANCE UNDER LTC CHANGKON
([REDACTED]), WHO SOURCE CLAIMS IS NOW AN
ADVISOR TO THE IN PRO CAMP COMMANDER. LATE IN
1980, SOURCE WAS CAPTURED BY LAO FORCES.
FOLLOWING POLICE IN THE VICINITY OF BAN PAI THA
/VIENTIANE 1748/1048//, THE NEW
VIENTIANE. THE POLICE WERE IN THE AREA TO
INTERVIEW PRISONERS FROM LAOS TO THAILAND WHEN
SOURCE'S THREE BAN THA BLUNDERED INTO THEM
AND WAS CAPTURED. SOURCE WAS HELD IN 1110 B
PRISON, HATTAPOON DISTRICT, VIENTIANE
HOSPITALITY FOR 11 MONTHS. SOURCE WAS THEN
TRANSFERRED TO VIENTIANE HANGKONG POLICE
PRISON INTERROGATION CENTER WHERE HE REMAINED
FOR ANOTHER 11 MONTHS. SOURCE WAS THEN
TRANSFERRED TO THE NEW MILITARY PRISON IN
VIENTIANE UNTIL SOMETIME EARLY IN 1982.
SOURCE THEN TRANSFERRED TO THE HONG THAI
RE-EDUCATION CAMP; HONG PAI DISTRICT, LAOS
DURING WHICH TIME HE REMAINED FOR TWO
YEARS AND SIX MONTHS BEFORE ESCAPING WITH TWO
OTHER INMATE AND ONE PRISON GUARD. SOURCE
ADmits THIS WAS A DIFFICULT TRIP, EXPLAINING
THAT HE MADE HIS WAY TO THE BAN DANG RIVER.

SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 4445Z

COMMUNICATION SEP 87

RELIED DURING DUTY HOURS

THIS IS A STORY BEACH MESSAGE

SUBJECT: STORY BEACH BIOGRAPHIC REPORT RE: SEA

AND SPoke A WORD WHICH HE TOOK TO *SD*
SD, HIS HOME WHICH HE REACHED IN APR 84.

C. SOURCE WAS AGAIN ARRESTED AT HOME BY
LOANG PHANG DISTRICT POLICE (COMB DANG)
DURING LOANG PHANG. SOURCE WAS HELD IN
HONG PRISON IN LOANG PHANG FOR 1 YEAR AND 8
MONTHS. SOURCE ESCAPED WHILE RECEIVING
MEDICAL TREATMENT AT BANG HOSPITAL ON 1 JUN
81. (COMMENTS: SOURCE USED APR 84 AS THE
DATE OF HIS DISAPPEARANCE AND 11 APR 87 AS THE
DATE OF ESCAPE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SAYING
HE HAD BEEN HELD IN HONG PRISON FOR 1 YEAR AND
11 MONTHS. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THIS
DISCREPANCY, SOURCE SAID HE COULD NOT
EXPLAIN. THEN HE SAID HE HAD SPENT SOME TIME
AT HOME AT BAN PAI PHAN BETWEEN AFTER APR 84
AND WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED, AND HAD SOME
FARM WORK FOR RELATIVES. THIS TIME ACCORDING
FOR PART OF THE DISCREPANCY, HE EXPLAINED).
SOURCE ENTERED IN PRO CAMP ON 10 JUN 87, WHERE
HE WAS REHABILITATED SOURCE.

12. RELATIVES:

RELATION NAME AGE RESIDENCE

FATHER

MOTHER

SISTER

SISTER

SISTER

BROTHER

1E 3

1D 4 2 9549

4 16 SEA C STONY BEACH CONFIDENTIALITY 37

AT NUMBER 34: CONTACTED 32: 7
CATEGORY:

TRY LOCATED 23: TH STATE/CITY 15:
TRY REPORTED 10: VS
PE SIGHTING 46: CAMP JIN ONLY
T SIGHTING 42: TF560020 11 12

BSOURCES 27: PRISON
TIONS 51: 871124 STONY IR#60240117-88
871124 DA08K TH-03/2410397

RRENT ACT 45: ABSENCE OF AMERICANS CAPTIVITY 39:

MARKS 36: CAMPIN THANGON MILITARY PRISON AREA 1.3 1/2

TE RECEIVED 8: 871217 DATE OF INFO 35 8205

T DATE 38: ADDRESS 25:

IGIN CODE 17: 0

LYGRAPH CATEGORY 53

LYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

IS25173

DUPLICATE INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTER

NO FURTHER DISSEM
OR REPRO. REL
PER DAM ONLY

COPY NUMBER-----

ASSOCIATION WITH RESISTANCE GROUPS: REFER
TO PARAGRAPH 11.

COMMENTS: A. SOURCE PROVIDED INFORMATION
REPORTED IN LIT'S O 024 0170 07, 110 0 024
010 07, AND 0 024 002-02.

SOURCE PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFO TO HIS
ROOMMATE (NAME) (S), WHO IN TURN
PASSED THE INFO TO A MEMBER OF THE LAO
RESISTANCE GROUP (NAME) (S). SKETCHES OF
PLACES WHERE SOURCE WAS OVERHEARD, NAME OF
VICTIM, DETAILS OF A BALCONY PROVINGHAM PLANT
TO PROTECT A UNITED INTERNS CASUALTY TEAM
RELATING TO VOLUNTARY REPARATION OF LAO
REFUGEES, AND OTHER REPORTS ABOUT LAO REFUGEES
FROM BAN FAN AND BAN INTER (S). SOURCE
CLAIMED HIS ROOMMATE MAY EVEN BE AN AMERICAN
IS HELD IN LAOS, BUT HE IS NOT YET READY TO BE
INTERVIEWED BY THE SUBJECT. HIS ROOMMATE SENT
ALONG A SAMPLE OF HIS WORK. A SKETCH OF
BAN NEU. SOURCE WOULD NOT RELEASE THE SKETCH
FOR FEAR HIS ROOMMATE (NAME) MIGHT THINK
SOURCE WAS PASSED IT OFF AS SOURCE'S OWN WORK.

DATE/PLACE OF REPARATION NUMBER: 10, 17, 18
SENT: SP 70-01

ME 8 70 71020 110 0 024 002-02

4 70 CONFIDENTIALITY 87

AL NUMBER 30 CONTACTED 301
CATEGORY 1A

TRY LOCATED 03 TH STATE/CITY 10

TRY REPORTED 10: LA

RE SIGHTING 46: GRV-HSY

SIGHTING 42: 11 12

SSOURCES 27 XREF REMARK

SS

SS

CTIONS 01 880106 JCRCL 187-039 MSG

880106 JCRCL DTG 461428Z

RENT ACT 40 CAPTIVITY 30

MARKS 06 EVLREN 1 GRV MFI N LAOS 86 ANALYST 10: 10

WE RECEIVED 8: 880421 DATE OF INFO 30 8808

DATE 30: ADDRESS 20

COIN CODE 17: 8

LYGRAPH CATEGORY 03

LYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

1821069

NOV-87281/01230 TOR-87281/04282 TAD-87281/05272 CDSN-MIA628

PAGE 2 OF 2
090427Z OCT 87
02 0000 0000

PAGE 2
PAGE 1

NAME 2 7100

A 16 56 STONY BEACH CONFIDENTIALITY 37

JAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 32: 1A
CATEGORY:

JTRY LOCATED 23: TH STATE/CITY 15

JTRY REPORTED 10: LA

JPE SIGHTING 46: POW-F/H CRS-H

JST SIGHTING 42: VH190570 11 12

JDSOURCES 27: PASOUT
JCTIONS 51: 871005 STONY IR#60270173-87
871005 DADOK TH-03 05077277
871008 STONY 080427Z 810

JURRENT ACT 45: CAPTIVITY 39:

JMARKS 36: POW REG 1PW F105 VIENNAI HOSP ANALYST 13: AN

JATE RECEIVED 8: 871016 DATE OF INFO 35 7012

JAT DATE 38: ADDRESS 23:

JIGIN CODE 17: 0

JLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 00 NON-PRISONER

JLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

NAME 3

ID # 1 9428

KA 16

CONFIDENTIALITY 37

JAT NUMBER 34

CONTACTED 32: 5
CATEGORY

JTRY LOCATED 23: TH STATE/CITY 15

JTRY REPORTED 10: LA

JPE SIGHTING 46: NO PW INFO

JST SIGHTING 42: 11 12

JDSOURCES 27: PASOUT
JCTIONS 51: 871005 STONY IR#60270173-87
871005 DADOK TH-03 05077277

JURRENT ACT 45

CAPTIVITY 39

JMARKS 36: POW REG 1PW F105 VIENNAI HOSP ANALYST 13: AN

JATE RECEIVED 8: 871016 DATE OF INFO 35 7012

JAT DATE 38: ADDRESS 23:

JIGIN CODE 17: 0

JLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 00 NON-PRISONER

JLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

DISSEMINATE

1025173

ME 18 ID # 1 8421
 AT NUMBER 34 CONFIDENTIALITY 37
 CONTACTED 31
 CATEGORY 7
 ATTY LOCATED 23 17 TH STATE/CITY 13
 ATTY REPORTED 10: LA
 AFE SIGHTING 48: CAMP INFORMATION ONLY
 AT SIGHTING 42: 11 12
 RESOURCES 27 HAND PRISON
 55
 STIONS 51 871006 STONY IRAG001-13-87
 871016 DASH TN-03 061050E
 CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 37
 ENRMS 36 36 ANALYST 13 AN
 DATE RECEIVED 8: 871016 DATE OF INFO 35
 AT DATE 38: ADDRESS 25
 AFEIN CODE 17: 0
 POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 33:
 POLYGRAPH RESULTS 34:

ME 18 ID # 2 8430
 AT NUMBER 34 6D STONY BEACH CONFIDENTIALITY 37
 CONTACTED 31
 CATEGORY 7
 ATTY LOCATED 23 17 TH STATE/CITY 13
 ATTY REPORTED 10: LA
 AFE SIGHTING 48: CAMP INF 11 12
 AT SIGHTING 42: 11 12
 RESOURCES 27 55
 REED CAMP
 55
 STIONS 51 871013 STONY IRAG00140002-86
 871013 DASH TN-03 130850Z
 CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 37
 ENRMS 36 CAMPIN HOUAY THEUN REED CAMP ANALYST 13: AN
 DATE RECEIVED 8: 871016 DATE OF INFO 35 84
 AT DATE 38: ADDRESS 25
 AFEIN CODE 17: 0
 POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 33:
 POLYGRAPH RESULTS 34:

CONFIDENTIALITY 12 YES

ME 3 50 STONY BEACH CONFIDENTIALITY 27

A 15 50 STONY BEACH CONFIDENTIALITY 27

AT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 27 CATEGORY 1A

TRY LOCATED 23 TH STATE/CITY 15

TRY REPORTED 10 LA/VS

PE SIGHTING 46 POW F/H

IT SIGHTING 42 11 12

RESOURCES 27 CAMP 18A

WIDMS 51 071108 S'DNY IR860240104-88

071108 DAOCK TH-10 190804Z

URRENT ACT 45 CONFIDENTIALITY 27

MARKS 36 FOURER POW'S FISHING CAMP 10A ANALYST KN

ATS RECEIVED 8 071217 DATE OF INFO 27 1908

IT DATE 28 ADDRESS 29

RIGIN CODE 17 0

LYGRAPH CATEGORY 50 08 NON-PM

LYGRAPH RESULTS 24

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX938 MCN = 89095/14462 TOR = 890950847

RTTSZYU RUEKJCS6825 0950846 -RUEALGX

ZNY

HEADER

R 050846Z APR 89

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACHQ/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEADDA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC

RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQ/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEAHQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 050827Z APR 89

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-HIA//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-HIA/DAH/DAH-3//

INFO RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC EARL JACKSON//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-HIA//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PW-HIA//

RUEAHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//

RUEAHQA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/HIL//

RUEAHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEHKK/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR

RUEHKK/USDAO HONG KONG

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//PW- 16825

SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0142 89.

BODY

***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

COUNTRY LAGS (LA).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0142 89/ 50 ADMITS HIS REPORT
OF LIVE SIGHTING OF THREE CAUCASIANS IS ACTUALLY HEARSAY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 750800.

REQS: D-VOP-2430-04; S-VOP-05242; S-VOP-05159.

SOURCE: " /SOURCE IS A LOWLAND LAO REFUGEE, RESIDENT OF NA PHO CAMP. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT FROM AN UNNAMED SECONDARY SOURCE WHO IS ALSO A RESIDENT OF NA PHO. SOURCE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY BEACH REPORT FILED IN RESPONSE TO TWO DIA/PU-HIA SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENTS. SOURCE ADMITS THAT HIS NOVEMBER 1975 REPORT OF THREE ALLEGED AMERICANS CAPTIVE NEAR THE LAO-VIETNAM BORDER WAS A BEARSAY REPORT DERIVED FROM ANOTHER REFUGEE.

TEXT

1. IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSIVE QUESTIONING, SOURCE ADMITTED THAT HIS NOVEMBER 1987 LIVE SIGHTING REPORT OF THREE ALLEGED AMERICAN PRISONERS WAS IN FACT BEARSAY. SOURCE CLAIMS A LAO REFUGEE NOW RESIDENT IN NA PHO CAMP IS THE ACTUAL SOURCE OF THE STORY, BUT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL FEARS RETRIBUTION BY LPDR AGENTS IF HE COOPERATES WITH USG IN PW RELATED MATTERS. SOURCE DECLINED TO NAME THE SECONDARY SOURCE. SOURCE ADAPTED THE STORY IN HOPE OF GAINING FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION FOR RESETTLEMENT. SOURCE AGREES TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE SECONDARY SOURCE TO CONSENT TO MEET RO.

2. SOURCE MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CHANGES TO HIS REPORT.

A. SOURCE DOES NOT RECALL THE MONTH OF THE SIGHTING. THE YEAR OF THE SIGHTING WAS EITHER 1973 OR 1974. SOURCE STATED THAT AT THAT TIME, THE PATHET LAO HAD ENTERED VIETNAME, BUT HAD NOT YET SEIZED POWER. SOURCE WAS NO LONGER CERTAIN WHEN THE CAMP WAS FIRST USED FOR AMERICAN PRISONERS. HE INSISTED THAT THE SITE WAS CALLED "THAI (CAMP) 18" VICE "KONG 18" AS NOTED IN S VOP 05242 SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENT.

B. AS A PRISONER OF WAR, THE SECONDARY SOURCE WAS FORCED TO PERFORM HARD LABOR IN THE PATHET LAO VIENG XAI HEADQUARTERS AREA. THE PRISONERS WERE ORGANIZED INTO AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF 30 TO 35-MAN COMPANIES, WITH EACH COMPANY DIVIDED INTO THREE 10 TO 12 MAN TEAMS. THE SECONDARY SOURCE'S COMPANY WAS SUPERVISED BY A PATHET LAO OFFICER NAMED SENGHAN ((LNU)); HIS TEAM WAS SUPERVISED BY A PATHET LAO OF UNKNOWN RANK NAMED THIT-HANG ((LNU)). WHEN THE TEAM WAS ASSIGNED A JOB, THIT-HANG WOULD ESCORT THE TEAM AT ALL TIMES, BOTH FOR SECURITY AND SUPERVISION. THIT-HANG PROVIDED THE INFORMATION THAT THE CAUCASIANS WERE AMERICANS, AND THAT A TOTAL OF 30 AMERICANS WERE IMPRISONED AT CAMP 18. IN ADDITION TO THE SUPERVISOR, ROTATING DETAILS OF ONE OR TWO PATHET LAO SOLDIERS WERE

ASSIGNED TO HELP GUARD THE TEAMS AS THEY WORKED.

C. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT AREAS NEAR THE LAO-VIETNAM BORDER MIGHT BE DELINEATED ON MAPS AS LAO TERRITORY, BUT AT THE TIME OF HIS REPORT VIETNAM EXERCISED DE FACTO SOVEREIGNTY THERE. HE STATES THAT THE SITE IN QUESTION IS IN FACT INSIDE HOUA PHAM PROVINCE.

D. SOURCE COULD NAME ONLY THREE MEMBERS OF THE SECONDARY SOURCE'S TEAM; KEO, TUI, AND HORT. HE COULD GIVE NO SURNAMES, AND DOES NOT KNOW THE PRESENT LOCATION OF ANY OF THE TEAM MEMBERS SAVE THAT OF SECONDARY SOURCE, WHOSE NAME HE REFUSED TO DIVULGE.

E. REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS ON THE CAUCASIANS OBSERVED BY THE SECONDARY SOURCE, SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT PATHET LAO PERSONNEL WERE STATIONED THROUGHOUT THE SURROUNDING AREA. SECONDARY SOURCE SPECULATED THAT THE PRISONERS HAD FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OVER A SPECIFIED AREA, AND DID NOT DARE VENTURE BEYOND THOSE LIMITS. THE CAUCASIANS APPEARED APPREHENSIVE TO SECONDARY SOURCE AND NEITHER SIDE DARED INITIATE CONTACT.

F. SECONDARY SOURCE TOLD SOURCE THAT SOVIETS ARE PRESENT IN LAOS MOSTLY AT INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS AIRFIELDS OR LARGE HEADQUARTERS. SOURCE FURTHER MAINTAINS THAT SECONDARY SOURCE WAS AT ONE POINT TREATED BY A CUBAN DOCTOR AT VIENG XAI. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW HOW SECONDARY SOURCE LEARNED OF THE DOCTOR'S NATIONALITY.

G. SOURCE HELD STEADFAST TO HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE CAUCASIANS' CLOTHING. HE DESCRIBED THE WHITE CROSS ON THE BACK OF THE SHIRT AS "THE MARK OF A PRISONER." HOWEVER, NO LAO PRISONER WORE SUCH A MARK.

3. SOURCE REFUSED TO AGREE TO POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION WHILE HE REMAINS AT SD. HE STATES THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF RETRIBUTION BY LPDR AGENTS IS VERY REAL. SOURCE KNOWS AND BELIEVES THAT WAS NEITHER A REFUGEE NOR A RESISTANCE MEMBER. SOURCE HAS NOT SEEN IN SD SINCE MARCH 1988, BUT THINKS IT LIKELY THAT A REPLACEMENT FOR IS NOW PRESENT IN THE CAMP.

1. SOURCE COLLECTED AND ADAPTED PW INFORMATION TO IMPROVE HIS CHANCES FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. THE FEAR OF LPDR PRESENCE IN THE REFUGEE SYSTEM IS NOT UNUSUAL AMONG LOWLAND LAO REFUGEES IN THE THAILAND CAMPS. IT BECOMES MORE ACUTE IN SD WHENEVER THE SPECTER OF INVOLUNTARY REPATRIATION ARISES.

3. RO ENCOURAGED SOURCE TO PERSUADE HIS

SECONDARY SOURCE TO MEET RO HIMSELF, AT THE SAME TIME
REITERATING USG POLICY REGARDING PW-MIA RECOVERY.

4. USE OF THE TERM "KHAI" VICE "KONG" IS NOT
SIGNIFICANT IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE.

//IPSP: PG 2430//
//COMSOBJ 5217//
ADMIN
PROJ: 6999-10.
COLL: AB, AC.
INSTR: US, MO.
PREP: TH-13.
ACQ: 10 (890328)
DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCM, POL,
DATA/TLO JCRC).

#6825

NOON

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX663 MCN = 89031/13891 TOR = 890310914
RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS6603 0310849 -RUEALGX.

ZNY

HEADER

R 310849Z JAN 89
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
R 301417Z JAN 89
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VP-PW//
TO RUEHBA/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
INFO RUEHBE/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
RUEHBA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUEADWW/JSC WASHINGTON DC
BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02

NSC FOR RICHARD CHILDRESS
-0049/VP-PW

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
BODY

SUBJECT: SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENT

REF: USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA// MSG 190836Z NOV 87, SUBJ: IIR 6
024 0104-88/SIGHTING OF THREE CAUCASIAN PRISONERS NEAR LA/VN
BORDER.

1. IN REPLY CITE: S-VOP-05242. SOURCE: ✓
TITLE: PW/MIA INFORMATION COUNTRY: LA. OBJECTIVE: PG2430.
2. BACKGROUND:

A. IN ADDITION TO REFERENCED STONY BEACH IIR, LAO REFUGEE
SOURCE ✓ IS ALSO THE SOURCE FOR
IIRS 6 024 0173 87, 6 024 0178 87, 6 024 0185 87, AND 6 024 0002
87. IN REF STONY BEACH IIR, ✓ REPORTS THAT IN AUGUST 1975 HE
OBSERVED THREE CAUCASIANS WHILE PARTICIPATING IN A WOODCUTTING
DETAIL. THE SIGHTING WAS REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE NEAR CAMP
18A, LOCATED NEAR THE LAO-VIETNAM BORDER, AND INSIDE VIETNAM,
ACCORDING TO THE ROUTE OF TRAVEL DESCRIBED BY ✓. THE
CAUCASIANS WERE FISHING WHEN OBSERVED, AND WERE WITHOUT GUARDS OR
ANY TYPE PHYSICAL RESTRAINT; THE THREE CAUCASIANS WERE DESCRIBED AS
BEING DRESSED IN BLUE UNIFORMS WITH A WHITE CROSS ON THE BACK.

B. ✓ STATES THAT HE WAS TOLD BY GUARDS ASSIGNED TO HIS
WOODCUTTING DETAIL THAT THE CAUCASIANS WERE AMERICAN PRISONERS.
✓ AND HIS ELEVEN-MAN DETAIL APPROACHED TO WITHIN 20-30 METERS
FROM THE CAUCASIANS FOR SEVERAL MINUTES.

C. WITH REGARD TO NEARBY CAMP 18A, ✓ WAS TOLD BY A
PATROL LAO GUARD THAT IT HAD BEEN USED TO HOUSE DISABLED VETERANS
UNTIL JULY 1975, AFTER WHICH AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE MOVED INTO THE
CAMP.

D. VP-PW HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL LAO REFUGEES WHO WERE
FORMERLY HELD IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE AND LEARNED THE FOLLOWING WITH
REGARD TO CAMP 18A. THERE ARE ACTUALLY TWO CAMP 18'S IN HOUA PHAN
PROVINCE, 18A AND 18B; BOTH ARE REFERRED TO AS KONG, VICE CAMP.
KONG 18A IS LOCATED AT VH 164601, OPPOSITE BAN NATHENE AND EAST OF

PAGE:0011

ROUTE 65, AND APPROXIMATELY SIX KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF VIENGSAI. THIS CAMP HOUSES 200 DISABLED LPDR SOLDIERS, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN OFF LIMITS TO ALL REEDUCATION/SEMINAR INMATES. KONG 18A IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF VIENGSAI AUTHORITIES. ALTHOUGH *✓* IS PROBABLY DESCRIBING KONG 18A IN HIS REPORT, HIS LOCATION PLACES THE FACILITY WITHIN VIETNAM WHICH IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE ACTUAL LOCATION, WELL WITHIN THE BORDERS OF LAOS.

E. KONG 18B, ALSO KNOWN AS KONG 11, VH 330678, IS LOCATED NEAR HOANG CHA, ABOUT 23 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF SOP HAO, 100 METERS WEST OF ROUTE SIX AND THE NAM HAO RIVER. 18B HOUSES 60 DISABLED LPDR SOLDIERS, AND REEDUCATION/SEMINAR INMATES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ENTER 18B TO WORK INSIDE. 18B/11 IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOUA PHAM PROVINCE AUTHORITIES.

TEAR LINE-----TEAR LINE-----TEAR LINE
3. REQUIREMENTS: REQUEST FURTHER INTERVIEW OF *✓*

WITH REGARD TO HIS CLAIMED SIGHTING OF THREE CAUCASIANS TO COVER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND AREAS OF INTEREST:

A. DOES HE MAINTAIN THAT HE OBSERVED THREE CAUCASIANS NEAR CAMP 18A IN AUGUST 1975? DOES HE DESIRE TO CHANGE ANY PORTION OF THIS PARTICULAR SIGHTING REPORT? SINCE *✓* WAS INTERVIEWED AS FAR BACK AS NOVEMBER 1987, INTERVIEWER MAY HAVE TO TAKE *✓* BACK THROUGH DETAILS OF THE SIGHTING.

B. *✓* SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT CAMP/KONG 18A IS ACTUALLY LOCATED IN BOUA PHAM PROVINCE, VICE VIETNAM, AND THAT IT CONTINUES TO HOUSE DISABLED LPDR SOLDIERS. DOES HE FEEL THAT THE FACILITY IS ACTUALLY IN VIETNAM, VICE LAOS?

C. IS *✓* CERTAIN OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE CAUCASIANS, THAT THEY WERE IN BLUE UNIFORMS WITH WHITE CROSSES ON THE BACK? DID HE ADD THIS DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION TO HIS REPORT FOR SOME REASON?

D. *✓* REPORTED THE FIRST NAMES OF ONLY SIX MEMBERS OF HIS ELEVEN-MAN WORK DETAIL; CAN HE RECALL THE LAST NAMES OF ANY OF THE SIX AND/OR THE FIRST AND LAST NAMES OF THE REMAINING MEMBERS? IF THIS INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE, VP-PH WILL COORDINATE WITHIN THE LAO REFUGEE COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN ATTEMPT TO LOCATE NAMED INDIVIDUALS.

E. ARE ANY OF THE MEMBERS OF HIS FORMER WORK DETAIL NOW LOCATED IN THAILAND AND AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW? ANYONE SO IDENTIFIED SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED WITH REGARD TO THE SIGHTING.

F. CAN *✓* EXPLAIN WHY THE THREE CAUCASIAN PRISONERS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GUARDED OR HELD UNDER ANY TYPE PHYSICAL RESTRAINT?

G. DOES *✓* REMEMBER THE NAMES OF EITHER OF THE TWO GUARDS WHO REPORTEDLY TOLD HIS GROUP THAT THE CAUCASIANS WERE AMERICAN PRISONERS; DID THE GUARDS ACTUALLY STATE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS WERE AMERICAN PRISONERS; SUPPOSE NO ONE HAD STATED THAT THE CAUCASIANS WERE AMERICANS, HOW WOULD HE HAVE DESCRIBED THE CAUCASIANS; ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD HE HAVE EVEN REPORTED THE SIGHTING?

H. WHAT DOES *✓* KNOW ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIETS, AMERICANS OR OTHER CAUCASIANS WITHIN BOUA PHAM PROVINCE?

I. WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF THE CAUCASIANS TO THE PRESENCE OF WORK DETAIL COMING INTO THE AREA; SHOCK, SURPRISE?

J. DID THE CAUCASIANS COMMUNICATE WITH THE MEMBERS OF *✓* GROUP AT ANY TIME, TO INCLUDE THE GUARDS; WHAT WAS SAID?

PAGE:0012

K. *✓* STATES THAT HE PASSED A FACILITY IN VIETNAM WHICH THE GUARD SAID WAS CAMP 18A. IS HE CERTAIN THAT THE FACILITY HE OBSERVED WAS IN VIETNAM; IS HE ALSO CERTAIN THAT THE GUARD STATED THAT THE FACILITY OBSERVED WAS CAMP 18A?

L. *✓* APPEARS TO BE MISTAKEN AS TO THE ACTUAL LOCATION OF THE FACILITY DESCRIBED AS CAMP 18A; COULD HE NOT ALSO BE MISTAKEN AS TO THE ACTUAL LOCATION OF THE SIGHTING, THAT IN FACT, HE WAS PROBABLY IN HOUA PHAM PROVINCE ON THE WOODCUTTING DETAIL WHEN THE SIGHTING OCCURRED?

M. WOULD *✓* AGREE TO POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO THE SIGHTING, IF REQUESTED IN THE FUTURE?

TEAR LINE-----TEAR LINE-----TEAR LINE
4. GUIDANCE:

B. REQUEST ALL RESPONSES TO THIS REQUIREMENT BE PREPARED IN MESSAGE FORMAT AND FORWARDED TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VP-PH//, WITH INFO FOR CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI AND JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH. ORIGINALS OR LEGIBLE PHOTOCOPIES OF ALL SKETCHES, DOCUMENTS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC. (EXCEPT HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS) SHOULD BE SENT VIA REGISTERED MAIL DIRECTLY TO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ATTN: VP-PH, ROOM 22230, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5390. IF HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS ARE RECEIVED, ADDRESSEES SHOULD SUBMIT AN IIR TO THAT EFFECT AND TRANSMIT AN ELECTRICAL MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI REQUESTING DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

C. IAW DOD POLICY, RESPONSES TO THIS REQUIREMENT WILL BE CLASSIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM, SECRET.
- (2) CRASH OR GRAVESITE REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM, CONFIDENTIAL.
- (3) ALL OTHER PH/MIA-RELATED INFORMATION (E.G. INFORMATION REGARDING REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, INCLUDING DOG TAGS, DETENTION CAMPS, ETC.): CONSISTENT WITH POLICY CONCERNING SOURCES, METHODS OF COLLECTION, AND CONTENT.

D. ORIGINATOR'S CONTROL NUMBER IS 5.

POC IS

SECURE

ADMIN

BT

#6604

NNNN



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY LAO REFUGEE

SUMMARY: Lao refugee source 9/ has reported seeing an American in 1973 in Viengsay, Houa Phan Province.

DETAILS: 9/ reports that while he was held in the seminar camp at Viengsay, Houa Phan Province, he was hospitalized in either November or December 1973 for a period of 15 days. During this period 9/ observed a Caucasian on three occasions; the individual was sitting at the entrance to caves in the area, and smoking a cigarette. 9/ was told that the Caucasian was an American F-105 pilot who had been captured in Houa Phan Province in 1972.

ANALYSIS: On 9 May 1973, American civilian pilot NAME crash Porter aircraft near the Plain of Jars area in central Laos and was immediately by the Lao Communists. NAME was eventually moved to V held in the caves there. NAME was released in August 1974. Upon re United States in 1974 NAME stated that he had been the sole American Viengsay, and that he knew of no other American prisoners in Laos.

EVALUATION: During his stay at Viengsay in late 1973, 9/ observed American civilian pilot NAME

DATE OF EVALUATION: 18 August 1988

YO-PW CATEGORY: Returnee

MSGNO 3 (PCX) *01/06/88* *10:08:38.1.5*
ZCZC 15:07:24Z (R)
EMI DTG : 88010609562158
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ZM
R 061450Z JAN 88
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADND/OSCA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//JO-CTC//
RUEAIIA/ANMCC FT RYCHIE MD
RUEADADA/AFIS ANNE BOLING AFB DC
RUEAIIA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//JO-CTC/TOXII//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEANCC/CSC CS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/DIEMSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//
RUEAIIA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEAIIA/AFM FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 061450Z JAN 88
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
INFO RUEBQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PH-MIA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PH-MIA//
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC-MR CHILDRESS//
RUEAIIA/EMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUEADUD/AMCONSUL UDORN
BT
EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 00720
3007 JAN 88

EZ2:
SUBJ: JCRC RPT T87-539; ALLEGED AMERICAN GRAVE SITES
IN NORTHERN LAOS
REF: A. PH-MIA BKK 050727Z OCT 87, IIR 6 024 0173 87
B. PH-MIA BKK 051056Z OCT 87, IIR 6 024 0178 87
C. PH-MIA BKK 061055Z OCT 87, IIR 6 024 0185 87
D. PH-MIA BKK 130853Z OCT 87, IIR 6 024 0002 88
E. PH-MIA BKK 190836Z NOV 87, IIR 6 024 0104 88
F. PH-MIA BKK 241039Z NOV 87, IIR 6 024 0117 88
SOURCE/ ADMIN DATA:
A. NAME: 9/ ✓
B. ID DATA: 40
C. DOB: 1952
D. ADDRESS: 9/

E. LANGUAGES: LAO
F. ALMOST INTERVIEWED ON 25 NOV 87 BY
MSGT, USAF.

2. SUMMARY: IN A LETTER WRITTEN TO JCRC, SOURCE PROVIDES LIMITED INFORMATION ABOUT ALLEGED AMERICAN GRAVESITES IN NORTHERN LAOS. HIS LETTER ALSO INCLUDES A REFERENCE TO AN AMERICAN PILOT WHO SURVIVED AND WAS CARED FOR AT A VIENGKAI HOSPTAL. THIS INFORMATION WAS REFERRED TO THE STONY BEACH TEAM FOR FOLLOW-UP. DURING SEVERAL INTERVIEW SESSIONS WITH STONY BEACH, SOURCE MAINTAINED THAT HE HAD VALID GRAVESITE INFORMATION. WHEN JCRC INTERVIEWER CONTACTED HIM, HE REFUSED TO COOPERATE, CITING "PERSONAL PROBLEMS". JCRC HAS SINCE RECEIVED TWO LETTERS FROM SOURCE ASKING FOR MONEY TO IMPROVE HIS LIFESTYLE AND TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. SOURCE IS APPARENTLY LINKED TO LAO E

A, WHO
PS MADE
SIMILAR ATTEMPTS TO GAIN USG SUPPORT FOR HIS ALLEGED POW/MIA INFORMATION GATHERING ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

3. INFORMATION: IN MID SEPTEMBER 1987, SOURCE CONTACTED JCRC BY LETTER DATED 10 SEPTEMBER 1987 WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING AMERICAN GRAVE SITES. HIS LETTER, WRITTEN IN LAO, READ IN PART (QUOTE): ... I HAVE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT MISSING AMERICANS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF LAOS. HERE IS A BRIEF LIST WITHOUT DETAIL:

1. ONE PILOT'S GRAVE AT MUANG BENG, UDOMKAI.
2. TWO PILOT'S GRAVES AT MUANG SING, LOUANCHANTHA.

3. PHATHI RADAR CENTER, FOUR HEADS IN A CAVE.
4. F-105 PILOT WHO CRASHED AND WAS INJURED AND THEN CARED FOR AT NAWIT HOSPITAL, VIENGKAI, HOUAPHAN (SAM NEUA) PROVINCE. (UNQUOTE)

4. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH FOR FOLLOW-UP ON SOURCE'S ITEM 4, ABOVE. STONY BEACH CONTACTED SOURCE, RESULTING IN A SERIES OF REPORTS (REFS A THRU F). IN EARLY OCTOBER 1987, STONY BEACH DEBRIEFER (TM-03) PROVIDED JCRC WITH A LETTER SOURCE HAD WRITTEN TO LAO REFUGEE S. A PREVIOUS SOURCE OF POW/MIA REPORTING) CONCERNING AMERICAN GRAVE SITES IN LAOS. THE LETTER, TRANSLATED FROM LAO, READS IN PART (QUOTE): I (SOURCE),

PROVINCE, SAW
THE GRAVE OF AN AMERICAN IN LAOS AT BAN NALOUANG, NAYA DISTRICT, UDOMKAI PROVINCE. THE GRAVE IS ABOUT 12 KILOMETERS FROM THAT VILLAGE, ABOUT TWO HOURS PLUS BY

FOOT TO THE NORTHEAST OF BAN NALOUANG. I SAW THIS GRAVE IN AUG 86. THE GRAVE IS STILL UNDISTURBED. I BURIED THE REMAINS. HE LIVES AT 124/44 AND KNOWS ALL THE DETAILS ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CRASH OF THE BEAVER "SIBALIYU" (PHONETIC) TYPE. I DON'T KNOW THE RANK, OR DATE OF THE CRASH. I JUST KNOW THIS IS THE GRAVE OF AN AMERICAN FOR SURE. THIS IS ALL I KNOW. (UNQUOTE)

5 JCRC INTERVIEWER CONTACTED SOURCE A. FD
ON 25 NOV 1987. SOURCE INFORMED JCRC INTERVIEWER THAT HE HAD MET WITH (STONY BEACH DEBRIEFER) THREE TIMES AND HAD PASSED MUCH INFORMATION CONCERNING AMERICAN PRISONERS. JCRC INTERVIEWER INFORMED SOURCE THAT HE WAS SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN THE AMERICAN GRAVE SITE INFORMATION HE HAD WRITTEN ABOUT IN HIS

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MSGNO 9 (PCIX) *01/06/88* *10:08:38.5.4*
 ZCZC 15:07:24Z (PC)
 ENI DTG : 88010609580621
 RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0720 0061450- -RUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 061450Z JAN 88
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//NO-CTC//
 RUEAIAA/ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEADADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//NO-CTC/TOXII//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANCC/CNC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEATIA/DINSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACMC/CNC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAJAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//
 RUEMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUEATIA/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 061428Z JAN 88
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEBQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 INFO RUEBQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//N -PW//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEADWH/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//WSC/MR CHILDRESS //
 RUEAFS/EMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEAUI/AMCONSUL UDORN
 BT
 EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 00720
 3007 JAN 88

EZ2:
 SUBJ: JCRC RPT T87-539; ALLEGED AMERICAN GRAVE SITES
 LETTER TO JCRC:
 6. SOURCE SAID HE WAS NOT YET CERTAIN WHETHER OR
 NOT HE WANTED TO COOPERATE IN PROVIDING THE GRAVE SITE
 INFORMATION, INDICATING THAT HE WAS PRESENTLY
 EXPERIENCING "FAMILY" PROBLEMS AND "OTHER PROBLEMS". HE
 SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD REVEAL
 HIS INFORMATION, AND WOULD RETURN THE FOLLOWING DAY TO
 LET JCRC INTERVIEWER KNOW OF HIS DECISION.
 7. JCRC INTERVIEWER EXPLAINED THE HUMANITARIAN
 ASPECTS OF THE USG'S EFFORT TO ACCOUNT FOR ITS MISSING.
 SOURCE RESPONDED THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT MANY REFUGEES IN
 SO POSSESS INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE OF VALUE TO

THE USG, BUT "FOR VARIOUS REASONS" THEY DID NOT WISH TO
 SHARE THIS INFORMATION WITH AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL.
 SOURCE SUGGESTED THAT THE USG WOULD HAVE BETTER RESULTS
 IF A REFUGEE IN THE CAMP, LIKE HIMSELF, WERE EMPLOYED TO
 CONTACT OTHER REFUGEES TO OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION. JCRC
 INTERVIEWER EXPLAINED THAT HIRING A REFUGEE WOULD NOT BE
 POSSIBLE, AND ASKED HIM AGAIN IF HE WOULD SHARE HIS
 ALLEGED GRAVE SITE INFORMATION. SOURCE SAID HE'D THINK
 IT OVER AND RETURN "TOMORROW". THE FOLLOWING DAY SOURCE
 DID NOT RETURN.

8. COMMENTS: SINCE HIS MEETING WITH JCRC
 INTERVIEWER, SOURCE HAS WRITTEN TWO ADDITIONAL LETTERS.
 IN HIS FIRST LETTER, WRITTEN IN LAO, DATED 4-11-87, HE
 STATES IN PART (QUOTE): ... I'M SORRY I DID NOT PROVIDE
 DETAILS TO YOU WHEN YOU CAME TO SEE ME, BUT IT WAS
 BECAUSE I HAD PERSONAL PROBLEMS, IN THAT I HAVE TO
 DEFEND ON OTHERS WHO ARE NOT MY RELATIVES. WHEN I GET
 THE RESPONSE ABOUT THE DOCUMENT WRITTEN WHILE IN LAOS,
 I'LL GIVE YOU THE DETAILS RIGHT AWAY. I ONLY ASK, IF
 THERE IS REAL HUMANITARIANISM, HOW WILL I BE REPAID? I
 WOULD LIKE YOU TO ANSWER ME PERSONALLY. WHAT IS THE
 REAL POLICY? PLEASE EXPLAIN IT TO ME. PLEASE GIVE ME
 MONEY ENOUGH TO PROTECT ME FROM THE COLD. WHAT I HAVE
 NOW IS INADEQUATE. I HOPE I CAN GET ENOUGH MONEY FROM
 YOU IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE LAO WHO ARE
 INVOLVED WITH THE INFORMATION I GAVE TO (STONY BEACH
 DEBRIEFER). (UNQUOTE)

9. IN THE SECOND LETTER, ALSO WRITTEN IN LAO, DATED
 23-11-1987, POSTMARKED ON 4 DEC 87, SOURCE SAID,
 (-QUOTE): ... I TOLD (STONY BEACH DEBRIEFER) EVERYTHING I
 COULD REMEMBER. HE SAID HE WOULD FORWARD THE DOCUMENTS,
 WHICH INCLUDED MY PERSONAL BACKGROUND, TO WASHINGTON.
 THOSE DOCUMENTS INCLUDED A PROPOSAL OF MINE. WHAT DID
 THEY SAY? I THINK THE USA HAS NO LIMITS IN SEARCHING
 FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS MATTER, BUT WHY IS IT
 THAT YOU WON'T GIVE ME EVEN A LITTLE BIT OF MORAL
 SUPPORT? I'M A MAN OF INSUFFICIENT MEANS AS IT IS.
 (STONY BEACH DEBRIEFER) HAS SEEN HOW POOR I AM. ITS NOT
 THAT I'M WRITING TO ASK FOR SILVER OR GOLD JUST TO LAY
 AROUND, BUT JUST A LITTLE BIT TO BUY CLOTHING AND
 BLANKETS AND TO HAVE MONEY TO BUY A LITTLE FOOD AND BE
 ABLE TO CHANGE MY LIFESTYLE SO I CAN BE OF FURTHER USE
 TO YOU. ... ITS NOT THAT I'VE LOST MY SPIRIT TO HELP,
 BUT AS THEY SAY: IF YOU WANT TO CAPTURE A TIGER, YOU
 HAVE TO TRAIN ANOTHER TIGER FOR THE JOB. YOU CAN'T SEND
 AN OX TO CAPTURE A TIGER. (UNQUOTE)

10. CONSIDERING SOURCE'S APPARENT DESIRE TO GET
 INVOLVED IN REPORTING POW/MIA INFORMATION FOR PROFIT, WE
 DOUBT THAT HE IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ANY RELIABLE GRAVE
 SITE INFORMATION. WE ARE ESPECIALLY SUSPICIOUS OF HIS
 CONNECTION WITH:

NAME9

NEUTRALIST RESISTANCE FACTION.
NEVERTHELESS, JCRC INTERVIEWER WILL ATTEMPT TO CONTACT
SOURCE AGAIN ON THE CHANCE THAT HE WILL SHARE HIS
ALLEGED GRAVE SITE INFORMATION. A COPY OF SOURCE'S
LETTERS WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC AND DIA/VO-PH.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH STONY BEACH.

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MSGNO 38 (PCKX) *11/24/87* *06:09:55.4.24
ZCZC 11:08:58Z (PC)
EMI DTG : 8711240552Z733
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ZL
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/ OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//TO-CTC//
RUEADADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//TO-CTC//XOXX//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHCC/OSC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHB/DIRNSA-FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/OSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//
RUEHQA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHQA/RFC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 241039Z NOV 87
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH/DAN/
INFO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR CHILDRESS/
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/CJCS-PW-MIA//
RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J2233/J3/J36//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCS/MIL//
RUEHQA/COR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
RUEHGF/USDAO SINGAPORE
RUEHML/USDAO MANILA RP
RUEHKE/USDAO HONG KONG
BT
EZ1:
SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//PW- 51957
EZ2:
THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0117 88.
COUNTRY LAOS (LA).
SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0117 88/THANGON MILITARY PRISON
FACILITY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 820500.

REQS: D-VOP-43639.

SOURCE: 5D / - SOURCE IS A LOWLAND LAO REFUGEE RESIDENT OF NA PHO HOLDING CENTER. FORMER MEMBER OF LAO RESISTANCE. RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. IT SUPPLIES LIMITED INFORMATION ON THANGON MILITARY PRISON FACILITIES AND ROUTINE. NO MENTION OF AMERICAN PRS. ENCLOSURES.

TEXT: 1. THANGON MILITARY PRISON IS LOCATED WEST OF AND ADJACENT TO HIGHWAY 15, APPROXIMATELY 2 KILOMETERS NORTH OF BAN THANGON //UTM COORDS TF 5602//. THE PRISON OCCUPIES A SQUARE-SHAPED COMPOUND BORDERED ON THE WEST SIDE BY THE NAM NGUOM RIVER, AND ON THE NORTHEAST AND SOUTH SIDE BY A 1.5 METER HIGH BARBED WIRE FENCE. SKETCH OF THE COMPOUND AND SURROUNDING AREAS WILL BE FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER TO DIA/TO-PW. CELL BLOCK AND ADMIN BUILDINGS IN THE COMPOUND WERE CONSTRUCTED OF UNPAINTED WOODEN PLANKS. FLOORS WERE CONSTRUCTED WITH WOODEN PLANKS. THE CAMP KITCHEN WAS A BAMBOO WALLED HUT WITH A THATCHED ROOF.

2. THANGON MILITARY PRISON WAS CONSTRUCTED DURING 1984 OR 1985. THE PRISON IS CONTROLLED AND OPERATED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THE COMMANDER IS CAPT BUAKHON (LNU), AND 1LT SOMSAWIT (LNU) IS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER. ONE PLATOON OF LPA TROOPS SERVED AS STAFF AND PROVIDE SECURITY. THE PRISON HOLDS A TOTAL OF 25-30 PRISONERS IN FIVE CELLS. THE MAJORITY OF THE PRISONERS ARE LAO RESISTANCE PERSONNEL.

3. FROM 21 DEC 81 UNTIL MAY 82, SOURCE OCCUPIED CELL NUMBER 3 TOGETHER WITH (LNU), (LNU); AND (LNU). (LNU), THE CHIEF INMATE AND (LNU) OCCUPIED CELL 5.

4. DAILY ROUTINE: NO WAKE UP TIME WAS ENFORCED. PRISONERS WERE FED IN THEIR CELLS AT 1100 HOURS AND 1730 HOURS. PRISONERS WERE ALLOWED TO BATHE EVERY THIRD EVENING. THE BATHING AREA WAS ALONG THE NAM NGUOM RIVER ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE COMPOUND. BATHERS WERE CLOSELY WATCHED BY GUARDS WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. PRISONERS WERE NOT ALLOWED ANY OUTDOOR EXERCISE. AN

INDOCTRINATION SESSION WAS HELD EACH SATURDAY MORNING FROM 0800 TO 1200 HOURS. CAPT BUAKHON MADE ANTI-RESISTANCE SPEECHES AT EACH SESSION.

5. CONDITIONS: NO SOAP, PERSONAL HYGIENE SUPPLIES, OR MEDICINES WERE MADE AVAILABLE. ALMOST ALL PRISONERS WERE COVERED WITH AN ITCHY RASH THOUGHT TO BE

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PAGE 002:

PAGE 0024

MSGNO 39 (PCXX) *11/24/81* *06:09:55.5.5*
 ZCZC 11:08:58Z (PC)
 EMI DTG : 87112405523883
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 ZNY
 R 241053Z NOV 81
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAAB/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XO-CTC//
 RUEDADA/AFIS AMBS ROLLING AFB DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XO-CTC/IOX//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHCC/CHC CG WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACMC/CHC WASHINGTON DC
 RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//
 RHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 241039Z NOV 81
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAM/
 INFO RUEADNW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR CHILDRESS/
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PW-MIA//
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/MIL//
 RUHQBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEHCP/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEHML/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEHKK/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT
 EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//PW- 51957

EZ2:
 THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
 SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0117 88.
 COUNTRY: LAOS (LA).
 SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0117 88/THANGON MILITARY PRISON
 CAUSED BY BLACK LICE. VISITORS WERE ALLOWED, B3T HAD TO
 REQUEST A PASS THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MFI). SOURCE
 SAW ONLY ONE VISITOR DURING HIS SIX MONTHS AS AN INMATE;
 WIFE OF NAME, THE CHIEF INMATE. NO MAIL WAS ALLOWED IN
 OR OUT OF THE PRISON. AN OPEN TRENCH SERVED AS THE
 LATRINE.
 6. SECURITY: NO NIGHT LIGHTING WAS INSTALLED.

GUARDS WERE ARMED WITH AK-47'S, RPD'S, B-40 B-41 ROCKET
 LAUNCHERS, AND GRENADES. ONE ESCAPE ATTEMPT OCCURRED
 DURING SOURCE'S INTERMENT. NAME (LNU) TRIED TO
 SWIM AWAY WHILE BATHING AND WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY
 GUARDS. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, NAME (LNU); NAME
 FORMER CELLMATE WAS TAKEN FROM THE PRISON DURING THE
 NIGHT. CAMP RUMOR WAS THAT NAME HAD BEEN EXECUTED.
 7. PRISONERS COMMUNICATED CLANDESTINELY FROM
 CELL TO CELL BY PASSING MESSAGES DISGUISED AS CIGARETTE
 BUTTS THRU HOLES IN CELLS WALLS.

COMMENTS: SOURCE WAS COOPERATIVE DURING INTERVIEW.

//IPSP: PG 2430//.

//CONSOBJ: 552//.

PROJ: 6999-10

INSTR: US: NO

PREP: TH-03.

ENCL: CAMP SKETCH OF THANGON MILITARY PRISON TO -

FOLLOW TO DIA/VO-PW

DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMB BANGKOK (COA,DCM2,POL SA3,
 DATT/TLO, JCRC)

SENT TO: DIA/VO-PW ONLY W/ENCL.

BT

#1957

NNNN

NNDD

MSGNO 29 (PCX1) *11/19/87* *06:03:54:1.4*
 ZCZC 11:02:49Z (PC)
 BNI DTG : 87111905580188
 RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS1214 3230843- -RUEALGX.

R 190843Z NOV 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//TO-CTC//
 RUEADADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//TO-CTC/TOXK//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAR/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACHC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//
 RUEHBBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 190836Z NOV 87
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM-HIA//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH/DAM/
 INFO RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR CHILDRESS/
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/FM-HIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-FM-HIA//
 RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J223/J3/J36//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS /LCC/MIL//
 RUEHBBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEHML/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEHKK/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT
 EZ1:

SECTION 1, OF 02 BANGKOK TH//FM- 51214

EZ2:
 THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
 SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0104-88
 COUNTRY: LAOS (LA) VIETNAM (VM)
 SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0104-88/SIGHTING OF THREE CAUCASIAN
 PRISONERS NEAR LA/VM BORDER
 WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
 INTELLIGENCE.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 750800
 REAS: D-VOP-H3468
 SOURCE: - SOURCE IS A LOWLAND
 LAO REFUGEE RESIDENT OF NA PHO HOLDING CENTER. FORMER
 MEMBER OF LAO RESISTANCE. SOURCE OBTAINED THE
 INFORMATION WHILE A PRISONER AT VIENGXAI. RELIABILITY
 OF THE SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. RELIABILITY OF
 SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. DURING AUG
 75, THREE CAUCASIANS IN PRISON UNIFORMS WERE SIGHTED
 FISHING NEAR A CAMP KNOWN AS CAMP 18A LOCATED NEAR THE
 BOUA PHAM PROVINCE, LA/VM BORDER.

TEXT: 1. DURING AUG 75, WHILE SOURCE WAS A
 PRISONER AT VIENGXAI, SOURCE AND ELEVEN OTHER PRISONERS
 WERE SELECTED FOR A WOODCUTTING DETAIL. SOURCE COULD
 RECALL ONLY THE FIRST NAMES OF SIX OTHER PRISONERS ON
 THE DETAIL:
 THREE GUARDS ASSIGNED TO THE DETAIL WERE KNOWN TO SOURCE
 ONLY AS SGT HUNTI, THITHANG (A FORMER LT, BLIND IN THE
 RIGHT EYE, WHO HAD BEEN STRIPPED OF HIS RANK FOR
 PHILANDERING WITH ANOTHER'S WIFE), AND KEO (THE DRIVER).
 THE DETAIL LEFT VIENGXAI BY TRUCK AT 0703 HOURS AND
 PASSED THRO
 GH BAN PHOUNSAN (NCA), BAN PHOUN NEDA (NCA)
 BAN PHOUN KANG (NCA) BAN PHOUN MUANG (NCA), BAN DEUT
 (NCA), A LAO POLICE CHECKPOINT, AND A VIETNAMESE
 CHECKPOINT BEFORE ARRIVING AT WHAT THE SOURCE TOOK TO BE
 THE LA/VM BORDER. (ASIDE: SOURCE'S SKETCH OF THE ROUTE
 TAKEN IS FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. USING SERIES
 1501 AIR SHEET NF48-14 EDITION 2 MAP, SOURCE INDICATED
 THAT HE WAS RELATIVELY S

URE THAT THE ROUTE TRAVELLED WAS
 FROM VIENGXAI ALONG HWY 65 TO MUANG POUN (VHS347) AND
 NORTH ALONG HWY 651 TO THE BORDER). ABOUT A THREE
 MINUTE DRIVE PAST THE BORDER, POSSIBLY VIC VHS570, THE
 TRUCK STOPPED AND THE PRISONERS ENTERED A WOODED AREA
 WEST OF THE HIGHWAY. THE WOODCUTTING DETAIL LASTED FROM
 1000-1300 HOURS. AT A PLACE APPROXIMATELY 100 METERS
 FROM THE HIGHWAY, AT A STREAM WHICH WAS APPROX 3 METERS
 WIDE, ALL TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE WORK DETAIL SAW THREE
 CAUCASIANS FISHING. THE DETAIL APPROACHED WITHIN 20 TO
 30 METERS FROM THE CAUCASIANS FOR THREE TO FOUR
 MINUTES. BOTH GUARDS ASSIGNED TO THE DETAIL WARNED THE
 MEMBERS OF THE DETAIL NOT TO APPROACH OR TALK TO THE
 CAUCASIANS, WHO THE GUARDS SAID WERE AMERICAN PRISONERS.
 THE THREE CAUCASIANS WERE NOT UNDER GUARD OR IN CHAINS.

(SOURCE NOTE: THERE WAS PROB
BLY NO NEED TO GUARD THE
PRISONERS, SINCE THE AREA WOULD BE TOO DIFFICULT FOR AN
ESCAPE).

2. ALL THREE CAUCASIANS WORE LIGHT BLUE UNIFORMS
WITH LONG SLEEVES AND PANTS. THE BACK OF EACH
PRISONER'S SHIRT WAS MARKED WITH A SIX INCH BY SIX INCH
WHITE CROSS. EACH ARM OF THE CROSS WAS APPROX 1-1 1/2
INCHES WIDE. THE PRISONERS WORE LIGHT GREEN CANVAS
SPORTS SHOES. THEIR SHIRTS HAD NO COLLARS, AND WERE
SIMILAR IN STYLE TO THOSE COMMONLY WORN BY CONSTRUCTION
WORKERS.

3. AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 HOURS, THE TRUCK CARRIED
BT

#1214
NNNN
NNDD

MSGNO 30 (PCXX) *11/19/87* *06:03:54.2.2*
ZCZC 11:02:49Z (PC)
EMI DTG : 87111905581678
RTTCZTUV RUEKJCS1214 3230843- --RUEALGX.
ZNY
R 190843Z NOV 87
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEMAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XO-CTC//
RUEADADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XO-CTC/XOEX//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CNC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIAR/DIUSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CNC WASHINGTON DC
RUECJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//
RUEHGBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEIAG/NPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 190836Z NOV 87
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-HIA//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PW/DAM/
INFO RUEADND/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR CHILDRESS/
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-HIA /
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/CJCS-PW-HIA//
RUEKQQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/HIL//
RUEKQPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUEKEL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
RUEKCP/USDAO SINGAPORE
RUEKML/USDAO MANILA RP
RUEKEX/USDOLO HONG KONG
BT
EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//PW- 51214

E22:
THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0104-88
COUNTRY: LAOS (LA) VIETNAM (VN)
SUBJ: IIR 6 0 4 0104-88/SIGHTING OF THREE CAUCASIAN
THE DETAIL FOR MIDDAY 9L AT AN UNID
NTIFIED THAI DAM
VILLAGE ABOUT ONE OR TWO KILOMETERS FURTHER INTO
VIETNAM. ON THE WAY THE S U
" SAW A FACILITY WHICH HIS
GUARDS SAID WAS CAMP 18A. SOM
TIME LATERAI A G 75,

SOURCE ASKED A PL. GUARD NAMED UNCLE SI ((LNU)) ABOUT CAMP 18A. UNCLE SI TOLD SOURCE THAT CAMP 18A WAS AN INSTALLATION FOR DISABLED VETERANS UNTIL JUL 75. DURING JUL 75 THE DISABLED VETERANS WERE MOVED TO A NEW INSTALLATION (NFI) A

NO AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE MOVED INTO CAMP 18A (NFI). (SOURCE COMMENT--UNCLE SI HAD RECEIVED MEDICAL TREATMENT IN VIENGSAI FOR A LEG INFECTION. ONE OF UNCLE SI'S LEGS HAD SOME YEARS EARLIER BEEN PARTIALLY AMPUTATED DUE TO WOUNDS RECEIVED AND UNCLE SI HAD ONCE LIVED IN CAMP 18A.

COMMENTS: 1. REFER TO IIRS 6 024 0173 87, 6 024 0178 87, 6 024 0185 87, AND 6 024 0002 88 FOR SOURCE'S ACCOUNT OF ANOTHER FIRST HAND LIVE SIGHTING AND RELATED PRISON CHRONOLOGY OF SOURCE.

2. SKETCH OF CAMP 18A AND THE SURROUNDING AREA IS FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

3. AS DURING PAST INTERVIEW, THE SOURCE CONTINUES TO SUGGEST USG AUTHORITIES SEND HIM BACK INTO LAOS TO GATHER FURTHER EVIDENCE RELATING TO AMERICAN PWs AND GRAVESITES. THIS REPORT IS THE SECOND FIRSTHAND LIVE SIGHTING CLAIMED BY THE SOURCE. SOURCE HAS ALSO CLAIMED INFORMATION ABOUT SEVERAL GRAVESITES OF AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL. IT APPEARS THAT THE SOURCE INTENDS TO BECOME A REGULAR REPORTER OF PW/MIA INFORMATION, FOLLOWING IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF SD, WHO INITIALLY INTRODUCED SOURCE TO STONY BEACH DEBRIEFER.

//IPSP: PG 2430//

//CONSOBJ: 410//

PROJ: 6999-10

INSTR: US: NO

PREP: TM-10

ENCL: 1 MAP OF SOURCE'S ROUTE TO CAMP 18A TO

FOLLOW TO DIA/VO-PW

DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMB BANGKOK (CDA, DCM2, POL SA3,

DATT/TLO, JCRC

SENT TO: DIA/VO-PW ONLY (W/ENCL)

WARNING:

BT
#1214
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18A-184.

KONG 18A (VH 164-601) located at the opposite

of BAN NATHENE and east of the route # 65.
and approx 6 Kms north west of VIENGSAI.
this camp was off limits for re-education inmates all the times.

there were 200 disabled LPDR soldiers, they were under VIENGSAI controlled.

KONG 18B or KONG 11 (VH 330-678) located near

HOAY CHA about 23 Kms south of SOPHAO and about 100 meters west of route # 6 and NAM HAO river.
there were 60 disabled LPDR soldiers.

the only KONG 18B HOAY CHA, the re-education inmates could go inside and worked with them and they were under controlled of HOUA PHAN province.

100

Encl to IIR 6 024 0002 88

1. 10/13/87* 06:09:52.0.6*
2. ZCZC 11:08:46Z (FC)
3. EMI DTG : 87101305175102
4. RTTSZYU RUEKJCS5087 2860919- -RUEALGX.
5. ZNY
6. R 130919Z OCT 87
7. FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
8. INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
9. RUEAQA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
10. RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
11. RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
12. RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOC/XOXL//
13. RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
14. RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
15. RUEANCC/CHC CC WASHINGTON DC
16. RUETIAR/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
17. RUEACMC/CHC WASHINGTON DC
18. RUCAJAL/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
19. RUEHBRB/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
20. RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
21. RUEALGX/SAFE
22. R 130853Z OCT 87
23. FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM/NIA TEAM//
24. TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH/DAH//
25. INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//
26. RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-NIA//
27. RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PW-NIA//
28. RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
29. RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCS/HIL//
30. RUEHBP/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
31. RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
32. RUEHML/USDAO MANILA RP
33. RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
34. RUEHKK/USDAO HONG KONG
35. BT
36. EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 45087

EZ2:

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

<> SERIAL: IIR <><<6 024 0002 88<><>.

<> COUNTRY: LAOS (LA).

<> SUBJ: IIR <><<6 024 0002 88/HQAT<><< THEUN PRISON CAMP

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CLOCATE FOR TRAVIS

PAGE 0003

1. UNDERGROUND CELL FOR UNSUCCESSFUL "ESCAPEES" WHO WERE SNACKLED AND HELD HERE FOR THREE MONTHS.
2. PRISON CELL WITH CHAINS.
3. QUARTERS FOR PRISONERS WHO WORKED ON DISTANT PARM LABOR DETAILS.
4. BARRACKS FOR ONE SQUAD OF SECURITY FORCES.
5. MEETING BUILDING.
6. KITCHEN.
7. COOKING/EATING UTENSIL FABRICATION AREA.
8. BLACKSMITH SHOP AND AREA WHERE SNACKLES AND CHAINS WERE PLACED ON PRISONERS.
9. SUPPLY WAREHOUSE.
10. RESIDENCE OF CAPT LEO.
11. RESIDENCE OF SOULTYAN.
12. "UNCLE" PHUNG'S RESIDENCE.
13. CAPT SON'S RESIDENCE.
14. PHONGPA'S RESIDENCE.
15. RICE STORAGE.
16. THAO SING'S RESIDENCE.
17. CAPT NONG'S RESIDENCE.
18. KHANTA'S RESIDENCE.

End of IIR 6 024 0002 88

C1LOCATE FOR TRAVIS

PAGE 0004

DOI: 850000.
 REQS: D-POP-43468.
 SOURCE: 50 / - LOWLAND LAO REFUGEE
 OF 40 HOLDING CENTER AND FORMER MEMBER OF THE LAO
 RESISTANCE. SOURCE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION WHILE AN
 INMATE OF THE HOUAY THEUN PRISON CAMP FROM EARLY 1982
 UNTIL HIS ESCAPE IN EARLY 1984. RELIABILITY OF THE
 SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.
 SUMMARY: THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. IT
 PROVIDES A LIMITED DESCRIPTION OF THE HOUAY THEUN
 RE-EDUCATION CAMP ALONG WITH NAMES OF CAMP STAFF
 PERSONALITIES.

53/5: 1. THE HOUAY THEUN PRISON CAMP
 (NCA) WAS LOCATED ALONG THE BANKS OF THE HOUAY THEUN
 STREAM BETWEEN THE HOUAY THEUN/HOUAY LING AND THE LOUAY
 THEUN-NAM THONG RIVER JUNCTIONS, AND EAST OF THE HIGHWAY
 BETWEEN PHOKSAVAN //UTMCOORD UG 1050//, AND HUANG KHAM
 (BAN BAN) //UTMCOORD UG 5072// XIANG KHOUANG PROVINCE.
 (COMMENT: SOURCE'S SKETCH OF THE PRISON CAMP AND THE
 SURROUNDING AREA WILL BE FORWARDED TO DIA/VO-PW UNDER
 SEPARATE COVER). THE CAMP WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO SECTORS:

A. THE MAIN SECTOR CONSISTED OF 12 BUILDINGS:
 TWO PRISONER BARRACKS, ONE UNDERGROUND PUNISHMENT CELL,
 ONE GUARD FORCE BARRACKS, ONE MEETING BUILDING, A
 KITCHEN, A BLACKSMITH SHOP, A COOKING/EATING UTENSIL
 FABRICATION BUILDING, ONE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE, TWO
 ADMINISTRATOR RESIDENCE BUILDINGS, AND ONE LATRINE.
 B. THE STAFF RESIDENCE SECTOR WAS LOCATED ON A
 RIDGE SOUTHEAST OF THE MAIN SECTOR, AND CONSISTED OF
 SEVEN BUILDINGS: SIX STAFF RESIDENCES AND ONE RICE
 STORAGE FACILITY.

2. STAFF PERSONALITIES:

- CAPTAIN KHAM ((LNU))	MILITARY COMMANDER
- CAPTAIN SOW ((LNU))	POLITICAL DEPUTY
- CAPTAIN LEO ((LNU))	DAILY ADMINISTRATOR
- PVT SOULIVAN ((LNU))	DAILY ADMINISTRATOR
- PLATOON LDR "UNCLE" PHENG ((LNU))	LABOR DETAIL GUARD
- SQUAD LDR PHOMMA ((LNU))	LABOR DETAIL GUARD
- SQUAD LDR KHAMTA ((LNU))	LABOR DETAIL GUARD
- SQUAD LDR SOUK ((LNU))	LABOR DETAIL GUARD
- SQUAD LDR THAO SING ((LNU))	CAMP GUARD
- PVT THAO PHONG ((LNU))	CAMP GUARD WED
	COLLABORATED WITH AND
	ACCOMPANIED SOURCE
	IN SOURCES ESCAPE TO

BT
 #5087
 NNNN
 E23
 TEXT

C1LOCATE FOR TRAVIS

PAGE 0002

AN EFFORT TO VERIFY SOURCE'S PRISON CHRONOLOGY. SOURCE
 HAD CLAIMED A FIRST HAND LIVE SIGHTING OF AN AMERICAN PW
 PATIENT IN A VIENGXAI HOSPITAL IN 1973 (REF IIR 6 024
 0173 87). REF TO IIR'S 6 024 0185 87 AND 6 024 0178 87
 FOR SOURCE'S DESCRIPTION OF HANO PRISON AND DATA
 HOSPITAL IN LOUANG PRABANG, FROM WHICH HE ALSO CLAIMS TO
 HAVE ESCAPED.

//IPSP: PG 2430//
 //COMSOBJ: 410//.

PRM: 6999-10.

COLL: A/C.

INSTR: US: NO.

PREP: TM-03.

ENCL:

TO FOLLOW: 1 ENCLOSURE: PRISON CAMP SKETCH

AND TRANSLATION, 1 CY

DATA (871001).

DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMB BANGKOK (CDA, DCM2 POL SA3,

DATT/TLO, JCRC)

SENT TO: DIA/VO-PW ONLY (W/ENCL).

WARNING:

BT

#5087

NNNN

E23

TEXT

6 024 0002 88

NNND

C1LOCATE FOR TRAVIS

PAGE 0001

MSGNO 161 (PCIX) *10/13/87* *06:09:56.3.6*
 ZCZC 11:08:46Z (PC)
 EMI DTG : 87101305170854
 RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9087 2860919- --RUEALGX.
 ZNY

R 130919Z OCT 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEDADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOOE/XOXX//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUICJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 RUEHBBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 130853Z OCT 87
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM/MIA TEAM//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PW/ DAM//
 INFO RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA-FW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-FW-MIA//
 RUEHQQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/KIL//
 RUHOBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEHKL/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEHHK/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT
 EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 45087

EZ2:

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
 SERIAL: IIR 006 024 0002 8800.
 COUNTRY: LAOS (LA).
 SUBJ: IIR 006 024 0002 88/HOUAY-- THEUN PRISON CAMP
 LUANG PRABANG.
 SQUAD LOR BOALI ((LNU)) SUPPLY
 PVT THAO SOUNDOI ((LNU)) (NF1).
 COMMENTS: SOURCE WAS COOPERATIVE, BUT AT TIMES
 CONTRADICTED HIMSELF ON DATES OF CONFINEMENT AT SEVERAL
 PRISON FACILITIES FROM WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE
 ESCAPED. INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED IN

TO SECRET

PAGE 0045

MSGNO 125 (PCIX) *10/06/87* *08:04:14.6.9*
 ZCZC 13:02:25Z (PC)
 EMI DTG : 87100607175699
 RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9979 2791120- RUEALGX.
 ZNY

R 061120Z OCT 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEDADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOOE/XOXX//
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUICJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 RUEHBBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 061055Z OCT 87
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM/MIA TEAM//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PW/DAM//
 INFO RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA-FW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-FW-MIA//
 RUEHQQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/KIL//
 RUHOBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEHKL/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEHHK/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT
 EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 43979

EZ2:

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
 SERIAL: IIR 6 2
 5 0185 87
 COUNTRY: LAOS (LA)
 SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0185 87/MANO PRISON, LUANG PRABANG,
 LAOS
 WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY
 EVALUATED INTEL
 DOI: 870600
 REQ: D-POP-43468
 SOURCE: S'D
 REFUGEE RESIDENT OF NA PHO HOLDING CENTER, NAKHON

PHANOM, THAILAND. SOURCE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION WHILE AN INMATE OF MANO PRISON DURING THE EIGHTEEN MONTH PERIOD ENDING ON 11 JUN 87 WHEN SOURCE ESCAPED WHILE ON MEDICAL RELEASE TO DARA HOSPITAL, LUANG PRABANG. RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY BEACH REPORT. IT PROVIDES A LAYOUT SKETCH AND LIST OF PERSONALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH MANO PRISON, LUANG PRABANG, LAOS.

TEXT: 1. THE MANO PRISON OCCUPIES A ONE SQUARE CITY BLOCK COMPOUND ENCLOSED BY AN APPROXIMATELY FOUR METER HIGH BRICK AND MORTAR WALL. EACH OF THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE COMPOUND HAS A HIGH GUARD TOWER. THE PRISON ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE BUILDING OCCUPIES THE FULL LENGTH OF THE EAST SIDE OF THE COMPOUND. A BLOCK OF FOUR ADJACENT CELLS (ONE HOLDING 42 CHINESE PRISONERS, ONE HOLDING OUTSIDE WORK RELEASE INMATES, AND TWO ORDINARY CELLS) AND A TRADITIONAL MEDICINE TREATMENT BUILDING PARALLEL THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND. A BLOCK OF FIVE ADJACENT CELLS (ONE ORDINARY CELL, ONE CELL FOR OUTSIDE WORK RELEASE INMATES, TWO CELLS FOR LAO RESISTANCE PRISONERS, AND ONE FEMALE INMATE CELL) IS LOCATED PARALLEL THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND, WITH A SOLITARY CONFINEMENT DARKROOM LOCATED IN THE SOUTHWEST CORNER. TWO GUARD QUARTERS BUILDINGS AND A KITCHEN ARE LOCATED ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF THE COMPOUND. A SKETCH IDENTIFYING THE LAYOUT OF THE PRISON COMPOUND AND THE AREA SURROUNDING THE MANO PRISON WILL BE FORWARDED TO DIA/VO-PH UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

2. AS OF JUN 87, THE MANO PRISON INMATE POPULATION INCLUDED APPROXIMATELY 50 CHINESE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PRISONERS, APPROXIMATELY 50 LAO RESISTANCE PRISONERS, AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ORDINARY INMATES. NO CAUCASIAN PRISONERS WERE HELD IN MANO PRISON.

3. MANO PRISON STAFF PERSONALITIES INCLUDED:

POLICE CAPT CHANDE

MG (LNU) WARDEN

POLICE 2LT KHAMCHAN (LNU)

PLT LDR KHAM (LNU)

ASST SQD LDR SI (LNU)

PVT SAI (LNU)

PVT XAI (LNU)

PLT LDR SOMPHON (LNU)

SQD LDR NEDA (LNU)

KHAMSAN (LNU)

CPT KHAMGEUN (LNU)

DEPUTY WARDEN

KHAMMADIAN

STAFF DUTY NCO

STAFF

STAFF

PROVINCIAL CRIME SECTION

INTERROGATOR, PROVINCIAL

CRIME SECTION

PROVINCIAL CRIME SECTION

DEPUTY CDR FOR CRIMINAL

CASES, PROVINCIAL CRIME

SECTION

CPT SOMPHAN (LNU)

CDR, PROVINCIAL CRIME SECTION

BT

#3979


NNNN

NNDD

MSGNO 126 (PCIX) *10/06/87* *08:04:14.7.8*
 ZCZC 13:02:25Z (PG)
 ENI DTG : 87100607180832
 RTTCZLN RUEKJCS3979 2791120 -RUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 061120Z OCT 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAAB/CHO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADADA/AFIS AMSS BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOC/XOIX//
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANCC/CMC DC WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAR/DINSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACAC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUCAJAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 RUEHBERA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUETIAD/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 061055Z OCT 87
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM KIA TEAM//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAM//
 INFO RUEADNM/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-KIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PW-KIA//
 RUHQBQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/HIL//
 RUHQBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEHML/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEHKK/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT
 EZ1: SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 43979
 EZ2:

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
 SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0185 87
 COUNTRY: LAOS (LA)
 SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0185 87/MANO PRISON, LUANG PRABANG,
 SQD LDR PHENG (LNU) SUPPLY NCO
 COMMENTS: THE TRANSLATION OF THE TERM "KHAMBIAN"
 USED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE IS NOT KNOWN.
 2. REFER TO IIR 6 024 0178 87 FOR SOURCE'S
 DESCRIPTION OF THE DARA HOSPITAL, LUANG PRABANG, FROM
 WHICH SOURCE CLAIMS TO HAVE ESCAPED WHILE RECEIVING
 MEDICAL CARE DURING THE TIME HE WAS AN INMATE OF MANO
 PRISON.

//IPSP: PG 2430//
 //CONOBJ: 4107//
 PROJ 6999-10
 COLL A/C
 INSTR US: NO
 PREP TM-03
 APPR
 ENCL TWO: (1) SKETCH WITH ATTACHED
 - TRANSLATION AND (2) A LIST OF PERSONALITIES
 - FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO DIA VO-PW.
 WARNING
 BT
 #3979:
 NRNN
 NNDD



MSGNO 16 (PCIX) *10/05/87* *07:08:56.37*
 ZCZC 12:07:50Z (PC)
 ENI DTG : 87100507012960
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 ZNY
 R 051104Z OCT 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOOE/XOXX//
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEYIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEAMCC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEJAAA/USCINCSOC MACOILL AFB FL
 RUEHBBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUEYIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 051056Z OCT 87
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW/MIA TEAM//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAM//
 INFO RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/HR CHILDRESS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PW-MIA//
 RUEHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUEALIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/MIL//
 RUEHBPB/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHDPF/DITAFMIC FT DETRICK MD
 RUEHRL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEHRL/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEHKK/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT
 EZ1:
 BANGKOK TH 43807
 EZ2:
 THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
 SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0178 87
 COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA)
 SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0178 87/FRENCH SURGEON AT DARA
 HOSPITAL, LOUANG PHRABANG
 WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY
 EVALUATED INTEL.
 DOI: (U) 870600
 REAS: (U) D-VOP-43468; D-VOP-43639
 SOURCE: (U) - A LOWLAND LAO
 REFUGEE RESIDENT OF SO HOLDING CENTER, SO

60 THAILAND INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY PERSONAL OBSERVATION. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY BEACH REPORT. A CAUCASIAN FRENCH NATIONAL WAS PERFORMING AS A SURGEON AT THE DARA HOSPITAL IN LOUANG PHABANG DURING EARLY JUN 87. A SKETCH OF THE HOSPITAL COMPOUND IS FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

TEXT: 1. SOURCE OBSERVED A CAUCASIAN DOCTOR AT THE DARA HOSPITAL IN LOUANG PHABANG SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE TWO OR THREE DAY PERIOD ENDING ON 11 JUN 87. SOURCE SAW THE DOCTOR ARRIVE FOR WORK IN THE MORNING ON A BICYCLE. IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THE HOSPITAL THAT THE DOCTOR WAS A FRENCH NATIONAL WHO HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A LONG TIME (NFI). NFI ON THE IDENTITY OF THE SURGEON, OR HIS PLACE OF RESIDENCE. DESCRIPTION: APPROXIMATELY 66 INCHES TALL, THIN, SHORT FULL FACE BEARD WITH MUSTACHE, WORE WHITE MEDICAL UNIFORM WHILE ON DUTY (NFI).

2. SOURCE HAD BEEN A PRISONER IN MARO PRISON IN LOUANG PHABANG FOR EIGHTEEN MONTHS WHEN HE WAS SENT FOR MEDICAL CARE TO DARA HOSPITAL WHERE HE ESCAPED AFTER TWO OR THREE DAYS ON 11 JUN 87.

COMMENTS: 1. SKETCH OF THE DARA HOSPITAL COMPOUND IS FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER TO DIA VO-PW. SOURCE COULD NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF ANY STAFF OR OFFICIALS ASSIGNED TO THE HOSPITAL.

2. (U) SOURCE WAS MOST COOPERATIVE. SOURCE'S MOTIVATION SEEMS TO BE TO GAIN ASSISTANCE IN RESETTLEMENT. SOURCE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD NO RELATIVES IN THE THIRD COUNTRIES AND HE HAD BEEN REJECTED FOR RESETTLEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES.

//IPSP: PG 2430//

//COMOBJ: 410//

PROJ (U): 6999-10

COLL (U): A/C

INSTR (U): US: NO

PREP (U): TH-03

APPR (U): AN

ENCL (U): ONE: SKETCH MAP OF DARA HOSPITAL, FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER TO DIA VO-PW.


WARNING (U)

BT

#3807

NNNN

NNDD



MSGNO 128 (PCLX) *10/05/87* *09:08:46.5.4*

ZCZC 10:07:38Z (FC)

EMI DTG : 87100504132140

RITSZYUW RUEKJCS3667 2780815- .RUEALGX.

ZNY

R 050815Z OCT 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADW/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAQA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEADDA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC

RUEAQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOC/XOIX//

RUEBIC /SSCSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEITAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

RUEBBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUEITIA/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 050727Z OCT 87

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW/MIA TEAM//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAN//

INFO RUEADW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/HR-CHILDRESS//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PW-MIA//

RUEBBA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/KDL//

RUEBBA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEBCL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR

RUEBCL/USDAO MANILA RP

RUEBGP/USDAO SINGAPORE

RUEBHK/USDO HONG KONG

BT

EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 43667

EZ2:

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0173 87

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA)

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0173 87/AMERICAN PRISONER AT

- VIENGXAI HOSPITAL (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY

- EVALUATED INTEL

DOI: (U) 731100

REQS: (U) D-VOP-43468

SOURCE: (C/NF) SD / - A LOWLAND LAO

FORMER MEMBER OF LAO RESISTANCE. SOURCE OBTAINED THE

INFORMATION WHILE A PATIENT AT A MEDICAL FACILITY NEAR

THAN NA VIT CAVE, VIENGXAI. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. AN AMERICAN PILOT WAS BEING HELD IN A HOSPITAL AT THAN NA VIT CAVE (NCA), VIENGXAI, VICINITY //UTMCOORD VN 1957//, IN NOV OR DEC 73. A SKETCH OF THE AREA WILL BE FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER TO DIA VO-PW.

TEXT: 1. DURING NOV OR DEC 73, SOURCE OBSERVED A CAUCASIAN PATIENT SITTING OUTSIDE THE ENTRANCE TO THE THAN NA VIT CAVE HOSPITAL FACILITY AT VIENGXAI, VICINITY //UTMCOORD VN 1957//. SOURCE WAS A PATIENT AT A NEARBY ABOVE GROUND HOSPITAL FACILITY FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS, AND OBSERVED THE CAUCASIAN ON THREE OCCASIONS DURING THAT PERIOD. EACH SIGHTING WAS FROM A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 40 METERS AT APPROXIMATELY 1800 HOURS, AND EACH TIME THE CAUCASIAN WAS SMOKING CIGARETTES WHILE SITTING IN A CHAIR NEAR THE CAVE ENTRANCE. SOURCE WAS A PATIENT BEING TREATED FOR HEADACHES AND DIZZINESS, AND ASKED HIS PHYSICIAN, DOCTOR PASEUT ((LNU)), IF THE CAUCASIAN WAS A SOVIET. DOCTOR PASEUT EXPLAINED THAT THE CAUCASIAN WAS AN AMERICAN PILOT WHOSE F-105 AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT SOP BEN (NCA), BOUA PHAN PROVINCE DURING 1972 (NEI ON LOCATION, DATE, OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS OF THE AIRCRAFT). DOCTOR PASEUT ORDERED THE SOURCE TO STAY AWAY FROM THE AMERICAN. DOCTOR PASEUT WAS AN ETHNIC LAO WHO HAD RECEIVED MEDICAL TRAINING IN VIETNAM (NFI).

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE AMERICAN: TALL, WHITE COMPLEXION, WEARING WHITE PATIENT-UNIFORM, WEARING NO JEWELRY (NFI), WITH LEFT LEG WRAPPED IN WHITE BANDAGES FROM THE FOOT TO THE KNEE.

3. SOURCE WAS A SGT WITH A SPECIAL GUERRILLA UNIT OCCUPYING A POSITION AT THONG KHANG (NCA), XIENGXONG SUBDISTRICT, NAN DISTRICT, LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE. IN MAR 73, THE POSITION WAS OVERRUN BY VIETNAMESE TROOPS, AND SOURCE WAS HELD AS ONE OF 87 PRISONERS AT PHOU HE NAI (NCA). IN DEC 75, HE WAS A MEMBER OF A WORK DETAIL TRUCKED FROM VIENGXAI TO VIENTIANE TO PICK UP CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. WHILE IN VIENTIANE, SOURCE ESCAPED AND FLED TO THAILAND.

4. A SKETCH MAP OF THE VICINITY OF THE SIGHTING AND THE PLACE WHERE SOURCE WAS IMPRISONED IN VIENGXAI IS FORWARDED TO DIA VO-PW UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

COMMENTS: 1. SOURCE WAS REFERRED TO STONY BEACH DEBRIEFER BY SD, A SOURCE WITH A LONG RECORD OF PW/MIA REPORTING.

2. SOURCE WAS VERY COOPERATIVE DURING QUESTIONING. SOURCE CLAIMS TO HAVE JOINED LAO RESISTANCE FORCES IN 1974 AND TO HAVE BEEN

SUBSEQUENTLY RE-CAPTURED AND CONFINED AT THE FOLLOWING
LOCATIONS: KILO 8 POLICE PRISON IN VIENTIANE; NAKHONBAN
PRISON, VIENTIANE; TRANCON MILITARY PRISON, VIENTIANE;
HOUAY THEUN RE-EDUCATION CAMP, XIANG KBOUANG (ESCAPED);
MANO PRISON AND DARA HOSPITAL (ESCAPED), LUANG PRABANG.

3. SOURCE HAD IN HIS POSSESSION A NOTEBOOK WITH
SKETCHES OF SEVERAL CRASH/GRAVESITES (FORWARDED TO

BT
#3667
NNNN
NNDD

MSGNO 130 (PCXX) *10/05/87* *05:08:46.6.9*
ZCZC 10:07:38Z (PC)
EMI DTG : 87100504134324
RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS3567 2780815- -RUEALGX
ZBT

R 050815Z OCT 87
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEMAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEADADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOGX/XOIX//
RUEHRC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTAB/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEAHMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHTAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 050727Z OCT 87
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM/MIA TEAM//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH/DAM//
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/FM-MIA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-FM-MIA//
RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/MIL//
RUEHBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
RUEHKL/USDAO MANILA RP
RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
RUEHKL/USDAO HONG KONG
BT

EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH #3667

EZ2:

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0173 87

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA)

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0173 87/AMERICAN PRISONER AT

JCRC), A SKETCH OF MANO PRISON, A PERSONAL CHRONOLOGY,
AND THE ADDRESS OF A JCRC DEBRIEFER. PHOTOCOPY OF THE
NOTEBOOK IS FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. SUBSEQUENT
IIR'S WILL FORWARD SKETCHES AND LISTS OF PERSONALITIES
FOR ALL LOCATIONS WHERE SOURCE WAS IMPRISONED.

4. SOURCE CLAIMS TO HAVE PASSED SOME SKETCHES
TO RESISTANCE PERSONNEL AT NA PHO CAMP. SOURCE
EXPRESSED DISILLUSION AT THE FACT THAT THOSE INDIVIDUALS

NEVER REWARDED HIM FOR HIS EFFORTS. SOURCE HAS NO RELATIVES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND CLAIMS HE WAS REJECTED FOR RESETTLEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES. SOURCE'S MOTIVATION SEEMS TO BE TO GAIN ASSISTANCE IN RESETTLEMENT AND/OR FINANCIAL REWARD FOR HIS KNOWLEDGE OF MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE US GOVERNMENT. SOURCE DISPLAYED A SKETCH OF THE SAN NEUA AREA MADE BY A ROOMMATE AND CLOSE FRIEND AT [REDACTED]. SOURCE WENT ON TO MENTION THAT HIS FRIEND MAY KNOW WHERE AN AMERICAN PRISONER IS BEING HELD IN LAOS. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT HIS FRIEND WAS NOT YET WILLING TO BE INTERVIEWED, PREFERRING TO WAIT AND OBSERVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOURCE'S INTERVIEW WITH THIS DESCRIBER.

IPSP: PG 2430//

COMB: 410//

PROJ (U): 6999-10

COLL (U): A/C

INSTR (U): US: NO


PREP (U): TH-03

APPR (U):


ENCL (U): TWO: (1) PHOTOCOPY OF SOURCE'S NOTEBOOK, (2) SKETCH OF VIENGXAI, FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO DIA TO-PW.

WARNING (U):

BT
#3667
1000
1000



110 6004 01 13 X7



LIVE SIGNATURE 9682

PAGE 0011

MSGNO 45 (PCIX) *12/31/86* *22:05:15.2.1*
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 R 010243Z JAN 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAAA/CHO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAAA/ARMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 312035Z DEC 86
 FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 TO RUEHKK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 INFO RUEHKK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 INFO RUEHKK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC//J5/OCJCS-PH-MIA//
 RUEHIA/CIA WASH DC//DDO/EA/VCL//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEADPW/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

BT
 EZ1:

EZ2:

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT T86-039

NSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

A. JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 111238Z FEB 86

1. REVIEW OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SC
 SOURCE OF REF A, REVEALS NO CORRELATION TO DATA IN JCRC

FILES.

2. THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL POSITION AND NOT A FINAL
 EVALUATION. EVAL - RH

BT

#5491

NNNN

NNDD

01 241312Z FEB 86 RR

DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//
 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/EA/VCL//
 SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC/CA/OCS/ENR//
 DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 NSC WASHINGTON DC

S-0180/VO-PW

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

REF: JCRC-LNB MSG DTG 111236Z FEB 86, SUBJ: JCRC REPORT T86-039,

RE: SC

1. REF REPORT FORWARDED CLAIMS BY SC THAT HE SAW
 U.S. PWS ALIVE IN VIETNAM ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHILE IN VIETNAM ON
 OFFICIAL PRK BUSINESS. YOUR RPT DOES NOT SPECIFY HIS CLAIMED
 FUNCTION AND THE CAPACITY UNDER WHICH HE CLAIMS TO HAVE VISITED
 VIETNAM. YOUR REPORT DOES POINT OUT THE ERRATIC BEHAVIOR OF MR.
SC AND THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING BOTH HIS POLYGRAPH
 EXAMINATION AND IN RESPONDING IN A COHERENT MANNER TO THE FEW
 DIA/NNIC/VO/VO-PW

MR. TOURISON/X50501/24FEB86/BT

COL OBERST, USAF, VO-PW CHF



02

RR

QUESTIONS POSED.

2. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU ARE ABLE TO DEVELOP
 REGARDING SC FUTURE ACTIVITIES IN THAILAND, A DESCRIPTION
 OF HIS CLAIMED DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHILE IN THE PRK, AND ANY
 COMMENTS FROM LOCAL U.S. AND RESPONSIBLE THAI/CAMBODIAN SOURCES
 REGARDING THEIR VIEW OF HIS CREDIBILITY.

3. VO-PW COMMENT: THIS OFFICE HAS HAD CONTACT, DIRECTLY OR
 INDIRECTLY, WITH A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS EXHIBITING THE TYPE OF
 BEHAVIOR SC HAS EXHIBITED. WHILE NOT ALL THESE INDIVIDUALS
 ARE QUITE AS ERATIC AS SC THEY HAVE ALL PRESENTED
 GRANDIOSE CLAIMS REGARDING FIRST-HAND LIVE SIGHTINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN
 DETERMINED TO BE FICTITIOUS. SOME OF THE MORE RECENT EXTREMES
 INCLUDE PERSONS SUCH AS NAME

NAME BUT A FEW. NEARLY
 ALL THESE ENTREPRENEURS HAVE LATER ESTABLISHED TIES TO VARIOUS
 PRIVATE CITIZENS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PW/MIA ISSUE. SEVERAL OF THESE
 CONCERNED CITIZENS HAVE OFTEN LEVERAGED THESE SOURCES AS VERIFYING
 THE PRESENCE OF LIVE PWS WHICH THEY FURTHER OFFER TO SUPPORT THEIR
 CLAIMS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN A COVER-UP ON THE PW/MIA
 ISSUE. WE WILL BE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN SEEING TO WHAT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY
F112201Z FEB 86
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY
INFO CSICINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J5//
OIC WASHINGTON DC//DOD-PW//
SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW//
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//ASPCA CHILDRESS//
JCS WASHDC//J5//
CIA WASHDC//DDO/CA/VEL//

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 07628

CITE: 3112 FEB 86.

SUBJECT: JCRC REPORT 788-019, ALLEGED FIRSTHAND
OBSERVATION OF LIVE AMERICAN POWS IN VIETNAM AND
LAOS

SC Data

1. SUMMARY: SOURCE, A BATEVE CANADIAN MALE FROM SHAN STATE PROVINCE, PROVIDED CONFLICTING FIRSTHAND INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS ALLEGED PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF LIVE AMERICAN POWS IN VIETNAM AND LAOS DURING 1984. END OF SUMMARY.

2. ON 31 JANUARY 86, SOURCE WAS INTERVIEWED BY AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS DURING A VISIT TO SITE 2 REFUGEE CAMP. THE REPORT OF THIS INTERVIEW, DATED 3 FEBRUARY 86, WAS PASSED TO THE JCRC LIAISON OFFICE, AND THE SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE REPORT IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:

"THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, SC TOLD US THAT IN 1984 HE ATTENDED A STUDY COURSE IN HANOI, SAW PRISONER PHAM VAN DONG PERMITTED SC AND 17 OTHER LAO AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS IN THE COURSE TO VISIT A PRISON IN HANOI. ACCORDING TO SC, PHAM VAN DONG WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE THE BRAVERY OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND POWER OF COMMUNISM BY SHOWING HOW THE VIETNAMESE WERE ABLE TO HANDLE THE AMERICANS. SC SAID THAT ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1984, HE AND THE OTHER OFFICIALS LEFT THE HANOI CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE OFFICE AND DROVE FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES BEFORE COMING TO THE PLACE WHERE THE PRISONERS WERE HELD. THE OFFICIALS' EYES WERE COVERED DURING THE TRIP. THE GROUP ENTERED AN UNDERGROUND PRISON WHERE THEIR EYES WERE UNCOVERED. SC SAID THAT HE ESTIMATED THE PRISON TO BE 100 METERS BY 100 METERS IN SIZE. HE SAW THREE CELLS (OF A REPORTED TOTAL OF 30 CELLS) AND CLAIMED THAT HE SAW 100 AMERICANS IN EACH OF THE THREE CELLS FOR A TOTAL OF 300. THE PRISONERS WERE DRESSED IN BLUE CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THEY WERE VERY SLIM AND PALE WITH LONG BEARDS. HE ESTIMATED THEIR AGES TO BE ABOUT LATE 20'S. SOME USED CANES AND WERE BALD.

SC ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN AMERICAN POWS IN SAIGON ON DECEMBER 3, 1984. SC SAID THAT ON THAT DAY THE GROUP LEFT THE CENTRAL PARTY OFFICE AND DROVE FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES TO A PLACE NEAR THE RIVER.

ACTION (1,1)
INFO J3-DICE//J3/J5//J2/J3/J5//J5//J5//
OIC WASHINGTON DC//DOD-PW//
SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW//
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//ASPCA CHILDRESS//
JCS WASHDC//J5//
CIA WASHDC//DDO/CA/VEL//

SECTIONAL

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 45

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PAGE 1 OF 1
1112982 FEB 86
SECT 01 OF 02

RR

03 03

EXTENT AND WHAT LINKS TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS SC EXTENDS HIS
CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES ON THE PW/MIA ISSUE.

4. (U) POC IN DIA/VO-PW IS SEDGWICK DOWNEY TOURISON.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DIA EVALUATION OF PW/MIA INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY SC

SC, a Vietnamese refugee of Chinese ethnic extraction who has resettled in Pennsylvania, reported hearsay information concerning U.S. prisoners of war in Hanoi in the 1978 time frame. He stated that while he was a student at a government-run cooking school on Bach Mai Street in Hanoi in 1975 he became acquainted with a young Vietnamese male named SS, whose father was a major in the North Vietnamese Army. SS's home was located on Ly Nam De Street near the intersection of Ly Nam De and Phan Dinh Phung Streets.

According to SC during one conversation with SS, the topic of news reports on the release of PWs was broached. SC stated that not all U.S. PWs had been released; the SRV had kept a number of important prisoners to use as hostages to acquire war reparations or attain other SRV objectives. SC indicated that on another occasion when he visited SS at the latter's home, SS pointed out the location where the U.S. prisoners of war were being held. During the interview with the DI-7C representative, SC initially said the location was inside the Citadel somewhere between the East Gate (WJ 8821 2585) and the intersection of Phan Dinh Phung and Ly Nam De Streets (WJ 8832 2643). SC later altered his description of the location to a group of buildings outside the Citadel on Ly Nam De Street between the two points previously mentioned, i.e., the approximate location of 17 Ly Nam De Street (former Citadel PW Camp where U.S. prisoners were detained during the Vietnam War). According to SC, this group of buildings was surrounded by a high wall topped by barbed wire; no guards were visible. The wall was a reddish brick color. Initially SC stated that there were guards at the gate; he later said there were guards in guard towers; and finally said that there were no guards visible, but heard from SS that there were guards inside the wall. SC's changes in his story resulted from attempts by the interviewer to obtain a more detailed description of SC's observation. SC claimed to have walked past the compound allegedly containing U.S. PWs on a number of occasions; he refused to provide a more specific estimate. He recalled that the compound appeared no different from other military facilities on that street. SC stated that he never saw the prisoners, nor did he ever hear them speak. He had no idea how many there were, nor how long they had been held. SC indicated that he knew of no one else in the refugee stream who knows of the presence of U.S. PWs in Hanoi in the 1978 time frame. In addition, he claimed not to know where in Vietnam the U.S. prisoners had been held during the Vietnam War.

Three other Vietnamese refugees have reported sightings of U.S. prisoners of war in Hanoi following Operation Homecoming in 1973. SC has claimed that he had a neighbor in Hanoi named SS about 22 years old, the son of a North Vietnamese Army colonel. SS lived with his parents. According to SC, SS claimed that in July or August 1980 he had overheard his father telling his mother that more than 50 U.S. prisoners of war held at the Citadel were being moved that evening to underground bunkers there because a U.S. delegation in Hanoi at that time was scheduled to visit the Citadel on the following day.

SC, a former undertaker in Hanoi, reported he had personally observed three unidentified Americans in Hanoi from 1974 through January 1979. He stated that these Americans may have assimilated into Vietnamese life. SC supplied information about the facility at 17 Ly Nam De and the neighboring area that would rule out the possibility that U.S. PWs were detained here between March 1973 and January 1979. No deception was noted during his polygraph examination.

SC claims two separate sightings of American prisoners in Hanoi. In June 1974, he saw 200 Americans while working as a gardener in a Hanoi military complex that included the General Staff Department (GSD), the head office of Army Politics, the office of the army newspaper People's Army, and the head of logistics, for whom SC worked. According to SC the complex was bordered by Duong Hoang Djeu (north), Phan Dinh Phung (east), and Ly Nam De (south). SC first claimed sighting of the Americans was in the GSD section, located in the northwest part of the complex. He stated he was later told by a lieutenant colonel who worked in the GSD and was previously known by SC that the U.S. prisoners were U.S. pilots, tank drivers and mechanics, and that they would be exchanged for goods with the Carter Administration at some time in the future. His second sighting reportedly occurred in December 1978 in the area occupied by the head of Army Politics located in the southwest quadrant of the complex on Ly Nam De Street. He stated that he saw faces through the windows of a house, and heard those individuals speak in English. He estimated that 40-50 U.S. prisoners were held there.

In contrast to the above accounts, SC, a former major in the Quartermaster Corps, North Vietnamese Army, who was stationed in the Hanoi area from 1967 to 1975, stated that the Citadel was closed on 20 July 1970, and the U.S. prisoners of war were moved to the Dan Hoi PW Camp west of Hanoi. According to SC on 25 November 1970, the Citadel was reopened and held U.S. prisoners until 16 March 1973. This information is confirmed by returned U.S. PWs. Additionally, SC asserted that he had first-hand knowledge that this facility was not used as a detention facility after March 1973.

It is not possible to determine the veracity of SC's hearsay information at this time. During his interview a significant degree of evasiveness was noted. Moreover, in certain instances he changed his story when asked for details, and gave the impression that he was "ad-libbing" and perhaps making up portions of his story as he went along. Similarities between SC's claimed source and that of SC are readily apparent.

A copy of this report and evaluation will be maintained for future reference in conjunction with other refugee reporting concerning the above matter.

842

(6643) - Feb 80

- From major in 8m Corps, RVN, was o/c of 1st Airborne
in 1968-73. (1967-73). Received award of US Army
in 1971 - only time in which this award

- After San Toy said PWs were moved to the Nam V. Camp
reported was well as many by picture evidence.

- Citadel was built on 30 July 70. US PWs moved to the Nam V. Camp
west of Hanoi. On 25 Nov 70, Citadel was captured, held US PWs until
16 Mar 73.

- was 266 ft only, because that US remains buried at
Citadel point 1973. On several occasions generally
interference with US remains buried at the Nam V. Camp
in May 73 on the 20th 1973. The PWs were released from all
connection with US remains. He doesn't think that US remains
survived to be buried at the Citadel in 73.

(6912)

A. Schmitt was reported in and was buried in the remains

of 400 US military personnel who were buried in the remains

843 (2)

in SEA. He stated that personal effects and identification S/Ps

remains were included in boxes which were buried at

in Hanoi. The facility has been identified as a burial site

attribution was made from PWs from June 69 until March

73. Between 1971 and 73, this testimony supports a large number of

US remains which indicate a burial is to be made at

On several occasions - 1974-76, up to mid-77

collected to work certain remains - some of

which he represented. It was in these circumstances that he was

able to show the approx. 400 remains stored there.

Thompson

- about 1974-1975, from 1974 through 1977
about 1974-1975, from 1974 through 1977
American remains buried in Hanoi. He also
stated that he had obtained second-hand information from a soldier
of former US military personnel working at the Do Pham facility
in Hanoi.

Memorandum for Record

6 January 1982

SUBJECT: Report of Interview - SC

1. On 5 January 1982 the undersigned interviewed ~~SC~~ ^{SD} by telephone concerning his claimed hearsay knowledge of U.S. prisoners of war in Hanoi in the 1978 timeframe. During a previous interview with ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC}, also of Philadelphia, PA, ~~AN~~ ^{AN} was informed of ~~SC~~ ^{SC} PW/MIA information by ~~SSC~~ and was furnished ~~SC~~ telephone number.

2. Results of the 5 January interview, conducted entirely in Vietnamese, are as follows:

a. ~~SC~~ ^{SC}, a Vietnamese refugee of Chinese extraction, was born in Hanoi, Vietnam on ~~SD~~ ^{SD}. He claims to have grown up in Hanoi. The family residence in Hanoi was at ~~SD~~ ^{SD}. He attended grades 1-3 at the Chinese Elementary School on Luong Ngoc Quyen St. He attended grades 4-6 at a war-time "dispersed school" in Bac Ninh, 29 kms northwest of Hanoi. He completed his studies in 1968 or 1969. He then worked in the family business in Hanoi, which involved the production and sale of foodstuffs, until 1975. In that year he commenced an 18-month training program at a government-run technical school on Bach Mai St., where he became qualified as a cook. He then became a cook at the Trang Tien Restaurant near a state-run hotel on the street bearing the same name as the restaurant. He continued to work at this restaurant until he was expelled from Vietnam as an Overseas Chinese in April 1979. He claimed to have travelled by small fishing boat ~~SD~~ ^{SD}. The escape was organized by a ~~AN~~ ^{AN} Hanoi businessman who is now resettled in the United Kingdom. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} stated that the escape was not sponsored by the Vietnamese Public Security Service.

b. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} is a bachelor. He stated that he had never served in the Vietnamese military establishment because ethnic Chinese are exempt from military service. He then added that in fact Chinese are prohibited from such service, and that such individuals are not involved in Vietnamese politics and are content to engage in business to make a living. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} stated that his parents and certain other immediate family members are currently living in China. He himself resettled in Philadelphia about one year ago. He lives with an older and a younger brother. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} is a student of English at what he termed the "NSC." He indicated that he had met ~~SDC~~ ^{SDC} (~~SC~~ ^{SC} also referred to ~~SDC~~ ^{SDC}) since arriving in the U.S. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} had come to the U.S. with a friend of ~~SC~~ ^{SC}. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} stated that initially he did not consider his PW/MIA information significant enough to report, but decided to do so at the encouragement of ~~SC~~ ^{SC}.

c. Mr. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} claims to possess hearsay information concerning the presence of U.S. prisoners of war in Hanoi in 1978. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} stated that while he was a student at the cooking school in 1975 he met and became a close friend of a female student named ~~NAME~~. Her younger sister, ~~NAME~~ had a boyfriend named ~~NAME~~ whose father was an NVA Major. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} stated that he was introduced to ~~NAME~~ and chatted with him often. ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC} home was located on Ly Nam De St.

~~SSD~~ ^{SSD} near the intersection of Ly Nam De and Phan Dinh Phung Streets. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} claimed to have occasionally visited ~~SC~~ ^{SC} at the latter's home. During one conversation with ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC}, the topic of news reports on the release of PW's was broached. According to ~~SC~~ ^{SC}, ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC} stated that not all U.S. PWs had been released. The SRV had kept a number of important prisoners to use as hostages to acquire war reparations or attain other SRV objectives. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} didn't know whether this was speculation or whether ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC} actually had knowledge. When pressed for the full name and military assignment of ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC} father, ~~SC~~ ^{SC} made a vague comment to the effect that the NVA Major had retired and was at home. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} terminated this line of questioning saying that he did not have any further knowledge about the NVA major.

d. On one occasion when ~~SC~~ ^{SC} visited ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC} at the latter's home, ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC} pointed out the location where the U.S. PW's were being held. During the interview with the undersigned, ~~SC~~ ^{SC} initially said the location was inside the Citadel somewhere between the East Gate (WJ 8821 2585) and the intersection of Phan Dinh Phung and Ly Nam De Streets (WJ 8832 2643). ~~SC~~ ^{SC} later altered his description of the location to a group of buildings outside the Citadel on Ly Nam De Street between the two points previously mentioned, i.e., the approximate location of 17 Ly Nam De Street (former Citadel PW Camp where U.S. prisoners were detained during the Vietnam War). According to ~~SC~~ ^{SC}, this group of buildings was surrounded by a high wall topped by barbed wire; no guards were visible. The wall was a reddish brick color. Initially ~~SC~~ ^{SC} stated that there were guards at the gate; he later said there were guards in guard towers; and finally said that there were no guards visible, but heard from ~~NAME~~ ^{NAME} that there were guards inside the wall. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} changes in his story resulted from attempts by the interviewer to obtain a more detailed description of ~~SC~~ ^{SC} observation. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} claimed to have walked past the compound allegedly containing U.S. PWs on a number of occasions; he refused to provide a more specific estimate. He recalled that the compound appeared no different from other military facilities on that street. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} stated that he never saw the prisoners, nor did he ever hear them speak. He had no idea how many there were, nor how long they had been held. ~~SC~~ ^{SC} indicated that he knew of no one else in the refugee stream who knows of the presence of U.S. PWs in Hanoi in the 1978 timeframe. In addition, he claimed not to know where in Vietnam the U.S. prisoners had been held during the Vietnam War.

3. During the interview the undersigned noted a significant degree of evasiveness of the part of Mr. ~~SC~~ ^{SC}. Moreover, in certain instances he changed his story when asked for details, and gave the impression that he was "ad-libbing" and perhaps making up portions of his story as he went along. It is recommended that no further contact be made with Mr. ~~SC~~ ^{SC}, and that an evaluation of this information be made.

AN

AN

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
NAS HARBERS POINT, HAWAII 96842Ref: RP81-060
21 December 1981From: CH-OPS
To: CDR-JCRC

Subj: U.S. POWs in Hanoi Citadel (Hearsey)

Source:

- a. Name: SC
- b. DOB: SD
- c. POB: SD
- d. Former Position: Warrant Officer, ARVN 1955-1975
- e. Present Location: DM77
- f. Identification Data: SD
- g. DOI: Jul/Aug 1979

Information:

In 1941 source, along with his family, moved from China to Long Son Province, NVN, and then on to Hanoi in 1948. Source joined the French Army in 1951 and was assigned to an airborne unit at Tan Son Nhut. Source's family moved to Saigon in 1954. Source joined ARVN in 1955, and served with airborne units to 1972. With the rank of warrant officer, he served as the

In June 1975, source reported as directed by the communist government to Phi Long Building, Le Van Duyet St (former name), Saigon, to commence reeducation. After 4 months, source escaped by climbing a wall at night and sought refuge at a Chinese friend's home near Ban Me Thuot (AQ 7903), where he remained until June 1980. With a view to escaping overland to China, he travelled to Hanoi in June 1980. He had a false I.D. procured with the help of his friend and train tickets in his false name. Travel papers to visit his wife's

NAME SD were obtained by bribes to various police and local communist officials. He arrived at NAME residence on 11 June 1980 and remained there 41 December 1980. Unable to procure false documents with which he could travel northward to escape to China, and fearing detection, he returned to southern Vietnam in December 1980 and escaped by sea.

Source claimed that while in Hanoi he and a neighbor named SSC, who lived at SD with his parents, had casual conversations on several occasions. Source described SSC as about 22 years old, dedicated to communism, a braggart, and the son of a PAVN Colonel (name unknown). During one of these conversations in July or August 1980, SSC is alleged to have stated that he had heard his father and mother talking in the previous evening after he SSC had gone to bed. SSC claimed his father had said that over 50 U.S. POWs held at the "Citadel" were being moved that evening to underground bunkers there because the "U.S. delegation" in Hanoi at the time was scheduled to visit the Citadel on the following day (NFI).

CH-OPS, JCRC

Ref: RP81-060
21 December 1981

For AAS, re internal EMI: Source claimed no knowledge of American bodies stored at the Citadel. He could provide no information as to the reason for the "special visit" of the "U.S. delegation," nor could he say when it arrived in Hanoi, claiming his knowledge was limited to the information obtained second-hand from SSC.

A-N

SUBJECT: Inputs to HISEA3

TO: All Analysts.

1. This memorandum is intended as an aid to record actions taken by you that should be made a matter of record but does not result in an immediate "hard" copy. The only instances of its use that come to mind are telephone calls for assistance by another agency, requests for imagery or contact with a source to set up an interview. Once input to the data base (if applicable) it will be filed in the identified case file. For analyst's convenience our recall it can be used for other purposes, to be maintained in the case file.

2. The following information must be filled in:

a. Date 2 Oct 81 + 5 Jan 82.

b. ID No. Name SC

c. Type of action Telephone Interview

d. Agency DI-7C

e. Notes/comments/etc Ma. SC who SD grew up in Hanoi, was mentioned to DI-7C by Ma. SSC (0944) on 1 Oct 81. SC had been interviewed by AN on 22 Sep 81. SC stated that SC, who he had met after meeting in Data had told him he had seen more than 10 U.S. PWs in the vicinity of 1 by Nam De St., Hanoi, in about 1978.

f. OTHER:

See my memo for SC PW/MIA information brief on interview conducted on 5 Jan 82.

3. Analyst: AN AN

4. Pass to M for action

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION	
1. TO	INITIALS	CIRCULATE	
	DATE	COORDINATION	
2.	INITIALS	FILE	
	DATE	INFORMATION	
3.	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN	
	DATE	PERFORM VERBATION	
Per forscen of SC; 1 Oct 81	INITIALS	SEE ME	
	DATE	SIGNATURE	

REMARKS

- ①
- ② Speaks Vietnamese and Chinese - no English.
- ③ Saw more than 10 U.S. PWs on Ly Nam De St., Hanoi, in about 1978.
- ④ Lived in Hanoi at least 20 years.

Call Ma. SC, SSP over the weekend - he will have Ma. ANM call me to the phone.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM	DATE
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41

AUGUST 1967

GSA FPMR (41CFR) 101-11.206

5041-101-01

GPO : 1975-555-904



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
NAS BARBERS POINT, HAWAII 96882

20 APR 1982

Ref: (C)RP82-003
17 March 1982

From: CH-OPS
To: CDR-JCRC

Subj: U.S. POWs in Hanoi Citadel (Hearsey) (Follow-up)

Ref: (a) CH-OPS, JCRC, Report (C)RP81-060 of 21 Dec 1981
(b) DIA msg 032244Z FEB 82

Source:

- a. Name: SC
- b. DOB: SD
- c. POB: SD
- d. Former Position: Warrant Officer, Medical Corps, ARVN
- e. Present Location: SD
- f. Identification Data: 0p474/Cap Anamur
- g. DOI: Jul/Aug 1980
- h. Map Base: Hanoi City Map 1:12,500; Series 1309, Ed. 3
- i. Date of Interview: 26 Feb 82

Initially reported at reference (a), source was the subject of a request for re-interview at reference (b). The following information relates primarily to the collection requirements at reference (b) and is not an exhaustive re-examination of source's account. The interview was conducted in English, with frequent assistance of an interpreter.

Information:

Source moved with his family from SD China, to Hanoi in 1941. His family included his parents, an uncle and aunt, and grandfather and grandmother. Source was an only child. His father drowned in the late 1940's, following which his mother remarried. Source joined the French Army as a private on 24 Jun 1951. SD received basic, airborne, and medical training in Hanoi at the Center for Instruction of Airborne Troops of Indochina (French acronym-CITAPI). CITAPI LBN was SD. After training, he worked as a medic in the CITAPI dispensary until 1953, then he was assigned to the HQ (Battalion), Airborne Division (French acronym-BDAP), as a sergeant. BDAP LBN was SD. In 1954 BDAP was moved to Southern Airborne Base (Tan Son Nhut) near Saigon. The BDAP returned to France in 1955. Source was transferred to the 7th Battalion, Airborne Brigade (Vietnamese) in Saigon. He retained the rank of sergeant. He served in RVN airborne units as a medic until 1970, when he was transferred to the office of the Surgeon General (Vu Ngot Hoan) as a warrant officer.

Source continued to maintain SD (sub-source) had told him he had obtained his information in July (or possibly August) 1980. He denied (Ed. as he had during the previous interview in December 1981) that he had previously told the U.S. Refugee Officer that the date was July 1979.

Classified by _____
Declassify on _____

CH-OPS, JCRC

Ref: (C)RP82-003
17 March 1982

Source now claims that upon his escape from Phi Long he went to the home of his wife's parents. He denied his previous statement that he had sought refuge with a friend in Ban Me Thuot (Ed. I personally conducted the previous interview and recall repeated references to Ban Me Thuot during the discussion of his escape). He now claims to have been at Phi Long only one month before his escape, again denying his earlier statement of 4 months. On his escape from the Phi Long Building, he went to the home of his friend, ARVN, SD, who went to source's wife, SD, to obtain money (about 100 new piastres) for source. Source then went to the marketplace in Cho Lon and claimed he was offered false identity papers by an unknown Chinese on the street. Accepting the offer, he paid for and was given a "residency certificate" showing his name as SD and his address as SD Bao Loc. He then travelled openly by bus to that address, and lived there with his parents-in-law until he allegedly went to Hanoi in 1980. He claimed he returned to Saigon from Bao Loc (a distance of some 200 Km, he estimated) every few months (at least twice a year) during this 3-year period to obtain money from his wife through the intermediary Hong. He claimed he was never challenged during these travels by security personnel, but did have his residency certificate (validated by security police in Bao Loc), in his possession. He carried no other documents.

Source claimed he went to Saigon in June 1980 and took a train to Hanoi. He carried no documents other than his residency certificate and train ticket in his false name. Unlike his earlier report, he claimed to have bribed no one and carried no travel permits. He claimed he did not expect to be, nor was he, challenged by security personnel due to his age. He claimed only "youngsters" drew careful attention of security personnel.

He first explained that he'd elected to escape over land through China because he could contact his "friends in other countries" to sponsor him for immigration from there. Asked why he felt he could not contact his friends from any other country of refuge, he avoided the question to say he thought it would be "cheapest and best" to go through China; that there were no sea pirates that way.

Source claimed his family was "surrounded" after his first escape from the Phi Long Building, apparently thinking he had returned there. His family was threatened at that time, but not harmed. They were thereafter denied ration cards and other documentation. He claimed a recent letter from his wife received since his arrival on SD said that his oldest son had just been imprisoned by the communists, but the reasons were not clear.

He did not take his family with him to Hanoi to escape from VN due to lack of funds. Asked if danger to his family was a factor, he claimed it was not, saying again that it was due only to a lack of funds. He added as an afterthought that he could not have any contact with his family for reasons of their safety.

CH-OPS, JCRC

Ref: (C)MP82-003
17 March 1982

Source claimed he has never seen his wife or seven children since he reported to the Phi Long Building in June 1975. He stated that, as he had had no contact for 5 years, whether he remained in or escaped from Vietnam should have no effect on his family's treatment at the hands of the communists.

Source claimed that, as SS and he lived close to each other in Hanoi, they encountered each other and engaged in casual conversations on several occasions. In one such conversation, source pointed to "Europeans" he saw on the street and, wondering who they were, asked SS if they were Americans. SS responded that these were Russians or perhaps Hungarians and that the only Americans were at the Citadel, then revealed the story attributed to him at reference (a).

Source identified a point on the north side of 3D St at WJ88632297 as the approximate location of the building at which SS and he lived in Hanoi. Described as a two-house structure; that is, sharing a common wall at the center, source said he lived at #32A on the west side, while SS lived at #32 on the east side.

Asked why he had not come forward with this information till October 1981, as he has been at Palawan since 7 June 1981, he claimed he had not been asked about live Americans, only airplane crashes and graves, so he did not know that such information was needed. (Ed. This is unlikely, but cannot be refuted with certainty).

Source was instructed to provide a detailed written statement concerning the planning for, and events leading up to, his escape from VN. The inclosure hereto was furnished in response.

Comments:

The more source was pressed concerning inconsistencies in this testimony compared with his earlier statements, the more reluctant he became to "remember" details, apparently concerned that the details would be dissimilar to previous testimony.

Source expressed a high degree of confidence during his previous interview and again during this interview in his ability to salute and deceive those with whom he dealt. These remarks were given in the context of dealing with communist government officials, but appear to explain his disdain for accuracy in this account as well.

Inclosure

Operations
Interviewer

3

WES COMMAND

UNION MEDICAL OFFICE
PERSONNEL

DATE: FEBRUARY 26th 1982

FROM: Mr. SC

TO: THE REPRESENTATIVE OF US AMBASSY IN HANOI

Dear Sir,

According to your request, I respectfully report to you my story as follows:

I was captured from Viet Nam on May 11th 1981 with a fishing boat No. 7. After my wife's arrangement, on May 10th 1981 I was told to be at the car station very early in the morning. SS was there at 7 o'clock and a man named KHOS had took me along with him for 1 Km, then he stopped a car heading for CAN THO with a price of 70\$VN. At CAN THO I TOOK ANOTHER CAR FOR LONG XUYEN. At the LONG XUYEN's fair, boat VAN CONG, there was a man who brought me home. Once arrived at the house, I saw many people waiting. At 11pm, a boat was coming to get us out to the middle of the river and there we remained over night. At 4pm the next day my boat and the others began to paddle from LONG XUYEN to BACH SOI/BACH GIA. There we got to wait until midnight. At 12pm the big boat came and got us all, 47 people, men, women and children. The boat was 10m long and 1.80m large.

We sailed out from BACH SOI and then to the night sea on MAY 11th 1981. After 30 hours sailing, we had been rescued by the GERMAN ship CAP. ANANUA, that was the MAY 13th 1981.

After about one month living on the ship on JUNE 13th 1981 we were landed in DMG to the VEC UP TO THIS DAY. All of my travelling money my wife should pay to the boat owner. Both of them still are in VIET NAM.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS.

RE

854

/29/89

PAGE 1

ME 3 : SC ID # 2 : 40003
 A 16 : CONFIDENTIALITY37:
 AT NUMBER 34 : CONTACTED 32: 1A
 CATEGORY:
 TRY LOCATED 23 : SD STATE/CITY 15 :
 TRY REPORTED 10: VN
 PE SIGHTING 46 : NO PW INFORMATION
 T SIGHTING 42 : 11 12
 SOURCES 27 : 55
 TIONS 51 : 871008 DET32 IR 15120001-88
 871008 DET32 DTG 080650Z
 RRENT ACT 45 : CAPTIVITY 39:
 MARKS 36 : EVLREQ ECONMC RECOVERY-HAND1 ANALYST 13: AJ
 TLE RECEIVED 8: 890329 DATE OF INFO 35
 URCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:
 IGIN CODE 17: E
 ILYGRAPH CATEGORY 53:
 ILYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

IS17054

855

/09/89

PAGE 1

ME 3 : SC ID # 2 : 09915
 A 16 : CONFIDENTIALITY37:
 AT NUMBER 34 : CONTACTED 32: 1A
 CATEGORY:
 TRY LOCATED 23 : SD STATE/CITY 15 :
 TRY REPORTED 10: PDW-HSY
 PE SIGHTING 46 : MU270520 11 211600N 12 1051600E
 T SIGHTING 42 :
 SOURCES 27 : 55
 UNDERGROUND
 PRISON
 TIONS 51 : 53 P
 870915 DET32 IR 15120274-87
 870915 DET32 DTG 130659Z
 RRENT ACT 45 : CAPTIVITY 39:
 MARKS 36 : FULREN 300 FWS KEPT PHU THU-82 ANALYST 13: AJ
 TLE RECEIVED 8: 890306 DATE OF INFO 35 52
 URCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:
 IGIN CODE 17: E
 ILYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS
 ILYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

IS17054

11/02/81

1101

PAGE

NAME 3 SC ID 2 1101
 AKA 16
 BOAT NUMBER 34 50
 CONFIDENTIALITY 37
 ENTRY LOCATED 23 1 STATE/CITY 15
 ENTRY REPORTED 10 VN
 TYPE S/LH/INI 45 PHU-HUY
 DATE SIGHTING 42 HANOI 11 12
 DATE SIGHTING 42 HANOI 11 12
 SUBSOURCES 27 45
 ACTIONS 51 611024 DAORP DTG 260754Z
 CURRENT ACT 43
 REMARKS 34 FOLKED UNKNOWN HAD CITIZENSHIP 80 ANALYST 13 440
 DATE RECEIVED 8 811102 DATE OF INFO 35 9007
 ACT DATE 38 1102 0 81 ADDRESS 23
 ORIGIN CODE 17 C

527009

DIA

1. Vietnamese refugee SC provided
 during information of US POW at the Hanoi Citadel
 to State Department Refugee Coordinator at the
 SC refugee camp. During this interview
 SC stated that in July 1970 he was told by
 a young man named SS that in July 1972 SS
 had his father, a Colonel in the USA, telling SS
 mother that because a US diplomat was arriving
 and would visit the Hanoi Citadel, they would have
 to move the US POWs left there into the
 basement so they would not be observed.
 During a reinterview by JCRC officials, SC
 stated that in June 1975 he reported to the Ph. Long

Building on Ye Van Duyet Street in Saigon to commence reeducation. After four months there, he was put in each night in a separate Chinese prison, known as Ba Vi Prison, where he remained until June 1980. In June 1980 he transferred to the 10 and then paper bag (living measures) prison and local court officials and transferred to Hanoi, from where he planned to escape, en route to China. He arrived at his superior's office here in Hanoi in June 1980 and remained there until December 1980. Unable to procure false documents with which he could travel northward, to escape to China, and fearing detection, he returned to southern

Vietnam in December 1980 and escaped by sea. While in Hanoi he claimed to have spoken with a neighbor named SS who stated that one evening in July or August 1980 he asked his father tell his mother that some 50 U.S. PWs held at the Citadel were being moved that evening to underground bunkers because a U.S. delegation in Hanoi at the time was scheduled to visit the Citadel on the following day.

a. SS was questioned a second time by JCRC reps. to clarify discrepancies between his two earlier testimonies and to obtain additional details on his reports. On this occasion he stated

that SS ^{had returned} provided him this information in July or August 1980 and denied Jimmy Valle's Refugee Officer's statement that the date was July 1979. SS also denied during this later interview that upon his escape from Phnom Penh he went to the house where he was born in Dait. He denied his previous statement that he had sought refuge with a friend in Ban Me Thut. He also stated during this interview that he had been at Phnom Penh only one month before his escape, again denying his earlier statement of four months. While staying with his in-laws in Dait, he would travel to Phnom Penh for months to

obtain money from his wife. In June 1980 he took a train to Hanoi but, unlike his earlier reports, he claimed to have liked Hanoi and earned money from his work. "SC" could not give any additional information concerning the Committee at the Citadel. He said only he had not seen anyone with this information until October 1981 when he had been at the SS camp since June 1981, he claimed he had not been asked about the Committee, only airplane crashes and guns, so he did not know that such information was needed.

3. John view of the many inconsistencies in SC's testimony, which seem to become more numerous

with each sighting, his reliability has become questionable, thus ^{therefore} resulting in little credibility ^{can be} attributed to that portion of his report dealing with US PWs. While DTC has previously referred reports of American PWs in Korea, none of these reports have been substantiated as providing reliable evidence that US POW action had taken place in Vietnam. SO, information cannot be definitively accepted nor does the low information in being and he was not given additional details concerning the alleged US PWs. It should be noted, however,

That's their view as US delegation to Hanoi in July-August 1969, which SC, obviously mentioned in the accurate timeframe of the ^{Hanoi} US delegation's visit, two JCCC representatives did visit Hanoi on 1 October 1969. Referring the witness's opinion can be changed. P. 10, p. 4.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF RESEARCH CENTER

RETCEYON RUEKJCSA163 0342244
ROUTINE
R 032244Z FEB 82

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DI-7C//

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO USDAO BANGKOK TH//JCRC-LNO// CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3//
BT

SUBJ: REFUGEE REPORT

REFS: A. USDAO MANILA RP MSG 078 260754Z OCT 81

B. JCRC LHM RP81-060 21 DECEMBER 1981

REF B PROVIDES FURTHER DETAILS TO REF A CONCERNING SUBJECT'S HEARSAY INFORMATION OF U.S. PWs AT THE CITADEL IN HANOI. REF A STATED THAT IN JULY 1979-80 (THE SOURCE OF SC INFORMATION) HEARD HIS FATHER SAY A U.S. DELEGATION WAS ARRIVING AND WOULD VISIT THE HANOI CITADEL AND THEY WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO MOVE THEMSELVES PWs DETAINED THERE INTO THE BASEMENT SO THEY WOULD NOT BE OBSERVED. REF B STATED THAT SC OBTAINED THE INFORMATION IN JULY OR AUGUST 1980 REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT TO REINTERVIEW SOURCE ON NEXT SCHEDULED TRIP TO RP AND DETERMINE EXACTLY WHEN HE OBTAINED HIS INFORMATION. IN ADDITION, REQUEST YOU ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY CERTAIN PORTIONS OF REF B: WHAT WAS SC POSITION IN THE FRENCH ARMY? HOW LONG DID HE STAY AND HAVE HIM IDENTIFY THE UNITS TO WHICH HE WAS ATTACHED? SC STATED THAT HE HAD ESCAPED FROM THE PHU LONG BUILDING IN SAIGON WHERE HE WAS BEING REEDUCATED AND SOUGHT REFUGE AT A FRIEND'S HOME NEAR BAN HE THUOT. SINCE THERE IS QUITE A DISTANCE BETWEEN SAIGON AND BAN HE THUOT, HAVE SC EXPLAIN HOW HE TRAVELED TO BAN HE THUOT UNDETECTED BY SECURITY POLICE. WHY DID HE PLAN TO ESCAPE TO CHINA AS OPPOSED TO ESCAPING BY SOME OTHER ROUTE? WHERE WAS HIS FAMILY DURING THE TIME THAT HE WAS IN HANOI? WHY DID HE NOT TAKE THEM TO HANOI WITH HIM? WHERE ARE THEY NOW? IF THEY REMAIN IN VIETNAM, WHY DID HE CHOOSE TO LEAVE THEM BEHIND AT THE HANDS OF COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES WHO MIGHT PUNISH THEM FOR SC ESCAPE FROM REEDUCATION AND EVENTUAL ESCAPE FROM VIETNAM? WHY DID SC CONFIDE TO SC THE PW INFORMATION WHICH HE HAD OVERHEARD FROM HIS FATHER? IN YOUR REINTERVIEW OF SC PRESENT HIM WITH A MAP OF HANOI AND HAVE HIM PINPOINT THE EXACT LOCATION OF HIS UNCLE'S HOME, WHERE HE LIVED FOR APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS, AND HAVE HIM ALSO PINPOINT THE LOCATION OF SC HOME. HAVE SC PROVIDE DETAILS OF HIS ESCAPE FROM VIETNAM. WHEN DID HE ARRIVE AT THE SC REFUGEE CAMP? WE NOTE THAT HE ORIGINALLY REPORTED THIS INFORMATION ON 22 OCTOBER 1981. IF A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME LAPSED FROM HIS ARRIVAL AT THE REFUGEE CAMP TO OCTOBER 1981, REQUEST YOU QUERY SC AS TO WHY HE HAD NOT REPORTED THIS INFORMATION EARLIER.

REWR 3 FEB 82 REAS 3

BT

ACTION DI-7C(1)
INFO NMIC(1) DIA(1)

(D,6,F)

MCN-87034/04214 TOR-82034/2244Z TAD-82035/0124Z CDSN-MIA816

PAGE 1 OF 1
032244Z FEB 82

JLHM CASUALTY
RESOLUTION CENTER

ANALYSIS & STUD

REFUGEE REPORT & EVALUATION

SOURCE DATA: SC
REFUGEE REPORT INTERVIEW NR & DATE: RP81-060, 21 Dec 81
ANALYST: J
CROSS REFERENCE(S):

CATEGORY DATA: Live Sighting/3rd Hand Account

FINDINGS: Review of data supplied by the source reveals no correlation to data in JCRC files

CORRELATE DATA: None

BACKGROUND/COMMENTS: Although there have been other reports of Americans still being held captive in Vietnam, none have ever been corroborated.

AN
DISPOSITION: JCRC Liaison Office, Bangkok
JCRC AS Files
OSD/ISA, PW-MIA Affairs
"MIA-DI-7C"

FOLLOW-UP:

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
NAS BARBERS POINT, HAWAII 96862

Ref: (C)RP81-060
21 December 1981

From: CH-OPS
To: CDR-JCRC

Subj: U.S. POWs in Hanoi Citadel (Hearsay)

Source:

- a. Name: -- SC
- b. DOB: SD
- c. POB: SD
- d. Former Position: Warrant Officer, ARVN 1955-1975
- e. Present Location: SD
- f. Identification Data: Op 474/Cap Anamur
- g. DOI: Jul/Aug 1979

Information:

In 1941 source, along with his family, moved from China to Long Son Province, NVN, and then on to Hanoi in 1948. Source joined the French Army in 1951 and was assigned to an airborne unit at Tan Son Nhut. Source's family moved to Saigon in 1954. Source joined ARVN in 1955, and served with airborne units to 1972. With the rank of warrant officer, he served as the personal aide to the ARVN Surgeon General from 1972 to 1975.

In June 1975, source reported as directed by the communist government to Phi Long Building, Le Van Duyet St (former name), Saigon, to commence reeducation. After 4 months, source escaped by climbing a wall at night and sought refuge at a Chinese friend's home near Ban Me Thuot (AQ 7903), where he remained until June 1980. With a view to escaping overland to China, he travelled to Hanoi in June 1980. He had a false I.D. procured with the help of his friend and train tickets in his false name. Travel papers to visit his wife's uncle (DATA) Hanoi, were obtained by bribes to various police and local communist officials. He arrived at his residence on 11 June 1980 and remained there till December 1980. Unable to procure false documents with which he could travel northward to escape to China, and fearing detection, he returned to southern Vietnam in December 1980 and escaped by sea.

Source claimed that while in Hanoi he and a neighbor named SS who lived at SSD (rest with his parents, had casual conversations on several occasions. Source described SS as about 22 years old, dedicated to communism, a braggart, and the son of a PAVN Colonel (name unknown). During one of these conversations in July or August 1980, SS is alleged to have stated that he had heard his father and mother talking in the previous evening after he had gone to bed. SS claimed his father had said that over 50 U.S. POWs held at the "Citadel" were being moved that evening to underground bunkers there because the "U.S. delegation" in Hanoi at the time was scheduled to visit the Citadel on the following day (MFI).

OPS, JCRC

Ref: (C)RP81-060
21 December 1981

For A&S, re internal EXI: Source claimed no knowledge of American bodies stored at the Citadel. He could provide no information as to the reason for the "special visit" of the "U.S. delegation," nor could he say when it arrived in Hanoi, claiming his knowledge was limited to the information obtained second-hand from SS.

AN
Operations

INCOMING

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

memorandum

DATE: October 23, 1981

TO: Operations Officer

FROM: MIA/POW Interview

Date of Interview: 10/22/81

Place of Interview: 50 Asylum Refugee Camp

Refugee Interviewed: SC

TO: Captain J. DAO

SC provided the following information which was derived from a fairly recent conversation with a young man, (about 20 years of age) in Hanoi named SS (only given name known).

In July 1979, SS heard his father, a Colonel in the NVA, telling SS's mother that as a U.S. Delegation was arriving, and would visit the Hanoi Citadel, they would have to move the U.S. POWs kept there into the basement so they would not be observed.

SC reportedly went on to say that such was customary during any kind of "special visit", and that as of July 1980, over 50 U.S. POWs were held in the Citadel.

Comments: SC is a former Airborne Officer who says he feels concern for the Americans as some may be his friends. He further claims that he was in Hanoi to arrange for his escape. While SC does not know the full name of SS, he recalled his address: 550. He further states that he believes the house was that of NVA agents, as it contained monitoring devices.

DATE: 10/22/81
SUBJECT: REFUGEE INTERVIEW - 50 ASYLUM REFUGEE CAMP
REFERENCE: FROM HANOI HANIN, 01, 020 5115 AT 25 0141 0211

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

RTTUZYUW RUHQSGG0877 3490215
ROUTINE
R 142110Z DEC 81

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//DI 7C//
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36//

UNCLAS
SUB J: STATUS REPORT ON REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEW OF REFUGEES

SUBJ: STATUS RE: YOUR REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEW OF REFUGEES
 B. USDAO BANGKOK TH 031036Z NOV-81
 C. YOUR 191617Z NOV 81
 D. YOUR 200218Z AUG 81
 E. YOUR 221101Z SEP 81
 F. YOUR 221408Z NOV 81
 G. MY 281600Z OCT 81 (READDRESSD DET 31 PSAA 200713Z OCT 81)
 H. YOUR 101832Z NOV 81
 I. USDAO HANUAH 060754Z OCT 81
 RE: 21 OCT. REF. REQUESTS ON 2-12 DEC. INTERVIEW TRIP TO RP
 PURSUANT TO CITED REFS.
 A. NAME (REFS A AND B). NO RECORD AT REFUGEE OFFICE.
 HANUAH: LUNAHUA TO INFO AT REFS. AND PRIMARILY DUE DIRECTLY TO
 PH. LANUA: NAKPO ON INFO RECEIVED PRIMARILY DUE
 REFUGEE. NAME OF FRUIT OF NAME IN THE
 NAME STATED. EVANUATED RELATIVES FOR U.S. ON 30 SEP 81.
 ALSO PROVIDED FOR ADMIN AND TEL:

1. JVA, BACZ, (REF) HUI IN OTRS AT DATA ON VISITS
THERE BY INTERVIEWER AND JVA REP OVER 2-DAY PERIOD. DID NOT RESPOND
TO ASKS LEFT WITH NEIGHBORS. UNDOUBTEDLY AVOIDING INTERVIEWER.
IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONTACTED JVA REP AFTER INTERVIEWER'S RETURN TO
MANILA. WILL CONTINUE PURSUIT FB-2.
2. FOL REFUGEES CONTACTED PURSUANT TO CITED REFS; REPORTS FORTHCOM-
ING.

NAMES

1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 26

ACTION DI-7C(1)
INFO RATC(1) DIA(1)

(N, C)

ACH=81349/00459 TOR=81349/02312 TAD=81349/0314Z CDSN=MIA257

PAGE 1 OF 1
142110Z DEC 81

871

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

RTTUZYUW RUHQSGG7314 07603220
ROUTINE
R 162330Z MAR 82

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//DI 7C//
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J36//
BT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: STATUS REPORT ON INTERVIEW OF REFUGEES IN RP PURSUANT TO DIA
COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

A. YOUR 1916172 NOV 81
 B. YOUR 2901242 JAN 82
 C. YOUR 0923042 FEB 82
 D. YOUR 0322442 FEB 82
 E. YOUR 2301302 JAN 82
 F. YOUR 7023232 FEB 82
 G. YOUR 2522332 JAN 82

1. REFUGES NAME PARTED FOR _____ IN JAN 82 WHO WAS NOT
 INTERVIEWED PURSUANT TO KEY A. FDC/ADDR: DATA

2. FOR REFUGES CONTACTED PURSUANT TO CITED REFS: REPORTS FORTH-
 COMING DATA TEL: DATA

→ NAMES

3. INITIAL JCRC INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED ON FOL REFUGEES. CITED
REFS WERE ADDRESSED DURING COURSE OF INTERVIEWS:

4. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS RECEIVED AFTER 21 FEB 82 WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO INTERVIEWER. WERE NOT PURSUED DURING TRIP IN RP 23 FEB - 1 MAR 82, AND ARE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR SPECIFICALLY IN THIS STATUS REPORT. WHILE MOST REFUGES IN THIS CATEGORY WERE ROUTINELY INTERVIEWED; FORTHCOMING REFUGES MAY NOT ADDRESS ALL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS. LOOSE ENDS WILL BE ATTENDED TO NEXT TRIP (TENTATIVELY MAY 82).

ACTION DI-7C(1) (U, 7, F)
INFO CJCS: (1) CJCS (3) SJCS (1) J3 (5) NIDS (1) J3:NMCC (1)
J4 (4) J5 (2) SECDEF: (1) SECDEF (7) USDP (15) ASD:PA (1)
DI-2 (1) DI-5 (1) NMIC (1) OS (1) SMS (1) DC-4 (1)
DC-4A (1) AT-X (1) DIO (1) DE (1) DB-4A (1) DIA (1)

MCN=82076/00541 TOR=82076/03142 TAB=82076/03142 CD5N=M1233

PAGE 1 OF 1
162330Z MAR 82

LIVE SIGHTING REPORT

PAGE 012 211 2310000 8615

11 APR 1989

THIS PAGE CONFIDENTIAL IF AKA FILED OR
CONFIDENTIALITY IS YES

NAME 3 : 50 ID 4 2 : 108615

AKA 11 : 55 CONFIDENTIALITY 371

BOAT NUMBER 11 : CONTACTED 321

CHRY LOCATED 23 : TH STATE/CITY 15 : 1

CHRY REPORTED 10 : 12

TYPE SIGHTING 46 : POW 2/H

151 SIGHTING 42 : 11 12

SUBSOURCES 27 : KIER GIAN

ACTIONS 31 : 890105 STONY JR 60240042-99

890105 STONY TH-10 0505452

890411 IAC REVIEW BOARD

890105 STONY 6024004389EMCL

CURRENT ACT 45 : 890411 IAC APP'D KNIGHT/GRANHAM CAPTIVITY 391

REMARKS 36 : 1 PU KIER GIAN 82 ANALYST 13: AM

DATE RECEIVED 81 : 370107 DATE OF INFO 35 : 8209

SOURCE FOR 14 : ADDRESS 251

ORIGIN CODE 17: 0

PHOTOGRAPH CATEGORY 53:

PHOTOGRAPH RESULTS 21:

IAC
REVIEW
PANEL

11 APRIL 1989

ENVELOPE
 CDSN = LGX838 MCN = 89005/06774 TOR = 890050549
 RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0364 0050550- -RUEALGX

ZNY

HRADER

R:050550Z JAN 89
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEACHC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADADA/AFIS-ARRS BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE

R:050545Z JAN 89

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PH-KIA//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TR-PD/DAH/DAH-3//
 INFO RUEADND/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC HR CHILDRESS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-TSA/PH-KIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PV-HIA//
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LDG/HIL//
 RUEQBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEBK/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEBK/USDAO HONG KONG

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//PH-00364

SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0042 89.

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 COUNTRY: THAILAND (TH).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0042 89/FIRST HAND SIGHTING OF AN
 ALLEGED-AMERICAN, ENGLISHMAN AND THAI IN THE KIEN GIANG
 PROVINCIAL JAIL (RACH GIA CITY) AS OF SEPT 82 (S/NF).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 820900.

REQS: 0-VOP-2430-04; VOP-05161.

SOURCE: SOURCE IS A VIETNAMESE REFUGEE WHO WAS INCARCERATED IN THE KIEN GIANG PROVINCIAL JAIL BETWEEN APR 80 AND DEC 83. SUMMARY: THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. IT CONTAINS LIMITED FIRST HAND INFORMATION ON AN ALLEGED AMERICAN, ENGLISHMAN AND THAI WHO WERE INCARCERATED IN THE KIEN GIANG PROVINCIAL JAIL IN RACH GIA CITY AS OF SEPT 82. ENCLOSURE

TEXT:

1. SOURCE WAS CAPTURED OFFSHORE OF RACH GIA CITY IN APRIL 1980 ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FROM VIETNAM. HE WAS TAKEN TO THE KIEN GIANG PROVINCIAL PRISON IN RACH GIA CITY WHERE HE WAS INCARCERATED UNTIL DECEMBER 1983. IN ABOUT SEPTEMBER OF OCTOBER 1982, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO WORK IN THE PRISON KITCHEN AND TAKE FOOD TO OTHER INMATES. ABOUT THIS TIME THREE FOREIGNERS WERE BROUGHT INTO THE COMPOUND. HE LEARNED FROM ONE OF THE FOREIGNERS WHO WAS THAI THAT THE OTHER TWO WERE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH. THE THAI SAID THE THREE OF THEM WERE CAPTURED BY VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WHILE ON A BOAT NEAR THU CHU ISLAND NEAR THE EXTREMITTY OF VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS WITH CAMBODIA. THE ALLEGED AMERICAN AND ENGLISHMAN WERE PORTRAYED AS ADVENTURERS WHO WERE GUIDED BY THE THAI. SOURCE SAW THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS FREQUENTLY OVER A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS WHEN HE TOOK FOOD AND WATER TO THEM. IN ABOUT JANUARY 1983 THE THREE FOREIGNERS WERE TAKEN TO COURT. THE THAI RETURNED TO THE COMPOUND AFTER BEING SENTENCED TO SERVE SIX MORE MONTHS. THE ALLEGED AMERICAN AND ENGLISHMAN WERE NOT RETURNED TO THEIR CELLS, BUT WERE EVIDENTLY TAKEN TO ANOTHER UNDISCLOSED LOCATION. THE THAI WAS RELEASED PRIOR TO SOURCE'S RELEASE. SOURCE NEVER SAW THEM AGAIN. AFTER THE THAI LEFT, SOURCE NEVER HEARD ANYTHING MORE ABOUT THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS.

2. THE ALLEGED AMERICAN WAS ABOUT 45 YOA, 1.8 METERS TALL WITH A MEDIUM BUILD. HIS SKIN WAS WHITE. HE HAD A HEAVY BROWN BEARD AND THICK BUSHY EYEBROWS. HIS HAIR WAS SHOULDER LENGTH, MEDIUM BROWN. HE WAS DRESSED IN BLACK SHIRT AND PANTS. THE ENGLISHMAN WAS ABOUT 26 YOA, 1.8 METERS TALL, MEDIUM BUILD, WHITE SKINNED WITH MEDIUM LENGTH BLACK HAIR. HE HAD BEEN WOUNDED IN THE LOWER LEFT LEG NEAR THE ANKLE. THE WOUND WAS BANDAGED. HE WORE GRAY TROUSERS WITH A YELLOW TEE SHIRT. THE THAI WAS ABOUT 32 YOA, 1.6 METERS TALL, MEDIUM BUILD WITH BROWN SKIN, BLACK HAIR, DARK BROWN EYES AND WORE GRAY SHIRT AND TROUSERS.

SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THEIR NAMES OR ANY OTHER DETAILS ABOUT THEM.

COMMENT: SOURCE WAS COOPERATIVE DURING THE INTERVIEW AND ANSWERED QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. HE ASKED FOR NO FAVORS.

//IRSP: PG-2430//

//CONSOBJ: 521//

ADMIN

PROJ: () 6999-10.

COLL: () AB, AC.

INSTR: () US; NO.

PREP: () TM-10.

EXCL: () TO FOLLOW: ONE ENCLOSURE.

1. HAND DRAWING OF KIEN GIANG PRISON AS OF DEC 83 (U),

1 CT, 1 PG.

ACQ: SITE TWO, ARANYAPRATHET, THAILAND

(881214)

DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCM, POL, SA, DATT/YLO JCRC).

BT

#0364

NNNN



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY VIETNAMESE REFUGEE (08615)

SUMMARY: Source reported on his observation of an American, an Englishman, and a Thai at the Kien Giang Provincial Prison in September 1982.

DETAIL: Source reported he was jailed at the Kien Giang Provincial Prison in Rach Gia City, Vietnam, from April 1980 to December 1983. Assigned to work in the prison kitchen, his duties included taking food to other inmates. In about September or October 1982, three foreigners were brought into the compound. In conversation with one of these men, a Thai, source learned the other two were American and English and that the three of them had been captured near the Chu Island, in Vietnamese territorial waters in proximity to Cambodia waters. Source described the two Caucasians as adventurers and the Thai as their guide. Source saw the three men frequently over a three month period when he brought food and water to them. They were taken to trial in January 1983. The Thai was returned to the prison to serve a six month sentence, then released. The two Caucasians did not return to the prison and source heard nothing further about their fate. Source provided a sketch of the internal configuration of the prison.

ANALYSIS: Richard Knight, an Englishman, and Frederick Graham, an American, were arrested on an island off the coast of Vietnam in June 1983 and held at the Kien Giang Provincial Prison for a period of about two weeks prior to their transfer to Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC).

Knight and Graham entered Vietnamese waters on a Thai fishing trawler in mid-June 1983, in search of the buried treasure of the pirate Captain Kidd. They dispatched the rented trawler southward to replenish fuel, then went ashore at Hon Doc Island in a rented rubber dinghy. Hon Doc is an island in the Isles des Pirates archipelago off the shore of Vietnam, near the territorial waters of Cambodia. Arrested by the local militia, they were taken to Kien Giang Prison. Graham, who was debriefed extensively concerning his detention by the Vietnamese, said he had heard the two Thai crewmen of the trawler had been arrested at sea, but had no confirmation of this until he saw them later in HCMC. Graham and Knight were transferred to a HCMC detention facility on 2 July 1983, then returned to Rach Gia in late September for trial. They were not again held in the provincial prison. Returned to HCMC, they were eventually released; Graham in May 1984, Knight in August 1984.

EVALUATION: This source's information correlates exclusively and, for the most part, accurately to the arrest and detention of Frederick Graham and Richard Knight.

DATE OF EVALUATION: 13 January 1989.

PW-MIA CATEGORY: Formerly-held U.S. Civilian Detainee/Non-U.S., Westerner.

OCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTERNO FURTHER DISSEM
OF INFO. REL
PER DAM ONLY
COPY NUMBER 10

10
SUBJECT: STAFF BLANCH INTERVIEW REPORT
1. 024147 JAN 89
2. 024147 JAN 89
3. 024147 JAN 89

SOURCE: TH/PP/0001

SUBJECT: STAFF BLANCH INTERVIEW REPORT

1. 024147 JAN 89
2. 024147 JAN 89
3. 024147 JAN 89

4. SEX: MALE
5. RELIGION: BUDDHIST
6. MARITAL STATUS: 02
7. CURRENT ADDRESS: 02

8. PREVIOUS ADDRESSES: 024147 JAN 89
VILLAGE, TAN CHAU DISTRICT, AN GIANG PROVINCE.

9. EDUCATIONAL HISTORY: SEVEN YEARS.

10. MILITARY SERVICE/EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
- 1970 - 1980: FISHING BOAT
- 1980 - 1981: TO BAIT FOR ATTEMPTING TO LEAVE VN
- 1981 - 1982: SAN KILL HOUSE

11. RE-EDUCATION CAMP/PRISON CHRONOLOGY:
- 1982 - 1983: KIEU GIANG PROVINCIAL JAIL.

12. RELATIVES:
- RELATION: NAME: 02 ADDRESS:
- WIFE: 02

13. DAUGHTER: 02
- DAUGHTER: 02
- DAUGHTER: 02

14. AFFILIATION WITH RESISTANCE GROUPS: NONE.

15. COMMENTS: A. SOURCE PROVIDED INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN IIR 6 024 0042 89.

16. DATE/PLACE OF DEARST/NUMBER OF DEARST:
(024147) JAN 89 TAN CHAU CAMP, SITE 2, ARVN/PRINCE, TH/PP-10

ACTION: 024147 JAN 89

(K.I.)

MCI: 89005/01006 100-89005/03482 TAD: 89005/03482 CDSN: 89005/03482

CITE:

SERIAL:

PASS:

COUNTRY: VN

SUBJ: IIR EVALUATION 6 024 0042 89

REF: 6 024 0042 89

REQS:

SOURCE: 02

TEXT:

CONSP: 02 INFORMATION IN SUBJECT IIR RELATES TO
THE DETENTION OF FREDERICK GRAHAM AND RICHARD KNIGHT AT THE KIEU GIANG
PROVINCIAL PRISON. GRAHAM IS AMERICAN, KNIGHT BRITISH. THEY WERE
INCARCERATED THERE FOR A LITTLE OVER TWO WEEKS IN LATE JUNE 1983.
TRANSFERRED TO HCMC ON 2 JULY. THEY WERE DETAINED FOR TWO MONTHS,
RETURNED TO NACH GIA FOR TRIAL, THEN TAKEN BACK TO HCMC UNTIL MID-1984,
WHEN THEY WERE RELEASED FROM VN. THEY HAD ENTERED VN WATERS ON A THAI
FISHING TRAWLER WITH TWO THAI CREWMEN. THEY WERE ARRESTED ON AN ISLAND
OFF THE ISLES DES PIRATES OFF THE COAST OF VN, NEAR CO. TERRITORIAL
WATERS, WHERE THEY HAD BEEN SEARCHING FOR THE BURIED TREASURE OF THE
PIRATE CAPTAIN KIDD.

REPORTER:

INDT: 890105.

GUID: 02 CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN
AT THIS FACILITY IN 1987, BELIEVED TO BE THOMAS SCHOLEY. WAS HE
TRANSFERRED? WHEN, WHERE? WHAT IS HIS STATE OF HEALTH? WAS HE
RELEASED? WHEN?

VALUE: OF VALUE.

RELCTRY:

EVALUATE:

PRODUCE:

CUSTNO:

CCKSOSJ:

COPY 10A to VOWS JC 1/5/89

ENVELOPE

CSN = LG838 MCN = 89005/06774 TOR = 890050549
RTTS21UV RUEKJCS0364 0050550 -RUEALGX

ZNY

HEADER

R 050550Z JAN 89

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEADDA/AFIS AMES DOLLING AFB DC

RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CD WASHINGTON DC

RUEETIAQ/DIRESA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 050550Z JAN 89

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM-RIA//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VP-PH/DAN-3//

INFO RUEADND/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//SEC-DE CHILDRESS//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/FM-RIA//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/CJCS-FM-RIA//

RUEADDA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J35//

RUEADDA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/CO/KIA//

RUEADDA/CDR JCRC BARRBERS PT HI

RUEALGX/USDAO HUALA LIMPUR

RUEHHC/USDAO HONG KONG

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//FM- 00364

SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0042 89.

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
COUNTRY: THAILAND (TH).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0042 89/FIRST HAND SIGHTING OF AN
ALLIED AMERICAN, ENGLISHMAN AND THAI IN THE KIEN GIANG
PROVINCIAL JAIL (RACH GIA CITY) AS OF SEPT 82 (3/NF).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI:

820900.

REQS:

D-VOP-2430-04; VOP-05161.

SOURCE:

SOURCE IS A VIETNAMESE REFUGEE WHO WAS INCARCERATED IN THE KIEN GIANG PROVINCIAL JAIL BETWEEN APR 80 AND DEC 83. SUMMARY: THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. IT CONTAINS LIMITED FIRST HAND INFORMATION ON ALLEGED AMERICAN, ENGLISHMAN AND THAI WHO WERE INCARCERATED IN THE KIEN GIANG PROVINCIAL JAIL IN RACH GIA CITY AS OF SEPT 82. ENCLOSURE.

TEXT:

1. SOURCE WAS CAPTURED OFFSHORE OF RACH GIA CITY IN APRIL 1980 ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FROM VIETNAM. HE WAS TAKEN TO THE KIEN GIANG PROVINCIAL PRISON IN RACH GIA CITY WHERE HE WAS INCARCERATED UNTIL DECEMBER 1983. IN ABOUT SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 1982 HE WAS ASSIGNED TO WORK IN THE PRISON KITCHEN AND MAKE FOOD FOR OTHER INMATES. ABOUT THIS TIME THREE FOREIGNERS WERE BROUGHT INTO THE COMPOUND. HE LEARNED FROM ONE OF THE FOREIGNERS WHO WAS THAI THAT THE OTHER TWO WERE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH. THE THAI SAID THE THREE OF THEM WERE CAPTURED BY VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WHILE ON A BOAT NEAR THU CHU ISLAND NEAR THE EXTREMITY OF VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS WITH CAMBODIA. THE ALLEGED AMERICAN AND ENGLISHMAN WERE PURPORTEDLY ADVENTURERS WHO WERE GUIDED BY THE THAI. SOURCE SAW THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS FREQUENTLY OVER A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS WHEN HE TOOK FOOD AND WATER TO THEM. IN ABOUT JANUARY 1983 THE THREE FOREIGNERS WERE TAKEN TO COURT. THE THAI RETURNED TO THE COMPOUND AFTER BEING SENTENCED TO SERVE SIX MORE MONTHS. THE ALLEGED AMERICAN AND ENGLISHMAN WERE NOT RETURNED TO THEIR CELLS, BUT WERE EVIDENTLY TAKEN TO ANOTHER UNDISCLOSED LOCATION. THE THAI WAS RELEASED PRIOR TO SOURCE'S RELEASE. SOURCE NEVER SAW THEM AGAIN. AFTER THE THAI LEFT, SOURCE NEVER HEARD ANYTHING MORE ABOUT THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS.

2. THE ALLEGED AMERICAN WAS ABOUT 45 YOA, 1.8 METERS TALL WITH A MEDIUM BUILD. HIS SKIN WAS WHITE. HE HAD A HEAVY BROWN BEARD AND THICK BUSHY EYEBROWS. HIS HAIR WAS SHOULDER LENGTH, MEDIUM BROWN. HE WAS DRESSED IN BLACK SHIRT AND PANTS. THE ENGLISHMAN WAS ABOUT 25 YOA, 1.8 METERS TALL, MEDIUM BUILD, WHITE SKINNED WITH MEDIUM LENGTH BLACK HAIR. HE HAD BEEN WOUNDED IN THE LOWER LEFT LEG NEAR THE ANKLE. THE WOUND WAS BANDAGED. HE WORE GRAY TROUSERS WITH A YELLOW TEE SHIRT. THE THAI WAS ABOUT 32 YOA, 1.6 METERS TALL, MEDIUM BUILD WITH BROWN SKIN, BLACK HAIR, DARK BROWN EYES AND MORE GRAY SHIRT AND TROUSERS.

NOFORN

PAGE:0011

ENVELOPE
 CDSN: LGX867 HCN: 89080/03672 TOR: 890800159
 RTTSZYUN RUEKJCS2576 0800155- RUEALGX

ZNY
 HEADER
 R 210156Z MAR 89
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 210152Z MAR 89
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-3//
 TO RUEHKK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM-MIA//
 INFO RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J233/J3/J36//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ISA-BAP//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//OEA-SEA-ITH/CRES-RSC//
 RUEHKK/USDAO HONG KONG HK
 RUEHKK/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR MY
 RUEHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
 RUEADWW/DA WASHINGTON DC//J-5//
 BT

CONTROLS

CITE: DAH-3-13446-88
 SERIAL: EYAL 024-02-89
 BODY

COUNTRY: TH
 SUBJ: IIR EVALUATION 6 024 0042 89 (U).
 REF: 6 024 0042 89.
 REQOS: D-VOP-2430-1.
 SOURCE: 5
 TEXT:

CONRESP: AM DIA/FM-MIA) INFORMATION IN SUBJECT IIR
 RELATES TO THE DETENTION OF FREDERICK GRAHAM AND RICHARD KNIGHT AT
 KIEN GIANG PROVINCIAL PRISON. GRAHAM IS AMERICAN, KNIGHT BRITISH.
 THEY WERE INCARCERATED THERE FOR A LITTLE OVER TWO WEEKS IN LATE
 JUNE 1983. TRANSFERRED TO HCMC ON 2 JULY, THEY WERE DETAINED FOR
 TWO MONTHS, RETURNED TO RACH GIA FOR TRIAL, THEN TAKEN BACK TO HCMC
 UNTIL MID-1984, WHEN THEY WERE RELEASED FROM VM. THEY HAD ENTERED
 VM WATERS ON A THAI FISHING TRAWLER WITH TWO THAI CREWMEN. THEY
 WERE ARRESTED ON AN ISLAND OF THE ISLES DES PIRATES OFF THE COAST
 OF VM, NEAR CB TERRITORIAL WATERS, WHERE THEY HAD BEEN SEARCHING
 FOR THE BURIED TREASURE OF THE PIRATE CAPTAIN KIDD. GOOD WORK,
 TYPICAL OF TH-10.

REPORTER: TH-10.
 IRDT: 890105.
 GUID: AM CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN
 AT THIS FACILITY IN 1987, BELIEVED TO BE THOMAS SCHOOLEY. WAS HE
 TRANSFERRED? WHEN, WHERE? WHAT IS HIS STATE OF HEALTH? WAS HE
 RELEASED? WHEN?
 VALUE: C OF VALUE.

PAGE:0012

EVALUATE: ANALYST
 PRODUCE: A BASIC-INTEL.
 CUSTNO: B046.
 CONSOBJ: 521.
 TPSP: PG 2430.
 ADMIN:
 PROJ: 6999-10.

BT

#2576

NOFORN

SECRET

NOFORN

40384

[illegible]

CERTAIN

1.1 m Mel. 6C

Hyg. tem. Tard, dusky eyebrows front dark at
Hair - med. brown, shollid light

Richard Knight

264/0

1.8 M, med Bld.
Hair - blk, med length
- Wounded -

9-30's

243

One vs Two Thais
Thai fight w/ others
said Thai no source of info
Lukas - 3 months
Jun 83 vs 54/Oct 82
H said 5/4/63 vs June 63
" " 1/63 vs Jul 63

SC - with, but:
was in V. water,
close CB water;
on island

What:

Rach. Bank Penning P. Prison

Ther. r. i. n. s.

J. k. m. , m. f. g.

D. a. b. e. a. t.

E. n. i. n. g. , Y. M. C. A. , n. o. b. i. e. t. i. v. e. s.

A. c. c. i. d. e. n. t. s.

~~Went court, to court 4/83~~

Did go to court later.

Sketch description of knowledge of
R. G. D. i. n. g. . . .Doesn't work:

with, not up.

2 cases actually of those

This case (more work)

3 mo. N. s. 2 with

Am. 9. 11/83, 11/83

N. s. 11/83-7/83

Went court, N. s. H. C. M. C. / p. e.

Physical descriptions given
related to 2 cases, use it
if you have copy with
him with C. i. n. s. he
described them.

What:

T. H. not caught

Did not know / ed. T. H.

T. H. not known killed Rach. b. i. e.

SOURCE

DA-P

IN

26 AUGUST 1979

DEAR MISS DOROTHY M. BODDEN,

I REEN YOUR LETTER ON 6 AUGUST 1979.

THAT YOU HAVE SEND TO MR. THONG MY VIHANGVONG THAT

YOU KEEP LOOKING FOR YOUR SON. THAT IS REASON WHY

I WRITE YOU THIS LETTER. I WAS IN THE TAIL IN VIENGXAY

SURNED PROVINCE SINCE DECEMBER 1975 TO JULY 1979

ON 30 DECEMBER 1975 I HAD SEEN 5 AMERICAN PILOTS

UNKNOWN NAMES IN THE TAIL WHICH IS 16 KM IN THE TOWN

OF VIENGXAY. THE SHIA TAIL IS TWO HOO MEILAS FROM

THE TAIL WHERE I WAS. I CAN NOT KNOW THE 5 AMERICAN

PILOTS BECAUSE WE WERE NOT IN THE SAME TAIL.

THE AMERICAN TAIL IS IN THE HOLE OF THE FOOTHILL.

THE NEAL AND OTHER THAT THE COMMUNISTS GAVE TO

PRISONERS OF WAR IF ARE BETTER THAN LAOTIANES.

I WONDER WHY THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT

SEND THEM BACK TO THEIR COUNTRY BECAUSE THE

WAR HAS ALREADY ENDED.

ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF THE TAIL, HE SAID THAT

THEY WOULD KEEP 5 AMERICAN PILOTS HERE TO WORK AT

THE MANUFACTURE BECAUSE THEY HAVE A GOOD BACKGROUND

OF THE MACHINE.

HOPING THAT MY LETTER WILL GIVE YOU SOME IDEA

AND REQUEST YOUR GOVERNMENT TO FORCE THE

FRIEND KAYSONE PHOMVITHANE THE PRIME MINISTER OF

LAOS TO SEND 5 AMERICAN PILOTS BACK TO THEIR

COUNTRY SO THAT THEY CAN MEET THEIR WIVES

CHILDREN AND THEIR PARENTS.

THAT IS MY GREAT PURPOSE.

IF YOU INTEREST SOME THING PLEASE YOU WRITE AGAIN.

Sincerely yours,

SOURCE

Date Printed: 09/08/90

Produced by user

SOURCE DATA SHEET

Source Name: 100222 Case No: 00407

AKA:

Boat Number: Contacted:

Entry Located: US State/City:

Entry Reported: LA

Type Sighting: POW-F/H

Lat Sighting UTM: VN103557 LAT: 202313N LONG: 1041330E

Subsources	Actions
1: 791108 REFUG LTR TO LEAGUE	
2: 791108 LEAGU LTR PH REFUG	
3: 00222 JAC REVIEW BOARD	
4:	
5:	
6:	
7:	
8:	
9:	
10:	
11:	
12:	

Current Action: 00222 JAC APP'D HON-U.S. Analyst:

Remarks: S US VIENG XAI 75-78

Date Received: 791116 Date of Info: 78

Source DOB: Address:

Origin Code: A Category: 6

Polygraph Category:

Polygraph Results: 0010 051 US MDI

X END OF RECORD

XXXX

XXXX

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF
HEADQUARTERS

VZCZCHAY741

MULTI

ACTION:

OIAI

DISTR

OPR IDIAI (05) NMIC FILE

(005)

CNR

TRANSIT/040007Z/040009Z/000132GRP430

DE RUEKJCS #1346 3308850

ZNY

R 040027Z DEC 79

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC-4A//

TO RUMTBK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//JCRC LNO//

INFO RUMHENA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI//CDD//

BT

SUBJ: ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS (T-4HX-49618)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS VALIDATED AS ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO

SUBJ CIR:

2. REQUIREMENTS:

A. A WASHINGTON AREA ORGANIZATION PROVIDED A LETTER RECEIVED

ON 16 NOV 1979, FROM LAO REFUGEE NO. SC

3. DATED 26 AUG 79, REFUGEE STATED THAT

WHILE HE WAS DETAINED IN VIENG XAI, BAN HENG PROVINCE, FROM DEC 75

TO JULY 76, HE SAW FIVE AMERICAN PILOTS IN A JAIL LOCATED 15 KMS

NORTH OF VIENG XAI, 2400 METERS FROM HIS DETENTION AREA. HE FURTHER

STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE AMERICANS, NOR THEIR NAMES. REQUEST

THAT REFUGEE BE CONTACTED REGARDING HIS INFORMATION. SPECIFICALLY

REQUEST A SKETCH MAP OF THE CAMP AND SURROUNDING AREA AND THAT HE BE

QUERIED REGARDING THE FOLLOWING:

A. HOW OFTEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DID HE SEE THE

ALLEGED AMERICANS?

B. HOW DID HE KNOW THESE PRISONERS WERE AMERICANS?

C. DID HE EVER SPEAK TO THESE AMERICANS, OR DID HE EVER HEAR ANY

OF THEM SPEAKING?

NOTE: LETTER WAS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH, SO SOURCE HAS SOME COMMAND OF

THE LANGUAGE.

D. DOES HE KNOW THE CAPTURE LOCATION AND DATES OF THE ALLEGED

AMERICANS?

E. REFUGEE STATED "ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF THE JAIL, HE SAID

THAT THEY WOULD KEEP 5 AMERICAN PILOTS HERE TO WORK AT THE MANU-

FACTURE BECAUSE THEY HAVE A GOOD BACKGROUND OF THE MACHINE." WHAT

EXACTLY DOES HE MEAN BY "THE MANUFACTURE" AND "THE MACHINE?"

PAGE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 2 4882
F. COULD HE POSSIBLY IDENTIFY THE AMERICANS IF HE WERE SHOWN
PHOTOS?
G. DID HE HEAR ABOUT ANY OTHER AMERICANS BEING HELD IN LAOS AT
ANY TIME?
H. GUIDANCE:
A. SKETCH MAP SHOULD INCLUDE THE GENERAL SIZE, SHAPE, AND

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 1386
USE OF BUILDINGS WITHIN THE CAMP AND THE DISTANCE FROM TWO OR MORE
LOCATIONS OR GENERAL LANDMARKS IDENTIFIED ON EXISTING MAPS.
ADDITIONAL PW/MIA INFORMATION DEVELOPED DURING THE INTERVIEW SHOULD
BE REPORTED.
B. IF REFUGEE HAD DEPARTED SO, REQUEST FORWARDING
ADDRESS.
C. REQUEST RESPONSE BE PROVIDED TO DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY DIRECT, ATTN: DI-7C.

BT
#1386
ANNOTES
DD

PAGE 2
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040181Z

0000181

DI SS RR
NO

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DI-7C//
USDAO BANGKOK TH//JCRC LN0//
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2//J-3//
CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI//

SUBJ: REQUEST STATUS OF REFUGEE INTERVIEW

REF: DIA MSG 040027Z DEC 79, SUBJ: ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

CT-NHX-440383

REFERENCE REQUESTED THAT MR. L. ~~XXXX~~ BE CONTACTED
AND INTERVIEWED REGARDING HIS ALLEGED U.S. PW INFORMATION.
REQUEST STATUS OF INTERVIEW OR U.S. ADDRESS IF REFUGEE HAS
DEPARTED.

NNNN

MS. PENNY GARDNER, DI-7C, 44705
3 JAN 80

DR, DD, CS, DI-D, DI-7C, DI-A,
DI-7

C-2005/DI-7C

896

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

DI-7C

VZCZCHAY283
MULT
ACTION
DIA1
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DIA(10) NMIC FILE
(010)

TRANSIT/0040057/0050435/027130TOR0050431
DE RUMTOKA 00632 0040057
ZNY
R 004133Z JAN 80
FM USDAO BANGKOK
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUHNSNA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUHNSNA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

BANGKOK 00632

CITE: 0041 JAN 80

DIA FOR DI-7C/CINCPAC FOR J2/J3

SUBJ: STATUS OF REFUGEE INTERVIEWS

REF: A. DIA MSG 4548 DTG 032320Z JAN 80
B. DIA MSG 4551 DTG 032320Z JAN 80

1. REF A AND B REQUEST STATUS OF INTERVIEW OF
REFUGEES MR. NAME AND MR. SOURCE, RESPECTIVELY.

2. REFUGEE INTERVIEW TRIP TO NORTHEAST THAILAND
REFUGEE CAMPS WILL BE CONDUCTED DURING WEEK OF 7 JANUARY.
ATTEMPTS TO INTERVIEW ABOVE NAMED REFUGEES, AMONG OTHERS,
WILL BE MADE AT THAT TIME.

3. REFERENCE A REQUESTED ADDRESS OF JS
HE DEPARTED TO UNITED STATES ON 18 DECEMBER.
FORWARDING ADDRESS IS LISTED AS FOLLOWS:

SUB-SOURCE
DATA

PAGE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 2

(NO PHONE NUMBER AVAILABLE)

15384

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PAGE 2

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

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ACTION

DIA:

0137R

DIA(10) NMIC FILE

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TRANSIT/0101215/0101256/000141TOR0101226

CE RUHTKA N3054 0101215

ZNY CCCCC

R 101140Z JAN 80

FM USDAO BANGKOK

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

INFO RUHMBNA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

BT

BANGKOK 03054

CITE1

0173 JAN 80

DIA FOR DI-7C, DC-4A; CINCPAC FOR J2/J3

SUBJ: ADDITIONAL RGMTS (7-4NY-40010)

REF: DIA MSG 4992 DTG H400271 DEC 79

REF MESSAGE REQUESTS INTERVIEW OF LAO REFUGEE MR. [Source] WHO HAD SENT LETTER TO WASH DC ALLEGING POW/MIA KNOWLEDGE.

2. [Source] NOTE SPELLING, TAKEN FROM BIO FILE) PLUS WIFE AND TWO INFANT SONS DEPARTED TO UNITED STATES ON 2 DECEMBER 1979. ACCORDING TO NEIGHBORS IN [Source] REFUGEE CAMP, ADDRESS IS:

SOURCE DATA

[Source] WAS RESETTLED BY TH

SOURCE DATA

11

3. FOLLOWING BIO DATA WAS A SEATING ON [Source] STORY AS DESCRIBED IN REF MSG. [Source] WAS BORN 19 [Source] DATA LAOS. HE HAD SIX YEARS PRIMARY

PAGE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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MESSAGE CENTER

SOURCE DATA

35150

HE WAS ARRESTED BY THE PATHET LAO. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOR ONE MONTH AT VIENGXIAY, THEN HELD FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE IN A FOREST AREA NEAR THE VIETNAM BORDER. HE ESCAPED IN MAY 1978 AND CROSSED INTO THAILAND ON 20 JUNE 1978. [Source] ENTERED DATA ON 1 JAN 1979 AND WAS INTERVIEWED BY U.S. REFUGEE WORKERS ON 20 AUGUST 1979. AT THE TIME OF HIS INTERVIEW HE MADE NO MENTION OF ANY POW/MIA KNOWLEDGE AND DID NOT MENTION THE SIGHTING OF ANY AMERICANS DURING HIS PERIOD OF CAPTIVITY. BIO FILE INDICATES [Source] IS LITERATE IN LAO. (NOTE: HE HAVE FOUND THAT OFTEN ONE REFUGEE WILL WRITE A LETTER FOR ANOTHER, THUS THE ASSUMPTION IN REF MSG THAT [Source] HAD SOME COMMAND OF ENGLISH MAY NOT BE VALID. HE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT AS A MATTER IN AN AMERICAN CLUB, HE SHOULD HAVE SOME DEGREE OF FAMILIARITY WITH ENGLISH.

BT

#3054

ANNOTES

TJ

PAGE 2

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1 February 1980

Memo for Record

Information concerning refugee Mr. *Sealif* was discussed with USA interviewer, who will pursue the case.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 9, 1980

MEMORANDUM

TO: DIA - Admiral Tuttle
 FROM: SA/VLC - Michael Gelner

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations

Mr. Don Bissonette (spelling?) an English teacher at North Seattle Community College called today to inform me that a student of his claimed to have information regarding Americans held prisoner in Laos. Mr. Bissonette said that the student, a refugee from Laos, had said that he was captured in 1977 by the Vietnamese and that he met five Americans. The student is *Sealif*.

Sealif DATA

After checking with DI-7C, I called Mr. Bissonette to tell him that the U.S. Government had previously interviewed *Sealif* and that he would probably be interviewed again. I thanked him for calling the matter to my attention.

Since Mr. Bissonette would have only hearsay information, and since DI-7C holds considerable information from *Sealif*'s prior interview, I did not seek further details, preferring to leave these for a personal interviewer to pursue at some future time if you think it desirable.

22 July 1980

MEMO FOR RECORD

Reference: Dept of State Memorandum, dated 9 July 1980, subj: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

With reference to the attached memorandum, Mike Salner telephoned me after receiving a call from Mr. Don Bissonette in Seattle. Mr. Bissonette told Mike that he had been teaching English to a Lao refugee named NAME. During one of the classes, NAME mentioned having knowledge of five American prisoners in Laos.

DIA initially became aware of NAME's information through a letter he wrote to the League of Families. The letter stated that he had seen five American prisoners in the Vieng Say area of Laos from December 1975 to July 1978.

JCRC Bangkok was tasked to interview NAME; however, he departed for the U.S. before he could be interviewed. He is currently on the list of Lao refugees in the U.S. to be interviewed.

AN

AFFIDAVIT OF Source

STATE OF WASHINGTON
County of Pierce

ss.

Source

being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says:
That I am a Laotian Citizen and I speak very little English. I am making this Affidavit today through an interpreter: NAME.

SOURCE DATA

I was given two pieces of United States identification. One piece of identification was to authorize me to guard houses and buildings that Americans were occupying. The other piece of identification was given to me from the US AID Program, and identified me as an employee of the program. After I quit working for the United States, I drove a taxi in Pakse City to Savannakhet.

At the end of December, approximately three days before the end of the year, I was stopped by the Communists and asked for identification while in my taxi. I did not have all of the travel documents which I was supposed to have had to be driving the taxi, and, at that time, the Communists found my United States identification card. Because of the identification card I was arrested. This arrest took place in the town of Thakak in Laos. I was then transported in the back of a truck which was covered with canvas, and I was unable to see where the truck was going. We stopped at many villages, and would stay at a village usually every night. At night I would be brought out of the truck, my hands and feet tied, and allowed to sleep outside and to eat.

After twenty days of travelling in the truck we arrived at a village called Viengxay. I was told the village was Viengxay by my captors, and I also read the name of the village on signs in the outskirts of the village. I did not go into the village itself, but I could see a number of houses in the hills and near the road that looked like a village.

Affidavit

-1-

We stayed in Viengxay two days, and then I was taken by truck to a prison camp. The road to the prison camp was not in good condition, and there were some small hills over which the road crossed. We travelled approximately 25 mph to 30 mph, and it took us 3 1/2 hours to reach the prison camp from Viengxay. I believe that we travelled in an easterly direction.

When we arrived at the camp, the camp was surrounded by bamboo trees. There was one cave at the mountain that looked like the cave was a natural cave and not man made. The cave was being used to hold prisoners. There was a small stream coming down from the mountain on the left side of the cave which was used for drinking water and also to take showers. There were two guard huts made of bamboo, approximately ten yards from the front of the cave. I was held in a bamboo tent some distance from these guard huts. The prison camp looked like it was large enough to accommodate approximately 100 prisoners.

I saw five Caucasian prisoners being held in the cave. I was told by my guard that these prisoners were American pilots. All five of the prisoners were quite tall -- approximately six feet in height. One of the prisoners was slightly shorter than the others. This prisoner had mixed white and dark hair. Three of the prisoners had light brown hair and the last prisoner also had whitish, dark hair. I noticed a gold ring on one of the prisoners' hands. This was one of the prisoners that had light brown hair. I stayed at this prison camp for approximately one month. During this time my hands were tied and I was kept a short distance away from the cave. When I was interrogated I was brought down to the cave, approximately ten yards from the entrance, and interrogated in bamboo huts that were located about ten yards from the cave. During the interrogation the guards would point to the American prisoners and ask me if I had helped Americans. They also would question the American prisoners while they were questioning me and I could see the American prisoners shaking their heads when they pointed to me. I could not hear any of the questions being asked of the American prisoners and I don't think that the American prisoners could hear the questions being asked of me.

The Americans wore a light green uniform that appeared to be a Soviet uniform. They wore pieces of car tires tied onto their feet for shoes. I also saw a pink towel which the Americans used to wash themselves when they were taken to the stream to wash. All five of the American prisoners were quite skinny; however, they all appeared to be uninjured. There were twelve guards at the camp, and there were always two guards guarding the Americans at the cave. All of the guards had guns -- apparently, they were A-K guns. I did notice that when the American prisoners were sitting down that I could see a red rash on the lower part of their ankles.

The guards prevented myself or the three other Laotians who were

Affidavit

-2-

prisoners with me, from communicating with the Americans, or allowing the Americans to communicate with us.

Approximately thirty days after I had arrived at this prison camp, which would have been the latter part of February, 1976, I was transferred to Engkham Re-education Camp in a truck which took approximately ten days and was in the south of Laos. I remained in that camp until the latter part of 1978. The Communists then released me.

After being released from the prison camp I returned to my home town, Nakhon, and was reunited with my wife and my son, who was born 50 after I had been captured. Thereafter my family and I escaped to Thailand, and were in a refugee camp. I was given a Category-1 since I had worked for the U. S. Government, and was given priority for immigration to the United States. My family and I then came to the United States in February of 1979.

I have had this affidavit read to me by NAME and I swear that the contents herein are true.

NAME

I, being duly sworn on oath state: I am a Laotian National who has immigrated to the United States. While in Laos, I was a pilot in the Lao Air Force, and went to the University of Taiwan. I speak Laotian, Thai, six dialects of Chinese, some Vietnamese and English. I have read the affidavit of NAME, and I swear that the answers set forth herein are the answers given to me by NAME on this date.

NAME

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 18 day of July, 1980.

Notary Public in and for the State of Washington, residing at:

Puyallup

On this day personally appeared before me NAME, and through his interpreter, NAME who was also personally present before me, sworn that the foregoing statement was true and made voluntarily by him, and that his interpreter has read the entire statement to him.

SIGNED this 18th day of August, 1980.

Notary Public in and for the State of Washington, residing at: Puyallup.

Affidavit

-3-

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

IN REPLY

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ACTION
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DPR DIA(18) NMIC FILE
(818)

TRANSIT/122135Z/122137Z/000102GRP0339
DE RUEKJCS #1730 3172137
ZNY
R 122135Z NOV 88
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//D1-7C//
TO RUHJFS/AMEMB VIENTIANE LA
RUHOBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUHQH/USDAO BANGKOK TH//JCRC-LNO//
BT

7234

SUBJ: LAO REFUGEE ~~XXXX~~
1. FYI - DURING LATE 1979, A LAO REFUGEE ~~XXXX~~
WROTE A LETTER FROM THAILAND IN WHICH HE INDICATED HE HAD OBSERVED
FIVE CAUCASIAN PWs AT VIENG XAI. HE REPORTED THAT HE WAS ALSO A
PRISONER AT THE TIME HE OBSERVED THE CAUCASIANS AND THAT HIS CAPTORS
TOLD HIM DURING TWO INTERROGATIONS THE CAUCASIANS WERE U.S. FLYERS.
SUBSEQUENTLY, ~~XXXX~~ ISSUED A SIGNED SWORN DEPOSITION CONCERNING
HIS SIGHTING AT THE REQUEST OF THE FATHER OF A SERVICEMAN MISSING IN
SEA.

2. DURING THE PERIOD OF 30 OCT 88-1 NOV 88, ~~XXXX~~ WAS DE-
BRIEFED BY A DIA ANALYST IN SEATTLE, WASH. HE REPORTED THAT HE WAS A
USAID EMPLOYEE (TRUCK DRIVER) IN SAVANNAKHET DURING 70-75. AFTER
HIS USAID EMPLOYMENT, HE OBTAINED EMPLOYMENT AS A BUS DRIVER, ALSO IN
SAVANNAKHET. HE WAS ARRESTED BY COMMUNIST FORCES IN LATE DEC 75 WHEN
TWO FORMS OF USAID IDENTIFICATION WERE DISCOVERED ON HIS PERSON
DURING A SEARCH CONDUCTED AT A HIGHWAY CHECK POINT LOCATED IN
THAKHEK. HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSFERRED BY TRUCK WITH THREE OTHER
PRISONERS TO THE VIENG XAI AREA WHERE HE OBSERVED THE FIVE CAUCASIANS
IN JAN 76. SUBSEQUENT TO THE DEBRIEFING, ~~XXXX~~ VOLUNTARILY SUB-
MITTED TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. THE EXAMINER OPINED THAT
~~XXXX~~ WAS TRUTHFULLY REPORTING HIS OBSERVATIONS.

3. FURTHER DEBRIEFING OF ~~XXXX~~ IS ANTICIPATED. ATTEMPTS TO
VERIFY HIS BONA FIDES AND TO LOCATE THE DESCRIBED DETENTION FACILITY
WILL BE MADE. THIS MATTER WAS BRIEFED AT THE PW/MIA INTERAGENCY
GROUP MEETING ON 7 NOV 88.

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INCOMING

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PAGE 01
PRIORITY NMIC
REFERENCE FROM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE, 1318 CHARACTERS
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY NMIC
ASPC
PRINTER ASSIGNED BY NMIC
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY NMIC
BT, DOB: LAOS, AMEMB, REFUGEE, STAG LA, SE ASIA
DICTIONARY, Q, PROFILE
288 318 381 382 383
NMIC AUTOIN NMIC NUMBER:
281-847418
280CD10891

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EZSI:
NMIC
ACTION DIA
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DIA (8) NMIC FILE
BT
TRANSIT/3230715/3230742/000:270H3230722
EZSI:
DE MINIPRA #0000:3230715

P 100/182 NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEKJCS/OSA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUHQH/USDAO BANGKOK
RUHQH/USDAO BANGKOK
RUHQH/USDAO BANGKOK
BT

VIENTIANE 0000
L 12000 ROS-2 11/18/88 MOSER, LEO J. CR-M
EZSI:
TAGS: BREF, PIMR, LA
EZSI:

SUBJECT: LAO REFUGEE ~~XXXX~~
EZSI:

REF: DIA 122135Z NOV 88
1. EMBASSY VIENTIANE IS MAKING WHAT EFFORTS IT CAN TO LOOK
INTO THE REPORT THAT FIVE CAUCASIAN PRISONERS OF WAR WERE
OBSERVED AT VIENG XAI IN JANUARY OF 1976 (REFTEL). WE HAVE
THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON
EITHER ~~XXXX~~ OR THE VIENG XAI SITE. WE WILL, OF COURSE,
REPORT ANYTHING THAT WE MAY SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOP.
2. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION AMPLIFYING
THIS REPORT, ALSO THE RESULTS OF EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
THE BONA FIDES OF ~~XXXX~~.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

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DE RUEHOKA 05011 3241123
ZNY
R 191100Z NOV 80
FM USDAO BANGKOK
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUMHSPA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUMJPS/ANEMBARRY VIENTIANE
BT

BANGKOK 05011

CITE: 8478 NOV 80

ADMIN MESSAGE FOR DIA/DI-7C/DI-0.

SUBJ: LAO REFUGEE *SOURCE*

REF: A. DIA MSG 7234, DTG 122130Z NOV 80.
B. USDAO BKN 35074, DTG 180040Z NOV 80.

1. REF A INDICATED EFFORTS TO VERIFY BONA FIDES OF
REFUGEE *SOURCE* (NOTE SPELLING). OUR REF B
REQUESTED INFO TO ASSIST IN LOCATING HIS REFUGEE FILE AND
INDICATED HE COULD NOT VERIFY REFUGEE'S ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT
BY USAID LAOS.

2. DISREGARD PARA 1 OF REF B AS WE HAVE NOW LOCATED
REFUGEE FILE FOR *SOURCE*
SOURCE DATA

3. FOLLOWING INFO

SOURCE DATA

PRISONED IN VJENG XAY FOR ONE MONTH AND THEN FOR TWO PLUS
YEARS IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE IN A FOREST NEAR THE VN
BORER (NFI). ESCAPED ON 28 APRIL 1978. FLED TO THAILAND

PAGE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

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PAGE 2

ON 28 JUNE 1978, ENTERED JANUARY 1979. HE
WAS INTERVIEWED BY REFUGEE WORKERS ON 29 AUGUST 79 AND
NOTATION WAS MADE THAT HE PROVIDED NO POW/MIA INFO DURING
THIS INTERVIEW. PRE-DEPARTURE CHECKLIST DATED 28 NOV 79
ALSO INDICATES BY NOTATION THAT HE PROVIDED NO POW/MIA
INFORMATION.

SOURCE DATA

SOURCE DATA
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PAGE 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
DOLLARD AIR FORCE BASE, NE 2044

REPLY TO
ATTN: WFO

5 Nov 80

SUBJECT: (80HQ479-8) 10-446

TO: DIA/DI-7C

1. A polygraph examination was requested by Mr. [redacted] (DI-7C), for the purpose of verifying information related by [redacted] regarding the possible imprisonment of U.S. citizens within Laos during 1976.
2. On 26 Oct 80, the Chief, USAF Polygraph Program authorized the conduct of requested examination in accordance with AFR 124-13.
3. Background: In a signed sworn affidavit [redacted] provided information indicating he had been arrested by communist forces and transported to a containment area near the village of VIENG XAI, LAOS. While held at the containment area he observed five caucasian males who were identified by his captors as U.S. fliers. The five caucasians were held in a hillside cave and were observed by [redacted] from a distance of approximately 30 feet. A copy of [redacted]'s affidavit is attached.
4. On 30 and 1 Nov 80 [redacted] was administered a polygraph examination by [redacted] Certified DoD Polygraph Examiner with the assistance of an interpreter/translator. The following are the relevant questions asked and the answers provided by [redacted]

METHOD

METHOD

After a careful analysis of the charts produced during the examination it was the opinion of the examiner that [redacted] was truthful in his answers to questions a, b, and c of Series I, and questions b and d of Series II. An analysis of questions a and c of Series II failed to reflect sufficient significant responses to make a determination of truthfulness and therefore the results are inconclusive.

5. On 4 Nov 80, the polygraph charts produced during the examination of [redacted] conducted on 30 and 31 Oct 80 were independently reviewed by MR.

Deputy Chief, USAF Polygraph Program, who concurred with opinion of the original examiner.

6. The polygraph charts and allied documents are on file at HQ AFOSI/CVPG, available to your office on request.

NAME

Chief, USAF Polygraph Program

1 Atch

Affidavit of [redacted]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01
 ROUTINE
 REFERENCE FROM USDAO BANGKOK, SSN 8874 AT 18 0040Z NOV 88
 ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSG

PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSG
 CDS (U)
 SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSG
 DOR: USDAO, REFUGEE, SE ASIA
 DICTIONARY: 09, PROFILE
 103 300 810 810
 MACC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:
 251-055000
 ZCZC010142

ZYUW

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MACC
 ACTION
 DIAI
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DIA-051-NMCC-FILE
 (B10)
 TRANSIT/320941/320948/000:0709320948
 E252:
 DE RUMHOKA #8874 320941
 ZNY
 R 180940Z NOV 88
 FM USDAO BANGKOK
 TO RUEHLS/DIA WASHDC
 INFO RUMHQA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUMJFB/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RT

BANGKOK 88074

E253:
 E254:
 CITE: 2400 NOV 88
 ADMN MSG FOR DIA/DI-7C/DI-0
 SUBJ: LAD REFUGEE

E255:
 REF: DIA SECRET MSG 7234, DTG 122130Z NOV 88
 1. WE NOTE FROM REF MESSAGE YOUR ATTEMPTS TO VERIFY THE BONA-FIDES OF SUBJECT REFUGEE. WORDS AN EXAMINATION OF HIS REFUGEE RECORDS WERE SE OF ANY USE? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE AS MUCH OF THE FOLLOWING INFO AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST US IN LOCATING HIS FILE. SPELLING OF HIS NAME AS REFLECTED ON HIS REFUGEE PASSBOOK, DATE OF BIRTH, Y-NUMBER, DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM THAILAND, NAME OF REFUGEE CAMP WHILE IN THAILAND, NAME OF PRIMARY APPLICANT (PAI IN CAMP REFUGEE FAMILY IF NOT SCOTT).
 2. FYI, THE PERSONNEL RECORDS FROM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE WERE EVACUATED TO BANGKOK IN 1978. TO INCLUDE RECORDS OF ALL USAID LOCAL NATIONAL EMPLOYEES. WE HAVE CHECKED THESE RECORDS AND FIND NO EVIDENCE OF SCOTT'S EMPLOYMENT BY USAID LAOS.
 BT

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 PAGE 2
 ANNOTES
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 MESSAGE CENTER

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TRANSIT/211740Z/211820Z/RRR:320948
 DE RUEKJCS #3101 3P61820
 ZNY
 R 211740Z NOV 88
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DI-7C//
 TO RUMJPS/AMEMB VIENTIANE LA
 INFO RUMHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHMDK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//JCRC-LNO//
 RUMHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EA-VLK//
 BT

1987
 SUBJ: LAD REFUGEE
 REFS: A. DIA MSG 122130Z NOV 88; SUBJECT: SAME AS ABOVE
 B. AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE MSG 180719Z NOV 88, CITE 0000, SUBJ: SAME AS ABOVE

1. REF A PROVIDED INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM LAD REFUGEE REGARDING HIS SIGHTING OF FIVE CAUCASIAN PMS AT VIENG XAI, LAOS IN JANUARY 1976. REF B REQUESTED FURTHER INFORMATION AMPLYING REF A.
 2. REF A PROVIDED ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO DATE ON THIS CASE. REF A WILL BE REINTERVIEWED IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP MORE DETAIL. IF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS OBTAINED DURING THIS INTERVIEW, HE WILL, OF COURSE, FORWARD THIS INFORMATION TO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE AND OTHER ADDRESSEES.

BT
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 ANNOTES
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

4 December 1980

SUBJECT: Lao Refugee SOURCE

1. On 2 December 1980, Mr. Stanford Stone, a USAID employee, was interviewed concerning his possible knowledge of SOURCE. Stone was the USAID area co-ordinator in Savannakhet Province during the period 1966-1975.

2. In regard to SOURCE, Stone recalled, although vaguely, that SOURCE was employed as a waiter at the USAID club in Savannakhet. He also indicated that he thought SOURCE was employed at the club as a guard. He could not recall SOURCE's employment with USAID as a driver. In regard to SOURCE's claimed employment with Pepsi Cola, Stone stated that there was no Pepsi Cola plant in Savannakhet. There was, however, a Chinese man, whose name Stone could not recall, who distributed Pepsi Cola in Savannakhet. Stone opined that SOURCE might have been employed by this man.

3. Stone stated that the residences of USAID employees in Savannakhet were not guarded. The residences of DA7A were guarded by Lao nationals. These Lao nationals were under the control of a Lao Col named Le. Col Le, according to Stone, was the Special Guerilla Unit (SGU) commander who was the direct counterpart to the DA7A in Savannakhet. Col Le, then General Le, was executed by the Pathet Lao after the government fell in 1975.

4. Stone advised that Lao nationals were employed by USAID in one of two ways: either as direct hire or as hourly rate employees. Each type of employee would have been issued a USAID I.D. card by the USAID HQS in Vientiane.

5. Using a map of Savannakhet, Stone identified the USAID compound, his residence, the residence of the DA7A, the USAID warehouse, the Pepsi Cola distributorship, and the DA7A.

Additionally, Stone provided the identities of several persons (John Tucker, Jerry Nell, Gordon Dibble) all of whom are in the Washington D.C. area, who might be able to provide additional information in regard to SOURCE.

Analyst/DI-7C

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

4 December 1980

Re: SOURCE

1. On 2 December 1980, Mr. J. Nell, a current USAID employee, was interviewed concerning his possible knowledge of SOURCE. Nell was assigned to Savannakhet city Laos with USAID from 1966-1974.

2. In regard to SOURCE, Nell recalled that he hired a man named SOURCE at the USAID club during the period Mar '69-Dec '69. He employed SOURCE there as a waiter and recalled that SOURCE's wife also was employed at the club. Additionally, he recalled that SOURCE was employed as a driver for USAID in an hourly capacity. Nell felt that SOURCE drove for DA7A but was not certain of his recollection. Nell had no recollection of SOURCE's involvement in guarding the residences of DA7A but provided the name of one DA7A currently assigned in the Washington D.C. area who might amplify on this point.

3. Nell, DA7A recalled that those Lao nationals who guarded residences were issued a small pink identification card which was signed by Col Le, the SGU commanding officer in the Savannakhet area. A small photograph of the bearer was affixed on each I.D. card and the writing of three languages (Lao, French, and English) was present on each card.

4. Additionally, Nell provided the identities of two Lao nationals who are currently in the U.S., who might know SOURCE. J. Nell concluded by stating that SOURCE was still employed by USAID in 1974 when he (Nell) left that area.

Analyst

Analyst/DI-7C

DP343
D H
PH-MIA-2-9

SEATTLE (UPI) -- A FORMER ROYAL LAO AIR FORCE PILOT CLAIMS UP TO 50 AMERICAN SERVICEMEN OF THE VIETNAM WAR ERA ARE BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN LAOS. IT WAS REPORTED.

IN A COPYRIGHT STORY SUNDAY, THE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER SAID THE FORMER PILOT, SAYFA PHOUNSVAN, WHO NOW DIRECTS THE LAO FAMILY CENTER INC., IN SEATTLE, HAS GAINED HIS INFORMATION FROM THE HUNDREDS OF LAOTIAN REFUGEES WHO SEEK SERVICES FROM HIS AGENCY.

"THE TRUTH IS THAT THERE ARE TODAY 40 OR 50 AMERICANS, MOST OF THEM PILOTS WHO WERE SHOT DOWN OVER LAOS DURING THE (VIETNAM) WAR, BEING HELD PRISONER THERE NOW," SAID SAYFA. "THE PEOPLE COMING TO THE LAO FAMILY CENTER TELL ME THAT THE COMMUNISTS FOUND MANY AMERICANS ALIVE IN THE JUNGLES AND HAVE KEPT THEM."

SAYFA PREDICTED THAT THE AMERICANS BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN LAOS WON'T BE RETURNED FOR SEVERAL MORE YEARS BECAUSE, IN ADDITION TO WORKING AS LABORERS, THEY ARE BEING FORCED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW.

"THE GOVERNMENTS THERE USE THE AMERICANS TO TEACH THEM HOW TO FLY THE AIRPLANES AND HELICOPTERS ABANDONED IN 1975," SAYFA SAID. "THEY ARE ALSO BEING USED AS ENGLISH INSTRUCTORS AND FOR OTHER WORK."

UNTIL RECENTLY, OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY HAS BEEN TO DENY SUCH REPORTS, BUT LAST WEEK, THE POST-INTELLIGENCER SAID, STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE CARRYING OUT AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION INTO SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION.

UPI 02-09-81 01:08 AES

Source: Silath - English language letter (typewritten) dated 9 August 1979, from Bangkok, Thailand. Source reported on (1) capture and death of 4 Americans, February 1962; (2) death of American killed in action November 1971; (3) three Americans killed March 1971; (4) death of American pilot (no date); (5) 50 American POWs at end of 1978. Long-hand notes on page did not copy well and are not decipherable. Has there been any follow-up with this source?

Source: Boontang - Laotian and English language letter dated 4 October 1979, from Udon, Thailand. English section refers to two American POWs. The Laotian section of the letter needs to be translated. Source has offered to do any follow-up on this report?

Source: Phannavong - English language letter dated 26 August 1979, from Udon, Thailand. Source reported seeing five American POWs in prison on 30 September 1975, asked Dorothy Soddan to write to him. Any follow-up on this?

I would appreciate your comments on these reports, Dorothy. Following that, I will obtain translations and then turn the reports over to DIA and to the Asian and Pacific Affairs Committee, as soon as they are complete and ready for investigation.

Sincerely,

George L. Soddan

SOURCE

918

(8)

LETTER (ENGLISH) 26 AUGUST 1979 -

FROM TO N-

SOURCE SAW N. LETTER TO ANOTHER
REFUGEE.REPORTS SEEING 5 AM PRISONS IN
PRISON, 30 DEC. 1975.

ASKED N. TO WRITE AGAIN.

ANY FOLLOW-UP.

WELDERS • STEEL FABRICATORS • BOILER MAKERS

MINATION O

merican Consul at

ive date I examined

for evidence of any of

SERIOUS DISE

Leprosy, infectious

MENTAL CONDITIONS:

Mental retardation
(mental deficiency)

Insanity

Prev
atta
Psyc
Sexu

CLASS B:

Physical Defect, Disease, or Disability Ser
Physical Well-Being.

CLASS C:

Minor Conditions

(CHECK NUMBER (1) BELOW OR COMPLETE NUM

My examination, including the X-ray and other

☐ (1) No defect, disease, or disability.(2) Defect, disease, or disability, or prev
diagnosis, and pertinent details*):

DECLARATION OF VISA APPLICANTS

PLACE ICHM MEDICAL SERVICE
DATE OF EXAMINATION 28 NOV

Place of birth CITY BANGKOK COUNTRY THAILAND
as I established NAME

Names of any of the following conditions:

ACQUISITORY DISEASES:

Lymphogranuloma venereum
Syphilis, infectious stage
Tuberculosis, active

MENTAL CONDITIONS:

Mental retardation
(mental deficiency)
Insanity

Previous occurrence of one or more
attacks of insanity
Psychopathic personality
Sexual deviation

Mental defect
Mental drug addiction
Chronic alcoholism
(See previous, sec. 94.7, USFHS Regs.)

CLASS II

Physical Defect, Disease, or Disability Serious in Degree or Permanent in Nature Amounting to a Substantial Departure from
Physical Well-being

CLASS C

Minor Conditions

Tubal dilation 1 1/2 yrs ago

CHOOSE NUMBER TO FOLLOW ON COMPLETE NUMBER 020

My examination, including the X-ray and other reports herein, revealed:

(1) No defect, disease, or disability.

(2) Defect, disease, or disability, or previous occurrence of one or more attacks of insanity as defined in the
Appendix, and amounting to a substantial departure from physical well-being.

Kjone

PAGE 3

D A

12-1111-2-9

SEATTLE (UPI) -- A FORMER NOYAL LAO AIR FORCE PILOT CLAIMS ON 10
50 AMERICAN SERVICEMEN OF THE VIETNAM WAR ARE BEING HELD CAPTIVE
IN LAOS. IT WAS REPORTED.

IN A COPYRIGHT STORY SUNDAY, THE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER SAID
THE FORMER PILOT, SHYPA PHOUNSHYANT, WHO NOW DIRECTS THE LAO FAMILY
CENTER INC. IN SEATTLE, HAS GAINED HIS INFORMATION FROM THE HUNDREDS
OF LAOTIAN REFUGEES WHO SEEK SERVICES FROM HIS AGENCY.

"THE TRUTH IS THAT THERE ARE TODAY 40-50 AMERICANS, MOST OF
THEM PILOTS WHO WERE SHOT DOWN OVER LAOS DURING THE (VIETNAM) WAR,
BEING HELD PRISONER THERE NOW," SAID SHYPA. "THE PEOPLE COMING TO THE
LAO FAMILY CENTER TELL ME THAT THE COMMUNISTS FOUND MANY AMERICANS
ALIVE IN THE JUNGLES AND HAVE LEFT THEM."

SHYPA PREDICTED THAT THE AMERICANS BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN LAOS
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ARE ALSO BEING USED AS ENGLISH INSTRUCTORS AND FOR OTHER WORK."

UNTIL RECENTLY, OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY HAS BEEN TO DENY SUCH
REPORTS. BUT LAST WEEK, THE POST-INTELLIGENCER SAID, STATE AND
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERING OUT-
STANDING INVESTIGATION INTO SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION.

UPI 02-09-81 01:08 HES

Memorandum for Record:

12 February 1981

SUBJECT: Lao Refugee

1. On 10 February 1981, I contacted Mr. John Tucker, U.S. State
Department (Refugee Programs), who is acquainted with. I
asked Mr. Tucker to call. In regard to the information in
the enclosure, Mr. Tucker indicated that he had been called by
on 9 February 1981. I told Mr. Tucker that NBC desired to
interview him in regard to the U.S. PW issue and I solicited Mr.
Tucker's advice on whether he should consent to the interview.
I did not mention the information contained in the enclosure to
Mr. Tucker.

2. On 10 February 1981, Mr. Tucker contacted me and stated that
he had just spoken to. Mr. Tucker stated that I told him
about the interview contained in the enclosure and claimed that he
had been misquoted in the article. I claimed to have no information
other than that which had been previously provided by Mr. Source.
I told Mr. Tucker that he had filed a complaint with the Seattle
Post-Intelligencer and that he was going to be reinterviewed on 11 February
1981 to correct the situation.

3. Further, Mr. I told Mr. Tucker that he had been contacted by
ABC-LA and NBC-NY who had also requested interviews. I indicated
that he had been interviewed by ABC-LA but that the focus of the inter-
view was his resettlement activity with the Lao refugee community and
that the U.S. PW issue was not discussed. I declined the NBC-NY
interview. I also told Mr. Tucker that he had been interviewed
on film by channel 11 (Seattle-local) but that he had disclaimed any
personal knowledge concerning the U.S. PW issue. I reportedly
read Mr. Source's deposition which being interviewed. I
concluded the conversation with Mr. Tucker by indicating that he did not
know why he had been contacted by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.

ANALYST

Intelligence Research Specialist
DI-7C

22/3/81

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Re-evaluation of Polygraph Examination Results

Reference: a. Polygraph examination of Vietnamese refugee NAME on 2 December 1980 and 12 January 1981.

b. Polygraph examination of Lao refugee SOURCE on 30 Oct 80 and 1 Nov 80.

1. ... Because of the conflicting results of the polygraph examinations of NAME, OSI was asked to re-evaluate the results of the polygraph examination of Mr. SOURCE.

2. OSI has informed the undersigned that a review of the test results has been independently conducted by two of their examiners. It is their conclusion that the original report, i.e., No Deception Indicated, is still valid. In order to assure themselves that the atmosphere in which the testing was conducted and methodology employed were acceptable, they had further discussions with the examiner, NAME. As a result of these discussions with NAME, the OSI has concluded that the original report of the examination is still valid.


JOHN E. KENNEDY
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, PM/MIA Branch

22 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Lao Refugee SOURCE

On 22 June 1981, I contacted Mr. S. Straub, an investigator with INS, Seattle, Wash. Mr. Straub indicated that the INS file for SOURCE carries an AKA of SOURCE. The file indicates that SOURCE entered the U.S. with a spouse, NAME (1954) and two other persons: DOBs: 1967 and 1976. Mr. Straub indicated that neither the file of SOURCE nor his spouse contained an employment history. Mr. Straub indicated photographs of SOURCE and NAME are available and that he would forward them to me.

ANALYST
Analyst

22 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Lao Refugee SOURCE

1. In an attempt to solidify the partial verification of SOURCE's background, Mr. Jerry Nell, USAID, reviewed the video-cassette of ABC's three-part series on the U.S. PM/MIA issue. The segment which was presented by ABC on 20 Mar 81 contained an approximate two-minute interview of SOURCE.

2. After reviewing the segment, which presented several "full-face" views of SOURCE, Mr. Nell stated that he did not know SOURCE. Mr. Nell again stated that he did employ one SOURCE at the USAID Club at Savannakhet, Laos, but that the person presented by ABC did not appear to be the SOURCE he employed. Mr. Nell stated that the wife of SOURCE was also employed at the USAID Club and that she became pregnant during the early 1970's. Mr. Nell stated that he could probably identify SOURCE's spouse from a photograph.

Analyst

24 July 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Lao Refugee SOURCE

1. On 21 Jul 81, SOURCE, an Indochinese refugee, was interviewed in an attempt to verify the claimed USAID employment of SOURCE. I was referred to Mr. Jerry Nell, who is a current USAID official who was formerly assigned at Savannakhet, Laos, the location at which Mr. SOURCE claimed employment. Mr. Nell advised that Mr. SOURCE was formerly involved in the delivery of water to homes of USG representatives in Savannakhet. As this was the type employment claimed by SOURCE, Mr. Nell felt that I might know SOURCE.

2. During the interview, Mr. SOURCE advised essentially as follows: He was born on SOURCE. He moved with his family while still a young child. He worked for USAID in Savannakhet from 1962-1975. He was employed as a vehicle mechanic during this entire period. He never was involved in delivering any water to the homes of USG representatives in Savannakhet. He stated that two men were employed by USAID in the water delivery job and he provided their names, neither of which was SOURCE. He stated that these two men used helpers to deliver the water, but these helpers were not actual USAID employees. He did not know the helpers and that he could not identify them by photograph. He stated that the water delivery truck was always parked in the same spot in the motor pool yard. The truck would usually depart daily at about 0730 to deliver water and would usually not return to the motor pool yard until the end of the work day at approximately 1600.

3. SOURCE was unable to recognize a photograph of Mr. SOURCE or his wife. Further, Mr. SOURCE, who was born and lived in Savannakhet until 1977, was unable to recognize photos of Mr. or Mrs. SOURCE. Mr. SOURCE was unable to provide the current locations of either water truck drivers. However, Mr. SOURCE provided the identity of one former USAID employee who might be able to substantiate the former USAID employment of Mr. SOURCE. This person, who was a maintenance employee, is NAME. PA.

Analyst
DI-7C

7/27/84

Subject: SOURCE allegedly saw 5 POWs at Muang Viengkay in 1976. At the present time wife has been working together with SOURCE at SOURCE work.

NAME: SOURCE's wife has talked to SOURCE about the live sighting of POW and SOURCE has talked to this subject and said that he fed up with this subject so he did not like to talk anymore. He said that there were so many people came to see him, from federal government, state government, local government, Chinese people, and every body said they were very important person representative from the government. The result of interview finally SOURCE has lost his job previously. Now SOURCE has a job and has enough money for living so he is not interested with that subject and again, also he refuses to give his address and telephone number.

ANALYST

27 July 1984

23



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20331

SOURCE 0447
LAOS

Source 0447 reported that in January 1976 he observed five Caucasians at a detention facility in Sam Neua Province, Laos, and that guards said they were American pilots. Source provided limited descriptions of the five persons.

Source was interviewed with a polygraph. The polygraph did not reveal any indications of deception to the relevant questions.

Source claimed to have been arrested and detained by communist authorities because they discovered identity cards showing that he had worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Verification of the USAID employment could have lent credence to the purported arrest which initiated the series of events that led to the alleged sighting.

USAID employee files were checked. There was no record that Source was ever employed by USAID. Several former and current USAID employees, who would have known Source if he had been an employee of USAID, were shown pictures of him. They stated they had never seen him.

Confronted with the fact that there was no record that he was ever employed by USAID, Source changed his story. He asserted that the USAID identification cards in question had belonged to a friend, and that he was temporarily holding them for the friend when they were discovered by security forces. He was unable to supply a name for the friend that could be verified by USAID records.

ME THOD

NAME is the only American who returned from confinement in Sam Neua Province. He was held captive from 7 May 1973 to 18 September 1974. NAME reported that he never saw or heard about other U.S. PWs during his imprisonment.

Seeking to corroborate Source 0447's account, DIA analysts interviewed another Lao refugee, now living in the U.S., who underwent reeducation in the Sam Neua area from July 1975 to November 1981. An experienced engineer, he was employed in planning and managing reconstruction and new construction projects in the region. Because of his special skills, he lived with and had direct access to senior Pathet Lao authorities and installations (including detention facilities) in this region. He has been the source of proven accurate information concerning the detention system. He insists that he never saw or heard about any live U.S. PWs in the Sam Neua region.

Although Source 0447 passed a polygraph examination, significant features of his account cannot be reconciled with other reliable information.

CASE: # 0047

NAME: I. SOURCE

1. SUBSTANCE OF REPORT:

- a. Time Frame: December 1975 - January 1976
- b. Number of individuals sighted: Five American pilots.
- c. Location: Viengsay, Houa Phan Province, Laos
- d. Circumstances of Sighting: Rode east from Viengsay on a truck which stopped at a cave/camp; he was held in the camp for one month, and observed five Caucasians in the cave. SOURCE was asked by the guards if he had helped the American prisoners.
- e. Description of Individuals: All were tall; hair was described as white or light brown.
- f. Date information received: December 1979

2. LATEST INITIATIVE: January 1986, request that JCRC identify other refugees from area of Viengsay, Houa Phan Province.

3. VO-PW ANALYTIC PROCESS

- a. Supported by other evidence (yes/no): No
 - b. Presence of conflicting evidence: Refugees held in Houa Phan Province, to include Viengsay during the period 1975-1984, say they neither heard of nor saw Americans in the province.
 - c. Polygraph (yes/no: DI/NOI/Inclusive): Yes, NOI
 - d. Follow-up: Additional refugees from Houa Phan Province being sought.
4. UNRESOLVED BECAUSE: There is no supporting evidence that five Americans were held in Houa Phan Province in 1975 or 1976.

2 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview, SOURCE

L. SOURCE OF was interviewed on 2 August 1984; telephone number 6644. He stated essentially the following:

- He was arrested at Thakhek by Pathet Lao forces because he had the American ID card of his friend Siphay in his possession. Siphay, a Montagnard, used to work with Mr. John Tucker with USAID at Pakse, and Siphay told SOURCE to keep the ID card for him because Siphay was afraid that the Pathet Lao would arrest him if they saw it.
- SOURCE was a pick-up truck driver (called a taxi in Laos), and he drove this vehicle from Savannakhet to Thakhek. When the Pathet Lao checked his vehicle, they found that one of the passengers had a weapon in his possession. SOURCE was arrested and sent to the Huang Viengsay area.
- SOURCE allegedly saw five American POWs in 1976 outside Viengsay, some 15-20 kilometers from the Vietnam border.
- SOURCE was riding a truck escorted by Pathet Lao armed guards when the truck stopped in a mountain valley. He saw five American POWs and the Pathet Lao asked him if he knew or recognized the American POWs. He replied no. The Pathet Lao soldier walked to the American POWs and came back after awhile. SOURCE guessed that the Pathet Lao asked the American POWs if they knew SOURCE.
- The distance observed was about 20 meters.
- Afterwards, SOURCE was sent to Huang Viengsay for interrogation, then the Pathet Lao sent him to Ban Angkham, Xepon District, Savannakhet Province. He stayed in the Angkham prison for two years, was released in 1978, and fled to Thailand.

COMMENT: SOURCE does not want to come to Washington because there is no one to take care of his family and he is afraid he will lose his job. He says he has given all the information to the American authorities already, and that if they come back to ask the same questions he is afraid he will not remember everything he told them before. Lastly, he says there is one thing he can certify, that he saw five American POWs by his own eye in Sam Neua Province. If they come to ask many questions, he cannot answer such as exact location, time, day, date, how big or small, what they looked like, etc.

ANALYST

Prisoners remain in camp 04 and 06
MUANG ET province of SAM NEUA

U. (04-06) 1975 to 1981

seminar camp 04-06 from 1975-81

WW. seminar camp 06 Muang ET.
1975 to 1981.

seminar camp 04 Muang ET
1975 to 1981.

seminar camp 06 Muang ET
1975 to 1981.

seminar NONG HET XIENG KHOUANG
1975 to 1981

seminar camp 06 Muang ET
1975 to 1981.

seminar camp 06 MUANG ET
1975 to 1981.

nine years in seminar camp
in Sam Neua province
nine years in seminar camp
in Sam Neua province

nine years in seminar camp
in Phongsaly and Sam Neua
province.

ALL STATE THEY WENT TO SAW NOK HING 05 27
American POWs in their Prison (Sam Neua) province.

SOURCE DATA

DPOB.

Fled to THAILAND 07-19-84.

arrived USA.

Sponsored by

SD

SC

was daughter in law of a former GEN
the commander in chief of RLA, for
husband was still at camp 05

She was arrested and sent to MUANG VIENG SAI to join her
husband on 7-28-1977 with two sons.

She was released to Vientiane on 02-12-1983 and worked
with N as his secretary, N was also a former
RLG and working with new regime LPDR as as NAME DATA

then he was arrested and sent to MUANG
VIENG SAI on 05-16-1984, for this reason source has to flee to
Thailand on 07-19-84, instead to wait for her husband to
get out of MUANG VIENG SAI.

During the period of his confinement at MUANG VIENG SAI
and seminar camp 05 she had never seen and heard about
american POW; she also had the Queen walking in front
of the cave of her confinement with the King, but source
said, she had never heard or seen any american with the
King and Queen.

During the period of 8 months working with N
source had the opportunity to travel with him to MUANG
PHONSAVANH, plain of Jarn, XIENG KHOUANG and central Lao
from SAVANNAKHET to DONGHENE, MUANG PHALAN and SEPON
source said, she had seen russian and czechoslovakian.

advisers on the route # 9 from Laos to Vietnam, also she had seen many former RLA officers whose had worked on the road construction. AT XIENGKHOANG and PHONSAVANH she had seen many former republic of south Vietnam inmates whose had worked on the road construction and guarding by north Vietnam army.

Interview on 13/27/86

ANALYST

SOURCE DATA

arrived USA

Fled to THAILAND - September 29, 1984

Released from seminar MUANG VIENGSAI TO VIENTIANE on Sept 198

Status - Married with 3 children

Sponsored by

SD

SOURCE was a former SGT of the Royal Lao army, his last assignment was a SD

, stationed at SEND, SAVANNAKHET MR III

He was sent to seminar camp 06 MUANG ET province of SAM NEUA on August 12, 1975, then moved to MUANG VIENGSAI on July 1981, until he was released from MUANG VIENGSAI to VIENTIANE on the end of 1981.

His wife has arranged with LPDR in VIENTIANE to get him released from seminar camp by bribing the LPDR authority in Vientiane.

During the period of his 6 years detention at the different seminar camp and working details in the different places in the SAMNEUA province, SOURCE had never heard or seen any American POW in that area.

The villagers of SAMNEUA province, mostly the old generation's people were very sympathetic with the seminar inmates and they hated the communist regime, except the young generation's people, because they did not know about the free world.

Interview 4/22/86

SD

arrived USA

arrived Thailand 10-23-83

Fled from seminar camp MUANG VIENG XAY on 10-11-83

Status Married with 8 children

Sponsored by SD

SC was a former Lt Col of Royal Lao army artillery. He was sent to seminar MUANG VIENG XAY on July 11, 1975, he had been in a different seminar camp such as seminar camp BAN NAPHA. Then moved to seminar BAN LONG MB and finally moved to seminar camp OA at MUANG ET (20°48'N-101°01'E).

Source said, he had worked detail on the different places in the Sam Neua's province, he had never seen American POW in that area, during his 8 years detention with LPDR.

Source had seen one wreckage of aircraft (sky rider) in MUANG VIENG XAY's area but did not see the remains of pilot, estimated about 500 inmates still in the seminar camp OA and OB.

Interview on May 21, 1986

ANALYST

SOURCE

0447

31

SOURCE DATA

DFOB.

arrived USA. SD

Fled to THAILAND 04-11-1984

Status Married with 4 children

Sponsored by

Education SD

Joined the royal Lao air force on 10-01-1970

SC was a former PVT of Royal Lao air force, SD. He was sent to seminar camp Phonavon from SAVAN NAKHET's air base on 10-29-1975, stayed at Phonavon for one year then moved to NONGHET, until the time he had escaped from NONGHET seminar camp on 12-07-83.

There were 300 inmates in the seminar camp NONGHET, all of them were from Royal Lao air force officers.

During the period of 8 years detention at PHONSAVAN and NONGHET source had never seen or heard American POWs in Laos. But during three months stayed in his home town BANNONG NAM CHAN, SAVANNAKHET waiting for permission paper source had opportunity to travel to SEPON and near BANGONG he had seen several Soviet and Mongolian advisors on the road #9 at BAN SETHAMOUAK (16°31'N-105°43'E).

Interview on June 5th 1986

ANALYST

32

SOURCE

Interview on Thursday Aug 3rd 1984

- ~~source~~ was arrested at Thakhek by PL because he has american ID card of his friend named SIPHAY, SIPHAY (a montagnard) used to work with MR. JOHN TUCKER a USAID at Pakse, and told him to keep his ID card for him, because SIPHAY was afraid of PL will arrest him if they see it.

- ~~source~~ was a pick-up truck's driver (called it a taxi in Laos), he has driven this taxi from Savannakhet to Thakhek, when the PL checked his taxi also found one of his passengers has a mach. arm in his possession.

- After arrested ~~source~~ is sent to Muong Viengsay area.

- ~~source~~ allegedly saw 5 american POWs, in 1976 and side Muong Viengsay, near Vietnam border about 15 to 20 kms.

- ~~source~~ was riding a truck escorted by PL armed guards, when truck stopped in front of two mountains valley, he saw 5 american POWs and PL asked him, did he know and recognize these american POWs? he replied no, then the PL soldier walking toward the american POWs about quite a while PL came back ~~source~~ has guessed that PL asking american POWs about knowing the name ~~source~~ before.

- distance observed about 20 meters.

- After ~~source~~ was sent to Muong Viengsay for interrogation, then the PL sent him back to

→ next page ②

BAN ANCKHAM - XEPONE district, SAVANNAKHET province, he stayed in the ANCKHAM prison for 2 years, then he was released in 1978, then fled to Thailand.

- When ~~source~~ arrived USA and resided at SD, there were five different groups of Americans came to interview him.

- First group - MR and MRS HARRY FORD (PHONETIC)

- Second - MRS. NORTON and one man from USA.

- Third - 4 Americans (3 men and one woman)

- Fourth - 4 Americans and one LAO (MR. SADA LAO PILOT)

- Fifth - 2 Americans came to give him a paper of his affidavit, in which he told them in interview.

(COMMENT)

- ~~source~~ does not like to come to Washington, because there is no body to take care of his family and also he is afraid to lose his job at ~~source~~ area. He said, he has given all the information already to the American authority, Now if they come back to ask the same question, I am afraid, I do not remember every things which I have told them before. Only one thing, I can certify that I have seen five American POWs by my own eye in the SAMNEUA province. If they come to ask me many question, I can not answer such as, exact location, time, day, date, How big or small, what they look like etc....

ANALYST

NSGRO 127 (PCIX) #11/04/87* 001:38:03-5.04

2220-06:38:46Z (PC)
 DMI DTG : 871032151417Z
 PPTSZYUW RUEKJCS801:3080107 --RUEALGX

ZNY
 P 040107Z NOV 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUHAF/SAFE

P 031022Z NOV 87
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//

TO RUEKPA/CIN JCRC BARBERS POINT HI
 RUEHRC/USDAO BANGKOK TH

INFO RUEHRC/CHC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//NO/PA/TOC//

RUEAIIA/DIPUSA FT MEADE MD//DS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PA-MTA//

RUEHRC/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36/J233//

RUEHRC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/PLC//
 RUEHFP/FSI WASHINGTON DC//INFO-CYBER//

BT

EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02

EZ2:

S-1449/VO-PH

SERIAL: IIR 6-014-0033-87

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN) USSR (RV) VIETNAM (VN)

SUBJ: IIR 6-014-0033-87/SOVIETS IN LAOS

DOI: 871022(R0)

REDS: D-VOP-83468

SOURCE: LAO INDIGENANT *Source* WHO HAS GENERALLY

BEEN A RELIABLE REPORTER TO DATE.

SUMMARY: SOVIET AEROPLOT AND OTHER TECHNICAL/ADVISORY

PERSONNEL WERE ROUTINELY ACCOMPANIED BY LAO ARMED SECURITY

PERSONNEL AND MAY HAVE BEEN CONFUSED WITH BRING U.S. PMS UNDER

DETENTION. SOVIETS INVESTIGATING LAO AIR FORCE MIG-21 CRASHES AND

SOVIET SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN THE

SUBJECT OF PM/MIA REPORTING. THERE WERE NO AMERICANS AT ANY LAO

AIRBASE IN THE LPOR DURING 1976-85.

TEXT:

1. SOVIET SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL IN VIENTIANE PROVINCE.

A. DURING 1982-83 SOURCE FREQUENTLY WENT HUNTING ALONG HIGHWAY 13 IN NORTHERN VIENTIANE PROVINCE. WHILE HUNTING IN THE BAN THALAT AREA AT KILOMETER MARKER 70 HE FREQUENTLY TRAVELED TO THE AREA OF KILOMETER MARKER 62. LOCAL VILLAGERS THERE REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY TO THE EAST OF KM 62 WHICH THEY STATED WAS ASSOCIATED WITH SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. THE VILLAGERS ALSO REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF AS MANY AS TEN SOVIETS AT THIS

FACILITY, SOME OF WHOM VISITED NEARBY VILLAGES. THEY STATED THE FACILITY WAS GUARDED BY ARMED LAO SECURITY PERSONNEL AND WAS A RESTRICTED ZONE.

B. WHILE HUNTING IN THE AREA OF KM 62 SOURCE NOTED A DIRT ROAD RAN TO THE EAST OF HIGHWAY 13 AT THAT POINT TO AN UNIDENTIFIABLE COMPLEX APPROXIMATELY 800-1000 METERS EAST OF HIGHWAY. WHILE HUNTING LATE IN THE DAY SOURCE OBSERVED A VERY TALL THREE SIDE MAST WITH A FIXED RED LIGHT ON ITS TOP WITH SOME TYPE OF ANTENNA ARRAY ON THE MAST. DUE TO THE LIGHTING AND DISTANCE HE WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE REPORTED SOVIET COMPLEX AND ITS ANTENNA MAST.

C. BASED ON PRIOR OBSERVATIONS OF THE TRAVELS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL, NORMALLY ACCOMPANIED BY AN ARMED DRIVER AND ARMED SECURITY GUARD, SOURCE PRESUMED ANY SOVIETS FROM THE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY WOULD HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY GUARDED DURING VISITS FROM THEIR FACILITY TO NEARBY VILLAGES. ((VO-PH COMMENT: DIA/VO-PH HAS RECEIVED REPORTING OF THE REPORTED PRESENCE OF CAUCASIAN PMS AT THE VILLAGES OF BAN KEUN APPROXIMATELY TEN KILOMETERS TO THE EAST OF BAN THALAT. LAO RESISTANCE FORCES HAVE REPORTED NO U.S. PMS IN THIS AREA DURING THEIR PROXYT FORMATS INTO THIS AREA. SOURCE'S INFORMATION ABOVE MAY EXPLAIN THE POSSIBLE SOURCE OF SUCH REPORTING.))

2. PRESENCE OF SOVIET PERSONNEL INSPECTING LAO AIR FORCE MIG-21 CRASHES DURING 1980.

A. DURING 1980 A LAO AIR FORCE MIG-21 CRASHED AT BAN KEUN, EAST OF HIGHWAY 13 IN VIENTIANE PROVINCE. THE PILOT EJECTED AND WAS RECOVERED SAFELY. THE CRASH CAUSED THE DEATH OF ONE LOCAL WATER BUFFALO. AFTER THE CRASH SOVIET INVESTIGATORS ACCOMPANIED BY LAO AIR FORCE OFFICERS WENT TO THE CRASH SITE IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE CRASH.

B. DURING 1980 A LAO AIR FORCE MIG-21 CRASHED AT XIENG KHOUANG AIRFIELD DURING AN AIR SHOW INVOLVING THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET ADVISORS. THE MIG-21 WAS PILOTTED BY LAO AIR FORCE MIG-21 SQUADRON COMMANDER MAJOR BOWKONG WHO WAS KILLED WHEN HE WAS UNABLE TO EJECT. AFTER HIS DEATH HE WAS REPLACED BY MAJOR CHANPHENG, A MEMBER OF THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY, WHO WAS STILL THE LAO AIR FORCE MIG-21 SQUADRON COMMANDER AS LATE AS 1985. THE CRASH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INVESTIGATED BY SOVIET AND LAO PERSONNEL.

C. IN BOTH THE ABOVE INCIDENTS, SOURCE VIEWED IT QUITE LIKELY THAT PERSONS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA MIGHT HAVE SEEN SOVIETS ACCOMPANIED BY ARMED LAO SECURITY PERSONNEL AND COULD HAVE THOUGHT THEY WERE U.S. PMS UNDER DETENTION. ((VO-PH COMMENT: DIA/VO-PH HAS FREQUENTLY RECEIVED REPORTS OF CAUCASIANS SAID TO BE U.S. PMS IN BOTH THE XIENG KHOUANG AND BAN KEUN AREAS. SOURCE'S INFORMATION MAY ASSIST IN THE EXPLAINING THE SOURCE OF SOME OF THIS REPORTING.))

3. PRESENCE OF SOVIET AEROPLOT GROUND CREWS IN LAOS.

A. THE SOVIETS FLEW AN MI-8 HELICOPTER KEPT IN A RESTRICTED AREA AT VATTAY AIRPORT AND SERVICED BY AN ALL SOVIET GROUND SERVICE CREW. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT PERMIT AIR LAOS GROUND SERVICE CREWS TO SERVICE THEIR AIRCRAFT AND PROVIDED THEIR OWN PERSONNEL TO PERFORM SUCH SERVICE. THESE INDIVIDUALS WORE BLUE WORK CLOTHES

WITH THEIR SHIRTS HANGING OUTSIDE THEIR TROUSERS. ALL WERE CAUCASIAN. SOURCE BELIEVED HE RECALLED THE MI-8 DOMESTIC FLIGHT CREWS ALSO WORE THE SAME COLORED CLOTHING AS THE GROUND SERVICE CREWS. THEIR DIFFERENCE FROM AEROFLOT INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT CREWS WERE WERE BLUE TROUSERS AND WHITE SHIRTS.

5. SOURCE FIRST OBSERVED SOVIET GROUND SERVICE CREWS AT SAN NEUA AIRPORT IN MID-1976 WHEN HE WAS A C-123 RADIO NAVIGATOR FLYING ON C-123 AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER 058 BETWEEN VIENTIANE AND SAN NEUA ON LAO MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MISSIONS. FROM THEN UNTIL OCT 83 HE NOTED THAT THESE GROUND SERVICE CREWS NORMALLY NUMBERED AS MANY AS FIVE PERSONS AND ROUTINELY APPEARED AT LAO AIRPORTS WHEN THE VIENTIANE BASED AEROFLOT SOVIET MI-8 WAS OPERATING AWAY FROM VIENTIANE. SOURCE ROUTINELY OBSERVED MI-8 GROUND CREWS ON TEMPORARY DUTY AT LAUNG PRABANG, SAN NEUA, XIENG KHOUANG, SAVANNAKHET, AND PAKSE AIRPORTS. SINCE THESE AIRPORTS WERE THE BASES FROM WHICH AIRCRAFT MADE ROUTING TRIPS TO SECONDARY AIRPORTS, SOURCE VIEWED IT AS LIKELY THE MI-8 AND GROUND CREWS WOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AT ALMOST ANYWHERE IN LAOS AN MI-8 COULD LAND. FOR EXAMPLE, LAUNG PRABANG AIRPORT WAS THE BASE FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH LAOS IN THE AREAS OF LAUNG PRABANG, LOUNG NAX THA, OUDOMSAI, AND PHONG SALLY PROVINCES, OPERATING PRIMARILY BETWEEN LAUNG PRABANG NORTH LAOS BASE TO PROVINCIAL CAPITAL AIRSTRIPS. THE SOVIETS USED THEIR MI-8 FOR SUCH FLIGHTS BECAUSE MANY STRIPS COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE OTHER AIRCRAFT.

C. SOURCE BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE THAT LAO NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE AEROFLOT FLIGHT OPERATIONS COULD HAVE SEEN A GROUP OF CAUCASIANS SURROUNDED BY GUARDS AND HAVE MISTAKEN THEM FOR AMERICANS UNDER DETENTION WHEN THEY WERE ONLY SOVIET AEROFLOT GROUND SERVICE CREWS

PS801
NEN
NND

MSGNO 128 (PCXX) *11/04/87* 001:38:03.6.92
ZCZC -061361462 (PC)
EMI DTG : 87110321515551
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS5802 3080107 -RUEALGX
ZNY
P 040107Z NOV 87
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 031922Z NOV 87
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//
TO RUEHBP/CH JCRG BARBERS POINT HI
RUEHBP/USDAO BANGKOK TH
INFO RUEHBP/JCRG LIAISON BANGKOK TH
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//OW/PA/ICOG//
RUEAIIA/DIBASA FT MEADE MD//BS//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-HII//
RUEHBP/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J233//
RUEHBP/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//
RUEHBP/FBI WASHINGTON DC//INTD-C12R//
BT
EZ1:

FINAL SECTION OF 02

EZ2:
WITH PL SECURITY GUARDS.

4. SOURCE OBSERVED SOVIET CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS AT SAN NEUA IN 1976-77. A. DURING 1976-77 SOURCE ROUTINELY FLEW BETWEEN SAN NEUA CITY AND VIENTIANE CITY. WHILE AT SAN NEUA CITY OVERNIGHT HE AND OTHER C-123 CREWMEN WERE QUARTERED AT A SMALL LPOR HOTEL USED AS VISITING TYP QUARTERS. WHILE AT THIS HOTEL SOURCE NOTED THE PRESENCE OF CAUCASIANS HE CONFIRMED WERE SOVIET ENGINEERS ENGAGED IN SUPERVISING CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW HOTEL AT SAN NEUA FOR THE LPOR. THE GROUP NUMBERED 4-5 AND ALL WORE BLUE CLOTHING SIMILAR TO THAT WORN BY SOVIET AEROFLOT GROUND SERVICE PERSONNEL.

5. SOURCE OBSERVED THE SOVIET ENGINEERS EXIT THE HOTEL AND THEY NORMALLY GOT INTO A PL MILITARY TRUCK AND WERE ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO ARMED PL SECURITY PERSONNEL. THE DRIVER WORE A K-94 TYPE HOLSTERED PISTOL AND ONE SECURITY GUARD HAD A SHOULDER CARRIED AK ASSAULT RIFLE.

6. SOURCE MET FORMER LAO OFFICERS AT SAN NEUA CITY OFTEN ASSIGNED THERE ON LABORER PROJECTS DURING 1976-77. SOURCE CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY LIKELY THAT MANY SUCH FORMER ROYAL LAO ARMY OFFICERS MIGHT HAVE SEEN THE SOVIET CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS ACCOMPANIED BY ARMED PL GUARDS AND BELIEVED THE CAUCASIANS MIGHT HAVE BEEN U.S. PWs UNDER PL DETENTION. ON FLIGHTS INTO SAN NEUA SOURCE ROUTINELY VIEWED THE CITY FROM THE AIR AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH ALL LANDMARKS SURROUNDING THE AIRPORT. THERE WAS NO PRISON AT EITHER END OF THE RUNWAY USED TO DETAIN FORMER LAO GOVERNMENT MILITARY OR CIVILIAN DETAINEES ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A PRISON IN SAN NEUA CITY FOR CRIMINALS. ((DIA/VO-PH COMMENT: DIA HAS RECEIVED PRIOR REPORTING OF THE SIGHTING OF CAUCASIANS IN THE SAN NEUA CITY

AREA, ONE CLAIMING THEY WERE IN A PRISON AT THE END OF THE SAM NEUA (REPORT).

TO: FM COMNAVJ. SOURCE'S INFORMATION MAY ASSIST IN EXPLAINING THE NATIONALITY OF SUBJECT OF SIGHTINGS OF CAUCASIANS IN LAOS BY INDIVIDUALS WHO REPORTED SUCH SIGHTINGS IN UNFAMILIAR AREAS THROUGH WHICH THEY WERE TRAVELLING.

//IPSP: PG2430

//COMNSBJ: 13//

PROJ: N/A

COLL: NONE

INTST: U.S. NO

PREP: AAI

APPR: P.J. CAPILLATO, COL, USAF, CEF, VO-PH

BYAL: N/A

ENCL: N/A

BT

#5802

NNNN

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INQUIRE-DOCS

ITEM NO:00405023

ENVELOPE

RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS5130 1280002

HEADER

R 070002Z MAY 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

R 052030Z MAY 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//

TO RUEHBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS POINT HI

INFO RUEHBK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RUEHBK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUEHBQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36/J233//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/TLC//

RUEATIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/EA/ICOG//

RUEATIA/DIRNSA/FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//BS//

RUEADWW/NSC WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02

NSC FOR RICHARD CHILDRESS

0483/VO-PH

SERIAL: IIR 6-014-0035-88

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

PASS: N/A

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN)

SUBJ: IIR 6-014-0035-88/SOVIET ADVISORS IN NORTHERN LAOS

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS5130

DOI: 851200

REQS: D-VOP-43468

SOURCE: A LAO IMMIGRANT WHO HAS BEEN A RELIABLE REPORTER TO DATE.

SUMMARY: SOVIET ADVISORY PERSONNEL ROUTINELY VISITED HOUA PHAN PROVINCE DURING 1975-85. THEIR PRESENCE WAS WELL KNOWN TO LOCAL CIVILIANS AND REEDUCATION INMATES WHO WOULD NOT NORMALLY HAVE CONFUSED THEM WITH BEING "U.S. PWs." IN SOURCE'S VIEW, SOME RURAL VILLAGERS MAY HAVE CLAIMED IN JEST THE SOVIET ADVISORS WERE "U.S. PWs."

TEXT:

1. SOVIET CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS BEGAN ARRIVING IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE STARTING AS EARLY AS 1975. THE TECHNICIANS NORMALLY ARRIVED AT SAM NEUA CITY'S NA THONG AIRFIELD BY MI-8 HELICOPTER AND WERE MET THERE BY HOUA PHAN PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES THEY WERE VISITING. THERE WERE TWO RECURRING CATEGORIES OF SOVIET CIVILIAN

TECHNICIANS WHO CAME TO HOUA PHAN PROVINCE FROM THE FALL OF 1975 AND CONTINUING UNTIL DEC 85: AGRICULTURAL SPECIALISTS AND MEDICAL SPECIALISTS.

A. SOVIET CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS ARRIVING AT SAM NEUA WERE EASILY

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IDENTIFIABLE AS TO THEIR PARTICULAR SPECIALTY BASED ON THE MARKINGS OF THE LAO CADRE VEHICLE IN WHICH THEY ROSE AFTER ARRIVING IN SAM NEUA. IN ADDITION, THE SPECIFIC CADRE WITH WHOM THEY WERE TRAVELING CLEARLY LINKED THEM TO SERVING AS AN ADVISOR IN A SPECIFIC SPECIALIZED AREA. PROVINCIAL HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL CADRE ROUTINELY TRAVELED IN NON-MILITARY COLOR JEEPS WITH MARKINGS STENCILED IN LAO INDICATING THEIR SPECIFIC OFFICE. DUE TO THE LIMITED NUMBER OF SUCH VEHICLES IN THE SAM NEUA AREA IT WAS QUITE EASY TO BOTH IDENTIFY SUCH VEHICLES AND ASSOCIATE THEM WITH THE NAMES OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROVINCIAL CADRE. SOVIET SPECIALISTS NORMALLY APPEARED TO ARRIVE SINGLY. WHEN TRAVELING BY LAO JEEP THEY NORMALLY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ARMED LAO DRIVER AND TWO OR THREE LAO CADRE. SOVIET TECHNICIANS WERE EITHER A BLUE OR KHAKI WORK UNIFORM. THE BLUE UNIFORM WAS SIMILAR TO THE BLUE WORK UNIFORM WORN BY AEROFLOT FLIGHT CREWS.

B. DURING 1981-83 A NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY PERSONNEL ROUTINELY VISITED THE VIENG XAI AREA BUT THEY ALWAYS ARRIVED BY MI-8 AT VIENG XAI AIR STRIP RATHER THAN AT SAM NEUA CITY AIR STRIP. THESE SOVIET ADVISORS WERE ROUTINELY MET BY LAO MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM HOUA PHAN PROVINCE OR VIENG XAI DISTRICT HQ. IN THE VIENG XAI

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AREA THEY TRAVELED BY LAO MILITARY JEEP. THESE SOVIET ADVISORS ALWAYS WORE CIVILIAN CLOTHING. AS WITH THE CIVILIAN ADVISORS, IT WAS EASY TO IDENTIFY THEIR FUNCTION BY THE LAO CADRE WITH WHOM THEY WERE ASSOCIATING AND BY THEIR USE OF A LAO MILITARY JEEP AS OPPOSED TO A NON-MILITARY "CIVILIAN" JEEP.

C. STARTING AS EARLY AS 1975 THE SOVIET MEDICAL ADVISORS APPEARED TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADITIONAL LAO HERBAL MEDICINE AS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THEIR ASSISTANCE TO LAOS. HOUA PHAN PROVINCE MEDICAL SERVICE PERSONNEL ROUTINELY TRAVELED ABOUT HOUA PHAN PROVINCE WITH THEIR SOVIET ADVISORS TO INSPECT THE STATUS AND QUALITY OF THE RURAL MEDICAL SYSTEM, PLACING EMPHASIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RURAL HERBAL DOCTORS. DURING 1984 AND UNTIL DECEMBER 1985 IT WAS COMMON TO OBSERVE THE CIVILIAN JEEPS FROM HOUA PHAN PROVINCE MEDICAL SERVICE TRAVELING ALONG HIGHWAY 6 AND NEAR THE VIETNAMESE BORDER. THIS JEEP ROUTINELY STOPPED BRIEFLY AT THE TOWN OF SOP HAO WHILE EN ROUTE TO XIENG KHO DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. THE TOWN OF SOP HAO HAD A SMALL LOCAL RURAL SHOP WHICH SOLD BEVERAGES AND SNACKS. DUE TO THE DISTANCE INVOLVED IN TRAVELING FROM SAM NEUA CITY TO XIENG KHO, A STOP AT SOP HAO WAS AN APPROPRIATE BRIEF REST STOP. THE SOVIET MEDICAL ADVISORS AND

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PROVINCIAL CADRE NORMALLY STOPPED FOR NO MORE THAN TEN MINUTES AT SOP HAO BEFORE CONTINUING ON TO XIENG KHO.

D. THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS WAS PERHAPS AN ODDITY IN THE EARLY YEARS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN DEC 75, BUT AS TIME WENT ON THEY BECAME HERELY ANOTHER PART OF THE LANDSCAPE. DUE TO THE SECURITY PARANOIA IN LAOS, MOST LOCAL VILLAGERS WOULD SEE THE SOVIET TECHNICIANS BUT PAY LITTLE OVERT ATTENTION TO THEM. LAO CITIZENS KNEW IT WAS ALWAYS BETTER TO EXPRESS LITTLE OVERT INTEREST IN THESE TECHNICIANS OUT OF CONCERN SUCH INTEREST MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED BY LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF SOVIETS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING ACCOMPANIED BY LAO MILITARY OFFICERS, CLEARLY SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS.

E. THE SOVIET CIVILIAN ADVISORS TRAVELING ALONG HIGHWAY 6, OR IN OTHER AREAS OF HOUA PHAN PROVINCE, WOULD NOT NORMALLY HAVE BEEN CONFUSED WITH BEING AMERICANS, LET ALONE A "U.S. PW." THEY ALWAYS WORE THE STANDARD BLUE OR OLIVE DRAB WORK GARB AND, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE VEHICLE DRIVER, SUCH GROUPS WERE NOT NORMALLY ARMED. LAO CIVILIAN CADRE WORE EITHER CIVILIAN CLOTHING OR LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY FIELD UNIFORMS WITH NO RANK. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE

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ROYAL LAO ARMY AND GOVERNMENT UNDERGOING REEDUCATION IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE GENERALLY WERE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE SOVIETS AND KNEW THEM FOR WHAT THEY WERE. SEMINAR INMATES EXPRESSED A CERTAIN CURIOSITY AND INTEREST IN THEM WHEN THEY FIRST ARRIVED IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE IN 1975 BUT AS THE YEARS WENT ON THE INMATES PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO THEM. SEMINAR INMATES ENGAGED IN ROAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR ON ROADS SUCH AS HIGHWAY 6 ROUTINELY SAW THE PROVINCIAL MEDICAL AND AGRICULTURAL SERVICE "CIVILIAN" JEEPS DRIVING ALONG HIGHWAY 6 BETWEEN SAM NEUA CITY AND XIENG KHO. IN SOURCE'S VIEW, NONE OF THESE INMATES WOULD NORMALLY HAVE CONFUSED SUCH CAUCASIANS WITH BEING EITHER AMERICANS OR "U.S. PWS." THE SAME MIGHT NOT BE TRUE FOR LOCAL VILLAGERS. EVERYONE KNEW THE LAO GOVERNMENT'S STATED POSITION THAT THERE WERE NO U.S. PWS ALIVE IN LAOS AND IT WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY ALL SEMINAR INMATES THAT THERE WAS TO BE NO DISCUSSION ON THE U.S. PW SUBJECT WHILE IN SEMINAR CAMP. THIS WAS NOT A SPECIFIC CAMP POLICY, RATHER IT WAS SOMETHING EVERY INMATE UNDERSTOOD. IT TOOK LITTLE EDUCATION TO REALIZE THAT PRISON CADRE PUNISHED INMATES FOR ANY ACTION OR WORD WHICH WAS "REACTIONARY" OR "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY." SINCE THE LPDR GOVERNMENT HAD STATED THERE WERE NO U.S. PWS ALIVE IN LAOS, TO HAVE ENTERED INTO A DISCUSSION WITH FELLOW INMATES ON SUCH A SUBJECT RAISED THE INEVITABLE POSSIBILITY THAT A CAMP INFORMANT MIGHT INFORM ON SUCH A CONVERSATION AS INDICATIVE OF SOMEONE WHO WAS CLEARLY A "REACTIONARY." IN SOURCE'S VIEW, THIS ALSO APPLIED TO A SITUATION WHEN SEMINAR INMATES WOULD SEE A SOVIET ADVISOR SUCH AS A MEDICAL SPECIALIST. TO HAVE OPENLY SPECULATED SUCH AN INDIVIDUAL

MIGHT BE A "U.S. PW" OPENED ONE UP TO THE SAME TYPE OF POTENTIAL

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS5131

PUNISHMENT. RURAL UNEDUCATED VILLAGERS, WHILE AWARE IT WASN'T WISE TO DISCUSS SUBJECTS WHICH EVERYONE KNEW WERE TABOO, WERE NONETHELESS SOMEWHAT LESS SOPHISTICATED. VILLAGERS MIGHT WELL MAKE SOME TYPE OF OUTLANDISH CLAIM IN ORDER TO IMPRESS THE LISTENER. SUCH OUTLANDISH STATEMENTS BY VILLAGERS WERE INTENDED TO DO NOTHING MORE THAN TRY TO CONVEY A SENSE OF "SUPERIORITY" OVER INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS SEMINAR INMATES. IN SOURCE'S VIEW, IT WAS NOT INCONCEIVABLE A VILLAGER MIGHT POINT OUT A VISITING SOVIET CIVILIAN TECHNICIAN TO A SEMINAR INMATE AND JOKINGLY STATE THE SOVIET WAS A "U.S. PW."

F. EXCEPT FOR VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, THE VISITING SOVIET MEDICAL AND AGRICULTURAL ADVISORS IN THE AREA OF SOP HAO WERE THE ONLY CAUCASIAN FOREIGNERS IN THAT AREA CLOSE TO THE VIETNAMESE BORDER. VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS FROM THANH HAO PROVINCE DID COME TO SOP HAO TO BARTER OR SELL SMALL QUANTITIES OF LOCAL PRODUCE SUCH AS TOBACCO AND THERE WERE NO VIETNAMESE MILITARY IN THE AREA FROM LATE 1983 THROUGH THE END OF 1985.

2. VO-PW COMMENT: SOURCE IS ~~SC/AN~~ FORMER ROYAL LAO ARMY FIELD GRADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO IS A TRAINED OBSERVER AND REPORTER. HIS INFORMATION ABOVE WAS OBTAINED FROM PERSONAL

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OBSERVATION WHILE A SEMINAR INMATE UNDERGOING REEDUCATION IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE DURING LATE JULY 1975-DECEMBER 1985. HE HAS BEEN A RELIABLE REPORTER TO DATE CONCERNING OTHER SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THE PW/MIA ISSUE. HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE MOVEMENTS OF SOVIETS IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH ASPECTS OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY ANOTHER SOURCE WHO OBSERVED THEM IN PHONG SALY PROVINCE DURING 1975-83.

///IPSP: PG 2430//

///COMSOBJ: 13//

ADMIN

PROJ: N/A

COLL: NONE

INSTR: U.S.

PREP: ~~ANALYST~~, GS-14, ANALYSIS BRANCH CHIEF,

VO-PW 2

APPR: JOSEPH A. SCHLATTER, COL, USA, VO-PW, CHF

EVAL: N/A

ENCL: N/A

DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY LAO REFUGEE

Source (0447)

SUMMARY: In August 1979, a Lao refugee wrote that he had observed five American pilots in a jail 15 kilometers north of Viengsay, Houa Phan Province, Laos, specifically on 30 December 1975.

DETAILS: On 26 August 1979, Lao refugee ~~Source~~ wrote a letter from Thailand to an American citizen in Illinois to report that he had observed five American pilots in a jail 15 kilometers north of Viengsay. This information was never brought to the attention of U.S. Government personnel in Thailand. In August 1980, after he had resettled to SD ~~Source~~ prepared an affidavit which contained further details of the sighting, in which he stated that he was held in a prison camp 3 1/2 hours drive away from Viengsay in what he thought to be an easterly direction. At the prison camp during the period of approximately one month, SC claimed he observed five prisoners which a camp guard told him were American pilots. The prisoners were described as tall, skinny, dressed in light-green clothing which appeared to be Soviet uniforms, and guarded by two armed personnel; one of the Caucasian prisoners wore a gold ring. On 5 November 1980, ~~Source~~ was administered a polygraph examination and asked if he had seen five Caucasian prisoners in northern Laos, at Viengsay, and if the guards had told him that the Caucasians were U.S. flyers; no deception was indicated.

ANALYSIS: In August 1984, ~~Source~~ was interviewed in his native language by a DIA/PW-MIA analyst. At that time he stated that in 1976 he was riding on a truck near Viengsay, escorted by Pathet Lao guards, when the truck stopped near a mountain; he observed five American PWs and was asked by the guards if he recognized the Americans to which he replied no. Since 1984, ~~Source~~ has refused to discuss the sighting further. DIA/PW-MIA has made innumerable attempts to contact ~~Source~~ and discuss the sighting information; however, he has not been available. There are indications that he will not be available in the future. Since the early 1980's DIA/PW-MIA has interviewed many Lao refugees who were held in camps in the Viengsay area or who resided there; all state that they never saw nor heard of American prisoners being held in the province. Some of these refugees had freedom of travel throughout Houa Phan Province and would have known of Americans being held there if that had been the case.

The majority of refugees interviewed from Houa Phan Province did state that they had seen groups of Soviets in the area, especially during the period 1975 - 1985, and that the Soviets always travelled with armed Pathet Lao escorts. The Soviets were known to operate from a base in Sam Neua throughout the province, working in agriculture and medicines. Other Caucasians who have worked for years throughout Houa Phan Province have included American Mennonite teams and United Nations Development Program personnel; these personnel usually travel with armed Pathet Lao guards also.

EVALUATION: ~~Source~~ was never able to pinpoint the area of the sighting, other than it was near Viengsay, in Houa Phan Province. If he had travelled north of Viengsay for 15 kilometers as he stated initially, he would have been close to Sam Neua City, the base camp area of the Soviets. There is

some doubt as to where the sighting occurred, whether in a jail, a cave, or near a mountain and some doubt as to why he was in the area of the sighting, i.e. being held in a prison, a jail, or travelling through in a truck. It should be noted that determination was made early on that source lied as to why he was arrested by the Pathet Lao and why he was in the area of Viengsay. On the other hand he passed a polygraph examination when he stated he observed Caucasian prisoners and when he claimed that the guards told him that the Caucasians were American.

Based upon information from the large number of Lao sources who were held in or lived near Viengsay, that there were no American PWs in that area, while Soviets were often seen in the province, it is highly probable that

source observed Soviet advisors working in Houa Phan Province. Sighting information is similar to many previous refugee reports received by DIA/PV-MIA in which the refugee source claimed to have seen Caucasian prisoners and to have been told by Pathet Lao guards that the Caucasians were American. The majority of these former reports were determined to have been sightings of either American Mennonites or United Nations Development Program teams, Soviet advisors, or other Europeans detained in a specific area or travelling in the area with armed escorts. In this instance, source probably observed Soviet advisors working out of a base camp somewhere near Sam Neua City, Houa Phan Province.

DATE OF EVALUATION: February 1990.

PV-MIA CATEGORY: Nationality Undetermined, not U.S.

November 6, 1979

Mrs. Dorothy Rodden
5707 Valant Avenue
Downers Grove, Ill. 60515

Dear Dorothy,

I have received eight refugee reports which you sent to the National League office in Washington. I can only suppose that these are the reports which you and N were going to send to me some time ago.

I have put the reports together with some notes to help me put the information to some use on behalf of our sons. Gladys and I are still very busy completing the analysis of the 400 reports obtained from refugees plus a number of others which arrive almost daily.

1. Burabouth Phanvongsa - English language letter of 20 August 1979, from Ban Khai Camp, Thailand to Dorothy Rodden. Source reports finding dogtag of Curran, H.V.; heard rumor of American POWs; gave his information to a Lt. Col. Embassy Officer. Source willing to help. Has there been any follow-up to this source?
2. Vongrichit Khan Say - Two Laotian language letters apparently written on 8 and 18 August 1979. Have these letters been translated?
3. Thong Ky Vithangavong Aka Thong Nee Vithangavong - (1) English language letter written 25 July (rec'd 4 August). Source reported from Udon refugee camp, Thailand on American bodies near Sapan. (2) Letter from Dorothy Rodden to source dated 6 August. (3) Laotian language letter with detailed map dated 17 August(?). No translation of this letter. (4) English language letter dated 18 August. (rec'd 30 August). Source states that he has received letter from Dorothy Rodden and has sent her three letters. Source makes appeal for money. Whatever there is of value, must be in the Laotian language section. What information does source have and is there a continuing communication?
4. Phasook Nonginthirath - Laotian language letter from Udon, Thailand, date unknown. No translation. What is status?
5. Khamanotrak - Laotian language letter apparently dated 18 July, received by Dorothy Rodden approximately 25 July from Udon, Thailand. A partial translation by Phasay Phouangmaly indicates that source reported on plane crashes and arrest of Americans (no date). Source gave personal background information and offers help if wanted. Has there been any further contact?

HOW NOW DISPLAYING RECORDS FOR SOURCE NAME:

CASE # CTRY ROAT-NO

NAME

AKA NAME

00447 CA

SO 0014

HOW NOW DISPLAYING RECORDS FOR AKA-SOURCE:



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340



0345/PA-MIA

22 MAR 1990

TO: Headquarters
Joint Casualty Resolution Center
Naval Air Station
Barbers Point, HI 96862

SUBJECT: Forwarding of DIA Evaluations of Indochinese Refugee Reports

1. Enclosure for your retention are copies of DIA evaluations of Indochinese refugee reports which pertain to non-United States personnel.
2. Future DIA evaluations of refugee reports will be provided on a periodic basis.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

5 enclosures

1. Eval of SDV(RLC)
2. Eval of SDV(RLC)
3. Eval of SDV(RLC)
4. Eval of SDV(RLC)
5. Eval of SDV(RLC)

cc:
JCRC/LNO
OASD/ISA

Joseph A. Schmitter
JOSEPH A. SCHMITTER
Colonel, USA
Chief, Special Office for Prisoners
of War and Missing in Action

Source file

SOURCE NAME:

CASE#: 12117

ALIAS: (if applicable)

DATE CASE CREATED: 12 OCT 89

SIGHTING SUMMARY: DOG TAG AND LIVE SIGHTINGS IN LAOS

PRIMARY ANALYST: A/ALIST

SECONDARY:

TAB	DOCUMENT(S)	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	CIR-316/04519-89 CIA/DDO HSB TO PM/NIA	121828Z OCT 89	POW-HSY: Source provided hearsay information concerning 14 American POW's being held at Thua Luang, Nakhik'xanton in the Vientiane district of Houaphan Province.
			GRV-HSY (DOGTAB): Source provided dog tag information on Fred L. Smith Jr., in Kontum district in March 1972 and his body buried in Gia Lai- Kontum Province.
			POW-HSY: Source provide hearsay information concerning three additional POW's being held at an Air Base in Haung Nam.

127189

PAGE 1

THIS PAGE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIALITY 13

APR 3 SOURCE ID # 12117

KA 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37

DAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 32
CATEGORY 1AENTRY LOCATED 23 STATE/CITY 15
ENTRY REPORTED 10 LA/VN VS
TYPE SIGHTING 46 POW-MV
ST SIGHTING 42 UH960470 11 202022N 12 1041911ESUBSOURCES 27
ACTIONS 51
SITHA
891012 CIADO CIR316/0451989
891012 CIADO DTG 121528Z

CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39

REMARKS 36 FOLREG 14PWS IN HOUAPHAN(P)89 ANALYST 13: 89

DATE RECEIVED 8 891027 DATE OF INFO 35 89

SOURCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:

ORIGIN CODE 17: 0

POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

POLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

DIS16029

127189

PAGE 2

THIS PAGE CONFIDENTIAL IF AKA FILLED OR
CONFIDENTIALITY 13 VER

APR 3 ID # 40551

KA 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37

DAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 32
CATEGORY 1AENTRY LOCATED 23 STATE/CITY 15
ENTRY REPORTED 10 LA/VN VS
TYPE SIGHTING 46 POW-MV
ST SIGHTING 42 UH960470 11 201911N 12 1040013ESUBSOURCES 27 MAUNG HAM
ACTIONS 51
891012 CIADO CIR316/0451989
891012 CIADO DTG 121528Z

CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39

REMARKS 36 FOLREG 3PWS IN MAUNG HAM-89 ANALYST 13: 89

DATE RECEIVED 8 891027 DATE OF INFO 35 89

SOURCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:

ORIGIN CODE 17: 0

POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

POLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

DIS16029

5/27/89

PAGE 3

HIS PAGE CONFIDENTIAL IF AKA FILLED OR
 ON-IDENTICALITY IS YES

AME 8 SOURCE ID # 40550

KA 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37

DAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 33

ENTRY LOCATED 23 STATE/CITY 15
 ENTRY REPORTED 10 LA/VN
 TYPE SIGHTING 46 GRV-HSY (DOGTAG)
 ST SIGHTING 42 13 142100N 12 1081000E

SUBSOURCES 27 56
 CIA-LAI CONG
 TUM PROV
 ACTIONS 51 891012 CIADO CIR316/04511989
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CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39

REMARKS 36 EVLREQ GRV IN CIA LAI CONG TUM ANALYST 13: N

DATE RECEIVED 8: DATE OF INFO 35 7203

SOURCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:

ORIGIN CODE 17: D

POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 33:

POLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

KA 109

USER NAME

C NUMBER

ENTRY LOCATED

ENTRY REPORTED ON

IS REPORTING

CASER

S-SOURCES

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED 37

DATE RECEIVED 8

DATE OF INFO 35 7203

REMARKS/HISTORY

EX CATEGORY 51

EX RESULTS 24

CATEGORY 50 1A

ORIGINAL

SOURCE 17 D

PENDING ACTIONS

STATUS/REMARKS

ANALYST

UNCLASSIFIED NAME

REPORT LOCATION

U.S. ADDRESS

CONTACTED 32

CAPTIVE

ENVIRONMENT 39

01916029

12A ID#	1	12A127	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED: 37
FOGEE NAME	3	SOURCE	
AF NUMBER	4		
DATE LOCATED	23		DATE RECEIVED: 8
DATE REPORTED ON	10	LAIVM	DATE OF INFO: 15/89
FE SUSPECT	44	POB: HKG	
CATION	42	MA360498	203022
IS-SOURCES	27	"THAN LUANG"	SITHA
CTCROSS/RELATD	51	891015 CTAD: CTR316/0451989	
TUMBER ANALYSIS	51	891012 CTAD: DTS 1315382	
MY CATEGORY 53			
MY RESULTS 24			
CATEGORY: 59	1A		
ORIGINAL SOURCE: 37	D		
TR IN DAY			
FINDING ACTIONS:	45		
STATUS/REMARKS	36	FOL REG: 1A1051TH	HOWAPHAN (A) 89
ANALYST	13	CONTACTED: 31	CAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT: 39
UNCLASSIFIED NAME	16		
REFUGEE LOCATION	15		
U.S. ADDRESS	25		

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
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489																													
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DT UNDER ANALYSIS										89/D12-CIA 10-DTS 12/15/89																			
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#12117

Date Printed: 08/06/90

Produced by user

#8621

ROUTINE
P 121117Z OCT 89
FM CIA
TO DIA/PW-AJ

2-08
7-22-90

NNNN SOURCE DATA SHEET NNNN

Source Name: Source Case No: 08621

Alia: SD Confidential:

Boat Number: SD Contacted:

Entry Location: TH State/City:

Entry Reported: VN

Type Sighting: POW-F/H

Lat Sighting: UTH: HANOI LAT: 205900N LONG: 1055100E

Subsources: Subsources: Actions:

1:	081112 STORY IR 08240024-89
2:	081112 STORY TH-04 201118Z
3:	081114 STORY DIO 140422Z
4:	080306 STORY IR 08240027-89
5:	080306 STORY TH-04 060644Z
6:	080309 STORY UTO 090809Z
7:	
8:	
9:	
10:	
11:	
12:	

Sub sources

Current Action:

Analyst: AN

Remarks: 4-3 PMS HELD HANOI 0612

Data Received: 090210

Date of Info: 0612

Source DOB: 310519 Address:

Origin Code: 0 Category: 1A

Polygraph Category: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

Polygraph Results:

N END OF RECORD

NNNN

NNNN

2. A VIETNAMESE
A DOG TAG BEARING THE DOG TAG IS TIED OFF
VIETNAMESE. WITH THE BEARING STATES THAT 13 IN HANOI
CAPTAIN AND A HELICOPTER PILOT REPORTEDLY SHOT DOWN AT
DONTON DISTRICT IN MARCH 1972 AND HIS BODY BURIED IN SEA LAG
DONTON PROVINCE.

3. FOLLOWING
INFORMATION FROM A FORMER LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY FIRST LIEUTENANT

THERE ARE 14 AMERICAN POW'S BEING HELD
AT THAK LONG, BANGKOK CANYON IN THE VIETNAMESE DISTRICT (10244) OF
BANGKOK PROVINCE. "THAK LONG" IS THE FORMER DISTRICT OF PHUOC
SCAPARANG. LONG IS LOCATED ONE KILOMETER EAST OF "BANGKOK" WHICH IS 17
KILOMETERS EAST OF THE VIETNAMESE BORDER. THE 14 AMERICAN POW'S ARE GUARDED BY A 20-400 POLICE COMPANY
COMMANDED BY A POLICE LIEUTENANT STING. THE POW'S
OWN RICE AND VEGETABLES FOR A LIVING, BUT THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO
WEAR SHOES. THERE ARE THREE ADDITIONAL
POW'S BEING HELD AT AN ALSO BASE IN HANOI (UNLOCATED). THESE THREE
POW'S ARE REPORTEDLY BEING USED TO TEACH ENGLISH TO PAW SOLDIERS
AND NOW THE LATTER ARE TO USE AN ALSO SIGNAL SYSTEM.
THERE ARE FOUR POW'S LOCATED AT THE SAME ALMOSE. NO FURTHER
INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE.

NAME 3 Source (SC) ID # 2 109905
 BOAT NUMBER 34 SD CONFIDENTIALITY 32
 ENTRY LOCATED 23 TH STATE/CITY 15 CONTACTED CATEGORY 32 1A
 ENTRY REPORTED 10 VN
 TYPE SIGHTING 46 JW-HSV
 1ST SIGHTING 42 11 12
 SUBSOURCES 27 SS
 ACTIONS 51
 CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39
 REMARKS 36 FOLDED 30 PLUS HELI HANOI ANALYST 18 AD
 DATE RECEIVED 8: 890310 DATE OF INFO 35
 SOURCE DOB 14: 310515 ADDRESS 29
 ORIGIN CODE 17: 0
 POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 33: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS
 POLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

DTS17054

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
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[illegible]

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS

THE 019 COUNCIL HAS DECIDED TO CHARGE \$1000 FOR 25 MONTHLY MEALS

Source

Archival

NO. 100-10000

ANALYSIS DATA REPORT

STILL AVAILABLE IN LIMITED QUANTITIES OF \$69.00 PER COPY

Source

Analysis

CASE NUMBER	SOURCE NAME	COUNTRY	INTERVIEW DATES	DOC	LOC	WFO	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COMBENT	STATUS
13331			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13332			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13333			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13334			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13335			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13336			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13337			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13338			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13339			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13340			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13341			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13342			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13343			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13344			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13345			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13346			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13347			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13348			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13349			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13350			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13351			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13352			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13353			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13354			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13355			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13356			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13357			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13358			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13359			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13360			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13361			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
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13363			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
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13365			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13366			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13367			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13368			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13369			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13370			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13371			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13372			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13373			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13374			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13375			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13376			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13377			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13378			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13379			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13380			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13381			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13382			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13383			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13384			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13385			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13386			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13387			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13388			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13389			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13390			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13391			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13392			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13393			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13394			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13395			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13396			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13397			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13398			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13399			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13400			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13401			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13402			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13403			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13404			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13405			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13406			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13407			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13408			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13409			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13410			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13411			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13412			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13413			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13414			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13415			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13416			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13417			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13418			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13419			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13420			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13421			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13422			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13423			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13424			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13425			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13426			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13427			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13428			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13429			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13430			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13431			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13432			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13433			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13434			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13435			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13436			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13437			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13438			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13439			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13440			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13441			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13442			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13443			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13444			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13445			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13446			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13447			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13448			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13449			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13450			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13451			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13452			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13453			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13454			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13455			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13456			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13457			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13458			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13459			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13460			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13461			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13462			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13463			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13464			04-07/01	30 YRS MEX-SPANISH LAST	0013		5'00	150		WFO
13465		</								

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-01-2001 BY 60321 SP1 BAW/STP/STP

CASE NUMBER	SOURCE NAME	SIGHT	RECEIVED INFORMATION	DOC	LAT	LONG	UTM	ZONE	OFFICE	CATEGORY	OTHER ANALYSIS
0153			POW-VIA	12	210000	126.0554	1265232	12	VI	UNDER ANALYSIS	
0154			LOCATIONS IN SON JUNG-68	74	205550	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0160			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0161			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0162			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0163			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0164			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0165			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0166			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0167			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
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0169			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0170			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0171			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0172			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0173			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0174			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0175			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0176			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0177			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0178			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0179			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0180			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0181			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0182			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0183			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0184			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0185			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0186			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0187			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0188			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0189			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0190			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0191			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0192			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0193			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0194			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0195			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
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0200			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0201			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0202			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0203			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0204			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0205			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0206			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0207			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
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0209			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
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0212			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0213			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0214			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
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0216			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0217			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0218			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0219			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0220			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0221			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0222			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0223			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0224			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0225			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0226			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0227			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0228			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0229			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0230			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0231			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0232			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0233			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0234			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0235			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0236			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0237			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0238			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0239			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0240			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0241			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0242			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0243			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0244			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0245			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0246			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0247			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0248			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0249			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0250			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0251			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0252			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0253			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0254			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0255			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0256			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0257			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0258			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0259			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0260			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0261			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0262			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0263			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0264			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0265			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0266			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0267			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0268			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0269			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0270			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0271			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0272			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0273			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0274			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0275			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0276			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0277			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
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0279			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
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0281			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0282			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0283			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0284			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0285			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0286			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0287			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000	12	VI		
0288			POW-VIA	74	210000	126.0541	1260000				

ANALYSIS DATA REPORT

UNION: 712 SEVEN WAS ALONG ON CENTER HIGH OF MICHIGAN 1050000 FOR 25 MINUTAL HOURS

CMS NUMBER	SOURCE NAME	SUBJECT	REPORTED INVESTIGATIVE	DATE	AGE	SEX	HT	WT	HAIR	EYES	COMPLEXION	ACTION OFFICE
15859		POW-SGT	5 ALIVE - 10 BROTHERS	0711	210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15864		POW-SGT	OUTSIDE BOMB		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15865		POW-SGT	THREATS FOR ARMY OF PHOENIX		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15866		POW-SGT	THREATS FOR ARMY OF PHOENIX		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15867		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP	77-79	210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15868		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15869		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15870		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15871		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15872		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15873		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15874		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15875		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15876		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15877		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15878		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15879		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15880		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15881		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15882		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15883		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15884		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15885		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15886		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15887		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15888		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15889		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15890		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15891		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15892		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15893		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
15894		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP		210000	POW/MAN	5'6 1/2	160	BRN	BLU	FAIR	POW-PHILADELPHIA
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15965		POW-SGT	POW 15 ANN NY A CAMP									

ANALYSIS DATA REPORT

Source: Bill called me from an auto store at Ocean Station No. 95, Newport, N.H.

CLASS NUMBER	SOURCE NAME	SIGET	REPORTED INFORMATION	DOS	LAT	LONG	UTM	DISTANCE MTR	CITY	COUNTRY	ACTION OFFICER
14694			THE 476	73	2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
14695			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
14696			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
14697			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
14698			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
14699			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
15515			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
15516			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
15517			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
15518			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
15519			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK
15520			THE 476		2180000	1650100E	WKE35450	3,000 M	VI	VIET NAM	WALK

TOTAL NUMBER OF RECORDS PRINTED: 400

ANALYSIS DATA REPORT

CLASSIFICATION WHICH WAS PLACED ON CERTAIN POINT OF DISCUSSION IN CONNECTION WITH THE MATTER.

[illegible]

ANALYSIS DATA REPORT

CHICAGO, ILL. (UPI) — A 1960s-era photograph of a man in a suit and tie, possibly a politician or businessman, is shown. The image is grainy and appears to be a reproduction from a newspaper or magazine. The man is looking slightly to the right of the camera. The background is dark and indistinct.

[illegible]

INQUIRE=BOC4D
ITEM NO=00544215
ENVELOPE
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS1449 0110618-
ZNY
RUEALGX
HEADER
R 110618Z JAN 88
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
R 110602Z JAN 88
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//WO-PW//
INFO RUHQHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
BT
CONTROLS

LIATSON BANGKOK 01449

3017 JAN 88

BODY

SUBJ: LY NAM DE STREET, HANOI SRV

1. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN ISSUE NUMBER 9489, 26 OCT 87 ANNOUNCED THE DEATH OF PAVN SR COL NGUYEN DAN (DDOANP), DPOB 1920, HUONG SO (FORMERLY HUONG THAI) (V), HUONG DIEN (FORMERLY HUONG TRA) (D), BINH TRI THIEN (FORMERLY THUA THIEN). SR COL DAN WAS FORMERLY THE DIRECTOR OF THE REAR SERVICES INSTITUTE, CAPITOL MILITARY REGION, HANOI. SR COL DAN'S LAST ADDRESS WAS LISTED AS 12A LY NAM DE. DAN DIED IN MILITARY HOSPITAL 108 ON 23 OCT 87.

2. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, ISSUE NUMBER 9494, 31 OCT 87 ANNOUNCED THE DEATH OF PAVN SR COL NGO KY-AKA BACH VAN (BACH VAN), DPOB 1916, NAM HONG (V), NAM NINH (D) HA NAM NINH (P). SR COL BACH VAN WAS FORMERLY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MATERIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT, CAPITOL MILITARY REGION, HANOI. BACH VAN DIED IN MILITARY HOSPITAL 108 ON 23 OCT 87. HIS LAST ADDRESS WAS ALSO LISTED AS 124 LY NAM NINH STREET.

BT

1440

ADHESION

PAGE:0002

INQUIRE=DOCHD
 ITEM NO=00765847
 ENVELOPE
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS6688 0391137- -RUEALGX
 ZNR
 HEADER
 R 081137Z FEB 88
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 081130Z FEB 88
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEHQBA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 INFO RUEHQBA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF VASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEADPW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//
 RUEHMA/CDR USACILHI FT SHAFTER HI
 BT
 CONTROLS

LIAISON BANGKOK TH 06688

3095 FEB 88

BODY
 SUBJ: LY NAM DE STREET, HANOI

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN ISSUE NUMBER 9537 DATED 13 DEC 87
 REPORTED THE DEATH OF PAVN SR COL LU GIANG, AKA NGUYEN
 TRUONG BON (BONNF), DPOB 1919, NGHI XA (V), NGHI LOC
 (D), NGHE TINH (P). GIANG'S DEATH WAS ANNOUNCED BY THE
 GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, MK7 COMMAND, QUAN DOI NHAN
 DAN PUBLISHING HOUSE, AND HIS FAMILY. ACCORDING TO THE
 ARTICLE, SR COL GIANG WAS THE FORMER POLITICAL COMMISSAR
 OF BINH TRI THIEN SUBREGION, FORMER CHIEF OF MK4
 POLITICAL SECTION, AND FINALLY THE DIRECTOR OF THE QUAN
 DOI NHAN DAN PUBLISHING HOUSE. GIANG DIED ON 9 DEC 87
 IN MILITARY HOSPITAL 175, HCMC. HIS LAST RESIDENTIAL
 ADDRESS WAS LISTED AS NUMBER 16A LY NAM DE ST, HANOI
 CITY.
 BT
 #6688

NNNN

PAGE:0004

INQUIRE=DOCTD
 ITEM NO=00329900
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = LGX556 MCN = 89038/14885 TOR = 890381042
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 ZNR
 HEADER
 R 071041Z FEB 89
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 071015Z FEB 89
 FM FBIS BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEHMAA/FBIS RESTON VA
 RAYWIA/ONA/CAMBERRA AS
 RAYWB/JIO/CAMBERRA AS
 RUAJMB/POSTF WESTPAC KAHU SEKA JA
 RUCLACC/CDRATFSTOPGP FT BRAGG NC//SB//
 RUODKKB/FBIS LONDON UK//BBC//
 RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS WASHINGTON DC
 RUEKJCS/DEFINTAGENCY WASH DC
 RUETIAM/MPC FT GEO G MEADE MD
 RUEHQBA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHQIPA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHJBP/FBIS OKINAWA JA
 RUHJVT/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE LAOS
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
 ACCT FBK-ENDK
 BT
 CONTROLS

SERIAL: BK0702101589

BODY
 COUNTRY: SRV
 SUBJ: RADIO REPORTS DO MUOI'S TET VISITS TO CITIZENS

SOURCE: HANOI DOMESTIC SERVICE IN VIETNAMESE 1100 GMT 5 FEB
 89

TEXT:

((TEXT)) ON 4 FEBRUARY -- ON THE OCCASION OF THE LUNAR NEW
 YEAR IN THE YEAR OF THE SNAKE -- COMRADE DO MUOI, PARTY
 CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITICAL BUREAU MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
 COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, PAID A TET VISIT TO THE FORCES IN THE HO
 CHI MINH MAUSOLEUM MANAGEMENT BOARD. SENIOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL
 DOAN KHUE, CHIEF OF THE VPA JOINT GENERAL STAFF; AND TRUONG
 TUNG, VICE CHAIRMAN OF HANOI PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED
 CHAIRMAN DO MUOI.

ON BEHALF OF THE ARMY AND POLICE FORCES IN THE MAUSOLEUM
 MANAGEMENT BOARD, COLONEL NGUYEN MANH TUONG REPORTED THE SUCCESS
 IN PRESERVING PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S BODY AND IN PROTECTING THE
 BA DINH SQUARE. CHAIRMAN DO MUOI COMMENDED THE CADRES,

PAGE:0005

WORKERS, AND CIVIL EMPLOYEES IN THE MAUSOLEUM MANAGEMENT FORCES FOR OUTSTANDINGLY FULFILLING THEIR 1988 ASSIGNED DUTY. HE WISHED THAT THE CADRES, WORKERS, AND CIVIL EMPLOYEES WOULD ENJOY GOOD HEALTH AND HAPPINESS IN THEIR FAMILIES, AND FULFILL THE TASKS ASSIGNED BY THE MINISTRIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERIOR AND THE HANOI PARTY COMMITTEE.

ON THE SAME DAY, CHAIRMAN DO MUOI PAID A TET VISIT AND DONATED GIFTS TO THE FAMILIES OF TWO SISTERS: MRS NGUYEN THI DUONG, 87 YEARS OLD, FIVE OF WHOSE SONS ARE FALLEN HEROES, WITH ANOTHER CURRENTLY A HIGH-RANKING ARMY CADRE; AND MRS NGUYEN THI LANH, 79 YEARS OLD, WHOSE ONLY SON IS A FALLEN HERO. BOTH OF THEM LIVE AT NO. 12A LY NAM DE STREET. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CHAIRMAN ATTENTIVELY INQUIRED ABOUT THE HEALTH AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE FAMILIES, EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE TWO SISTERS FOR THEIR MERITS IN RAISING THE CHILDREN, AND WISHED THEM LONGEVITY, GOOD HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS.

CHAIRMAN DO MUOI THEN CALLED ON MRS VO THI TUE, 80 YEARS OLD, WIDOW OF LATE WRITER NGUYEN TUAN, WHO LIVES AT NO. 92 TRAN HUNG DAO STREET, HOAN KIEM PRECINCT. HE HIGHLY APPRAISED THE MERITS OF LATE WRITER NGUYEN TUAN, WHO HAVE LEFT BEHIND A PRECIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE COUNTRY'S LITERATURE, AND WISHED MRS TUE GOOD HEALTH, LONGEVITY, AND HAPPINESS IN LIVING WITH HER CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN. HE ALSO PAID A TET VISIT TO ELDERLY ARTIST VO AN NINH, 83 YEARS OLD, WHO LIVES AT NO. 36 TUE TINH STREET, BAI BA TRUNG PRECINCT. HE CORDIALLY TALKED WITH THE ARTIST AND HIS FAMILY. HE CITED THE ARTIST'S HARD AND ASSIDUOUS WORK AS A GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO VIETNAM'S PHOTOGRAPHY. HE WISHED THE ARTIST AND HIS DEPENDENTS PLENTY OF GOOD HEALTH AND HAPPINESS. HE HAD A SOUVENIR PICTURE TAKEN TOGETHER WITH MR VO AN NINH AND HIS DEPENDENTS.

ADMIN
(ENDALL) 051100 18530702.003 VU/EVANS/ET 07/1028Z FEB
BT

#0702

NNNN

Vietnam Tally Company

See: VIETALCO

VIETNAMTOURISM

Vietnamese: Công ty Du Lịch Việt Nam

English: Vietnam Travel Service

Address: 54 Nguyen Du St., Hanoi, SVN
17 Lang Song Sq., Ho Chi Minh City, SVN

Phones: Hanoi 52854 Ho Chi Minh City 24987, 93444

Cable Address: VIETNAMTOURISM HANOI

Telex: 269 TORISVT (Hanoi), DULVINA-SGN-295 (Ho Chi Minh City)

Vietnam Travel Service

See: VIETNAMTOURISM

VIETTRANS

Vietnamese: Tổng Công ty Giao nhận Kho vận Ngoại thương Việt Nam

English: Vietnam National Foreign Trade Forwarding and Warehousing Corporation

Address: 13 Ly Nam De St., Hanoi, SVN
406 Nguyen Tat Thanh St., Ho Chi Minh City, SVN


Phones: Hanoi 54913 Ho Chi Minh City 99917, 22415

Cable Address: VIETTRANS HANOI & VIETTRANS HOCHIMINH CITY

Telex: 4505


Subordination: Ministry of Foreign Trade

Services: Handles the forwarding and transportation operations connected with Vietnam foreign trade by sea, rail, land, air or post. Undertakes to forward and transport diplomatic cargoes, transit goods, exhibition articles as well as personal effects to and from Vietnam at the request of customers in country or overseas. Manages foreign trade warehousing business including refrigerating spaces and cooling chambers. Deals with all problems concerning the forwarding and transport services: customs clearance, goods survey, packing and repacking cargoes, cargo insurance, booking sea and air freight or acts as lessor or lessee of containers, etc.



Heavy shield of location of complex on 14 March 1968

Enclosure 1 to IR 604 0046 P8



Enclosure 1 to IR 604 0046 P8

MEASUREMENTS OF AREA IN WHICH SHUTTER WAS PLACED
BY NAME OF STREET IS AT BOTTOM. GEL THERM 3 MEASUREMENTS
MADE WITH AN X. THE INTENSITY OF THE RADIATION
IS INDICATED BY SHUTTER PLACEMENTS

PAGE:0005

PREP: TM-04.
 ENCL: TO FOLLOW.
 1. MEMORY SKETCH.
 ACQ: (881026).
 DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCM, POL,
 - SA DATT/TLO JCRC).

BT

#9560

NNNN

PAGE:0001

ENVELOPE

CDSN: LOY454 MCN: 89065/05338 TOR: 890650639
 RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0850 0650639 RUEALGX

ZNY

HEADER

R 060639Z MAR 89

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADMD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEADADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC

RUEBEC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEANCC/CMC CG WASHINGTON DC

RUEYIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEYIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 060646Z MAR 89

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PH-MIA//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//PH-MIA/DAN/DAH-3//

INFO RUEADNM/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC-MR CHILDRESS//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PH-MIA//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PH-MIA//

RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//

RUEYIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/XIL//

RUEBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEBKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR

RUEBHK/USDO HONG KONG

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//PH- 10850

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0097 89.

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0097 89/REINTERVIEW OF SD
 ON ALLEGED SIGHTING OF AMERICANS IN HANOI IN 1986

 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 861220.

REQS: D-VOP-2430-04.

SOURCE: / SD
 VIETNAMESE REFUGEE CLAIMING ACCESS IN 1986 TO THE PAVN
 GENERAL STAFF COMPLEX BY VIRTUE OF HIS SKILL AS A
 PRACTITIONER OF TRADITIONAL ORIENTAL MEDICINE.

SUMMARY THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. IT
 PROVIDES FURTHER INFORMATION FOLLOWING UP IIR 6 024 0026
 89 AND CORRECTS THE ADDRESS OF THE HANOI COMPOUND IN
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TEXT:

1. AFTER CORRESPONDING WITH HIS WIFE IN HANOI,
 SOURCE CORRECTED THE ADDRESS OF THE COMPOUND IN WHICH HE
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 STREET WEST OF THE CITADEL AREA. SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE
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///IPSP: PG 2430//.
 //COMSOBJ 521//.
 ADMIN
 PROJ: 6999-10.
 INSTR: US: NO.
 PREP: TH-04.
 ACQ: ,890302)
 DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCH, POL,
 SA, DATT/TLO JCRC).

BT

#0850

NNNN

ENVELOPE
 CDSN = LGY680 HCN = 89068/15334 TOR = 890680856
 RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS1628 0680856 RUEALGX
 ZNY

HEADER
 R 090856Z MAR 89
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/DCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANAF/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADCA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADDA/AFIS AMBS BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEATIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEBEC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANCC/CNO CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEATIAH/DHNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEATIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 090805Z MAR 89
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM-HIA//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//FM-HIA//
 INFO RUEBHK/USDAO HONG KONG//FM-HIA//
 BT

JANGKOK TH//FM- 11628

FOR 64 FROM COL MIKI

BODY
 SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON IIR 6 024 0097 89.

1. ^{AN} ^N THE RO OF IIR 6 024 0097-89, REQUESTED THAT I RELEASE HIS IIR COMMENTS FROM HIS HONG KONG DRAFT WHICH I EDITED BEFORE RETRANSMITTING IT FROM BANGKOK. HE CONSIDERS THEM IMPORTANT TO CONVEY THE IMPORT OF PARA 1 OF THE REPORT. HE STATES THAT THE COMMENT SECTION WAS ALSO MEANT TO REFLECT FAVORABLY ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SOURCE AND CONTAINED SOME INFORMATION OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO THE ANALYSTS THAT DIDN'T SEEM TO FIT IN THE TEXT PARA.

2. HERE ARE PETERSON'S COMMENTS TO PASS TO YOUR FM/HIA ANALYSTS. QUOTE

BECAUSE RO HAD INSISTED AT THE INITIAL INTERVIEW (IIR 6 024 0026-89) THAT NUMBER 17 COULD NOT BE AN ADDRESS ON THE WEST SIDE OF LY NAM DE, SUBJECT HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE OF WRITING TO HIS WIFE IN HANOI TO ASK HER TO HAVE THE ADDRESS VERIFIED BY AN OLD ACQUAINTANCE, ^{NAME} WHO IS A GOOD FRIEND OF ^{NAME} SON-IN-LAW AND A CAPTAIN

ASSIGNED TO C24 OF DIRECTORATE KH6, THE PRISON MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE (SOURCE USED THE TERM "CUC QUAN LY TRAI GIAM TRUNG UONG") OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (MOI). IN THE LETTER, SOURCE HAD ASKED HIS WIFE FOR THE VERIFICATION BY USING THE PRETEXT THAT SOURCE PLANNED TO WRITE TO ^{NAME}. SOURCE'S JANUARY RESPONSE INCLUDED A FINAL PARAGRAPH, WHICH SOURCE THOUGHT ^{NAME} HAD ADDED, STATING THAT SOURCE WAS RIGHT ABOUT THE NUMBER 17 FOR THE ADDRESS. A COMMENT EXPRESSED CURIOSITY OVER SOURCE'S WANTING THE LY NAM DE ADDRESS. IN A SUBSEQUENT LETTER, THE SISTER OF SOURCE'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW WROTE ^{NAME} (SOURCE'S WIFE) SAYS THAT IF YOU WRITE TO MR. 17 (THE LETTER WILL NOT BE RECEIVED. IF YOU WRITE TO 14-16 THE YOUNG LADY WILL RECEIVE IT. THIS INDICATED TO SOURCE THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION HAD REVEALED THAT THE ADDRESS OF THE COMPOUND WAS 14-16 LY NAM DE RATHER THAN 17 LY NAM DE. RO INSPECTED THE LETTERS AND WAS CONVINCED OF THE ACCURACY OF SOURCE'S ACCOUNT OF THE EXCHANGES. UNQUOTE.

ADMIN

BT

#1628

NOON

DOI: 861220.

RECS: D-WP-2430-04

SOURCE: SP.
VIETNAMESE REFUGEE CLAIMING ACCESS IN 1986 TO THE PAVN
GENERAL STAFF COMPLEX BY VIRTUE OF HIS SKILL AS A
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//IPSP: PG 2430//.
//CONSOBJ 521//.
ADMIN
PROJ: 6999-10.
INSTR: US: NO.
PREP: TM-04.
ACQ: (890302)
DISSEM: FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCM, POL,
SA, DATT/TLO JCRC).

BT

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NO FURTHER DISSEM
OR REPRODUCTION
PER: DAN ONLYPLACE INFORMATION
IN THE CENTER

COPY NUMBER 17

ROUTINE

FM USDAO HONG KONG ML/PW-MIA//
TO : DIA WASHDC/DAM/VO-PW//
INFO USDAO BANGKOK TH/PW-MIA//

RUC 0006 02 1700

THIS IS A STORY REACH MESSAGE

SUBJECT: STORY REACH BACKGROUND REPORT

1. SC
2. SC
3. CITY/TOWN: VIETNAM

4. RELIGION: ROMAN CATHOLIC

5. SO

6. SO

7. SO

8. BACKGROUND HISTORY:

9. SD

10. BELT/PHONE HISTORY:

11. SD

12. RE-EXPLAINED HISTORY:

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ENVELOPE

CDSN = LOY191 MCN = 88333/07455 TOR = 883331114

RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS9560 3331115 -RUEALGX.

ZNY

HEADER

R 281115Z NOV 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAAMA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAACA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEADDA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC

RUEAC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEANCC/CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIA/DINSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEAIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 281115Z NOV 88

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAM/DAH-3//

INFO RUEADPH/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR CHILDRESS//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

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RUEHBA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR

RUEHKK/USDO HONG KONG

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK TH//PW- 59560

SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0026 89.

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VM).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0026 89/ALLEGED AMERICANS SIGHTED
IN HANOI IN 1986

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 861220.

MCN=88318/00810 TOR=88318/04302 TAD=88318/04977 CDSN=MIA757

Source
Data

DOI: 861220.

REGS: D-VOP-2430-04.

SOURCE: *SO*
 VIETNAMESE REFUGEE CLAIMING ACCESS IN 1986 TO THE PAVN
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 SA, DATT/TLO JCRC).

BT

#0850

NNNN

PAGE 6

ME 3 ID 2 07091

A 16

RT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED CATEGORY: 32 1A

TRY LOCATED 23 KS STATE/CITY 15
 TRY REPORTED 10: VN
 TYPE SIGHTING 46 POW-HSY
 IT SIGHTING 42

RESOURCES 27 XREF HANOI
 UNDERGROUND
 PRISON
 BE DINH PARK
 CTIONS 51 870918 DET32-TR-15120275-87
 870918 DET32-UTD-1801652

CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39

MARKS 34 POLRED UNK 8 PMS HANOI-85 ANALYST 13: PN

DATE RECEIVED 8: 890303 DATE OF INFO 35 85

SOURCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:

RIGIN CODE 17: E

OLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

OLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

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PAGE 8

ME 3 ID 2 09915

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RT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED CATEGORY: 32 1A

TRY LOCATED 23 KS STATE/CITY 15
 TRY REPORTED 10: VN
 TYPE SIGHTING 46 POW-HSY
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RESOURCES 27 DUNG
 UNDERGROUND
 PRISON

CTIONS 51 870915 DET32-TR-15120224-87
 870915 DET32-UTD-1506592

CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39

MARKS 34 POLRED 300 PMS KEPT PHU THO-82 ANALYST 13: PN

DATE RECEIVED 8: 890308 DATE OF INFO 35 82

SOURCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 25:

RIGIN CODE 17: E

OLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

OLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

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CONTACTED 32

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TRY REPORTED 10: UN

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871008 DTICZ TR 15120001-00

871008 DTG 082450Z

ORIENT ACT 45

CAPTIVITY 39

PARAGRAPH 34 : EVLUED ECONOMIC RECOVERY-HAND

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1. *Chrysomelids*

[illegible]

JOIN CODE 17: E

LYNNH CATERING 73

LYMPH RESULTS 241

MSGNO

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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCMA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHADA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC

RUEHADA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOC6/XOIX//

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RUEHIAH/DIENSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEHACG/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHIAH/MFC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALIX/SAFE

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RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC//OAS-3//

RUEHNC/SECSTATE WASH DC//OAS-3//

RUEHNC/SECDEF WASH DC//OAS-3//

RUEHIAH/CIA WASH DC

RUEHJCS/JCS WASH DC//OCSJCS (P-MIA) 1-2//

RUEHNC/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RUEHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS POINT HI

RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//1-2/1-3/3233//

RUEHQA/NO AFIS FT BELVOIR VA//DNO//

RUEHQA/NO AFIS FT BELVOIR VA//DNO//

RUEHQA/NO PSAA HICKAM AFB HI//DNO//

RUEHQA/COMINT CAMP SMITH HI//1A//

RUEHQA/SHRIG HICKAM AFB HI//DNO//

RUEHQA/COMINT SEOUL KOR//32//

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EZ2:

SERIAL: IIR 1 512 0275 87

SUBJ: AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR DETAINED AS LATE AS 1965

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

DOI: 870225

REQS: D-70P-43468; D-70P-43639

SOURCE: SC VIETNAMESE STAYING AT THE REFUGEE

CAMP IN PUSAN, KOREA, WHO ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM HIS FRIEND.

RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE AND SUBSOURCE HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: UNTIL 1985, AN

UNDERGROUND DETENTION FACILITY LOCATED ADJACENT TO HO CHI MINH

MEMORIAL HALL IN HANOI, VN HAD POSSIBLY BEEN USED FOR AMERICAN

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RUEHIAH/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHNC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEHACG/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHIAH/DIENSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

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RUEHNC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEHIAH/MFC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALIX/SAFE

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SERIAL: IIR 1 512 0001 88

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN)

SUBJ: IIR 1 512 0001 88 VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC RECOVERY POLICY

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 870200

REQS: K-2C1-00031

SOURCE: SC A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL STAYING AT THE

REFUGEE CAMP IN PUSAN, KOREA, WHO ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION WHILE

LIVING IN VIETNAM. SOURCE'S RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THE NEWLY ELECTED GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE VIETNAMESE

COMMUNIST PARTY, NGUYEN VAN LINH, 63 YEARS OLD, DECLARED A NEW

ECONOMIC POLICY AT THE 6TH PARTY CONGRESS HELD IN DEC 86 TO HELP THE

STAGNATED ECONOMY RECOVER.

TEXT: 1. IN DEC 86, THE 6TH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS WAS

HELD IN HANOI, VIETNAM AND MR. NGUYEN VAN LINH WAS ELECTED AS

GENERAL SECRETARY. HE WAS THE FIRST CHIEF OF THE PARTY COMMITTEE

(FIELD COMMENT: MAYOR) IN HO CHI MINH CITY AFTER THE FALL OF THE

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. HE IS KNOWN AS AN EXPERT ON ECONOMY. HE

DECLARED SOME NEW ECONOMIC RECOVERY POLICIES WHICH WERE SIGNIFICANTLY

DIFFERENT FROM EARLIER POLICIES.

2. NEWLY DECLARED POLICIES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES ARE NOW AUTHORIZED TO ENGAGE IN FOREIGN TRADE. PRIOR TO THE 6TH PARTY CONGRESS, ALL INDUSTRIAL EXPORT AND IMPORT ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM WAS ACCOMPLISHED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN COMMERCE. THIS CENTRALIZED APPROACH TO FOREIGN TRADE IMPEDED THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. AFTER THE 6TH PARTY CONGRESS, ALL INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES DESIGNATED BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE THEIR BUSINESSES BASED ON SELF-REGULATING RULES CONCERNING FOREIGN TRADE AND FOREIGN LOANS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN COMMERCE.

B. VIETNAMESE RESIDENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES ARE PERMITTED TO VISIT AND INVEST IN BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM. THIS APPLIES TO ALL VIETNAMESE PEOPLE REGARDLESS OF DATE OR MEANS OF DEPARTURE. TO INCLUDE ESCAPEES. UPON APPROVAL OF THEIR REQUESTS, VIETNAMESE VISITORS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES ARE PERMITTED TO MEET FAMILY MEMBERS AND TO VISIT ANCESTRAL GRAVES. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS NEW POLICY ARE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHO RESIDE IN CHINA; THEY ARE EXCLUDED FROM THIS VISIT PROGRAM.

C. THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HANDICRAFT PRODUCTION AND RESUME PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS. THIS POLICY ALSO APPLIES TO OWNERS OF SMALL MANUFACTURING SHOPS.

D. DUE TO THE DISORGANIZED NATURE OF THE COLLECTION FARM SYSTEM, AGRICULTURAL LAND WILL BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG FARMERS FOR PRIVATE OWNERSHIP. AFTER FARMERS PAY INCOME TAX TO THE GOVERNMENT WITH EITHER AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS OR CASH, THEY ARE THEN ALLOWED TO SELL THE REMAINING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS TO THE GOVERNMENT OR ON THE OPEN MARKET ON THEIR OWN. IF FARMERS SELL PRODUCTS TO THE GOVERNMENT, THEY CAN RECEIVE HARD-TO-PURCHASE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS AS PAYMENT.

E. THE RATION SYSTEM WHICH DISCRIMINATED BY OFFICIAL POSITION, AGE, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS ABOLISHED.

F. CHECK POINTS LOCATED ON ROADS AND HIGHWAYS FOR INSPECTION OF RATIONED OR CONTROLLED ITEMS ARE NOW UNUSED. EACH CHECK POINT HAD BEEN MANNED BY ONE SECURITY POLICE, ONE TAX OFFICIAL, AND ONE GOODS MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL. CONTRABAND ITEMS FOUND WERE CONFISCATED. BUILDINGS THAT HAD BEEN USED AS CHECK POINTS ARE NOW UNMANNED.

G. MANUAL WORKERS, WHO HAD BEEN PAID BY AN ALLOTMENT SYSTEM, ARE PAID BY THE AMOUNT OF WORK ACCOMPLISHED. UNDER THE OLD SYSTEM, WORKERS LOST ALL INCENTIVE TO WORK HARD DUE TO THE SMALL WAGES THAT THEY RECEIVED. THIS IN TURN LEAD TO A DECREASE IN PRODUCTIVITY AND PRODUCT QUALITY. BUS DRIVERS NOW RECEIVE A PRO-RATED PAYMENT BASED ON TOTAL INCOME DURING THE PAY PERIOD. FACTORY WORKERS ARE PAID BY THE RATE OF WORK ALLOCATION ACCOMPLISHED.

COMMENTS: 1. SOURCE ACQUIRED INFORMATION FROM OPEN MEDIA AND OBSERVATION OF RESULTS OF POLICY CHANGES ON DAILY LIFE OF VIETNAMESE CITIZENS.

2. SOURCE VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER DEBRIEFING UNTIL HE DEPARTS KOREA FOR A THIRD COUNTRY.

//IPSP CORE: PG1900//

//COMSOBJ: 41//

PROJ: 1421-10

INSTR: US NO

PRDP: 1-10127

ACQ: SET 32 PSAA, SEOUL, KOREA, 870900

BT

#2740

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1909 HAI PHONG, PRINTED BY AMS IN JUL 86 WAS USED FOR COORDINATE OF LOCATION. THIS GAZETTEER, NORTH VIETNAM, PUBLISHED BY THE CIA IN AUG 64 WAS ALSO USED FOR IDENTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS.

//TPSP CODE: P02130//

//COMSOBJ: 310//

PRGJ: 1421-10

INSTR: US NO

PRDP: AF-52-012

APPR: THOMAS V. LEWIS, LT COL, CC, USAF

ENCL: N/A

DISSEM: N/A

BT

#1618

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END

PRISONERS OF WAR.

TEXT: 1. IN 1970, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTED AN UNDERGROUND DETENTION FACILITY IN BE DINH PARK, HANOI ADJACENT TO HO CHI MINH'S TOMB WHICH IS LOCATED AT //GEOCOORD: 2102N/1055030E//. //UTMCOORD: 48QWJ873265//. A RUMOR CIRCULATING AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS IN HANOI //GEOCOORD: 2102N/10551E// AND HAI PHONG //GEOCOORD: 2052E/10641E// INDICATES THAT UNTIL 1982, THE FACILITY HAD BEEN USED INTERMITTENTLY TO HIDE AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR. SINCE 1970 WHEN THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES ATTACKED A PRISONER OF WAR CAMP IN SON TAY //GEOCOORD: 2108N/10530E//, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT CONSTANTLY RELOCATED THE AMERICANS FROM ONE FACILITY TO ANOTHER TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER SURPRISE ATTACK. THE PRESENCE OF THE POW'S REMAINED A SECRET FROM THE GENERAL POPULACE BECAUSE THE PRISONERS WERE TRANSPORTED ONLY AT NIGHT.

2. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTED THE UNDERGROUND DETENTION FACILITY AT THE SAME TIME AS HO CHI MINH'S TOMB WAS CONSTRUCTED. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HO CHI MINH'S TOMB BEGAN IN 1969 AND WAS COMPLETED CIRCA 1970. MOST OF THE TOMB WAS ALSO CONSTRUCTED UNDERGROUND. THE CIVILIAN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS SELECTED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF HO CHI MINH'S TOMB UNDERWENT A THOROUGH BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION WHICH COVERED THEIR FAMILIES FOR A PERIOD OF THREE GENERATIONS. THE RUMOR CONCERNING THE UNDERGROUND DETENTION FACILITY WAS STARTED BY SOME OF THE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF HO CHI MINH'S TOMB.

3. HO CHI MINH'S TOMB CONSISTS OF A 100 METERS (M) X 100M X 5M GRANITE STRUCTURE ABOVE GROUND LEVEL AND THREE UNDERGROUND FLOORS. A COMPANY SIZE SPECIAL UNIT IS TASKED WITH PROVIDING SECURITY FOR HO CHI MINH'S TOMB AND IS STATIONED 70M TO 80M WEST OF THE TOMB. TWO VIETNAMESE POLICEMEN ARE POSTED AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE TOMB AND A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE POLICEMEN PATROL INSIDE THE TOMB BUILDING. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE POLICEMEN IN CIVILIAN ATTIRE PATROL AROUND THE TOMB AREA. ACCESS TO THE TOMB IS ALLOWED TO ALL TOURIST GROUPS AND INDIVIDUAL VIETNAMESE CITIZENS CAN VISIT THE TOMB EITHER WITH PERMISSION FROM THE LOCAL POLICE STATION OR WHEN FOREIGN TOURISTS ARE VISITING THE TOMB.

4. MANY OF THE VIETNAMESE GENERAL POPULACE BELIEVE SOME AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR ARE STILL DETAINED IN A VERY SECRET PLACE AND ARE TO BE USED IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. SOURCE FEELS THAT THE RUMOR IS TRUE BECAUSE MOST RUMORS THAT CIRCULATE AMONG THE GENERAL POPULACE HAVE PROVED TO BE TRUE IN THE PAST.

COMMENTS: 1. SOURCE FIRST HEARD ABOUT THE UNDERGROUND DETENTION FACILITY FROM FRIENDS WHO ATTENDED THE VIETNAM NATIONAL SHIPPING SCHOOL WITH SOURCE IN 1980. WHEN HE VISITED HANOI IN 1985, HE ALSO HEARD THE SAME INFORMATION FROM FRIENDS WHO LIVED IN HANOI. SOURCE DID NOT PURSUE THE TOPIC ANY FURTHER BECAUSE HE WAS NOT CONCERNED AT THAT TIME. SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER WHICH OF HIS FRIENDS HAD TOLD HIM THIS INFORMATION. SOURCE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR FUTURE DEBRIEFINGS UNTIL HE IS RELOCATED TO A THIRD COUNTRY.

2. (C/MF) VIETNAM CITY MAPS 1:15,000, HAI PHONG, EDITION 1, SERIES

MSGRO 108 (PCIK) #09/15/87# #06105135.9.5*

ZCZC 111041262 (PC)

ZNY DTG 87091505323246

PTCZTUN RUEKJCS1285 2580933

RUEKJCS

ZNY

P 150933Z SEP 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADND/DCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEADND/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEADND/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC

RUEADND/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOCB/KKK//

RUEADND/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEADND/DIGMA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEADND/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEADND/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEADND/SAFE

P 150933Z SEP 87

FM DMT 32 PSAA SEOUL KOR//CO//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC//FO-PM//

RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC//DAB-3//

RUEADND/SECSTATE WASH DC//EAP/TLC/CA/CS/DSR//

RUEADND/MSC WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC//OASD-ISA-PM-HIA//

RUEADND/CIA WASH DC

RUEADND/CIA WASH DC//OCJCS (PM-HIA)/J-5//

RUEADND/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RUEADND/CDR JCRC BARBERS POINT HI

RUEADND/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2/J-3/J-33//

RUEADND/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC//XOOCB//

RUEADND/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC//XOOCB//

RUEADND/COMUSMACV CAMP SMITH HI//IA//

RUEADND/SHRTO HICKAM AFB HI//DOB//

RUEADND/COMUSMACV SEOUL KOR//J2//

BT

EZ1:

EZ2:

SERIAL: IIR 1 512 0274 87

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN)

SUBJ: POSSIBLE VIETNAMESE UNDERGROUND DETENTION FACILITY FOR US

POW'S

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

DOI: 870200

REGS: D-VOP-43468; D-VOP-43639.

SOURCE: SD

A REFUGEE STAYING AT THE VIETNAMESE

REFUGEE CAMP IN POSAN, KOREA, WHO ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM A

VIETNAMESE ARMY OFFICER. RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE AND SUBSOURCE

HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE UNDERGROUND DETENTION FACILITY FOR U.S. POW'S IS LOCATED IN THE AREA OF HUNG HOA //GEOCOORD: 2115N/10518E//, PHU THO PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. THE FACILITY IS SAID TO HOUSE APPROXIMATELY 300 U.S. POW'S.

NOTE: 1. LOCATION: A DETENTION FACILITY HOLDING SOME 300 U.S. POW'S IS LOCATED WITHIN A MOUNTAIN APPROXIMATELY 50 KILOMETERS (KM) WEST OF PHU THO //GEOCOORD: 2115N/10518E//, PHU THO PROVINCE. THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE PRISON IS GEOCOORD: 2115N/10518E. UTM: 48QJ270520. THE AREA IS MOUNTAINOUS AND THE HUNG RIVER //GEOCOORD: 2017N/10639E// FLOWS NEARBY.

2. SECURITY AT THE FACILITY:

THREE DEFENSIVE PERIMETERS SURROUND THE MOUNTAIN, WITH EACH DEFENSIVE LINE SPACED TWO KILOMETERS APART. VIETNAMESE ARMY UNITS ARE DEPLOYED ALONG EACH DEFENSIVE LINE. THE ONLY ACCESS ROAD TO THE AREA IS NARROW AND EXTENDS FROM AN UNKNOWN ROAD.

CHECK POINTS ARE LOCATED AT EACH ENTRANCE TO THE FIRST AND SECOND DEFENSIVE LINES, AND ARE ENCOUNTERED UPON ENTERING THE SITE. ALL PERSONNEL AND CARGO ARE THOROUGHLY INSPECTED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE AREA. VEHICLE LOADING COMPARTMENTS ARE COVERED AND SECURED BEFORE GIVEN ACCESS TO THE AREA. SUPPLIES ARE ALSO TRANSPORTED INTO THE AREA BY 200 AND 300 TON BOATS USING THE HUNG RIVER.

3. OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL ARE DEPLOYED ALONG THE FIRST DEFENSIVE LINE. ONLY OFFICERS ARE DEPLOYED ALONG THE SECOND AND THIRD DEFENSIVE LINES. INDIVIDUALS ARE ALLOWED TO ENTER ONLY THE PERMITTED AREA WHERE THEY ARE ASSIGNED (FIELD COMMENT: SUBSOURCE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SECOND DEFENSIVE LINE). THE THIRD DEFENSIVE LINE IS THE HOME IN THE CENTER OF THE AREA (FIELD COMMENT: SUBSOURCE HEARD FROM MEMBERS ASSIGNED TO THE THIRD DEFENSIVE LINE THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 300 U.S. POW'S LIVING IN THE UNDERGROUND FACILITY OF THE MOUNTAIN). ONCE ASSIGNED TO THE AREA, NO ONE IS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE WITH ANYBODY OUTSIDE OF THE AREA.

4. THE POW'S HAVE A DAILY ONE-HOUR SUBSISTENCE PERIOD WITHIN THE UNDERGROUND FACILITY THROUGH A SPECIALLY DESIGNED SUN BATH SYSTEM. POW'S ARE PROVIDED WESTERN STYLE MEALS, BATHS, AND ENJOY RECREATIONAL FACILITIES.

5. PRIOR TO LEAVING VIETNAM IN FEB 87, SOURCE FREQUENTED THE HOME OF THE SUBSOURCE, VIETNAMESE ARMY SS

SS IN HAIPHONG CITY. THE CAPTAIN'S SISTER-IN-LAW, NAMED NAME, IS A CLOSE FRIEND AND OLD SCHOOLMATE OF SOURCE.

6. IN 1982, SUBSOURCE WAS A MEMBER OF HEADQUARTERS, 350TH SECURITY COMMAND, VIETNAMESE ARMY IN HAIPHONG WITH THE RANK OF FIRST LIEUTENANT. IN DEC 82, SUBSOURCE SUDDENLY DISAPPEARED FROM HIS HOME WITHOUT ANY NOTICE. IN DEC 84, HE RETURNED HOME WEARING THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND WAS REASSIGNED TO THE SAME UNIT. DURING HIS TWO YEAR ABSENCE, SUBSOURCE'S UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT AND LOCATION WERE UNKNOWN TO HIS FAMILY.

7. AFTER HIS RETURN IN DEC 84, SS RELATED THE ABOVE DATA TO SOURCE AND ASKED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: IN FEB 82, HE AND NINE OTHER ARMY OFFICERS IN HIS UNIT WERE SELECTED FOR A SPECIAL

PAGE 0051

ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFERRED TO HANOI ALONG WITH AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ARMY OFFICERS FROM VARIOUS OTHER UNITS. THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO INFORM THEIR FAMILIES OF THEIR LOCATION. THE FOLLOWING DAY, THEY TRAVELED TO VIENT TRI//UNCOORD// 2100/05050// FROM THE PROVINCE BY TRAIN. AT VIENT TRI THEY BOARDED ARMY TRUCKS AND MOVED TO THE ASSIGNED AREA.

4. SUBSOURCE SURMISED THAT THE TIGHT SECURITY AROUND THE DETENTION AREA WAS TO PREVENT A RESCUE OPERATION SIMILAR TO THE SON TAY RAID.

5. SOURCE VOLUNTEERED THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT, BASED ON THE DEGREE OF THE SOURCE. THE DEBRIEFER FEELS HE WAS SINCERE AND RELAYING WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE TRUTH. SOURCE IS 36 YEARS OLD, AN AUTO MECHANIC BY TRADE AND A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE. ALTHOUGH THE HOME ADDRESS OF SUBSOURCE IS UNKNOWN TO SOURCE, HE COULD ACQUIRE THE ADDRESS THROUGH HIS KISTEN WHO WORKS WITH SUBSOURCE AT A SHOE FACTORY IN HAIPHONG. SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER DEBRIEFING. DEPARTURE TO A THIRD COUNTRY IS NOT EXPECTED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

6. COORDINATES WERE FOUND USING ARMY MAP SERVICE MAP VIETNAM 1: 50,000, VIENT TRI, EDITION 1-ANS, SHEET 605 (1, 50000 DATED 1965.)

//TYPE CODE:

//COMSOBJ:

PRM:

INSTR: US NO

PRP: AF-52-011

APPR: THOMAS V. LEWIS, LT COL, CC, USAF

ENCL: N/A

DISSEM: N/A

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20304

DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY LAO REFUGEE

25 JUL 78

(8434)

SUMMARY: A Lao refugee reports observing foreign prisoners in Viengsay, Houa Phang Province, during the period 1969-1973.

DETAILS: Lao refugee *Source* has reported that during the period 1969-November 1973, when he was in his teens and living near Viengsay, he observed several foreign prisoners working on a karst a kilometer away. *Source* never got closer to the group than a kilometer, and claimed that the prisoners were foreign because of their size; at no time did *Source* claim that the prisoners were American.

ANALYSIS: Three Americans are known to have been held at Viengsay in the past. United States Air Force pilots Shelton and Ardica were captured near Viengsay in 1969, and probably survived in captivity through 1969. In May 1973 American civilian pilot Emmet Kay was captured and moved into Viengsay and held until his release in 1974. Kay was held at Viengsay during a portion of the time mentioned by *Source*, and Kay knew of another American being held at Viengsay. Of the nine Americans captured in Laos and moved to Hanoi for detention and eventual release in 1973, none were ever moved into or through the Viengsay area. There is some doubt as to exactly where *Source* lived in the Viengsay area; i.e. he says the karst was south of his home when it is actually north, and the north arrow on a sketch he provided is pointing south. Nevertheless, the area is extremely rough, with huge karsts and tall mountains and trees, and it is doubtful that he could have observed a distant karst as claimed from any point in Viengsay. Of the large volume of past reporting with regard to Viengsay, indications are that prisoners were held in the large caves, practically underground, and that they did not work hard labor.

EVALUATION: Extensive imagery analysis of Viengsay has indicated that the area of the karst as identified by *Source* is actually a small hill, not a karst. Attempts to reinterview *Source* about this claimed live sighting have failed and in March 1989 it was learned that *Source* had returned to Laos in December 1988 to live permanently. *Source* described the prisoners as foreign because of their size; besides Shelton, Ardica, and Kay, Chinese prisoners are believed to have been held at Viengsay and may account for the sighting. The absence of Americans at Viengsay during the period 1969-1972 would indicate that if *Source* did indeed see prisoners at Viengsay, they were not American; it should be noted that at no time did *Source* claim that the prisoners were American.

DATE OF EVALUATION: July 1989.

PH-MIA CATEGORY: Nationality Undetermined; not U.S.

CLASSIFIED BY: PH-MIA
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20304

EVALUATION OF PH/MIA INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY LAO REFUGEE

25 JUL 78



SUMMARY: Lao refugee *Source* claimed he observed tall individuals working at the mouth of the Lao communist wartime headquarters at Vieng Xai, Houaphang Province, during 1969-73. He speculated the individuals he observed might have been American.

DETAILS: *Source* claimed he was a local resident of the area of wartime Lao communist headquarters in the caves at Vieng Xai during 1969. At that time, 14 years of age, he observed a group of tall individuals surrounded by armed guards from a distance of one kilometer, dumping rock from a large cave entrance. He speculated the individuals might have been American because they were noticeably larger than nearby armed guards who *Source* could identify as Lao. He was unable to provide an exact number of the persons he saw and could not describe them. He had no knowledge, firsthand or hearsay, about U.S. PWs at Vieng Xai other than that he claims he gained through direct observation at one kilometer distance during 1969-November 1973.

DETAILS: The area of *Source's* claimed sighting is in the general area of the wartime headquarters of Lao communist forces. At least two Americans were reliably reported detained in this cave complex through the mid to late 1960s. The Lao communist cave complex at Vieng Xai was frequently visited by foreigners during the war years and was the scene of a visit by *Source's* British Military Attaché during 1973 based on hearsay information from a local area guard. The precise fate of the U.S. PWs at Vieng Xai has never been formally disclosed by the Lao communist government.

The description of *Source's* claimed sighting at Vieng Xai generally precludes his sighting from being accepted as a statement of fact. *Source* may have hearsay knowledge of the presence of U.S. PWs at Vieng Xai in the 1960s but could not have made his sighting at one kilometer as described.

EVALUATION: DIA/VO-PW concludes *Source* did not make his sighting as described.

DATE OF EVALUATION: 15 January 1988

VO-PW CATEGORY: Fabrication

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PAGE 0001

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 ZBT SSSSS

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FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

8 000609Z1200 MAY 87

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TO RUEHQA/CNO JCRC BANGKOK TH

INFO RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//32/33/36//

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RUEHQA/CS WASHINGTON DC//PO-3//

RUEHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//PO-3//

RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//PO-3//

RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

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PAGE 0002

(1967 TO NOVEMBER 1973) SOURCE LIVED WITH HIS FAMILY NEAR THE PATHET LAO MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN VIENGKAY. SOURCE STATED THAT ABOUT ONE KILOMETER SOUTH FROM THE BANGKOK HOUSE WHERE HE LIVED HE COULD SEE THE ENTRANCE OF A CAVE ON A HAIL MOUNTAIN. FROM THIS DISTANCE, SOURCE SAID HE FREQUENTLY SAW SEVERAL MEN WHO HE BELIEVED TO BE FOREIGN PRISONERS NEAR THE MOUTH OF THE CAVE, USUALLY IN THE LATE AFTERNOON.

4. (S/W) SOURCE STATED THAT HE FIRST NOTICED THE FOREIGN PRISONERS IN 1969 WHEN HE WAS 14 YEARS OLD. WHEN HE LEFT VIENGKAY IN NOVEMBER 1973, THEY WERE STILL THERE. SOURCE SAID HE SAW THESE MEN ALMOST DAILY, AND SURMISED THEY WERE FOREIGNERS BECAUSE, EVEN FROM A DISTANCE OF ONE KILOMETER, THEY WERE NOTICEABLY TALLER THAN THEIR PATHET LAO GUARDS. HE WAS NOT SURE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER, BUT USUALLY SAW FIVE OR SIX AT A TIME AT THE CAVE ENTRANCE. SOURCE STATED THAT THE CAVE WAS MARLBOROUGH AND WAS ABOUT HALFWAY TO THE TALL MOUNTAIN. HE BELIEVED THE PRISONERS WERE ENGAGED IN EXCAVATING AND RELAXING THE CAVE. HE USUALLY SAW THEM IN THE EVENINGS WHEN THEY WERE HAULING OUT LOOSE ROCK AND DROPPING IT OVER THE EDGE. AT THE BASE OF THE MOUNTAIN IS A LARGE QUANTITY OF LOOSE ROCK WHICH HAD BEEN REMOVED IN THE MAKING OF THE CAVE. THE CAVE ENTRANCE WAS ACCESSIBLE BY A NARROW DIRT ROAD WHICH RAN DOWN THE FACE OF THE MOUNTAIN TO THE WEST. THERE WAS A GUARD POST AT THE END OF THE ACCESS ROAD.

5. (S/W) SOURCE NEVER SAW ANY OF THE FOREIGN PRISONERS CLOSE UP, AND NEVER HEARD ANYONE TALK ABOUT THEM. HE DESCRIBED A NORTH SOUTH ROAD WHICH IS LOCATED TO THE EAST OF THE CAVE, ALONG WHICH WAS SITUATED OTHER IMPORTANT PATHET LAO FACILITIES INCLUDING THE HOME OF GENERAL SECRETARY SITHON KHAMMONE PHOUKHANG, PARTY SECRETARY SITHON KHAMMONE PHOUKHANG, SOUTHERN VIETNAM AND PATHET LAO POLICE HEADQUARTERS. SOURCE LIVED NORTH OF THE CAVE NEAR THE PARTY PROPAGANDA BUREAU AND THE BUREAU'S BROADCASTING STATION AT THE BASE OF PHOU KHE MOUNTAIN. A BROADCASTING ANTENNA WAS SITUATED AT THE TOP OF PHOU KHE.

6. (C) BACKGROUND. SOURCE STATED THAT HIS FATHER, A FORMER BUSINESSMAN IN PHNOM, WAS A MUSICIAN WITH A PATHET LAO CULTURAL GROUP. WHEN SOURCE WAS NINE YEARS OLD (1964), THE FAMILY MOVED TO BAN VOU, SALAVAN PROVINCE WHERE HIS FATHER WAS ASSIGNED TO THE "CULTURAL OFFICE." BEFORE MOVING TO VIENGKAY, THEY LIVED A SHORT WHILE IN BAN NAPHILANG NEAR HIANG PHIM (LD 0927), SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. SOURCE STATED THAT IN VIENGKAY, THE PATHET LAO

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CAVE UP, ON
SIDE OF MOUNTAIN

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EXECUTED HIS FATHER FOR REASONS UNKNOWN TO HIM.

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TEXT

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R 061005Z MAY 87

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 000609412000 MAY 87

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEBQPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//

RUEHJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//

RUEHJCS/JCS WASHDC//J3/PH-MIA//

RUEHJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PH-MIA//

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//

RUEAFS/AMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUEAFD/AMCONSUL UDORN

BT

EZ1:

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 19984

CITE: SECRET NOFORN 3274 MAY 87

EZ2:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT 00187-183000, FOREIGN PRISONERS SEEN
 AFTER HIS FATHER'S DEATH. SOURCE WENT TO VIENTIANE
 TO LIVE WITH RELATIVES UNTIL HE WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE
 FROM THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH MURDERED MY
 FATHER TO COME TO THAILAND.

7. (C) COMMENT: SOURCE INITIALLY CONTACTED
 JCRC BY LETTER, ASKING THAT HE MEET WITH HIM IN
 HAITI REFUGEE CAMP. SOURCE OFFERED TO "WORK FOR"
 JCRC IF WE NEED ANYONE TO GO BACK INTO LAOS TO
 LOOK FOR INFORMATION. HE THANKED HIM FOR HIS
 INTEREST, BUT POLITELY REFUSED HIS OFFER. SOURCE
 DREW A ROUGH SKETCH-MAP OF THE VIEWKAY AREA WHICH
 WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC AND DIA/TO-PH.

DEC:OADR.

BT

#9984

NNNN

E23

TEXT

187-183

NNDD

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
LIAISON OFFICE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: JCRC-LNB

13 May 1987

SUBJ: Lao Refugee Sorala

TO: Commander, JCRC


1. Please refer to our message, DTG 060941Z MAY 87, JCRC Rpt T87-183.
2. Enclosed for your information and analysis is the sketch map provided by Subject refugee and reported in cited message report.

[Signature]
JCRC Liaison Officer

Atch:
a/s

Copy to:
DIA/VO-PW, w/atc

UNCLASSIFIED



1030

UNCLASSIFIED

1081

Z05/01/89

SECRET
NOFORN

PAGE 2

THIS PAGE CONFIDENTIAL IF AKA FILLED OR
CONFIDENTIALITY IS YESNAME 3 : *See Ref* ID : 2 106434

AKA 16 : CONFIDENTIALITY 37:

BOAT NUMBER 34 : T-133814 CONTACTED 32:
CATEGORY: 6CNTRY LOCATED 23 : TH STATE/CITY 15 :
CNTRY REPORTED 10 : LA
TYPE SIGHTING 46 : POW-F/H
1ST SIGHTING 42 : VH190370 11 202441H 12 104132ZSUBSOURCES 27 : XREF 602400987
*See ASO JEC**Subsources*ACTIONS 31 : 870504 JCRC L T87-183 H98
880115 PMIA DIA EVAL
880811 JCRC L T88-433 H98
881118 JCRC L T88-604 H98
890117 PMIA SDR 9-MOP03237
890321 STONY DTG 210921Z
890719 JCRC DTG 191812Z
890723 IAC REVIEW BOARD

CURRENT ACT 43 : 890723 IAC APP'D HON-U.S. CAPTIVITY 39:

REMARKS 36 : FOLKES, J-6 PW'S CAVE VIENGXAY ANALYST 13: SV

DATE RECEIVED 8: 870607 DATE OF INFO 35 7511

SOURCE DOB 14: 870513 ADDRESS 27:

ORIGIN CODE 17: 6

POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 33:

POLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

UNCLASSIFIED

DIS13003

SECRET
NOFORN

Henricus Pad
House of Khantay Siptudone - Animal Fines Commission

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	524	525	526	527	528	529	530	531	532	533	534	535	536	537	538	539	540	541	542	543	544	545	546	547	548	549	550	551	552	553	554	555	556	557	558	559	560	561	562	563	564	565	566	567	568	569	570	571	572	573	574	575	576	577	578	579	580	581	582	583	584	585	586	587	588	589	590	591	592	593	594	595	596	597	598	599	600	601	602	603	604	605	606	607	608	609	610	611	612	613	614	615	616	617	618	619	620	621	622	623	624	625	626	627	628	629	630	631	632	633	634	635	636	637	638	639	640	641	642	643	644	645	646	647	648	649	650	651	652	653	654	655	656	657	658	659	660	661	662	663	664	665	666	667	668	669	670	671	672	673	674	675	676	677	678	679	680	681	682	683	684	685	686	687	688	689	690	691	692	693	694	695	696	697	698	699	700	701	702	703	704	705	706	707	708	709	710	711	712	713	714	715	716	717	718	719	720	721	722	723	724	725	726	727	728	729	730	731	732	733	734	735	736	737	738	739	740	741	742	743	744	745	746	747	748	749	750	751	752	753	754	755	756	757	758	759	760	761	762	763	764	765	766	767	768	769	770	771	772	773	774	775	776	777	778	779	780	781	782	783	784	785	786	787	788	789	790	791	792	793	794	795	796	797	798	799	800	801	802	803	804	805	806	807	808	809	810	811	812	813	814	815	816	817	818	819	820	821	822	823	824	825	826	827	828	829	830	831	832	833	834	835	836	837	838	839	840	841	842	843	844	845	846	847	848	849	850	851	852	853	854	855	856	857	858	859	860	861	862	863	864	865	866	867	868	869	870	871	872	873	874	875	876	877	878	879	880	881	882	883	884	885	886	887	888	889	890	891	892	893	894	895	896	897	898	899	900	901	902	903	904	905	906	907	908	909	910	911	912	913	914	915	916	917	918	919	920	921	922	923	924	925	926	927	928	929	930	931	932	933	934	935	936	937	938	939	940	941	942	943	944	945	946	947	948	949	950	951	952	953	954	955	956	957	958	959	960	961	962	963	964	965	966	967	968	969	970	971	972	973	974	975	976	977	978	979	980	981	982	983	984	985	986	987	988	989	990	991	992	993	994	995	996	997	998	999	1000	1001	1002	1003	1004	1005	1006	1007	1008	1009	1010	1011	1012	1013	1014	1015	1016	1017	1018	1019	1020	1021	1022	1023	1024	1025	1026	1027	1028	1029	1030	1031	1032	1033	1034	1035	1036	1037	1038	1039	1040	1041	1042	1043	1044	1045	1046	1047	1048	1049	1050	1051	1052	1053	1054	1055	1056	1057	1058	1059	1060	1061	1062	1063	1064	1065	1066	1067	1068	1069	1070	1071	1072	1073	1074	1075	1076	1077	1078	1079	1080	1081	1082	1083	1084	1085	1086	1087	1088	1089	1090	1091	1092	1093	1094	1095	1096	1097	1098	1099	1100	1101	1102	1103	1104	1105	1106	1107	1108	1109	1110	1111	1112	1113	1114	1115	1116	1117	1118	1119	1120	1121	1122	1123	1124	1125	1126	1127	1128	1129	1130	1131	1132	1133	1134	1135	1136	1137	1138	1139	1140	1141	1142	1143	1144	1145	1146	1147	1148	1149	1150	1151	1152	1153	1154	1155	1156	1157	1158	1159	1160	1161	1162	1163	1164	1165	1166	1167	1168	1169	1170	1171	1172	1173	1174	1175	1176	1177	1178	1179	1180	1181	1182	1183	1184	1185	1186	1187	1188	1189	1190	1191	1192	1193	1194	1195	1196	1197	1198	1199	1200	1201	1202	1203	1204	1205	1206	1207	1208	1209	1210	1211	1212	1213	1214	1215	1216	1217	1218	1219	1220	1221	12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(1967 TO NOVEMBER 1973) SOURCE LIVED WITH HIS FAMILY NEAR THE PATHEE LAO MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN VIENTIANE. SOURCE STATED THAT ABOUT ONE KILOMETER SOUTH FROM THE BANGKOK HOUSE WHERE HE LIVED HE COULD SEE THE ENTRANCE OF A CAVE ON A TALL KARST MOUNTAIN. FROM THIS DISTANCE, SOURCE SAID HE FREQUENTLY SAW SEVERAL MEN WHOM HE BELIEVED TO BE FOREIGN PRISONERS NEAR THE MOUTH OF THE CAVE, USUALLY IN THE LATE AFTERNOON.

4. SOURCE STATED THAT HE FIRST NOTICED THE FOREIGN PRISONERS IN 1969 WHEN HE WAS 14 YEARS OLD. WHEN HE LEFT VIENTIANE IN NOVEMBER 1973, THEY WERE STILL THERE. SOURCE SAID HE SAW THEM NEAR ALMOST DAILY, AND GUESSED THEY WERE FOREIGNERS BECAUSE, EVEN FROM A DISTANCE OF ONE KILOMETER, THEY WERE NOTICEABLY TALLER THAN THEIR PATHEE LAO GUARDS. HE WAS NOT SURE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER, BUT USUALLY SAW FIVE OR SIX AT A TIME AT THE CAVE ENTRANCE. SOURCE STATED THAT THE CAVE WAS NARROW, AND WAS ABOUT HALFWAY UP THE TALL KARST. HE BELIEVED THE PRISONERS WERE ENGAGED IN EXCAVATING AND ENLARGING THE CAVE. HE USUALLY SAW THEM IN THE EVENINGS WHEN THEY WERE HANtering OUT LOOSE ROCK AND MOVING IT OVER THE EDGE. AT THE BASE OF THE KARST IS A LARGE QUANTITY OF LOOSE ROCK WHICH HAD BEEN REMOVED IN THE MAKING OF THE CAVE. THE CAVE ENTRANCE WAS ACCESSIBLE BY A NARROW DIRT ROAD WHICH RAN DOWN THE FACE OF THE KARST TO THE WEST. THERE WAS A GUARD POST AT THE END OF THE ACCESS ROAD.

5. SOURCE NEVER SAW ANY OF THE FOREIGNER PRISONERS CLOSE UP, AND NEVER HEARD ANYONE TALK ABOUT THEM. HE DESCRIBED A NORTH SOUTH ROAD WHICH IS LOCATED TO THE EAST OF THE CAVE, ALONG WHICH WAS SITUATED OTHER IMPORTANT PATHEE LAO FACILITIES INCLUDING THE HOME OF GENERAL

BT
NNNN
BT
TEXT
167-183
NNNN

CIRLAME

PAGE 0004

NSCRO 26 (PCEC) 050504/87 050505:48.2.5"
 ZCZC: 11:04:54Z (PC)
 EMT DTG: 87050606022983
 RTTUXTUN RUMELJCS9984: 1261005 -RUMALOX.
 EMT: 333333

R 061005Z MAY 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO: RUMALOX/CSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUMALOX/CSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUMALOX/AMCC FT KITCHEN MD
 RUMALOX/SAFE

R 00060941200 MAY 87
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUMALOX/CSA JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 INFO: RUMALOX/CSA JCRC BARBERS PT HI//33/33/336//
 RUMALOX/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//
 RUMALOX/JCS WASHDC//33/33/336//
 RUMALOX/SECDEF WASHDC//33/33/336//
 RUMALOX/SECSTATE WASHDC//33/33/336//
 RUMALOX/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUMALOX/AMCONSUL UDORN
 BT

EZ1:
 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 19984
 CITE:
 3274 MAY 87
 EZ2:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT 00167-18300, FOREIGN PRISONERS SEEN
 AFTER HIS FATHER'S DEATH, SOURCE WENT TO VIETNAM
 TO LIVE WITH RELATIVES UNTIL HE WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE
 FROM THE HATEFUL GOVERNMENT WHICH MURDERED HIS
 FATHER TO COME TO THAILAND.

TO: JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 JCRC BY LETTER, ASKING THAT HE MEET WITH HIM IN
 HATED REFUGEE CAMP. SOURCE OFFERED TO "WORK FOR"
 JCRC IF HE NEEDED ANYONE TO GO BACK INTO LAOS TO
 LOOK FOR INFORMATION. HE THANKED HIM FOR HIS
 INTEREST, BUT POLITELY REFUSED HIS OFFER. SOURCE
 DREW A ROUGH SKETCH-MAP OF THE VIENGKAY AREA WHICH
 WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC AND DIA/VO-PW.

DEC:DADE.
 BT
 /9984
 RUMAL
 E23
 TEXT
 187-183
 RUMAL



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
 LIAISON OFFICE
 AMERICAN EMBASSY
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: JCRC-LNB

13 May 1987

SUBJ: Lao Refugee

Couple

TO: Commander, JCRC

1. Please refer to our message, DTG 060941Z MAY 87, JCRC Rpt 787-183.
2. Enclosed for your information and analysis is the sketch map provided by Subject refugee and reported in cited message report.

Name

JCRC Liaison Officer

Atch:
 a/s

Copy to:
 DIA/VO-PW, w/atc

UNCLASSIFIED

ENVELOPE
 DESTINATION: RUEKJCS1538-22409411 - RUCALGX
 DATE: 11/05/82 AUG 88
 FROM: JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO: RUEADND/OCAS WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEBNA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEKAL/ARMC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEKJCS/SAFE
 R: 110930Z AUG 88
 FM: JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO: RUEADND/CSA JCRC BANGKOK TH
 INFO: RUEBNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//22/35/36//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO: 35//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-PH-RH//35//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA//35//
 RUEADND/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRRESS//
 RUEADND/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEADND/AMCONSUL UDORN
 PT
 CONTROLS

10W 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 41538

3378 AUG 88

***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****
 BODY
 INFO: JCRC RPT 788-433; HEARSAY OF AMERICAN PRISONER
 IN LAOS

REF: JCRC REX 0609412 MAY 87 (187-183)

1. SOURCE/ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

- A. NAME: *unclassified*
- B. ID DATA:
- C. DPOB: 1. *Source DMN*
- D. ADDRESS:
- E. PROFESSION: *SP*
- F. EDUCATION: *SP*
- G. LANGUAGES:
- H. STATUS: *SP*

WITH INFO

- I. DATE OF INFORMATION: JULY 1988
- J. INTERVIEWED ON: 4 AUG 88 BY *WJN/mef*
- K. MAP(S) USED: JOG NE 48-14; 50 SERIES SHEET
- 5942-2
- L. OTHER: *SP*

2. SUMMARY: SOURCE REPORTS HEARSAY OF AN AMERICAN WHO IS ALLEGEDLY LIVING UNDER LOOSE CONTROL WITH FOUR OTHER AMERICANS AT AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION IN LAOS. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SOURCE, WHICH HE INSISTS IS THE AMERICAN POW'S NAME AND IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS, WAS MORE LIKELY COPIED FROM AN AIRCRAFT ENGINE DATA PLATE. END SUMMARY.

3. INFORMATION: SOURCE STATED THAT ON 18 JULY 1988, MR. *unclassified* CAME TO VISIT HIM AT *unclassified* ALLEGEDLY INFORMED SOURCE THAT HE HAD THE NAME OF AN AMERICAN PRISONER WHO IS PRESENTLY ALIVE IN LAOS. HE ASKED SOURCE TO CHECK THE NAME AND IDENTIFICATION DATA WITH U.S. OFFICIALS AND GET BACK TO HIM WITH THE U.S. OFFICIAL'S DECISION ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. SOURCE PRODUCED A PHOTOGRAPH OF A HANDWRITTEN SHEET WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: *unclassified* LY COMING FROM *unclassified*

4. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, *unclassified* TOLD HIM THAT *unclassified* IS LIVING IN LAOS UNDER LOOSE OFFICIAL CONTROL. HE DID NOT TELL SOURCE THE SPECIFIC LOCATION WHERE *unclassified* IS LIVING OR ANY OTHER ASSOCIATED DETAILS; ONLY THAT THE IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION SHOULD BE CHECKED. SOURCE THEN MENTIONED, ALMOST AS AN ASIDE, THAT *unclassified* WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN BEING RESETTLED TO THE UNITED STATES, IMPLYING THAT *unclassified*'S CONTINUED COOPERATION MIGHT BE LINKED TO HIS RESETTLEMENT CHANCES.

5. SOURCE WENT ON TO ADD THAT IN ADDITION TO THE "IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION" PROVIDED ABOVE, HE ALSO SAW A SECOND SHEET OF PAPER WHICH HAD BEEN WRITTEN IN *unclassified*'S OWN HAND. ON THIS SECOND SHEET WAS A LARGE LETTER "L", TO THE RIGHT OF WHICH WERE SEVERAL BLANK LINES. AS SOURCE RECALLED, THE BOTTOM OF THE SHEET INCLUDED A WRITTEN NOTE, IN ENGLISH, INDICATING THE LOCATION WHERE MR. *unclassified* IS CURRENTLY LIVING. SOURCE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO COPY THE INFORMATION, NOR WAS HE GIVEN ENOUGH TIME TO EXAMINE IT CLOSELY. AFTER SHOWING SOURCE THESE TWO SHEETS, *unclassified* THEN ALLEGEDLY TOLD SOURCE THAT THERE WERE FOUR OTHER AMERICANS WHO WERE LIVING WITH MR. *unclassified*. *unclassified* SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH *unclassified* AND TRIED TO CONVINCE *unclassified* TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SOME TYPE OF EVIDENCE WHICH HE COULD BRING BACK TO SHOW TO U.S. OFFICIALS. *unclassified* THEN RESPONDED THAT IF *unclassified* COULD BRING BACK SOME PROOF OF HIS CONTACT WITH A U.S.

PAGE:0058

PAGE:0059

OFFICIAL, HE WOULD TRY TO ESCAPE TO RETURN TO FRIENDLY
CONTROL.

6. SOURCE STATED THAT IN
1978 ON 7/13

1978 ON 7/13
SOURCE CLAIMED THAT HE FIRST MET [REDACTED] IN

ONLY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM IMPROBABLY SINCE 1979.
ASKED IF SOURCE FELT THAT [REDACTED] WAS TRUSTWORTHY,
SOURCE RESPONDED THAT HE BELIEVED [REDACTED] TO BE "FAIRLY
RELIABLE".

8. COMMENT: SOURCE WAS REFERRED TO [REDACTED] BY THE

ADKSH
BY
#1538

SECRET

NOFORN

PAGE:0001

INQUIRE:DOCS
ITEM:MO-00720759
ENVELOPE
RTTSZTUF RUCZC56418 3120849-SSSS-RUEALGX
ZNY SSSSS

HEADLINE
R 070849Z NOV 88
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADND/OC3A WASHINGTON DC
RUEADIA/CSO WASHINGTON DC
RUEADIA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEADIC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEADIA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC
RUEADIC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEADIC/CMC DC WASHINGTON DC
RUEADIA/DINRASH/PT GEORGE G HEADS NO
RUEADIC/AFPC PT GEORGE G HEADS NO
RUEADIC/SAFE
R 070852Z NOV 88
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM NIA//
TO RUEADIC/OTA WASHINGTON DC//NO-PH/DAH/DAB-3//
INFO RUEADND/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR CHILDRESS//
RUEADIC/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/FM NIA//
RUEADIC/CS WASHDC//J5/OCJCS-FM NIA//
RUEADIA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
RUEADIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCG/HEL//
RUEADIA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUEADIA/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
RUEADIC/USDAO HONG KONG
BT

CONTROLS

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//FM-56418

SECRET NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0009 89.

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).

SUBJECT: IIR 6 024 0009 89/ALLEGED AMERICAN PRISONER
BEING HELD IN LAOS (S/WF).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRET

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SECRET

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PAGE:0002

DOI: (U) 881000.

REQS: (U) D-VOP-2430-04.

SOURCE: (C/WF) //OTS 024-0004-9//SOURCE IS AN
AMERICAN FORMER REFUGEE FROM LAOS WHO OBTAINED
INFORMATION BY LETTER FROM A FRIEND WHO IS A LAO
REFUGEE AND MEMBER OF THE LAO RESISTANCE OPERATING FROM
THE NAPHO REFUGEE CAMP.

SUMMARY: (C/WF) THIS IS A STORY BEACH REPORT. IT
REPORTS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ALLEGED PRESENCE OF
PETER ((SIJUMP)) IN LAOS. ENCLOSURES.

TEXT: 1. (C/WF) APPROXIMATELY 1 OCT 88 SOURCE
RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HIS FRIEND, ((SIJUMP))
WHO IS A LAO REFUGEE IN NAPHO REFUGEE CAMP, HAKKON
PHAWON, THAILAND. ((SIJUMP)) IS A REFUGEE NUMBER 15
C. ((SIJUMP)) IS A MEMBER OF THE LAO
RESISTANCE. ABOUT FOUR TIMES A YEAR HE ENTERS LAOS WITH
A RESISTANCE UNIT TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE LAO GOVERNMENT. ((SIJUMP)) ALLEGED THAT HE
RECENTLY TALKED WITH LIEUTENANT PETER SIJUMP AN
AMERICAN PW WHO IS BEING HELD IN CENTRAL LAOS.

2. (C/WF) ((SIJUMP)) CLAIMS THAT SIJUMP WROTE THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON A PAPER WHICH ((SIJUMP))
RECEIVED BACK TO THAILAND: QUOTE: NAME: MR. PETER
SIJUMP; DATE OF BIRTH: 1/4/1948; FATHER NAME: MR. PETER
PILLAR; MOTHER NAME: MRS. LINDEN LA PAUL; NICK
NAME & NICK NAME: PETER SIJUMP; NAME OF YOUR
HIGH SCHOOL: TEXAS HIGH SCHOOL; YEAR OF GRADUATION:
1966; NAME OF YOUR COLLEGE: TEXAS UNIVERSITY; YEAR
OF GRADUATION: 1969; MAJOR: SOUS LIEUTENANT;
MILITARY INFO: NAME: SOUS LIEUTENANT; SERIAL NUMBER:
120347; DATE DOWN: 3/4/1971; LOCATION: TYPE OF
AIRCRAFT: F-105; POSITION OF AIRCRAFT: 4000 FOOT;
LAST UNIT ASSIGNMENT: BATTLE ON ROAD NUMBER 12;
FLIGHT NUMBER: 134; TAIL NUMBER 0436; FLIGHT MEMBER:
2 PERSONS; FLIGHT COMMANDER: GEN VINCENT DOMANCO,
MR. PETER SIJUMP; YOUR SIGNATURE & DATE: YOUR
HANDWRITING: WROTE A LETTER TO LOVED ONE WITH SPECIAL
WORDS ONLY KNOWN TO SOMEONE IF SO, IF NO DESCRIBE
YOURSELF: USE CODE 99 ON THE RING; FINGERPRINT; LEFT
THUMB; RIGHT THUMB. UNQUOTE.

3. (C/WF) SOURCE SAID THAT ((SIJUMP)) CLAIMS THAT HIS
RESISTANCE GROUP CAN BRING PETER SIJUMP TO THAILAND.
SOURCE THOUGHT THAT ((SIJUMP)) AND HIS GROUP PROBABLY
WOULD WANT A REWARD FOR THE RESCUE OF SIJUMP. SOURCE
SAID THAT HE WOULD VISIT NAPHO DURING THE WEEK OF
24 OCT 88 AND ATTEMPT TO FIND OUT MORE DETAILS
CONCERNING SIJUMP.

4. (C/WF) SOURCE SHOWED A LETTER THAT HE HAD RECEIVED

SECRET

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SECRET

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PAGE:0003

FROM [REDACTED] WHICH ALLEGED THAT [REDACTED] WAS IN POSSESSION OF A DOCTAG AND SKULL OF A DEAD US SERVICEMAN. THE DOCTAG HAD THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN: GALE R. F., 2291088 D., USMC 3, BOLKNESS. THE LETTER ALSO CLAIMED THAT [REDACTED] HAS SEVEN TEETH AND A DOCTAG OF ANOTHER SERVICEMAN. THE DOCTAG CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING: REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT, 48 DA 1100941.

5. COMMENTS: (U)

A. (C/M) SOURCE CLAIMED HE WOULD RETURN WITH MORE DETAILS O/A 4 NOV 88. STORY BEACH WAS INFORMED BY JCRC LHO-BK RPT THAT SOURCE DID RETURN TO EMBASSY AND PROVIDED SOME ADDITIONAL DETAIL. JCRC REP RECEIVING THIS MATERIAL IS CURRENTLY TRYING TO VERIFY. WILL PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL DETAIL IN SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AFTER 14 NOV 88.

B. (S/M) SILENCE PROBABLY IS A MISHEARING OF SIJAN, LAUCE PETER, SSN 594-95-4876. SIJAN'S REMAINS WERE RECOVERED AS OF 23 APR 74.

//INFO: (U) PG 2430//
//CONSIDER: (U) 521 //

ADMIN

PRCT: (U) 6999-10.

INSTR: (U) US: NO.

PREP: (U) TH-02.

ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW. TWO ENCLOSURES

1. PERSONAL DATA SHEETS (U), 1 PG, 1 CT (U)

2. LETTERS PHIOU (U), 4 PGS, 1 CT, 1M-LM (U)

ACQ: (U) THAILAND (801029)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DECL:OADR

BT

#6418

NOFORN

SECRET

NOFORN

PAGE:0018

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGY256 MCN = 88323/22073 TOR = 883231449

RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS8429 3231450

--RUEALGX.

ZNY

HEADER

R 181450Z NOV 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAABA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAABA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEAABA/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEAABA/ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD

RUEADADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEBHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAAMC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/DIIRISA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUECQAR/USCINCPAC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEAIIA/AFPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 181445Z NOV 88

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEBHPA/COR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO RUEBHPA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//

RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//NO-PH//

RUEKJCS/JCS VASBDC//OCJCS-PH-MIA/J5//

RUEKJCS/SACDEF VASBDC//OASD-ISA/PN-MIA//

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE VASBDC//NSC//

RUEAIIA/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUEAIIA/AMCONSUL UDORN

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 58429

1 3537 NOV 88

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: JCRC RPT T88-600; HEARSAY OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN SOUTHERN LAOS

REF: A. USDAO/PN-MIA 070832Z NOV 88; (IIR 6 024 0009 89)

- B. JCRC BKK 110935Z AUG 88 (T88-433)

- C. JCRC BKK 060941Z MAY 87 (T87-183)

1. SOURCE/ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:

- A. NAME: *Source* (H)
- B. ID DATA:
- C. DPOB: *Source DATA*
- D. ADDRESS:

- E. PROFESSION: SC
- F. EDUCATION: SC
- G. LANGUAGES: SC
- H. STATUS: ALLEGEDLY HAS MOVED OUT OF SC

THAILAND

- I. DATE OF INFORMATION: 23 SEP 88
- J. INTERVIEWED ON 1 NOV 88 BY

- K. MAP REF: N/A
- L. OTHER: SC

2. SUMMARY: SOURCE PROVIDES ALLEGED HEARSAY OF THREE AMERICAN PRISONERS BEING HELD IN LAOS. HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE LOCATION DETAILS OR ANY SPECIFICS ABOUT THE AMERICANS. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH A NAME IN AN EFFORT TO SECURE THE AMERICANS' RETURN. SOURCE PROVIDED A COPY OF TWO PHOTOS SHOWING THREE CAUCASIAN MEN DRESSED IN FLIGHT SUITS WITH THEIR HANDS HELD IN THE AIR. THE PHOTOS APPEAR TO BE TAKEN AT THE TIME OF CAPTURE. END SUMMARY.

- 3. INFORMATION: ON 1 NOV 88 SOURCE, IN THE COMPANY OF SC

- TO ALL MY COMRADES FROM I LOVE AND WHO ARE INVOLVED WITH THE PRISONER ISSUE:
IF YOU WANT THE NAME AND COMPLETE HISTORY OF THESE PRISONERS, WE DON'T ASK FOR MUCH. WE NEED 1,8000 KIP (SIC) IN LAO MONEY. PART MUST BE THAI MONEY, BUT WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH BECAUSE WE WILL ARRANGE A DINNER TO SEND OFF THE BOSS WHO WILL RETURN TO TAKE UP HIS NEW DUTIES IN VIETNAM. THEN IT WILL BE EASY FOR US TO ARRANGE FOR THE PEOPLE YOU SPECIFY TO MEET WITH US. SPECIFICALLY, THE PERSON WHO DELIVERED THESE PICTURES AND LETTERS; THAT IS COMRADE NAME ASIDE FROM HIM, THERE IS NO ELSE WE TRUST.
- WRITTEN BY: Name

4. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE LETTER, SOURCE PROVIDED JCRC REP WITH A PHOTOCOPY OF TWO PHOTOGRAPHS. THE FIRST PHOTOGRAPH SHOWS TWO CAUCASIAN MEN, ONE DRESSED IN A FLIGHT SUIT, AND THE OTHER IN FATIGUES STANDING NEXT TO A SMALL HELICOPTER WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE LANDED IN A CLEARING SURROUNDED BY TREES. ON THE TAIL BOOM OF THE HELICOPTER APPEAR THE LETTERS "U.S.A...", WITH THE "A" BEING ONLY PARTIALLY VISIBLE AT THE RIGHT BORDER OF THE PHOTOGRAPH. BENEATH THE PHOTOGRAPH IS HANDWRITING IN LAO WHICH SOURCE STATED IS THE PHOTOCOPY OF THE REVERSE OF THE PHOTOGRAPH. THE

HANDWRITING IS MOSTLY ILLEGIBLE. FROM WHAT JCRC REP CAN MAKE OUT, IT READS IN PART: "HELICOPTER... ILLEG... COMRADE BILLY... ILLEG... COMRADE... ILLEG... CAPTURED ON 19-ILLEG-71 AT LAN SEUN BATTLE 719 (ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE)." THE SECOND PHOTOGRAPH SHOWS A CAUCASIAN MALE WITH A MUSTACHE, WEARING DARK TROUSERS, A DARK LONG SLEEVE SHIRT WHICH IS UNBUTTONED, EXPOSING A WHITE T-SHIRT BENEATH. THE MAN HAS HIS HANDS HELD ABOVE HIS HEAD, AND APPEARS TO BE STANDING IN DEEP WATER BESIDE WHAT APPEARS TO BE SCRAP METAL OR WRECKAGE. THERE IS A LIGHT STRIP, POSSIBLY A NAME TAG, ABOVE HIS RIGHT BREAST POCKET, BUT THE WRITING IS NOT LEGIBLE. SOURCE WOULD NOT REVEAL WHERE THE COPY OF THE PHOTOS WAS OBTAINED, BUT ONLY INTIMATED THAT THEY WERE RELATED

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
TO HIS EFFORTS TO LOCATE AMERICAN PRISONERS. THE LAO HANDWRITING BELOW THE PHOTO SAYS: "COMRADE NAME -105 PILOT SHOT DOWN AND CAPTURED ON 6-12-71 AT SAN HAPONG, HUANG PHIN, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE; 13-12-1971 (ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE, SAME AS IN FIRST PHOTO)."

5. SOURCE STATED THAT HE PLANNED TO MEET WITH THE AUTHOR OF THE LETTER IN LAOS ON 10 NOVEMBER. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAS INFORMATION THAT THERE ARE THREE AMERICANS UNDER CONTROL OF NAME

BUT HE IS RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS UNTIL HE CONTACTS THONGPHAN IN PERSON. SOURCE STATED THAT HIS OBJECTIVE IN TRYING TO ASSIST IN LOCATING AMERICAN PRISONERS IS THAT HE AND HIS WIFE DO NOT WISH TO BE RESETTLED TO A THIRD COUNTRY, BUT RATHER PREFER TO RETURN TO A FREE LAOS. HE BELIEVES THAT IF HE IS SUCCESSFUL IN PROVING THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT IS STILL HOLDING AMERICAN PRISONERS IT COULD LEAD TO CONDITIONS MORE FAVORABLE TO HIS RETURN.

6. COMMENT: SOURCE CAME TO

NOFORN

CAMP. MR. NAME PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:

A COPY OF THE LETTER PROVIDED BY SOURCE AND THE
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE TWO PHOTOGRAPHS WILL BE FORWARDED TO
HQ JCRC AND DIA/VO-PH.

IN REF B, SOURCE PROVIDED INFORMATION COPIED
OFF OF AN AIRCRAFT DATA PLATE WHICH HE INSISTED WAS THE
NAME (LY CONDO) AND IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS OF A LIVE
AMERICAN PRISONER. IN REF C, SOURCE REPORTED SEEING
SEVERAL FOREIGN PRISONERS BETWEEN 1969 AND 1973 NEAR A
CAVE IN VIENGXAY, LAOS. DECL.

ADMIN
BT

#8429

NNNN

SECRET

NOFORN

SECRET

01 171932Z JAN 87 RR SSSS S

DIA WASHINGTON DC//VP-PH//

USDAO BANGKOK TH//PH-HIA//

INFO JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CPR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

NSC WASHINGTON DC

SECRET NOFORN

NSC FOR RICHARD CHILDRESS

S/NF-DDI7/VP-PH

SUBJECT: SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENT (U)

REF: JCRC LIAISON REPORT T87-383, 060741Z MAY 87, SUBJECT:

FOREIGN PRISONERS SEEN IN VIENGXAY CAVE IN NOV. 73 (S/NF)

1. (C) IN REPLY CITE: S-VOP-05237. SOURCE

TITLE: PH/HIA INFORMATION (U). COUNTRY: LA.

OBJECTIVE: PG2430.

2. (S/NF) BACKGROUND:

A. LAO REFUGEE ~~Source~~ LOCATED AT NAPHO CAMP.
187/20 WHEN HE WAS INTERVIEWED IN APRIL 1987, CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN
FIVE OR SIX PRISONERS, WHOM HE BELIEVED TO BE FOREIGNERS, WORKING
AT A CAVE ON THE SIDE OF A KARST IN VIENGXAY AS LATE AS NOVEMBER
1973. ~~Source~~ CLAIMS THAT HE OBSERVED THE POSSIBLE FOREIGN
DIA/WHIC/DC-4A/VP/VP-PH/DAH-3/DAH-3/DAH

GRAY/VP-PH/SOSOL/PTG

USA-VP-PH/CHF

SECRET

Name

6434

SECRET

02 RR SSSS

PRISONERS DURING THE PERIOD 1969 - NOVEMBER 1973, WHEN HE LIVED WITH HIS FAMILY ABOUT A KILOMETER AWAY TO THE NORTH, DESCRIBED AS NORTH OF THE CAVE NEAR THE PARTY PROPAGANDA BUREAU AND THE BUREAU'S BROADCASTING STATION AT THE BASE OF PHOU KHE MOUNTAIN.

B. ~~Source~~ DID PROVIDE A SKETCH MAP OF THE VIENGSAI AREA WHICH SHOWS THE LOCATIONS OF HOMES/CAVES OF HIGH-RANKING PATHET LAO, AS WELL AS POLICE HQS AND THE BROADCAST STATION. ON THE SKETCH,

~~Source~~'S NORTH ARROW IS ACTUALLY POINTING TO THE SOUTH, WHICH WOULD PUT HIS HOUSE ADJACENT PHOU KHE, WITH VIENGSAI BEING DUE NORTH FROM HIS HOME. FROM PHOU KHE ~~Source~~ WOULD HAVE HAD EASY ACCESS TO THE MAIN ROADS THROUGH THE AREA, AS WELL AS TO THE KARST AREA WHERE THE PRISONERS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE WORKING.

C. INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE ~~Source~~'S SIGHTING WAS THAT THE REPORT WAS A FABRICATION ON HIS PART; HOWEVER, FEEL THAT FURTHER INTERVIEW OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IS IN ORDER. ~~Source~~ IS ALSO THE SOURCE OF TWO OTHER REPORTS TO JCRC LIAISON: T88-433, AUGUST 88 AND T88-600, NOVEMBER 88, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OF A HEARSAY NATURE. IT'S INTERESTING THAT IN JCRC REPORT T88-433 ~~Source~~ HAS INFORMATION THAT MR. ~~Source~~ (AKA ~~Source~~) IS

SECRET

03 RR SSSS

AN AMERICAN PRISONER IN LAOS, ALTHOUGH ~~Source~~ IS PROBABLY SINCERE IN HIS OFFER TO HELP LOOK FOR PW INFORMATION, THE AUGUST 88 REPORT MAY BE A GOOD INDICATION AS TO ACCURACY OF HIS OTHER REPORTING, ESPECIALLY THE INITIAL FIRSTHAND LIVE SIGHTING REPORT OF APRIL 87.

3. (S/NP) REQUIREMENTS:

TEAR LINE-----TEAR LINE-----TEAR LINE
REQUEST FURTHER INTERVIEW OF LAO REFUGEE SOURCE ~~Source~~

WITH REGARD TO THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF INTEREST.

A. PLEASE TRY TO PINPOINT LOCATION OF ~~Source~~'S HOME IN VIENGSAI. LOOKING AT MAP SHEET 589 IV, SERIES 17015, AND ASSUMING THAT ~~Source~~ LIVED AT THE BASE OF PHOU KHE, HE PROBABLY COULD NOT HAVE SEEN THE KARST AS DESCRIBED SINCE THE LOCATION OF SEVERAL OTHER KARSTS NEARER PHOU KHE WOULD HAVE OBSTRUCTED HIS VIEW INTO VIENGSAI. IF YOU ARE ABLE TO PINPOINT THE LOCATION OF HIS HOME, AND IF INDEED HIS VIEW WOULD HAVE BEEN OBSTRUCTED, INFORM ~~Source~~ OF THIS FACT AND ASK FOR HIS REACTION.

B. WAS ~~Source~~ ABLE TO TRAVEL INTO VIENGSAI FROM HIS HOME NEARBY? HOW OFTEN DID HE DO SO? HOW CLOSE DID HE COME TO THE

SECRET

04 RR SSSS

KARST AND CAVE WHERE THE FOREIGN PRISONERS WERE LOCATED?

C. ASSUMING *Souder* WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL NEAR THE KARST IN

QUESTION, WHAT DID HE OBSERVE, I.E., WAS THE NARROW DIRT ROAD UP TO THE CAVE ON THE SIDE OF THE KARST OPEN TO TRAVEL BY ANYONE? WERE THERE CHECKPOINTS? EVIDENTS WHAT SIZE VEHICLE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TRAVEL THE ROAD, IF ANY?

D. WHICH AREAS OF VIENGSAI WERE DENIED, RESTRICTED, OR OFF LIMITS TO NORMAL TRAVEL TO *Souder* AND HIS FAMILY?

E. ON THE SKETCH MAP PROVIDED *Souder* WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE HOMES OF SEVERAL PATHET LAO PERSONS IN VIENGSAI AS WELL AS OTHER FACILITIES. HOW DID HE OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION? RECOMMEND THAT *Souder* BE ASKED AGAIN TO SKETCH THE VIENGSAI AREA, AND TO INCLUDE THE LOCATION OF HIS HOME.

F. DURING THE PERIOD 1969 - 1973 WHEN *Souder* LIVED NEAR VIENGSAI, WAS THE AREA EVER SUBJECTED TO BOMBING? WHAT WERE THE BOMBING TARGETS IN THE AREA? DID ANY OF THE KARST CAVES THROUGHOUT THE AREA APPEAR TO BE TARGETS FOR BOMBING?

G. WITH REGARD TO THE FOREIGN PRISONERS, HOW WERE THEY DRESSED AS THEY WORKED AT THE CAVE? WERE THEY WEARING ANY TYPE ARM OR LEG

SECRET

05 RR SSSS

RESTRAINTS, WERE THE PRISONERS UNDER GUARDS? HOW MANY GUARDS WERE EVIDENTS? WERE THE GUARDS PATHET LAO OR VIETNAMESE?

H. DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE ALLEGED SIGHTING, 1969 - 1973, WAS THE SOLE LABOR ACTIVITY OF THE PRISONERS DEVOTED TO THE SINGLE CAVE ON THE SIDE OF THE KARST? HOW MANY PRISONERS TOTAL DID

Souder OBSERVE WORKING ON THE CAVE? WHAT WERE THE NATIONALITIES OF THE OTHER PRISONERS OBSERVED?

I. *Souder* STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE PRISONERS WERE FOREIGN. WHY WAS THIS ASSUMPTION BASED UPON THEIR HEIGHT ALONE? DID THE FOREIGNERS WORK HARD LABOR ALONG WITH OTHERS AT THE CAVE, OR COULD THEY HAVE BEEN SUPERVISORS?

J. *Souder* STATES THAT THE FOREIGNERS WERE PRISONERS. WHAT IS THIS CLAIM BASED UPON? COULD THESE WORKERS HAVE BEEN OTHER THAN PRISONERS?

K. DOES *Souder* MAINTAIN THAT HE OBSERVED FOREIGN PRISONERS AT VIENGSAI DURING THE PERIOD 1969 - 1973?

L. WOULD *Souder* SUBMIT TO POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO THE SIGHTING INFORMATION, IF REQUESTED IN THE FUTURE?

SECRET

SECRET

DL RR SSSS

TEAR LINE - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - TEAR LINE

4. (C) GUIDANCE:

A. THIS REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, THEIR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES AND/OR OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS. DISCREET USE OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE MADE BY COLLECTORS IN CONTACT WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS ONLY AS PRESCRIBED IN DIAH 58-33, VOL I, CHAPTER 3, PARA 8.B.

B. REQUEST ALL RESPONSES TO THIS REQUIREMENT BE PREPARED IN MESSAGE FORMAT AND FORWARDED TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VP-PW//, WITH INFO FOR CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI AND JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH. ORIGINALS OR LEGIBLE PHOTOCOPIES OF ALL SKETCHES, DOCUMENTS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC. (EXCEPT HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS) SHOULD BE SENT VIA REGISTERED MAIL DIRECTLY TO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ATTN: VP-PW, ROOM 2E23D, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5370. IF HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS ARE RECEIVED, ADDRESSEES SHOULD SUBMIT AN IIR TO THAT EFFECT AND TRANSMIT AN ELECTRICAL MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI REQUESTING DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

C. IAW DOD POLICY, RESPONSES TO THIS REQUIREMENT WILL BE

SECRET

07 07 RR SSSS

CLASSIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM, SECRET.

(2) CRASH OR GRAVESITE REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM,

CONFIDENTIAL.

(3) ALL OTHER PW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION (E.G., INFORMATION REGARDING REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, INCLUDING DOG TAGS, DETENTION CAMPS, ETC.): CONSISTENT WITH POLICY CONCERNING SOURCES, METHODS OF COLLECTION, AND CONTENT.

3. ORIGINATOR'S CONTROL NUMBER IS S-VOP-87004. POC IS

(NAME / DOG

SE KY-3 THE PENTAGON DPOF

DECL 8ADR

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

WFOFM

PAGE:0030

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LKX699 MCN = 89080/14221 TOR = 890800926

KEYCIVON RUEKJCS3817 0800915-CCCC--RUEALGX

ZNY CCCCC

READES

R 210915Z MAR 89

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

R 210921Z MAR 89

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//

BT

CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL BANGKOK TH//PW- 13817

CONFIDENTIAL WFOFM 58-0220 MAR 89

BODY

SUBJECT: SOURCE RETURNS TO LAOS (U)

REF: S-VOP-05237, DTG 171932Z JAN 89

(C/REF) IN MAR 89, THE SECTION LEADER OF SOURCE'S
ASSIGNED QUARTERS AT NA PRO CAMP STATED THAT SOURCE
RETURNED TO LAOS TO LIVE PERMANENTLY IN DECEMBER
1988. SOURCE MOVED AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND

WITHOUT USING OFFICIAL CHANNELS FOR REPATRIATION.
TH-13 WILL CONTINUE INQUIRING AT EACH VISIT TO NA

PRO.

ADMIN

DECL:QADR

BT

#3817

NARN

CONFIDENTIAL

WFOFM

SECRET

IAC

REVIEW
PANEL

25 JULY 1989

OPR: DIA/PW-MIA
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

SECRET

SECRET

SOURCE NAME: 59466 CASE# 06434
 ALIAS: (U: ADD166310) DATE CASE CREATED: 27 MAR 89
 SIGHTING SUMMARY: JCRCL T87-138 RPT, Foreign Prisoners Seen in Viengsay Cave in
November 1973. (S/NF)
 PRIMARY ANALYST: AWA LYST SECONDARY:

TAB	DOCUMENT(S)	DATE	COMMENTS
1	Background Reference Material		Background reference material on the following message: <u>The 8-02-0000-88 MSG 070832Z NOV 88</u> <u>DAOIC</u>
2	JCRCL T87-183 MSG TO CJCRC	060941Z MAY 87	POW-PHI Source provided firsthand information concerning several prisoners who he believed to be foreigners at the mouth of a prison cave in Viengsay, Moungphan Province, Laos in November 1973.
3	DIA EVAL RPT	16 JAN 88	DIA Evaluation on PW/MIA information provided by Lao Refuges. Level 4. Source did not make his sighting as described. (Fabrication).
4	JCRCL T88-433 MSG TO CJCRC	110935Z AUG 88	POW-HSY Source provided hearsay information concerning an American who is allegedly living under loose control with four other Americans at an unidentified location in Laos. Source mentioned the name and identification numbers, was more likely copied from an aircraft engine data plate.
5	JCRCL T88-800 MSG TO CJCRC	181445Z NOV 88	POW-HSY Source provided hearsay information concerning three American prisoners being held in Laos. Source would not provide location details or any specifics about the Americans. Source also provided a copy of two photos showing three Caucasian men dressed in flight suits.
5	PW-MIA MSG TO DAO BIC	171932Z JAN 89	Source Directed Requirement (S-YOP-05257). Requests reinterview and clarification of source's story.

SECRET

SECRET

CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE: #2

SOURCE NAME: _____ CASE# _____

TAB	DOCUMENT(S)	DATE	COMMENTS
7	STONY BEACH MSG to PW/MIA	210921Z Mar 88	Source Returns to Laos. Source returned to Laos to live permanently in December 1988.
8	CJCRC MSG to JCRCL	192200Z May 87	Evaluation of Rot T87-183. Information provided by source is too limited to permit correlation to data in JCRCL files.
9	DIA EVAL RPT	Jul 88	DIA Evaluation of Information Provided by Lao Refuges. Level 4. (06434).

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE:0014

ENVELOPE

CDN = L01868 MCN = 89203/06915 TOR = 892030415
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS0257 2030413-0000--RUEALGI.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADLINE

R 220413Z JUL 89

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGI/SAFE

R 191812Z JUL 89

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO RUEHBT/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

INFO RUEHCSA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/J5//

RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS//NO3A60//

BODY

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT T88-433

A. JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 110935Z AUG 88

1. INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SOURCE OF
 REF A, REVEALS NO CORRELATION TO DATA IN JCRC FILES. THIS IS NOT A
 FINAL EVALUATION.

EVAL - WFK.

ADMIN

BT

#0257

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
 PROVIDED BY LAO REFUGEE
 (0434)

SUMMARY: A Lao refugee reports observing foreign prisoners in Viengsay, Houa Phan Province, during the period 1969-1973.

DETAILS: Lao refugee *Small* has reported that during the period 1969-November 1973, when he was in his teens and living near Viengsay, he observed several foreign prisoners working on a karst a kilometer away. *Small* never got closer to the group than a kilometer, and surmised that the prisoners were foreign because of their size; at no time did *Small* claim that the prisoners were American.

ANALYSIS: Three Americans are known to have been held at Viengsay in the past. United States Air Force pilots Shelton and Hrdklica were captured near Viengsay in 1969, and probably survived in captivity through 1968. In May 1973 American civilian pilot Emmet Kay was captured and moved into Viengsay and held until his release in 1974. Kay was held at Viengsay during a portion of the time mentioned by *Small*, and Kay knew of no other Americans being held at Viengsay. Of the nine Americans captured in Laos and moved to Hanoi for detention and eventual release in 1973, none were ever moved into or through the Viengsay area. There is some doubt as to exactly where *Small* lived in the Viengsay area, i.e. he says the karst was south of his home when it is actually north, and the north arrow on a sketch he provided is pointing south. Nevertheless, the area is extremely rough, with huge karsts and tall mountains and trees, and it is doubtful that he could have observed a distant karst as claimed from any point in Viengsay. Of the large volume of past reporting with regard to Viengsay, indications are that prisoners were held in the large caves, practically underground, and that they did not work hard labor.

EVALUATION: Extensive imagery analysis of Viengsay has indicated that the area of the karst as identified by *Small* is actually a small hill, not a karst. Attempts to reinterview *Small* about this claimed live sighting have failed and in March 1989 it was learned that *Small* had returned to Laos in December 1988 to live permanently. *Small* described the prisoners as foreign because of their size; besides Shelton, Hrdklica, and Kay, Chinese prisoners are believed to have been held at Viengsay and may account for the sighting. The absence of Americans at Viengsay during the period 1969-1972 would indicate that if *Small* did indeed see prisoners at Viengsay, they were not American; it should be noted that at no time did *Small* claim that the prisoners were American.

DATE OF EVALUATION: July 1989.

PW-MIA CATEGORY: Nationality Undetermined; not U.S.

CLASSIFIED BY: PW-MIA

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

SECRET
 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

**DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY LAO REFUGEE**

Source: 1 (6434)

SUMMARY: A Lao refugee reports observing foreign prisoners in Viengsay, Houa Phan Province, during the period 1969-1973.

DETAILS: Lao refugee Source has reported that during the period 1969-November 1973, when he was in his teens and living near Viengsay, he observed several foreign prisoners working on a karst a kilometer away. Source never got closer to the group than a kilometer and surmised that the prisoners were foreign because of their size; at no time did Source claim that the prisoners were American.

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DATE OF EVALUATION: July 1989

FN-NIA CATEGORY: Nationality Undetermined; not U.S.

HISY 18 PWIS 1987

Source, ~~claiming~~ claiming to be a general in the Sao Phi Sao resistance reported to American held in Laos. An offer to return 2 prisoners in exchange for assistance to the resistance was declined.

NAME: SC ID 4 2 50
 VA 32 SD: STONY BEACH CONFIDENTIALITY
 DAT NUMBER 20 CONTACTED 32
 NTRY LOCATED 23 TH STATE/CITY 18
 NTRY REPORTED 10 CA
 VPE SIGHTING 42 PCU-HRY (HYP) 12
 ST SIGHTING 42 11
 UNSOURCES 27 8
 ACTIONS 8: 870910 DAOB 17-13 1143572
 870917 STONY 1700871 810
 870928 VO PH 2921361
 870910 STONY 15460240141-87
 CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 35
 REMARKS 36 FOLDED 63 PW'S SAN NEUA PROV ANALYST 13: AN
 DATE RECEIVED 8 870914 DATE OF INFO 35 87
 ACT DATE 38 ADDRESS 25
 ORIGIN CODE 17: A
 POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 33: 06 NON-PRISONER
 POLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

0.831105

NO FURTHER DISSEM
OR REPRO. REL
PER DAM ONLY

OJCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTER

COPT NUMBER--

ROUTING
8 170057Z SEP 87
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH/PP-RIA//
TO : DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-P4//
TO : USDAO BANGKOK TH/PP-RIA//

OUT OF SCOUTING UNIT. SUBJECT INTRODUCED
SUBJECT TO *NAME* AT *NAME*.
APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS. AFTER THAT, HE TO
CIVIL. PERSONNEL, ARMY CONTROLLING
THAILAND THROUGHOUT THAILAND. *NAME* *NAME*
THE *DATA* OF THIS
INFORMATION. NO KILL *DATA*.
DATA. SUBJECT CLAIMS THAT
HE *NAME* PERSONAL HISTORY AND POINT OF
CONTACT WITH SOURCE IS OUT OF BANGKOK. *NAME*
PERSONAL HISTORY. *DATA*.
DATA (CONVICT: DURING THIS PERIOD
THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL MATTERS.
ALSO, SOURCE CLAIMS HE *NAME* INVOLVED
IN THE SUBJECT (PT)).
14. COMMENTS: A. SOURCE PROVIDED
INFORMATION REPORTED IN J2C 8 041 041 07.
15. ALTHOUGH THE PHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OF THIS RESUME ARE UNCLASSIFIED, AN MODERATE
"T" RISK TO THE SECURITY OF US MILITARY
INTERESTS AND INFO.

CITE 02 OF BE BANGKOK TH/PP-RIA//

DELIVER TO
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

THIS IS A STORY BEACH MESSAGE

SUBJECT: STORY BEACH RESISTANCE REPORT RE: SC

1. SC

2. *NAME* SC

3. *NAME* SC

4. *NAME* SC

5. *NAME* SC

6. *NAME* SC

7. *NAME* SC

8. *NAME* SC

9. *NAME* SC

10. *NAME* SC

11. *NAME* SC

12. *NAME* SC

13. *NAME* SC

14. *NAME* SC

15. *NAME* SC

16. *NAME* SC

17. *NAME* SC

18. *NAME* SC

19. *NAME* SC

20. *NAME* SC

21. *NAME* SC

22. *NAME* SC

23. *NAME* SC

24. *NAME* SC

25. *NAME* SC

26. *NAME* SC

27. *NAME* SC

OJCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTER

ZYUW RUEKJCS6399 2722126

PRIORITY
P 292126Z SEP 87
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-P4//
TO : USDAO BANGKOK TH/PP-RIA//

COMMUNICATION

ONLY

-1272/VO-PW

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND: SC

REF: USDAO BANGKOK 170057Z SEP 87.

1. REF MSG FORWARDED BACKGROUND ON SC

SC. NR. SC BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES ARE HIGHLY

SUSPICIOUS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. SC HAS STATED TO HAVE BEEN A "BEHIND THE SCENES"
GENERAL AND A LEADER OF LAO RESISTANCE GROUP. NR. SC IS NOT
KNOWN TO BE EITHER.

B. SC HAS STATED HE IS VERY CLOSE TO *NAME*

KNOWN TO BE RESIDING IN *DATA* IN THAILAND. IS INDEED IN HIS 80S, AND

DATA OF VOLUNTEER BATTALION *DATA* BASED IN

DATA PROVINCE AND NUMBERING APPROXIMATELY 500 MEN.

REPORTEDLY, HIS MAIN AVOCATION WAS SMUGGLING, PURCHASING MILITARY

UNIFORMS IN THAILAND, INSURING THEIR TRANSPORT ACROSS *DATA*

PROVINCE AND SALE TO THE "PATHEE" LAO. HE ALSO REPORTEDLY PURCHASED

FUEL IN THAILAND WHICH HE SOLD TO NVA FORCES IN LAOS. HE WAS

PRIMARILY ALLIED WITH FORMER ROYAL LAO ARMY GENERAL *NAME*

NAME COMMANDER OF *DATA* UNTIL HIS ELEVATION AS *DATA* ARMY

DATA IN THE FALL OF 1971. AT THAT TIME *NAME* LOST BV

BUT WAS PERMITTED TO ORGANIZE A 300 MAN MILITIA UNIT. HIS

SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES CONTINUED FROM 1971 UNTIL 1975.

C. SC STATES HE THINKS VERY LITTLE OF *NAME* AND *NAME*

NAME RESIDENT OF THAILAND. IS REPORTEDLY CLOSELY

ASSOCIATED WITH ROYAL THAI MILITARY, PARTICULARLY ONE UNKNOWN THAI

GENERAL GRADE OFFICER. PRIOR TO 1975 *NAME* WAS REPORTEDLY

ASSOCIATED WITH *NAME* PERSONNEL AT *DATA*. OVER THE LAST

SEVERAL YEARS *NAME* HAS ROUTINELY VISITED FORMER ROYAL ARMY

PERSONNEL FROM REGION 4 AFTER THEIR FLIGHT TO *DATA* AND HAS

ASKED FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF HIS "RESISTANCE" GROUP WHICH MAY INCLUDE

LITTLE MORE THAN *NAME* *NAME* HAS OFTEN STATED HE WANTS TO

"CLEAR" THE *DATA* *NAME* IS ASKING FORMER LAO ARMY OFFICERS

FROM SOUTH LAOS TO HELP HIM IN THAT EFFORT. ON ONE OCCASION,

FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE NAVY ADMIRAL *NAME* REPORTEDLY PAID

A COURTESY CALL ON *NAME* AT A TIME WHEN *NAME* RESISTANCE FORCES

WERE TO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN SOUTH LAOS AND WHEN BEING SUPPORTED BY

THE KHMER ROUGE. THIS VISIT WAS BY VIRTUE OF *NAME* BEING

SOMEWHAT OF THE *NAME* PATRIARCH SINCE THE DEATH OF PRINCE

NAME

D. *NAME* ALSO ADVANCED IN YEARS, FORMERLY WORKED CLOSELY

WITH GENERAL *NAME* AND WAS ASSOCIATED WITH *NAME* PERSONNEL

AT *DATA*. *NAME* PRIMARY ENDEAVOR APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN HIS

INVOLVEMENT IN A PURCHASING CORPORATION AT *DATA*.

2. TO SUMMARIZE, SC APPEARS LINKED TO AN INDIVIDUAL

WHOSE BACKGROUND IS SOMEWHAT SUSPECT. HIS MOTIVES ARE UNCLEAR BUT, IN

LIGHT OF HIS LACK OF CANDOR ON HIS BACKGROUND, WE SUSPECT THE

PURPOSE OF HIS CONTACTS IS OTHER THAN THEY APPEAR. RECOMMEND YOU

CHECK ON THE SUBJECT WITH THE LOCAL *NAME* WHICH MAY HAVE MORE

BACKGROUND ON HIS ASSOCIATIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

3. POC IN DIA/VO-PW IS *NAME*

4. ACTION DIA/SPEC(B) (M,C)

MCN=87272/07286 TOR=87272/2126Z TAD=87272/2130Z COSM=MIASOS

PAGE 1 OF 1
292126Z SEP 87

MCN=87280/00058 TOR=87280/01012 TAD=87280/01142 COSM=MIASOS

PAGE 1 OF 1
170057Z SEP 87
00 0001 000

C/LOCATE FOR NAME

PAGE 01

MSGNO 76 (PCIX) 09/10/87* 01:06:26.21*
 ZCZC 06:05:21Z (PC)
 EMI DTG : 87091000335106
 RTTSZUN RUEKJCS9536 2*01550 ---RUEALCA
 ZNY
 1 1004900 SEP 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANAA/CHO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEDADA/AFIS AMES BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEABQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//KX000/10X1//
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHCC/CHC DC WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACAC/CHC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEDBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUETIAO/MFC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 1 00100357Z SEP 87
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW/MIA TEAM//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH/DAM//
 INFO RUEADND/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NR CHILDRESS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA-PH-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC//J5/OJCS-PH-MIA//
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUETIAA/CTA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCSA/KIL//
 RUHQHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEKHL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEKHL/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEKHL/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEKHL/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT
 EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//PW/ 39536

EZ2:
 THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
 SERIAL: 1 IIR 006 024 0141 8700
 COUNTRY: 1 LAOS (LA)
 SUBJ: 1 006 024 0141 87/6800 AMERICAN PWs IN LAOS
 WARNING: 1 THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY
 EVALUATED INTEL
 DOI: 1 870900
 REQs: 1 D-70P-43468
 SOURCE: 1 //SEA 50 / - ETHNIC LAO RESIDENT
 OF 50 SOURCE CLAIMS TO BE A FORMER LAO
 50 NOW LEADING A RESISTANCE GROUP OPERATING IN
 XIANG KHUANG PROVINCE AND THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN LAOS.
 HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

C/LOCATE FOR NAME

PAGE 02

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. IT
 REPORT THA 68 AMERICAN PWs ARE BEING HELD IN LAOS. IN
 RETURN FOR USG SUPPORT FOR SOURCE'S RESISTANCE GROUP
 SOURCE'S MEN CAN ARRANGE TO BRING THE PWs TO
 PHETIAINLY

TEXT: 1. ON 7 SEP 87, SOURCE PROVIDED A
 WRITTEN REPORT IN LAO REGARDING ON 22 AMERICAN PWs HELD
 AT THREE SEPARATE LOCATIONS. A STONY BEACH DEBRIEFER
 TRANSLATION OF REPORT FOLLOWS:
 "AMERICAN PWs HELD IN NORTHERN LAOS ARE AT: LOCATION 1,
 THAN PHA HAY CAVE, SAN HEUA PROVINCE BETWEEN SAN HEUA
 PROVINCE AND DIEN BIEN PHU IN VIETNAM. THERE ARE 18 PWs
 WITH CAPTAIN NAME, AN AMERICAN PILOT, AS SENIOR PW.
 BRIEF BACKGROUND ON CAPT NAME RECEIVED BUT IS NOT
 COMPLETE. SON OF AN AMERICAN GENERAL ASSIGNED TO THE
 UNITED STATES NAME AND HAD AN OLDER
 BROTHER IN THE US NAVY STATIONED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
 LOCATION 2: THERE IS ONE PERSON, AN AMERICAN WHOSE
 AIRCRAFT WAS ALSO SHOT DOWN, BUT WHOSE LEG WAS BROKEN.
 THIS INDIVIDUAL IS UNDER THE CARE OF A LAO THAI
 TRIDSMAN AND HE MARRIED A LAO FROM THAT VILLAGE (NPT)
 AND HAS TWO CHILDREN. HE IS CLOSELY WATCHED AFTER BY
 THE FATHER OF A LAO DENG WITH THE RANK OF 1ST
 LIEUTENANT. HE WILL BRING THE PW TO THAILAND IN JUL
 87. AFTER REACHING THAILAND, HE MUST BE PROTECTED,
 CARED FOR, AND GIVEN MONETARY REWARD. THE AMERICAN'S
 NAME IS NAME (FIELD COMMENT: PHONETIC). THE FATHER OF
 THE LAO DENG SOLDIER IS CALLED FATHER NAME, LIVING AT
 NAME XIANG KHUANG
 PROVINCE. LOCATION 3: THERE ARE THREE AMERICAN PILOT
 PWs. THESE THREE ARE HELD IN VIETNAM AND WERE SENT FROM
 SADUAY (PHONETIC) MILITARY CAMP, VINH CITY, NGAN TANG
 (PHONETIC) TO WORK ON CONSTRUCTION OF AN AIRFIELD FOR
 MIG-21 AND MIG-23 AIRCRAFT AT XONGHAK, HUANG PHU, XIANG
 KHUANG PROVINCE, 50 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF PHONGSAVAN IN
 THE AREA OF PHOU KOU. THESE THREE AMERICAN PWs ARE
 GUARDED BY VIETNAMESE MILITARY ALONG WITH 14 SOVIET
 ENGINEERS. EACH DAY THE AMERICAN MILITARY MEN WORK
 TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIETS. FOR THE MOST PART THEY LAY
 OUT THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE AREA OF THE NEW
 AIRFIELD, AND TEACH ENGLISH TO VIETNAMESE OFFICERS OF
 THE 337TH DIVISION WHO ARE WORKING ON THE CONSTRUCTION
 OF THE AIRFIELD AND CONSTRUCTING A NEW HEADQUARTERS
 TOGETHER WITH A LPLA CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT, AND ARE ALSO
 BUILDING UNDERGROUND TUNNELS AT TWO PLACES. THE TUNNELS
 ARE IN RESERVE IN CASE THERE IS WAR IN LAOS. NAME
 GOVERNMENT WOULD RELOCATE TO THOSE PLACES. ALSO THEY
 ARE CONSTRUCTING 150 NEW BUILDINGS IN THIS AREA. MR.

CIRC

AMOS

PAGE

SS RECEIVED THIS REPORT FROM A LAO DEMO 1ST
LIEUTENANT WHO IS RELATED TO THE WIFE OF THE AMERICAN PW
NAMED A/eng.

HP SS (FIELD COMBAT ALTERNATE

SEPARATELY AS AN ENCLOSURE TO THIS IIR.

BT

0953

NNNN

EZ3

TEXT

USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM/MIA TEAM// 10035T

NNNN

CIRCULATE FOR

PAGE 00

NSCWD TT (PCX) *09/10/87* 40106:26:3.35

ZCZC 06105121Z (PC)

ENL DTG : 87091000341780

RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS9536 2530359 --RUEALGX

ZNT

R 100357Z SEP 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADND/OSMA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/NO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC

RUEHAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XDOOS/TOXX//

RUEHC //SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEHACC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEHAAA/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUEHAAA/AFPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 00000357Z SEP 87

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM/MIA TEAM//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH/DAN//

INFO RUEADND/WHITEROUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PA-MIA//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC//J5//OJCS-PA-MIA//

RUEHAAA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//

RUEHAAA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCS/MIL//

RUEHAAA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEHAAA/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR

RUEHAAA/USDAO MANILA RP

RUEHAAA/USDAO SINGAPORE

RUEHAAA/USDAO HONG KONG

BT

EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//FM/ 39536

EZ2:

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: IIR 006 024 0141 8700

COUNTRY: LAOS (LA)

SUBJ: IIR 006 024 0141 87/6800 AMERICAN PWS IN LAOS

2. SOURCE COMMENTED REGARDING THE REPORT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IN CONTROL OF A/eng HAD BEEN READY TO BRING HIM TO THAILAND IN JUL 87 AS STATED. HOWEVER, SINCE SOURCE HAD NOT RECEIVED US SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS, PLANS TO BRING HIM OUT WERE DROPPED. THAT PW CAN BE BROUGHT OUT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, ONCE SOURCE RECEIVED THE REQUIRED SUPPORT.

3. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT THE 22 PWS DISCUSSED ABOVE WERE PART OF A TOTAL OF 68 AMERICANS PWS HELD IN

CIRCULATE FOR

PAGE 00

LAOS. THEY WERE HELD AT EIGHT DIFFERENT POINTS, BUT MAY HAVE BEEN FURTHER SPREAD OUT (WFI). HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED ONE AMERICAN PW HELD SOMEWHERE IN LAOS WHO HAD HAD THE FIRST TWO FINGERS OF EACH HAND AMPUTATED. SOURCE WOULD DISCLOSE NO OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PW, BUT STATED THAT HE CAN BE EASILY BROUGHT OUT BY SOURCE'S MEN PROVIDING SOURCE'S RESISTANCE GROUP IS OF THE US GOVERNMENT.

1. THE SOURCE OF IIR 6 024 0151 ST REFERRED STORY BEACH DESIRER TO CURRENT SOURCE, SAYING CURRENT SOURCE HAD DETAILS REGARDING THE PW LITTS-SHIGHTING DISCUSSED IN IIR 6 024 0151 ST.

2. SOURCE CLAIMED TO BE A FORMER LAO "BEHIND THE SCENES" GENERAL OFFICER WHO IS NOW THE TOP LEADER OF A LAO RESISTANCE GROUP IDENTIFIED AS "S". HE CLAIMS TO FREQUENTLY TRAVEL TO LAOS TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS.

3. SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD SET OFF MANY BOOBY TRAPS, BUT NEVER HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS TO HIS ANCESTRAL MAGIC TALISMAN. SOURCE OFFERED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS POWERS TO THE STORY BEACH DESIRER AFTER THEIR RELATIONSHIP HAD MATURED. SOURCE EXPLAINED FURTHER THAT IF HE WERE TO DISPLAY THE TALISMAN IN AN AIRCONDITIONED ROOM, THE ELECTRIC POWER WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY DISRUPTED. SOURCE OFFERED TO USE THE TALISMAN TO THE DESIRER IF THE DESIRER WISHED TO ACCEPT SOURCE'S OFFER TO TRAVEL TO LAOS.

4. SOURCE REPEATEDLY MENTIONED THAT IF THE DESIRER COULD PARTICIPATE IN ARRANGING THE SAFE RECOVERY OF TWO LIVE PWs, THE DESIRER WOULD PROBABLY BE ALLOWED TO "STAY IN THAILAND FOREVER."

//IPSP: PG 2430//

//COMSEC: #10//

PRECJ : 6999-10

INSTR : US: NO

PRECJ : TS-03

APPR :

WARNING :

BT

49536

NNNN

EX3

TEXT

USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW/MIA TEAM// 100357Z SEP 87

NNNN

1/12/88

PAGE 2

AVE 9 50 10 8 2 8323

CA 116
 DAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 32
 CATEGORY 1A

NTRY LOCATED 23 TH STATE/CITY 13
 NTRY REPORTED 10 LA
 YPE SIGHTING 44 POW-HSY
 ST SIGHTING 42 11 12

UNRESOURCES 27 55
 CTIONS 51
 890810 STONY IR 60240420-88
 890810 STONY TH-13 608172

URGENT ACT 43 CAPTIVITY 39
 ENVRG 34 FOLDED 225PM HELD CAVE LA 84 ANALYST 13 84

ATL RECEIVED 8 890811 DATE OF INFO 85 84

ORCE DOB 14 ADDRESS 25

RIGIN CODE 17 0

OLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

OLYGRAPH RESULTS 24

11513049

PAGE:0018

ENVELOPE
 RTZKJW RUEKJCS1267 2231739

HEADLINE
 R 101739Z AUG 88
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEWAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEKAWA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADDA/AFIS WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHM/DIRNSA FT GORDEN G WEADE MD
 RUEACAC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEJAA/USCINCPAC MACBELL AFB HI//8312//
 RUEHQA/MPG FT GORDEN G WEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 E 100817Z AUG 88
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//FM-NIA//
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//FM-FM/DAM//
 INFO RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//SEC MR CHILLERESS//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA FM-NIA//
 RUEKJCS/PCS WASHDC//35/CSCS FM-NIA//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//831223/23/436//
 RUEHQA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/KCS/LDA/KILL//
 RUEHQA/CSA JCRC BANGKOK TH-11
 RUEHQA/USDAO HONOLULU HI//831223//
 RUEHQA/USDAO SINGAPORE
 RUEHQA/USDAO MANILA RP
 RUEHQA/USDAO HONG KONG
 BT

SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK TH//FM- 81267

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0420-88.

ROOT
 /***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0420-88/REARAY OF 225-88-1
 - ALLIED AMERICAN PW HELD IN XUA PHAN PROVINCE
 - IN 1984.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
 - FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
 -

PAGE:0019

PAGE:0020

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 840300

SOURCE: 55 SOURCE IS A LAO REFUGEE WHO WAS ACTIVE IN THE LAO RESISTANCE FORCES VIC PHOU KONG KHAD IN 1985 WHEN HE HEARD THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT FROM A FORMER PLA OFFICER. RELIABILITY OF SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY REACH REPORT. IT CONTAINS HEARSAY INFORMATION ON 225 ALLIED AMERICAN AND 35 FRENCH PRISONERS ALLEGEDLY HELD IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE IN 1984.

TEXT: 1. SOURCE'S FRIEND AND FELLOW TRIBAL CLANSMAN, 55 WAS A CAPTAIN IN ROYAL LAO ARMY (RLA) BATTALION (BN) 311. AFTER THE PATRIOT LAO (PL) TAKEOVER, 55 WAS SENT TO SENHAI AT AN UNKNOWN LOCATION IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, THEN TRANSFERRED TO THAM NAM KAI (UNLOCATED - SEE COMMENTS), SAM NEUA (D), HOUA PHAN (P). UPON RELEASE FROM SENHAI IN 1985, 55 JOINED SOURCE AT SOURCE'S RESISTANCE ELEMENT VICINITY PHOU KONG KHAD //UTMCOORDS 48QV7579// WHERE HE RELATED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. 55 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY KILLED IN COMBAT WITH LAO COMMUNIST FORCES.

2. AT THAM NAM KAI, 55 WAS ASSIGNED TO A MESS DETAIL FOR THREE MONTHS IN EARLY 1984. HIS DUTIES INCLUDED PREPARING AND DELIVERING RATIONS TO A CAVE WHERE AMERICAN AND FRENCH PRISONERS WERE HELD. FROM RATIONS DOCUMENTS, 55 KNEW THAT THERE WERE 225 AMERICAN PRISONERS AND 35 FRENCH PRISONERS. 55 PL SUPERVISOR (NFI) TOLD HIM THAT THE PL WERE RESPONSIBLE TO FEED AND CARE FOR ONLY 60 OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS, THOSE WHO ACTUALLY HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY LAO COMMUNIST FORCES DURING THE WAR. THE REMAINDER OF THE AMERICANS AND ALL THE FRENCH HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE THAM NAM KAI LOCATION FROM VIET NAM IN THE LATE 1970'S (NFI) SO THAT VIET NAM COULD DENY HOLDING AMERICAN PRISONERS.

3. TO DELIVER THE RATIONS, 55 PASSED THROUGH TWO LEVELS OF SENTRIES AND DELIVERED THE FOOD TO A THIRD SET OF SENTRIES, WHO IN TURN PASSED THROUGH A FOURTH SET OF GUARDS TO GIVE THE FOOD TO THE PRISONERS. THE TWO OUTER GUARD POSTS WERE MANNED BY PL SOLDIERS, WHILE THE INNER GUARD POSTS WERE MANNED BY VIETNAMESE. ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS, THE PRISONERS WERE ALLOWED OUTSIDE FOR EXERCISE AND EXPOSURE TO SUNLIGHT; ON

THESE DAYS 55 COULD OBSERVE THEM AND, ON OCCASION, APPROACH CLOSELY ENOUGH TO SPEAK WITH THEM. SOME OF THE PRISONERS, PARTICULARLY THE LONG-TERM FRENCH PRISONERS, COULD SPEAK LAO AND TRIBAL LANGUAGES. SOURCE COULD RELATE NOTHING THAT WAS SAID IN ANY SUCH ENCOUNTER. THE PRISONERS WORE SHORT OR CUT-OFF TROUSERS AND T-SHIRTS AND WERE BAREFOOT. THEY WERE MOSTLY IN GOOD HEALTH IN SPITE OF LIMITED RATIONS AND POOR OR NO MEDICAL SUPPORT. THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE ALL SHACKLED WHILE THE FRENCH WERE UNCHAINED. ALL THE FRENCH PRISONERS HAD HAD THE LEFT EAR CUT OFF. ON OCCASION (NFI) THE PRISONERS WOULD BE REPORTED ON WORK DETAILS BY THE VIETNAMESE GUARDS. WORK ASSIGNED WAS USUALLY FARM WORK OR WORK RELATING TO SOME INDIVIDUAL SKILL. 55 NOTED THAT THERE WERE ALSO APPROXIMATELY 1000 LAO PRISONERS HELD IN THE THAM NAM KAI AREA. (SEE COMMENT 1.)

4. THE THAM NAM KAI SITE IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY ONE KM SOUTH OF A ROAD FROM SAM NEUA //UTMCOORDS 48QV800878// TO THE VIETNAMESE BORDER. NEAR A MOUNTAIN NAMED PHOU PHALAN (U/V), THE ROAD INTERSECTS A ROAD LEADING SOUTH TO SAM TEU //UTMCOORDS 48QV8620100//. THE SITE IS APPROXIMATELY FIVE TO EIGHT KMS WEST OF HUANG KANG (UNLOCATED). AN AIRFIELD BUILT SINCE 1975 LIES SOUTH OF AND PARALLEL TO THE ROAD AT THAT POINT. DISTANCE FROM THE ROAD TO THE AIRFIELD IS NOT KNOWN, BUT THE AIRFIELD IS VISIBLE FROM THE ROAD, AND NO STREAM INTERFERES. AN ACCESS ROAD DEPARTS THE MAIN ROAD JUST EAST OF THE AIRFIELD AND LEADS SOUTH-SOUTHWEST APPROXIMATELY ONE KM TO THE SITE. (SEE COMMENT 2.)

5. THE THAM NAM KAI SITE LIES AMONG VERY STEEP KARST FORMATIONS. SOUTH OF THE AIRFIELD NOTED ABOVE IS A NARROW RIDGE APPROXIMATELY 800-1000 METERS LONG; THE LONG AXIS OF THE RIDGE IS EAST-WEST. AT THE EAST END OF THIS RIDGE IS A MEETING HALL; ON THE NORTH SIDE ADJACENT TO THE EAST END OF THE AIRFIELD IS A BUILDING DESCRIBED AS THE SOVIETS' HOUSE; ON THE SOUTH SIDE AND WEST OF CENTER ARE A PAIR OF CAVES, ONE RELATIVELY LARGER THAN THE OTHER. THE SMALLER OF THESE CAVES HOUSED THE FRENCH PRISONERS; THE LARGER CAVE HOUSED THE AMERICANS. SOUTH OF THE EASTERN HALF OF THIS RIDGE LIES ANOTHER SHORTER RIDGE ALSO ORIENTED EAST-WEST. ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THIS SECOND RIDGE IS A SUPPLY BUILDING; ON THE SOUTH SIDE ARE A FINANCE OFFICE AND THE FORMER QUARTERS OF NEUA YEU, IDENTIFIED BY SOURCE AS SOUPEANOUYONG'S POLITICAL OFFICER. SOUTH OF THE SECOND RIDGE LIES A THIRD, HIGHER RIDGE THAT FORMS A "C" WITH ITS OPEN SIDE TO THE NORTH; LENGTH IS ESTIMATED IN EXCESS OF ONE DAY'S MARCH; ELEVATION ABOVE LOW GROUND ADJACENT IS ESTIMATED AT 130 METERS. AT THE

EAST END OF THE "C" IS A BUILDING USED AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR INCOMING PRISONERS; ON THE SOUTHEAST FACE OF THE "C" STAND THE FORMER QUARTERS OF PHOONHONGVITTHI; ON THE SOUTH FACE OF THE "C" IS A RADIO STATION FORMERLY USED AS THE P. BROADCAST STATION. INSIDE THE CENTER OF THE "C" FROM EAST TO WEST ARE A SALES STORE, QUARTERS FOR THE LAO PRISONERS, SOUPHABOUDTONG'S FORMER QUARTERS, AND THE HEADQUARTERS OF PAY-DANG LAO, SAID BY SOURCE TO BE A COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LAO TRIBAL PEOPLES. AT THE WEST TIP OF THE "C" ARE MORE CAVES. AT THE TIME OF S-9 OBSERVATIONS, THESE CAVES WERE BEING PREPARED FOR OCCUPATION BY THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH PRISONERS. THE NEW LOCATION IS APPROXIMATELY FOUR TO FIVE KM FROM THE OLD DOOMLA CAVE. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THE PRISONERS WERE TO BE MOVED TO THE NEW LOCATION. BETWEEN THE SECOND RIDGE AND THE "C" AND FOLLOWING THE CONTOUR OF THE "C" IS A WEST-FLOWING WATERCOURSE; THE EASTERN END OF THIS STREAM IS CALLED THE NAM KAI WHILE THE WESTERN PORTION IS CALLED THE NAM SIDA. SEE ENCLOSURE.

6. AT THE HIGHEST POINTS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND RIDGES SOUTH OF THE AIRFIELD ARE SMALL (MFT) "RADARS" OPERATED BY THE VIETNAMESE. AT THE EAST END OF THE RIDGE ADJACENT TO THE AIRFIELD IS A LARGE (MFT) "RADAR" OPERATED BY THE SOVIETS. AT THE APPROXIMATE CENTER OF THE "C"-SHAPE RIDGE IS A RADIO TOWER ASSOCIATED WITH THE BROADCAST STATION NOTED IN PARA 5. SOURCE COULD PROVIDE NO DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ANTENNAS OR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT AT ANY OF THESE INSTALLATIONS.

7. S-9 STATED THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE TEAM NAM KAI SITE WAS A VIETNAMESE COLONEL NAMED BLAO DAO (SURNAME UNKNOWN); THE SENIOR LAO MEMBER OF THE COMMAND WAS COLONEL JOMHART ((LNU)). A LAO COLONEL NAMED ST ((SOUTHPASUT)) WAS ALSO PRESENT, BUT HIS DUTIES WERE NOT KNOWN.

COMMENTS (U) 1. SOURCE WAS UNABLE TO EXPLAIN HOW S-9 WAS ABLE TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE PRISONERS THROUGH THE REMAINING TWO LEVELS OF GUARD POSTS.

2. COMPARISON OF GRAPHICS AND VERBAL DESCRIPTIONS PROVIDED BY SOURCE WITH TOPOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS AVAILABLE TO US SEEM TO SUGGEST THE TEAM NAM KAI SITE TO NAM NA KAI/VIENG KAI/UTMCOORDS 48091957//. THE PRESENT CONFIGURATION OF NAM NAID FEATURES IN THIS AREA IS REPRESENTED ON SOVIET 1:100,000 MAPSHEET NUMBER F-46-125. A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THIS MAP IS FORWARDED AS AN ENCLOSURE.

//TSP// (U) PG 2430//

//CONSOBJ (U) 5217//

AMUL

PROJ: (U) 6999-10

INSTA: (U) US: MO

PROD: (U) TM-13

ACC:

EXCL: (U) TO FOLLOW TO DIA, TO-FU: ONE HAND DRAWN

WEIGHT SKETCH OF PRISON SITE AND ONE

CLARIFIED/TRANSLATED SKETCH OF THAT DRAWING

BT
#1267

COLL 50 CAMP 14 JUN 88

1. NAME: SC
 AKA: 1 50

2. DOB: 50

3. POB: 50

4. CITY: LAO

5. ETHNIC: HONG (HMO)

6. SEX: MALE

7. RELIG: CHRISTIAN (DENOMINATION UNKNOWN)

8. UN #. (VALIDITY UNKNOWN, THIS IS NOT IN SEQUENCE WITH OTHER T'S ASSIGNED AT NAM YAO IN THE SAME PERIOD.)

9. CURRENT ADDRESS: 50 (SUBJECT TO EARLY REMOVAL TO 50 FOR RESETTLEMENT.)

10. PREVIOUS ADR: 50

11. OCCUPATION: SEE ITEM 13.

12. EDUCATION: UNKNOWN

13. MILITARY SVC: 62-72: BW 109, REGT 23, "ITU" FORCES, LAO
 HIS REGION 2.
 72-75: BW 206, REGT 22, "ITU" FORCES, LAO MILITARY
 REGION 1 AND 2.

14. RE-EDUCATION CAMP: EVADED ARREST AND SEMINAR; SEE ITEM 16.

15. RELATIVES:

NAME	DOB	POB	REL	ADR
DATA				A

16. RESISTANCE AFFILIATION: MEMBER "CHAO FA" RESISTANCE FORCES.
 75-82 VIC PHOU BIA////; 82-85 VIC PHA LAI ////; 85-86 VIC PHOU
 HONG KHAO ////.

17. REMARKS: SOURCE ACTS AS A LEADER IN THE 50 CAMP, AIDED
 IN LOCATING OTHER SOURCES AND IN FINDING PERSONS WHO COULD CLEAR
 UP DETAILS OF REPORT. WILL PROBABLY BE RELOCATED TO DATA
 AS SOON AS THE SPIRIT MOVES NAME.

BT
 11/12/78 0014/CS731 2502244

BT
 1 062244Z SEP 88
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO ROKHAI/SAFE
 R 061336Z SEP 88
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//
 TO USDAO BANGKOK TH//PH-CIA//
 BT

BT
 SUBJ: BIO REPORT (U)

1. TO-PH IS NOT INT. IN RECEIPT OF SOURCE BIO REPORTS FOR THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:

A.
 B.
 C.
 D.
 E.
 F.

2. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY OF THESE BIOS HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRANSMITTED. OTHERWISE, WOULD APPRECIATE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE OUTSTANDING BIOS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FOR SOURCES OF IIIS WHICH WERE PUBLISHED TWO OR MORE WEEKS AGO. THANKS IN ADVANCE.

PAGE 02

BT
 0731

SAID THAT HE WAS REQUESTED TO WAIT AT THE HOME
UNTIL AFTER ABOUT FOUR HOURS AND CLAIMED TO HAVE PERSONALLY
STAYED THE HOME. BUT SAID HE WAS ABLE TO "DO NOTHING" BECAUSE

NNNN

NNNN

Data Printed: 06/11/90

Produced by USSR: Alaska

NNNN SOURCE DATA SHEET NNNN

Source Name: Southern

Case No: 09003

AKA: Southern

Confidential:

Boat Number: 110041

Contacted:

Entry Located: TH

State/City:

Entry Reported: LAType Sighting: PM-F/HLat Sighting: UTM: VM390640 LAT: 202400N LONG: 1041320E

Subsource:	Actions:
1: <u>Southern</u>	1: 061121 JCRC T84-472 NSO
2:	2: 061121 JCRC DTG 210041Z
3:	3: 070327 IAC PANEL REVIEW
4:	
5:	
6:	
7:	
8:	
9:	
10:	
11:	
12:	

Current Action: 070327 IAC APP'D FABRICATION

Analyst: AV

Remarks: 10 PM'S NR VIENXAY 84

Data Received: 061121

Date of Info: 0610

Source DOB:

Address: Southern DATAOrigin Code: B

Category:

Polygraph Category:

Polygraph Results:

1 _____ END OF RECORD _____

NNNN

NNNN

NNNN

NNNN

Data Printed: 06/11/90

Produced by USSR: Alaska

NNNN SOURCE DATA SHEET NNNN

Source Name: Southern

Case No: 05528

AKA: Southern

Confidential:

Boat Number: N/A

Contacted:

Entry Located: TH

State/City:

Entry Reported: LAType Sighting: GRV-F/H (DOOTAG)Lat Sighting: UTM: MC250940 LAT: _____ LONG: _____

Subsource:	Actions:
1: <u>Southern</u>	1: 060911 JCRC T84-388 NSO
2:	2: 060911 JCRC DTG 110501Z
3:	3: 060925 JCRC T84-388 EVAL
4:	4: 060925 JCRC DTG 230007Z
5:	5: 061024 JCRC T84-446 NSO
6:	6: 061215 JCRC T84-472A NSO
7:	7: 061215 JCRC DTG 151018Z
8:	8: 070105 JCRC T84-472B NSO
9:	9: 070105 JCRC DTG 051039Z
10:	
11:	
12:	

Current Action:

Analyst: AV

Remarks: 40P54DT SAVANNAHDET

Data Received: 060910

Date of Info:

Source DOB:

Address: Southern DATAOrigin Code: BCategory: 1A

Polygraph Category:

Polygraph Results:

1 _____ END OF RECORD _____

NNNN

NNNN

Data Printed: 04/11/90

Produced by user: *Alma*

SOURCE DATA SHEET

Source Name: *Southeast* Case No: 49434
 Alt: *Southeast* Confidential
 Boat Number: Contacted
 Entry Location: TN State/City:
 Entry Reported: LA
 Type Sightings: GRV-HSY (DDGTAG)
 1st Sighting UTH: X0899270 LAT: (000)

- Subsource -
 Subsource 1: 1. 890615 JCRCI 789-222 RPT
 2. 900321 JCRCI 789-135 RSO
 3. 900321 JCRCI 870 2110502
 4. 4.
 5. 5.
 6. 6.
 7. 7.
 8. 8. SAVANNAHSETT
 9. 9. PROV
 10. 10.
 11. 11.
 12. 12.

Current Action: Analyst: *AM*

Remarks: RPS+PT IN HUMAN CHAIN

Date Received: 900611 Date of Info:

Source ID#: Address: *Southeast*

Origin Code: B Category:

Polygraph Category:

Polygraph Results:

END OF RECORD

Source (288)

DATE RECEIVED: 900611
 DATE OF INFO: 31

GRV-HSY (DDGTAG)
 X0899270

SAVANNAHSETT
 PROV

890615 JCRCI 789-222 RPT
 900321 JCRCI 789-135 RSO
 900321 JCRCI 870 2110502

CONTACTED: 31
 CAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT: 39

Source

SECRET

SECRET

Data Printed: 06/27/90

Produced by: MARI, ALEX

SOURCE DATA SHEET

Source Name: Source Case No: 40436Alt: Source Confidential:Host Number: Source Confidential:Entry Location: TH State/City:Entry Reported: LAType Sighting: GRY-HOY (300740)Lat Sighting: UTM: X099220 LAT: 1000

Subsource	Actions
1.	1. 899413 JCRC 704-222 RPT
2.	2. 900321 JCRC 774-135 RPT
3.	3. 900321 JCRC 770 2110302
4.	4.
5.	5.
6.	6.
7.	7.
8.	8. SAVANNAHET
9.	9. PROV
10.	
11.	
12.	

Current Action: Source Analyst: avRemarks: RPT-PT IN PHANG CHANData Received: 900411 Date of Info: 2Source ID: Source Address: Source DATAOrigin Code: 8 Category: SourcePolygraph Category: SourcePolygraph Results: Source

END OF RECORD

SECRET

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE RECORDS
FOOT BRANCH, BANGKOK, THAILAND



TAP-PEH-1 (600-3-1b)

June 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND, ATRN: TAP-PEH-1, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 2231-0002

SUBJECT: Update on Remains Held at CILMI Pending Final Identification

1. Reporting period of May 1990

a. Remains received:

(1) CILMI 0114-90

These remains were received on 2 May from JCRC. They consist of three charred and calcined human cranial fragments, two calcined human long bone fragments which fit together and may be part of a radius or ulna shaft, three calcined fragments which fit together and may be part of a human metacarpal or metatarsal shaft, three calcined fragments of humeral bone which may or may not be human, and 15 crumbling, charred and calcined fragments of non-bone material. The human bone is probably adult; nothing else can be said of it. An ID tag for Source was also received. The remains and ID tag were allegedly recovered in eastern Savannakhet Province near the Lao-Viet border at a site referred to as the Lao Son battlefield. The source, who acquired the material from another party, knows nothing else that might serve to locate the site or to elaborate the circumstances of recovery. (Ref: JCRC RPT 9700-125, 2710302 MAR 90)

(2) CILMI 0115-90

These remains were received on 4 May from JCRC and consist of a tooth and two bone fragments. The tooth is a mandibular first premolar (#21). It is unrestored and has moderate occlusal attrition on the facial cusp tip. One of the bone fragments is that of a human infant right femur. The age at death is estimated to be 1.5 to 2.5 years. The other bone fragment is a left ramus portion of an adult human mandible. No other relevant data can be obtained. Five ID tag rubbings were also provided. Source Auu Yamb, Sol Sen, Park Lik, and Bhou-Biet. None is listed as killed or unaccounted for in SEA. As the source was preparing to leave Vietnam, a friend gave him bone fragments and ID tag information that pertained to remains that he was hiding at his residence. The source did not know how the remains were obtained or anything about them. (Ref: JCRC RPT 9700-041, 2 Apr 90)

NAME

40436

12829

TAPC-PED-W (600-8-1a)

SUBJECT: Update on Remains Held at CILHI Pending Final Identification

(3) CILHI 0116-90

These remains were received on 8 May from JCRC and consist of three bone fragments. Two tiny pieces resemble human cranial bone. The third fragment, 44 mm in length, is probably the shaft of a human metacarpal. Nothing else can be determined. ID tag rubbings for *Abn* were also received. *Abn* is listed as killed or unaccounted for in SEA. The source provided the remains samples and ID tag rubbings given him by an acquaintance in Vietnam. Source believes that this acquaintance acquired the remains in Long Thanh (near Loc Tam, Dong Nai Province), and that one of the samples originally came from Binh Dong District, Song Be Province. (Ref: JCRC RPT #789-90, 1 Jan 90)

(4) CILHI 0117-90

These remains were received on 8 May from JCRC. They consist of two cranial bone fragments, a central body portion of a rib, and a portion of bone which may be sternum. Nothing else can be determined. ID tag information for *Abn* who is not listed as killed or unaccounted for in SEA, was also provided. Just prior to source's departure from Vietnam, a family friend came to see source and requested that he pass ID tag and remains information to U.S. government officials. The source was given bone fragments and a piece of paper with ID tag data. (Ref: JCRC RPT #789-90, 20 Dec 89)

(5) CILHI 0118-90

These remains were received on 8 May from JCRC and consist of four very small pieces of bone. One has a sutural margin similar to that seen for human cranial bone; nothing else can be determined. An ID tag rubbing for *Abn* who is not listed as killed or unaccounted for in SEA, was also received. The source obtained the material from a Cambodian who claims to have the remains and ID tag of the American MIA. (Ref: JCRC RPT #790-90, 2 Apr 90)

(6) CILHI 0119-90

These remains were received on 14 May from JCRC and consist of a minimal assortment of bones from a Mongoloid female. She was 20-35 years of age and 59-60 inches tall at time of death. (Ref: JCRC RPT #790-90; not yet received)

(7) CILHI 0120-90

These remains were received on 25 May from DIA and consist of six tiny bone fragments. They are perhaps from a short bone, such as a metatarsal. They may or may not be from a human. Nothing else can be determined. The source claimed they were from a U.S. serviceman lost in the Vietnam War. (Ref: DIA letter C-0439/PH-MIA, 14 May 90)

TAPC-PED-W (600-8-1a)

SUBJECT: Update on Remains Held at CILHI Pending Final Identification

(8) CILHI 0121-90 thru CILHI 0125-90

These remains were received on 29 May from a CIOEL led by Rep. Sonny Montgomery. They were turned over to the CIOEL by/repatriated of the *Abn* family. *Abn* is a Republic of Korea (ROK) citizen who was killed on 28 May in five redemptive wooden coffins. All five sets of remains have dentition, and two of the remains have a name associated with ID tag. CILHI 0122-90 is associated with *Abn* (USA) and CILHI 0123-90 is associated with *Abn* (USA). The other three remains have no ID and/or personal effects upon which to base a name association, but the DPRK did provide the province in which all the excavations occurred.

(9) CILHI 0126-90

CILHI 0127-90

These remains were received on 30 May from a JCRC/CILHI recovery team following joint US-Lao excavations of two aircraft crash sites in Savannakhet Province. CILHI 0126-90 consists of the crowns of four human teeth (three molars and one premolar); the dental portions were found in association with uniform items. They were recovered from a F-4 aircraft crash site at grid coordinates XD 477415 associated with REFNO 1488, an incident involving two men. CILHI 0127-90 consists of one small bone fragment, which was found in association with personal effects during the recovery operations. Upon closer examination and comparison with laboratory reference specimens, the bone has been determined to be from a woman's mandible. It was recovered from an OV-1 aircraft crash site at grid coordinates XD 363443 associated with REFNO 0553, an incident involving one individual. (Ref: JCRC LHO Bux TH 260713Z MAY 90, SBA 09/CIL/90 and SBA 10/CIL/90)

b. Recommendations submitted:

(1) On 2 May: That CILHI 0212-88 be declared the remains of an Unknown Asian Mongoloid and returned to the SRV when possible (these remains were received during the 3 Nov 88 repatriation in Hanoi); that CILHI 0013-89 be declared the remains of Unknown Asian Mongoloids and returned to the SRV when possible (these remains were received during the 25 Jan 89 repatriation in Hanoi).

(2) On 14 May: That CILHI 0007-90 be identified as the remains of *Abn* USA; that CILHI 0008-90 and CILHI 0010-90 be identified as CILHI Group Remains 1-90, the unidentified remains of *Abn* all USA (the preceding remains, REFNO 1717, were recovered during the Jan 90 joint recovery mission in Laos); that CILHI 0011-90 be identified as the remains of *Abn* USA; that CILHI 0012-90 be identified as CILHI Group Remains 2-90, the unidentified remains of *Abn* and *Abn* USA (the preceding remains, REFNO 1729, were recovered during the Jan 90 joint recovery mission in Laos); that CILHI 0036-90 be identified as the remains of *Abn* USAF; and the nonassociable bone segregated from these remains be declared CIL Portion #544 (these remains were received during the 10 Apr 90 repatriation in Hanoi).

CF:
COR, WESTCON
COR, JERC
USCINCPAC
DIR, DIA
JERC, JNO

Date Printed: 06/18/90

Printed by: amf: 06/18/90

SOURCE DATA SHEET

Source Name: 51-4441 Case No: 49436

Alias: Source Confidential:

Last Number: Contacted:

Entry Location: TN State/City:

Entry Reported: LA

Type Sighting: ORV-HSY (DOOTA0)

Lat Sighting: UTM: XD90270 LAT: LONG:

Subsources: 1: 890613 JCRC 789-222 RPT

2: 980321 JCRC 798-133 MSG

3: 980321 JCRC DTD 211038Z

4: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

5: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

6: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

7: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

8: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

9: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

10: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

11: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

12: 980327 JCRC 785-135 Encl

Current Action: Analyst: ad

Remarks: RPS-DT IN HUANG CHAN

Data Received: 980611 Date of Info:

Source DOB: Address: Source DATA

Origin Code: 8 Category:

Polygraph Category:

Polygraph Results:

END OF RECORD

NNNN

NNNN



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

LIAISON OFFICE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346-0001

17 MAY 1990

From: JCRC-LNO

To: Commander JCRC

SUBJ: LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Ref: JCRC RPT 789-135, JCRC LIAISON 211038Z MAR 90

Attached for your information and analysis are the dog tag and bone fragments reported at ref. A follow-up letter from the Source of ref is also attached, along with a translation.

Atch:

1. Dog tag
2. Bone fragments
3. Letter from Source
4. Translation of Source's letter

CY TO:
DIA/PW-MIA

(ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

DEAR SIR,

I ~~should~~ ^{am} ~~interested~~ ^{interested} in your inquiry about the remains of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~man~~ ^{man} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~you~~ ^{you} ~~took~~ ^{took} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~forensic~~ ^{forensic} ~~examination~~ ^{examination}. ~~What~~ ^{What} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~current~~ ^{current} ~~status~~ ^{status} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~remains~~ ^{remains} ~~you~~ ^{you} ~~discovered~~ ^{discovered} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~remains~~ ^{remains} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~area~~ ^{area} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~road~~ ^{road} ~~on~~ ^{on} ~~19~~ ¹⁹ ~~March~~ ^{March} ~~1990~~ ¹⁹⁹⁰. ~~Whatever~~ ^{Whatever} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~results~~ ^{results} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~examination~~ ^{examination}, ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~owner~~ ^{owner} ~~wants~~ ^{wants} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~items~~ ^{items} ~~back~~ ^{back}. ~~I~~ ^I ~~hope~~ ^{hope} ~~you~~ ^{you} ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~extend~~ ^{extend} ~~me~~ ^{me} ~~your~~ ^{your} ~~cooperation~~ ^{cooperation}. ~~If~~ ^{If} ~~I~~ ^I ~~am~~ ^{am} ~~unable~~ ^{unable} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~return~~ ^{return} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~items~~ ^{items}, ~~I~~ ^I ~~am~~ ^{am} ~~sure~~ ^{sure} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~have~~ ^{have} ~~a~~ ^a ~~lot~~ ^{lot} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~trouble~~ ^{trouble} ~~over~~ ^{over} ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~future~~ ^{future}, ~~because~~ ^{because} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~word~~ ^{word} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~anyone~~ ^{anyone} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~gives~~ ^{gives} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~US~~ ^{US} ~~government~~ ^{government} ~~factual~~ ^{factual} ~~evidence~~ ^{evidence} ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~rewarded~~ ^{rewarded} ~~generously~~ ^{generously}.

THIS IS THE REASON THAT THE LAO ARE SCRAMBLING TO FIND AMERICAN REMAINS OR PRISONERS OF WAR.

IN CLOSING, I HAVE NOTHING MORE TO REPORT, BUT WAIT TO MEET YOU ON MONDAY, 19 MARCH 1990.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

(SIGNED) : ~~Samuel~~
14/3/90



8 DEC 89

JOINT CASUALTY
RESOLUTION CENTERCASUALTY DATA DIVISION
ANALYSIS & STUDIES

REFUGEE REPORT PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

5598
4613

REFUGEE REPORT NUMBER & DATE: 709-222, 13 June 1989

ANALYST: [REDACTED]

CROSS REFERENCE(S): None

CATEGORY DATA: Identification Media Data/Firsthand Account


FINDINGS: Initial analysis of the information provided by this source reveals no correlation to data in JCRC files. This is not a final evaluation.

CORRELATE DATA: None

BACKGROUND COMMENTS: The identification media data provided does not correlate with any unaccounted for individual.

JCRC

THIS EVALUATION IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM BASIC REPORT

DISPOSITION: JCRC-LAO
DIA/PW-MIA

LIASON OFFICE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
AND SAN FRANCISCO MEM-OR

FROM: JCRC-LHO JCRC RPT T89-222
TO: Commander, JCRC 13 June 1989
SUBJ: SAC SAC INFORMATION FROM LIA LISTED IN REFERENCE

b. Present Location: Unknown address; postmark from Ubon

Province.

c. Interview data: Source was not interviewed. Letter was translated by 1 JCAC USAF.

2. Information: On 7 May 89, JCAC-LNO received a short letter from Source which forwarded a photocopy of a dog tag. The dog tag reads:

3. Source's letter simply states that if the tag is of

1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 26

Source: Letter to the Editor (English translation)

FILE ON

ENVELOPE
CDSN = L0795 MEN = 9008017329 TOR = 900801044
BEEZYVIN BUREAU 0801043

ZNY

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO KUALA/SAFE

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUMKMA/COM JCRC BANGKOK TH

INFO RUMKJCS/JCS NARSIC/OCJCS-P5-HIA/J5//
RUMKJCS/SECDEF NARSIC/OASD-ISA/P5-HIA//
RUMKJCS/USCINCPAC RUMKJCU HI//J3//

DIRECTOR/IA WASHINGTON DC//FM CIA//
 HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON DC//
 DIRECTOR/STATE WASHINGTON DC//

CONFIDENTIAL

0027 MAR 90

NOTE: SEE REG 190-135; REG 240 INFORMATION AND

PARTIAL WEATERS

100-107424-13 and 64

1. SOURCE/ADMINISTRATIVE DATA: 3-14

- A. ID DATA: NONE
- C. INFO: URG; KHAMMAT, THAILAND
- D. ADDRESS: *South East*

- B. PROFESSION: FARMER
- F. LANGUAGES: NORTHEAST THAI

1. MAP(S) USED: SHEET JOG MAPS-15, 16

1. DATE OF INFORMATION: JAN 90
2. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
3. INTERVIEW DATA: SOURCE WAS INTERVIEWED AT
THE AMERICAN EMBASSY BANGKOK ON 0 FEB 90 BY

2. SUMMARY: IN JANUARY 1960 SOURCE TRAVELLED

TO EASTERN SAVANNAH STATE PROVINCE WHERE HE ACQUIRED A
DOG TAG BEARING THE NAME NAME AND
BONE FRAGMENTS ALL SENT TO BIRMINGHAM TO NAME FOR ANALYSIS

CANNOT GIVE A COHERENT ACCOUNT OF THE ACQUISITION,
NOR CAN HE SPECIFY THE SITE WHERE THE REMAINS WERE
FOUND.

3. INFORMATION: SOURCE CLAIMS THAT IN EARLY JANUARY 1990 HE AND A PARTNER NAMED ~~ALICE~~

TRAVELLED TO EASTERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE SEEKING SCRAP ALUMINUM FOR REMAINS IN THAILAND. SOURCE AND ~~NAME~~ FLOWED ROUTE NINE THROUGH HUANG PHIN (AKKOD0927) AND SPORE (AKKOD344) TO HUANG CHAN (U/L). AT HUANG CHAN THEY MET A THAI MAN NAMED ~~NAME~~ GAVE THE TWO MEN A SMALL QUANTITY OF BONE FRAGMENTS AND A BATTERED DOG TAG BEARING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

~~NAME~~ TOLD SOURCE THAT HE PERSONALLY RECOVERED THE REMAINS WITH THE DOG TAG AMONG THEM NEAR THE LAO-VIET BORDER AT A ~~NAME~~ REFERRED TO AS THE CAN SON BATTLEFIELD (U/L). SOURCE KNOWS NOTHING ELSE THAT MIGHT SERVE TO LOCATE THE SITE OR TO ELABORATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DISCOVERY. ~~NAME~~ CHANGED THE TWO TO IMMEDIATELY TURN OVER OF THE REMAINS AND DOG TAG IN EXCHANGE FOR WHATEVER REWARD WAS AVAILABLE. AT THE FINAL INTERVIEW SESSION, SOURCE ACKNOWLEDGED NO'S EXPLANATION OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING POW/MIA AND AGREED TO SURRENDER THE ITEMS WITHOUT COMPENSATION.

4. COMMENT: THE ~~NAME~~ FOR SO INTERVIEW CHALUNATED SEVERAL VISITS TO THE EMBASSY BY SOURCE AND ~~NAME~~ ANOTHER THAI CIVILIAN. INITIALLY SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE RECOVERY OF THE REMAINS HIMSELF. UNDER CLOSE QUESTIONING, HOWEVER, HE WAS UNABLE TO SUPPLY CREDIBLE DETAIL ABOUT TRAVEL TO THE SITE, THE SITE ITSELF, OR ABOUT OTHER PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE RECOVERY. AT LENGTH, SOURCE ADMITTED THAT HE HAD OBTAINED THE REMAINS FROM THE MAN NOTED ABOVE AS ~~NAME~~ BUT SOURCE DECLINED TO PROVIDE FURTHER IDENTIFYING DATA ABOUT ~~NAME~~. WHILE THE DOG TAG APPARENTLY CORRELATES TO REFNO 1561-0-02, SOURCE AND HIS COMPANIONS LACK CREDIBILITY.

5.) THE DOG TAG, BONE FRAGMENTS, SOURCE'S LETTER AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

ADMIN
BT

#7549

NNNN



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

WASHINGTON OFFICE
AMERICAN EMBASSY

FROM: JCRC-LNO;
TO: Commander, JCRC

JCRC RPT 789-122
13 June 1989

SUBJ: DOG TAG INFORMATION FROM LAO LIVING IN THAILAND

1. Source/Administrative Data:

- a. Name: ~~NAME~~
- b. Present Location: ~~NAME~~ address; postmark from Ubon Province.
- c. Interview data: Source was not interviewed. Letter was translated by ~~NAME~~ USAF.

2. Information: On 7 May 89, JCRC-LNO received a short letter from Source which forwarded a photocopy of a dog tag. The dog tag reads:

~~NAME~~ USMC, Catholic

3. Source's letter simply states that if the tag is of interest, JCRC can come to see him to get it.

Attachment:

Source's letter (in Thai w/English translation)

1110

7 May 1969

Dear Sir,

How is your work going? The name enclosed, is it on your list? Do you want it? Please come to see me. If you don't come, please write to me because I want to know if good or not.

Kerem of Dog Tag

Name

USMC, Catholic

Signed: * Source

1111


-4-40-36

Date


Dear Sir,

How is going your work?
 Is it existed about two things?
 How about the right alive?
 Do you want them, please come to see me.
 If you don't come, please write to me
 soon, because I want to know this
 could work out? *

1112



1113



MSGNO 244 (PCIX) *11/23/87* *11104128.6.8*
 ZCZC 16:081892 (PC)
 ENL DTG : 8711231009447
 RTTSTUN RUEKJCS1539 3271439- -RUEALGX.
 ZNY
 R 231430Z NOV 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 201416Z NOV 87
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//NO-PH//
 TO CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/PCS/INT-NO//
 BT
 EZ1:

EZ2:
 S/NP-1546/NO-PH
 SUBJ: NO-PH SOR'S

1. THE FOLLOWING SOR'S TASKED TO CIA CAN BE CANCELLED:

S-NP-05017
 S-NP-05020
 S-NP-05028
 S-NP-05003
 S-NP-05004
 S-NP-05008
 S-NP-05011
 S-NP-05033

2. NO-PH REVIEW OF SOR'S TASKED TO CIA OVER THE PAST YEAR
 CONTINUES.

BT
 #1539
 NNN
 NND

MSGNO 88 (PCIX) *03/18/87* *05104135.2.8*
 ZCZC 10:031162 (PC)
 ENL DTG : 87031804513025
 RTTCTUN RUEKJCS2041 0770343- -RUEALGX.
 ZNY
 R 180343Z MAR 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAANA/CHO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAANA/ARMC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 171800Z MAR 87
 FM COM JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 TO RUEKHK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 INFO RUEHQQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PA-MIA//
 RUEADWH/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC//OCJCS-PG-MIA/JS//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//NO-PH//
 BT
 EZ1:

EZ2:

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT T86-446
 NSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

1. JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 240721Z OCT 86

1. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY *Source* SOURCE OF

REF A, REVEALS NO CORRELATION TO DATA IN JCRC FILES.

2. THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL POSITION AND NOT A FINAL
 EVALUATION. EVAL - AM

BT
 #2041
 NNN
 NND

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

LIAISON OFFICE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346

FROM: JCRC-LNB

11 February 1987

SUBJ: Letters from

TO: Commander, JCRC

1. Please refer to our message, DTG 300714Z JAN 87, JCRC RPT T86-472C.
2. Enclosed for your information and analysis are subject letters reported in cited report.

Name

Atch:
2 letters and one envelope

Copy to:
DIA/VO-PW, w/attn (originals)

MSGNO 603 (PCX)

01/30/87 009:15:17.5.9*

ZCZC

ZNY

P 300717Z JAN 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/AMCCO FT RITCHIE MD

RUEHAAA/CNO CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/SAFE

P 300714Z JAN 87

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEHAAA/COR JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY

INFO RUEHAAA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36// PRIORITY

RUEHAAA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// PRIORITY

RUEHAAA/JCS WASHINGTON DC//J5/PW-MIA// PRIORITY

RUEHAAA/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA// PRIORITY

RUEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC/NR CHILDRESS// PRIORITY

RUEHAAA/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUEHAAA/AMCONSUL UDORN

BT

EZ1:

CITE:

3066 JAN 87

SUB/DTY:

JCRC RPT T86-472B. FOLLOW-UP ON CLAIM

OF POW SIGNATURE

REF:

A. JCRC RPT T86-472B DEC 86 (NOTAL)

B. DIA/VO-PW 161330Z DEC 86 (NOTAL)

C. JCRC RPT T86-472A DEC 86 (NOTAL)

D. DIA/VO-PW 122152Z DEC 86 (NOTAL)

1. ON 28 JAN 87, JCRC-LNB RECEIVED THE

FOLLOWING LETTER (IN LAO) FROM SOURCE

QUOTE

12 JANUARY

I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER. AS FOR SENDING YOU THE

SIGNATURE, I'VE TRIED MY BEST. MY DAILY LIFE IS

VERY DIFFICULT. MY FRIENDS ARE ALWAYS COMPLAINING

AND I HAVE TO TRY TO HIDE FROM THEM BECAUSE I HAVE

NOT BEEN ABLE TO GIVE THEM ANYTHING. ARE YOU

GOING TO HELP ME? I'M LIVING UNDER THE MOST

DIFFICULT CONDITIONS. I HAVE GIVEN YOU MY ONE

HUNDRED PERCENT ALREADY, BUT YOU HAVEN'T DONE ANY-

THING. LIKE THE BODY I BROUGHT BEFORE, I DIDN'T

SEE ANYTHING FROM THAT AT ALL.

RESPECTFULLY,

Sue

DISCUSSED BEFORE IS STILL NOT FINISHED. I HAD RESULTS, BUT THOSE PEOPLE ONLY WANT MONEY. IF THEY DON'T SEE THE MONEY, THEY WON'T BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THEIR WORK. AS FOR ME, I CAN'T GO OVER THERE. I WANT TO COME TO SEE YOU BUT CAN'T BECAUSE I'M COMPLETELY OUT OF MONEY. THEREFORE, I ASK YOUR COMMITMENT. THEY THINK THEY'VE BEEN LIED TO, DO YOU WANT THEM TO COME TO SEE YOU YOURSELVES? OR WILL YOU GO YOURSELF? I CAN'T GO BECAUSE I HAVE NO MONEY TO TRAVEL. PLEASE ANSWER THIS LETTER QUICKLY BECAUSE THE MEN WHO BROUGHT THE BODIES THINK THEY'VE BEEN DECEIVED. THEY DON'T BELIEVE ME BECAUSE WE CAME BACK WITH NOTHING AFTER FIVE DAYS. NOW I HAVE NO WAY OUT. YOU'RE NOT GOING TO RESCUE ME, ARE YOU? I HELPED AS MUCH AS I COULD ALREADY. I CAN'T CONTINUE BECAUSE I HAVE NOTHING LEFT. THEY ONLY WANT MONEY. THERE'S ONLY ONE WAY YOU MUST COME HERE YOURSELF. IF YOU CAN'T COME, AT LEAST WRITE TO TELL THEM.

IS THE ATTACHED LETTER WHAT YOU WANTED? IF IT IS, PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME. FINALLY, I HOPE YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I'VE TRIED TO SAY ABOVE. AS FOR THE COORDINATES OF THE PRISON, THEY KNEW IT, BUT DIDN'T GIVE IT TO ME BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T SEE ANY MONEY. THEY ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN A REWARD.

SIGN: 51-422

Said Date

(END OF TRANSLATION OF LETTER)

3. ENCLOSED WITH SOURCE'S LETTER IS A REPRODUCED LETTER, TYPEWRITTEN UNDER THE LETTERHEAD "UNITED VIETNAM VETERANS ORGANIZATION POW/MIA AFFAIRS, PROJECT LAZARUS, 8065 BELL CROSS WAY, WILSONVILLE, CA 95095, (213) 646-7575". THE INTRODUCTION OF THE REPRODUCED LETTER IS BY COLONEL JAMES ROY CRATER. IT IS A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO AMERICAN POWS INFORMING THEM THAT THE PRISONERS ARE FREE LAO AND INSTRUCTS THE POWS TO COOPERATE TO INSURE THEIR SAFE RETURN TO A SECURE BASE WHERE THEY WILL BE PICKED UP.

4. COMMENTS: THE ABOVE LETTER, LIKE THE LETTER REPORTED IN REF 8, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN SOURCE, I.E., THE BODY OF THE LETTER IS WRITTEN HEAVILY COMPARED TO SOURCE'S LARGER, RATHER SHAKY SIGNATURE. WE ALSO NOTE THAT WHILE SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE TRAVELED TO LAOS AND PERSONALLY OBTAINED A POW SIGNATURE (REF 8), HE MENTIONS IN HIS LETTER HIS INABILITY TO GET "THE COORDINATES OF THE PRISON" FROM HIS CONTACT. WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR SOURCE'S RESPONSE TO OUR 23 DECEMBER LETTER REQUESTING THAT HE FORWARD THE POW SIGNATURE HE ALLEGEDLY OBTAINED IN LAOS. A COPY OF SOURCE'S LETTER, ALONG WITH A COPY OF OUR 23 DEC LETTER TO HIM WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC AND DIA/

BT

NSCDD 153 (PCH) 01/05/87 06:08:21.3192

ZZCZ 11/07/82 (PCH)

PITTSBURGH RUEKAC0095 0051047 - RURALGX

ZNY

P 051047Z JAN 87

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC

INFO: READWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUMHAA/CHO WASHINGTON DC

RUMHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUMHAA/AMSC PT RITCHIE MD

RURALGX/SAFE

P 051039Z JAN 87

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEHQA/CIN JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY

INFO: RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J38// PRIORITY

RUEHQA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TC-PH// PRIORITY

RUEHQA/CS/JCS BARSDC//J2/PW-MIA// PRIORITY

RUEHQA/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA// PRIORITY

RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NS CHILDRESS// PRIORITY

RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUMJUD/AMCONSUL UDORN

BT

EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 00295

CITE: 3005 JAN 87

EZ2:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT T86-8728, ANOTHER LETTER FROM

VO-PH

BT

#0295

NNNN

DDDD

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

C-1747/VO-PW

18 DEC 1986

FROM:

VO-PW

SUBJECT:

PW Sighting JCRC Rpt T86-472

DO

OR

L GEN PERFOOTS HAS BEEN

1. **PURPOSE:** The following is provided in response to your questions.2. **BACKGROUND:**

a. Source of JCRC report claimed that in October, he traveled to Viengkay Province, Laos, where he met 10 American PWs and obtained the signature of one of them. He did not have the signature with him at time of interview.

b. The following responds to your questions:

(1) Any follow up on this?

ANS: On 10 December, JCRC received the form referenced in 21 November report. The form is a blank one produced by an organization headed by James "Bo" Gritz, LTC, USA (Ret), and is signed by Gritz.

(2) Was signature provided?

ANS: The source stated he had a form and a separate piece of paper with the U.S. PW's signature. He did not provide the separate piece of paper. He have asked JCRC to attempt to obtain the separate piece of paper.

(3) Why wouldn't someone go with the guy to Ubon?

ANS: JCRC stated they did not go to Ubon because their judgment was that the story was lacking in credibility and sending someone to Ubon was not the best use of their resources.

c. The source of this report has been interviewed three times by JCRC. He initially provided dog tag data and made no mention of having seen live Americans.

(1) Later, he told a liaison agency of a hearsay account of 226 U.S. PWs in Laos, information he had not provided JCRC in two previous interviews.

Continued to Recallance in Defense of the Nation
1961 - 1986

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

- (2) In a third report, he claimed to have been in Laos from 13 October through 3 November. He have seen 10 U.S. PWs at that time and to have obtained the signature of one PW. Yet, on 17 October, he telephoned JCRC from Ubon, Thailand.
- (3) Each of his reports has been accompanied with an appeal for money or resettlement assistance. The nature of reporting since late July involving this source and his information raises questions as to his truthfulness.

2 Nov

MSGNO

196 (PCXX)

12/18/86 *16:05:23.5.0*

ZCZC 21:03:00Z (PC)

PTTSZYU RUEKJCS817 3501952-

--RUEALGX.

ZNY

P 161952Z DEC 86

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

P 161300Z DEC 86

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//

TO RUEHKK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

INFO RUHQSPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

BT

EZ1:

P??:

SUBJ: 1784/VO-PW

REF: JCRC RPT T86-472A

A. JCRC-LNB 150938Z DEC 86

B. JCRC-LNB 210841Z NOV 86, RPT T86-472A

C. DIA/VO-PW 122115Z DEC 86

1. APPRECIATE YOUR RAPID RESPONSE TO REF C. HAVE GONE

2. REQUEST YOU INFORM US OF STATUS OF TWO ACTIONS:

A. IN REF B, THE STATED HE HAD FORM AND SEPARATE PIECE OF PAPER

WITH SIGNATURE OF US PW. HE PROVIDED YOU THE FORM DESCRIBED IN REF

A1 HAS HE PROVIDED THE SEPARATE PIECE OF PAPER? IF NOT, WHEN DO YOU

PLAN TO RECONTACT HIM TO OBTAIN THE PAPER?

B. IN REF B, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF POLYGRAM

EXAMINATION. WHAT IS STATUS OF YOUR PLANS TO RECONTACT

PLANS FOR POLYGRAM?

BT

#8817

NNNN

NNDD

1128

1127

PAGE 006

MSGNO 125 (PCXX)

12/15/86 *06:08:46.8.94*

ZCZC 11:07:44Z (PC)

PTTSZYU RUEKJCS4056 3491016-

RUEALGX.

ZNY

O 151016Z DEC 86

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUHQSPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEHMAA/CDR WASHINGTON DC

RUEHABA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/AMCC PT MITCHELL MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

O 151010Z DEC 86

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEHMAA/CDR WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// IMMEDIATE

RUEHMAA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY

INFO RUEHMAA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J5// PRIORITY

RUEHMAA/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA// PRIORITY

RUEHMAA/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA// PRIORITY

RUEHMAA/INTERSTATE WASHDC//NSC/NR CHILDRESS// PRIORITY

RUEHMAA/AMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUEHMAA/AMCONSUL VIENTIANE

BT

EZ1:

O 16:02:02 LIAISON BANGKOK 34056

3498 DEC 86

CITE:

EZ2:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT T86-472A, RESPONSE TO REQUEST

FOR INFORMATION

REF: A. JCRC-LNB 210841Z NOV 86, RPT T86-472

B. DIA/VO-PW 122115Z DEC 86 (NOTAL)

1. REF B REQUESTED A RESPONSE TO DIA

DIRECTOR'S QUESTION AS TO WHY JCRC PERSONNEL

DID NOT OBTAIN SOURCE'S SIGNATURE TO USON

TO OBTAIN THE PW SIGNATURE HE CLAIMED HE HAD IN

REF A.

2. DIA SUPPOSITION EXPRESSED IN REF B

IS CORRECT. JCRC LNO'S JUDGMENTAL DECISION

REGARDING BEST USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES WAS

BASED ON OUR ASSESSMENT, WORKS OUT BY SUBSEQUENT

INFORMATION REPORTED BELOW, THAT SOURCE'S STORY

WAS LACKING IN CREDIBILITY. THE FOLLOWING

PARAGRAPHS REPORT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RECEIVED

ON 10 DEC, BUT NOT REPORTED EARLIER AS ALL JCRC

PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN EITHER UP-COUNTRY OR OUT-OF-

COUNTRY INTERVIEWING OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES.

3. INFORMATION: DURING THE 17 NOV

INTERVIEW, SOURCE 54 MENTIONED THAT HE HAD A

FORM WRITTEN IN ENGLISH WITH SPACES FOR AMERICAN

PONS TO FILL IN PERSONAL INFORMATION. HE SAID

MSGNO 168 (PCX) *12/12/66* *18:03:04.9.6*
 ZCZC 23:01:48Z (PC)
 OTTSTYU RUEKJCS1837 3462230 RUEALGX
 ZNY
 O 122230Z DEC 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 O 122115Z DEC 86
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
 TO RUEHRC/JCRC LIAISON BARBERS PT
 INFO RUEHRC/PA COR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 BT
 KZ11

BT22

5-1757/VO-PH

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

REF: JCRC LNO 210841Z NOV 86, RPT 785-572

1. REF A REPORTED CLAIM BY SOURCE THAT HE HAD JOURNEYED TO AREA IN VIETNAM PROVINCE, VISITED WITH 10 US PWs AS WELL AS SEVERAL LAOTIAN PWs, OBTAINED SIGNATURE OF ONE AMERICAN AND RETURNED TO THAILAND. DIRECTOR, DIA, HAS ASKED VO-PH QUOTE WHY DIDN'T THEY GO WITH THE GUY TO UBOON TO GET THE SIGNATURE UNQUOTE.
 2. BASED ON THE FACTS SURROUNDING SOURCE'S REPORT, HE SURMISE YOU DID NOT DO SO BECAUSE HIS CURRENT AND PAST REPORTING IS SOMEWHAT SUSPECT. THE REPORTING HAS BEEN COUPLED WITH APPEALS FOR MONEY AND RESETTLEMENT. SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE ENTERED LAOS ON 13 OCTOBER AND REMAINED THERE THROUGH THE END OF OCTOBER, HOWEVER, ON 17 OCTOBER HE, WITH A FRIEND'S ASSISTANCE, TELEPHONED JCRC FROM UBOON, THAILAND. WE ALSO NOTE THAT HIS REPORT HAS GROWN FROM CLEVER DOG TAG AND REPORTS OF REMAINS, THROUGH REPORT OF 225 US PWs NEAR SRV-LAO BORDER, NOW TO VISIT WITH 10 US PWs.
 3. WE MUST REPLY TO DIRECTOR BY COB MONDAY, 15 DEC. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ANSWER IMMEDIATELY.

BT
 #7837
 KORN
 KEND

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

DIA EVALUATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY

SUMMARY: Source's reports on the alleged relocation of 225 American PWs from Vietnam to Laos in June 1986. The source further reports that he allegedly sighted 10 American PWs in Laos in late October 1986.

DETAILS: Source has been interviewed three times by JCRC. He initially provided dog tag data and made no mention of having seen live Americans. Later, he told a liaison agency of a hearsay account of 225 U.S. PWs in Laos. This information had not been provided to JCRC in two previous interviews.

In a third report, Source claimed to have been in Laos from 13 October through 3 November and seen 10 U.S. PWs at that time and obtained the signature of one. Yet, on 17 October, he telephoned JCRC from Uboon, Thailand.

JCRC has been waiting for the signature of the PW and made numerous requests for Source to send the signature. Mr. Source says he has the signature, but will not hand it over until he receives some kind of reward.

ANALYSIS: VO-PH has no prior reporting on the movement of American PWs from Vietnam to Laos in June 1986.

It is doubtful that Source is a man who proclaims he has no money, ever made his two trips into Laos. The forms provided by him, and which he considered to be proof, were copies of those produced by an organization headed by James "Bo" Gritz and signed by Gritz.

His ruse of seeing 10 U.S. PWs in Laos was overshadowed by his phone call to JCRC from Uboon, Thailand.

Each of his reports has been accompanied with an appeal for money or resettlement assistance. The information provided by this source raises questions as to his truthfulness and his holding of valid information.

EVALUATION: The information provided by Source is fabricated.

DATE: 9 March 1987

CLOCATE

PAGE 000

PAGE 000

MSGNO 1012 (PCX) *11/21/86* *16:09:14.5.0*

ZCZD 211021232 (PC)

RTTSYUW BUREAUS:258 3250916

ZNY

R 210916Z NOV 86

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEAHC/CSB-GRD/OC/CS

RUEADN/CSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAAA/CSO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAAA/CSAP WASHINGTON DC

RUEAAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD

RUEALC/BAF

O 1 001108Z NOV 86

O 1 001108Z NOV 86

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CLOCATE

HE OBTAINED THE SIGNATURE OF ONE OF THE AMERICANS, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE IT WITH HIM AT THE TIME OF THE INTERVIEW. IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS INFORMATION, SOURCE REQUESTED RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE FOR HIS FAMILY. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT WRITE, NEITHER WOULD HE MAKE A COMMITMENT TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. SOURCE PROMISED TO MAIL THE REMAINS OF PAPER ON WHICH HE HAD THE AMERICAN'S SIGNATURE AFTER RETURNING TO HIS HOME IN UPH PROVINCE.

3. INFORMATION: ON 17 NOV 86, JCRC-LAN RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM SOURCE. HE STATED HE WAS IN BANGKOK AND WANTED TO COME TO JCRC-LAN TO TALK WITH THE "BOSS" (THE BOSS). ABOUT SOMETHING IMPORTANT. HE ARRIVED BANGKOK LATER WITH TWO OTHER MEN WHO DECLINED TO ENTER THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. SOURCE WAS SIGNED IN (HE HAD NO IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS) AND ESCORTED TO JCRC-LAN OFFICE WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO [REDACTED].

4. SOURCE SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO REPORT INFORMATION ABOUT LIVE AMERICAN PRISONERS HE HAD SEEN RECENTLY IN LAOS, BUT FIRST WANTED TO KNOW IF HIS FAMILY COULD BE RESETTLED TO THE UNITED STATES IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS COOPERATION. AFTER EXPLAINING THAT US POLICY DOES NOT ALLOW FOR SPECIAL FAVORS, RESETTLEMENT OR REWARDS IN EXCHANGE FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION, SOURCE WAS ASKED ABOUT THE DETAILS OF HIS ALLEGED SIGHTING.

5. SOURCE STATED THAT SOON AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM THE MUONG KHE JAIL (REFS A AND B) IN EARLY OCTOBER, HE RETURNED TO LAOS AND VISITED HIS MOTHER. HIS MOTHER ENJOINED HIM TO STOP HIS RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES, FEARING FOR HIS SAFETY, BUT SOURCE TOLD HER HE COULD NOT STOP UNTIL HE FOUND OUT MORE ABOUT THE MISSING AMERICANS THAT HE HAD HEARD ABOUT. SOURCE THEN CONTACTED HIS UNCLE, [REDACTED].

6. [REDACTED] (NO. 1819). SOURCE STATED THAT [REDACTED] AS THE PERSON WHO HELPED HIM OBTAIN THE REMAINS THAT HE HAD BEEN CAUGHT WITH IN MUONG KHE.

7. SOURCE ASKED [REDACTED] HE HAD HEARD ANY MORE INFORMATION ABOUT MISSING AMERICANS. RESPONDED THAT HE HAD HEARD THERE WERE AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGN PRISONERS BEING HELD IN VIENGKAY. SOURCE: [REDACTED] THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT MORE ABOUT THEM, AND [REDACTED] AGREED TO TAKE HIM THERE TO SEE THE AMERICAN PRISONERS FOR HIMSELF. SOURCE STATED THAT ON 13 OCTOBER, HE, [REDACTED] AND 30 SOLDIERS LEFT KENGKOK IN A SOVIET "66" TAN HUEL TRUCK HEADED FOR VIENGKAY, DRIVING NORTH ALONG ROUTE 13. ARRIVING IN THAKHEK (VE 8073), THEY STAYED FOR THREE DAYS THEN CONTINUED NORTH, TAKING

SECTION 01 OF 03 LIAISON BANGKOK 51258

0999 NOV 86

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PAGE 000

MSGNO 1018 (RXX)

11/21/84 161000Z JAN 85

ZCZC: P1021232 (P)

ATTENTION: RUEK/CS1258 320016

1 210910Z NOV 84

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO: RUEKCS/CS1258-CHLD/OCJCS

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CULCATE

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THERE WAS ALSO A "SMALL BATTALION", 300-400, OF VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS. THE VIETNAMESE LIVED IN THREE LONG BARRACKS JUST OUTSIDE THE PERCHED DETENTION FACILITY, WHILE THE 74-04 LAO SOLDIERS LIVED IN TWO BARRACKS INSIDE THE FENCE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE DETENTION BUILDING. SOURCE SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE VISITED VIENGKAY AND COULD NOT RECALL THE DETAILS OF THE AREA.

8. SOURCE TOOK SOURCE TO SEE THE PRISONERS. HE WAS LED TO A LONG WOODEN BUILDING WHICH WAS DIVIDED UP INTO FIVE LARGER ROOMS. IN THE FIRST ROOM WERE 10 AMERICANS AND 20 PRISONERS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES, INCLUDING 10 BLACK MEN. THE SECOND ROOM CONTAINED 200-300 FORMER ROYAL LAO ARMY OFFICERS, MAJOR AND ABOVE. THE THIRD ROOM CONTAINED 100 CAPTAINS AND FIRST LIEUTENANTS. THE FOURTH ROOM HELD 100 SECOND LIEUTENANTS, AND IN THE FIFTH ROOM WERE 50 MILITANCE FIGHTERS.

9. AT THE FIRST ROOM, SOURCE LEARNED THAT TWO OF THE AMERICANS COULD SPEAK LAO. SOURCE GAVE ONE OF THEM A BLANK PIECE OF PAPER AND ASKED HIM TO SIGN HIS NAME AND WRITE SOME PERSONAL INFORMATION. THE AMERICAN AGREED TO SIGN HIS NAME, BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE PERSONAL INFORMATION. ASKED IF HE WAS SURE HE HAD PERSONALLY WITNESSED THE AMERICAN SIGNING HIS NAME ON THE PAPER, SOURCE STOOD UP TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS STANDING ABOUT FOUR FEET AWAY AT THE TIME. ASKED WHAT THIS AMERICAN LOOK LIKE, SOURCE SAID THAT HE, LIKE THE OTHERS, WAS VERY THIN. HE WAS ABOUT 40 YEARS OLD AND HAD SHOULDER LENGTH RED HAIR. THAT'S ALL SOURCE COULD RECALL.

10. SOURCE SAID HE STAYED IN VIENGKAY A FEW NIGHTS, RETURNED TO BAN KENGKAI ON 13 NOVEMBER AND CROSSED BACK TO THAILAND A FEW DAYS LATER. ASKED IF HE BROUGHT THE PAPER WITH THE AMERICAN'S SIGNATURE, SOURCE SAID THAT HE LEFT IT AT HIS HOME IN UDOM. HE WAS AFRAID TO CARRY THE PAPER TO BANGKOK WITH HIM, FEARING THAT HE WOULD BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE IF HE WERE STOPPED BY THAI POLICE AND IT WAS FOUND ON HIM. SOURCE VOLUNTEERED THAT HE ALSO HAD A FORM WRITTEN IN ENGLISH WHICH HAD SPACES FOR AMERICAN POWS TO FILL IN PERSONAL INFORMATION, BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN AFRAID TO BRING IT TO LAOS WITH HIM. HE HAD OBTAINED THE FORM FROM FRIENDS AT HAPRO REFUGEE CAMP. JCRC REP ASKED SOURCE IF HE WOULD MAIL THESE TWO PAPERS TO JCRC AFTER ARRIVING BACK HOME. SOURCE SAID HE WOULD. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WOULD BE BACK IN BANGKOK IN MID-DECEMBER IF JCRC SHOULD HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS AFTER RECEIVING THE SIGNATURE.

11. JCRC INTERVIEWER TOLD SOURCE THE IMPORTANCE THE US GOVERNMENT PLACES ON INFORMATION ABOUT LIVE AMERICANS AND ASKED SOURCE IF HE WOULD BE

CULCATE

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WILLING TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAM. SOURCE

HAD NOT HEARD OF A POLYGRAPH DEVICE SO IT WAS EXPLAINED TO HIM. HIS RESPONSE IN CULCATE LAO COULD BE TRANSLATED AS TWO-WAY: "I DON'T WANT TO DIE!" SOURCE WAS ASSURED THAT THE PROCEDURE WAS NOT

#1255

END

END

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MSGNO 667 (PICK) 11/21/84 16:08:51.7.48
 2222/211021232 (PC)
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 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADCS/CSG-WHD/OC/JCS
 RUEADWD/CSSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADMA/CSC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADSA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADLA/AMCJ: FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEADG/DAFP
 O 1 08210841200 NOV 86
 O FM JCRC/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 O TO RUEADPA/TOR O OJCRC O BANGKOK TH
 INFO RUEADON/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J5//
 RUEADCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//NO-PH//
 RUEADCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUEADCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEADWH/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NR CHILDRESS//
 RUEADTS/AMEMBASSY VIETNAME
 RUEADU/AMCONSOJ UDORN
 BT
 121

SECTION 03 OF 03 LIAISON BANGKOK 51258
 3855 NOV 86

CITE:
 822
 SUBJECT: JCRC RPT 786-472, ALLEGED SIGHTING OF TEN
 AMERICAN PRISONERS IN LAOS
 HARMFUL, AND SERVED ONLY TO VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF
 A PERSON'S INFORMATION. SOURCE SAID HE STILL WAS NOT
 SURE IT WAS A GOOD IDEA, BUT IF JCRC WANTED PROOF,
 HE WOULD MAIL THE SIGNATURE HE OBTAINED AND HE COULD
 SEE FOR HIMSELF. HE WENT ON TO STATE AGAIN THAT
 IF THE INFORMATION PROVED TRUE, HE WOULD LIKE
 RESETTLEMENT TO THE US FOR HIS FAMILY. IF IT IS
 NOT TRUE, HE WILL ASK FOR NOTHING. SOURCE WAS TOLD
 THAT HIS BEST CHANCE TO GET HIS FAMILY TO THE US WOULD
 BE TO ENTER THE REFUGEE SYSTEM AND APPLY FOR RESETTLE-
 MENT. SOURCE SAID HE COULD NOT DO THAT BECAUSE HIS
 WIFE IS A THAI CITIZEN.

12. COMMENT: INTERVIEWER TAKES NOTE OF
 SOURCE'S CLAIMED EASY ACCESS TO THE ALLEGED AMERICAN
 PRISONERS, SOURCE'S INABILITY TO RECALL BUT FEW
 DETAILS OF HIS TRIP TO VIENGKAY, AND THE FACT OF HIS
 SEVERAL APPEALS FOR RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE FOR HIS
 FAMILY. HOWEVER, RECEIPT OF THE SIGNATURE THAT SOURCE
 PROMISED TO SEND SHOULD SHED ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON THE
 CREDIBILITY OF HIS INFORMATION.
 SOURCE STATED THAT THE TWO

C1LOCATE

HEN WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE COAST AIR
 NAME

AS A LABORER IN BANGKOK

BT

11258

NRJG

NRJG

142550Z NOV 66 RR

66DEF

DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//

CIA WASHINGTON DC//DD/PCS//INT-RR//

S-3175/VO-PH

SUBJ: SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENT

REF: TDFIRB-315/31473-66, CITE 04633, DTG 201706Z SEP 66.

3. IN REPLY CITE S-VOP-05004, SOURCE: SOURCE OF REF. TITLE:

PW/MIA INFORMATION. COUNTRY: LA. OBJECTIVE: P62430.

2. BACKGROUND: JCRC MESSAGE CDTG 330501Z

SEP 66 (POUCHED SEPARATELY) DESCRIBES POSSIBLE AMERICAN REMAINS

CONFISCATED BY NUKDAHAN POLICE. THE SOURCE, *Source* STATED

THAT IN JULY 1966, WHILE AT BAN HONG-CHIK (VIC MC4886) HIS

RESISTANCE SUPERIOR, *MAC* DIRECTED *SC* TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO

EASTERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE TO LOOK FOR AMERICAN REMAINS.

BELIEVED THE LOCATION WHERE HE ALLEGEDLY FOUND REMAINS WAS NEAR BAN

THAKHONG IN XEPON DISTRICT. DURING HIS DEBRIEF *SC* MADE NO MENTION

TO JCRC REP OF HEARSAY INFORMATION CONCERNING 226 U.S. PW AS HE DID

DURING HIS CIA DEBRIEF (CIA TDFIR 315/31473-66). *SC* STORIES

GIVEN TO JCRC

DIA/NHIC/DC-4/DC-3/DC-ES/VO/OA-3/DB-2C

NAME

NR5007

66DEF

AND CIA ARE BASICALLY THE SAME EXCEPT THAT IN TALKING TO CIA, HE

ADDED THE 226 PWS. WHY DID HE NOT TELL JCRC ABOUT THE 226 PWS?

3. REQUIREMENTS: REQUEST REINTERVIEW OF

SOURCE ABOUT HIS CLAIMED TRIP WITH *Source* DID *SC* REALLY

TRAVEL TO XEPON DISTRICT? DID HE REALLY OBSERVE 226 US PWS? DID HE

OBSERVE ANY US PWS AT ALL? WHY DID HE NOT TELL JCRC ABOUT THE 226

US PWS? STATION MAY WISH TO POLYGRAPH SOURCE IF FABRICATION IS

SUSPECTED.

4. GUIDANCE:

A. *DATA*

B. REQUEST ALL RESPONSES TO THIS REQUIREMENT BE PREPARED IN

MESSAGE FORMAT AND FORWARDED TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//, WITH

INFO FOR CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI AND JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH.

ORIGINALS OR LEGIBLE PHOTOCOPIES OF ALL SKETCHES, DOCUMENTS,

US US

RR

BBB

PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC. (EXCEPT HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS) SHOULD BE SENT VIA REGISTERED MAIL DIRECTLY TO DIA, ATTN: V6-PH, ROOM 2E230, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4113, IF HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS ARE RECEIVED. ADDRESSEES SHOULD SUBMIT AN IIR TO THAT EFFECT AND TRANSMIT AN ELECTRICAL MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI REQUESTING DISPOSITION INSTRUCTION.

C. IAW DOD POLICY, RESPONSES TO THIS COLLECTION EMPHASIS WILL BE CLASSIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM, DATA
- (2) CRASH OR GRAVE SITE REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM,

DATA

(3) ALL OTHER PH/HIA-RELATED INFORMATION (E.G., INFORMATION REGARDING REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, INCLUDING DOG TAGS, DETENTION CAMPS, ETC.): CONSISTENT WITH POLICY CONCERNING SOURCES, METHODS OF COLLECTION, AND CONTENT.

D. ORIGINATOR'S CONTROL NUMBER IS S-VOP-86020. POC IS

AUTOVON 228-0501 DATA

COMMERCIAL (COLLECT) (202) 676-0501.

RR

Nafa

Southeast Asia Report

FBI

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

LAOS

ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THAILAND REPORT MIA REMAINS

DATA

[Article]: "Three Lao Claim To Have Buried a U.S. Pilot, Ask for a Reward, Are Arrested by the Police"

[Summary]: Three Accused of Secretly Entering the Country Reveal Evidence of Pilot

The war in Laos has been over for a long time, but the search for the remains of U.S. soldiers will probably continue both on the part of the government with direct communications and on the part of individuals from the families of those lost who hire former U.S. soldiers with war experience in Laos to help in the search for evidence of or remains of soldiers from that war. In Mahakhan Province there was a report that at 1100 hours on 8 August an official from the U.S. Embassy stationed in Thailand with the section working to solve the problem of soldiers from the United States who have been missing since the Vietnam war, met with Police 24 Mr. Chamrat Chaisak, the officer on duty at the provincial police station in Mahakhan District, and expressed his desire to meet with the three accused Lao who were arrested for slipping into Thailand without permission. The Lao were

Names (The meeting was requested) because the embassy had received word from Mr. Khamkao, a Lao leader, that these three had buried the body of a U.S. pilot and had brought some evidence with them. Police 24 Mr. Chamrat reported this to Police Maj. Udom Chanthaphithak, a police inspector, and also listened to the complete story of the three.

It revealed that before the war in Vietnam and Laos had ended, the three of them had made a living by gathering household goods and selling them. One day as they were searching for household goods at Ban Hongchik Village, Songkhon District, Savannakhet Province in Laos, they found the half burned remains, just bones, of a U.S. soldier in a flight suit (pilot) which was half burned; so together they took off the suit and kept the same case which were hanging from the neck. The name on the tags was

Names ... *data*
They buried the skeleton until a time when the system in Laos would be changed. Then they fled and entered Thailand at Ban Hongchik Village, Khammarat District, Udonratchathani Province. Later they learned that the Americans had been searching for those missing, and were giving rewards to those who led them to skeletons or evidence of U.S. soldiers. So they told the story to Mr. Khamkao and returned to check where they had buried the remains.

Then they returned to the Thai shore with the intention of going to the refugee center at Mahakhan Province, but were arrested by the provincial police of the district before they could. After Mr. Khamkao asked a few questions, he left but not a date to return in the near future to let the three know what happened. He did not reveal what the mistakes or the importance of this pilot had been.



Abstract

345 00

FROM JCRCLAB

31 October 1986

SUBJ: LOSTAS LERN - 100-111

TO: Commander JCRC

1. Please refer to our message, DTG 240721Z Oct 86
JCRC Report T86-146.
2. Enclosed for your information is the subject
letter received by Reference.

Atch:
a/s

Copy to:
DIA/VO-PW: w/stph

MSGNO 112 (PCIK) *10/24/85* *04:06:26.80*
ZCZC 09:05:22Z (PC)
RTTSZYUW RWKJES7602 2970727- -RUMAL

R 240727Z OCT 88
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO DIRACMS/CSB GRND/OC/CS
DIRADWD/OCMA WASHINGTON DC
DIRNMAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
DIRNDAZ/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
DIRNRAA/ANMCC FT RYUSCHIE MD
DIRNRAA/ANMCC FT RYUSCHIE MD

N 040718Z OCT 68
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEHQA//CJCS JCRC BARBERS PT HI
INFO RUEHQA//USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/
RUEHQA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//OC/M-
RUEHQA/CJCS WASHDC//J2/J3-MIA//
RUEHQA/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
RUEHQA/ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHDC//CHILDREN
RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
NRATO/ANCONEST THORN
BT

LIAMON HANKEK 47602
CITE: 47602 OCT 64

001-768-988
SUBJECT: JMC RPT 768-988, LETTER ALLEGING MORE REMAINS
AND KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS
REF: A. JMC LIAISON 110901Z SEP 66 768-988
B. JMC LIAISON 030750Z OCT 66 768-988
1. ON 20 OCT, JMC RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING
LETTER (IN TRAN) FROM [REDACTED] ONE OF THE
THREE LACIANS ARRESTED IN NGONMAN AND REPORTED
IN REF'S A AND B.

0000
16 OCT 1954
DEAR A. M. T. G.
BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE, I MUST EXCUSE MYSELF FOR NOT
GOING TO SEE YOU. I COULD NOT BECAUSE I HAVE A LOT
OF PROBLEMS. FIRST, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR A FOREIGNER
LIKE ME TO TRAVEL. ANOTHER PROBLEM IS MONEY. I HAVE
TO EAT AND TAKE CARE OF MY FAMILY. BUT FOR THE GOOD
JOBS I DO, I AM PAID VERY LITTLE. THEREFORE, I
WOULD LIKE YOU TO ADVANCE ME 2,000 DOLLARS (TWO
THOUSAND DOLLARS). I NEED IT TO PROVIDE FOR MY FAMILY
AND PAY FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES. BECAUSE PAYING BILLS
ALONG THE WAY GETS THE BEST RESULTS. I HOPE YOU
UNDERSTAND. AS FOR THE REMAINS AND IDENTIFICATIONS
OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MEN, THE TWO OTHER CORPSES

ARE STILL WITH MY MEN AND THERE ARE STILL MANY MORE
LIVE AMERICAN PRISONERS. BUT LET'S SETTLE THE FIRST
MATTER FIRST. THEN I'LL SURE THERE'LL BE MORE. AND
WE MUST MAKE AN AGREEMENT. FINALLY, I HOPE YOU ARE
SAFEGUARDING THE PROMISE YOU MADE WITH ME. THANK YOU
IN ADVANCE. RESPECTFULLY,
SEND RESPONSE IN CARE OF

P.S. LET'S WAIT UNTIL WE CAN GET TOGETHER AND THEN
TALK AGAIN. I'LL COME AND SEE YOU AFTER YOU SEND THE
MONEY.

END QUOTE

2. COMMENT: ON 17 OCT, JCRC 744 RECEIVED
A PHONE CALL FROM 44. A THAI FRIEND SPOKE FIRST, AND
SAID THAT 44 HAD JUST BEEN RELEASED FROM JAIL AND
WANTED TO MEET WITH JCRC REP. AGAIN. WHEN ASKED WHY
THE UNIDENTIFIED THAI GAVE THE PHONE OVER TO 44,
44 WAS JUST ABOUT INCOHERENT AND SOUNDED LIKE HE
MIGHT HAVE BEEN SUFFERING THE EFFECTS OF OVER-CHEERAT-
ING HIS RELEASE FROM JAIL. HE KEPT INSISTING THAT
44 TRAVEL TO UDORN IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE HE HAD
SOMETHING IMPORTANT TO TALK ABOUT BUT WAS NOT ABLE
TO PROVIDE ANY MORE THAN THAT. IT IS LIKELY THAT
THE ABOVE LETTER WAS WRITTEN BY ONE OF 44 THAI
FRIENDS, POSSIBLY THE SAME PERSON WHO PUT HIM UP TO
MAKING THE TELEPHONE CALL. THE MUANGKARN POLICE HAD
INFORMED US THAT AFTER THEIR RELEASE, 44 AND HIS
TWO SIDEKICKS WOULD BE TAKEN TO NAKHO REPOUSE CAMP.
APPARENTLY, 44 DID NOT MAKE IT THAT FAR. FOR THE
RECORD, THE ONLY PROMISE MADE WITH 44 WAS THAT BY
AGREEING TO TURN OVER THE REMAINS HE HAD IN HIS
POSSESSION, HE WOULD HAVE A CLEAR CONSCIENCE. THE
ABOVE LETTER WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC AND DIA/
VO-PW BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.

BT

#7602

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END

MSGNO 329 (PXX) *10/09/86* *00106118.4.0*
ZCZC 05:03:57Z (P)
RTTUZLTON RUEKJCS5974 2820131- --RUEALGX

P 090131Z OCT 86

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEACEN/DC
RUEADND/OCSS-GRID/OCJCS
RUEADND/OCSS-WASHINGTON DC
RUEAKAA/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAKAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAKAA/AFMCC FT RITCHIE MD
RUEALGX/SAFE

P 090125Z OCT 86

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEKSPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY
INFO RUEKSCA/USCINCPAC-HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA// PRIORITY
RUEADNH/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NR-CHILDRESS// PRIORITY
RUEAKCF/CORNLPERCEN ALEX VA//DAFC-PES//
BT

E21

CITE: LIAISON BANGKOK 49574
E22: 3755 OCT 86

SUBJECT: MEDIA INTEREST IN MUANGKARN REMAINS CASE
REF: A. JCRC LIAISON 110501Z SEP 86, T86-388
B. JCRC LIAISON 030799Z OCT 86, T86-388A
ON 6 OCT, SEVERAL LOCAL NEWS CORRESPONDENTS
CONTACTED JCRC-LNB ENQUIRING ABOUT THE REMAINS WHICH
HAD BEEN CONFISCATED BY MUANGKARN POLICE FROM THREE
LAOTIANS ARRESTED ON 22 AUG (REF A). ANTICIPATING
THAT THESE INQUIRIES MAY PRECIPITATE ADDITIONAL
PRESS INTEREST IN THE U.S., WE WANTED TO PROVIDE
A HEADS-UP. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE BANGKOK NEWSPAPER
"THE NATION REVIEW" CARRIED AN ARTICLE ABOUT THESE
REMAINS ON 7 OCTOBER.

2. WE ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY TO THE PRESS THAT THE
REMAINS RECEIVED WERE OF LIMITED QUANTITY (REF B),
NOTHING APPROXIMATING A "SET" THAT THE NEWS PEOPLE
HAD APPARENTLY HEARD ABOUT. WE ALSO POINTED OUT
THAT THERE WAS NO ASSURANCE THESE REMAINS COULD BE
IDENTIFIED OR CORRELATED TO THE DOG TAG WHICH WAS
ALSO WITH THE REMAINS. THIS INCIDENT WAS CITED AS
ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HOW INEXPERIENCED RECOVERY EFFORTS
MAY ONLY RESULT IN THE DESTRUCTION OF POTENTIALLY USEFUL
EVIDENCE.

3. THE BONE FRAGMENTS WILL BE HAND-CARRIED TO
CIEH FOR EXAMINATION BY *1/14* ON HIS

RETURN TO HAWAII FROM THAILAND

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

COMMENTS ON CIA PW/MLA REPORT

- CIA message 201906Z SEP 85 (tab 1) reported the alleged relocation of 226 Americans PWs from Vietnam to Laos in June 1985.
- Sources of this report first came to JCRC attention in late July.
- Sources have offered alleged remains and dog tags and asked for money in exchange.
- Sources were arrested by Thai police for illegal entry.
- CIA report is similar to hearsay reported previously through JCRC and was probably obtained by CIA through Thai police channels.
- Reports seem to be another scheme to obtain money for information.
- YO-PW has no prior reporting on the movement of American PWs from Vietnam to Laos in June 1985.
- MI11 attempt to locate other persons from the area for interview.
- This reporting is not yet candidate for operation other than re-interviews and collection.

STATUS OF ACTIONS ON 20 SEP CIA REPORT OF 226 US PW IN LAOS

20 SEP REPORT:

- Source claimed knowledge of 226 US PWs recently moved from Vietnam to Laos (circa June 1986).
- Source stated that a friend has a brother who is Lao Army officer who knows location of 226 US PW.
- In June 86, source, friend and friend's brother traveled to location near Xapone to verify the presence of US PW.
- Source was told to wait while friend and brother went to investigate.
- After four hours, friend returned (without brother) and stated that he had seen the US PWs but could not get close because of Lao and Vietnamese security forces.
- Report was provided to CIA by Thai officials who commented that source and two others associated with him "involved themselves with the alleged POWs in expectation of receiving a reward and resettlement in the US."

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

- Reviewed reporting chronology.
- Source had been interviewed by JCRC previously for dogtag information and had not reported the information of 226 US PW to JCRC.
- Requested CIA and/or JCRC follow-up and reinterview source; suggested polygraph if fabrication is suspected.

REPORTING CHRONOLOGY

28 July 1986 - (tab 2) JCRC-LNO interviewed *Source* learned that following

- Has information from dog tag of *Name*.
- Says *Name* Lao have *Name* dog tag plus two others, and four sets of American remains.
- Remains can be purchased for \$20,000 each.
- Information provided to *SC* by brother Thai villager *Name*, who claims to have Lao contacts.
- *Name* claimed to *SC* that his Lao contacts know of 250 American prisoners being held along the Thai-Lao border.
- *Name* dog tag is that of U.S. Army Warrant Officer 1 *Name* BNR, lost in helicopter incident 8 March 1971 in southern Laos.

5 August 1986 - (tab 2) Letter from *SC* received by JCRC-LNO:

- *Name* attempting to obtain location and signatures of the 250 American prisoners.
- \$20,000 per set of remains requested.

3 September 1986 - (tab 2) JCRC learned of arrest of two Thai and three Lao in possession of remains, artifacts, and the Cleve dog tag.

- Visited Lao prisons *SC* *Name*.
- Observed small amount of remains, *Name* dog tag, .38 caliber bullet, and probable flight suit remnants in possession of Thai police.
- Interviewed Lao sources who claim to have access to three sets of remains from crashsite of jet aircraft in Laos.
- Sources entered Thailand with portion of remains to sell to U.S. Government; arrested by Thai.
- Lao sources, *Name* *Name* *Name*, made no mention of American prisoners.

6 September 1986 - (Tab 3) JCRC-LNO received second letter from Thai citizen

- Claims his sources double crossed him.
- States his sources were arrested at Mukdahan.

16 September 1986 - CIA obtained report from an official liaison service as follows:

- Lao national in jail at Mukdahan reports having obtained three sets of remains from Lao villager in Savannakhet Province, Laos.
- Lao villager claims that his elder brother is a member of unit guarding 226 American prisoners.
- PIs reported to be guarded by Lao Army and Vietnamese Army troops.
- According to the villager, the PIs had been moved from Vietnam to Laos in June 1986.

INTERIM EVALUATION:

- No similar reporting in data base.
- Individuals held in seminar in Xepona area report no knowledge of or no rumors of Americans held in that area.
- Source claims to be associated with Lao resistance, yet no member of Lao resistance has reported 226 US PW near Xepona.
- Sequence of reporting suggests source was attempting to gain reward from USG; when on forthcoming, he reported another story.
- Report, while probably bogus, will continue to be investigated until definitive conclusion reached.
- The photo dogtag appears to be genuine and probably was recovered from crashsite; may have been recovered by source or by his sources.

C1

PAGE 000

MSGNO 144 (PCX)
ZCZC 071041232 (PC)
RTTUZYU/ROKJCS1572 2540505-
ZNY

-RDEALGX

R 110505Z SEP 86

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

THRU ROKJCS/CHS-GRID/OCJCS

RORAND/OCMA WASHINGTON DC

RORAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RORAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RORAAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD

RORADG/SOC-GRID/SECDEF

RDEALGX/SAFE

R 110501Z SEP 86

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RORADG/COM JCRG BARBERS PT HI

THRU RORAAA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J38//

RORADG/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//

RORADG/JCS WASHINGTON DC//J5/PW-MIA//

RORADG/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-TSA/PW-MIA//

RORADG/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NR CHILDRESS//

RORADG/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

RORADG/AMEMBASSY UDORN

RORADG/COMUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI

RORADG/COMILPERCEN ALEX VA//DAFC-PES//

BT

EZ11

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 41572

EZ2:

CITE: 3680 SEP 86

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT T86-388 POSSIBLE-AMERICAN REMAINS

- CONFISCATED BY MUHDAHAN POLICE

REF: JCRC LIAISON 220835Z AUG 86, RPT T86-354

(MOTAL)

1. REF REPORTED HEARSAY INFORMATION FROM THAI CITIZEN *Source* CONCERNING FOUR POSSIBLE SETS OF AMERICAN REMAINS AND DOG TAG INFORMATION ON *Name*

2. ON 2 SEP 86, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PASSED LATERALLY TO JCRC-LNB:

ON 0 AUG 86 TWO THAI MEN AND THREE LAOTIANS WERE ARRESTED BY MUHDAHAN PROVINCIAL POLICE AT SAM KHA VILLAGE CHECK-POINT, HUANG DISTRICT, MUHDAHAN PROVINCE. THE MEN CLAIMED THAT A LAO RESISTANCE FIGHTER SENT THEM TO CONTACT THE AMERICAN CONSULATE IN UDORN PROVINCE IN ORDER TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ITEMS FOR REWARD: SEVERAL SMALL PIECES OF BONE, A PIECE OF BURNT MATERIAL WITH A ZIPPER WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN PART OF A FLIGHT SUIT, AND ONE DOG TAG WITH THE FOLLOWING:

C1

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THE TWO THAI MEN WHO HAD ALREADY BEEN RELEASED ON BAIL, SAID A LAO RESISTANCE SOLDIER NAMED *Name*

HAD RECOVERED THE ABOVE ITEMS AT BAN MONG CHIK, SONGKHRO DISTRICT (WC 8891), SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAOS. *Name* ATTACHED TO THE 120 LAO RESISTANCE BATTALION AT BAN MONG VILLAGE, KONGKARAT DISTRICT, BOM PROVINCE, THAILAND. END OF REPORT.

3. A SECOND FOLLOW-UP REPORT INDICATED THAT THE THAI MEN'S NAMES WERE *Name*

THE THAI WERE CHARGED WITH HIDEING THE LAO INTO THAILAND, AND WERE LATER RELEASED ON BAIL. THE LAO WERE CHARGED WITH ILLEGAL ENTRY. ALL FIVE ARE TO APPEAR IN COURT. *Name* CLAIMED THAT HE WAS BRINGING THE THREE LAO TO NAPHO KEUPOH CAMP AND HE HAD BROUGHT ALONG THE DOG TAG TO TURN IN TO AMERICAN OFFICIALS AT THE CAMP FOR A REWARD.

4. ON 2 SEP 86, JCRC REP *Name* TRAVELED TO MUHDAHAN TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND REQUESTED TURN-OVER OF THE DOG TAG AND OTHER ASSOCIATED ITEMS.

AFTER MEETING BRIEFLY WITH LT COL MONTHE SUKMAN, CHIEF OF MUHDAHAN PROVINCE IMMIGRATION,

HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE SMALL QUANTITY OF CONFISCATED REMAINS HAD BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF, LT COL UDORN JANTHITAK.

5. *Name* WENT TO THE POLICE STATION AND WAS MET BY POLICE OFFICER JANTHAI CHAISAK WHO BROUGHT OUT A SACK CONTAINING BONE FRAGMENTS AND OTHER OBJECTS FOR EXAMINATION. HE ALSO MADE THE THREE LAOTIAN PRISONERS AVAILABLE FOR QUESTIONING. THE SACK CONTAINED FIVE OR SIX SMALL BONE FRAGMENTS, THE LARGEST BEING ABOUT AN INCH AND A HALF LONG WHICH APPEARED TO BE A SEGMENT OF AN ARM OR LEG BONE. A SECOND PIECE WAS ALMOST CIRCULAR IN SHAPE, ABOUT AN INCH IN DIAMETER AND MAY BE A PIECE OF SKULL OR SCAPULA. THE REMAINDER OF THE PIECES WERE SMALL, UNIDENTIFIABLE FRAGMENTS. ALSO INCLUDED WITH THE REMAINS WAS A .38 CALIBER BULLET, ONE BUTTON SHAP, ONE PIECE OF ZIPPER, AND ONE PIECE OF PARTIALLY BURNT MATERIAL WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN A FLIGHT SUIT, AND THE *Name* DOG TAG.

6. THE THREE LAOTIAN PRISONERS WERE BROUGHT IN FOR QUESTIONING. THEY IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS *Name* AND *Name*.

Name STATED THAT IN JULY 1986, WHILE AT BAN MONG CHIK (ACCORDING TO *Name* LOCATED IN VICINITY OF WC 8888), HIS RESISTANCE SUPERIOR, *Name* (LNU) DIRECTED SOURCE *Name* TO GO WITH HIM

BT

RUCALCZ/REDAUX/STC 234030Z
 DTG: 110515Z SEQ 86
 FT 653 WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEAHG/CSG-GRD/CASG
 RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAQA/CSG WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAABA/ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEASDQ/SCG-GRD/SECDEF
 RUEALCZ/SAFE
 C RUCALCZ/SAFE SEQ 84-00
 PH C-000000 LIAISON WARRIOR TR-00
 TO RUEHQA/CON-CHS-BAWERS FT HI
 INFO RUEHQA//USMC/PAF BOWLING HT//76/13/136//
 RUEHQA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//76-99//
 RUEHQA/STS WASHDC//75/76-KIA//
 RUEHQA/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA 76-KIA//
 RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//ESL//
 RUEAFS/ARMEDSERV VENTNAMS
 DIA/UD/ANCSNTH-DOCOM
 RUEHQA/CRUSADACTRY FT SHAFTER HI
 RUEAHQ/COMHILPEREN ALET VA//DAPC-PES//
 DTG: 110515Z

SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 41572

0221:
CITE: 3680 SEP 86
TO A LOCATION IN EASTERN SATUNAGHAT PROVINCE TO LOOK FOR AMERICAN REMAINS. IT WAS NOT SURE OF THE LOCATION WHERE HE HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT BELIEVED IT WAS NEAR A VILLAGE CALLED BAN THAKONG IN KHAMMONG DISTRICT. HE SAID HE AND TWO OTHERS WERE ON THE CRASH SITE OF A JET AIRCRAFT. SOURCE SAID HE COULD TELL IT WAS A JET BECAUSE OF THE SHORT BACK WINGS. "THE TWO MEN ALLEGEDLY FOUND THREE SETS OF REMAINS IN THE COCKPIT OF THIS JET. PUT THEM IN A BAG AND THEN RETURNED TO BAN MONG CHIT. SO CLAIMED THAT THE REMAINS INCLUDED THREE FULL SETS, INCLUDING COMPLETE SKULLS AND ALL OTHER BONES EXCEPT ONE OF THE FINGER WHICH WAS MISSING OFF OF ONE OF THE SKELETONS. (NOTE: JUDGING FROM THE FRAGMENTED AND PARTIALLY BURIED REMAINS WHICH WERE COMPLICATED, THE CLAIM OF THREE FULL SETS IS DOUBTFUL.) SOURCE SAID HE WOULD BRING THEM TO HIM TO TAKE THE REMAINS AS A SAMPLE TO PRESENT TO U.S. OFFICIALS TO DETERMINE THAT THEY ACTUALLY HAD SOMETHING AND TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH THE U.S. WOULD PAY. SOURCE SAID HE CROSSED THE RIVER INTO KHAMMONG DISTRICT OF UDORN PROVINCE, AND

was advised by resistance leader CRANCO, MR CHAMPAINE
TO KIDNAP THE BRITAIN TO TWO OFFICIALS: MR HANCOX, NETHER
CAMB (INTER-001) AND MR LOCAL THAI (CAMB)
MESSAGE WAS FORWARDED TO JCRC HEADQUARTERS VISIT TO THE MEGHANA
POLICE STATION AND HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE LOANIAN
PROSECUTOR. THE RESULTS OF THE PAPERS VARIED SOMEWHAT
FROM THE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY A-100
6. THE INTERVIEW WAS OBTAINED FROM ONE OF THE
POLICE OFFICIALS INFORMED BY A-100. THE
PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF WAS WAITING TO MEET WITH MR
LOCAL. WAS TALKING TO THE PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS
WHERE HE MET WITH POLICE. COLONEL SAMES VENTILATED
COL. SAMES EXPLAINED THAT HE KNEW OF THE EFFORTS OF THE
US GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA. AND REQUESTED TO BE AS HELPFUL IN THIS
CASE AS POSSIBLE. HE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT BECAUSE
THE LOCAL AND OTHER THINGS WERE MORE COMPLICATED AS
PART OF THE LAW. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO
OBTAIN INFORMATION OFFICIALS IN HIS PRESENTED AS
EVIDENCE THAT THEIR CASE GOES TO COURT. HE SUGGESTED
THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO REARRANGE THE ITEMS. HE
TOOK OF THE COURT. PROSECUTOR WHICH HE PROPOSED
COULD GO ON FOR A MONTH. TO FACILITATE THAT EVENTUALITY
HE SUGGESTED THAT AN OFFICIAL LETTER OF REQUEST BE
PRESENTED ASSISTING THE TURN-OVER OF THE ITEMS TO
US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
7. MR CHAMPAINE THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE REQUIREMENT
FOR PROPER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO BE OBSERVED, AND AGREED
TO OBTAIN THE REQUESTED LETTER. (BEFORE CLOSING THE
MEETING, THE COLONEL MADE A COMMENT TO HIS DEPUTY
THAT THE EFFORTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF ITS MISSING SERVICEMEN
WAS VERY IMPRESSIVE.)
8. MR JCRC 7000 RETURNED TO HANCOX
ON 8 SEP 68. A LETTER FROM 65 (SOURCE OF
INFO) WAS WAITING. THE LETTER SAID IN PART: "ABOUT
THE NAME THAT I MENTIONED YOU, I FOUND OUT THEY DOWN-
DROPPED HIM. BUT THEN THEY WERE CAPTURED BY MEGHANA,
ON ABOUT THE 26TH OF AUG." THE LETTER WAS NOT
SPECIFIC, BUT INDICATES THAT THERE IS A CONNECTION
BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL CLEVELY REPORT IS RECEIVED FROM
A-100 AND THE LAC RESISTANCE PEOPLE WHO WERE
APPREHENDED IN MEGHANA. 65 FULL LETTER WILL
BE REPORTED SEPARATELY. A COPY OF THE TWO NEWS
ARTICLES WITH TRANSLATION WILL BE FORWARDED TO MR JCRC.
HE WILL CONTINUE APPROPRIATE EFFORTS TO GAIN CUSTODY
OF THE REMAINS AND EFFECTS AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

BT
#1572
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MSGNO 195 (PCT) 008/22/86 004 02:58.8
 ZCZC 111011Z027(P)
 PTTSTLN RUEKJCS8774 230802Z
 ZNY
 P 220802Z AUG 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEAHS/CSG GRD/OCJCS
 RUEADN/CSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAA/CHO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEASDG/SGC GRD/SECDEF
 RUEALGZ/SAFE
 P 220832Z AUG 86
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEHQA/COM JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY
 INFO RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J5//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEADN/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/PW-CHILDRESS//
 RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEHQA/AMCONSUL UDORN
 BT
 E211
 SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 38774
 CITE: 3621 AUG 86
 E22:
 SUBJECT: JCRC RPT T84-154, AMERICAN REMAINS AND
 PRISONERS IN LAOS
 1. SOURCE/ADMIN DATA:
 A. NAME: *Soukha*
 B. AGE: *30*
 C. ADDRESS: *...*
 D. PROFESSION: FARMER
 E. LANGUAGES: THAI (NATIVE)
 F. STATUS: *...*
 G. DATE OF INFO: JULY 1986
 H. INTERVIEWED AT US EMBASSY ON 7 JULY 86
 JCR
 2. SUMMARY: SOURCE PROVIDED DOG TAG INFORMATION
 ON *...* ALONG WITH HEARSAY INFORMATION
 OF FOUR SETS OF REMAINS AND 250 AMERICAN
 PRISONERS BEING HELD AT AN UNSPECIFIED LOCATION ALONG
 THE THAI/LAO BORDER.
 3. INFORMATION: SOURCE, A RESIDENT OF
Soukha SAID
 HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN CONTACTED BY AN ACQUAINTANCE
 NAMED *...* WHO LIVED IN BAN NANGKANG ABOUT

SIX KILOMETERS FROM SOURCE'S VILLAGE. *...* HAD HEARD
 THAT SOURCE WAS PLANNING TO COME TO BANGKOK TO VISIT
 HIS SON AND TOLD HIM THAT SINCE HE WAS GOING TO BANGKOK
 ANYWAY, HE SHOULD GO TO THE US EMBASSY AND REPORT THE
 INFORMATION THAT HE HAD OBTAINED FROM TWO LPA OFFICERS.
 ONE A LT COL. THAT HE HAD MET IN LAOS ON A RECENT
 TRIP FOR UNSPECIFIED REASONS. SOURCE THEN TOOK WITH
 A PIECE OF PAPER WHICH *...* HAD GIVEN HIM WITH THE
 FOLLOWING INFORMATION PRINTED IN ENGLISH:

...
 4. *...* TOLD SOURCE THAT THE INFORMATION HAD
 BEEN COPIED FROM A METAL NECK TAG, AND THAT THE PATRIOT
 LAO HAD TWO IN ADDITION TO THAT ONE AND FOUR SETS
 OF AMERICAN REMAINS. *...* GAVE SOURCE 500 BART
 (ABOUT TWENTY US DOLLARS) TO HELP NEARBY HIS EXPENSES
 IN CONTACTING THE US EMBASSY IN BANGKOK.
 5. *...* ALSO TOLD SOURCE THAT HIS TAG CONTACTS
 HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY KNEW OF A LOCATION ALONG THE
 THAI/LAO BORDER WHERE 250 AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE
 BEING HELD. HE TOLD SOURCE THAT IF THE US EMBASSY
 WAS INTERESTED HE COULD TRY TO GET EVIDENCE SUCH AS
 SIGNATURES OR FINGERPRINTS. HE TOLD SOURCE TO ASK
 IF THERE WOULD BE ANY PAYMENT IF EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED.
 6. AFTER AGREEING WITH *...* TO PASS ON THE
 INFORMATION, SOURCE LATER TALKED WITH HIS FRIEND
... WHO LIVES AT BAN LAT YAKHA. *...* ADVISED
 SOURCE TO CONTACT *...* WHO LIVES IN BAN
 KINCHAN, AMPHOP TRANTHAN. *...* EXPLAINED THAT *...*
 HAS A RELATIVE NAMED SAIFA (LNU) WHO HE HEARD WAS ALSO
 INTERESTED IN AMERICAN REMAINS AND HAD HEARD THAT HE
 WAS PAYING 500,000 BART (ABOUT 20,000 US DOLLARS)
 FOR EACH SET OF REMAINS. SOURCE STATED THAT HE
 DECIDED IT WOULD BE BETTER IF HE JUST FOLLOWED *...*
 INSTRUCTIONS AND CONTACTED THE US EMBASSY.
 7. JCRC REP EXPLAINED THE POLICY OF NON-PAYMENT
 FOR INFORMATION AND REMAINS, AND THE HUMANITARIAN
 NATURE OF THE USC'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CASES OF
 MISSING AMERICANS. SOURCE WAS ASKED TO EXPLAIN THE
 SAME TO *...* AND ASK HIM TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL
 DETAILS THAT HE COULD.
 8. COMMENT: SOURCE, A MAN OF MODEST MEANS,
 SEEMED SINCERE AND APPEARED TO BE AN INNOCENT
 BETWEEN. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A FRIEND OF HIS SON'S,
 MR. *...* THE PIECE OF PAPER PROVIDED
 BY SOURCE WITH *...* 5 DOG TAG INFORMATION WILL BE
 FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC. WE NOTE THAT *...*
 BT
 #8774

NSCNO 200 (PCIE) 08/22/86 06:02:59 181
 ZCZC 1110140Z (PC)
 PTSTLTON RUEKJCS774 230842Z - RUEALGX

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/CSG-GR1D/OCJCS
 RUEADG/CSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANAN/CSG WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANNA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAAN/ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEASDG/SDG-GR1D/SECDEF
 RUEALGX/SAFE

P 220855Z AUG 86
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEADG/CSG JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY
 INFO RUEANNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J6//
 RUEALGX/DIA WASHINGTON DC//J2/J3/J6//
 RUEALGX/JCS WASHDC//J5/PA-HIA//
 RUEALGX/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PA-HIA//
 RUEADN/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NM CHILDRESS//
 RUEADN/EMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEADN/AMCONSUL UDORN
 BT

EZ1:
 SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 38774
 3621 AUG 86
 CITE:
 EZ2:
 SUBJECT: JCRC RPT 786-354, AMERICAN REMAINS AND
 PRISONERS IN LAOS

WERE IN A CR-1 THAT CRASHED
 NEAR XD666365 ON 22 MAR 71. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE
 HAS BEEN NO PREVIOUS REPORTING ON THIS CASE. END
 COMMENT.

9. ON 8 AUG 86, JCRC-LNB RECEIVED THE FOLLOW-
 ING LETTER (IN THAI) WHICH ADDRESSED THE REMAINS
 AND THE 250 AMERICAN PRISONERS.
 QUOTE

30 JULY 79

DEAR MR.

I RETURNED HOME ON 8 JULY, AND WAS VERY BUSY WITH
 VARIOUS MATTERS. I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY
 ARE INSISTENT ABOUT THE PAYMENT. I'M GOING TO TRY
 AS BEST I CAN TO HELP THE AMERICANS. AS FOR THE
 PAYMENT OF 500,000 BAHRT PER CORPSE AS I MENTIONED,
 I'M GOING TO TRY TO EXPLAIN AND TAKE THE DOCUMENTS
 TO SHOW THEM. THEY WANT (MONEY) ONLY. I AGREED TO

HAVE THEM GET THE OTHER TWO NAMES ALONG WITH SOME
 MONEY TO GIVE YOU TO EXAMINE FOR AN AMERICAN NUMBER
 AND VARIOUS EVIDENCE OF THE REMAINS IF POSSIBLE.
 IF I GET THEM I WILL LET YOU KNOW IMMEDIATELY SO (YOU)
 CAN DO SOMETHING WITH THEM. ACCORDING TO THE
 NEWS REPORTS, MONEY IS RETURN IN THE AMOUNT MENTIONED
 IF HE RECEIVED THE MONEY, HE CAN BE TRUSTED
 WITH HE WILL GET SIGNATURES OF 250 PRISONERS TO GIVE
 (YOU) AND TELL THEIR DETAILED LOCATIONS. THEREFORE
 IF MY LETTER IS USEFUL TO YOUR GOVERNMENT, SEND ME AN
 ANSWER QUICKLY SO I CAN START WORK TO HELP YOU.
 IF IT DOES GO AGAINST THE POLICE OR YOUR GOVERNMENT,
 PLEASE FORGIVE ME.
 FINALLY, I HOPE YOU UNDERSTAND THIS.
 RESPECTFULLY

END QUOTE
 COMMENT: ON 8 AUG SOURCE CALLED JCRC-LNB
 AND SAID HE RECEIVED MORE INFORMATION AND WOULD SEND
 IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE ASKED AGAIN ABOUT PAYMENT
 FOR THE REMAINS TO WHICH JCRC HAS REITERATED THE
 EARLIER STATED POSITION. AT THAT POINT THE LINE WENT
 DEAD (SOURCE WAS PROBABLY AT A PAY PHONE AND HAD
 BEEN TALKED-OUT). SOURCE CALLED AGAIN ON 9 AUG AND
 LEFT WORD FOR E. J. TO CONTACT HIM. HE WILL
 ATTEMPT FOLLOW-UP WITH SOURCE AND REPORT ANY ADDITIONAL
 INFORMATION. A COPY OF SOURCE'S LETTER WILL BE
 FORWARDED TO HQ JCRC AND DIA/TO-PW.

BT
 38774
 R000
 EZ3
 TEXT
 C22A
 N000

Abstract

S.P.C.R.S.T.
Central Intelligence Agency



Form 10-100

3 MAR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Defense Intelligence Agency
Special Office for PW/MIA (VO-PW)

ATTENTION: Warren Gray

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Information Provided by Lao National

REFERENCE:

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

ADISCU

TO: *Adm*

FROM: *Adm*

SUBJECT: hangson camp, quang ninh

DOCUMENT SENT ON 11/07/90

REMARKS: tell me about it please routine

PPDISCTL(1)

PPDISCTL(2)

INFO

ENTRELOPE

CDSN = LCM957 MCH = 90311/12326 TOR = 903110820

RTTCXTUN RUEKJCS0169 3110821 RUEALGX

ZNY

HEADER

R 070821Z NOV 90

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

R 070605Z NOV 90

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DAN//

INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC DR. KARL JACSON//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OASD-PW-MIA//

RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LCS/NI//

RUEHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEHKL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR

RUEHKL/USDAO HONG KONG

BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 60169

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0123 91

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0123 91/ABSENCE OF AMERICANS AT HANG
SON REEDUCATION CAMP, QUANG NINH PROVINCE

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 870000.

REFS: S-YOP-05295; D-YOP-2430-03-90.

SOURCE: SC //A 36-YEAR-OLD VIETNAMESE BOAT PERSON AND FORMER (SC) ASSIGNED TO THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE. SOURCE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION REPORTED HEREIN THROUGH PERSONAL OBSERVATION. SOURCE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY BEACH REPORT. IT PROVIDES A LIMITED DESCRIPTION OF THE HANG SON REEDUCATION CAMP (QUANG NINH PROVINCE) AS IT EXISTED IN LATE 1987 AND ITS IMMEDIATE POPULATION, WHICH INCLUDED NO AMERICANS. THIS REPORT RESPONDS TO DIA SOURCE DIRECTED REQUISITION S-YOP-05295, PARAGRAPH 1, ENCLOSURE.

TEXT:

1. SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS DURING THE PERIOD 1980-1985. DURING THESE PERIODS, HE MADE FREQUENT TRIPS TO THE HANG SON REEDUCATION CAMP TO INTERROGATE CRIMINAL SUSPECTS.

2. THE HANG SON REEDUCATION CAMP (TRAI CAI THAO) HANG SON) WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY THREE KM SOUTH OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY 18 NEAR PHAM HON THAI VILLAGE, DON THIEU DISTRICT, QUANG NINH PROVINCE IN VICINITY 20 47 36 N 106 41 38 E //UTM COORDS--48QJ17627. AS LOCATED BY SOURCE ON MAP SHEET MF48-12, SERIES 1501 AIR, 1:1250,000//. IT WAS CONSTRUCTED AROUND 1975 BY THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS OFFICE AND WAS ADMINISTERED BY THE PSS HEADQUARTERS (BAN CHIEU HUY CAMER SATS). THE CAMP COMMANDER (GIAM THI) WAS PSS MAJ (1701) TRAU (TOO TRAU), WHO IS PRESENTLY ABOUT 45 YOA. HIS THREE ASSISTANTS WERE PSS SR CPT (4804) LAN (TOO LAN), 40 YOA; PSS SR CPT (1901) HUNG (DAO HUNG), 40 YOA; AND PSS SR CPT (1901) OANH, 40 YOA.

3. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT AT THE TIME OF HIS LAST VISIT TO HANG SON CAMP IN LATE 1987, IT WAS UNDERGOING RECONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION. AS SUCH, HE CLAIMED HE COULD NOT ESTIMATE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CAMP AREA. PORTIONS OF THE CAMP (RF1) WERE SURROUNDED BY BRICK WALLS APPROXIMATELY 1.60 METERS TALL AND 20 CM THICK, BUT THERE WAS NO WALL OR FENCE THAT CLEARLY DEFINED THE LIMITS OF THE CAMP AREA. THERE WERE 16 SINGLE-STORY BUILDINGS IN THE CAMP, ALL CONSTRUCTED OF BRICK WITH TILE ROOFS. SEVEN SPECIALLY DESIGNATED AS A SPECIAL DETENTION CELL (KIEM GIAM) FOR ESCAPEES. THE REMAINING BUILDINGS IN THE CAMP CONSISTED OF FOUR WAREHOUSES (WHICH HELD CEMENT AND STEEL REINFORCEMENT RODS FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF

THE CAMP), A BUILDING CONTAINING THE OFFICES OF THE CAMP COMMANDER AND HIS ASSISTANTS, QUARTERS FOR THE CAMP ADMINISTRATORS, AND A WOOD AND METAL WORKING WORKSHOP. THERE WAS ALSO A LIME KILN AND TWO BRICK KILNS. THE ARRANGEMENT OF THESE STRUCTURES AS THEY APPEARED IN LATE 1987 IS REFLECTED IN A DETAILED SKETCH PREPARED BY SOURCE (SEE ENCL.). SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE INTENDED PLAN FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CAMP AND NEVER VISITED THE CAMP AFTER 1987. THEREFORE, HE COULD NOT SPECULATE AS TO ITS CURRENT CONFIGURATION.

4. THERE WERE ABOUT 400 PRISONERS IN HANG SON CAMP, ALL SENTENCED TO REEDUCATION TERMS OF NOT MORE THAN 10 YEARS. PRISONERS WERE ALLOWED TO SEND AND RECEIVE MAIL AND TO RECEIVE UNLIMITED VISITS FROM FAMILY MEMBERS. ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, THEY WERE REQUIRED TO ATTEND POLITICAL LECTURES AND THEY RECEIVED REGULAR REINFORCEMENT OF THE CAMP'S INTERNAL REGULATIONS. ALL PRISONERS PARTICIPATED IN CAMP DETAILS, WHICH CONSISTED MAINLY OF MAKING BRICKS, QUARRYING ROCK, AND WORKING IN THE FIELDS.

5. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT HE COULD NOT ESTIMATE THE GUARD STRENGTH OF THE CAMP, BUT COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE CAMP WAS GENERALLY VERY LAX. HE ALSO COULD NOT DESCRIBE THE DAILY ROUTINE OF THE CAMP.

6. SOURCE STATED THAT AT NO TIME DURING HIS VISITS TO HANG SON CAMP DID HE EVEN OBSERVE OR HEAR OF ANY PRISONER THAT WAS AN AMERICAN, FOREIGNER, OR ETHNIC OR MIXED BLOOD VIETNAMESE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN TO BE AN AMERICAN.

COMMENTS:

1. SOURCE WAS GENERALLY COOPERATIVE, BUT WAS VERY CAUTIOUS IN HIS STATEMENTS. HE ANSWERED MOST QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER, BUT BECAME SOMEWHAT EVASIVE WHEN PRESSED FOR SPECIFIC DETAILS.

2. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCURATELY ESTIMATE THE FREQUENCY OF HIS VISITS TO HANG SON CAMP BECAUSE IT WAS DETERMINED BY HIS WORKLOAD AT THE CAMP. HE INSISTED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS VISITS WERE FREQUENT ENOUGH FOR HIM TO HAVE BEEN AWARE OF ANY UNUSUAL PRISONERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE EASILY BEEN MISTAKEN FOR AMERICANS.

//TSP: 1 PG 2430//
//CONSOL: 1 521//
ADMIN
PRN: 6999-11.
COLL: AB.
INSTR: US: NO.

001: 860000

RECS: D-YOF-2430-02-90, D-YOF-2430-06-90,
D-YOF-2430-09-90.

SOURCE: A 35-YEAR-OLD VIETNAMESE BOAT PERSON AND FORMER PSS (L) ASSIGNED TO THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE. SOURCE CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY SELECTED ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN SEARCH ACTIVITIES TO RECAPTURE ALLEGED US PWS WHO HAD ESCAPED FROM SHV DETENTION FACILITIES. SOURCE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY RECAP REPORT. IT PROVIDES INFORMATION FROM SOURCE'S FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN SHV GOVERNMENT-DIRECT OPERATIONS TO LOCATE AND RECAPTURE ALLEGED AMERICAN PWS WHO HAD ESCAPED FROM DETENTION FACILITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS IN FEB 77 AND SEP 84. IT ALSO ALLEGES THAT, FOLLOWING THESE ESCAPES, THE LIVE PWS REMAINING IN CAPTIVITY WERE TRANSPORTED TO TWO UNDERGROUND FACILITIES IN HANOI WHERE THEY WERE HELD AS LATE AS 1986.

ENCLOSURE.

TEXT:

1. IN FEB 77, SOURCE WAS A PSS SERGEANT ASSIGNED TO THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICE (PHONGCIE DUEP THA HINH SJN) OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE. ON AN UNRECALLED DATE THAT MONTH, SOURCE WAS CALLED IN TO SEE THE ASSISTANT OFFICE CHIEF OF HIS OFFICE, PSS MAJ ((VU)) HOA ((VOI HOA)). HOA, NOW 46 YOA, INFORMED SOURCE THAT HE HAD BEEN CHOSEN TO ASSIST IN AN OPERATION TO LOCATE AND RECAPTURE AN AMERICAN PRISONER WHO HAD ESCAPED FROM AN SHV PRISON CAMP. HOA CLAIMED THAT HE AND SOURCE WERE THE ONLY MEMBERS OF THEIR OFFICE TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPERATION AND STRESSED ITS EXTREME SECRECY.

2. WHILE RECEIVING HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM HOA, SOURCE WAS SHOWN A WRITTEN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE OPERATION. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE ORDER STATED THAT THE OPERATION WAS ORGANIZED AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY JUSTICE (CUCJ QUAN PHAP) OF THE SHV MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND). THE ORDER WAS SENT DIRECTLY FROM THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY (MPS) (BOO COONG AN) TO SOURCE'S OFFICE AND THE SECURITY OFFICE (PHONG AN NINH) OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE AS WELL AS TO THE MILITARY JUSTICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PAVN FORCES. SOURCE RECALLED THE ORDER WAS SIGNED BY SENIOR COLONEL ((TRAN)) HUNG ((TRANH HUNG)), THEN DIRECTOR OF THE MPS POLICE CRIMINAL LAW DEPARTMENT (CUCJ CANH SATS HINH

SOURCE INCLUDED IN THE ORDER WAS A COMPLETE BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN, INCLUDING NAME, AGE, HEIGHT, WEIGHT, PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, NAME(S) AND FORENMENT, AND OTHER DATA AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE. A SMALL BLACK-AND-WHITE PHOTO OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN TAKEN WHILE IN CAPTIVITY WAS ALSO ATTACHED. SOURCE CLAIMED HE COULD NOT RECALL ANY OF THE PERSONAL DETAILS INCLUDED IN THE ORDER AND COULD NOT PROVIDE A DESCRIPTION BASED ON THE PHOTOGRAPH. SOURCE ONLY SAW THE ORDER ONCE PRIOR TO BEGINNING THE OPERATION AND HITHERTO THE ORDER NOR ANY RECAPTURE FROM IT WERE CARRIED BY THE SEARCH TEAM MEMBERS DURING THE OPERATION.

AFTER RECEIVING HIS INSTRUCTIONS, SOURCE WAS TOLD TO REPORT TO PSS LTC ((HUYEN)) MINH CHAU ((HUYEN MINH CHAU)), THEN OFFICE CHIEF OF THE SECURITY OFFICE (PHONG AN NINH) OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS OFFICE, WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEEING THE SEARCH EFFORT. CHAU ASSIGNED SOURCE AND A PERSON NAMED ((NAME)) NAME ((NAME)) THE TASK OF PATROLLING THE COASTAL AREA BETWEEN HAI PHONG AND QUANG NINH IN AN EFFORT TO LOCATE THE ALLEGED AMERICAN. DURING THE PERIOD HE WORKED WITH NAME ((NAME)) SOURCE LEARNED THAT HE WAS A PAVN SOLDIER (NAME AND SPECIALTY UNKNOWN) AND WAS ONE OF THE ADMINISTRATORS (REFERRED TO BY SOURCE AS QUANG DIAS) OF THE FACILITY FROM WHICH THE ALLEGED AMERICAN ESCAPED. NAME NEVER TOLD SOURCE ANY DETAILS OF THE LOCATION OR ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON CAMP, BUT REVEALED IN CASUAL CONVERSATION THAT HE WORKED IN HAI BAC PROVINCE, IMPLYING THAT THE CAMP WAS ALSO LOCATED THERE. NAME, THEN ABOUT 40 YOA, ALLEGEDLY HAD A UNIVERSITY DEGREE IN ENGLISH (SCHOOL UNKNOWN) AND HAD PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT (CUCJ DOOTS HOOA) OF THE MND. DURING THE TIME HE WORKED WITH SOURCE, NAME ALWAYS WORE CIVILIAN CLOTHES.

4. SOURCE AND NAME PATROLLED THE AREA NORTH OF HAI PHONG AND INTERVIEWED LOCAL RESIDENTS FOR LEADS REGARDING THE ALLEGED AMERICAN FOR APPROXIMATELY 20 DAYS. THIS AREA WAS BELIEVED BY LTC CHAU TO BE THE MOST LIKELY ROUTE OF ESCAPE FOR THE ALLEGED AMERICAN, WHO WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING COORDINATED HIS ESCAPE AND POSSIBLE PICK-UP BY BOAT WITH THE CIA THROUGH THE HELP OF CIA PLANTS IN THE PAVN (MFI). DURING THE OPERATION, SOURCE AND NAME COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH CHAU AND THEREFORE DID NOT KNOW ANY OTHER PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE SEARCH EFFORT OR IN WHAT AREAS THEY WERE CONCENTRATED. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 20 DAYS, CHAU CALLED OFF THE SEARCH. SOURCE RECEIVED NO INFORMATION REGARDING THE RESULTS OF THE OPERATION, BUT BELIEVED THAT, BASED ON THE DURATION OF THE SEARCH, THE ALLEGED AMERICAN WAS NEVER FOUND.

5. ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN LATE SEP 84, SOURCE WAS AGAIN CHOSEN TO PARTICIPATE IN A SEARCH FOR AN

ALLEGED ESCAPED AMERICAN PW. AT THAT TIME, SOURCE WAS A PSS 1LT AND WAS STILL ASSIGNED TO THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS OFFICE. HE CLAIMS HE WAS THE ONLY ONE FROM HIS OFFICE CHOSEN FOR THIS DUTY AND THAT NO OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS OFFICE WERE INFORMED OF IT. HE WAS CONTACTED DIRECTLY BY PSS 1ST LIEUTENANT (1LT) MAI (LIE MAI), THEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS OFFICE. MAI, NOW JUDGE TO TA AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NOI GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF POLICE (TOONG CUC (CHIEF SAYS), GAVE SOURCE A WRITTEN OPERATION ORDER SIGNED BY ((TRAN)) DONG (THAINE DONG), THEN DIRECTOR OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (MOI) GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (TOONG CUC) AN KINH).

6. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE OPERATION ORDER PROVIDED THE SAME TYPE OF DETAILED BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION INCLUDED IN THE ORDER FOR THE FEB 77 SEARCH OPERATION. HOWEVER, THE ORDER ALSO INCLUDED A SERIES OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN TAKEN FROM DIFFERENT ANGLES. SOURCE RECALLED THE PHOTOS WHICH WERE ALL BLACK AND WHITE AND APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN AFTER THE ALLEGED AMERICAN WAS CAPTURED. INCLUDED A FRONTAL FACE PHOTO; A TWO-THIRDS PROFILE OF BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT SIDES; A FULL STANDING PHOTO; AND ONE PHOTO TAKEN WITH THREE OTHER CAUCASIANS WHO ALSO APPEARED TO BE PW. SOURCE RECALLED ONLY LIMITED DETAILS OF THE BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS INCLUDED IN THE ORDER, SAYING THAT THE ALLEGED AMERICAN HELD THE RANK OF CDR (TRUNG TAS) WHEN CAPTURED AND WAS A US NAVY PILOT BORN IN CALIFORNIA. ALTHOUGH HE CLAIMED HE COULD NOT RECALL ANY OTHER PERSONAL DATA, BASED ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS, SOURCE PROVIDED A DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN.

7. SOURCE DESCRIBED THE ALLEGED AMERICAN AS CAUCASIAN, APPROXIMATELY 1.80 METERS TALL, AND VERY THIN. HE HAD AN OVAL SHAPED FACE WITH A HIGH, STRAIGHT NOSE, BROWN EYES, AND "BUDDHA-LIKE" EARS. WHEN ASKED TO SKETCH THIS, SOURCE DREW AN EARLOBE WITH AN HOURGLASS SHAPE. HIS HAIR WAS BROWN AND VERY SHORT WITH A VERY NOTICEABLE RECEDING HAIRLINE. IN ALL PICTURES, HE WORE LOOSE-FITTING STRIPED PRISON PATIGUES. SOURCE DID NOT NOTICE ANY SCARS BUT RECALLED THAT THE PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION IN THE ORDER NOTED A LIMP AS THE ALLEGED AMERICAN'S MOST DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTIC.

8. AFTER GIVING SOURCE HIS INSTRUCTIONS, COL MAI ASSIGNED PSS MAJOR ((DAQ)) KHAC MAI (DOAF KHAC MAI), THE CHIEF OF THE SECURITY INTERROGATION OFFICE (PHONG DIFUOT TRA XET HOI) OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS OFFICE, TO DIRECT THE SEARCH EFFORT. SOURCE CLAIMED THE SEARCH TEAM CONSISTED OF HIMSELF, MAI MAI, THREE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NOI (NFI), AND THREE LOCAL BOAT

CREWMEN (NFI) WHO PROVIDED A SMALL BOAT. THE TEAM USED TO CONDUCT ITS SEARCH EFFORTS. THE BOAT CREWMEN WERE TOLD THE PURPOSE OF THE SEARCH WAS TO APPROXIMATE PERSONS TRYING TO FLEE VIETNAM ILLEGALLY AND KNOW NOTHING OF THE TEAM'S ACTUAL MISSION. COL MAI DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTUAL SEARCH EFFORT BUT WAS KEPT INFORMED OF THE TEAM'S PROGRESS BY MAI MAI.

9. DURING THIS OPERATION, SOURCE'S TEAM CONCENTRATED ITS EFFORTS ON THE QUANG NINH COASTAL AREA. SOURCE CLAIMS HE DID NOT KNOW ANY DETAILS OF THE DETENTION FACILITY FROM WHICH THE ALLEGED AMERICAN ESCAPED. NOR DID HE KNOW WHAT OTHER UNITS WERE TASKED WITH TRYING TO RECAPTURE HIM. AFTER THREE DAYS OF SEARCHING, SOURCE WAS INFORMED BY MAI MAI THAT THE SEARCH HAD BEEN TERMINATED. HE WAS NOT TOLD ANY RESULTS OF THE OPERATION BUT ASSUMED THAT THE ALLEGED AMERICAN HAD BEEN RECAPTURED.

10. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT IN BOTH OF THE ABOVE INCIDENTS, THE ALLEGED AMERICANS HAD ESCAPED FROM DETENTION FACILITIES ADMINISTERED BY THE NVN MOD. BECAUSE THE MOD SEEMED INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADEQUATE SECURITY, IN EARLY 1985 IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETENTION OF AMERICAN PW WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NOI. SOURCE LEARNED OF THIS DECISION IN EARLY 1985 FROM HIS FORMER CLASSMATE AND CO-OPERATOR IN QUANG NINH, PSS LTC 55. AT THAT TIME,

OF THE NOI GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY, SOURCE WAS IN HANOI TO GET A PLANE TICKET TO BEING TO INTERROGATE A MURDERER WHO HAD FLED THERE FROM QUANG NINH. WHEN HE STOPPED BY TO VISIT 55, COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SPENT THAT MORNING (DATE AND MONTH UNRECALLED) ACCOMPANYING DONG AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (NFI) TO A MEETING WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE MOD (NFI). THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS REPORTEDLY TO OFFICIALLY TURN OVER A NUMBER OF FILES PERTAINING TO ALLEGED AMERICAN PW STILL IN CAPTIVITY AT THAT TIME. 55 EXPLAINED FURTHER THAT, FOLLOWING THE TRANSFER OF THE FILES, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE ALLEGED AMERICANS WOULD ALSO BE PASSED TO THE NOI. WHEN THE MEETING CONCLUDED, 55 REPORTEDLY ACCOMPANIED DONG AND HIS DEPUTY TO INSPECT THE TWO SITES IN HANOI CITY CHOSEN BY THE NOI TO HOLD THE ALLEGED AMERICANS TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE SUFFICIENTLY SECURE BEFORE ARRANGING THE TRANSFER OF THE PRISONERS.

11. ACCORDING TO 55, THE TWO SITES CHOSEN WERE UNDERGROUND FACILITIES LOCATED BENEATH THE NOI INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL SCIENCE ((VIETNAM: HOC BOI HINH SAI)); LOCATED NEAR THE INTERSECTION OF TRAN HUNG DAO AND YET KIPU STREETS //UTHC0000--4804J860245// AND BENEATH THE HO CHI

NINE MAUSOLEUM ON HUNG YUONG STREET //UTACORDS-4804072260//. BOTH OF THESE FACILITIES WERE ALLEGEDLY BUILT AT THE SAME TIME AS THE SURFACE STRUCTURES, BUT 55 DID NOT TELL SOURCE ANY DETAILS OF THEIR CONSTRUCTION OR IF THEY HAD EVER BEEN USED PREVIOUSLY. AT THE TIME 55 VISITED THEM, THEY DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PRISONERS. ACCORDING TO SOURCE 55, 55 TOLD HIM THAT ONCE THE FACILITIES WERE APPROVED FOR USE, THE ALLEGED AMERICAN PWS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THEM FROM A PRISON CAMP NEAR THE VILLAGE OUTSIDE HANOI IN VICINITY //UTACORDS-48040514//. BECAUSE THEY WERE BEING HELD AT THAT TIME, SOURCE DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY ALLEGED AMERICANS WERE BEING HELD OR ANY DETAILS OF THEIR IDENTITIES OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE. HE ALSO DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG THEY HAD BEEN HELD AT THE LOCATION NEAR THE VILLAGE.

12. IN EARLY 1986, SOURCE MET 55 AGAIN AS HE WAS PASSING THROUGH HANOI ON HIS WAY BACK FROM HCMC. HERE HE HAD NOTICED THAT THERE WAS A FLOORISHING TRADE IN ALLEGED US REMAINS. WHEN HE COMMENTED ON THIS TO 55, 55 RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT THE CONCEPT OF SELLING REMAINS WAS RATHER ANGSTING SINCE LIVE AMERICANS WERE STILL HELD IN THE TWO LOCATIONS ABOVE. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH SOURCE, 55 ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD VISITED THE ALLEGED AMERICANS KEPT NEARBY THE INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL SCIENCE BECAUSE ONE OF THEM HAD DIED. HE SUPPOSEDLY HAD TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BODY TO BE PRESERVED ON THE SITE AND TO ENSURE THE HEALTH OF FOUR OTHER ALLEGED PWS STILL KEPT THERE. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE TIME OR CAUSE OF DEATH OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN NOR DID HE KNOW ANY FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF THE PRISONERS OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DETENTION FACILITIES.

13. SOURCE COMMENTED THAT IN LATE 1986, TRAN DONG WAS REPLACED AND 55 LAST HIS POSITION AS THIRD. SOURCE MET 55 AT THIS TIME AND 55 REPORTEDLY CONFIRMED TO SOURCE THAT THE ALLEGED AMERICANS WERE STILL KEPT AT THE TWO HANOI LOCATIONS. 55 NOW 37 YOA, IS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE HANOI MUNICIPAL PSS OFFICE AND MAY BE ATTACHED TO THE INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION OFFICE (PHONG DISEUP TRA XETS HOI).

14. SOURCE SUGGESTED THAT, IF US AUTHORITIES WISH TO OBTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ISSUE, HE WOULD WRITE A LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO 55 OR TO A MUTUAL FRIEND, PSS.) NOW 40 YOA AND ASSIGNED TO THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS OFFICE. IF THIS LETTER WERE PRESENTED TO EITHER OF THEM SECRETLY, SOURCE CLAIMS THEY WOULD, UPON RECOGNIZING HIS HANDWRITING, PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION.

COMMENTS:

1. NO MET SOURCE INITIALLY THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF A US INTERPRETER IN CAMP. SOURCE WAS VERY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT MEETING NO AND INSISTED THAT THE MEETING TAKE PLACE SECRETLY AND OUT OF SIGHT OF OTHER BODILY PEOPLE IN THE CAMP. SHE ALSO INSISTED THAT NO PROVIDE/REVEAL HIS POSITION AS AN OFFICER OF THE US COMBATANTS BEFORE SPEAKING TO NO. SOURCE DID NOT CONSENT TO AN INTERVIEW DURING THE INITIAL MEETING AND OPENLY REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM NO IN EXPEDITING HIS REFUGEE SCREENING. NO INFORMED SOURCE THAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE AND TOLD HIM TO CONSIDER CONSENTING TO AN INTERVIEW AND INFORM NO OF HIS DECISION UPON NO'S RETURN TO CAMP ONE WEEK LATER. THE FOLLOWING DAY NO'S OFFICE RECEIVED AN APOLOGOUS PHONECALL REQUESTING VERIFICATION OF NO'S POSITION AND FUNCTION. SOURCE ADMITTED DURING INTERVIEW THAT HE ARRANGED FOR A USER OFFICIAL TO PLACE THE PHONECALL ON HIS BEHALF.

2. SOURCE WAS GENERALLY COOPERATIVE DURING THE INTERVIEW AND ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS WITHOUT HESITATION. HE WITHDREW HIS REQUEST FOR SCREENING ASSISTANCE, BUT ASKED FOR A LETTER DOCUMENTING THE FACT THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BY NO. SOURCE AGREED TO FURTHER INTERVIEW AND A POLYGRAPH IF NECESSARY.

3. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT HE WAS CHOSEN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SEARCH FOR THE ALLEGED AMERICANS BECAUSE OF HIS EXCELLENT JOB PERFORMANCE IN PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS AND HIS PROVEN ABILITY TO PERFORM SPECIAL TASKS WELL.

4. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD KNOWN 55 SINCE MAY 79 WHEN THEY ATTENDED A THREE-MONTH PSS POLITICAL TRAINING COURSE IN HANOI. THEY HAD BECOME CLOSE FRIENDS WHEN THEY WORKED TOGETHER IN QUANG NINH ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE EARLY 1980'S.

5. SOURCE STATED THAT HE COULD NOT PROVIDE AN EXACT LOCATION OF HIS OFFICE, WHICH WAS CO-LOCATED WITH THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PSS OFFICE, BUT EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS IN HA NAM TOWN, HONG GAI CITY, QUANG NINH PROVINCE. SOURCE'S OFFICE CHIEF DURING THE PERIOD OF THE EVENTS OF THIS REPORT WAS PSS. NAME WHO IS NOW ABOUT 70A. PAGE
//IPC: (PG 2130//
//COMSOBJ: (52//
ADMIN
FIC: (6999-11.
COLL: (NONE.
INST: (US: NO.
PREP: (TH-06.

ENCL: TO FOLLOW TO DIA(PH-MIA) - 1 ENCLOSURE
 1. MEMORY SKETCH, 1 PG, 1 CT (0)
 ACQ: (900219)
 DISSEM: (FIELD) (EMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB) (DM) (POL)
 S (DATLO, EL/A, JORG)
 WARNING: (

ICE

BT

#804

NNNN

ENVELOPE

CASH = LGX123 NCN = 89354/05986 TOR = 893580418
 PTTSLYU/RUEKJCS8738 3540414 -RUEALGX

ZNY

HEADER

R 200414Z DEC 89

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEALGX/SAFE

RUEALGX/DITTS

R 200414Z DEC 89

FM USDAO HONG KONG HK//PH-MIA//

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//PH-MIA//

INFO RUEHKK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PH-MIA//

BT

CONTROLS

HONG KONG HK 18738

THIS IS A STORY REACH MESSAGE

BODY

SUBJECT: STATUS OF FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS IN RESPONSE TO
 S-TOR-05295

REF: DIA WASHINGTON DC/PH-MIA MSG 221130Z AUG 89,
 FORMER PSS CADRE

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF, SC HAS BEEN LOCATED AND REINTERVIEWED. REPORTS ON RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WILL BE PUBLISHED SOON. HOWEVER, NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE SC FOR REINTERVIEW HAVE PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL. NEITHER HONG KONG IMMIGRATION SERVICE, UNICEF, NOR JVA HAVE ANY RECORD OF A REFUGEE CORRESPONDING TO THE BIO DATA OF SOURCE. WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO LOCATE SOURCE, BUT IT APPEARS THAT SOURCE PROVIDED FALSE BIO DATA DURING INITIAL INTERVIEW.

2. FOC IS 1A-2 COMMERCIAL PHONE
 OAF4 L).

ADMIN

BT

#8738

NNNN

1178

1179

NO FURTHER DISSEM
PRIOR TO PEOC
FOR DISSEMJOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

COPY NUMBER 10

RODCA

VTN MACHALLES 230001

NOTES
1. SOURCE: AUG 89
IN HONG KONG (HK) (PW-KIA)
2. VIA MESSAGE (PW-KIA)
INFO DIA WASHDC//DIAH-2A//PW-KIA//

HONG KONG HK 12140

COMMUNICATION

THIS IS A STORY BEACH MESSAGE

SUBJECT: STORY BEACH INFORMATION REPORT

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1. NAME: SC
2. DOB: 54
3. CITIZENSHIP: VIETNAMESE (PW-KIA)
4. SEX: M
5. RELIGION: NONE
6. MARITAL STATUS: 50
7. CURRENT ADDRESS: 54
8. PREVIOUS RESIDENCE: 54
9. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 54-71, AFTER COMMUNIST
FROM 1980 SOURCE: INTERVIEWED, PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE
54-71 SOURCE: AT ECONOMIC SECURITY AT HQ BANG
10. MILITARY SERVICE HISTORY: 54-71, 54-71, 54-71
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ROUTINE
R 180501Z AUG 89
FM USDAO HONG KONG HK//PW-KIA//
TO USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-KIA//
INFO DIA WASHDC//DIAH-2A//PW-KIA//

HONG KONG HK 12140

COMMUNICATION

DELIVER TO: OFFICER ONLY

THIS IS A STORY BEACH MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PSS SOURCES

WHEN I UNCOVERED SC AND SC I PASSED THEM TO
HONG KONG AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST. THEY DID NOT
KNOW ABOUT SC AND HAVE NOT INTERVIEWED HIM TO DATE.
THEY HAD INTERVIEWED SC ON 31 JAN 89, BUT HE DID
NOT MENTION ANY ALIA INFORMATION AT THAT TIME.
THEIR INTERVIEW DID NOT RESULT IN ANY REPORTING, AND
THEIR EVAL OF SOURCE CREDIBILITY WAS LOW, WHICH WILL
BE REFLECTED IN ANY FORTHCOMING BID.

ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

(N)

ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

(N)

MCH-88230/03462 TOR-88230/08112 TAD-88230/08172 COSH-HIAGAS

1180

1181

PAGE:0029

**DIA SPECIAL
HANDLING REQUIRED**

PRIORITY
P 161828Z AUG 89
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAK-2A//
TO USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
INFO USDAO HONG KONG HK//PW-MIA//

COMMUNICATIONS

DELIVER TO
DAM-2A/1025/09
THIS IS A STORY BEACH MESSAGE
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
I RECEIVED A CALL FROM PH-RIA THIS AFTERNOON REQUESTING
INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR SOURCES QTS AND SC
(IN YOUR REPORTS YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED THESE SOURCES AS FORMER
PEP AND YOU DO NOT KNOW WHETHER QOTS HAS ALSO
INTERVIEWED THESE SOURCES AND, IF SO, HAS IT PUBLISHED ANY REPORTS
BASED ON THEIR INFORMATION. PH-RIA WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY REPORTS
EXPEDITING THE HQ-REPORTS ON THESE TWO SOURCES. PH-RIA NEEDS THIS
INFORMATION TO HELP DEVELOP POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON EEI FOR THESE
SOURCES

DEVELOPER

CUSSN = LAX675 HCN = 89219/03402 TOR = 892190620
RTTSSTW RUKJCS9573 2190617 KURALGX
ZNY
BRADEN
070617Z APR 80

[illegible]

CONTROLS

BANGKOK TB/PK- 39573

SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0323 89

NOV

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0323 89/CONTINUING DETENTION OF
ALLEGED AMERICAN PWs CLAIMED BY PSS CADRE

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: A30520

REFS: A-POP-2430-04

SOURCE: *is* SOURCE IS A 35-
YEAR-OLD VIETNAMESE BOAT PERSON. FORMERLY A PUBLIC

ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

(11)

MCN=88228/06878 TOR=88228/18262 TAD=88228/18372 CDSN=MIAR02
PAGE 1 OF 1

SECURITY SERVICE (PSS) LIEUTENANT ASSIGNED IN 1989 TO THE QUANG NINH PSS OFFICE AS OIC OF THE SOURCE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A PSS MAJOR REPORTEDLY THEN WORKING FOR THE SOURCE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY BEACH REPORT. IT PROVIDES LIMITED HEARSAY INFORMATION ON THE CONTINUING INCARCERATION OF EIGHT ALLEGED AMERICAN PMS IN A FACILITY IN TUYEN QUANG PROVINCE.

TEXT: SOURCE'S FRIEND ... SS, A PSS MAJOR ASSIGNED AS PERSONAL SECRETARY ... CLAIMED THAT ALLEGED AMERICAN PMS WERE BEING HELD AS LATE AS 1988 AT AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION IN TUYEN QUANG PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO SS, ONE PRISONER HAD DIED OF ILLNESS (WT). THE PRISONERS WERE ALLEGEDLY MOVED TO THE TUYEN QUANG SITE AFTER ONE OF THEM ESCAPED IN 1983 (REF IIR 6-024 0321 89). SS TOLD SOURCE THAT EIGHT ALLEGED AMERICANS REMAINED. THE CAMP IS REPORTEDLY IN AN AREA SURROUNDED BY A SOVIET MILITARY UNIT OR UNITS, AND THE LOCAL POPULATION KNOWS ONLY OF THE SOVIET FORCES THERE.

COMMENTS:

1. REF IIR 6-024 0321 89 FOR DETAILS REGARDING SOURCE HAD KNOWN SS SINCE THEY WERE CLASSMATES AT THE PSS ACADEMY IN HA LONG.

2. SOURCE ALSO ASSERTED THAT S.S. S OLDER BROTHER, A LIEUTENANT COLONEL IN THE PSS FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO THE QUANG NINH PROVINCE INVESTIGATIONS INSTITUTE (VUON KIEN SAT) IS NOW IMPRISONED FOR ATTEMPTING AN ILLEGAL DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM. ALSO DISSENTING WITH THE PARTY AND THE REGIME IS SOURCE'S PREVIOUS boss.

DATA

//TFSP: PG 2830//
//COMSOBJ: 52177.

ADMIT
FROM: (6999-11.
CALL: (NONE.
INSTR: (US: NO.
PREP: (TH-04.
EXCL: (NONE.
ACQ: ((890802)
DISSEM: (FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCM, POL,
- SA, DATT/ALO JCRC).
WARNING:

BT

#9573

NNNN

PAGE:0007

ENVELOPE
 CDSN # 111660 HCN # 89216/08262 TOR # 892160552
 RTTSTUN RUEKCS9343 2160549 KUALGX
 ZNY
 HEADER
 R/080549Z AUG 89
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO: RUEADWD/CSSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHQA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHQA/CJAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHQA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHQA/AFIS AMES ROLLING APB DC
 RUEHQA/AFPC/TCR/COMBANGUS
 RUEHQA/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHQA/CMC JC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHQA/SAFE
 R/080549Z AUG 89
 FM USDAO: BANGKOK TH//TS-NIA//
 TO RUEHQA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TS-NIA/DAM/DAM-3//
 INFO: RUEADWD/CSSA WASHINGTON DC//JCS DR. EARL JACKSON//
 RUEHQA/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA//TS-NIA//
 RUEHQA/CJCS WASHDC//J3/JCS-TH-NIA//
 RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
 RUEHQA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LDO/NIL//
 RUEHQA/CJAF JC WASHINGTON DC//PT HI
 RUEHQA/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
 RUEHQA/USDAO BANG KONG
 BT
 CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH//FM- 39343

SERIAL: IIR 6 024 0321 89.

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 BODY
 COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN).

SUBJ: IIR 6 024 0321 89/DETAILS OF MAY 83 WARRANT FOR
 ARREST OF ALLEGED AMERICAN

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
 FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 830500.

PAGE:0008

RECS: D-TCP-2490-01

SOURCE: IS A 35-
 YEAR-OLD VIETNAMESE BOAT PERSON FORMERLY A PUBLIC
 SECURITY SERVICE (PSS) LIEUTENANT. SOURCE RELIABILITY
 HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THIS IS A STORY BEACH REPORT. IT
 RELATES DETAILS RECALLED BY SOURCE OF A SPECIAL WARRANT
 FOR THE ARREST OF AN ALLEGED AMERICAN WHO HAD REPORTEDLY
 ESCAPED FROM PRISON IN NORTHERN VIETNAM IN 1963.

TEXT:

1. IN APR OR MAY 83, THE QUANG TRUNG PROVINCE
 PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE (PSS) OFFICE RECEIVED A SPECIAL
 ARREST WARRANT SIGNED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE
 PARTY. THE WARRANT WAS FOR THE ARREST OF AN
 ALLEGED US NAVY PILOT WHO HAD ESCAPED FROM AN
 UNIDENTIFIED SPECIAL DETENTION FACILITY. FOLLOWING IS A
 TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT AS RECALLED BY SOURCE. DETAILS
 UNRECALLED BY SOURCE ARE INDICATED BY DOTS (.....).

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
 ISSUES THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL ARREST WARRANT--

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROPOSAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF NOI
 PRISONS THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ISSUES THE FOLLOWING
 SPECIAL ARREST WARRANT--

NAME YEAR OF BIRTH 194.....
 POB - CALIFORNIA
 RESIDENCE COMMANDER, AMERICAN NAVY PILOT
 ARREST 196.....
 ESCAPED FROM SPECIAL DETENTION CAMP IN
 CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBJECT HEIGHT 1M7 LONG
 STRAIGHT NOSE, LONG EARLOBES
 IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS

REQUEST ALL PROVINCES CONCENTRATE ON THE ARREST BY ALL
 MEANS AVAILABLE. CABLE RESULTS IMMEDIATELY TO
 DATA (TROOPS ARE NOT TO BE INFORMED OF THIS
 ORDER)

(SIGNED) MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
 SECRETARY THANH DONG

2. QUERIED ABOUT MARKING ON THE WARRANT, SOURCE
 ASSERTED THAT IT BORE A RED STAMP OF THE OUTLINE OF AN
 ARROW NEAR THE TOP LEFT PORTION POINTING UP AT A
 30 DEGREE ANGLE TOWARD THE TITLE OF THE DOCUMENT, WHICH

BORN, THE PRINTED TERM "SPECIAL" (DAC SIET). THE SIGNATURE WAS THAT OF ((TRAN)) BONG ((TRAN)) BONG. ON THE LOWER RIGHT WAS AFFIXED A BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH OF A THIN FACED CAUCASIAN WITH BROWN HAIR AND BROWN EYES (AS FAR AS COULD BE ASCERTAINED FROM A BLACK/WHITE PHOTO). CLOSE-CROPPED HAIR, NO BEARD OR MUSTACHE, NO GLASSES AND HIGH FOREHEAD.

3. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CASE BY THE PSS OFFICE HEAD, ((NORTH)) THANG CONG ((NORTH)) THANG CONG, A PSS MAJOR. BECAUSE THE 32 MEN OF SOURCE'S UNIT WERE TO BE USED TO COVER THE QUANG NINH/HARBOUR AREA, SOURCE MADE THE MISTAKE OF INVOLVING OTHER PSS TROOPS. WORD CIRCULATED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VAMANT, AND THIS EVENTUALLY LED TO SOURCE'S DISMISSAL FROM THE PARTY (AND HIS JOB) IN 1984.

4. SOURCE DID NOT SEE THE ALLEGED AMERICAN WAS EVER CAUGHT. HE FELT CERTAIN OF THIS BECAUSE HE FREQUENTLY ASKED HIS CLOSE FRIEND ((S)) A CLASSMATE IN COURSE ((S)) AT THE PSS ACADEMY (IN HA CONG), IN 1972, WHO WAS AT THE TIME A PERSONAL ((S))

ON THE MANY OCCASIONS THAT SOURCE QUERIED HIS FRIEND, ((S)) AFFIRMED THAT THE ALLEGED AMERICAN HAD NOT BEEN CAUGHT. ((S)) CONTINUED TO BE ((S)) WORKING AND LIVING AT THE MINISTRY OFFICES AT DATA RAMOI, UNTIL ((S)) FELL INTO DISFAVOR WITH THE PARTY IN 1987 AND WAS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTRY. THEN A MAJOR, WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ASSIGNED AS ((S))

APARTMENT AT THE ((S)) WHERE HIS WIFE ((S)) WORKED.

COMMENTS:

1. SOURCE WAS COOPERATIVE AND REQUESTED ONLY THAT EXTREME CARE BE TAKEN TO PRESERVE HIS SECURITY AS A SOURCE. HE CLAIMED HUMANITARIAN MOTIVATION FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION, AND DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE HANOI REGIME, ONLY PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE HARSH TREATMENT HE RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF HIS SECURITY VIOLATION.

2. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INTERVIEW WERE PARTICULARLY DISADVANTAGEOUS. THE CAMP IS HOLDING CENTER TEMPORARILY ESTABLISHED ON A DATA WITH MINIMAL FACILITIES, TO ACCOMMODATE THE LARGE INCREASE IN RECENT ARRIVALS. NO HAD ONLY 1.5 HOURS BEFORE TRANSPORTATION RETURNED. SOURCE WAS UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT HIS LACK OF ANONYMITY. HE EXPRESSED READINESS FOR FURTHER CONTACT FOR CLARIFICATION AND FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE SHORT INTERVIEW, HE ALSO PROVIDED FURTHER INFORMATION FROM ((S)) ON ALLEGED AMERICAN PMS HELD AS LATE AS 1988, WHICH WILL

BE THE SUBJECT OF A SUBSEQUENT REPORT.

//TSP: PG 2130//

//CONSOBJ: 527//

ADMIN PROJ: (6999-11.

COLL: (NONE.

INSTR: (US: NO.

PROD: (TN-04.

ENCL: (NONE.

ACQ: ((090802)

DISSEM: (FIELD: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK (AMB, DCN, POL,

DATA/TLO JCRC).

BT

#9343

MEMO

NAME 3 SC 60768 ID # 2 : 04989

KA 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37

DAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 32
CATEGORY: 1ANTRY LOCATED 23 00 STATE/CITY 15
NTRY REPORTED 10 VN
YPE SIGHTING 46 PCN-HSY
ST SIGHTING 42 11 12

UBSOURCES 27 SS

KREP LIFE MAG
WORLDWIDE
ENTERPRISES,
INCSS
SS1015 CIAHQ CIRCUIT/0599488
SS1015 CIAHQ DTG 151012Z

CURRENT ACT 43 CAPTIVITY 39

REMARKS 34 FOLREQ 200 PWS IN CAVE-HAND1 ANALYST 13: AN

ATE RECEIVED 8: 881027 DATE OF INFO 55 8808

SOURCE DOB 14 ADDRESS 25

RIGIN CODE 17: D

OLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

OLYGRAPH RESULTS 24

NAME 3 SC ID # 2 : 06076

KA 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37

DAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 32
CATEGORY: 1ANTRY LOCATED 23 00 STATE/CITY 15
NTRY REPORTED 10 VN
YPE SIGHTING 46 PCN-HSY
ST SIGHTING 42 11 12

UBSOURCES 27 SS

CTIONS 51 SS1015 CIAHQ CIRCUIT/0599488
SS1015 CIAHQ DTG 151012Z

CURRENT ACT 43 CAPTIVITY 39

REMARKS 34 FOLREQ UNK# PWS HAND1 83-84 ANALYST 13: AN

ATE RECEIVED 8: 881027 DATE OF INFO 55 8804

SOURCE DOB 14 ADDRESS 25

RIGIN CODE 17: D

OLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 08 NON-PRISONER

OLYGRAPH RESULTS 24

UNIDENTIFIED ORIGINATOR

NAME ID	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED: 37
SUFFIX NAME	
BAT NUMBER	
COUNTRY LOCATED	DATE RECEIVED: 8/89
COUNTRY REPORTED ON	DATE OF INFO: 8/89
TREE STARTING	PWD-HSY
LOCATION	LAT 11 N LONG 12 E
SUB-SOURCES	SS SS SS
ACTION/REPORT	MATE LIFE HAG
ORIGINATOR	GROUPTIME
DATE ACQUIRED	EUTERARITSES
POLY RESULTS 24	INC
CATEGORY: 50	IA
ORIGINAL SOURCE: 17	D
FINDING ACTIONS:	
STATUS/REMARKS	
ANALYST	
UNCLASSIFIED NAME	
REFUGEE LOCATION	
U.S. ADDRESS	

26 IN

CONTACTED: 32 CAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT: 39

FOI Ref # 200 PWS IN DAVE HARTST

AN

[illegible]

PAGE 0006

MSGR 38 (PCX) *12/10/86# 05103:11.7.9#
 ZCZC 101021:17Z (PC)
 KTTZLUN RUEKJCS0180 3440924- -RUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 100558Z DEC/86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO:RUEADWD/CASA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIAA/CNAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/DIEMEA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEAIIA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/SEC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 100558Z DEC/86
 FM USSDO HONG KONG HK
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//OA-3//DE-20//DC-1A13//TO-PH/KCS-28//
 INFO RUEAIIA/CNO/CNAF HONOLULU HI
 RUEAIIA/USDAO BEIJING CH
 RUEAIIA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEAIIA/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 BT
 E21:
 SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 20180
 E22:
 SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 842 0127.87
 COUNTRY: (U) VIETNAM (VN)
 SUBJECT: IIR 6 842 0127.87/LYMAN DE JAIL POSSIBLE POW
 CAMP IN VIETNAM (U)
 WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
 FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
 DOI: (U) 861115
 HQS: (U)
 SOURCE: (U) //6-842 0224//

SUMMARY: THIS IIR FORWARDS INFORMATION PROVIDED
 BY A LOCAL VIETNAMESE CHINESE REFUGEE
 CONCERNING THE LY MAN DE JAIL NEAR HANOI.
 CLAIMS THE JAIL WAS USED TO HOUSE KIA/POW'S AFTER THE
 END OF THE WAR.

TEXT: A LOCAL REFUGEE OFFICER RECEIVED A LETTER
 WRITTEN BY A VIETNAMESE CHINESE REFUGEE
 CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE
 CONTEXT OF THE LETTER IS TRANSMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
 QUOTE

DEAR OFFICER OF THE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, HI,
 I AM A VIETNAMESE CHINESE REFUGEE FROM

REFUGEE NUMBER 55. ON SEPTEMBER 8 I WAS INTERVIEWED
 BY YOU AND I HAD REPORTED THE NEEDED INFORMATION TO YOU.
 NOW I WISH TO ADD THE FOLLOWING:

THIS IS ABOUT THE INFORMATION DISCLOSED BY CAPTAIN
 55 OF THE VIETNAMESE PUBLIC SECURITY CONCERNING
 THE WHEREABOUT OF LIVING AMERICAN SERVICEMEN DURING
 THE VIETNAMESE WAR. VIETNAMESE HAD IMPRISONED AMERICAN
 SOLDIERS IN SON TAY PROVINCE JAIL. LATER, WHEN THEY
 HEARD THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT CARRY OUT A RESCUE
 MISSION, THEY IMMEDIATELY MOVED THEM TO A DIFFERENT
 PLACE UNKNOWN TO ME. WHEN THE WAR ENDED, APART FROM
 THOSE RETURNED LIVING AMERICAN SERVICEMEN, OTHERS
 WERE BEING PUT IN LY MAN DE SECRET JAIL.

LY MAN DE JAIL IS SITUATED SOMEWHERE IN HANOI AND THE
 AREA IS CLASSIFIED AS A RESTRICTED AREA. IN THERE
 THEY HAVE A LOT OF SECRET UNDERGROUND CAVES, AND
 THERE IS ALSO A CONCEALED UNDERGROUND TUNNEL CONNECTING
 TO THE TOWN OF "HO CHI MINH". THIS RESTRICTED AREA IS
 ONLY OPENED TO HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS (THOSE
 ABOVE THE RANK OF MAJOR) OR AS LIVING QUARTERS FOR VIP.
 ONE HAS TO PASS THREE CHECK POINTS TO GET IN AND OUT
 OF THE RESTRICTED AREA.

THOSE LIVING AMERICAN SERVICEMEN WERE BEING IMPRISONED
 IN A SECRET PRISON OF THE LY MAN DE RESTRICTED AREA.

FROM 55 REFUGEE CAMP DATED
 SEPTEMBER 5, 1986.

UNQUOTE

COMMENTS: 55 HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED BY
 THE JCRC LIAISON OFFICER FROM BANGKOK. THIS INFORMATION
 IS FORWARDED AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THOSE INTERVIEWS.
 A COPY OF THIS LETTER WAS SHOWN TO THE JCRC REPRESENTATIVE
 ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO HONG KONG. HE SAID HE WAS
 AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION IN THE LETTER. SUBSEQUENT
 REPORTS ON HIS INTERVIEWS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED BY SEC COR.
 BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY THAT IS INVOLVED IN THE
 POW/MIA MATTER AND BEING THE LIAISON CONTACT IN HONG KONG,
 REQUEST AN EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT.

//IPSP: PG 2340//

//COMSOBJ: 1.3//

PROJ: (U) NONE

COLL: (U) NONE

INSTN: (U) US NO

PREP: (U) NAME AN CAPT, USMC, ANAVLO

APPR: (U) NAME AN USA, ACT DLOR

FINAL: (U) YES (ICR: D-WP-43486)

BT

#0180

NNNN

NNNN

R 100524Z DEC 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/COSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAAA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC //SECRETARY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQ/CMC CG WASHINGTON DC
RUEHQA/DINSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEAHQ/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHQA/AFPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEHQA/SAFE

R-100850Z DEC 86
FM USDAO HONG KONG HK
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//OAS-3/DB-2D/DC-4A3/TO-PW/KTS-2B//
INFO RUEKJCS/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHJ/USDAO HONGKONG CH
RUEKJCS/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUEHJ/JCRC LIAISON HONOLULU HI

SECTION 02 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 20180

K22:
 SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 842 0127 87
 COUNTRY: (U) VIETNAM (VN)
 SUBJECT: IIR 6 842 0127 87/1-THAN DE JAIL POSSIBLE POW

BT
#0150
XXXX
XXXX

PAGE 0000

R 310223Z JAN 87
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUMALWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUMAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUMABA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUMAAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD
RUMALGX/SAFE

N 290005Z JAN 67
FM CDR 00JCR000 BARBERS PT HI
TO 00RUH00/JCR000 LIAISON BANGKOK TH
INFO RUH00A/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5//
RUH00C/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PA-MIA//
RUH00D/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUH00E/JCS WASHINGTON DC//J5/ OCSJCS-PA-MIA//
RUH00F/DIA WASHINGTON DC//D-2/PA-MIA//

BT
E21:

E22:

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT HK85-067 (U)

NSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

A. JCRC LIAISON HANOI TH 300837Z SEP 86

B. USDOLO HONG KONG HK 1008582 DEC 86

1. REVIEW OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SC, AKA SC
 -- SOURCE OF REF A (HK86-067), REVEALS NO CORRELATION TO DATA
 IN JCRC FILES

2. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS REPORTS OF A POST WAR, U.S. POW CAMP IN THE HANOI AREA. THE HEARSAY NATURE AND LACK OF DETAIL IN THESE REPORTS PRECLUDE CORRELATION TO DATA IN JCRC FILES.

3. THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL POSITION AND NOT A FINAL EVALUATION.

BT
#9502
#0001
#0001

1196

07/06/86

PAGE

WFE 3 SC 10 4 2 5633
 KA 15 SC CONFIDENTIALITY 37
 CAT NUMBER 34 SD CONTACTED 35
 CATEGORY 14
 NTRY LOCATED 23 HK STATE/CITY 15
 NTRY REPORTED 10 UN
 NTRY SIGHTING 46 PDM-HSY
 ST SIGHTING 42 HAND 11 12
 SUBSOURCES 27 5
 CTIONS 51 860930 JCRCL HK84-067 HSO
 860930 JCRCL DTG 300637Z

CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39
 REMARKS 34 FOLRED FMS UNDERGROUND PRISON ANALYST 13 RM
 ATE RECEIVED 8: 361003 DATE OF INFO 35 70
 CT DATE 38: 1003 0 86 ADDRESS 25

RIGIN CODE 17: B

OLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

OLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

1821212

1197

ANE 4 Sc ID # 2 9248

KA 15
 CAT NUMBER 34 SD CONFIDENTIALITY 37
 NTRY LOCATED 23 HK STATE/CITY 15
 NTRY REPORTED 10 UN CONTACTED 32
 NTRY SIGHTING 46 PDM-HSY CATEGORY 14
 ST SIGHTING 42 YJ500290 11 12
 SUBSOURCES 27 5

CTIONS 51 861016 JCRCL HK84-048 RPT
 CURRENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39
 REMARKS 34 EVLREQ 2 ORVS QUANG NINH 72 ANALYST 13 RM
 ATE RECEIVED 8: 870812 DATE OF INFO 35 72
 CT DATE 38: ADDRESS 25

RIGIN CODE 17: B

OLYGRAPH CATEGORY 53:

OLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

01321069

06/12/87

7/24/88

PAGE 1

HE 3 ID # 2 - 9791
 A 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37
 RT NUMBER 34 50 CONTACTED 32: 1A
 CATEGORY:
 TRY LOCATED 23 HK STATE/CITY 15
 TRY REPORTED 10 UN
 PE SIGHTING 46 GRV-HSV
 IT SIGHTING 42 YJ520810 11 12
 RESOURCES 27 6
 TIONS 31 XREF CEMETERY
 880408 JORD HK88-016 RPT
 APPENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39
 MARKS 36 EVLRE22 GRVS CAI DUNG 70-71 ANALYST 13: 1A
 ITE RECEIVED 8: 880617 DATE OF INFO 35 71
 URCE DOB 14/ 50 ADDRESS 20:
 IIGIN CODE 17: B
 JLYORAPH CATEGORY 03:
 JLYORAPH RESULTS 24:

1817054

SEP 19 1988

 JOINT CASUALTY
 RESOLUTION CENTER

 CASUALTY DATA DIVISION
 ANALYSIS & STUDIES

REFUGEE REPORT & PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

REFUGEE REPORT NUMBER & DATE: HK88-016, 5 April 1988

ANALYST:

CROSS REFERENCE: None.

CATEGORY DATA: Grave Site/Hearsay Account

FINDINGS: Initial analysis of the information provided by this source reveals no correlation to data in JCRC files. This is not a final evaluation.

CORRELATE DATA: None.

BACKGROUND COMMENTS: The limited, hearsay information provided in this report is insufficient to permit a correlation with data in JCRC files.

Joe B. Garvey
 Lieutenant Colonel, USA
 Commander

DISPOSITION: JCRC-LRB
 DIA/PW-MIA

JOINT CASUALTY
RESOLUTION CENTERCASUALTY DATA DIVISION
ANALYSIS & STUDIES

REFUGEE REPORT & PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

22 JUL 87

SOURCE DATA:

REFUGEE REPORT INTERVIEW NUMBER & DATE: HK86-068, 16 October 1986

UNCLASSIFIED

2065 REFERENCE(S): HK86-072, 16 October 1986

CATEGORY DATA: Grave Site/First Hand Account

FINDINGS: Analysis of information provided by Source reveals a possible correlation to REFNO 1.

CORRELATE DATA: REFNO 1 On 17 October 1967, Lieutenant Junior Grade [redacted] flying an A-4B Attack Bomber in a flight of four. The aircraft, serial number 150219, crashed in the vicinity of grid coordinates 17542159, approximately 1200 meters northwest of Ma Cai, Quang Binh Province, Vietnam. No parachute was seen and no electronic beacon signals were heard. A subsequent report stated that an aircraft crashed in the vicinity of Y2400280, approximately 8500 meters southwest of Ma Cai. The pilot reportedly bailed out but did not survive. A folder detailing the circumstances of Lieutenant [redacted] case was presented to officials of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam during a POW/MIA Technical Meeting held in September 1985. Lieutenant [redacted] is carried in the presumptive status of dead, body not recovered.

BACKGROUND/COMMENTS: The location provided by Source is approximately 8500 meters from Lieutenant [redacted] incident, which is the only unresolved incident within 15 kilometers of Thon Cam Gang Hamlet (vicinity of grid coordinates 22500280). A probable correlation is not made because of the discrepancy in dates (1967 for Lieutenant [redacted] incident and 1971 or 1972 reported by Source) and the fact that Lieutenant [redacted] aircraft crashed over land. The hearsay nature of the Source's report could account for these discrepancies. The Source of HK86-072 reported similar information. Because both Sources were in Mai Ling Chau Camp at the same time, they may both be reporting the same hearsay story.

JOE D. HARVEY
LTC USA
Commander

THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL POSITION AND NOT A FINAL EVALUATION. THIS EVALUATION AND THE ATTACHED REFUGEE REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO THE MOK UPON DELETION OF ALL SOURCES NAMES AND IDENTIFICATION DATA.

DISPOSITION: JCRC LIAISON OFFICE, BANGKOK JCRC REFNO FILE(S): 0868-0-01
OASD/ISA, PW-MIA AFFAIRS REFNO-M-64
DIA/VO-PH



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

Head Office
AMERICAN CASUALTY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96340-0001

FROM: JCRC-LIB
TO: Commander, JCRC

REF: RPT JH868-016
April 3, 1988

SUBJ: Hearsay Burial of Two Remains

1. Source/Administrative data.

- a. Name: [redacted]
- b. DPOB: [redacted]
- c. Profession: [redacted]
- d. Present location data: [redacted]

e. Identification data: [redacted]

f. Educational level: [redacted]

g. Languages spoken: Vietnamese (fluent); Cantonese

h. Religion: Buddhist

i. Status: Closed camp internee

j. Date of information: 1970-1971

k. Interview data: Source was interviewed at [redacted] on 2 March 1988

USA.

1. Other: Source arrived in camp on 3 May 1986. His final address in Vietnam was [redacted] province. Source has no relatives in the U.S.

a. Maps used: Scale: 1:50,000; Series: 17014; Sheet: 6451

2. Summary: Source provided hearsay information regarding the burial of two U.S. aircraft crew members in a cemetery in Cai Dung village (Y2 5231) in 1970 or 1971. End summary.

3. Information: In January 1986, Source was looking for a means to flee Vietnam, therefore he was talking to various fishermen in Cai Dung village (Y2 5231) about the possibility of organizing an escape attempt. One fisherman was [redacted] about 50 years of age. [redacted] said that he wanted to leave Vietnam, too, but he was going to wait a little longer. He said that when he did depart he was going to try to exhume and take with him the remains of two U.S. aircraft crew members who had drowned in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1970 or 1971. [redacted] told Source that they were buried shortly after they were pulled out of the water in the cemetery behind the school and open air stadium in Cai Dung village. Quang believed that he could get a reward and resettled to the U.S. if he turned over the remains. Source has nothing further to report concerning this incident.

4. Interviewer's comments: Available map sheets record the village at Y2 5231 as being Cai Hung village. Source stated that the local people refer to the village as Cai Dung village.

LT COL, USAF
JCRC Liaison Officer

MSGNO 86 (PCEK) #09/30/86# #09/08/86 3:54
 ZCZC 10107362 (PC)
 PTTSZYUW HURKJCS410 2730843. -HURKJCS
 CHT
 R 300843Z SEP 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO: HURKJCS/CSG-GRD/OCJCS
 HURKJCS/OCMA WASHINGTON DC
 HURKJCS/OCMA WASHINGTON DC
 HURKJCS/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 HURKJCS/AMCCO FT KITCHEE MO
 HURKJCS/SOJ-GRD/SECDEF
 HURKJCS/SAFE
 P 300857Z SEP 86
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO HURKJCS/CSG-GRD/OCJCS
 INFO: HURKJCS/OCMA WASHINGTON DC//12/13/86//
 HURKJCS/OCMA WASHINGTON DC//10-PM//
 HURKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PA-KIA//
 HURKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PA-KIA//
 HURKJCS/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NS CHILDRESS//
 BT
 0211
 SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 44310
 CITE: 1316 SEP 86
 0221
 SUBJECT: JCRC RPT HRC6-67, HEARSAY OF U.S. PILOTS
 HELD IN HANOI (U)
 HRC6-68 (REPORT BY SAME SOURCE) (NOTAL)
 REF:
 1. SOURCE:
 - A. NAME: SC
 - B. DOB: SO
 - C. POB: SO
 - D. FORMER POSITION: FISHERMAN
 - E. PRESENT LOCATION: SO
 - F. IDENTIFICATION DATA: SO
 - G. DOI: 1979
 - H. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 3 SEP 86
 - I. NAME OF INTERVIEWER: SO
 05-13, DOB
 - J. OTHER: ARRIVED SO
 2. SUMMARY: SOURCE, A 32 YOA MALE VN
 (ETHNIC CHINESE) REFUGEE, PROVIDED LIMITED HEARSAY
 INFORMATION CONCERNING AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF
 AMERICAN PILOTS HELD IN AN UNDERGROUND PRISON IN HANOI.
 3. SOURCE STATED THAT SOMETIME DURING 1979,
 WHILE RESIDING IN HON GAY CITY, QUANG NINH PROVINCE,
 HE HEARD ABOUT AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF AMERICAN
 PRISONERS BEING HELD IN HANOI. SOURCE HEARD THE STORY

FROM 51 APPROX 40 YOA NATIVE OF HON
 GAY, QUANG NINH AND A CPT (TUONG UY) IN THE HON
 GAY PUBLIC SECURITY STATION. SOURCE STATED THAT HE
 HAD MET 51 SOMETIME DURING 1972 WHILE RESIDING IN
 HON GAY, QUANG NINH NEAR THE PRC BORDER. SOURCE
 STATED THAT 51 WORKED AS A PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICER
 IN THE SAME AREA WHERE HIS (SOURCE'S) WIFE WORKED AS
 A VENDOR AND THAT SHE BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH HIM.
 4. SOURCE STATED THAT SOMETIME DURING 1978
 ALL ETHNIC CHINESE RESIDING IN THE BORDER AREA WERE
 FORCED BY THE DRV GOVERNMENT TO RELOCATE FURTHER
 INLAND FROM THE BORDER AND THAT HE WAS RESETTLED IN
 HON GAY. AFTER HE RESETTLED IN HON GAY, SOURCE MET
 51 NEAR HIS HOME AND CHATTED WITH HIM. SOURCE HEARD
 FROM 51 THAT WHEN US POWS WERE RELEASED AT THE END
 OF THE WAR, A SMALL NUMBER OF U.S. PILOTS WERE MOVED
 FROM SON TAY PRISON TO HANOI WHERE THEY WERE DETAINED
 IN A SECRET UNDERGROUND PRISON. SOURCE HEARD FROM
 51 THAT THE ENTRY INTO THE UNDERGROUND PRISON WAS
 LOCATED INSIDE A RESIDENTIAL DWELLING IN THE AREA
 OF HO CHI MINH'S MAUSOLEUM. SOURCE HEARD THAT THE
 PRISON HAD THREE SEPARATE ECHELONS OF SECURITY
 GUARDS AROUND IT (THREE PERIMETER DEPTH). SOURCE
 HEARD THAT ONLY FIELD GRADE OFFICERS WERE ALLOWED TO
 ENTER THE AREA OF THE PRISON. SOURCE DID NOT HEAR
 WHETHER 51 HAD ACTUALLY SEEN THE PRISONERS HIMSELF
 OR HAD ONLY HEARD ABOUT THEM FROM SOMEONE ELSE.
 SOURCE WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION
 CONCERNING THE ALLEGED AMERICAN PRISONERS.
 5. SOURCE STATED THAT HE LIVED AT HIS POB UNTIL
 1940 WHEN HE CROSSED THE CHINA-VIETNAM BORDER, WITH
 HIS PARENTS, TO RESIDE IN HON GAY TOWN. SOURCE
 RESIDED IN HON GAY AND WORKED AS A FISHERMAN UNTIL
 1978 WHEN HE WAS FORCEFULLY RESETTLED TO RESIDE AT
 DATA QUANG NINH
 PROVINCE. SOURCE ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE BY BOAT DURING
 OCTOBER 1980 FROM HON GAY BUT WAS ARRESTED BY PUBLIC
 SECURITY PERSONNEL WHILE PREPARING TO ESCAPE.
 SOURCE WAS HELD IN THE QUANG NINH PROVINCIAL PRISON
 AKA "LANG 14" LOCATED IN HON GAY. IN MAY 1981
 SOURCE WAS RELEASED TO RETURN TO HIS HOME IN HON GAY
 CITY. SOURCE WAS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL ESCAPE
 BY BOAT FROM HON GAY ON 13 APRIL 1986.

6. COMMENT: SOURCE HAD IN HIS POSSESSION A
 RECEIPT FOR CONFISCATED GOLD (3.34 TALS) SIGNED BY
 SOURCE, A GOLDSMITH (ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE), AND AN
 EMPLOYEE OF THE STATE BANK (ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE).
 THE RECEIPT INDICATES THAT SOURCE WAS ARRESTED WHILE
 ATTEMPTING TO FLEE TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY. THE RECEIPT
 ALSO INDICATES THAT THE GOLD WAS TURNED IN TO THE
 STATE BANK BY DUONG THANH CHAU OF THE QUANG NINH

BT

#310

NNNN

NNDD

C1580

P

PRIORITY/ROUTING/CONTROL/STANDARD/STANDARD

ACT/STANDARD

MSGNO

98 (PCXX)

009/30/86# 09508:58.7.5#

ZZZZ 10107:362 (PC)

PTTSTUN RUKJCS4310 2730843

RUEALGX

ZNY

P 300843Z SEP 86

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEAHCN/CSS-GRD/OC/CS

RUEAHCN/OC/CS WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHCN/CSO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHCN/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHCN/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD

RUEAHCN/SEC-GRD/SECDEF

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 300857Z SEP 86

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEAHCN/OC/CS WASHINGTON DC//PRIORITY

INFO RUEAHCN/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//

RUEAHCN/DIA WASHINGTON DC//OC-PH//

RUEAHCN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PH-MIA//

RUEAHCN/CS WASHINGTON DC//J3/PH-MIA//

RUEAHCN/WHITEHOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//

BT

EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 004431000

CITE: 3716 SEP 86

EZ2:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT H286-67; REARAY OF U.S. PILOTS
 PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY STATION. THE RECEIPT WAS
 DATED 24 JANUARY 1981. SOURCE MADE A PLEA FOR
 RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE SUBSEQUENT TO THE INTERVIEW.
 SOURCE ALSO REPORTED GRAVESITE INFORMATION WHICH IS
 BEING REPORTED BY SEPARATE LETTER REPORT.

BT

#310

NNNN

NNDD



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

LIAISON OFFICE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96344

FROM: JCRC-LNB
TO: Commander, JCRC

REF: RPT #HX86-068
16 October 1986

SUBJ: Two Graves Said to Contain U.S. Remains in Quang Minh

REF: JCRC-LNB Msg, DTG 300837Z Sep 86 (HX 86-47, by same Source)

Source:

- a. Name: SC
- b. DOB: SD
- c. POB: SD
- d. Former Position: Fisherman
- e. Present location: SD
- f. Identification data: I.D. SD LM-SD
- g. DOB: February 1986
- h. Map used: Sheet 6451-2, Series 17014
- i. Date of interview: 3 September 1986
- j. Name of interviewer: AN GS-13, DOD
- k. Other: SD

Summary: Source, a 52 YOA male VN (ethnic Chinese) refugee, provided limited firsthand information concerning his observation of two graves alleged to contain the remains of two Americans in Thon Cau Gang Hamlet, Quang Minh Province (XJ 5029).

Information: Source stated that sometime during February 1986, while searching for an escape boat in the area of Cua Ong Port, Quang Minh Province, he saw two graves which were said to contain U.S. remains. Source stated that he saw the two graves on the north side of the laterite road which ran from the Cai Hong Bus Station (vic XJ 490290) to Cai Hong Town (XJ 5231). Source recalled that the two graves were located in a cemetery of Thon Cau Gang Hamlet (vic XJ 5029) and that the cemetery was located approximately 80 meters from the laterite road which ran from west to east through the hamlet.

HX86-068
PAGE TWO

Source talked with two local residents who lived across the road from the cemetery and heard from them that the two graves contained the remains of two Americans killed during two separate incidents. One of the two locals, known to Source as Mr. SD, a cadre of the Cam Pha Seafood Company, said that the incidents had occurred sometime during 1971 or 1972. The other local resident, known to Source as Mr. SD, approximately 55 YOA and local native who was a retired agricultural cadre, said that the aircraft of the two pilots had been attacking the Cam Pha mines when they crashed into the sea. Source heard that one of the pilots was a male caucasian and that fishing boats had recovered his body from the sea. Source did not hear about the second pilot. Source recalled that the two unmarked graves of the Americans was located near the edge of the cemetery which contained numerous graves of local villagers. The cemetery was not fenced and Source did not recall any name of the cemetery. Source was not able to provide further information concerning the alleged U.S. graves. Source's hand drawn memory sketch is enclosed.

AN
JCRC Liaison Office


Atch:
a/s

EP-NEW
WATER QUERY

K5. 1F 27 HAS HOSPITAL
10 OR 34 HAS HOSPITAL
15 OR 34 HAS HOSP

NUMBER OF RECORDS WHICH SATISFY YOUR REQUEST
PHSEAS 3

MARK TOTAL 3
ACTION



AN

PAGE 16

PAGE 1

027

SS

X036 = FOLREQ 61 US/2 AS, HANOI 74-76

X002 = 01811

0003 = SC

X036 = EVALAPP 1 PW B-52 HANOI 72

X002 = 08427

0003 = SC

X027 = SS

X036 = FOLREQ LINK # PMS HFLD HANOI

X002 = 04608

0003 = SC

X036 = FOLREQ 20 PMS FM LAOS TO HANOI

X002 = 08260

0003 = SC

X027 =

SS

X036 = FOLREQ 8-9 PMS HANOI

INITIAL SOURCE DATA

ALL HOSPITALS IN HANOI FM DIST 210100N/1055100E15 NNM 8

ID	NAME	SIGHT	PURPORTED INFO	DAYS	CTRY
		PW-F/H	2 CAU BNV HOSPITAL	8109	8109 VN
		PW-F/H	1 CAU HOSP HA DONG	68	68 VN
		GRV-HSY	2 US PW PMS HOSP	108	68 VN

TOTAL SIGHTINGS=

D1544034

11844034

3/02/89

PAGE

ADDITIONAL SOURCE DATA

ID	UTM/LOC	WGS COORDINATES	POLY CATEGORY	CE	AO	BIST	FM	MC
15862	WJ820250	210132N 1054721E	UNDER ANALYSIS	SV	6-2		1B	
12610	HAN01	205600N 1054700E		OS	8-8		9	
15427	WJ891230	210200N 1056100E	UNDER ANALYSIS	BS	1-8		1A	

END OF REPORT

1219

I am not engaged this
 day.

But - when in the CIA does
not. If they determined this
information, they should
have made it out of the
country very fast. No
Name or I will call
Name

MR: No CIA reports published on basis of info supplied by this guy. Therefore, CIA would have had to put out a "false" report. It is a mechanism of control which could cause harm, possibly.

6/20/68 - and
cc of poly methyl
4 CEA heavy
determi fibrin.

NSCNO 13 (PCIX) 004/11/88* 01:03:29.9.7*
 ZCIC--06:02:402--(PC)
 ENI DTG: 88041100423195
 RTTCZTU RUEKJCS762 1020443 SUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 110932Z APR 88
 FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OSCA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAAL/CDR WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANU/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//NO-CTC//
 RUEAAL/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEKAL/CA FIELD ACTIVITY WASHINGTON DC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 110352Z APR 88
 FM JCRC-LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEKBP/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 INFO RUEKBP/OSCD/AFB HONOLULU HI//12/13/156//
 RUEKCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//NO-PH//
 RUEKCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUEKCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/KR CHILDRESS//
 RUEHBM/COMSACT/RT FT SHAFTER HI
 RUEKCS/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/PLC//
 RUEKCS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEKBP/AMPC BANGKOK PH AFB TH//DRMCH//
 RUEKBP/NAVFSC TYNDALL AFB FL//DBRN//
 RUEKBP/COMNAVFORC ALEX VA//DAFC-PED-V//
 RUEKBP/COMNAVFORC WASHDC//NMC N 68//
 RUEKBP/COMNAVFORC WASHDC
 RUEKBP/CHC WASHDC//NRP 10/INTC/INTN//
 BT
 EZ1:

L SECTION 01 OF 05-LIAISON BANGKOK-17762

E22*

1765 APR 88
 SUBJ: JCRC RPT T88-094, SRV MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND
 FACILITIES (U)
 REF: A. JCRC BKK HSG DTG 210518Z MAR 88 (T88-093,
 BY SAME SOURCE)
 B. JCRC BKK HSG DTG 220906Z MAR 88 (T88-094,
 BY SAME SOURCE)
 C. JCRC BKK HSG DTG 240128Z MAR 88 (T88-104,
 BY SAME SOURCE)
 1. SOURCE:
 A. NAME: SC
 B. DOB: SO
 C. POB: SO
 (P)
 D. FORMER POSITION: MEDICAL DOCTOR
 E. PRESENT LOCATION: SO

F. IDENTIFICATION DATA: SO
 G. DOI: 1987
 H. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 23 MAR 88
 I. NAME OF INTERVIEWER: SO
 GS-15, DOD
 2. SUMMARY: SOURCE, A 41 YOA MALE VIETNAMESE
 REFUGEE, PROVIDED FIRSTHAND AND HEARSAY INFORMATION
 CONCERNING SRV MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES, SOME
 OF WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH US POWS.
 END SUMMARY.
 3. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE
 FOLLOWING HOSPITALS:
 A. VIETNAMESE-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP HOSPITAL (BANH VIEN
 VIET HO HOU NGHI), LOCATED IN THE HOAN KIEM AREA OF
 HANOI NEAR THE BANK OF THE RED RIVER ON PHAM DINH HO
 ST.
 B. BACH HAI HOSPITAL (BANH VIEN BACH HAI), BACH HAI
 STREET, HANOI.
 C. VIETNAMESE-GERMAN HOSPITAL (VIET-DOU) FORMERLY
 PHU DOAN.
 D. THANH NHAM HOSPITAL, FAIRLY NEW, LOCATED IN THE
 THANH NHAM AREA IN HAI BA TRUNG DISTRICT.
 E. HOSPITAL "B", LOCATED IN THE HOAN KIEM AREA.
 F. B.
 ICH CAU HOSPITAL, FOR GOVERNMENT SENIOR CADRE,
 LOCATED IN THE BA DINH AREA OF HANOI.
 G. HOSPITAL 108, MILITARY HOSPITAL LOCATED ON THANH
 HUNG DAO ST. NEAR THE RED RIVER.
 H. EASTERN MEDICINE HOSPITAL (BANH VIEN DONG Y),
 LOCATED ON NGUYEN BINH KHUEN ST. IN HAI BA TRUNG (D),
 HANOI.
 I. HOSPITAL 108, MOI HOSPITAL FOR PUBLIC SECURITY
 PERSONNEL, LOCATED IN THE CAU GIAY AREA OF HANOI.
 J. HOSPITAL 103, MILITARY HOSPITAL LOCATED IN HA
 DONG, APPROX 25 KM FROM HANOI.
 K. VIETNAMESE-CZECH FRIENDSHIP HOSPITAL (BANH VIEN
 VIET TIEN HU NGHI), LOCATED IN HAI PHONG CITY.
 L. VIETNAMESE-BULGARIAN HOSPITAL (BANH VIEN VIET
 SUN) LOCATED IN THAI BINH PROVINCIAL TOWN.
 M. HOSPITAL 175 (FORMERLY REPUBLIC GENERAL
 HOSPITAL), MILITARY HOSPITAL LOCATED IN HCMC.
 N. HOSPITAL 2, MILITARY HOSPITAL IN DISTRICT 5, HCMC.
 BT
 77762
 NR0X
 NRDD

1. (PC1) FOR 11/88 00103:301-39
 222C 06102:402 (PC)
 DHI DTG 0804100431953
 RTTCITUN RUELCST762-1020441- RURALC
 241
 R-104432 APR 88
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO BUREAU/OSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAA/CIO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//TO-CIC//
 RUEHAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEHQB/CSA FIELD ACTIVITY WASHINGTON DC
 RUEALC/SAPS
 R-105552 APR 88
 FM JCS LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 INFO RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J5//
 RUEHCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//
 RUEHCS/CS WASHDC//J5/PH-HIA//
 RUEHCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PH-HIA//
 RUEHQA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NS CHILDRESS//
 RUEHQA/COMUSCIBLT FT SHAFTER HI
 RUEHQB/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAY/VLC//
 RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEHQA/AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPHCA//
 RUEHQA/DAFPC TYNALL AFB FL//DMRA//
 RUEHQA/COMNAVILPERSON ALST VA//DAFC-PED-P//
 RUEHQA/COMNAVILPERSON WASHDC//MPC N 64//
 RUEHQA/COMNAVILPERSON WASHDC
 RUEHQA/CNC WASHDC//MPC TO/INTC/INTN//
 BT
 021

SECTION 02 OF 05 LIAISON BANGKOK 17762

E22L

3166 APR 88
 SUBJ: JCRC RPT T88-0941, SRY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND
 4. OF THE ABOVE HOSPITALS SOURCE WAS ONLY
 DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE BACH NAI HOSPITAL FOR A
 TWO MONTH PERIOD IN EARLY 1974. SOURCE WAS RELIEVED
 OF HIS DUTIES AFTER HE WROTE SARCASTIC ARTICLES
 CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT WHICH WERE PUBLISHED IN
 "HANOI MOI" NEWSPAPER. SOURCE NEVER OBSERVED OR HEARD
 ABOUT ANY AMERICANS WHO WERE TREATED AT BACH NAI
 HOSPITAL.
 5. SOURCE VISITED HOSPITAL 198 DURING JUNE
 1987. SOURCE CALLED UPON AN ACQUAINTANCE AT THE
 HOSPITAL WHO WAS KNOWN TO HIM AS 55 (LNU).
 APPROX 39-40 YOA NATIVE OF NORTH VIETNAM (POB
 UNKNOWN). 55 TOLD SOURCE THAT HE HAD TREATED SOME
 VIP PATIENTS INCLUDING CHU VAN TAN AND DUONG VAN NINH

FROM THE SOUTH. DR. 55 TOLD SOURCE THAT TAY DIED
 AFTER LEAVING THE HOSPITAL AND 55 LATER MIGRATED TO
 FRANCE. DR. 55 ALSO TOLD SOURCE THAT HE HAD TREATED
 SOME AMERICAN POWS DURING THE WAR. 55 FURTHER
 RELATED TO SOURCE THAT ALL OF THE AMERICANS HAD NOT
 RETURNED HOME. ACCORDING TO 55 SOME OF THE
 AMERICANS HAD REQUESTED VIETNAMESE CITIZENSHIP AND
 WERE NOW LIVING IN THE HOA BINH AREA. 55 COMPARED
 THE AMERICANS TO SOME OF THE FRENCH SOLDIERS WHO HAD
 ALSO REQUESTED TO REMAIN IN VIETNAM AND BE GRANTED
 VIETNAMESE CITIZENSHIP. WHILE IN HOSPITAL 198 SOURCE
 ALSO VISITED WITH DR. 55 APPROX 67-68 YOA
 NATIVE OF CENTRAL VIETNAM. DR. 55 WHEN DISCUSSING
 HIS PREVIOUS WORK ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD
 PROVIDED MEDICAL TREATMENT TO AMERICAN POWS DURING
 THE WAR. SOURCE ALSO HEARD THAT DR. NAME OF
 HOSPITAL 198 HAD TREATED AMERICAN POWS DURING THE
 WAR. SOURCE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY AMERICANS OR
 FOREIGNERS IN HOSPITAL 198. SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE
 HOSPITAL WAS FAIRLY CROWDED AT THE TIME BUT MOST OF
 THE PATIENTS WERE MEMBERS OF THE BORDER SECURITY
 FORCES WHO HAD BEEN WOUNDED OR INJURED IN THE BORDER
 AREAS OF VIETNAM AND LATER EVACUATED TO HANOI.
 6. SOURCE ALSO MET DR. 55 WHO WORKED
 IN THE VIETNAMESE-SOVIET HOSPITAL. DR. 55 WAS
 CHIEF OF THE INTERNAL MEDICINE DEPARTMENT. THE
 HOSPITAL WAS ALSO CALLED THE HOSPITAL FOR THE
 PROTECTION OF SENIOR VIETNAMESE-SOVIET CADRE (BENH
 VIEN MAO YE CAN BO CAO CAP VIET XO). SOURCE RECALLED
 THAT DR. 55 AND THE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE PANHOS
 SOURCE HEARD FROM DR. 55 THAT HIS FATHER, DR. NAME
 HAD TREATED AMERICAN POWS DURING THE WAR. 55
 MENTIONED ONE INCIDENT IN WHICH AN AMERICAN PILOT WAS
 SHOT DOWN IN THE HOAN KIEN AREA OF HANOI DURING
 1967. 55 SAID THAT THE PILOT HAD BEEN WOUNDED IN
 THE STOMACH AND THIGH. ACCORDING TO 55 ANOTHER
 AMERICAN PILOT WHO WAS A COLONEL, LANDED IN HO TAY
 LAKE ON THE SAME DAY THE OTHER PILOT WAS SHOT DOWN.
 55 SAID THAT THE COL. HAD MORE FLYING HOURS THAN
 ANY OTHER PILOT IN THE U.S. AND HE WAS A HERO IN THE
 KOREAN WAR. TRUNG SAID HIS FATHER PERFORMED SURGERY
 ON THE PILOT WHO WAS WOUNDED AND AT THAT TIME HIS
 FATHER WAS ASSIGNED TO HOSPITAL 198.
 7. ALSO DURING HIS JUNE 1987 VISIT TO HANOI,
 SOURCE MET DR. 55 APPROX 60 YOA NATIVE OF
 NORTH VIETNAM WHO HAD STUDIED ACUPUNCTURE IN THE PRC
 BUT WAS EXPELLED FROM THE SCHOOL AFTER HE STOLE SOME
 REFERENCE BOOKS. WHEN 55 RETURNED TO VIETNAM HE WAS
 ASSIGNED AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE

5D

55

HAD ALSO TRAVELLED TO HOLLAND AND FRANCE. DR. 65 SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO TREATED AMERICAN POWS DURING THE WAR BUT DID NOT MENTION ANY DETAILS. DR. 65 MENTIONED TO SOURCE THAT DR. 65 WAS HEAD OF THE 2477 HAD TREATED AMERICAN BOYS WITH ARM PROBLEMS DURING THE PERIOD 1968 TO 1970. SOURCE RECALLED HAVING MET DR. 65 DURING THE TIME THAT HE ST

17762

KNOB

KNOB

NSCNO 14 (PC11) 004/11/88 001103:30:03
 ZCZC 06:02:02 (PC)
 ENL DTG : 88081100425204
 RTTCZYU/RUEKJCS77621020443
 ZNY
 R 110443Z APR 88
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADND/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//TO-CJC//
 RUEAIIA/ADCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEHQA2/DCA FIELD ACTIVITY WASHINGTON DC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 110355Z APR 88
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
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 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//JO-PH//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//JS/PN-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PN-MIA//
 RUEADND/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/KR CHILLERS//
 RUEADND/COMUSACLT HI FT SHAFTER HI
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAB/TLC//
 RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEHQA/AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//OPCC//
 RUEHQA/RAFPSC TYNALL AFB FL//DDBH//
 RUEHQA/COMBILPERCEN ALEX VA//DAFC-PED-P//
 RUEHQA/COMNAVHILPERSON WASHDC//NRP N 64//
 RUEHQA/COMNAVHEDCOM WASHDC
 RUEHQA/CNC WASHDC//NSP 10/INTC/INTU//
 BT
 EZZ1:
 SECTION 03 OF 05 LIAISON BANGKOK 17762

EZZ1

3166 APR 88

SUBJ: JCRC RPT T88-0941, SRY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND WAS ASSIGNED TO HANOI AS A DOCTOR DURING 1973 OR 1974. SOURCE RECALLED THAT DR. 65 WAS APPROX 65 YOA AND A NATIVE OF NORTH VIETNAM WHO HAD BEEN TRAINED IN FRANCE. SOURCE VAGUELY RECALLED THAT DR. 65 HAD A BROTHER, DR. 65 WHO WORKED IN HOSPITAL 798. SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE HANOI EYE INSTITUTE WAS LOCATED ON BA TRINH ST IN HANOI. SOURCE ALSO HEARD FROM DR. 65 THAT DR. 65 APPROX 65 YOA NATIVE OF HANOI WHO RESIDED ON PHO HAM LONG ST, HANOI, HAD ALSO TREATED AMERICAN POWS DURING THE WAR. ACCORDING TO DR. 65, WAS AN 90 SPECIALIST WHO TREATED AMERICAN POWS IN HOA LO PRISON AND A CAMP IN HOA BINH (CAMP DESIGNATION NOT MENTIONED).

8. SOURCE STATED THAT MOST OF THE OLDER DOCTORS WITH WHOM HE WAS ACQUAINTED HAD BEEN TRAINED IN FRANCE, THE PRC, OR THE SOVIET UNION. SOURCE STATED THAT MOST OF THE YOUNGER DOCTORS WERE TRAINED AT THE HANOI UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE (TRUONG DAT HOC Y KHOA HAI NOI). SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE HEAD OF THE UNIVERSITY WAS DR DAM QUOC AN (NAM), A MILITARY OFFICER (POSSIBLY OF GENERAL RANK BUT NOT SURE). DR AN WAS IN CHARGE OF THE HOSPITAL AND THE ASSIGNMENTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO ATTENDED THE UNIVERSITY. AN'S DEPUTY WAS DR NGUYEN NHU AN. DR AN WAS A CIVILIAN AND IN ADDITION TO BEING THE DEPUTY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSIGNMENTS OF CIVILIAN MEDICAL DOCTORS WHO GRADUATED FROM THE UNIVERSITY.

9. SOME WARTIME MEDICAL FACILITIES WHICH SOURCE WAS ABLE TO RECALL INCLUDED: HOSPITAL 202 WHICH WAS LOCATED IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA IN KRATIE PROVINCE, CAMBODIA. SOURCE STOPPED AT HOSPITAL 202 FOR ABOUT FOUR DAYS DURING EARLY 1969 WHEN HE WAS BEING INFILTRATED FROM NORTH TO SOUTH VIETNAM. SOURCE DID NOT OBSERVE OR HEAR ABOUT ANY AMERICANS IN HOSPITAL 202. SOURCE WORKED AT HOSPITAL K-32 WHICH WAS LOCATED INSIDE CAMBODIA NEAR KATUN, TAY KINH, FOR TWO TO THREE DAYS SOMETIME DURING MID-1969. ALTHOUGH SOURCE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY AMERICAN POWS THERE, HE DID SEE AN ORANGE JACKET WITH MANY ZIPPERS AND SOME BOOTS WHICH WERE OF AMERICAN ORIGIN. SOURCE HEARD THAT AMERICAN POWS HAD BEEN TREATED THERE PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL BUT HAD ALREADY BEEN EVACUATED. SOURCE RECALLED THAT K-32 WAS LOCATED IN A HAND-DOG UNDERGROUND BUNKER WHICH WAS COVERED WITH APPROX SEVEN METERS OF EARTH. IT WAS OF SINGLE LEVEL CONSTRUCTION. SOURCE HEARD THAT K-32 WAS UNDER DEPARTMENT Q22 WHICH WAS THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF COSVN. K-32 HAD ONE SECTION CALLED "VAN HY" (ENGLISH LANGUAGE) WHICH HAD MEDICAL DOCTORS AND INTERPRETERS FROM NORTH VIETNAM WHO HAD BEEN TRAINED IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. K-32 WAS SUPERVISED BY A CADRE FROM Q22 WHO WAS CALLED TU BOM (BOOMS). TU BOM WAS A LTC A/D THE CHIEF OF Q22. HE CAME TO K-32 IN A VEHICLE WHILE SOURCE WAS THERE TO MEET AN IMPORTANT VIET CONG AGENT FROM SAIGON. THE AGENT (U/I) HAD BEEN WOUNDED IN HIS BUTTOCKS AND WAS EVACUATED TO K-32 FOR TREATMENT. THE AGENT KEPT HIS HEAD COVERED AT ALL TIMES AND NO ONE EXCEPT TU BOM WAS PERMITTED TO SEE HIS FACE. WHEN ANYONE COMMUNICATED WITH THE AGENT HIS FACE WAS COVERED OR THEY TALKED TO HIM BY USING A TELEPHONE WHICH WAS CONNECTED TO THE ROOM WHERE HE WAS STAYING. SOURCE COULD NOT RECALL ANY OTHER WARTIME MEDICAL FACILITIES.

10. SOURCE ONLY KNEW OF ONE FORENSIC MEDICAL FACILITY IN VIETNAM. SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE

FORENSIC MEDICAL SECTION/OFFICE (PHONG PHAP Y) WAS LOCATED ON THE SECOND FLOOR OF MILITARY HOSPITAL 106. THE STAFF INCLUDED BOTH MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES. SOURCE VISITED THE SECTION SOMETIME DURING 1969 WHEN HE WENT THERE TO CALL ON A FRIEND WHO WAS A FEMALE DOCTOR IN THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES. SOURCE'S FRIEND WAS DR

BT

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NSCNO 18 (PCKY) 008/11/88 01:03:30 3:58
 ZCZC 06:02:02 (PC)
 EMI DTG : 88041100042019
 RTTCZYUW RUEKJST752 (020443) RUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 110443Z APR 88
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/DCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
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 RUEAIAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEOABZ/DCAF FIELD ACTIVITY WASHINGTON DC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 110355Z APR 88
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEHBA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 INFO RUEHQHA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//70-PH//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEADAN/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NR CILDRSS//
 RUEBNA/CDRUSAC/PT SHAFER HI
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/PLG//
 RUEJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 RUEHMP/AMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPHCB//
 RUEIPGB/BAFESPC TTDALL AFB TX//DEBU//
 RUEABOF/COMHILPERCEN ALEX VA//DAPC-PED-P//
 RUEACNP/COMNAVILPERSCON WASHDC//INPC N 64//
 RUEBWA/COMNAVHEDCON WASHDC
 RUEACHC/CHC WASHDC//NOR 10/INTC/INTU//
 BT
 E21:

SECTION 04 OF 05 LIAISON BANGKOK 17762

E22:

3166 APR 88
 SUBJ: JCRC RPT T88-094, SRV MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND
 NAME APPROX 68-69 TOA (AS OF 1988) NATIVE OF
 NAME WHO HELD THE RANK OF PFC SR CPT AS OF 1967 WHEN
 SOURCE MET HER. SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE FORENSIC
 MEDICAL SECTION WAS A FAIRLY LARGE SECTION LOCATED
 NEXT TO THE MORGUE (NHA TU THI/NHAF TUNH THI). ALL
 STAFF MEMBERS WORE CIVILIAN ATTIRE AND HOSPITAL
 UNIFORMS. SOURCE WAS NOT ABLE TO RECALL FURTHER
 DETAILS CONCERNING THE FORENSIC SECTION. SOURCE WAS
 NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING THE MORGUE IN HOSPITAL
 108.

11. SOURCE STATED THAT DURING THE TIME HE
 WORKED AT THE BACH NAI HOSPITAL HE PERFORMED
 ACUPUNCTURE FOR SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE VIETNAMESE
 NEWS AGENCY (THONG TAN HA) WHICH WAS LOCATED AT

295 AGO (LANE/SIDESTREET), NAI HUONG IN THE BACH NAI
 AREA. SOURCE RECALLED THAT ONE CAUSE KNOWN TO HIM AS
 APPROX NO YOA NATIVE OF VINH
 PHU WHO RESIDED IN THE VNA COMPOUND, HAD MENTIONED
 THAT PUBLIC SECURITY PERSONNEL WHO HAD BEEN
 ASSOCIATED WITH AMERICAN POWS COORDINATED WITH THE
 VNA. IN JUNE 1967, SOURCE STATED THAT THE
 CENTRAL OFFICE FOR ALL INFORMATION WAS CALLED THE
 NGUYEN THONG HIEN INFORMATION CENTER WHICH WAS
 LOCATED NEXT TO HO TRIEN QUANG AN A LE LAKE IN
 HANOI CITY. SOURCE SAID THAT NG KHUAT PUT, WHO
 RESIDED AT 5 LY NAM DE STREET, OFTEN VISITED THE
 CENTER. SOURCE RECALLED THAT NG PUT WAS THE DIRECTOR
 OF THE GENERAL DEPARTMENT FOR PEOPLE'S SECURITY (TONG
 CUC TRUONG CONG AN NHAN DAN). SOURCE HEARD THAT THE
 NGUYEN THONG HIEN NEWS CENTER WAS UNDER THE CONTROL
 OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES AND WAS EQUIPPED WITH
 IBM COMPUTERS AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FOR MONITORING
 ALL TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH, AND WIRELESS
 COMMUNICATIONS. SOURCE SAID THAT ANOTHER MEMBER OF
 THE VNA, AN NAM (S) THANH, APPROX 50 YOA NATIVE OF
 THANH HOA WHO WAS ASSIGNED AS THE DEPUTY OF THE
 DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL NEWS SERVICE OF THE VNA, HAD
 ALSO BEEN INVOLVED WITH AMERICAN POWS DURING THE WAR
 BUT SOURCE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS OF HIS
 INVOLVEMENT. SOURCE ALSO RESIDED INSIDE THE VNA
 COMPOUND. SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE NEWS BANK (NGAN
 HANG TIN TUC) WAS LOCATED AT 5 LY THUONG KIET. THE
 VNA RADIO STATION WAS LOCATED AT QUANG BAT HO ST IN
 HANOI. SOURCE WAS NOT ABLE TO RECALL FURTHER DETAILS
 CONCERNING THE VNA.
 12. CONCERNING THE LY NAM DE AREA OF HANOI,
 SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD ONLY VISITED THE AREA ON A
 FEW OCCASIONS AND WAS NOT VERY FAMILIAR. SOURCE HAD
 PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED THE NAMES OF SOME OF THE
 OCCUPANTS OF NUMBER THREE LY NAM DE (REF B). DURING
 THIS SESSION B
 INTERVIEWER REALIZED THAT ONE OF THE
 NAMES SHOULD HAVE BEEN LUONG
 NAME. THIS MISUNDERSTANDING WAS DUE TO SOURCE'S
 ACCENT SINCE HE OFTEN SUBSTITUTES L'S FOR N'S WHICH
 IS TYPICAL FOR THE THAI BINH NAI PHONG AREA. SOURCE
 SUMMARIZED HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE LY NAM DE AREA BY
 SAYING THAT THE OCCUPANTS OF NUMBER THREE INCLUDED SR
 COL NAI THANH WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF INTELLIGENCE, SR
 COL LUONG VAN DOAN WHO WAS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
 AND SR COL NGO THE SON WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF
 ORGANIZING INTELLIGENCE (TO CUC TINH BAO). NUMBER
 FIVE WAS OCCUPIED BY PFC NG KHUAT PUT. NUMBER SEVEN
 WAS OCCUPIED BY SR COL LE MAN THANG, THE FORMER
 MILITARY COMMANDER OF HANOI, PRESENT POSITION
 UNKNOWN. SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO FURTHER KNOWLEDGE

CONCERNING THE LI-NAM DE AREA.

13. SOURCE STATED THAT OUT OF ALL THE PERSONNEL LISTED ABOVE THE MOST PROMISING SOURCE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING AMERICAN POW/MIA WOULD BE *NAME*

SOURCE OPINED THAT *NAME*

DISILLUSTIONED WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN VIETNAM

BT

17762

NNNN

NNDD

NSCWO 9-10011 8804/1/8804/1/05:30:4-14
ZCZC 06:00:40218C
GHI DTG: 8804/100H3706
RTTCITUN RUECJ 57762 1020443 - RURALGX
ZNY
R 110445Z APR 88
FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHW/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQ/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//NO-CYC//
RUEHAA/AMCC FT RITCHIE MD
RUEHAW/DCI FIELD ACTIVITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 110553Z APR 88
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEHQA/COM JCRC BARBERS PT HI
INFO RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//12/13/136//
RUEHQA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
RUEHQA/NS WASHDC//12/PH-MIA//
RUEHQA/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PH-MIA//
RUEHQA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MO CHILDRESS//
RUEHQA/COMUSCIBLT FT SHAFTER HI
RUEHQA/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/VLC//
RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUEHQA/AMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPHCS//
RUEHQA/NAFES TYNDALL AFB FL//DEB//
RUEHQA/COMHILPERCON ALEX VA//DAPC-FED-P//
RUEHQA/COMNAVHILPERCON WASHDC//INPC N 64//
RUEHQA/COMNAVHILPERCON WASHDC
RUEHQA/CIC WASHDC//NRD 10/INTC/INTN//
BT
EZ11

L SECTION 05 OF 05 LIAISON BANGKOK 17762

E22.

3165 APR 88

SUBJ: JCRC RPT T88-094A, SRY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND AND ALL THREE HAD THE POTENTIAL FOR ENTERING REFUGEE CHANNELS. OF THE MEDICAL FACILITIES LISTED ABOVE, SOURCE OPINED THAT PUBLIC SECURITY HOSPITAL 198 HAD THE MOST POTENTIAL REGARDING INFORMATION CONCERNING AMERICAN POW/MIA.

14. COMMENT: SOURCE WAS COOPERATIVE AND MADE NO REQUESTS OF THE INTERVIEWER. SOURCE PROVIDED A GREAT DEAL OF HEARSAY INFORMATION; MOST OF WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE LEARNED DURING JUNE 1987 WHILE VISITING HANOI. THE INTERVIEWER FINDS IT STRANGE THAT SOURCE WOULD MAKE IT A POINT TO BRING UP THE ISSUE OF AMERICAN POWS IN SUCH A MANNER UNLESS HE HAD INTENTIONS OF COVERING THIS SUBJECT PRIOR TO GOING THERE FOR HIS FINAL VISIT. INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY

PROVIDED BY SOURCE HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED TO THE
LOCAL STORY BEACH TEAM FOR FOLLOWUP AND SOURCE WAS
NOT SCHEDULED FOR REINTERVIEW BY JCRC. HOWEVER
WHILE THE INTERVIEWER WAS PRESENT IN THE CAMP TO
INTERVIEW OTHER REFUGEES, SOURCE SENT A REQUEST TO A
CAMP STAFF MEMBER ASKING TO MEET WITH THE
INTERVIEWER.

BT
#7762
NNNN
#000

3/02/99

ACTION
REF OLD REPORTS

NUMBER OF RECORDS WHICH SATISFY YOUR REQUEST
PHSEAS 9694

***TOTAL: 9694
ACTION
REF NEW
ENTER QUERY

705 IF 27 HAS HANOI
710 OR 36 HAS HANOI
715 OR 27 HAS HOSPITAL
720 OR 36 HAS HOSPITAL
725 OR 36 HAS HOSP

NUMBER OF RECORDS WHICH SATISFY YOUR REQUEST
PHSEAS 158

***TOTAL: 158
ACTION
REF NEW
ENTER QUERY

705 IF 10 EG HANOI

NUMBER OF RECORDS WHICH SATISFY YOUR REQUEST
PHSEAS 129

***TOTAL: 129
ACTION
OUTL N.S. 1, 2, 3, 27, 36, 3
PROCESSING FILE 1:PHSEAS

07544004

3/02/92

PAGE 1

X02 = 04369
X027 = U/I SWEDEN FM

XREF SJ
PAPERHILL FILE
XREF CASE W/
FOREIGN AIO WKR

X036 = EVLAPP 1 FREE BLK NR HANOI 84

X002 = 05862

X027 = NAME SS

X036 = FOLOUT 2 CAU BNH HOSPITAL 8109

X002 = 09012

X027 =

X036 = FOLOUT 55 US NR HANOI 81

X002 = 07498

X027 =

X036 = FOLREQ 300 PWS NR HANOI

X002 = 04800

X027 =

NAME SS

NAME SS

X036 = FOLOUT 1 FREE US LIVING HANOI

X002 = 04884

X027 =

NAME SS

SS

X036 = EVLAPP 1 PW HANOI CITY 69770

X002 = 92526

X027 =

NAME SS

X036 = EVLAPP 30-40 PWS HANOI 8210

X002 = 06146

X027 =

NAME SS

DTS44034

PAGE 2

X027 = NPHINAFILM PWS HANOI HILTON
X036 =

X002 = 06696

X027 =

X036 = FOLREQ 700 PWS NEAR HANOI

X002 = 08113

X027 =

X036 = FOLREQ 40 CAU HELD HANOI

X002 = 05384

X027 =

X036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INH-U 59-83

X002 = 04232

X027 = 1-REF W/1604

X036 = EVLREQ 40 US 14KM E OF HANOI

X002 = 01179

X027 =

X036 = EVLAPP 1 CAU NR HANOI 78

X002 = 02292

X027 =

X036 = EVLREQ 1 GRV F105 NR HANOI 72

X002 = 02197

X027 =

X036 = EVLREQ 2 PWS FILM NR HANOI 79

X002 = 01514

X027 =

DTS44034

3/02/89

PAGE 3

027 -
036 - EVLREQ PW 12001 MW OF HANOI

002 - 05388
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - CAMPIN HANOI CAMP 1470 62-63

002 - 05387
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - EVLREQ HANOI CAMP UNKNOWN EDGE

002 - 07352
027 - 55

0003 - SC

036 - FOLREQ 5FMS/552 HANOI 72

002 - 01034
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - EVLREQ UNK PWS HANOI-HOA BINH

002 - 00475
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - FOLREQ 33 PROG HANOI 74

002 - 00912
027 - 55

0003 - SC

036 - INTREQ 1 US GRV NEAR HANOI 68

002 - 04803
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - 1 -PH

002 - 09443
027 - 55

0003 - SC

01844034

3/02/89

PAGE 4

036 - FOLREQ WARDEN OF US MR HANOI

002 - 09240
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - EVLREQ 1 CRS F112-HANOI CITY 72

002 - 02610
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - EVLAPP 1 CAU HOSP HA DONG 68

002 - 04432
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - EVLREQ A/C CRASH HANOI MID71

002 - 04978
027 - 55

0003 - SC

036 - FOLREQ 1 DEFECTOR HANOI LT70-S

002 - 07085
027 - 55

0003 - SC

ICE HOUSE

036 - NPHIN GOVT OFFICES IN HANOI

002 - 04521
027 -

0003 - SC

036 - EVLREQ 1 ET CRS HANOI LTE-72

002 - 08334
027 - BAT BAT 55

0003 - SC

036 - FOLREQ UNK 6 PWS IN HANOI

002 - 05427
027 - -HOSPITAL 106
-NURSE 55

0003 - SC

036 - EVLREQ2 US PW RMS HOSP 106 68

002 - 04273
027 -

0003 - 1 SC

036 - EVLREQ 1 GRV F4H HANOI CITY 72

002 - 05935
027 -

0003 - 1 SC

036 - FOLREQ 2US HOA LO PRISON-HANOI

01844034

3/02/89

PAGE 5

X02 = 03021
 X27 =
 X36 = EVLREG RCSC 2PMS HANOI 670519

0003 = SC

X02 =
 X27 =

0003 = SC

X36 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 37-83

X02 = 02044
 X27 =

0003 = SC

X36 = EVLAPP 2 US PWS HANOI 8410

X02 = 01012
 X27 = WAREHOUSE

0003 = SC

X36 = EVLREG UNK 6 RMS HANOI MUSEUM

X02 = 02354
 X27 =
 X36 = FOLREG UNKUS NR HANOI JAN84

0003 = SC

X02 = 04124
 X27 =
 X36 = EVLPRO 20 US HANOI PARADE 6607

0003 = SC

X02 = 04125
 X27 =
 X36 = EVLREG 3 B-52'S HANOI 72

0003 = SC

X02 = 06773
 X27 =

0003 = SC

X36 = CAMPIN CAMP INFO ONLY-SEE 27

X02 = 01079
 X27 =

0003 = SC

DIS44034

13/02/89

PAGE 6

X027 = MOTHER (NF1)

X036 = EVLPRO OVER 10 US PWS HANOI 78

X002 = 00390

0003 = SC

X027 =
 SS

X036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 65-83

X002 = 03400

0003 = SC

X027 =
 SS

X036 = EVLREG HANOI CAMP KNOWLEDGE

X002 = 07698

0003 = SC

X027 =
 SS

X036 = FOLREG 50 USAF HELD HANOI 85

X002 = 05816

0003 = SC

X027 =
 SS

X036 = FOLREG 50-70 MOI CAMP 52 HANOI

X002 = 05106

0003 = SC

X027 =

X036 = FOLREG UNKUS HOSP#108 HA TAY

X002 = 01628

0003 = SC

X027 =
 SS

X036 = INTREG UNKUS HANOI 6 LAOS SUN

X002 = 06941

0003 = SC

X027 =
 SS

X036 = EVLREG 1 BLK FRENCH-HANOI

X002 = 03053

0003 = SC

X027 =
 SS

X036 = EVLAPP 1 US PW HANOI CAMP

DIS44034

3/02/80

PAGE 7

0002 = 06197

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = FOLREQ 6 PMS (1BLK) AIRBASE - HANOI

0002 = 01093

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = FOLREQ 4 CAU HANOI - FEB-MAY 77

0002 = 03123

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = FOLREQ US PW CAMP HANOI SUBURB

0002 = 08445

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = FOLREQ 2 PMS CAPTURED HANOI-71

0002 = 01266

0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = FOLREQ UNK#US THANH HOA/HANOI

0002 = 03814

0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = FOLREQ 1 PW#GRVS 852 HANOI 72

0002 = 04738

0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = EVLAPP 1 PW JET HANOI CITY 68

0002 = 00412

0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = EVLREQ 3 US IN HANOI

0002 = 05393

0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

0036 = EVLREQ HANOI CAMP KNOWLEDGE

01844034

3/02/80

PAGE 8

0002 = 02314

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = EVLREQ MANY REMAINS HANOI 83

0002 = 05394

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = CAMP IN HANOI CAMP INFO 54-83

0002 = 00751

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = UNK#US PMS NORTH OF HANOI 79

0002 = 05642

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = EVLREQ 12 AMERICANS IN HANOI

0002 = 03029

0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = FOLOUT UNK#US HANOI AFTER 75

0002 = 03049

0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

0036 = EVLREQ 1 CAU 35MI NW HANOI 83

0002 = 01162

0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

0036 = EVLAPP UNK#PMS HANOI AREA 78

0002 = 01419

0003 = SC

01844034

3/02/89

PAGE 9

0027 = ~~SS~~
 0036 = EVLREQ 110 US YEN BAI HOSPITAL

0002 = 02489 0003 = SC

0027 =
 0036 = EVLAPP 1 PH HANOI STREETS 73

0002 = 00962 0003 = SC

0027 = COMMANDO

0036 = EVLREQ UNK PMS HANOI 75-78

0002 = 05395 0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

0036 = EVLREQ HANOI CAMP KNOWLEDGE

0002 = 05396 0003 = SC

0027 = ~~SS~~

0036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 60-83

0002 = 04122 0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = EVLREQ 1 US GRV NEAR HANOI

0002 = 05351 0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = EVLAPP 1 US QUANG NINH HOSP

0002 = 09440 0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = FOLREQ 1 PH/F105 HANOI-66

0002 = 03014 0003 = SC

0027 = SS

0036 = EVLAPP 1 BLK NEAR HANOI 81

0002 = 04534 0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

J1844034

3/02/89

PAGE 10

0027 = ~~SS~~

0036 = NOPWIN 1 BLK BICYCLING HANOI

0002 = 03510 0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = EVLREQ 1 CAU ELECTRICIAN HANOI

0002 = 07591 0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

0036 = FOLREQ UNK 8 PMS HANOI-85

0002 = 05399 0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

0036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 58-83

0002 = 04717 0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = EVLREQ B52 WRECK DISPLAY HANOI

0002 = 03723 0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

1 DAY IN HANOI

0036 = EVLREQ 2 PMS B52 FT. H HANOI

0002 = 04067 0003 = SC

0027 =

0036 = FOLCUT 30 YEN BAI HOSP 65-68

0002 = 09713 0003 = SC

0027 =

SS

D1844034

3/02/89

PAGE 11

X027 = SS
 X036 = FOLREQ UNKNOWNS TREATED BY SRV
 X002 = 01694 0003 = SC
 X027 = SS
 X036 = EVLREQ PWS HELD HANOI UNKN
 X002 = 00854 0003 = SC
 X027 = 00854
 X036 = EVLREQ B-52 CRS NEAR HANOI
 X002 = 06076 0003 = SC
 X027 = SS
 X036 = FOLREQ UNKN PWS HANOI 83-84
 X002 = 04969 0003 = SC
 X027 =

SS

X036 = FOLREQ 200 PWS IN CAVE-HANOI
 X002 = 02546 0003 = SC
 X027 =

SS

X036 = EVLAPP 3 CAU HANOI/KHME
 X002 = 04372 0003 = SC
 X027 = SS

X036 = FOLREQ 70-80 US HELI HANOI 84
 X002 = 01016 0003 = SC
 X027 =

DIS44034

3/02/89

PAGE 12

X036 = FOLREQ UNKNOWNS PWS HANOI
 X002 = 04139 0003 = SC
 X027 =
 X036 = EVLREQ 50 BRVS HANOI VAN DIEN
 X002 = 02050 0003 = SC
 X027 =
 X036 = FOLREQ 1 PW NEAR HANOI 68069
 X002 = 05401 0003 = SC
 X027 = SS

X036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 46-83
 X002 = 05118 0003 = SC
 X027 =

SS

X036 = FOLREQ US SLAVES IN HANOI 85
 X002 = 08468 0003 = SC
 X027 = SS
 X036 = FOLREQ 5 PWS HANOI
 X002 = 04358 0003 = SC
 X027 =
 X036 = EVLREQ SOVIET TECHS-HANOI AREA
 X002 = 09895 0003 = SC
 X027 =

SS

XREF UNDER-
 TOWN

X036 = FOLREQ 1PW LA BORDER PRIOR-75
 X002 = 01649 0003 = SC
 X027 =
 X036 = EVLREQ 1 US BODY HANOI 7212
 X002 = 00673 0003 = SC
 X027 = SS

DIS44034

3/02/89

PAGE 13

X027 = SS
X036 = EVLREQ 3 CAU HANOI 75

X002 = 03209 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLOUT UNKSERVANTS NR HANOI

X002 = 05403 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 58-83

X002 = 04453 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLOUT SOME PWS HANOI 30 OR 31

X002 = 03167 0003 = SC
X027 = SS
X036 = FOLREQ 3-5 PWS NORTH OF HANOI

X002 = 05402 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 50-83

X002 = 02061 0003 = SC
X027 = SS
X036 = FOLREQ 2US/1DIED NR HANOI 72

X002 = 09764 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = EVLAPP 2US-1PW HANOI 71OR72

X002 = 09765 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = EVLREQ B52 CR: HANOI 72

D1844034

3/02/89

PAGE 14

X002 = 06473 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLREQ MANY US PWS NEAR HANOI

X002 = 02319 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = EVLREQ UNKUS HANOI AREA 76

X002 = 02226 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLOUT 2 US CAVE NR HANOI

X002 = 01329 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLREQ UNKUS BAC MAI HANOI

X002 = 04942 0003 = SC
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLREQ 28/30IC HANOI UNKYR

X002 = 04533 0003 = SC
X027 = SS
(6121547-0191)

X036 = FOLREQ GP OF US W/CHAINS HANOI

X002 = 01726 0003 = SC
X027 = SS
X036 = EVLREQ 1 GRV NEAR HANOI 6708

X002 = 03084 0003 = SC
X027 = SS
X036 = EVLAPP 1 PW SH HANOI MTD 72

D1844034

3/42/89

PAGE 15

X002 = 04811
X027 = EVLAPP UNK4PW'S HANOI CITY 79
X002 = 05381
X027 = SS

X036 = CAMPIN HANOI CAMP INFO 34-93
X002 = 02231
X027 = FOLREG-10 US FILMED HANOI-79
X036 = 06925
X027 = NOPHIN VIET DUC HOSP&TRNG ENVR
X036 = 00239
X027 = EVLPRO 2000 US PWS IN HANOI 76
X002 = 05747
X027 = SS

X036 = EVLREG 3 PWS EXECUTED HANOI 74
X002 = 04931
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLREV 4 PWS EXECUTED NR HANOI
X002 = 08613
X027 = SS

X036 = FOLREV 6 PWS WORKING NR HANOI
X002 = 01577
X027 = SS

0003 = 1 SC

0003 = SC

0003 = SC

0003 = SC

0003 = SC

0003 = 1 SC

0003 = SC

0003 = SC

0003 = SC

MFR

01 JUL 88

On 01 JUL 88, [redacted] and LNO [redacted] with [redacted] CIA, and discussed the [redacted] and VO-PW's JAN 87 request for an interrogation/polygraph. Mr. [redacted] did that the interrogation and polygraph were completed in FEB 87. He stated that those results were passed to VO-PW telephonically in FEB 87. Today he restated those results as follows: Mr. [redacted] tests indicated deception regarding his personal background and PW information as well as other aspects of his statement. CIA determined that [redacted] revealed no valid PW/MIA information, and that he should not, in future, be considered a reliable source intelligence on this issue.

This information should be considered in conjunction with the original JCRC interviewer's remarks in R286-091 of 17 110120Z86 (see Tab 1). [redacted] that [redacted] was afraid of being overheard by other Vietnamese refugees and refused to be interviewed until everyone else had left; he indicated several times he expected a reward for information tendered; he was an evasive and reluctant subject; he seemed more interested in "intelligence matters" than PW/MIA; and lacked any specific knowledge of the Security Officers College where he claimed to have studied counter-espionage for five years.

Considering Mr. [redacted] reliability and lack of factual information, I suggest his alleged PW/MIA information be presented to the next Inter-agency Council as a fabrication; and further, that it would be inappropriate to waste future assets by pursuing an interrogation and polygraph with [redacted] in France.

DIS44034

01 JUL 88

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

RE: Position between AN, CIA, and AN Collection
 Mr. YO-PR on 1 JUL 88 re: SC

AN inquired as to whether AN could provide YO-PR with a status of the vetting process and polygraph of SC. He responded that DIA would have to discuss this source with AN. CIA—that he AN could not help.

Previous attempts by AN to obtain written results have not been fruitful.

Mr. AN is expected back in the area on Tues. 5 JUL 88. YO-PR will contact him again at that time.

AME

21 June 88

Per AN instructions
 work up summary of SC report
 so he can re-interview him

Suggest interview questions, copy:

THINGS TO DO:
 1. Find MOI BNV Hosp info - esp 1980-81
 → Can run DB search for other sources
 2. MOI BNV Hosp experience? (AN)
 → Call him (AN) and ask if he did Polys on 60
 but wouldn't/didn't forward results to us.
 → V/W AN - He would can't previously
 → Re-poly? (maybe)
 from AN to the CIA
 2-7 June 88
 Forget interview the source. He has
 moved to France. Can pursue a
 France interview - write intel requirements
 when he gets back.

AN will call 30 June 88
 re AN. al CIA when he gets back
 from current assignment.

WORKING PAPER

902

CIT

PAGE 0010

MSGNO 40 (PCEX) *03/26/87* *04:06:39.4.3*

EZ20 09105143Z (PC)

ZNY DTG 1 87032604010317

RTTCZYU HNS/JCS9860 0850900

REALITY

ZNY

R 250900Z MAR 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO HNSADN/OCISA WASHINGTON DC

HNSAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

HNSAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

HNSAAA/ABCC FT RITCHIE MD

HNSALM/SAFE

R 251842Z MAR 87

FM CDA JCS BARBERS PT HI

TO HNSAAA/JCS LIAISON BARBERS HI

INFO HNSAAA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36//

HNSLCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//

HNSLCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PS-MIA//

HNSADN/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

HNSLCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC//OCISL-PH-MIA/J5//

BT

EZ11

EZ21 EVALUATION OF RPT 00004-09100 (U)

NSC FOR RPT/CHILDRESS

1. JCS LIAISON BARBERS HI 1911011 DEC 86

2. DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH// 052120Z JAN 87

3. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OC AC SO, SOURCE OF

REF A, REVEALS NO CORRELATION TO DATA IN JCS FILES.

2. (U) THE LIMITED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SOURCE IS NOT

SUFFICIENT TO CORRELATE THIS REPORT TO DATA IN JCS FILES.

3. (U) THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL POSITION AND NOT A FINAL

EVALUATION. EVAL - JAC.

DECL: OADR.

BT

09860

HNSM

EZ3

TEXT

HNS66-091

HNSD

WEEK OF 17 - 16 JAN 1987

12 JAN 87

1. C.E. ON		
2. EVAL ON DR INTERVIEW	SC	DATA
3. EVAL ON	SC	1
4. C.E. ON	SC	1
5. FOLLOW UP ON	SC	1
6. SDR ON CIA SOURCE		
7. TOR ON HANOI SOURCES		
8. COLLECTION PROGRAM ON HANOI SOURCES		
9. M - C.E. ON	DATA	
10. M - C.E. 1	DATA 1	

2. (b) The purpose of this collective emphasis is to request the ^{classification} ^{marking} further ~~information~~ and ~~release~~ of the ~~Public~~ ^{Public} ~~Security~~ ^{Security} ~~Information~~ ^{Information} reported by victims.

Refuse

52

10

5

100

9

15. The self reported 21 yoa public security
1. IT who volunteered to interview him that
he observed each of two different individuals
separately ^{on} occasions. Each time when
he was told ^{that} ~~was~~ ^{the} American ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~prisoner~~ ^{prisoner} treated and
continued in a Ministry of Interior hospital near

Hand 1 in 1981 and 1986, respectively. The

Source was told on the first occasion that the

DRAFT

MAN CAMP FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED CAMP OF SS

PLUs. ^{Additionally} ~~Return~~ AT a family gathering around

TET 1985 ~~was~~ A Relative who ~~expressed~~ To

LIVARON

Duke

the no. 1 to 16 The

Source that a number of PWs were

connected with the Ministry of Defense Area

The Source reported that he had attended a

SECURITY OFFICERS COLLEGE NEAR HA DONG CITY

from Dec 15 To 20 and performed counter-

INTELLIGENCE DUTIES IN THE QUANG PROVINCE

Public Security, State in Hon Gay

SC. ALSO STATED THAT HE WAS ARGUING?

with and/or knew about ^{potentially knowledg} ~~operation~~ of H.C. in

of TRA SERV NO I

(b) Reference A describes the continuing

Requirements for PW/MIA Information Ref

Para's

B is the Report of the initial interview

of W. Ref C is the Record of Interview

of a Vietnamese Thug/PT.

MOI Hospital - South of HA
HAI DICH - CAU GIAY

Dept KID, CUP CAU GIAY

Doc

Name

Name

- SECURITY OFFICER'S COLLEGE

VAN QUAN TRAINING V. V. HANG

OUTER LAM HA DANG

E 200 C 500

SC

- Col

SC

SD

DEPT OF GAIL

SC

DRD CHIEF, SEC

SC

SEC

SC

LTC

SC

RESIDENT OF

'LMD PAB'

SC

NSCRO ST (PC) 012/10/84 05103117777
 2222 101021172 (PC)
 RTTCZYUW HONGKONG 180 3440924 --KUALA
 21

R 100924Z DEC 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADND/CNSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADDA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHATA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHACD/CDC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHIAH/DINSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEHACM/CNC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHIAO/MFC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEHIAZ/SAFE

R 100924Z DEC 86

FM USDAO HONG KONG HK
 TO RUEHJCS/DIA --WASHDC//04-3/DB-20/DC-443/TO-PH/EIS-28//
 INFO RUEHACD/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUEHIA/USDAO HONGKONG CH
 --RUEHJCS/JCOC-- BARBERS PT HI
 --RUEHJCS/JCOC-- LIAISON BARBERS PT HI

BT
 EZ11

SECTION 02 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 20180

EZ2:

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 842 0127 87
 COUNTRY: (U) --VIETNAM-- (TH)
 SUBJECT: IIR 6 842 0127 87/LYMAN DE JAIL POSSIBLE --POW--

BT
 00180
 >NNNN
 ##DD

NSCRO ST (PC) 012/10/84 05103117777
 2222 101021172 (PC)
 RTTCZYUW HONGKONG 180 3440924 --KUALA

R 100924Z DEC 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADND/CNSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEADDA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHATA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHACD/CDC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHIAH/DINSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEHACM/CNC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHIAO/MFC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEHIAZ/SAFE

R 100924Z DEC 86

FM USDAO HONG KONG HK
 TO RUEHJCS/DIA --WASHDC//04-3/DB-20/DC-443/TO-PH/EIS-28//
 INFO RUEHACD/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUEHIA/USDAO HONGKONG CH
 --RUEHJCS/JCOC-- BARBERS PT HI
 --RUEHJCS/JCOC-- LIAISON BARBERS PT HI

BT
 EZ11

SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 20180

EZ2:

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 842 0127 87
 COUNTRY: (U) --VIETNAM-- (TH)
 SUBJECT: IIR 6 842 0127 87/LYMAN DE JAIL POSSIBLE --POW--
 CAMP IN --VIETNAM-- (U)
 REMARKS: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
 FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
 DOI: (U) 861115
 MSGS: (U) D-POP-4386
 SOURCE (U) 776 842 0224//

SUMMARY: THIS IIR FORWARDS INFORMATION PROVIDED
 BY A LOCAL --VIETNAMESE-- CHINESE REFUGEE
 CONCERNING THE LY NAM DE JAIL NEAR HANOI.
 CLAIMS THE JAIL WAS USED TO HOUSE --CHINA/POW--'S AFTER THE
 END OF THE WAR.

TEXT: A LOCAL REFUGEE OFFICER RECEIVED A LETTER
 WRITTEN BY A --VIETNAMESE-- CHINESE REFUGEE
 CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE SO CAMP. THE
 CONTENT OF THE LETTER IS TRANSMITTED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE
 DEAR OFFICER OF THE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, HK,
 I AM A --VIETNAMESE-- CHINESE REFUGEE FROM 5)

COMMENTS *2* AS BEEN INTERVIEWED BY
THE JCRC LIAISON OFFICER FROM BANGKOK. THIS INFORMATION
IS FURNISHED AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THOSE INTERVIEWS.
A COPY OF THIS LETTER WAS SHOWN TO THE JCRC REPRESENTATIVE
OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO HONG KONG. HE SAID HE WAS
AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION IN THE LETTER. SUBSEQUENT
REPORTS ON HIS INTERVIEWS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED BY SET COR.
BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY THAT IS INVOLVED IN THE
COP/POA/IA-OO MATTER AND BEING THE LIAISON CONTACT IN HONG KONG
REQUEST AN EVALUATION ON THIS REPORT.
//INSP: PG 2340//
//CONSON: 1,3//
PROJ: (U) NONE
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) US MO
PREP: (U) *AW*
APPR: (U) *AW*
EVAL: (U) YES (ICR: D-WOP-43486)
BT
#0180
NNNN
NNNN

08 (PCKX) 009/30/88 05:08/38:36
ZCZC 10:07:36Z (PC)
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS#10/273000S
ZNY
P 300841Z SEP 86
FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHC/CHS-GRD/OCCNS
RUEADH/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAAR/CHD WASHINGTON DC
RUEAFC/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAAB/AMSC FT RITCHIE MD
RUEASDC/SCG-GRD/SECDEF
RUEALC/SAFE
P 300837Z SEP 86
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEHBA/COM JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBA/NSICPC/NOHOLLO BT//J2/J3/J6//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//IO-PA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PA-MIA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PA-MIA//
RUEADWW/WHITELHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/HR CHILDRESS//
BT
C21:
ACTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 04310
CITE: 3716 SEP 86
C22:
SUBJECT: JCRC RPT H86-67, HEARSAY OF U.S. PILOTS
HELD IN NAMOI (U)
REF: H86-68 (REPORT BY SAME SOURCE) (NOTAL)
1. SOURCE:
A. NAME: SC
B. DOB: SD
C. POB: SD
D. FORMER POSITION: FISHERMAN
E. PRESENT LOCATION: SD
F. IDENTIFICATION DATA: SD
G. DOI: 1979
H. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 3 SEP 86
I. NAME OF INTERVIEWER: AW
J. OTHER: SD
2. SUMMARY: SOURCE, A 32 YOA MALE VM
(ETHNIC CHINESE) REFUGEE, PROVIDED LIMITED HEARSAY
INFORMATION CONCERNING AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF
AMERICAN PILOTS HELD IN AN UNDERGROUND PRISON IN NAMOI.
3. SOURCE STATED THAT SOMETIME DURING 1979,
WHILE RESIDING IN HON GAY CITY, QUANG NINH PROVINCE,
HE HEARD ABOUT AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF AMERICAN
PRISONERS BEING HELD IN NAMOI. SOURCE HEARD THE STORY

2. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS BORN IN THE NON
GAY PROVINCE AND WAS A FISHMAN DURING THE NON
GAY PUBLIC SECURITY STATUS. SOURCE STATED THAT HE
HAD MET ~~29C~~ ~~29C~~ DURING THE 1970S WHILE RESIDING IN
NON GAY. QUANG VINH NEAR THE FISHMAN SOURCE
STATED THAT ~~29C~~ WORKED AS A PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICER
IN THE SAME AREA WHERE HIS SOURCE'S FATHER WORKED AS
A FISHMAN AND THAT HE BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH HIM.
3. SOURCE STATED THAT SOMETIME DURING 1976
ALL ETHNIC CHINESE RESIDING IN THE BORDER AREA WERE
FORCED BY THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT TO RELOCATE FURTHER
INLAND FROM THE BORDER AND THAT HE WAS RESETTLED IN
NON GAY. AFTER HE RESETTLED IN NON GAY, SOURCE MET
~~29C~~ NEAR HIS HOME AND CONTACTED WITH HIM. SOURCE HEARD
FROM ~~29C~~ THAT WHEN HIS FATHER WAS RELEASED AT THE END
OF THE WAR, ~~29C~~ SHALL MEET ONE OF HIS PILOTS WERE NOTED
FROM NON GAY PRISON TO HANOI WHERE THEY WERE DETAINED
IN A SECRET UNDERGROUND PRISON. SOURCE HEARD FROM
~~29C~~ THAT THE ENTRY INTO THE UNDERGROUND PRISON WAS
LOCATED INSIDE A RESIDENTIAL BUILDING IN THE AREA
OF BO CHU MINH (HAUSOUK). SOURCE HEARD THAT THE
PRISON HAD THREE SEPARATE REGIMENS OF SECURITY
GUARDS AROUND IT (THREE PERIMETER DEPTH). SOURCE
HEARD THAT ONLY FIELD GRAD OFFICERS WERE ALLOWED TO
ENTER THE AREA OF THE PRISON. SOURCE DID NOT HEAR
WHETHER ~~29C~~ HAD ACTUALLY SEEN THE PRISONERS HIMSELF
OR HAD ONLY HEARD ABOUT THEM FROM SOMEONE ELSE.
4. SOURCE WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION
CONCERNING THE ALLEGED AMERICAN PRISONERS.
5. SOURCE STATED THAT HE LIVED AT HIS FISH BOAT UNTIL
1980 WHEN HE CROSSED THE CHINA-VIETNAM BORDER WITH
HIS PARENTS TO RESIDE IN NON GAY TOWN. SOURCE
RESIDED IN NON GAY AND WORKED AS A FISHERMAN UNTIL
1978 WHEN HE WAS FORCEFULLY RESETTLED TO RESIDE AT
6. PROVINCE. SOURCE ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE BY BOAT DURING
OCTOBER 1980 FROM ~~30~~ BUT WAS ARRESTED BY PUBLIC
SECURITY PERSONNEL WHILE PREPARING TO ESCAPE.
7. SOURCE WAS HELD IN THE QUANG VINH PROVINCIAL PRISON
AREA "LANG 14" LOCATED IN NON GAY. IN MAY 1981
SOURCE WAS RELEASED TO RETURN TO HIS HOME IN SO
CITY. SOURCE WAS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL ESCAPE
BY BOAT FROM NON GAY ON 13 APRIL 1985.

KSGMO 04 (PCY) 009/30/86* 05:08:36.7*
 ZCZC 10:07:36Z (PC)
 FTTSZ/IN RUEK/CSA130 2750843 --- --RUEALGX
 SPY
 P 300843Z SEP 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEAHCIS CSB GRID/OCJCS
 RUMKAW/OCMA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHAI/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABCA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAAL/AMCCO FT RITCHIE MD
 RUEASDC/SGC/GRD/SECDEF
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 300837Z SEP 86
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEHQA/CSA, JCR BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY
 INFO RUEHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//Z2/Z3/Z6//
 RUEHQA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//IO-PW//
 RUEHQA/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-PW//PW-MIA//
 RUEHQA/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUMKAW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NR CHILDRESS//
 BT
 #21:
 SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK C-44310C-4
 CITE: 3716 SEP 86
 #22:
 SUBJECT: JCRC RPT H266-87, HEARSAY OF U.S. PILOTS
 PROVIDING PUBLIC SECURITY STATION. THE RECEIPT WAS
 DATED 28 JANUARY 1987. SOURCE MADE A PLEA FOR
 RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE SUBSEQUENT TO THE INTERVIEW.
 SOURCE ALSO REPORTED GRAVESITE INFORMATION WHICH IS
 BEING REPORTED BY SEPARATE LETTER REPORT.
 BT
 #4310
 NNNN
 NNNN

C1DA0

NSCRO 4 (PCXX) 001/05/87* 18:04:31.2.5*

ZCZC 23:03:37Z (PC)

PTTS2YUN RUSKJCS2501 0052253- NOBALOX

ZNY

P 052253Z JAN 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

P 052120Z JAN 87

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//

TO RUEBAXIA/CIA WASHINGTON-DC//DOO/EA/VCL//

INFO RUEBHEK/JCRC LNO BANGKOK TH

BT

EZ11

EZ21

0018/TO-PH

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REFUGEE REPORT (U)

REF: JCRC LNO BANGKOK NSG DTG 191109Z DEC 85 (C) NSC26-051(C)

1. REFERENCED REPORT PERTAINED TO US PW LIVE SIGHTING

2. REPORT MADE BY SOURCE (C) (C) (C) IN (C) (C) DIA HOLDS HIGH INTEREST IN THIS SIGHTING AND IS CURRENTLY FORMULATING REQUESTS FOR FURTHER EXPLOITATION OF SOURCE. ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THIS SOURCE WOULD BE OF VALUE TO THE PLANNING PROCESS.

3. REQUEST YOU FORWARD (C) (C) (C) REPORTS ON SOURCE (C)

TO DIA/TO-PH

4. POINT OF CONTACT AT DIA/TO-PH IS / PH / DR (C) (C)

BT

#2501


R000

EZ3

TEXT

R006-091

R000



Ref: JRC, LA BARGES, H. Reg. ITS 191109Z DEC 86/HK860

Describe guard 1951 building
Describe interior of MOI Hospital
Admission paper - check for (S)

Similarities w/ SS

2 conversations in prison and
Hospital mentioned
H/S None
45 (Haw) SS
PAVN - LCO from 75 years old
Relatives working for SRV govt.

Called CIA 89 Dec 86

Requested update on status of setting of SC
SC will call us before then


push copies of reports on How to Bangkok ^{CIA HQ} and
HK

Request following in reinterview

1. Details surrounding sightings
 - a. Starting points, travel routes to & from
 - length of stay, routine inside, staffing
 - treatment for ailments, interior of Hosp,
 - interior of room, date of guards (exp, uni)
 - conversations with guards, staff
2. MOI background

Complete history of service

End of MOI involvement
reporting of MCHM
issue of doctors, (prison, punishment, etc)
live sighting
use of resistance
Groups: refugee
infiltrator
Location of MOI facilities
Prison system
Map of current directives (esp US MCHM doctrine)
Methods of
Box on sightings and possible disposition as agent.



Haiphong

CD 3 S-HOY

MEMORANDUM

29 DECEMBER 1986

SUBJ: INQUIRY INTO STATUS OF SOURCE

REF: A. TELECON BETWEEN VO-PW AND CIA, 29DEC86

B. JCRC LN BANGKOK TH MSG DTG 191109ZDEC86 (NPT)
HR86-091

1. IN REFERENCE A, I REQUESTED THAT THE CIA DETERMINE THE STATUS OF ~~SC~~ A 21 YEAR OLD NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN A 1ST LT IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OF THE SRV'S MOI PRIOR TO HIS ESCAPE TO ~~SC~~ REFERENCE B, REPORTS ~~SC~~ TO THE SIGHTING OF TWO CAUCASIANS SAID TO HAVE BEEN AMERICANS IN THE MOI HOSPITAL IN HANOI. CIA, IN AN EARLIER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, MENTIONED THAT ~~SC~~ WOULD BE VETTED AS A POSSIBLE DEFECTOR.

2. SEVERAL POINTS IN ~~SC~~ STORY ARE SIMILAR TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY ADMITTED FABRICATOR, ~~SC~~ BOTH MENTIONED TWO CAUCASIANS DRESSED IN STRIPED UNIFORMS, BOTH MENTIONED HOSPITALS IN THEIR ACCOUNTS, BOTH CLAIMED HEARSAY PW INFORMATION FROM A PAVN RELATIVE WITH THE RANK OF LCOL WHO WORKED ON LY NAM DE STREET IN HANOI, BOTH CLAIM RELATIVES WHO WORK FOR THE SRV GOVERNMENT. IN LIGHT OF THE

SIMILARITIES FROM SOURCES WHO DEPARTED VIETNAM IN DIFFERENT WAYS AND TO DIFFERENT FIRST ASYLUM POINTS, AND THE FACT THAT ~~SC~~ ADMITTED FABRICATING HIS LIVE SIGHTING, A THOROUGH REINTERVIEW OF ~~SC~~ IN CONJUNCTION WITH CIA VETTING PROCESS, AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, WILL BE REQUESTED. POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION WILL ALSO BE REQUESTED TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE CIA OR OSI TO TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER REINTERVIEW.

3. CIA STATED IN REFERENCE A, THAT VO-PW WILL BE INFORMED BY COS WEDNESDAY 31DEC86 REGARDING STATUS OF ~~SC~~ VETTING PROCESS. CE OR EDR DRAFTING PENDING COMPLETION OF THIS COORDINATION.

VN DESK ANALYST

AMERICAN EMBASSY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346

22 December 85

SUBJECT: VN Refugee


TO: Commander, JCRC

1. Please refer to our message, JCRC BKK 191101Z DEC 86 (BK86-091).
2. Enclosed is the hand drawn memory sketch provided by subject refugees.

AL USA, WASH
JCRC Liaison Officer

Attachment

Cy to:
DIA/VO-PW ✓



7/30/88

PAGE 2

ME 3 SC ID # 2 9013

A 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37

WAT NUMBER 34 CONTACTED 32: 1A
CATEGORY:

TRY LOCATED 23 59 STATE/CITY 10

TRY REPORTED 10 VN

PE SIGHT (M3) 46 POW-HSY

T SIGHTING 42 11 12

BSOURCES 27 550

TIONS 51

RRKENT ACT 45 CAPTIVITY 39

MARKS 34 POLRED UNKRUS LYNARDE CITADEL ANALYST 13 PJ

ITE RECEIVED 8: 861230 DATE OF INFO 35 89

URCE DOB 14: ADDRESS 20:

IGIN CODE 17:

LYGRAPH CATEGORY 33: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

LYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

Data Print: 06/11/90

Produced by user: AP

NNNN SOURCE DATA SHEET NNNN

Source Name: SC Case No: 85962

Aka: Confidential

Host Number: 50 Contacted:

Entry Located: 50 State/City:

Entry Reported: VN

Type Sighting: POW-P/H

1st Sighting UTM: MJ820290 LAT: 210132N LONG: 1094721E

Subsources	Actions
1: 555	1: 861219 JCRCI HK94-091: H90
2:	2: 861219 JCRCI DTD 191101Z
3:	3: 861221 VO-PH/NPR/TELE CIA
4:	4: 861222 JCRCI SKETCH
5:	5:
6:	6:
7:	7:
8:	8:
9:	9:
10:	
11:	
12:	

Current Action: Analyst: AP

Remarks: 2 CAU BNY HOSPITAL 8109

Data Received: 861230 Date of Info: 8109

Source DOB: Address:

Origin Code: 8 Category: 18

Polygraph Category: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

Polygraph Results:

END OF RECORD

NNNN

NNNN

181A029

TOTAL NUMBER OF BUSINESS PAPER REEL 164

[illegible]

TOTAL NUMBER OF RECORDS PRINTED WAS 164

THE HOUSE HAS PASSED THE BILL OF CONFIDENTIALITY FOR 75 MILLION STUDENTS

[illegible]

James
of

Name AN

SOURCE: FILL SPACE WAS BASED ON CENTER POINT OF INSIDE INVESTIGATOR FOR 25 SURVEILLANCE

CLASS
SOURCE NAMESOURCE
INVESTIGATIONCOS
LAT
LONGDISTANCE
TIME
CATEGORYACTION
OFFICE

Name

SC
Name

BETWEEN POLY DATA

SOURCE: FILL SPACE WAS BASED ON CENTER POINT OF INSIDE INVESTIGATOR FOR 25 SURVEILLANCE

CLASS
SOURCE NAMESOURCE
INVESTIGATIONCOS
LAT
LONGDISTANCE
TIME
CATEGORYACTION
OFFICE

BETWEEN POLY DATA

SC
Name

APPROVED FILE NUMBER HAS BASED ON CURRENT STATE OF ANALYSIS (EXCEPT FOR 25) ANALYTICAL VALUE

CASE NUMBER

ANALYST NAME

CLIENT

INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

DOC

LAT

LONG

DATE

STATUS

ANALYST

OFFICE

SC Name

ANALYSIS DATE: 10/10/10

APPROVED FILE NUMBER HAS BASED ON CURRENT STATE OF ANALYSIS (EXCEPT FOR 25) ANALYTICAL VALUE

CASE NUMBER

ANALYST NAME

CLIENT

INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

DOC

LAT

LONG

DATE

STATUS

ANALYST

OFFICE

SC Name

ANALYSIS DATA REPORT

1116 RELEASE WAS MADE ON COURT ORDER OF 210320N 105-0721B FOR 25 MATERIAL W/LES

CAS NUMBER	IR	MS	STATE	RECORDED	INVESTIGATOR	DOJ	LAST	LAST	TIME	OFFICIAL	CITY	COUNTRY	LETTER OFFICE
104-478			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-479			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-480			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-481			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-482			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-483			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-484			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-485			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-486			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-487			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-488			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-489			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-490			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-491			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-492			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-493			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-494			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-495			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-496			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-497			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-498			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-499			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-500			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-501			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-502			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-503			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-504			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-505			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-506			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-507			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-508			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-509			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-510			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-511			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-512			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-513			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-514			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-515			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
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104-520			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-521			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-522			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-523			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
104-524			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
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104-543			ALABAMA	IN	RECEIVED - FBI BAL	74	210000	MOBILE	040000Z	74	MOBILE	USA	
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ANALYSIS DATA REPORT

REMARKS: THIS SPACE WAS BASED ON CENTER POINT OF 21033N 156111E FOR 25 JUNE 1974. 0515Z.

[illegible]

SOURCE

(SIGHTING NUMBER 5862)

SUMMARY: Mr. *SC* states that on each of two separate occasions, 16 September 1981 and 20 April 1985, while he was an inpatient at the *Don* (NOI) Hospital 198 in Hanoi, he saw a Caucasian in a particular hospital room. Source heard from a doctor that the first of the men was an American and had come from a prison facility for health reasons. Both times the room the men were in was guarded at the door. Mr. *SC* was unable to learn anything further about the second man. Contrary to his self description as an officer source was an enlisted man in the Public Security Service (NOI), and did not provide an accurate location for Hospital 198. The source has undergone a polygraph examination with another agency, and indicated deception on issues tested, but those were not directly related to the PW-MIA issue. He has also provided other hearsay information on PWs.

DETAILS: Mr. *SC* stated that he was originally brought to the hospital from the Security Officers' College with malaria. He stated that he observed one Caucasian sitting in a room on his hallway with a guard at the door. *SC* heard from Dr. *Name* that the man was an American from a camp, and that there were 55 others in a camp somewhere. When *SC* returned to the hospital three and one-half years later for an adenoids operation, he again saw a Caucasian in the same room as previous. He knew only that the man was definitely different.

Source's inability to locate the hospital within the city limits of Hanoi reflects doubt on his report. The polygraph did establish that Mr. *SC* as an enlisted man rather than an officer, and that suggests that his statements about the Security College are also untruthful. He does not seem knowledgeable as would someone who had attended the college, and he was unable to recall the names of other staff of the hospital. Moreover he is highly atypical on his recall of specific dates. Although highly implausible, his report continues under analysis as a lead to a possible treatment center for PWs and/or other Caucasians in Hanoi. There are no other corroborating sources for this report.

SIGNIFICANT STEPS TAKEN/TO BE TAKEN IN RESOLVING CASE:

1. This case has been delayed in getting documents from another agency on the extent of Mr. *SC*'s deception. Coordination with the sister agency will continue to pursue documentation of the nature of Mr. *SC*'s deception during the polygraph examination.
2. This source has emigrated to France. DIA will continue to pursue a follow-up interview and another, possible re-polygraph.
3. Collection has been initiated to find other sources with knowledge of Hospital 198, and to validate the information and identity of Dr. *Name*.

INTERIM ASSESSMENT(S):

- 05682: THE SOURCE'S REPORT MAY BE CORRELATED TO THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET BLOC OR OTHER DIPLOMATIC CAUCASIANS IN HANOI;
 05682: THE SOURCE'S REPORT MAY BE PARTIALLY CORRELATED TO UNIDENTIFIED CAUCASIAN PRISONERS (POSSIBLY U.S. PWs), POSSIBLY AT THE FACILITY AT BANG LIET, SOME 10 KILOMETERS TO THE SOUTH;
 05682: THE SOURCE'S REPORT MAY BE A FABRICATION; RESOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF ONE OF THESE THREE THEMES CAN BE EXPECTED WITHIN SIX MONTHS.

SC
 (CUC PHO, CUC TINH Bao Bo Noi Vu)
 (Recently returned from Japan? Dec 86?)

SC
 Ch Investigation + Interrogation Dept BNV
 (CUC TRONG, CUC DIEU TRA VAXET HOI, BNV)

SC
 Deputy Ch Security-Intel Dept, BNV
 (CUC PHO, CUC AN NINH TINK Bao BNV)

Security Officer College in Van Quan Vill.?
 WS 8219 Hanoi "College F200" ne C500

1 Mar 89
 Req FO from DB2
 MW
 2 Mar 89
 P.A. T.N. from NSA

OJCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTER

ZYUW RUEKJCS1450 2651443

ROUTINE
R 201340Z SEP 88
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//
TO CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/SA//C06//

10440/VO-PW
SUBJECT: VN REFUGEE SOURCE
REF: A. PHONECON BETWEEN VO-PW ANALYST AND
B. PHONECON BETWEEN VO-PW COLLECTION NCR AND
C. MEETING WITH LTC. CHIEF, ANALYTICAL BRANCH, VO-
PW AND
D. MEETING WITH VO-PW ANALYST AND
ON 6 SEP 88.
REF: A THROUGH D ARE REQUESTS FROM VO-PW FOR CIA TO
PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THE VETTING PROCESS
AND POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION CONDUCTED ON. WE HAVE BEEN
ADVISED BY THAT UPON RECEIPT OF A WRITTEN REQUEST, CIA
WILL PROVIDE THEIR ASSESSMENT TO VO-PW.
REQUEST THAT CIA PROVIDE VO-PW WITH THE ASSESSMENT ON
THIS INFORMATION IS REQUIRED FOR VO-PW TO COMPLETE
ITS ANALYSIS OF MR. CASE
3. (U) VO-PW POC IS

ACTION VO-PW (2)
INFO WHIC (1) VO (1) DIA (1)
4SAFE

(D, G, F)

NCH-88265/05854 TDR-88265/14482 TAD-88264/00032 CDSN-HIA388
PAGE 1 OF 1
301340Z SEP 88

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

9 Sep 88

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initial	Date
1. <i>B</i>		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Did AN
ever come through?
(RE: SC polygraph results from CIA.)
polygraph 8 to close next week

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
<i>AN</i>	Phone No.

5041-102

GPO : 1984 O - 485-151

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

MSGNO 60 (PCXX) *12/19/86* *07:07:52.2.0*

C140 1289

ZCZC 121061502 (PC)

RITSLTUN/RUEKJCS4811 3531109 RUEALGX

ZNY

R 191109Z DEC 86

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAAA/ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 191101Z DEC 86

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEHGBA/COR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO RUEHGBA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//

RUEHJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//

RUEHJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PA-MIA//

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//

RUEHJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PA-MIA//

BT

Z21:

FROM 01 OF 03 LIAISON BANGKOK 005481100

CITE: 3918 DEC 86

E22:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT H86-0911 TWO CAUCASIANS OBSERVED

IN MCV HOSPITAL, HANOI CITY AND HEARSAY OF

AMERICANS HELD IN THE LY NAM DE AREA.

1. SOURCE:

A. NAME: SC

B. DOB: 15 NOV 65

C. POB: SP

D. FORMER POSITION: 1LT, PUBLIC SECURITY

E. PRESENT LOCATION: NO

F. IDENTIFICATION DATA: ID 5442,

G. DOI: 1981-85

H. MAP USED: SHEET 6151-2; SERIES L7014

I. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 3 DEC 86

J. NAME OF INTERVIEWER: Dave

K. OTHER: ARRIVED HONG KONG

2. SUMMARY: SOURCE, A 21 YOA FORMER COUNTER

ESPIONAGE OFFICER, PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION

CONCERNING HIS ALLEGED OBSERVATION OF TWO MALE

CAUCASIANS, SAID TO BE AMERICANS IN THE

LY NAM DE AREA (VIC WJ 8225) AND HEARSAY

INFORMATION CONCERNING "A NUMBER OF AMERICANS" SAID

TO BE HELD IN THE LY NAM DE AREA OF HANOI CITY.

3. INFORMATION: SOURCE STATED THAT ON

16 SEPTEMBER 1981, WHILE IN INPATIENT STATUS IN THE

IN HANOI CITY, HE OBSERVED ONE MALE CAUCASIAN PATIENT SAID TO BE AN AMERICAN. SOURCE STATED THAT HE, HIMSELF, HAD CONTRACTED MALARIA AND WAS ADMITTED TO THE HOSPITAL ON 15 SEP 81. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WALKED OUT INTO THE HALL ON THE FOURTH FLOOR OF THE HOSPITAL AND SAW A VIETNAMESE MAN STANDING OUTSIDE THE DOOR OF THE ROOM WHICH WAS LOCATED NEXT TO HIS OWN ROOM. SOURCE STATED THAT HE ASKED THE DOCTOR WHAT HE WAS DOING AND THE DOCTOR SAID HE WAS GUARDING A PATIENT IN THE ROOM IN FRONT OF WHICH HE WAS STANDING. THE DOCTOR TOLD SOURCE THAT THE MAN WAS ASSIGNED TO DEPT 110 WHICH WAS THE GUARD/SENTINEL DEPARTMENT (COC/ CAMH/ YEL). SOURCE STATED THAT WHILE STANDING IN THE HALL AND WITHOUT EVER ENTERING THE ROOM, HE PEERED INSIDE AND OBSERVED ONE MALE CAUCASIAN SITTING ON A BED IN THE ROOM. SOURCE DESCRIBED THE CAUCASIAN AS BEING APPROX 1.7 METERS TALL, LIGHT BROWN HAIR, HEAVY BUILD, SMALL HEAD, BLUE EYES, AND WITH HAIRY ARMS AND CHEST. THE CAUCASIAN WAS WEARING A PAJAMA TYPE UNIFORM WITH ALTERNATING VERTICAL STRIPES OF WHITE AND BROWN COLOR ON BOTH SHIRT AND LONG PANTS. SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE MAN'S SHIRT HAD ONE POCKET ON THE BREAST AND TWO LOWER POCKETS (ONE ON EACH SIDE) AT THE BOTTOM FRONT OF THE SHIRT. SOURCE STATED THAT HE STOOD OUTSIDE THE ROOM FOR APPROX FIVE TO 10 MINUTES, OCCASIONALLY GLANCING INTO THE ROOM. SOURCE WAS NOT ABLE TO FURTHER DESCRIBE THE CAUCASIAN. SOURCE HEARD FROM THE DOCTOR WHO WAS TREATING SOURCE FOR MALARIA THAT THE MAN WAS AN AMERICAN WHO HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT OF MALARIA AND THAT THE MAN HAD BEEN HELD IN A CAMP (TRAI) PRIOR TO HIS TRANSFER TO THE HOSPITAL. THE DOCTOR DID NOT MENTION THE NAME OR LOCATION OF THE CAMP BUT DID MENTION THAT 55 OTHER AMERICANS WERE ALSO BEING HELD. SOURCE STATED THAT THE DOCTOR, NAME, WAS A FRIEND OF SOURCE'S FATHER WHO WAS DATA AND A NATIVE OF NGHE AN PROVINCE WHERE NAME WAS FROM. SOURCE STATED THAT HE FIRST MET DR NAME IN 1980 WHEN SOURCE WAS A STUDENT AT THE SECURITY OFFICER'S COLLEGE. SOURCE STATED THAT HE VISITED DR NAME HIS HOME LOCATED IN THE COMPOUND OF THE BNV HOSPITAL AT THAT TIME AND THAT HE WAS TAKEN TO NAME ONE BY A POLITICAL INSTRUCTOR FROM THE SECURITY OFFICER'S COLLEGE KNOWN TO SOURCE ONLY AS NAME. SOURCE STATED THAT WHEN HE MET NAME IN 1980, NAME TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN TO ODESSA, USSR FOR SIX YEARS OF MEDICAL TRAINING.

4. SOURCE STATED THAT ON 20 APRIL 1985 HE RETURNED TO THE BNV HOSPITAL FOR AN ADENOIDS OPERATION

C100

PAGE 0000

AND WAS GIVEN A ROOM DOWN THE HALL FROM HIS PREVIOUS

BT

P4811

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NNDD

PAGE 000

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R 191117Z DEC 86

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADND/CSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEADAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEADAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEADAA/AMCC PT RITCHIE MD

RUEADAA/SAFE

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TO RUEADAA/CSA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J3/J36//

RUEADAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J3/J36//

RUEADAA/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PA-MIA//

RUEADAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//

RUEADAA/JCS WASHDC//J5/PA-MIA//

BT

EZ1:

SECTION 02 OF 03 LIAISON BANGKOK 000481100

CITE: 3918 DEC 86

EZ2:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT HCS-0911 TWO CAUCASIANS OBSERVED ROOM. SOURCE STATED THAT HE AGAIN SAW A VIETNAMESE MAN STANDING OUTSIDE THE DOOR OF THE SAME ROOM WHERE HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN ONE CAUCASIAN PATIENT, SAID BY () HE AN AMERICAN. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS AGAIN PERMITTED TO WALK UP AND DOWN THE HALL AND FOR A PERIOD OF APPROX 30 MINUTES HE STOOD ACROSS THE HALL FROM THE ROOM WHERE HE HAD SEEN THE CAUCASIAN PREVIOUSLY. SOURCE STATED THAT HE AGAIN PIERED INSIDE THE ROOM AND SAW ANOTHER MALE CAUCASIAN SITTING ON A BED. SOURCE STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE CAUCASIAN WAS SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE AND CLOTHING, HE WAS NOT THE SAME CAUCASIAN THAT HE HAD OBSERVED PREVIOUSLY. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO RECALL MORE DETAILS CONCERNING THE PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF THE SECOND CAUCASIAN AND THAT HE COULD ONLY RECALL THAT THE MAN LOOKED THE SAME AS THE FIRST CAUCASIAN BUT THAT HIS HEAD WAS BIGGER. SOURCE WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TWO CAUCASIANS WHOM HE OBSERVED IN THE BNV HOSPITAL ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS.

5. () SOURCE STATED THAT THE BNV HOSPITAL WAS LOCATED IN TO LIEN DISTRICT OF HANOI CITY, BETWEEN THE CAU GIAY BRIDGE (WJ 837253) AND MAY DICH CEMETERY (WJ 8126). SOURCE STATED THAT THE BNV HOSPITAL WAS LOCATED ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE MAIN ROAD (ROUTE 11A).

AND FRONTED ON THE ROAD (SOURCE'S SKETCH WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY). SOURCE RECALLED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF THE HOSPITAL WAS COL *Don*.

EXCEPT FOR COL *Don* AND *Don*, SOURCE CLAIMED TO BE UNABLE TO RECALL ANY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE HOSPITAL.

6. SOURCE STATED THAT HE ATTENDED THE SECURITY OFFICER'S COLLEGE (DAI HOC SI QUAN AN NINH) FROM 1 OCT 80 TO 2 SEP 85. SOURCE STATED THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER'S COLLEGE WAS LOCATED IN VAN QUAN VILLAGE (WJ 8219) OF HANOI CITY. SOURCE STATED THAT THE COLLEGE WAS DESIGNATED "E200" AND FORMERLY DESIGNATED AS "CS00". SOURCE STATED THAT HE STUDIED THE COUNTER ESPIONAGE COURSE (KHDA CHONG GIAN DIER) AT THE COLLEGE AND UPON GRADUATION WAS ASSIGNED TO THE COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION (PHONG CHONG GIAN DIER) OF THE QUANG NINH PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY STATION (SO CONG AN QUANG NINH) LOCATED IN HON GAY TOWN. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS ASSIGNED TO QUANG NINH BECAUSE HE HAD STUDIED CHINESE MANDARIN IN THE SECURITY OFFICER'S COLLEGE AND THAT QUANG NINH PROVINCE HAD A LARGE POPULATION OF CHINESE. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS ALSO ABLE TO SPEAK CANTONESE WELL. SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE QUANG NINH PSS UNTIL HIS ESCAPE BY BOAT ON 14 JUN 86.

7. SOURCE STATED THAT HIS FATHER (*Don*) (VICE *Don* FOR SOURCE), 55 YOA NATIVE OF DO LUONG, NGHE AN) AND MOTHER (*Don*) 53 YOA NATIVE OF *Don* *Don* CURRENTLY RESIDE WITH HIS FOUR SIBLINGS IN *Don*. SOURCE STATED THAT HIS PATERNAL UNCLE, *Don* (P), 40 YOA NATIVE OF NGHE AN, WAS THE *Don*.

SOURCE STATED THAT HIS MATERNAL UNCLE, *Don* WAS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ORGANIZATION SECTION OF THE GENERAL CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT (*Don*) LOCATED AT *Don*.

8. CONCERNING HOSPITALS IN THE VINH CITY AREA, SOURCE STATED THAT HE RECALLED THAT A HOSPITAL CALLED THE BINH VIEN BA LAN (POLISH HOSPITAL) HAD BEEN UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN 1976. SOURCE STATED THAT THE HOSPITAL WAS LOCATED NEXT TO CUA DONG (EAST GATE) IN THE HUNG LOC AREA OF VINH CITY, NGHE TINH (P) AND THAT THE HOSPITAL WAS A PROVINCE LEVEL HOSPITAL FOR NGHE TINH PROVINCE. SOURCE DID NOT OBSERVE OR HEAR ABOUT ANY AMERICANS BEING HELD THERE.

9. SOURCE STATED THAT EXCEPT FOR THE TWO CAUCASIANS, SAID TO BE AMERICANS, THAT HE OBSERVED IN THE BNV HOSPITAL, HE HAD NOT OBSERVED ANY OTHER AMERICANS REMAINING IN VIETNAM. SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD HEARD HOWEVER, THAT A NUMBER (NOT SO NGUOI) OF

AMERICANS WERE BEING HELD INSIDE THE CITADEL IN THE LY NAM DE AREA OF HANOI. SOURCE HEARD THE STORY FROM LTC *Don* A 42 YOA NATIVE OF *Don*.

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MSGNO

25 (PCIX) 12/19/86 07:07:06.8.78

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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADND/OSCA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAARA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAARA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEAARA/ANCC FT RITCHIE MD

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 191101Z DEC 86

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO RUEBFA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO RUEBFA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//

RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//TO-PH//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD/ISA/PW-MIA//

RUEADNW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//EOP/HR CHILDRESS//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//

BT

E21:

SECTION 03 OF 03 LIAISON BANGKOK 0004811000

CITE: 3918 DEC 86

E22:

SUBJECT: JCRC RPT BX86-091; TWO CAUCASIANS OBSERVED

AND DISTANT MATERNAL RELATIVE OF

SOURCE (RELATIONSHIP NOT RECALLED) WHO RESIDED IN

ST IN HANOI CITY (ADDRESS UNKNOWN). SOURCE

STATED THAT HE HEARD THE STORY FROM HAN WHEN HE MET

AT A FAMILY LUNAR NEW YEAR (TET) CELEBRATION IN

THANH CAT (V) THANH CHUONG (D) NGHE AN (P) DURING

EARLY 1985. SOURCE STATED THAT ONLY MENTIONED THE

AMERICANS ON THAT ONE OCCASION AND DID NOT PROVIDE

FURTHER DETAILS.

10. SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE VALUABLE INFORMATION

CONCERNING SRV INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND THAT HE WAS

AWARE OF SOME SRV INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ABROAD.

SOURCE STATED THAT LE MINH HUONG, THE DEPUTY CHIEF

OF THE SRV INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT (CUC PHO, CUC

TIMH BAO BO NOI VU) HAD RECENTLY RETURNED TO THE SRV

FROM AN ASSIGNMENT IN JAPAN. SOURCE ALSO CLAIMED THAT

COL NGUYEN TRONG LIEN (LIENT) WAS THE CHIEF OF THE

INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION DEPARTMENT OF THE SRV

(CUC THUNG, CUC DIEU TRA VA KET NOI, BO NOI VU).

SOURCE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HOANG GIA TUAN (TUANS) WAS

THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SECURITY-INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT

OF THE SRV (CUC PHO, CUC AN MINH TIMH BAO BO NOI

VU) AND THAT TUAN HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE SRV EMBASSY

IN FRANCE DURING THE 1970'S.

11. COMMENT: SOURCE REFUSED TO BE INTERVIEWED

C110

EARLY IN THE DAY AND INSISTED THAT HE BE INTERVIEWED LAST BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THAT OTHER REFUGEES WAITING OUTSIDE THE INTERVIEW ROOM MIGHT BE ABLE TO OVERHEAR THE INTERVIEW. DUE TO SOURCE'S RELUCTANCE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO FOLLOW-UP ON SOME OF HIS LEADS BECAUSE CAMP STAFF WERE REQUESTED TO RETURN HIM TO THE "LOCK-UP AREA" AT THE END OF THE DAY. SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY PROVIDED ALL OF HIS INFORMATION TO THE U.S. POLICE AND THAT HE HAD BEEN REMOVED. SOURCE REQUESTED SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE INTERVIEW THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE REMOVED AGAIN FOR ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT HE MIGHT PROVIDE. SOURCE WAS EVASIVE AND SEEMED TO BE MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RATHER THAN POW/MIA WITH THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE WITH SOURCE. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS HIS BACKGROUND AS A SECURITY OFFICER BUT SOURCE APPEARED TO HAVE ONLY GENERAL KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING THE PUBLIC SECURITY COLLECTIVE RATHER THAN THE SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE THAT HE COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO HAVE AFTER HAVING STUDIED THERE FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS. IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT SOURCE IS ACTUALLY A FORMER MEDIC OR LONG-RANGING MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES.

BT

#E11

NNNN

NNNN

1296

1542

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY
P 151322Z OCT 85
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
TO USDAO CANBERRA AS

21.345/VO-PH
SUBJ: QUERY STATUS
REF: A. DIA/DC-2 MSG 091522Z SEP 85
QUERY STATUS YOUR EFFORTS TO LOCATE REFUGEE SOURCE SC

BT

1297

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ZYUW RUEKJCS004 2523348

PRIORITY
P 091522Z SEP 85
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC-2//
TO: USDAO CANBERRA AS
INFO JCS 61A150N DANANG TH
CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/EA/VCL//

CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
USDAO HONG KONG HK

21.043/DC-2
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCE

REFS: A. DIA/DC-2 MSG 091512Z AUG 85 (DUAL)
B. USDAO HK MSG 040412Z SEP 85 (DUAL)
1. REF A REQUESTED USDAO HONG KONG PROVIDE CURRENT ADDRESS FOR VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCE WHO IS SOURCE OFF U.S. PM/IA-RELATED INFORMATION. REF B INFORMED DIA THAT UNHCR OFFICE HONG KONG REPORTED THAT SC DEPARTED FOR UNKNOWN ADDRESS IN AUSTRALIA ON 15 NOV 1984 AND LEFT NO CONTACT ADDRESS. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING THE CURRENT ADDRESS (IN AUSTRALIA) OF THE REFUGEE SOURCE FOR PURPOSES OF POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON PM/IA MATTERS.
2. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION REGARDING SOURCE SOURCE
DPOB: SD

WIFE: SD IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY HAVE LEFT VIETNAM. SC ARRIVED HONG KONG ON/ABOUT 10 OCTOBER 1984. DEPARTED FOR AUSTRALIA 15 NOVEMBER 1984.
3. SC WAS INTERVIEWED EXTENSIVELY AND POLYGRAPHED TWICE IN HONG KONG CONCERNING PURPORTED SIGHTINGS OF U.S. PM/IA IN HANDI IN 1978 AND 1982. DIA INVESTIGATED THE INFORMATION AND CONCLUDED HIS STORY WAS FICTION; HOWEVER, THE CASE CONTINUES TO ATTRACT CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER HIGH-LEVEL INTEREST. ANTICIPATING THAT ANOTHER REINTERVIEW AND POSSIBLE POLYGRAPH EXAM MAY BECOME NECESSARY, PLEASE ADVISE WHAT COORDINATION WOULD BE REQUIRED BY AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES FOR DIA OR OTHER U.S. OFFICER TO CONDUCT INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH IN AUSTRALIA; AND WHETHER USDAO CAN PROVIDE A SUITABLE SITE. REQUEST YOU DO NOT INITIATE CONTACT WITH THE SOURCE AT THIS TIME.
4. NAME FOR USDAO CANBERRA: YOU MAY WISH TO SHARE THIS MSG WITH

5. NAME POC AT DIA/DC-2 IS *mv* BT

ACTION DC-2(2) (D,6,7,8,F)
INFO CDR JCRC(1) NMIC(1) VO(1) AT3(1) AT-3(2) DB-2(1)
DB-2C(1) DB-2C2(1) DIA(1)
+SAFE

NOV-85253/00748 TOR-85253/25482 TAD-85253/25822 CDSNPA14854
PAGE 1 OF 1
091522Z SEP 85

ACTION VO-PH(3) (D,6,7,F)
INFO NMIC(1) VO(1) AT3(1) AT-3(2) DB-2(1) DB-2C(1)
DB-2C2(1) DIA(1)
+SAFE

NOV-85253/04853 TOR-85253/20152 TAD-85253/20172 CDSNPA1242
PAGE 1 OF 1
151522Z OCT 85

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01 JCS P 0702
ROUTING: FROM USDO HQNS HONG KONG. BEN 0241 AT 04 0617Z 0990
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSG:
BEAL: CHBA/ASPC
PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSG:
REL 011 09 01
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSG:
R. DBR: ASPC. BEAL: CHBA. USDAO. REFUGEE. SE ASIA.
AUSTRALIA. NEW ZEALAND. CURRENT DATE 090800

DICTIONARY: 03. PROFILE
14-0113 001 142 409 000 000 000 001
MHC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER
030-117300

CDSN: 000001 MCH: 00047/01000 TCH: 000470000 FTSTCH: 000470000
00011
RTTZYUW HUNHUA 0001 00000000 -RUENDIC

0002
R.040117Z 09P 00
FM USDO HQNS HONG KONG
TO: USDAO/CE/ASIA WASHDC/DC-2//
RUNDSPALZEC BARBERS PT HI
RUASIA/CE/ASIA WASHDC/DC-2//
RUMTSK/JCRC LIAISON WASHINGTON TH
BT
HONG KONG HK 10041

0003
0004

0005
0006

0007
REF: DIA 001011Z AUG 85
IN RESPONSE TO THE REF. ALTHOUGH SEARCH FOR
INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF ~~SOA~~ FORMER REFUGEE
SOURCE WAS CONDUCTED WITH LITTLE RESULTS. WE HAVE BEEN
INFORMED BY USDAO THAT SC DEPARTED FOR AUSTRALIA ON
15 NOV 84 AND THAT THEY HAVE NO CONTACT ADDRESS FOR HIM
THERE. IF NECESSARY WE COULD PROBABLY INITIATE A
HAI IMMIGRATION SEARCH FOR FLIGHT DATA TO DETERMINE WHERE
IN AUSTRALIA HE FLEW TO. BUT WE WOULD NEED TO JUSTIFY
THE SEARCH TO OUR LOCAL POLICE CONTACTS. PLEASE ADVISE
PDC CAPT ~~NAME~~ USMC ANAVLO

BT
0008
ACTION DC-2 (P)
INFO CJC (P) J3 (P) NIDS (P) J4 (P) J5 (P) JSOA (P) SECDEF (P)
SECDEF (P) USDP (P) ASD/PA (P) USDP/DSAA (P) MGC (U)
JST-3A (P) AT3 (P) AT-3 (P) AT-100 (P) DE-2 (P) DB-2 (P)
DB-00 (P) DB-40 (P) DB-400 (P) DIA (P) DC-4A3 (P)
+SAFE

0009

0010
0011

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INTEL DIVISION

EYU/ RHEA/CSS014/2421706

PRIORITY
P 30 1013Z AUG 85
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/DC-2//
TO USDO HQNS HONG KONG

21003/DC-2//
SUBJ: QUERT STATUS OF EFFORT TO LOCATE REFUGEE
REF: DIA DC-2 MSG 001011Z AUG 85

REF: QUERY STATUS EFFORT TO BELICATE ~~SOA~~ REQUESTED IN
REF: 01

ACTION DC-2 (P)
INFO RUC (P) VO (P) AT3 (P) AT-3 (P) DB-2 (P) DB-20 (P) DIA (P)
+SAFE

MCH:00043/04706 TCH:00043/17002 TAD:00043/17072 CDSN:00043
PAGE 1 OF 1
001000Z AUG 85

PAGE 1 OF 1
091112Z AUG 85
BT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SECURITY INFORMATION

ACTOR: 00-122 (21)
TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC-3//
INFO: CDR JCRC WASHINGTON DC//J3//
JCR/LIAISON BANGKOK TH
SUBJECT: 00-122 (21) (21)
C/O: 00-122 (21) (21)

SECTION 10 OF 10 LATEST VERSION IN FILE

CTL: 00-122 (21)

1. REQUEST TO LOCATE THE REFUGEE SOURCE

2. SOURCE (00-122) WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE AIR BY A
SUBJECT OF THE REFUGEE SOURCE IN THE AIR.

3. SOURCE (00-122) WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE AIR BY A
SUBJECT OF THE REFUGEE SOURCE IN THE AIR.

4. SOURCE (00-122) WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE AIR BY A
SUBJECT OF THE REFUGEE SOURCE IN THE AIR.

5. SOURCE (00-122) WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE AIR BY A
SUBJECT OF THE REFUGEE SOURCE IN THE AIR.

6. SOURCE (00-122) WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE AIR BY A
SUBJECT OF THE REFUGEE SOURCE IN THE AIR.

ACTOR: 00-122 (21)

TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC-3//

INFO: CDR JCRC WASHINGTON DC//J3//

JCR/LIAISON BANGKOK TH

SECTION 10 OF 10 LATEST VERSION IN FILE

MCN-05522/00000 TDR-05522/11012 TAD-05522/11272

00-122 (21)

PAGE 1 OF 1
00-122 (21) 00-122 (21)
00-122 (21) 00-122 (21)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SECURITY INFORMATION

ACTOR: 00-122 (21) (21)

IMMEDIATE
TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC-3//
INFO: CDR JCRC WASHINGTON DC//J3//
JCR/LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/LA/VCL//

20-04/DC-3

REQUEST TO LOCATE REFUGEE SOURCE
REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT TO LOCATE THE REFUGEE SOURCE

IF HE IS STILL IN
HONG KONG PLEASE PROVIDE CONTACT DETAILS; IF HE HAS RELOCATED TO
ANOTHER COUNTRY PLEASE PROVIDE LAST AVAILABLE CONTACT REFERENCE
ADDRESS.

ACTION: DC-3 (2)

INFO: 00-122 (21) VO (1) AT-3 (1) 00-2 (1) 00-28 (1) DIA (1)

+SAFE

MCN-05522/00000 TDR-05522/11012 TAD-05522/11272

00-122 (21)

PAGE 1 OF 1
00-122 (21) 00-122 (21)
00-122 (21) 00-122 (21)

INSERT FOR THE RECORD

PAGE 141 LINE 3389

The Vietnamese individual MT is hereafter referred to as Refugee Source SD. Source SD reported that once in 1978, and again in August 1982, he observed a group of Caucasians, whom friends said were American PWs, in what he called the Le Van Lich Prison, which he said was located on Ly Nam De Street, Hanoi, Vietnam.

SD attempted to corroborate Source SD account.

MT. Rather than corroborate his account, the information demonstrated that essential elements of Source SD account were not true.

One of the first objectives was to confirm the existence and location of the prison. Source SD illustrated his description of the prison with sketches that named the four streets bounding the block that contained the prison and depicted nearby buildings, including the vantage points from which he viewed the prisoners. The four streets bound a block on the east side of Ly Nam De Street, between its intersections with Le Van Lich Street and Ngo Hung Mieng (Hung Mieng side street). The rear of this block is bounded by a brick and stone wall formed by the foundation of an elevated railroad track that runs adjacent to Phung Hung Street, along the length of the block.

Describing the prison during the first interviews, Source SD said the prison was a subcompound of a larger compound entered through a vehicle gate on Le Van Lich Street; and that it was located at the rear of the offices of the People's Army Publishing House, which is on Ly Nam De Street. Also, he said the prison was surrounded by a high brick wall about the height of a one story building; that the wall was topped by barbed wire and floodlights; and that the wall had guard posts at the four corners. Among the other features he said he viewed in the prison were low buildings, with corrugated metal roofs, on each side of the central courtyard, and a water tower with a low bathing cistern at its base. He viewed the prison and prisoners on two separate occasions, once from each of two apartment buildings that housed People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) officers and their families. According to Source SD, the prison wall, over which he viewed the prisoners, was about 30 feet from these apartment buildings.

MT identified some features, such as the vehicle gate on Le Van Lich Street, the People's Army Publishing House, and a water tower and bathing cistern behind the Publishing House; they were not able to identify any prison walls with guard towers and floodlights at the corners, or anything in this block that looked like a

Source SD told his interviewers that at the time he viewed the prisoners some of them were drawing water with dippers from a low cistern near the base of a water tower in the prison. He told the first interviewer that the water tower was two stories high and mounted on four metal columns, with a metal ladder ascending one of the columns. MT discovered a water tower at the rear of the People's Army Publishing House that matched Source SD description, but that it would have been impossible to view the cistern near its base from the vantage points he described.

During a subsequent interview, Source SD was permitted to examine a close-up photograph of the water tower at the rear of the Army Publishing House and that was annotated to show the location of the water tower. In order to identify the precise location where he observed the prisoners, it is clearly apparent, from even a cursory examination of the photograph, that it would be impossible to view the bathing cistern at the base of the water tower behind the Army Publishing House from the vantage points he had described. At this point Source SD insisted that although he recognized the tower in the photograph, it was not the tower under which he viewed the prisoners and changed his description of the water tower and its location. While it would be possible to view a few square feet of the wall location from the vantage point of one of his sightings, it would be impossible to view it from the vantage point of the other sighting. In any event, MT again searched but could not find any water tower, cistern, guard towers, etc., at the new location.

MT also discovered that Source SD gave inaccurate information about the two apartment buildings that served as the vantage points for his sightings. He said that he made one sighting from each of the two apartment buildings in the housing compound, and that the sightings occurred during two of his frequent visits to the apartments of three PAVN General Officers who, he claimed, lived in these buildings. Several other sources who were familiar with this address asserted that the apartments were not occupied by General Officers. In fact, one person who was personally acquainted with the son of one of the Generals named by Source SD said he was certain that this General did not live in either of the buildings at this address. Since the type of detail cited by Source SD precludes any mistake concerning the identity of the General Officers whom he claimed to have visited at this address, and since these Generals do not live at this address, it appears that Source SD invented the story about visiting the apartment buildings from which he claimed to have viewed American PWs.

Source SD also indicated that the presence of American PWs at the site he described was common knowledge among the residents of the officers housing in the immediate area and among their friends. However, other persons who lived in the immediate area or who visited these apartment buildings provided information that disputes these claims by Source SD.

Duke

location where Source SD said he viewed American PWs. Their knowledge of the area along Ly Nam De Street was such that if Source SD observed American PWs at the time and under the circumstances he described, these other sources would have had some knowledge of those PWs.

In summary, Source SD described seeing American prisoners at a prison that did not exist. He said he saw them gathered around a bathing station that he couldn't have seen from the vantage points he described. When shown photographs that illustrated that fact, he firmly changed his story. While Source SD had some knowledge of the buildings and other features along Ly Nam De Street, that knowledge did not exceed that which could be acquired by any observant pedestrian passing by, and his sketches and descriptions of features that could not be seen from the street were replete with errors. Although he knew the names, ranks, and positions of three PAVN General Officers, that information is available to anyone who reads the Vietnamese press. He said he observed the American PWs while visiting the apartments of these Generals. However, he invented information that their apartments were in the buildings from which he said he observed the American PWs; thus, he probably fabricated the story that he visited those buildings. Finally, several other Vietnamese sources who had equal or better knowledge of this area of Ly Nam De Street, asserted that they had never heard or seen any indication that any American prisoners were held in this area after the Operation Homecoming prisoner of war releases in 1973.

The preceding discussion illustrates only some of the factual errors and inconsistencies that DIA's investigation discovered permeated Source SD account, and the type of information that demonstrated.

INT that Source SD story was not true.

In response to the question regarding the comparison of Source SD location and that reported by Mr. Rums, the following is submitted. Although Mr. Rums still refuses to discuss his information with DIA, an examination of the information reported in the news media indicated that the location of his sighting was different than the one cited by Source SD.

In December 1984, a Wall Street Journal article reported that in late 1978, Mr. Rums saw a face that looked definitely American to him, in the second floor of "one building in the Ly Nam De Street complex." According to this article, Mr. Rums later heard that possibly 4-7 U.S. PWs were detained at this site. Although the article did not state where this "complex" was located on Ly Nam De Street, it did state that the building "was the headquarters for the 'People's Army'."

The headquarters of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) is not located on Ly Nam De Street; it is located a few blocks west of Ly Nam De, near the intersections of Phan Dinh Phung and Hoang Dieu Streets.

In May 1985, a Washington Times article reported that Mr. Rums "saw one American in a room at 17 Ly Nam (sic) Street in Hanoi in September 1977," and that "he saw six or seven American PWs at the same location on Ly Nam (sic) Street in December 1978." Number 17 Ly Nam De Street, which was a U.S. PW camp during the war, is a facility well-known and publicized both during and subsequent to the war. Number 17 is located in a different block on Ly Nam De Street, approximately 230 yards north of the location at which Source claimed he saw U.S. PWs. In fact, during his initial interview Source noted he knew about the former PW camp at 17 Ly Nam De, and asserted it was not the compound where he saw U.S. PWs.

Although the prison features he described (e.g., courtyard surrounded by high brick walls with four guard posts) do not exist at the location Source SD described, that location would be in the rear of the compound at 25 Ly Nam De Street. While Source SD said he viewed prisoners at 17 Ly Nam De Street, that address does not exist. Thus, if the news media reports quoted Mr. Rums accurately, the location of his sighting is not the same one cited by Source SD.

While the preceding comments focused on whether Mr. Rums and Source SD claimed to have seen U.S. PWs at the same location, the question is moot. Whether the locations are some distance apart, as with the PAVN headquarters versus 25 Ly Nam De Street, or whether they are near, as with 17 versus 25 Ly Nam De Street, in the final analysis it is important to remember that information from several sources demonstrated that Source SD story is not true.

P-804-41-071
May 1983

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CAMBODIA

BRIEFS

NORTHEAST WY SEASON OFFENSIVE—In 1984-85 dry season offensive, KPRAF and Vietnamese Army volunteers in the northeastern region destroyed 4 major enemy positions and killed 60 comrades (about 1,800 enemies). They also seized 4,000 different weapons and 400 metric tons of ammunition, food supplies, and war material. More than 10,300 people of all nationalities in the northeastern region have joined in the military defense and construction work. Concerning the construction work, the KPRAF, in close cooperation with the Vietnamese Army volunteers in the northeastern region, repaired and built 240 km of road, 4 bridges, 14 warehouses, 24 infirmaries, and 27 houses. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodia 0430 GMT 11 Apr 85 HK]

CSO: 4212/81

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INFANTRY OFFICER'S SCHOOL MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY

RE151346 Ramol Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2330 GMT 14 Apr 85

[Statement by Major General (Jen He Bao), director of Infantry Officer's School No 1 marking its 4th founding anniversary—ramol] [Date not available]

[Summary] [Begin recording] The Tran Quoc Tuan Infantry Officer's School was established according to the northern military conference's decision on 15 April 1943 at Tan Trao village, Tan Hung District, Ha Tuyen Province. It was first named the Anti-Japanese Political Military School and subsequently was changed in line with various revolutionary stages to the Vietnam Political Military School, the Tran Quoc Tuan Infantry Officer's School, and the Infantry Officer's School No 1.

Over the past 40 years the school has produced tens of thousands of officers, thereby contributing significantly to building the three armed branches of the invincible VPA. It is the first school in Vietnam that has produced thousands of military instructors for various organizations, institutes, military schools, regions, and corps. The school has positively contributed to building and developing various tactical models and training programs and drafting various army rules and regulations for the armed forces and military school system.

"Over the past 40 years, the Tran Quoc Tuan Infantry Officer's School has consistently contributed appropriately to carrying out international obligations. Many officers, instructors, and graduates have participated in the Vietnam army volunteer troops in Laos and Cambodia. With the lofty spirit of proletarian internationalism, these comrades have shared weal and woe with the peoples and armies of the two fraternal countries. They have worked and bravely combated shoulder to shoulder, thereby contributing to the cause of liberation and protection of the revolutionary achievements of these two fraternal countries."

The contingent of officers and instructors produced by the school have worked enthusiastically and fought bravely, contributing actively to the cause of building the powerful armed forces and defeating the enemies. Thousands of comrades have sacrificed their lives for the revolutionary cause and tens of thousands of graduates have become middle and high-level

officers of our party, state organizations, and the armed forces. The school's achievements stem from the party's clear-sighted leadership, President Ho Chi Minh's close attention and valuable guidance, and the National Defense Ministry's close supervision. Before President Ho Chi Minh on nine occasions visited the school and many times accorded his commendation letters. This is the great driving force for the school to advance further.

"International assistance provided by the armed forces of fraternal countries in various aspects are important factors helping the school to fulfill all tasks and to gradually advance to standardization and modernization."

During the past 40 years many groups of officers, instructors, and graduates have contributed their efforts in promoting cadres for the party and upholding the school's traditional banner awarded by President Ho Chi Minh. Adhering to the president's teaching, the school has established the very fine tradition of strictly carrying out the revolutionary and military tasks, training and forging new military officers, and meeting all requirements for building and strengthening the armed forces.

"Taking pride in and encouraged by the glorious tradition, all members of our school are striving to surge forward to build the Tran Quoc Tuan Infantry Officer's School into the revolutionary, standardized, and modernized school. The school that sets good example in observing army discipline and satisfactorily carries out tasks in producing commanding officers with capable military skills, thereby contributing together with the entire party, people, and the armed forces, to fulfilling the tasks of triumphantly building and defending the Vietnamese socialist fatherland." (end recording)

CSO: 4209/326

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2 May 1985

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VAN KIEN DUNG ARTICLE ON BUON MA THUOT BATTLE

RE121309 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Mar 85 pp 1,4

[Article by Senior General Van Kien Dung: "The Buon Ma Thuot Victory"]

[Text] Exactly 10 years ago, on 10 March 1975, our people's armed forces, together with the central highlands tribesmen staged an offensive and uprising to liberate Buon Ma Thuot city, a major provincial capital of the puppet administration and an important rear base for the puppet army in the central highlands theater.

After more than 30 hours of continuous fighting, we seized control of the city. Thereafter, we foiled the enemy's counterattacks, wiped out the network of perimeter posts and forts, and completely liberated Dar Lac Province.

This was a major battle fought by various main force military corps [Binh Dong], in close coordination with the local armed forces, to liberate and achieve mastery over a city located in a vital area of a strategic region. It provided an opportunity to execute our party Central Committee Political Bureau's strategic decision to smash the puppet army, topple the puppet administration, liberate the south, and unify the homeland, thereby realizing great President Ho Chi Minh's sacred testament.

"The Buon Ma Thuot exploit will go down in our nation's history as a significant epic opening the great general offensive and the uprising that led the anti-U.S. resistance cause for national salvation to total victory." (Footnote: Le Duan's speech at Buon Ma Thuot on 11 April 1979)

This was a strategically significant assault that drove the enemy into a passive position, disordered his forces, and triggered the irresistible chain reaction of his collapse.

Early in 1975, the party Central Committee Political Bureau had promptly and correctly evaluated the balance of forces between us and the enemy, clearly pointed out the historic opportunity, and made the strategic decision to completely defeat the U.S. imperialist war of aggression by staging a general offensive and uprising to totally liberate the south.

PROJECT ASSIGNMENT INSTRUC			
DATE 4 February 1985	TIME Request for	20160/DC-2	
PROJECT DATA			
MIT			
DATE IN 4 February 1985	DATE OUT 28 February 1985	PRIORITY 11	
BRANCH DC-2	AN	TEL. SP. ORDER NUMBER NYI: 1809	
BRANCH ASSIGNMENT	RECEIVING OFFICE	DUE DATE	
ACTION			
APPROVAL			
SUPPORT			
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND REMARKS			
1. Reference working discussions between Cpt Gonzalez (DB-503) and I. AN (DC-28), 31 Dec 84.			
2. The following MIT provide different and complementing data of the facilities located in the region surrounding a facility formerly known as the "PA 801 PW CAMP AND N-67."			
DATA DATA			
3. Request DATA/MIT be made available for viewing by Chief, DC-28, in consultation with DB-5 analyst. The objective is to prepare			
DATA/MIT			
briefing of DoD and congressional authorities.			
for			
AN -28			
Branch Chief			
PAY NUMBER			

PROJECT ASSIGNMENT INSTRUC			
DATE 4 February 1985	TIME Former Na Not PW Camp AND N-67	20160/DC-2	
PROJECT DATA			
DATE IN 4 February 1985	DATE OUT March 1985	PRIORITY 11	
BRANCH DC-28	AN	TEL. SP. ORDER NUMBER NYI: 1809	
BRANCH ASSIGNMENT	RECEIVING OFFICE	DUE DATE	
ACTION			
APPROVAL			
SUPPORT			
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND REMARKS			
1. Refs: A. Working discussion Cpt Gonzalez (DB-503) and I. AN 31 Jan 85. B. MIT C. MIT D. MIT			
2. Request update of MIT. Additionally, confirm or refute the presence of a water tower, a bathing pool/cistern, and watch towers in the compound.			
3. MT/DATA			
2 Enclosures a/s			
AN DC-28 Branch Chief			
PAY NUMBER			

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



DD FORM 130/DC-2

Honorable Billy Henson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Henson:

This reply responds to your letter of 24 January to Mr. Peggy Ciffrino, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, in which you requested documents from the "Venanzi file" as well as the complete file on the August 1982 alleged sighting of U.S. prisoners of war in Southeast Asia.

Responses to the specific questions posed by you on 15 January regarding DIA's assessment of PW/MIA information obtained from a Vietnamese refugee source are enclosed. DIA will not release any office refugee case files; however, we will respond to any additional questions you may have.

DIA does not, and never did, possess or maintain the so-called "Venanzi file." We cannot identify the 40 documents you state are contained in this file. The alleged "Venanzi file" was never provided to House Task Force Chairman Gilman, Mr. Gilman and other members of the House Task Force on MIAs were advised that we did not have, or maintain, such a file. We provided documents and case summaries to the House PW/MIA Task Force that may equate to some of the material in the so-called "Venanzi file." These are, of course, available for your review.

Sincerely,

John R. Oberst
JOHN R. OBERST
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Prisoner of War and Missing
in Action Division

1 Enclosure
Q & A Summary

The following are answers to questions you posed during our meeting at DIA/DC-2 on 15 January 1985:

1. Q. What is the name and address of the source who reported sightings of U.S. PWs on Ly Nam De Street, Hanoi, during 1978 and 1982?
- A. On 28 January 1985, another agency which has originating control (ORCON) of this information has denied DIA the authority to release it.
2. Q. What is the street number of the Editorial Office of Van Nghe Quan Doi (Army Arts and Letters) Journal?

A. The offices of the Army Arts and Letters Journal are at 4 Ly Nam De Street, Hanoi, DRV. This address is about one city block north of and across opposite side of the street from the location the source described as the office for this journal. The location described by the source is 923 Ly Nam De Street, which is the offices of the Hanoi Hanoi Quan Doi Hanoi (Peoples Army Publishing House). One of the publications published by the Peoples Army Publishing House is the Army Arts and Letters Journal.

3. Q. Exactly what terms did our interviewer use to describe how the source identified on aerial photos the points from which he observed the prisoners and the location of the prisoners?

A. The following passage is quoted from the interviewer's message. ((NOTE: The alpha-numeric designations in the passage are keyed to the enclosed set of plastic overlays which, in turn, are keyed to the five aerial photos previously provided to your office. Source name has been replaced with the word Source in double parenthesis.)) QUOTE: Source was allowed to view the unclassified photographs and provided the following information: B37 is quarters bldg for Colonels and Generals. B39 is quarters area for Colonels and Generals and has an open area in the center of the building facing Ly Nam De Street which is large enough for vehicular traffic beneath the building. Area A3 according to ((Source)) is an open courtyard that he passed through to get from the home of Tan (B38) to the home of Quoc (B37) rather than a building complex as indicated in Ref 6. ((Source)) claimed that he observed the Caucasians in an open area bounded by B38, B36, C2, and B20. ((Source)) stated that he observed the Caucasians from the second floor of the north end of B39 and the second floor of the north end of B37 which were the homes of friends Tan and Quoc respectively. ((Source)) stated that the water tank in the area where he claimed to have sighted the Caucasians is located between and just north of the area between B36 and B38. ((Source)) stated that the water tower in photo 1A ((NOTE: This is the hand-held color photograph that you viewed in our office which depicts a two-story high water tower adjacent to the railroad track.)) is much taller than the one he saw since the one he saw is only as tall as the second floor of buildings B37 and B39. ((Source)) claimed that the water tower he saw had water below where the Caucasians were bathing and a catwalk or ramp above where he observed a guard. UNQUOTE.

4. Q. Did the source who reported sighting U.S. PWs on Ly Nam De Street, and another source interviewed by DIA, provide identical names for their friends and their friends' fathers who lived in the officer's housing compound from which sightings occurred?

A. During separate interviews, the source who reported having observed U.S. PWs presented two different sets of names:

1) During one interview the source said the sightings were made from the homes of his two close friends, Nguyen Nghia and Phung Van Tam. He described their respective fathers as Lieutenant General Nguyen Don and Major General Phung The Tai.

2) During a second interview this source said he made the sightings from the homes of his friends QMAC (surname unknown) and Phung Van Tam. He described their respective fathers as Brigadier General Chien (surname unknown) and Major General Phung The Tai.

Another source interviewed by DIA said he had played soccer with some of the young persons who lived in this officer's housing compound, including one youth named Nguyen Van Nghia. This source believed Nghia's father was a Major in the Artillery branch, but could not recall the father's name.

In summary, although the source who said he saw U.S. PWs was not consistent on this point, both sources agreed that a youth whose given name was Nghia lived in the officers' housing compound.

5. Q. What is the name of the sidestreet that extends east from Ly Nam De Street and is located between the officers' housing compound and Cua Dong Street?

A. Ng Hang Luong.

6. Q. What questions were asked during the second polygraph examination?

A.

MT

7. Q. Identify the source who said he had played soccer in the officers' housing compound.

A. This source is a U.S. person who requested and received assurances that his privacy would be protected and that his identity would not be released outside of DIA.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
JAN 25 1983
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
January 24, 1983
Dear Mr. Giffino:
This is to confirm our telephone conversations this date regarding my request for:
(1) the 30-odd documents from Colonel Vannan's and my Pentagon files; and
(2) the complete file on the alleged August 1982 sighting of U.S. prisoners-of-war in Southeast Asia which we discussed at length during our meeting with DIA personnel in the Pentagon at 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, January 15, 1983.
As I told you today, should my request for these documents not be honored by the close of business Tuesday, January 25, 1983, (two weeks after my request), I will consider said requests denied and will seek relief in the Federal courts in an effort to acquire these documents. I feel that two weeks is sufficient time to honor both of these requests, in that the "Vannan" file was made available in its entirety to Congressman Benjamin Gilman just last year, and the "August 1982 file" is currently available at the DIA's POW-MIA Branch in the Pentagon.
I appreciate your telephone confirmation to me today that you have advised DIA of my position on this matter. I look forward to hearing from you soon.
Sincerely,
Bill Hendon
BILL HENDON
Member of Congress
from West 24 North Carolina

cc: Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Colonel Ray White

01513

DIA Form 701-3 (10-82)

SOURCE NAME: Source CASE: 1542
 DATE OF LAST ENTRY IN CASE FILE: _____
 ALL ENCLOSURES TAGGED: (Y) N _____
 DATE COMPLETED: _____
 ACTION LOG UP TO DATE: (Y) N _____
 DATE COMPLETED: _____
 FOLLOW-UP ACTION REQUIRED: (Y) N _____
 TYPE FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED: Collection & phase up to 1542 in instruction
 DATE COMPLETED: _____
 AGENCY TASKED: _____

PM/MIA ADJUTANT TEAM REVIEW

DATE: 19 June 86NAME/CASE NUMBER(S): Source 1542/104 III

FOLDER REVIEW

- Establish logical order N/A
- Clarify non-self evident notes N/A
- Check with analyst regarding any missing data N/A
- Follow-up required yes (NO)

Additional collection required:

MT MT MT MT

Additional production required:

Analysis Production Computer Support

—Concur with conclusions yes no

COMMENTS:

TEAM MEMBER: AN

SUBSEQUENT PM/MIA OFFICE ACTION:

DATE: _____

Contact with sources

YES NO N/A

Collection tasked MT

Production/Analysis completed

No action taken

03/10/84

Vol. III

PAGE

NAME 3 *Source* ID # 2 1842
 A/C 16 CONFIDENTIALITY 37
 SCUT NUMBER 34 UNKNOWN CONTACTED 32
 CATEGORY
 ENTRY LOCATED 23 DATE STATE/CITY 15
 ENTRY REPORTED 10 VN
 TYPE EIGHTH 44 POW-F/H
 1ST EIGHTH 42 HANOI 11 210200N 12 105300E
 SUBSOURCES 27 *SOURCES*

ACTIONS 51 830315 CIAHQ FIR 317/09201
 840229 DC-2B MURDER BOARD
 CURRENT ACT 45 841224 EVAL APP'D CAT CAPTIVITY 39 D
 REMARKS 36 *Solving* T-8 CAJ NR PLANTATION ANALYST 13 AN
 DATE RECEIVED 8 830315 DATE OF INFO 25 78L8C
 ACT DATE 38 022 0 84 ADDRESS 25
 DR161M CODE 17 D

DATA

DATA

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

DIA Evaluation of PW/MIA Information
 provided by Vietnamese Refuges *Source*
 Source 1342

SUMMARY: Vietnamese Refuges *SC* stated that in mid-1978 and August 1982 he observed seven or eight caucasians he believed to be U.S. PWs in a permanent, walled prison on Ly Nam De Street near the Ministry of National Defense area, Hanoi, Vietnam.

DETAILS: Source 1342 was interviewed four times and varied significantly elements in descriptions of his observations. Initially he stated that he had counted 30 to 32 caucasians betting and lounging around a cistern within a walled prison as he observed them from the balcony of an adjacent two story officers' quarters building on Ly Nam De St., Hanoi. In the second and later interviews he stated that he had counted seven or eight prisoners on both occasions in mid-1978 and in August 1982. While he had first stated he surmised that the caucasians were Americans because they were speaking a language he recognized from a distance was neither Russian nor French, in later versions he stated that it was the friends he was visiting at the officers' quarters who told him that the men were U.S. PWs. Mr. SC consistently stated that he had the same vantage points of the prison on the two occasions, and gave a more or less consistent description of the prison when he was asked to assist interviewers to integrate his description with observable facts, the source changed the location of the prison and his description of the water tower. He also changed the name of one of the friends he was visiting on these observation opportunities.

The source was consistent in his assertion that the PWs were held in a permanent, walled prison. He stated that the prison facility was the size of a basketball court. Its outer wall was a one story masonry wall with barbed wire and floodlights on top and guard towers at the four corners. In the center of the courtyard was a cistern under a two story metal-framed water tower with catwalk and guard platform. Cistern and water tower were in the yard between two prisoner barracks with tin roofs. Mr. SC pointed out that the prison was in the block to the south of another prison where U.S. PWs were kept during the war (Note: This is a reference to the wartime prison camp at 17 Ly Nam De St. known as the

"plantation" by returning U.S. PWs. The source provided sufficient details concerning known buildings in the reported block to confirm that he has some acquaintance with it. His description would place the prison in the vicinity of 25-37 Ly Nam De St., just to the east of the Ministry of National Defense. In all interviews the source stated that his two vantage points were the second floor balconies of 37A and 37B Ly Nam De officers' quarters facing northward toward 25 Ly Nam De St. Mr. SC also stated that there was strict security around the block perimeter, but that people and schoolchildren in the neighborhood were aware that the PWs would be held there.

ANALYSIS: In an intensive three year investigative effort, DIA has been unable to corroborate this source's report with *MT/ DATA* intelligence. We have collected the interviews of 14 other Vietnamese residents who either lived or worked in the Ly Nam De St. area. In all of these cases the residents did not believe that U.S. PWs were held in the area after Operation Homecoming in 1973. All were aware that PWs had been held at the plantation during the war. The fourteen included individuals who had lived in the same neighborhood for up to 30 years, two northern Vietnamese military officers, the conductor of a train who had travelled by the compound in question on a daily basis, and children who had played throughout the area. Both military officers had visited friends at the officers' quarters during the period, and one of them had visited someone who worked next door at 25 Ly Nam De, the locus of the reported prison. None of these sources had ever heard or believed that there were PWs in the area. Another collateral source, former *SC*, indicated that he met an unidentified caucasian near 23 Ly Nam De on one occasion and at leisure at another location two blocks away two months later. He had many visits to this area and has drawn a map indicating that there are no prisons here. *SC* states that he has gleaned a hearsay report of five or six U.S. PWs in the area but has provided no further information on this report.

Additionally, *MT* intelligence contradicts the source's statements and his basis for making them. DIA has conducted an examination of *MT/ DATA* from 1970 through 1986. There is no indication that a prison such as the one described by Mr. *SC* exists there. After the source had been shown disparate elements of the prison which this examination had found such as a publicly available water tower and cistern, he replied that there was a second water

tower in the area. There is no second water tower. The recent CodeI attention on another cistern in this area is yet another attempt to establish the whole-the-prison-by-finding-a-part. When *MT* of the source's vantage points and the adjoining building indicated that his view was obstructed, he again attempted to change the location of the prison--however, even then not enough to enable him to view the situation as he reported he did.

Source 1542 has demonstrated that he has somewhat more than a passing knowledge, but not an exacting knowledge of this area. His ability to recall on different occasions some of the building names and placements may be due to his over one year residence on this block in 1979-80. DIA has had the area given an on site survey eight months and 14 months after Mr. *SC* second claimed sighting and found no evidence of a prison or of the tight security he claimed to be there, or of any recent changes there. *SC*

MT/ DATA

DIA believes that Source 1542 has created a fictional story of prison and PWs, possibly related to his earlier knowledge of the Plantation prison camp.

EVALUATION: Source *Source* has fabricated his report of a prison with PWs on Ly Nam De Street.

DATE: 11 December 1986

MSGNO 33 (PCN) 069/11 800 803 38 11 7 30
 CEC 08137012 (PC)
 RTTU:YUN RUEKJCS1587 250601-CEEC-RUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 106412 SEP 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEASOC/SDG-CHID/SECDEF
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 106312 SEP 86
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
 INFO RUEHQA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHQA/RUSCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36//
 BT
 EZ11
 LIAISON BANGKOK #15.1 C
 EZ2:
 CITE: MPVHLCUG
 FMVZSSM786
 SUBJECT: #COLLECTION EMPHASIS 86-0042
 RIJPRC USDO IX 260234Z AUG87
 1. ON 1 CRP 86 JCRC REP CONTACTED VN REFUGEE
 NAME SD

SOURCE STATED THAT HE FIRST MET
 SC IN SEPTEMBER 1982. SOURCE MET SC AT THE

SD KNOWN
 TO SOURCE AS NAME (SEE PARA TWO BELOW).
 SOURCE STATED THAT THE HOUSE OF NAME WAS DESIGNATED
 AS A MEETING POINT PRIOR TO ESCAPE AND THAT SC
 WAS ALREADY PRESENT THERE WHEN SOURCE ARRIVED.
 SOURCE STATED THAT HIS SISTER NAME

DATA AND HIS BROTHER NAME DATA
 ALSO MET SC AT THAT TIME BUT THAT THEY
 WERE ALSO NOT ACQUAINTED WITH HIM PRIOR TO ESCAPE BY
 BOAT AND KNEW NOTHING CONCERNING SC BACKGROUND.
 SOURCE STATED THAT HE KNEW OF ONLY ONE REFUGEE IN THE
 CAMP WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ACQUAINTED WITH SC

NAME SOURCE ADDED THAT HE RECALLED
 THAT A BROTHER OF NAME (COULD NOT RECALL NAME) WAS
 PROBABLY ACQUAINTED WITH SC RATHER THAN NAME BECAUSE
 NAME DID NOT APPEAR TO KNOW ANYTHING OF SC AT THE
 TIME OF THEIR ESCAPE. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT
 AWARE OF ANY RELATIVES OR FRIENDS OF SC WHO HAD
 ARRIVED IN HONG KONG AND ALSO DID NOT KNOW ABOUT ANY
 REFUGEES WHO HAD RECEIVED MAIL FROM SC AFTER HE
 WAS RESETTLED IN AUSTRALIA.

2. REFUGEE NAME SD

STATED THAT HE FIRST MET
 SC IN SEPTEMBER 1982 JUST PRIOR TO THEIR ESCAPE
 ON THE SAME BOAT. SOURCE STATED THAT HIS BROTHER

NAME

SD

NAME WAS INTRODUCED TO SC
 FATHER IN HANOI A FEW DAYS PRIOR TO THE BOAT ESCAPE.
 SOURCE STATED THAT HIS BROTHER WAS INTRODUCED TO SC
 FATHER BY ANOTHER PASSENGER ON THE SAME BOAT. NAME
 NAME APPROX 30 YOA NATIVE OF HAI PHONG
 AND FORMER KNITTER/DARNER WHO WAS RESETTLED FROM
 HET LING CHAU TO AUSTRALIA. SOURCE STATED THAT HE
 HEARD FROM HIS BROTHER NAME THAT NAME WAS A LONG
 TIME FRIEND OF SC FATHER. MRS NAME ACTED AS A
 "GO BETWEEN" TO ARRANGE THE ESCAPE OF SC AND FOUR
 FAMILY MEMBERS ACCORDING TO SOURCE. SOURCE WAS NOT
 AWARE OF ANYONE ELSE INVOLVED IN THE BOAT ESCAPE WHO
 MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
 BACKGROUND OF SC. SOURCE STATED THAT TO
 THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE SC AND HIS FAMILY WERE
 THE ONLY PASSENGERS TO ARRIVE FROM HANOI AND THAT
 THE OTHER ESCAPEES WERE FROM HAI PHONG. SOURCE
 STATED THAT HIS BROTHER NAME TOOK SC AND THE
 OTHER PASSENGERS FROM HAI PHONG PIER TO CUA ONG BY
 REGULAR PASSENGER BOAT WHILE SOURCE TRAVELED BY ROAD
 AND MET THEM IN CUA ONG WHERE THEY WERE ABLE TO PURCHASE
 AN ESCAPE BOAT BY POOLING THEIR MONEY. THE GROUP
 DEPARTED FROM CUA ONG, QUANG NINH ON 30 SEP 82 AND
 ARRIVED IN HONG KONG ON 3 DEC 82.

BT

#1587

NNNN

NNDD

MSGNO 130 (PC11) *06/29/86* *01108/04:15:27*
 ZCZC 12:05:57Z (PC1)
 RTTCZYU RUEKJCS463 2410847-CCCC--RUEALGX
 ZNY

R 290847Z AUG 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEAHQ/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQ/CHO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQ/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQ/CHC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQ/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEAHQ/CHC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQ/CHC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEAHQ/3DC GRID/SECDEF
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 290847Z AUG 86
 FM USDAO HONG KONG HK
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//7P-A1/AT-3/FO-PH/DC-1A/DB-2C/AT-8/AT-10//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//AT-OPS//
 INFO RUEHQA/USDAO BEIJING CH
 RUEHQA/USDAO FINLAND FI
 RUEHQA/USDAO CANBERRA AU
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/PA-MIA//
 RUEHQA/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/VLC/CA/OCS/ENR//
 RUEA11A/CIA WASHDC//DDO/INT-RA//
 RUEADAN/NSC WASHDC
 RUEHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3-2/J3/J36//
 RUEKJCS/CSSTASHOC//OCJCS-PH-MIA/J5//
 RUHQHQA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUHQHQA/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 BT
 E21

SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 14463

E22:
 REL AUKCAN
 SERIAL: IIR 6 842 0413 86
 COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN); AUSTRALIA (AS); FINLAND (FI)
 SUBJECT: IIR 6 842 0413 86/COLLECTION EMPHASIS
 WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
 EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
 DOI: 860822
 REQS: D-VOP-83468
 SOURCE: SC

//////
 SUMMARY: THIS IIR FORWARDS INFORMATION REQUESTED
 ON VIETNAMESE REFUGEES ASSOCIATED WITH *607415*
 TEXT: 1. OF THE TEN (10) INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN THE
 REQUIREMENT, INFORMATION ON ONLY TWO (2) CAN BE PROVIDED
 AT THIS TIME.

2. THE FOLLOWING LISTS ARE PROVIDED:
 A. NAME

NAMES

DATA

B. THE ENTIRE FAMILY RESETTLED TO DATA TO MYEMBANK
 1984. THE PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FOR VISAS WAS
 SC ALL RELATIONSHIPS LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS
 A AND B ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO SC
 NAME

NAMES

DATA

DATA

BT
 04463
 1400K
 1400D

MSGNO 428 (CEXX) 108/29/86 107:08:04-7:54
 ZCZC 12:05:57Z (PC)
 RTTCZYIN RUEKJCS4463 2010847-CCCC--RUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 290847Z AUG 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANAA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEANCC/CHC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUECTIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACMC/CHC WASHINGTON DC
 RUECTIAG/NPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEASDC/SDC GRID/SECDEF
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 290821Z AUG 86
 FM USDAO HONG KONG HK
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//FP-A1/AT-3/VO-PW/DC-4A/DB-2C/AT-8/AT-10//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//AT-OPS//
 INFO RUEHBI/USDAO BEIJING CH
 RUEHBI/USDAO PIRLAND FI
 RUEHBI/USDAO CANBERRA AU
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/PA-MIA//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/VLC/CA/OCS/EHR//
 RUEA11A/CIA WASHDC//DDO/INT-RR//
 RUEADWW/MSC WASHDC
 RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2/J3/J36//
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-PW-KIA/J5//
 RUHQHQA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUHQHQA/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 BT
 EZ11

SECTION 02 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 14463

EZ2:
 REL AUKAN
 SERIAL: IIR 6 842 0413 86
 COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN); AUSTRALIA (AS); FINLAND (FI)
 SUBJECT: IIR 6 842 0413 86/COLLECTION EMPHASIS DATA

DATA

DATA

C. NAME

NAMES

NAMES

DOB/POB	N/BROTHER-IN-LAW
20 SEP 60 HAIPHONG, VN	N/SON
01 MAR 54 HAIPHONG, VN	EDUCATION
08 NOV 57 HAIPHONG, VN	SECONDARY 2 YRS/69
25 MAY 77 HAIPHONG, VN	SECONDARY 2 YRS
24 JUN 76 HAIPHONG, VN	SECONDARY 2 YRS
18 MAR 58 HAIPHONG, VN	SECONDARY 2 YRS
26 APR 53 HAIPHONG, VN	SECONDARY 3 YRS
22 JUN 81 HONG KONG, HK	NONE

THE ENTIRE FAMILY HAS RESETTLED IN FINLAND AS OF 21 FEBRUARY 1983. THE PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FOR THE VISAS WAS THE BROTHER. NAME THE RELATIONSHIPS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH C ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO BROTHER NAME.

COMMENTS: 1. COORDINATION WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND A FLAG ACTION WILL CONTINUE TO HELP IDENTIFY THE REMAINING TWELVE (12) INDIVIDUALS IF THEY ENTER THE REFUGEE STREAM HERE IN HONG KONG. 2. ANY ADDRESSEE NO LONGER DESIROUS OF RECEIVING SUBJECT MATTER IN THIS SERIES SHOULD REQUEST REMOVAL FROM THE ELECTRONIC ADDRESSEE LIST. PLEASE SO ADVISE IF RECEIPT BY POUCH IS PREFERRED.

//IPSP: PG2430//

//COMSOBJ: 1.3//

PROJ: NONE
 COLL: NONE
 INSTR: US NO
 PREP:
 APPR:

NAMES

BT
 #4463
 >NNNN
 #XDD

MSGNO

56 (PCFX) *08/29/86* *00:06:25.0.6*

ZCZC-05:05:05Z (PC)

RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS403:2410333-CCCC-RUEALGX

ZNY

R 290333Z AUG 86

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHCC/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHIA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEAHIC/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHIA/NSC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEASDC/SDC GRID/SECRET

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 290334Z AUG 86

FM USDL HONG KONG HK

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//77-A1/AT-2/TO-74/DC-1A/DB-2D/DB-2C/AT-8/AT-10//

RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//AT-2PS//

INFO RUEHBY/USDAO BEIJING CH

RUEHBY/USDAO CANBERRA AS

RUEHBY/JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEHBY/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RUEHBY/DIAL CANBERRA AS

RUEAHN/NSC WASHDC

RUEAHIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/INT/RH//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PH-MIA//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/VLC/CA/OCS/ENR//

BT

EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 14403

EZ2:

SERIAL: IIR 6 842 0411 86

COUNTRY: VIETNAM (VN); AUSTRALIA (AS); CANADA (CA)

SUBJECT: IIR 6 842 0411 86/COLLECTION EXPRAIS 86-0042

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY

EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DOI: 860822

SOURCE: SC

SUMMARY: THIS IIR FORWARDS INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE

REFUGEES ASSOCIATED WITH SOURCE

TEXT: 1. THIS IIR PROVIDES THE NAMES OF PEOPLE

WHO FLED VIETNAM TOGETHER WITH SOURCE ON BOARD

ALL BUT FOUR OF THE SIXTEEN LISTED HAVE

RESETTLED IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA. THOSE FOUR:

NAMES

ARE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEWS.

INFORMATION PROVIDED IS KEYED TO THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE

A. NAME

B. SEX

C. DOB

D. POB

E. PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

F. DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM HONG KONG

G. COUNTRY OF RESETTLEMENT

H. CURRENT LOCATION IN HONG KONG

I. AVAILABILITY FOR INTERVIEW

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. PORTER/CARPENTER F. 11/28/84 G. CANADA H. N/A I. N/A

J. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. CONST. WORKER F. 11/28/84 G. CANADA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. N/A F. 11/28/84 G. CANADA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. N/A F. 11/28/84 G. CANADA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. WELDER F. 11/15/84 G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. SALESLADY F. 11/15/84 G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

F. 11/15/84 G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

F. 11/15/84 G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. STUDENT F. 11/15/84 G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. STUDENT F. 11/15/84 G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. FISHERMAN/HAWKER F. N/A G. N/A H. N/A I. YES

I. YES

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. STUDENT F. N/A G. N/A H. N/A I. YES

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. STUDENT F. N/A G. N/A H. N/A I. YES

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. SHOES MAKER F. 11/15/84 G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A

I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. STUDENT F. N/A G. AUSTRALIA H. N/A I. N/A

A. NAME B. F. C. SD D. SD

E. LATHE OPERATOR F. N/A G. N/A H. N/A I. YES

I. YES

BT

#4403

KNON

KNDD

MSGNO 55 (PCXX) *08/29/86* *00:06:25.0.2*
 ZCZC--051051052-1(C)
 RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS#403 2410333-CCCC--RUEALGX
 ZNY
 R 290333Z AUG 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/CSSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAICA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAICC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEAHC/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIAG/WPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEASIX/SEC-GRID/SECDEF
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 290234Z AUG 86
 FM USILO HONG KONG HK
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//AT-1/AT-3/TO-FM/DC-1A/DB-2D/DB-2C/AT-8/AT-10//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//AT-OPS//
 INFO RUEHBI/INDDAD BEIJING CH
 RUEHBY/USDAO CANNARA AS
 RUEHBP4/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHBI/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 RUEHBY/DIAL CANNARA AS
 RUEADWW/KSC WASHDC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/INT/RK//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/FM-HIA//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/PLC/CA/OCS/ENR//
 BT
 EZ11

SECTION 02 OF 02 HONG KONG HK 14403

EZ2:
 SERIAL IIR 6-842-0411-86
 COUNTRY VIETNAM (VN); AUSTRALIA (AS); CANADA (CA)
 SUBJECT: IIR 6-842-0411-86/COLLECTION EMPHASIS D874
 3. RECORDS SHOW THAT *NAME* DPOB:

SD
 ... NAME *SD*

COMMENTS: 1. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY FURTHER INFO IS NEEDED TO SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.
 2. ANY ADDRESSEE NO LONGER DESIROUS OF RECEIVING SUBJECT MATTER IN THIS SERIES SHOULD REQUEST REMOVAL FROM THE ELECTRONIC ADDRESSEE LIST. PLEASE SO ADVISE IF RECEIPT BY POUCH IS PREFERRED.

//IPSP: 2430//
 //COMSOBJ: 13//
 PROJ: NONE
 COLL: NONE
 INSTR: US NO

PREF: *NAME* USMC ANAYLO
 APPR: USAF AIRLO
 DT: *NAME*
 #4403
 NNNN
 NWDD

MSGNO 67 (PCX) *08/12/86* 41811108 2 04
ZCZC 03/09/92 (PC)
PTTSZYU RUEKJCS#055 2242140 SSSS-RUEALGX

ZNY
P 121402Z AUG 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEASDC/DOC-GRID/SECDEF
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 8 121601Z AUG 86
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//AT-OPS//
TO RUEBHX/USDAO HONG KONG RM
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC/CA/OCS/ENR//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PN-MIA//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/INT/RR//
RUEADNH/RSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEBXY/USDAO CANBERRA AS
RUEBXY/DIAL CANBERRA AS

BT
EZ1

EZ2

SECTION 01 OF 02
0633/VO-PN

SUBJ: COLLECTION EMPHASIS -- REFUGEE BOAT PASSENGER AND
ASSOCIATES IDENTIFICATION

REFS: A. CIR D-VOP-43468 PN/MIA REQUIREMENT

B. JCRC LMB MSG DTG 161212Z APR 83 (NOTAL)

C. USDAO HONK MSG DTG 200303Z JAN 84 (NOTAL)

D. USDAO HONG KONG MSG DTG 040417Z SEP 85 (NOTAL)

E. DIA VO-PN MSG DTG 311301Z JUL 86

1. THE FOLLOWING COMPRISES A COLLECTION EMPHASIS TO REF A, CIR D-VOP-43468, PN/MIA REQUIREMENT FOR DOD ADDRESSES EXCEPT JCRC. ALL RESPONSES TO THIS MESSAGE, LESS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATIONS, WILL BE IN IIR FORMAT, CITE D-VOP-43468 IN THE REQUIREMENTS BLOCK, AND BE ENTITLED, "COLLECTION EMPHASIS". ALL RESPONSES TO THIS MESSAGE WILL INCLUDE AS ADDRESSES, AT THE MINIMUM, DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PN/DC-4A/AT-3/DB-2D//, CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI, AND JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH. THIS COLLECTION EMPHASIS HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE COUNTRY OFFICER(S) IN AT-(3).

2. BACKGROUND:

A. SOURCE SC PROVIDED ALLEGED PN SIGHTINGS AND SOME BIOGRAPHIC AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION IN REFS B-C. WHILE SC INFORMATION REMAINS UNCORROBORATED BY INTELLIGENCE, CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST NECESSITATES THE PURSUIT OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE SC CASE, ESPECIALLY FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE SOURCE'S BACKGROUND. REF D INDICATES THAT MR. SC HAS MOVED FROM HONG KONG TO AUSTRALIA AS OF 15 NOVEMBER 1984. REF E ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE SOURCES WITH INFORMATION ON SC. EARLIER BACKGROUND IN VIETNAM, WE HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT REFUGEES NAME AND

NAME DESCRIBED IN PARA C 2-3 BELOW WERE SC FRIENDS IN HONG KONG.

B. THE PURPOSE OF THIS COLLECTION EMPHASIS MESSAGE IS TO IDENTIFY AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH VIETNAMESE REFUGEE NAME.

C. NAME FTY WAS BORN JD VIETNAM.

(1) NAME WAS BORN JD VIETNAM. HE FLED VIETNAM IN SEP 82 AND WAS INTERVIEWED IN D479 DURING 1983 AS REPORTED IN REF B. MR. SC WAS IN BOAT NO D479 ID NO D479 AND DURING 1983 HE WAS IN SD.

MR. SC HAS BEEN RESETTLED TO AUSTRALIA.

(2) NAME DPOB: SD

SD

(3) NAME SD

(V), HONG KAI (D), QIANG SD

3. REQUIREMENTS:

A. REQUEST YOU IDENTIFY AND FORWARD TO DIA/VO-PN THE FULL IDENTITY AND CURRENT LOCATION OF ALL INDIVIDUALS WHO FLED VIETNAM ON BOARD THE NAME BOAT WITH NAME INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) NAME
- (2) DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH
- (3) PRIOR EMPLOYMENT TO INCLUDE MILITARY/OUTR SERVICE
- (4) DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM HONG KONG (IF APPLICABLE)
- (5) COUNTRY OF RESETTLEMENT (IF APPLICABLE)
- (6) CURRENT LOCATION IN HONG KONG
- (7) AVAILABILITY FOR INTERVIEW

B. DIA/VO-PN WILL INTERVIEW ALL POTENTIALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS WHO DEPARTED VIETNAM WITH MR. SC AND MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING MR. SC BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES WHILE IN VIETNAM OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN REFUGEE FILES FOR THOSE PERSONS WHO DEPARTED VIETNAM WITH MR. SC. WOULD BE ANY INDICATION OF A RELATIONSHIP TO OR WITH MR. SC.

C. REQUEST YOU IDENTIFY AND FORWARD THE CURRENT LOCATION OR CONTACT POINT FOR REFUGEES NAME AND NAME.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE:

A.

DATA

B. A COLLECTION CAPABILITY STATEMENT (CCS) IS REQUIRED OF ALL DOD COLLECTORS EXCEPT JCRC IN RESPONSE TO THIS MESSAGE. SUBMIT CCS TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PN/DC-4A/AT-3/DB-2D//, INCLUDE CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI AND JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH AS INFO ADDRESSES ON CCS.

C. CITING INSTRUCTIONS, EXCEPT JCRC, FOR IIR PURPOSES. CITE THIS COLLECTION EMPHASIS IN THE TITLE OF THE REQUIREMENT NUMBER (REF #) IN THE REQUIREMENT NUMBER. CITE THE TSPS CODE 2430 AFTER THE NEW PROSIN BELOW THE 1ST LINE OF COMMENTS SECTION. CITE CONSOLE 15 AFTER THE NEW PROSIN "CONSOLE" BELOW THE TSPS LINE.

D. IIR DISTRIBUTION, EXCEPT JCRC. IIRS IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED ELECTRICALLY IN MESSAGE IIR FORMAT. ORIGINALS OR LEGIBLE PHOTOCOPIES OF ALL SKETCHES, DOCUMENTS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC. EXCEPT HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS SHOULD BE SENT VIA REGISTERED MAIL DIRECTLY TO DIA/ATM/TCYR, ROOM 22230, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5390. IF HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS ARE RECEIVED, ADDRESSEES SHOULD SUBMIT AN IIR TO THAT EFFECT AND TRANSMIT AN ELECTRICAL MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI REQUESTING DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

DATA

(3)

DATE _____

G. DAO/DLO APPRISE FBI LEGAT OF THIS ACTION IF APPROPRIATE

5. DIA//FO-PH// FOC IS: AA/ AUTOWON 225-0501/02;
COMMERCIAL (COLLECT) (202) 695-0501/02; GREY 960-8775; KY-3 THE
PENTAGON DROP 2509.
BT
#4893
NNNN
NNDD

[illegible]

003370-P4
AIRLINE, INCREASE TOP RETURNERS
SECRETARY FOR 1/10/68
SUBJ: COLLECTION PROGRAMS

[illegible]

3. INVESTIGATE

A. REQUEST YOU LOCATE WITHIN THESE SOURCES IDENTIFIED BELOW ANY AND ALL DATA RELATING TO: (1) DOES NOT AND DOES NOT HAVE ANY OF THESE IDENTIFIABLES HAS THE PROCEEDING THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS FOR IDENTIFIABLES; REQUEST YOU COORDINATE WITH LOCAL OFFICERS TO ESTABLISH A FLAG AREA THAT WILL IDENTIFY THE SUBJECTS IF THEY ENTER THE BEACON STREAM IN THE FUTURE; AND REVIEW BEACON PROCESSING DEVICES TO DETERMINE IF ANY OF THE IDENTIFIABLES OF AN IMPROBABLE ALIAS HAS PASSED THROUGH IT IS STILL IN THE PROCESS. REQUEST HAVE YOUR FORMATION ADDRESS, DATE RECEIVED AND OTHER INFO THAT CAN ASSIST YOU TO LOCATE THE IDENTIFIABLES.

8. THE INDIVIDUALS OF INTEREST

[illegible]

MCN=86223/05178 TDR=86223/21252 TAD=86223/21452 CDSN=MJA714
PAG

NAME: DATA:

DATE

NAME: _____

FOR SECURITY//PM//SI: REQUEST COP OFFICER REVIEW CO
RESOURCES AND FORMS: THREE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL, THESE MAY
ALSO BE USED BY BOTH LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ESTIMATE LOCATE A
RELATIONSHIP WITH
10-PM REQUEST TO INTERVIEW THE INDIVIDUALS IS PART TWO
AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, AS INFORMATION ON ADDRESSES,
CONTACT, POINTS OF RELATIVES OF THESE INDIVIDUALS IS DEVELOPED
REQUEST IS TO BE FORWARDED TO 10-PM FOR ACTION WITHIN INFO TO COP. CTS
END PAGE ONE

REMARKS: THE INSTRUMENTS AND BACKGROUNDS

DATA

8. A COLLECTION CAPABILITY STATEMENT (CCS) IS REQUIRED OF ALL INFO COLLECTORS EXCEPT JMWG IN RESPONSE TO THIS MESSAGE. SUBMIT CCS TO DIA WASHINGTON, DC/PA-POLIC/AFST/3708-ZCART/3/AT-10/10. INCLUDE COM JMWG BARBERS PT HI MC. JMWG (JANSEN BARBERS PT HI) INFO ANGELS IN CCS.

[illegible]

1971

DATA

9. TELEGRAPHIC KEY FOR VIETNAMESE SPELLINGS OF TONES MAY BE REFERENCED FOR VIETNAM-RELATED REQUIREMENTS ONLY.

6. DIA/NO-PW/ POX IS **AN** MOTORON 225-0501/02;
COMMERCIAL (COLLECT) (202) 695-0531/02; GARY 060-8133; SV-3 THE
POTENTIAL FOR 2306.

MSNO 159 (PCE) *05/12/86 *03:10:39.9.6

ZCZC 08:09:36Z (PC)
RUSZLTV-NUEKJCS725-1320536 -RUEALGK
ZNY
N 120536Z MAY 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGK/SAFE
N 120538Z MAY 86
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//O-PH//
INFO RUEKJCS/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
BT
EZ11

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 22725

EZ2:
CITE: 1363 MAY 86

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR REINTERVIEW OF SOURCE

N ADDITIONAL INFO

REF: A. DIA/DC-2 NSG, DTG 161710Z AUG 85

B. JCRC REX NSG, DTG 261111Z AUG 85

C. DIA/70-PH NSG, DTG 061441Z MAY 86 (REQUEST

FOR RETRANSMITTAL OF JCRC REX NSG 270200Z AUG 85.) (NOTE:

THIS IS THE REQUESTED RETRANSMITTAL).

FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE

SOURCE, SC, DURING ADDITIONAL DEBRIEFINGS

AFTERNOON OF 24 AUGUST 1985. SC PROVIDED THE INFORMA-

TION AFTER CONSULTING THE PHOTO/OVERLAYS PROVIDED BY

JCRC.

1. SOURCE WAS UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY ANY

OF THE BUILDINGS IN THE PHOTOS EXCEPT FOR THE THREE-STORE

VILLA LOCATED ACROSS DAI LO CHA DONG FROM BUILDING 958 IN

OVERLAY 5. SOURCE HAD BEEN IN THE VILLA ON TWO SEPARATE

OCCASIONS IN ABOUT LATE 1981 OR EARLY 1982. THE VILLA

WAS PART OF THE PAVN GENERAL STAFF COMPOUND AND WAS USED

ON THE TWO OCCASIONS AS A MEETING PLACE FOR DISCUSSIONS

BETWEEN SOVIET ADVISORS AND PAVN OFFICERS FOLLOWING MILI-

TARY EXERCISES. SOURCE SAID THAT DAI LO CHA DONG WAS

CLOSED OFF AT PHO LY NAM DE IN FRONT OF THE VILLA BY A

LARGE GATE. NO FURTHER INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE.

2. IN 1980, SOURCE HAD VISITED THE HOME OF A

FORMER HIGH SCHOOL FRIEND AT 59 PHO LY NAM DE. SOURCE

WAS NOT POSITIVE, BUT THOUGHT 59 PHO LY NAM DE WAS PRO-

BABLY LOCATED SOUTH OF DAI LO CHA DONG. IT WAS A BUILD-

ING THAT WAS POSITIONED PERPENDICULAR TO PHO LY NAM DE

AND CONSISTED OF SEVERAL APARTMENTS. ONE OF THE OCCUPANTS

OF 59 WAS A PAVN SENIOR COLONEL, THE FATHER OF A (LNU),

WHOM THE SOURCE HAD ATTENDED HIGH SCHOOL WITH FROM 1967-

70. FROM 1973-78, A, HAD STUDIED IN THE USSR AT THE

ULIANOVSK MILITARY SIGNAL OFFICERS SCHOOL. THE SOURCE

HAD MET WITH A IN MOSCOW A FEW TIMES WHILE BOTH WERE

STUDYING IN THE USSR. FROM 1978-81, A WAS ASSIGNED
TO AN UNIDENTIFIED PAVN SIGNAL REGIMENT SUBORDINATE
TO THE PAVN SIGNAL COMMAND. A HAD TOLD THE SOURCE THAT
THERE WERE AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SOVIET SPECIALISTS
ASSIGNED TO HIS REGIMENT WHICH WAS BASED AT SONG BOY
DISTRICT, BA SON BICH PROVINCE. WHEN NECESSARY, A
ACTED AS AN INTERPRETER FOR THE SOVIETS.

3. SOURCE ALSO KNEW THAT A HOUSING COMPOUND LO-
CATED AT 12A PHO LY NAM DE WAS USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PAVN
OFFICERS RANKING FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL TO SENIOR
COLONEL. THE SOURCE HAD NEVER VISITED THIS COMPOUND, BUT
ONE OF HIS SCHOOLMATES AT THE NGUYEN VAN THOI SCHOOL FROM
1967-70 LIVED AT 12A. THE FRIEND, NGUYEN VAN THOI, LIVED
AT 12A WITH HIS FATHER, A LT COLONEL. SOURCE ADDED THAT
THE NGUYEN VAN THOI SCHOOL WAS A SPECIAL HIGH SCHOOL FOR
THE CHILDREN OF SENIOR RANKING PAVN OFFICERS. ALMOST
ALL OF SOURCE'S SCHOOLMATES LIVED IN THE AREA OF PHO LY
NAM DE AND ALL OF THEIR FATHERS WERE AT LEAST OF LIEUTEN-
ANT COLONEL RANK. THE SOURCE BELIEVED THAT MOST OF THE
APARTMENT STYLE BUILDINGS WERE FOR OFFICERS RANKING FROM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL TO SENIOR COLONEL AND THAT MOST OF THE
GENERALS LIVED IN INDIVIDUAL HOUSES OR VILLAS. HOWEVER,
THE SOURCE SAID IT COULD BE POSSIBLE THAT A GENERAL MIGHT
LIVE IN ONE OF THE APARTMENT STYLE BUILDINGS.

4. THE SOURCE DESCRIBED 37A AS A TWO-STORY BUILD-
ING THAT HAD A LARGE CORRIDOR RUNNING FROM THE STREET
THROUGH THE FIRST STORY. THE CORRIDOR WAS LARGE ENOUGH
TO DRIVE A CAR THROUGH. THE SOURCE WAS NOT CERTAIN
WHETHER 37A WAS LOCATED TO THE NORTH OR THE SOUTH OF DAI
LO CHA DONG, BUT GUESSED IT WAS PROBABLY LESS THAN ONE
KILOMETER NORTH OF 59 PHO LY NAM DE. THE SOURCE WAS
POSITIVE THAT 37A WAS POSITIONED PERPENDICULAR TO AND ON
THE EAST SIDE OF PHO LY NAM DE. BUILDING 37A WAS SET BACK
ABOUT FIVE TO SEVEN METERS FROM PHO LY NAM DE AND THE
DRIVEWAY FROM THE STREET TO 37A WAS SLIGHTLY INCLINED.
THE SOURCE WAS POSITIVE THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHU THAI
DID NOT LIVE IN 37A. THE SOURCE VAGUELY RECALLED
THAT THAI LIVED IN (WORDS DROPPED FROM MESSAGE, POSSIBLY
"A QUARTERS") NUMBERED IN THE 20'S OF PHO LY NAM DE.

5. THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE OFTEN RODE HIS
BICYCLE UP AND DOWN PHO LY NAM DE IN TRANSIT TO OTHER
AREAS OF TOWN. HE SAID THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HE
NOTICED A SET OF GATES LOCATED ON THE EAST SIDE OF PHO
LY NAM DE THAT WERE ALWAYS CLOSED AND HAD GUARDS ON THE
INSIDE. THE SOURCE THOUGHT IT WAS STRANGE THAT THIS WAS
THE ONLY BUILDING OR COMPOUND THAT HE NEVER SAW ANYONE

BT
#2725
NNNN
END

PAGE 00

MSNO 158 (PCIX) 05/12/86* 03:10:39.9Z

ZCZC 061091961 (PC)
 PRIORITY RUMKJCS2725 1520534-SSSS--RUMALOT.
 ZNY
 R 120556Z MAY 86
 FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUMALOT/SAFE
 R 120558Z MAY 86
 FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 TO RUMKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
 INFO RUMKPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 BT

BT
 C211 SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 22725

C221
 CITE: 1503 MAY 86.
 SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR REINTERVIEW OF SOURCE
 ENTER ON LEAVE. THIS GATE WAS LOCATED SOMEWHERE BETWEEN
 57A AND 59 PRO LY NAM/DC. AT THE TIME, THE SOURCE HAD
 SPECULATED THAT IT MIGHT BE THE HOME OF AN IMPORTANT
 GENERAL. THE SOURCE COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER
 DETAILS.

BT
 #2725
 KMD
 KMD

ROUTINE
 R 061045Z MAY 86
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
 TO JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

2YIN RUMKJCS0589 1282057

1-0509/VO-PH
 SUBJ: RETRANSMISSION OF MSG
 1. REQUEST RETRANSMISSION OF JCRC LIAISON MSG CITE: 1520 AUG
 85 DTS 270250Z AUG 84: SUBJ: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR REINTERVIEW
 OF SOURCE. ~~INCOMPLETE~~ ADDITIONAL INFO: MSG WAS RECEIVED
 INCOMPLETE
 2. DIA/VO-PH POC IS AM BT

ACTION VO-PH (2)
 INFO: ARIE (1) VO (1) DIA (1)
 #SAFE

0,6,7)

NOA-04188/066

COSMIC LIAISON
 PAGE 1 OF 1

26 FEB 86

MFR

RE: NAME SOURCE IN
SC CASE

R/O RU

RET Phonocan W. CIA/DOO/VCL 26 Feb 86

NAME

SYNOPSIS 17 LND:

- ARI: Old Plantation, 17 LND
 - B17: LE VAN LINH STREET, ENTRANCE TO 21 LND
 - B21, B25, ~~B26~~: Possible Residences on Le Van Linh
 - B22: Possible Collective Housing, Military Personnel at 19 LND
 - B15: Possible Collective Housing, 21 LND
 - B23, B26, B27, B28, B24: Apparent Office and/or Military Quarters and Warehouse, and Maintenance Facility, at 21 LND by NAME
 - C1: Water storage or bathing, Cistern
 - B18: Lavatory, Latrine
 - B16, B19: Specific Erection Unconfirmed
- FOOTNOTE: C1, B16, B18, B19 APPEAR TO BE PART OF 21 LND WITH POSSIBLE ACCESS FROM 23 BY NAME OR
- B28, B30: Offices, Military Publishing House
 - C2, B20, B36, ~~B38~~
 - B38: Apparent Offices for Military Courts

1846

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT MILITARY CENTER

ZNY: RUEHBYAD720 0130501

PRIORITY
P 230502Z JAN 86
FM USDAO/USCINCPACREP CANBERRA AS
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/AT-3// PRIORITY

CANBERRA AS 00720

CITE
JAN 86

SUBJ: VN REFUGEE SOURCE

REF: DIA/VO-PW MSG DTG 271435Z NOV 85

1. NAME SOURCE HAS RECEIVED WORD
FROM COUNTERPART THAT SOURCE HAS BEEN LOCATED

DATA

2. AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE AUTHORIZED OUR
CONTACT WITH SC BUT ARE NOW REQUESTING WE NOT
REPEAT NOT USE A POLYGRAPH AS IT IS NOT AN ACCEPTED
PRACTICE FOR USE ON AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS/RESIDENTS.

3. AWAIT YOUR REPLY. RAIRA SENDS.
BT

1847

22 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Australian Refugee source SC
has been located

R/O: A-N

1. CIA/DDO/VCD has alerted VO-PW that
they have received a cable from their Australian
reports that
station that refugee source SOURCE has
been located at the following address:

SOURCE
Don

Apparently he has no phone. SC HAS BEEN AT THIS
ADDRESS SINCE EARLY 1984.

2. The station has also received the permission
of the Australian government for USDAO Canberra to
contact the source. The Australians did point out that
they do not allow polygraph examinations for Australian
persons.

ACTION VO-PW (2)
INFO CJCS (4) JS (8) HIDS (1) J4 (9) JS (2) JSOA (1) SECDEF: (1)
SECDEF (9) USDP (11) ASD:PA (1) USDP:DSAA (4) DR (1)
DD (1) ED (1) NMIC (1) AT (1) AT-3 (2) AT-100 (1) VP (1)
DB-2C (1) DB-4C (1) DB-403 (1) DIA (1) VO-PW (2)
VO-PW (2)
+SAFE

NOV 86022/01206 TOR 86022/00012 TAD 86022/00022 CDS 8614133
PAGE 1 OF 1
2000000 JAN 86

1848

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT MILITARY CENTER

ZYUW RUEHVA0511 0160450

IMMEDIATE

C-163-462 JAN 86

FM USDAO/USCINCPACREP CANBERRA AS

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// IMMEDIATE

INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CIA WASHDC//DDO/EA/VCL//

CANBERRA AS 00511

JAN 86

SUBJ: STATUS OF EFFORTS IN LOCATING VN REFUGEE
SOURCE

REF: DIA/VO-PW MSG 131350Z JAN 86

1. RE VN REFUGEE SOURCE, NAME

IS WORKING WITH COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION BUT TO DATE
HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE INDIVIDUAL. APPRECIATE
OFFER OF ASSISTANCE BUT BELIEVE ALL POSSIBLE IS BEING
DONE BY INVOLVED AGENCIES. THIS OFFICE AND ALL
OTHERS UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE AND SENSE OF URGENCY.
WE WILL NOTIFY YOU THE MOMENT SOME USEFUL INFO COMES
TO LIGHT.

2. COORDINATION WITH AUSTRALIANS ON
INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM.
SUITABLE SITE CAN BE FOUND. WE WILL HOLD OFF MAKING
CONTACT WITH THE SOURCE UNTIL YOU HAVE RECEIVED ALL
THE RELEVANT INFO THE SEARCH UNCOVERS.

BT

ACTION VO-PW(2)

INFO JCRC(4) J3(3) HIBS(1) J4(5) J5(2) JSOA(1) SECDEF(1)

(U,P,6,7,8,P)

SECDEF(8) USDP(11) ASD:PA(1) USDP:DSAA(A) NMIC(1)

AT-100(1) DB-2C(1) DB-AC1(1) DB-403(1) DIA(1)

VO-PW(1) VO-PW(2) VO-PW(2)

+SAFE

MMW=06018/0-102 TDR=06018/04402 TAD=06018/06022 CDSN=M1A10
180440Z JAN 86

1849

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT MILITARY CENTER

ZYUW RUEHJCS7031 0132108

PRIORITY

P-151350Z JAN 86

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//

TO USDAO/CANBERRA AS

INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/EA/VCL//

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

018/VO-PW

SUBJ: QUERY STATUS OF EFFORTS IN LOCATING VN REFUGEE SOURCE

REFS: A. DIA/DC-2 MSG DTG 091822Z SEP 85

B. DIA/VO-PW MSG DTG 151522Z OCT 85

C. USDAO/USCINCPACREP CANBERRA AS MSG DTG 260533Z NOV 85

D. DIA/VO-PW MSG DTG 271433Z NOV 85

E. USDAO CANBERRA MSG DTG 050603Z DEC 85

1. IN REF A VO-PW FORWARDED BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND
REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCE/AUSTRALIAN
IMMIGRANT SOURCE. REF B QUERIED THE STATUS OF USDAO EFFORTS
IN REF C USDAO CANBERRA REQUESTED RETRANSMISSION OF REF A. REF D
RETRANSMITTED REF A. REF E REPORTED THAT DATA WAS
PURSUING LOCATION AND CLEARANCE REQUESTED IN REF A.

2. QUERY STATUS OF EFFORTS ON A PRIORITY BASIS REQUEST USDAO
INFORM US IF ANY ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT AN IMMEDIATE
RESOLUTION.

3. POC AT VO-PW IS COL NAME THIS MESSAGE HAS
BEEN COORDINATED WITH NAME OF AT-3 AND HQS DATA
BT

ACTION VO-PW(2)

INFO NMIC(1) VO(1) AT-3(1) DB-2(1) DB-2C(1)

(D,6,7,8,P)

DB-2C2(1) DIA(1)

+SAFE

MMW=06018/04825 TDR=06018/31082 TAD=06018/31002 CDSN=M1A10
181940Z JAN 86

1850

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT MESSAGE CENTER

ZYUW RUENGPAL104 3430339

ROUTINE
R 090539Z DEC 85
FM USDAO-SINGAPORE SN
TO DIA WASHDC//VO-PW//
SINGAPORE SN 14104

DAD 1657

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING VIETNAMESE
REFUGEE

REFS: A. VO-PW 211535Z NOV 85
B. FONECON PW NAME (REFCOORD)/COL NAME
(ANNA) 4 DEC 85

1. REF B ADVISED THAT REFCOORD HAD NO INFORMATION AND
THAT FLAG ACTION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AS REQUESTED IN
REF A.

2. POC IS COL NAME ANNA 538-0251 EXT
214/213 BT

1851

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT MESSAGE CENTER

ZYUW RUENGPAL104 3430339

ROUTINE
R 090539Z DEC 85
FM USDAO/USCINCPACREP CANBERRA AS
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/AT-5//
CANBERRA AS 12008

1860 DEC 85

SUBJ: POW/MIA INTERVIEW

REF: YOUR MSG 271435Z NOV 85

NAME REQUESTING LOCATION/
CLEARANCE REQUESTED IN REF MSG WILL ADVISE AIRA
SENDS BT

ACTION VO-PW(2) (U,P,6,7,F)
INFO CJCS(4) J3(8) MIDS(1) JA(9) J5(2) JSOA(1) SECDEF(1)
SECDEF(9) USDP(1) ASD:PA(1) USDP:DSAA(4) CAO(1)
NAIC(1) JSI-38(1) AT3(1) AT-3(2) AT-100(1) DE-2(1)
DB-2(1) DB-28(1) DB-2C(1) DB-2C2(1) DB-403(1)
DB-46(1) DB-503(1) DIA(1) DC-4A3(1) VO-PW(2)
VO-PW2(2)
+SAFE

MCM=85342/00417 TOR=85343/02282 TAD=85343/04502

CDSN=K1A311

PAGE 1 OF 1
090539Z DEC 85

ACTION VO-PW(2) (U,P,6,7,F)
INFO NAIC(1) AT-3(2) DB-2C(1) DIA(1)
+SAFE

MCM=85339/01680 TOR=85339/06182 TAD=85339/06182

CDSN=K1A311
PAGE 1 OF 1
090539Z DEC 85

ZYUW RUTLIA9866 138

JAKARTA 1966

1697

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING VIETNAMESE
REFUGEES

REF: MR MSG DTR 251555Z NOV 85 SAT

REFUGEE COORDINATOR IN SINGAPORE HAS FLAGGED THE NAMES OF REFUGEES LISTED IN REFTEL. THE COORDINATOR, MR. ALAN BARR HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDOONESIAN REFUGEE EFFORTS. REGARDS. BT

ACTION VO-PW(2) (U,6,7,F)
INFO CJCS (4) J3 (8) NIDS (1) J4 (9) J5 (2) JSOA (1) SECDEF (1)
SECDEF (9) USDP (11) ASD:PA (1) USDP:DEAA (4) CAD (1)
NMC (1) J51-SB (1) AT3 (1) AT-3 (2) AT-189 (1) DS-2 (1)
DS-2 (1) DS-2B (1) DS-2C (1) DS-2C2 (1) DS-AD3 (1)
DS-46 (1) DS-50 (1) DIA (1) SC-443 (1) VO-PW(12)
VO-PW2 (2)
+SAFE

HCN-00330/01630 TUR-00330/04002 TAB-00330/04572 CDEM-0124572
 PAGE 1 OF 1
 041011Z DEC 90

MF

SUBJECT: Coordination with AT

R/O AN

2 IN A CONVERSATION WITH NAME

ON VO-PW MSG 27435Z TO US DRO

CHUBARRA, A RETRANSMITTAL OF VO-PW

(DC-2)'s earlier request for res. Order.

in locating source, 140 71stad

The message and solicited Priority and
Format Numbers. In NAME Suggester.

THAT COORDINATION WAS SUFFICIENT, AND
INDICATED THAT COORDINATION BE EXPRESS,
STATED WAS OPTIONAL.

1854

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ZYUW RUEKJCS7240 5312350

PRIORITY

P 271400Z NOV 85

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//

TO USDAO CANBERRA AS

INFO JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/EA/VCL//

CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

USDO HONG KONG HK

-21.458/VO-PW

SUBJ: RETRANSMITTAL OF DC-2 MSG DTG 091522Z SEP 85

REF: USDAO USCINCPAC REP CANBERRA MSG DTG 340533Z NOV 85

1. PER REF. HEADWITH RETRANSMITTAL OF MSG

-21.060/DC-2

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING VIETNAMESE REFUGEE

SOURCE

REFS: A. DIA/DC-2 MSG 091511Z AUG 85 (NOTAL)

B. USDO HK MSG 040617Z SEP 85 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTED USDO HONG KONG PROVIDE CURRENT ADDRESS

FOR VIETNAMESE REFUGEE ~~SC~~ WHO IS SOURCE OF U.S. PW/MIA

RELATED INFORMATION. REF B INFORMED DIA THAT USMC OFFICE HONG KONG

REPORTED THAT ~~SC~~ DEPARTED FOR UNKNOWN ADDRESS IN AUSTRALIA IN

15 NOV 1984 AND LEFT NO CONTACT ADDRESS. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE

IN IDENTIFYING THE CURRENT ADDRESS (IN AUSTRALIA) OF THE REFUGEE

SOURCE ~~SC~~ FOR PURPOSES OF POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON PW/MIA

MATTERS.

2. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION REGARDING SOURCE ~~SC~~3. OTHER: ~~SC~~WIFE: ~~SC~~ 1. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER MEMBERS OF HISFAMILY HAVE LEFT VIETNAM. ~~SC~~ ARRIVED HONG KONG ON/ABOUT

10 OCTOBER 1982; DEPARTED FOR AUSTRALIA 15 NOVEMBER 1984.

3. ~~SC~~ WAS INTERVIEWED EXTENSIVELY AND POLYGRAPHED TWICE

IN HONG KONG CONCERNING PURPORTED SIGHTINGS OF U.S. PW IN HANDI IN

1978 AND 1982. DIA INVESTIGATED THE INFORMATION AND CONCLUDED HIS

STORY WAS FICTION; HOWEVER, THE CASE CONTINUES TO ATTRACT

CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER HIGH-LEVEL INTEREST. ANTICIPATING THAT

ANOTHER REINTERVIEW AND POSSIBLE POLYGRAPH EXAM MAY BECOME

NECESSARY, PLEASE ADVISE WHAT COORDINATION WOULD BE REQUIRED BY

AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES FOR DIA OR OTHER U.S. OFFICER TO CONDUCT

INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH IN AUSTRALIA; AND WHETHER USDAO CAN PROVIDE

A SUITABLE SITE. REQUEST YOU DO NOT INITIATE CONTACT WITH THE

SOURCE AT THIS TIME.

4. FOR USDAO CANBERRA: YOU MAY WISH TO SHARE THIS MSG WITH

NAME ~~SC~~5. POC AT DIA/DC-2 IS ~~SC~~

6. ORIGINAL MESSAGE AND RETRANSMITTAL COORDINATED WITH AT-3.

7. END OF RETRANSMITTED MSG.

BT

ACTION VO-PW(2)

INFO NMIC(1) VO(1) AT3(1) AT-3(2) DB-2(1) DB-2C(1)

DB-2C3(1) DIA(1)

+SAFE

MCM=09301/00100 TOR=09301/22002 TAD=09301/20032 CDSN=MIA029

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214000Z NOV 85

1855

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ZYUW RUEKJCS7240 5300533

IMMEDIATE

O 340533Z NOV 85

FM USDAO/USCINCPACREP CANBERRA AS

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// IMMEDIATE

CANBERRA AS 11690

SUBJ: REFUGEE INTERVIEW

REFS: A. YOUR MSG 091522Z SEP 85

B. YOUR MSG 151522Z OCT 85

WE HAVE NO FILE ON INDIVIDUAL IN REF A. PLEASE RETRANSMIT

MESSAGE. AAIRA SENDS BT

ACTION VO-PW(2)

INFO CJCS(A) J3(8) NIDS(1) J4(9) J5(2) JSOA(1) SECDEF(1)

SECDEF(9) USDP(1) ASD/PA(1) USDP/DSAA(A) NMIC(1)

RTS-ZD2(1) AT-100(1) DB-2C(1) DB-403(1) DIA(1)

VO-PW(2) VO-PW2(2)

+SAFE

MCM=09300/01101 TOR=09300/00012 TAD=09300/00042 CDSN=MIA029

PAGE 1 OF 1
200533Z NOV 85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT MILITARY CENTER[illegible]

ADMIN. ASSISTANT FOR RECEPTIONS
ASSISTANT FOR (P/WR)P/AL. CLERK AND (P/WR)P/AL. STAFF CHIEF

2011: REPORT FOR ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING VICTIMS BETWEEN
1. ASSISTANCE TO LOCATE SEVERAL VICTIMS BETWEEN
IDENTIFIED IN PAGE 2 (BOLD) AND MAY HAVE IMPORTANT
INFORMATION. USA DOES NOT KNOW ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS
AT BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CHARLOTTE.

1. FOR DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION, HIGHEST TWO COORDINATE WITH JACK
BETWEEN TO ESTABLISH A PLAN ACTION THAT WILL IDENTIFY THE SUBJECTS
BY THEY ENTER THE REFUGEE STREAM IN THE FUTURE, AND BEWARE OF
PROSECUTIONS ACCORDING TO DETERMINING IF ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS OF AN
IMMEDIATE RELATIVE HAS PASSED THROUGH OR IS STILL IN THE PROCESS.
REMARKS MADE, OPEN, FORTHRIGHTLY ANSWER - DATE IDENTIFIED AND STATE
HOW THAT CAN ASSIST US TO LOCATE THE INDIVIDUAL.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

2. NAMES: DATA

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS B.-J. WERE IDENTIFIED CIRCA 1980, EMPLOYERS AND RESIDENCES IN NORTH VIETNAM POSSIBLY Hanoi, AND MAY HAVE RELATIVES IN VIETNAMESE MILITARY OR GOVERNMENT.

NAMES

3. FOR SECURITY/PD/10011: REQUEST FOR OFFICER REVIEW AND REVISIONS AND FORWARD BY INDIVIDUAL UNDER ISSUE, ASSOCIATION WITH CURRENT VIOLATION, AND RELEVANT INDICATE A MILITANT WITH ISSUE.

4. VO-PH WISHES TO INTERVIEW THE INDIVIDUALS ON PAGE TWO AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. AS INFORMATION ON ADDRESSES, CONTACT POINTS OR RELATIVES OF THESE INDIVIDUALS IS DEVELOPED, REQUEST IT BE FORWARDED TO VO-PH FOR ACTION WITH INFO TO CIB JCS ON JUNE 1980

8. POC AT 10-PM. 23 AN

[illegible]

DDN-25329/04008 TOR-25329/21082 TAD-25329/21082 CDM-25329/21082

PAGE 1 OF 1
251422Z NOV 87

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date 25 Nov. '85

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)

Abstract

1. H

2 VO-PW

Rm. 2E230, The Pentagon

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	For Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

In reference to your request from Congressman Hendon, the following information is available on North Vietnamese general officer Phung The Tai:

Current position: Deputy Chief of the
General Staff

1979 -Commander, Forward
Command, Phnom Penh.

-Commander, Forward
Command. Phnom Penh.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

NAME _____

✓DB-2C3

Phone No. 373-2483

1041-102

• U.S.G.P.: 100-461-276/42

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.506

MEETING OF 14 NOVEMBER

REVIEW OF LY NAM DE STREET

QUESTIONS:

Ly Nam De Street Case

1. What are buildings behind publishing house?
2. Are sources reporting buildings behind publishing house? When were they there, what did they report?
3. What are buildings B 16, 18, 19, 20, C 2?
4. Is there any two story jail in the area of the compound?

ACTIONS:

3. Ly Nam De Street Case. Wants sworn statement from me and notarized to the effect that me did not tell Hendon that he was not relieved by Tuttle or anyone else because he was not to handle certain cases because of his attitude or because he had a predisposition to refuse sources. (This was in reaction to our response to question 1, previously posed regarding Ly Nam De Street Case. Hendon stated that he would talk to Tuttle concerning above that date.

5. Wants source of Ly Nam De Street information brought to U.S. (him). Wants DIA's response in writing.

6. Wants unclassified photos with overlays of Ly Nam De Street Case.

CASES:

TALKING POINTS RE CONGRESSMAN HENDON'S QUESTIONS:

The following questions are listed to questions recorded in referenced file:

1. Mr. Hendon has not been relieved from any case for any reason. His analytical skill and judgement has been recognized in two promotions since joining the DIA's PA/RIA office.
2. In the interview at Tab 1, Source 1542 said the "Ly Nam Linh Jail" was located behind the editorial office of the Army Arts and Letters building, which he said was located at 178 Ly Nam De Street. In the later interview at Tab 10, the source stated that People's Army Newspaper office was in the northwest corner of the compound, at 178 Ly Nam De. In fact the building referred to is at 23 Ly Nam De St. and contains offices of the People's Army Publishing House. Behind this building:
 - a. There is no two building jail behind the People's Army Publishing House.
 - b. (Unclassified photos of area).
 - c. There are several buildings behind the offices of the People's Army Publishing House. DIA believes the buildings are part of a collective housing area for military personnel.
3. The Source said the Caucasians were speaking conversationally in a language foreign to him. Inasmuch as he was familiar with Russian, and knew the language spoken not to be Russian, Source 1542 inductively concluded that the Caucasians were speaking English, and presumed them therefore to be Americans.
4. DIA is not aware of any photographs which reveal a sign which prohibits the taking of pictures on the east side of Ly Nam De St. Human sources have reported that they have seen signs that prohibit the taking of pictures of areas on the west side of Ly Nam De; it appears that these restrictions do not apply to the area Source 1542 reported on.

MT

6. The only bathing cistern observable of the area between Le Van Linh St. and the vantage points described by Source 1542 is the rectangular one located near the base of the two-story high water tower in the area behind the offices of the People's Army Publishing House.

7. a. DIA has identified several press reports concerning the PAVN generals related by Source 1542. (Note: see 11st).

b. DIA has not yet confirmed the precise address of each of these three generals.

c. NG Phung Thi Tai and LO Nguyen Ban are two of the PAVN general officers related by source 1542 that are being referred to in Tab C3.

d. DIA has not yet confirmed the precise address of the PAVN generals referred to by the source. It believes Phung Thi Tai lived elsewhere on Ly Nam De St., south of the address related by the source. It believes the one-armed Commandant of the Military Officer Academy 3 lived near Son Tay. We have not seen any newspaper articles that give the address of any of the generals named by Source 1542.

8. DIA has identified two sons of Phung Thi Tai. DIA has not yet identified sons, if any, of Nguyen Ban.

9. Note: In the introduction to the question a source comment is mislabeled as a "CIA statement". It is Source 1542 who asserts that people in the restricted area knew of the PIs and that knowledge of the PIs asserted to be here was not common knowledge throughout the city. This is from the source only, and only reported by CIA.

A description of the sources is as follows:

A former PAVN major who lived within three blocks of this site, and who provided comprehensive information about offices and persons who resided on Ly Nam De Street through 1979, said that he had not seen or heard of any U.S. PIs being held in this area or elsewhere in Vietnam after the PV exchanges in 1973.

A plastics factory worker who lived from 1954 to August 1963 within two blocks of the site where Source 1542 said he saw U.S. PIs. She was one of three sources who told interviewers that as children during the war they had peeked over the wall of 17 Ly Nam De (i.e.

the Plantation) to look at the U.S. PIs held there. The other two who lived within about four blocks of this site, explained that one popular pastime of children in this area is to play on the elevated railroad tracks that overlook the rear of the compounds along this block of Ly Nam De Street. In fact, these two sources noted that because children in this area do not have TV and other entertainment to occupy their time, if any foreign prisoners were being held in one of these compounds, it would quickly become a popular neighborhood activity to try to catch a glimpse of them. These sources also stated that he or she had not heard or heard of any U.S. PIs being held in this area or elsewhere in Vietnam after the PV exchanges in 1973.

A CIA source said that once or twice a month, from 1979 to late 1982, he visited a friend who lived in the apartment buildings from which Source 1542 said he had viewed American prisoners. This source also said he had not seen or heard of any U.S. PIs being held in this area or elsewhere in Vietnam after the PV exchanges in 1973.

A former PAVN captain, who visited these apartment buildings several times until March 1982, visited the home of a PAVN officer who, since about 1970, was the Vice Chairman of the Military Court. In other words, he visited the home of an officer whose office was likely to have been next door at 25 Ly Nam De St., i.e. the location where Source 1542 said he saw American prisoners. Like other sources this former PAVN captain was aware that U.S. PIs had been held at 17 Ly Nam De St. during the war, but he had not seen or heard of any U.S. PIs being held on this street or elsewhere in Vietnam after the PV exchanges in 1973.

c. As to the present location of the sources: Questions concerning those debriefed by the CIA should be addressed to the CIA legislative liaison. As for the names and locations of sources debriefed by DIA, we refer you to the policy stated in our 30 January 1985 letter to you.

10. There is no substantiation, human or technical, that such a jail exists. During early interview Source 1542 indicated that the two buildings behind the People's Army Publishing House formed the jail where he had seen the Caucasians. During a later interview he claimed that it was located inside the compound at 25 Ly Nam De. There is no corroboration of the existence of a jail at either of these locations.

11. The League of Families visited 17 Ly Nam De Street, i.e. the former Plantation compound. The CIA comment was based on Source 1542's comment that he had seen Caucasian prisoners at 17B and 17C Ly Nam De St. Later evaluation clarified that the locations which Source 1542 was referring to were south of Le Van Linh Street, and were in fact, 23 and 37 Ly Nam De St.

12. The comment cited in this question - posted assertions which had been made by Source 1542. In subsequent interviews Source 1542 recanted his assertion that all people have required to have escorts.

13. Other sources who visited the address cited by Source 1542 stated that passes or escorts were not needed.

14. None of the sources, including Source 1542, interviewed by DOD and DIA, have said they entered the compound at 25 Ly Nam De St., the location most recently cited by Source 1542 as the location where he saw Caucasian prisoners.

15. There is no cistern or water tower observable on *MT* of Hanoi PW Camp HND-57.

16. HND-57 was ruled out. Not only does it not have the features described by Source 1542, but it is at a location different from that described by him.

17. DIA has a copy of "Pilots in Pajamas."

18. The reports of interview filed in case file 1542 constitute the transcripts of interviews of Source 1542. Field interviews are customarily not tape recorded.

19. Polygraph questions are at Tab 30.

20. There is no 17C Ly Nam De St. Source 1542 said there was a 17C Ly Nam De St.

21. DIA has only Source 1542's word for the biographic information he gave.

22. During a meeting on 8 December 1984 at the Pentagon in which Congressman Hendon participated, DIA representatives reported the information cited. We have not yet confirmed the precise location of no. 53 Cua Dong Avenue.

23. Source 1542 raised the name of BG Chien. DIA has not yet confirmed any one-armed BG Chien. Chien is an alias sometimes used by General Vo Nguyen Giap; he has both arms.

24. (Note: see preliminary bio-sheet from DS-2C, based on information received from the CIA; CIA's Legislative Liaison office should be the point of contact for further information)

25. We have only Source 1542's word that he was accompanied by 6-7 friends.

26. No question posed.

(Second set of questions begins here)

27. To the best of DIA's knowledge the friends named by Source 1542 have not entered refugee channels.

28. Reference response in question 12. During an early interview Source 1542 said "all people have to have escorts." Other sources who visited the address from which Source 1542 said he made the sighting report that neither passes nor escorts were needed. Source was somewhat inconsistent in naming his escorts.

MT
29. JHML:MS wrote the message at Tab 19.

30. (Enclosures).

31. Some of the photos depicted in the serowes at Tab 26 are part of the briefing board which Congressman Hendon has had occasion to view several times. The remainder are presented here.

32. (Enclosures).

33. Uncompleted question.

34. Excised portions deal with another, unrelated source. (See original)

35. The reported buildings are the two story apartment buildings at 37 Ly Nam De Street, labelled B37 and B39 in the unclassified photo set.

36. DIA has not interviewed Mr. Xinh. The personal name is insufficient to identify him, and it is only hearsay that he has settled in Canada.

37. Excised portions deal with another, unrelated source. (originals available for Congressman's personal use.)

36. The questions and records of this polygraph exam should be available through the CIA Legislative Liaison Office.

37. No question.



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Record of questions on case no. 1542 which Congressman Hendon poses to DIA

RECORDING OFFICER: AN

1. In a meeting with Congressman Bill Hendon, Western North Carolina, in a committee meeting room 1330-1500 hours 11 October 1985, the following questions on case no. 1542 were posed. LTC Steve Lucas represented DI-3/Legislative Affairs and the R/O represented the DIA analysis element, VO-PW.

2. Questions:

1. (To LTC Lucas): Cong. Hendon, based on a personal anecdote related to him by AN, would like Mr. AN personnel record reviewed to see if there were any "attitude" problems precluding him from the analysis of certain cases. Details? (within the limits of the privacy act).

(Directed to R/O on behalf of the case):

1. - 2. a. Is there a two building jail behind the editorial office of the Army Arts and Letters building?
b. Cong. Hendon would like to see a picture.
c. Are there two buildings behind the Army Arts and Letters building? What is behind it?
2. - 3. Source says "they were speaking English". - Is that true or false i.e. does the source say that?
3. - 4. Do we have any pictures of (a sign which gives) "the prohibition against taking pictures", which the source says were posted, among the photos of this case?
4. - 5. Does *MS* show a basketball goal in the area?



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

5. - 6. Source says the cistern was round; DIA says the only cistern in the compound described by source is square. Where is/are the cistern(s)?
6. - 7. (Tab 53) "Although he knew the names, ranks and positions of three PAVN general officers, this information is available to anyone reading the Vietnamese press.
- a) Do we have any of these press reports of these men?
 - b) Do we know where these men live?
 - c) Is this (i.e. Are two of these men) NG Phung The Tai and LE Nguyen Don?
 - d) Where do these guys live? Are their addresses in the newspapers?
7. - 8. Does Tai have a son named Tam? Does Vice Chairman of the State Inspectorate Don have a son named Nguyen Nghia?
8. - 9. Source indicates that PAs are common knowledge among residents of the officers' housing, (those living) in the immediate area, and their friends.
(Delete comment labelled a) per Cong. Hendon)
- DIA Statement: Other persons who lived in the immediate area or who visited these apartment buildings provided information that disputes these claims by the source.
- CIA Statement: People living in the officers' residences within this restricted area knew about the prisoners; the incarceration of the Caucasian prisoners was not common knowledge throughout the city.
- Who are the sources who (DIA) says lived (in the immediate area): e.g. two PAVN officers and several civilians who live within a four block radius of the compound?



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

- a) Where did they live?
 - b) Where are they now?
9. - 10. Source says the jail was independent from and smaller than the five or six building prison located at Le Van Linh Street.
- a) Where is the small jail independent from the other prison?
10. - 11. (Tab 1) ("This copy") CIA HQS Comment: In September 1962 the National League of Families visited the site at which source saw the prisoners.
Is this statement, the HQS CIA comment, accurate (yes or no)?
11. - 12. (Para. 2, Line 5) "All people have to have escorts" (Para. 5, Line 13, three lines from end): HQS Comment: "Normally even the friends of the residents living in the officers' quarters require escorts."
- a) Did any of these people living in the neighborhood and the two PAVN officers require escorts?
 - b) Does DIA have anyone with access to the compound or the jail?
- Who are they?
12. - 13. (Bottom of Tab 2) Is there a cistern or water tower located located within the photograph of Hanoi PW Camp MWD-67 (Plantation Annex, Alcatraz, Plantation West)?
13. - 14. Was MWD-67 ruled out? Why? (i.e. as a possible location for U.S. PAs)
14. - 15. Does DIA have the film "Pilots in Pyjamas"? Does the US Government?
15. - 16. Cong. Hendon would like a transcript of the interview(s) of the source.

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16.-17. (In respect to 2nd JCRC interview): (Tab 6)
Where are the polygraph questions?

17.- 18. Is there a 17C Ly Nam De Street? Does the Source
say there is a 17C?

Congressman Hendon: "Flawless geographic description":
(Tab 10: description of compound): "Le Van Linh runs
along south wall of the Citadel."

18.-19.a) Is background information on the Source accurate?

- b) Is he telling the truth about his parents and wife?
- c) Is there anything in his background which he is lying
about?

19.- 20. Congressman Hendon: Why was I not told that the source
lived on Cua Dong?

Where is no. 53 Cua Dong Street in relation to the PW
Compound?

20.- 21. Is BG Chien one armed?

21.- 22. Congressman Hendon would like a biographic sheet on MG Tai,
with picture, and unclassified if possible.

22.- 23. (Tab 10): Source claims at least 6-7 friends accompanied
him. Is this accurate or inaccurate?

23.-24. (DIA note in margin): "He has described the area entered
through 21 Ly Nam De."
((R/O Note: no question was posed on this note.))
(Congressman Hendon wishes to go over Tab 10 again)

(End meeting)

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Continuation of questions which Congressman Hendon
poses to DIA on case 1542

RECORDING OFFICER: JN

A second meeting with Congressman Hendon took place from
1440 - 1630 hours 17 October 1985 in the District of Columbia
subcommittee meeting room. The three files of case 1542 and the
file of case 1940 were again offered for the Congressman's perusal.
He posed the following questions to DIA on 1542. LTC Lucas and
R/O were again present to assist.

24. (continuing Cong. Hendon's questions directed to 1542) The source
says he was accompanied by several friends, who are named, "none of whom
have entered refugee channels". Have any of these friends entered
refugee channels?

25. Source says there was no requirement for access passes that he was
aware of and he was never escorted except by friends. Is this statement
deemed accurate by DIA?

(Note: Cong. Hendon wishes to pause and return to tab 10 with his
photo; meanwhile Chuck Lewis, staff assistant to Cong. Hendon brought
the photo mosaic for the Cong. Cong. Hendon was called to vote and
returned at approximately 1530 hours)

26. What is the *MT* dated closest to the time of sighting, i.e.
1982.



HOUSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

(26. continued) Was this *MT* used for the analysis of the case in general?

27. (Considering the message at Tab 19, i.e. DIA/DI-E2// message 181612Z May 1983) Who authored this message, by name?

28. (Tab 24) Cong. Hendon would like to see the enclosures for

—the document at this tab, i.e. 72 enclosures: 24-10 x 12 prints
24-20 x 24 prints
12 overlays
12 vugraphs

29. Cong. Hendon would like to see the original pictures instead of the xeroxes for Tab 25.

30. Cong. Hendon would like to see the *MT* used for the 1982 sighting.

31. Does source ever say... (This question was not completed by Cong. Hendon).

32. (Tab 28 i.e. DIA/DC-2// 162326Z June 1983) What are the excised portions of this message? Cong. Hendon would like to see the originals.

33. (Tab 26 (sic i.e. Tab 28), Paragraph 10). "A comparison of source's sketch and description with *MT* indicate that the residential building that source claimed to have made his sighting from in the large building parallel to Ly Nam De Street."

Cong. Hendon wants to know which building this is.

34. Have we interviewed the ethnic Chinese, Mr. Xanhy who has resettled in Canada?

35. (Tab 29,30) Cong. Hendon would like to see the stricken parts. Cong. Hendon stated: "They probably didn't relate to file".



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36. Cong. Hendon would like the questions and the records of the first polygraph exam.

37. Note: Congressman Hendon has placed a personal mark on the action record for Volume 1, case 1642 between the third and fourth analyst note, and wishes to take up the file next at that point.

AMERICANS RECORDED IN CAPTIVITY

Staff compilation of names based on current and archival DIA and DOD records yielded 244 unique names of individuals, all of whom should have been listed in captivity by DIA at the end of Operation Homecoming after all returnees had been debriefed.

Explanation of the fate of the 244 is as follows:

- 111 Military died in captivity (57 remain recovered)
- 2 Military deserters died in captivity
- 16 Civilians died in captivity
- 15 Military confirmed by DIA as POWs as of February, 1973. DIA changed status of 14 of these MIA within 6 months of the end of Operation Homecoming; the last one was changed in 1976
- 20 Military missing. DIA changed status in February-May 1973 to died in captivity
- 21 Military personnel who may have died in captivity, precise fate unclear
- 51 Military personnel reported in captivity by returnees during Operation Homecoming
- 6 Military personnel reported captured alive through reliable intelligence
- 1 POW returned alive (Garwood)
- 1 Symbolic POW (Shelton)

244 TOTAL

War in Southeast Asia: Casualty Accounting Process

DATE	Category	DoD	Military	Civilians	DIA	TOTAL
22 Oct. 1965	No Data	Located	58	0	58	58
			46	0	46	46
			235	0	235	235
			430	0	430	430
7 Nov. 1967	No Data	Located	222	13	235	235
			222	13	235	235
			222	13	235	235
13/18 Nov. 1969	POW Missing	413	44	31	484	484
	Missing	533	44	31	608	608
	TOTAL	1336	44	31	1411	1411
27 Jan. 1973	POW MIA	581	44	31	656	656
	MIA	1220	44	31	1305	1305
	TOTAL	1781	44	31	1856	1856
1/7 Feb. 1975	POW MIA	37	35	13	85	85
	Missing	111	35	13	159	159
	TOTAL	148	35	13	197	197
2 Dec. 1990	"Missing"	2500	35	13	2548	2548
14 July 1993	POW/MIA	1172	35	13	1220	1220
14 Nov. 1991	Dead/HR	1101	35	13	1159	1159
	TOTAL	2273	35	13	2321	2321
TODAY	POW/MIA	1	35	13	49	49
	Dead/HR	2235	35	13	2283	2283
	TOTAL	2236	35	13	2321	2321

CUMULATIVE SOUTHEAST ASIAN WAR CASUALTIES:

JAN - JUNE 1973

DoD

DIA


DATE*	POW	MIA	MNH**	TOTAL	POW	MIA	TOTAL	POW	CIV	CIV	MIL & CIV
				MIL			MIL	POW	MIA		TOTAL
6 Jan					820	1303	1923	41	13		1977
20 Jan					822	1305	1927	41	13		1981
26 Jan					826	1309	1935	41	13		1979
27 Jan	591	1220	118	1929	826	1305	1932	41	13		1985
5 Feb					861	1280	1941	42	13		1998
22 Feb					907	1278	1785	34	13		1932
12 Mar					974	1271	1645	30	13		1688
2 Apr					98	1270	1368	17	17		1400
27 Apr					65	1253	1339	12	17		1386
4 May					75	1253	1328	12	17		1357
12 May					95	1232	1287	12	17		1316
31 Jun	97	1103	108	1278	49	1211	1280	12	18		1290

* Where two dates are listed for the same month entry, the first date refers to DoD data and the second date refers to DIA data.

MNH* = Missing Non-Hostile

NOTE: The only DoD data available is shown above. DoD data obtained from DoD Comptroller Weekly Southeast Asian Casualty Data Change Summaries (1973). DIA data obtained from DIA Weekly Casualty Data Summaries (1973). Data from 5 Feb. 1973 onward includes persons "died on enemy lists" within individual POW and MIA totals.

War in Southeast Asia: American Prisoners + Missing Military plus Civilian



CUMULATIVE SOUTHEAST ASIAN WAR CASUALTIES: 1973-1992

Part I: July 1973-1979

DoD

DIA

DATE*	POW	MIA	MINH**	TOTAL MIL	DIED/RT**	POW	MIA	TOTAL MIL	CV POW	CV MIA	MIL & CV TOTAL
1973											
67 Jul	67	1008	100	1263		49	1191	1240	13	17	1270
1974											
1974 Dec	58	1003	97	1158		38	1063	1101	14	17	1142
1975											
2627 Sep	37	843	78	960		35	925	960	12	13	965
1976											
1976 Sep	37	911	73	1021	1966	35	896	921	13	13	947
1977											
3019 Sep	36	751	69	856	1640	34	825	859	21	13	904
1978											
31 Dec	36	734	64	834	1664						
1979											
2 Jan						34	800	834	12	15	861
1979											
30 Sep	30	612	60	702	1768	34	730	773	10	15	798
1979											
9 Jan						21	822	863	10	15	878
18 Dec						12	817	869	16	15	894

* Where dates are listed for the same month entry, the first date refers to DoD data and the second date refers to DIA data.

** MINH = Missing Non-Hostile

*** In 1975 DoD began reporting information on military casualties not reported in previous. Estimated Asian Casualty Data Change Summary: NOTE: DoD data obtained from DoD Comprehensive Weekly Southeast Asian Casualty Data Change Summaries for the years 1973-1977. DIA data obtained from DIA Weekly Casualty Data Summaries for the years 1973-1979 and 1979.

CUMULATIVE SOUTHEASTERN ASIAN WAR CASUALTIES: 1961-1972

DoD

DIA

DATE*	POW	MISSING	TOTAL	POW	POSSIBLE POW	MIA	TOTAL MILITARY	CV POW	CV MIA	MIL & CV TOTAL
1965										
22 Oct				58	96	286	430	0	0	430
1966										
31 Dec				96	162	298	497	0	0	497
1967										
31 Jul				186	160	428	694	0	0	694
2 Sep				205	95	438	738	13	7	758
2 Sep				207	119	548	774	13	7	794
7 Nov				222	Category	596	816	13	7	836
1968										
NO DATA LOCATED FOR EITHER DoD OR DIA										
1969										
1969 Nov	413	928	1339	389	444	987	1279	21	18	1322
1970										
29 Apr/2 May			1399	476		1027	1503	31	21	1559
1971										
30 Mar	480	1145	1625	483		1061	1544	27	13	1614
1972										
11 Mar	489	1126	1615	619		1108	1625	26	12	1673
30 Dec				619		1204	1823	41	13	1877

* Where two dates are listed for the same month entry, the first date refers to DoD data and the second date refers to DIA data.

NOTE ON DATA: Data selected to provide a representative sample and, where possible, to provide a comparison between DoD's public, military and DIA's intelligence estimates. DoD data was based on casualty information provided by each service and releases, weapons, or military personnel only.

NOTE ON SOURCES: DoD data obtained from public testimony. DIA data obtained from DIA Weekly Casualty Data Summaries for the periods 1965-1967 and 1968-1972. DIA data is based on intelligence information and may not correlate with DoD's official casualty claims for prisoners and missing.

War in Southeast Asia: American Prisoners + Missing Military plus Civilian

DATE	POW/MIA TOTAL	COMMENT
22 Oct. 1965	430	ALL MILITARY 59 POW — 372 MIA
27 Jan. 1973	1986	PARIS PEACE ACCORDS Signed Start of Operation Homecoming 667 POW — 1319 MIA
1 June 1973	1290	OPERATION HOMECOMING CONCLUDED and Returnees Debriefed 61 POW — 1229 MIA
18 Dec. 1978	224	LOWEST TOTAL LOCATED 22 POW — 202 MIA
2 Dec. 1980	2500	"UNACCOUNTED FOR" Now includes those recorded Dead/Body not recovered
Today	2266	"UNACCOUNTED FOR" Still includes those recorded Dead/Body not recovered

CUMULATIVE SOUTHEAST ASIAN WAR CASUALTIES: JULY 1973 - MARCH 1992 PART II: 1980 - 1992

DATE	POW/MIA	DECEASED	TOTAL MIL	POW	MIA	TOTAL "UNACCOUNTED FOR" MIL CASUALTIES
12/2/80						2500
9/25/82						2497
7/14/83			2500 "MISSING"			
1985						2483
1/11/86						2411
11/14/91	1/1171	1101	2273			
March 1992	1	2235	2236			2266

Note: The above data is drawn from public testimony by Executive Branch officials and from official documents. This is the only relevant data received from DoD or any of its agencies for this period. In the early 1970s, the individual military services had made presumptive findings of death for all but one individual. The one POW listed in 1991 and 1992 represents Col. Charles E. Shannon, who has been carried symbolically since 1982.

Quotations reflect terms used by the Executive Branch.

DIA's use of the term "unaccounted for" includes prisoners, missing, and dead/body not recovered.